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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
 Written contract for the payment of money, by its form intended as substitute for money and intended to pass from hand
to hand to give the HDC the right to hold the same and collect the sum due.
 Instruments are negotiable when they conform to all the requirements prescribed by the NIL ( Act 2031, 03 February
1911).
 Although considered as medium for payment of obligations, negotiable instruments are not legal tender ( Sec. 60, New
Central Bank Act, R.A. 7653); Negotiable instruments shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been
encashed or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. ( Art. 1249, CC) BUT a CHECK which has
been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor of cash.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

The NIL applies only to instruments which conform with the requisites laid down by Sec1 of the law. Should any of said
requisites be absent, the instrument would not be negotiable and would therefore not be governed by the NIL but by the general
law on contracts.

MICHAEL A. OSMEÑA VS. CITIBANK, ET AL. (2004), CALLEJO, SR., J.: The Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted
for the purpose of facilitating, not hindering or hampering transactions in commercial paper. Thus, the said statute should not
be tampered with haphazardly or lightly. Nor should it be brushed aside in order to meet the necessities in a single case.

NEGOTIABLE v. NON-NEGOTIABLE
Negotiable Non-negotiable
Contains all the requisites of Sec. 1 of the NIL Does not contain all the requisites of Sec. 1 of the NIL

Transferred by negotiation Transferred by assignment

HDC may have better rights than transferor Transferee acquires rights only of his transferor

Prior parties warrant payment Prior parties merely warrant legality of title

Transferee has right of recourse against intermediate Transferee has no right of recourse
parties

THE LIFE OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT:

1. issue
2. negotiation
3. presentment for acceptance in certain bills
4. acceptance
5. dishonor by or acceptance
6. presentment for payment
7. dishonor by nonpayment
8. notice of dishonor
9. protest in certain cases
10. discharge

A. Kinds of Negotiable Instruments

1. Promissory note - a promise to pay money
 unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker
 engaging to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer
 where a note is drawn to the maker’s own order, not complete until indorsed by him (Sec. 184, NIL).
2. Bill of exchange - an order made by one person to another to pay money to a third person.
 unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another signed by the person giving it
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 requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum
certain in money to order or to bearer (Sec. 126, NIL).
 Check: bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand.
Promissory Note Bill of Exchange
Unconditional promise Unconditional order

Involves 2 parties Involves 3 parties

Maker primarily liable Drawer only secondarily liable

Only 1 presentment - for payment Generally 2 presentments - for acceptance and for payment

B.Parties

 As regards promissory note:

1. Promissor/maker
2. Payee - person to whom the promise to pay is made.
 As regards bill of exchange:
1. Drawer - person who gives the order to pay.
2. Drawee - addressee of the order.
3. Payee - person to whom the payment is to be made.
 Indorser - the payee of an instrument who transfers it to another by signing it at the back thereof
 Indorsee - person to whom the indorser negotiates the instrument, who, by such negotiation, becomes the holderof
the instrument.


1. Must be in Writing and Signed by the Maker
 No person liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon.
 One who signs in a trade or assumed name liable to same extent as if he had signed in his own name. ( Sec. 18,
NIL)
 Signature of party may be made by duly authorized agent; no particular form of appointment necessary. ( Sec. 19,
NIL)
 "In writing" - includes print; written or typed
 Signature, binding so long it is intended or adopted as the signature of the signer or made with his authority.

2. Must contain an Unconditional Order or Promise to Pay

 Mere acknowledgment of a debt not a promise - should be an express promise on face of instrument to pay
money.
 An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with: (Sec. 3, NIL):
1. An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account to be debited
with the amount; or
2. A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument.
 an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional.
 Word "promise" is not absolutely necessary. Any expression equivalent to a promise is sufficient.
 As regards bills of exchange, words which are equivalent to an order are sufficient.
o Order - command or imperative direction; the instrument, by its nature, demanding a right.
o A mere request or authority to pay does not constitute an order.
o Although the mere use of polite words like "please" does not of itself deprive the instrument of its characteristics
as an order, its language must clearly indicate a demand upon the drawee to pay.
 But The promise or order to pay, to be unconditional, must be unqualified.
 Mere indication of the particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, or an indication of a particular account
to be debited with the amount will not render the order conditional.
 Neither does the recital of the transaction for which the instrument was issued make the promise or order conditional.
 The fact that the condition appearing on the instrument has been fulfilled will not convert it into a negotiable one.

METROPOLITAN BANK VS. CA. The treasury warrants in question are not NIs. They are payable
from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. An order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is NOT
unconditional.
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POWELL & POWELL V. GREENLEAF & CURRIER (1932).An instrument to be negotiable must contain, among other
things, an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money. An unqualified order or promise to pay
is unconditional within the meaning of the statute, though coupled with a statement of the transaction which gives rise to
the instrument.
Whether these instruments were negotiable must be determined from the language of the instruments themselves,
unaided by an inspection of the extrinsic agreements to which they refer.

It is the general rule that whenever a bill of exchange or promissory note contains a reference to some extrinsic
contract in such a way as to make it subject to the terms of that contract, as distinguished from a reference importing
merely that the extrinsic agreement was the origin of the transaction, or constitutes the consideration of the bill or note,
the negotiability of the paper is destroyed.

But it is equally well-settled that the negotiability of a bill or note is not affected by a reference which is simply a:

1. recital of the consideration for which the paper is given;

2. statement of the origin of the transaction; or
3. statement that is given in accordance with the terms of a contract of even date between the same parties .
In short, to destroy negotiability, the reference to a collateral contract must show that the obligation is burdened
with the conditions of that contract.

IRVING TRUST CO. V. LEFF (1930). A check has no valid inception until delivery. Delivery is the transfer of
possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another. Where the negotiable instrument is in the hands of a
holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. Where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
But as regards non-negotiable instruments, said rule does not apply. For instance, a thief has no title and can give
none.

An allegation of theft puts in issue the delivery of the check.

3. Sum Payable must be Certain

 The sum payable is a sum certain, even if (Sec. 2, NIL):
1. With interest;
2. By stated installments;
3. By stated installments with acceleration clause;
4. With exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the current rate; or
5. With costs of collection or attorney's fee.
 A stipulation to pay a higher rate of interest if the note is not paid or a lower rate if it is paid on or before maturity
does not render the instrument non-negotiable.
 A sum is certain if from the face of the instrument it can be mathematically computed.

4. Must be Payable in Money

 Capable of being transformed into money.
 instrument which contains an order or promise to do an act in addition to the payment of money - NOT negotiable.
 BUT If the order or promise gives the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money,
an instrument otherwise negotiable would not be affected thereby. (Sec. 5, NIL)
 But if the option is with the maker or person primarily liable, instrument is NOT negotiable.

INCITTI V. FERRANTE (1933). The negotiable character of an instrument is not affected by the fact that it designates a
particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made.
Money is purely a legal institution; it is impossible without law. Money is what the law or custom makes receivable for payments
of taxes and debts. It has value only by law and not by nature.

An instrument payable in the money of any country is negotiable for in this case the sum of money is fixed by the par exchange
on the known denomination of the currency with reference to the par.

Where a note is made payable in a country in the money or coins of another country, which money or coins have a value fixed
by the law or under the authority of the law of the country where the note is payable, and which value can by a simple
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mathematical computation be expressed in the value of the lawful money of the latter country, such a note by the law merchant
and under the NIL is negotiable.

5. Time of Payment must be Certain

 Purpose: Informing the holder of the instrument of the date when he may enforce payment thereof.
 An instrument may be payable:
1. on demand (Sec. 7. NIL)
a. Expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight, or on presentation;
b. No time for payment is expressed;
c. Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing,
accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand.
Demand instruments: Holder may call for payment any time; maker has an option to pay at any time, and the
refusal of the holder to accept payment will terminate the running of interest, if any, but the obligation to pay the
note remains.

2. at a fixed time
o Only on the stipulated date, and not before, may the holder demand its payment.
o Should he fail to demand payment, the instrument becomes overdue but remains valid and negotiable. It is
merely converted to a demand instrument.
3. at a determinable future time
o Determinable future time, if expressed to be payable (Sec. 4, NIL):
a. At a fixed period after date of sight;
b. On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified therein;
c. On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event which is certain to happen, though the
time of happening be uncertain.
o If payable upon a contingency, bot negotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect.

REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP. V. CA. If an instrument provides for the time when payment is to be
made on or before a fixed or determinable future time (ex: on or before 25 December 2000), makers or debtors
are entitled to make a complete settlement of the obligation at any time before said date.

4. Effect of acceleration provisions

o If option (absolute or conditional) to accelerate maturity is on the maker, still NEGOTIABLE.
 Maker may pay earlier than the date fixed but this option, if exercised, would be a payment in advance
of a legal liability to pay. It is still payable on the date fixed, and holder has no right to enforce
payment against the maker before such date.
o If option to accelerate is on the holder:
 If option can be exercised only after the happening of a specified event/act over which he has no control
(conditional), still NEGOTIABLE.
 If option is unconditional, time of payment is rendered uncertain, NOT negotiable.
o Other instances where instrument still NEGOTIABLE:
 When option given to the holder to accelerate the maturity of an installment note upon failure of the
maker to pay any installment when due.
 Acceleration, automatic upon default.
 Acceleration by operation of law.

UTAHSTATE NAT'L BANK V. SMITH (1919). In this case, the instrument provides that "if interest is not paid when
due, then both principal and interest shall become due at the option of the holder of the note."
The Court rules that the said provision did not convert the instrument into a non-negotiable one; it did not destroy the
negotiability of the instrument.

A note is negotiable if payable at a determinable future time. A matter is determinable that may be accurately found
out, settled, or determined.

A future determinable time could be one determinable at some time in the future, as well as one determinable at
present, or in advance.

An instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is payable at a determinable future time, the exact date of
payment being ascertainable at the date of the presentation, but not before.
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A note payable on or before a fixed date is payable at a determinable future time. If the instrument expressly states
that it is payable on or before a fixed date, it is payable at the date in question or, at the option of the payor,
at any earlier date selected by him for payment.

PUGET SOUND STATE BANK V. WASHINGTON PAVING CO. (1917). In this case, the instrument contains the
following provision: "This note shall become due and payable on demand at the option of the payee when it seems
itself insecure."
The Court noted that said provision gave the payee an unrestricted power to declare the note due at any time before
maturity, and that the right to exercise such power possessed by the payee is not dependent upon nor does it grow
out of any act, promise, or agreement of the payor/maker. In other words, it is a contingency over which the maker
has no control. As such, the note was declared not negotiable.

Said provision has made the question of the time of payment of the note absolutely dependent upon the will and
election of the payee.

HENRY V. MADISON (1933). In this case, the note provides: "Failure to pay any installment as the same becomes
due shall render the entire obligation then due and payable."
The Court ruled that upon default, the whole note became immediately due absolutely. This is not a case whereby it
became payable at the option of the holder.

5. Provisions extending time of payment

o General rule: Negotiability not affected. Effect is similar with that of an acceleration clause at the option of
the maker.
 Negotiability not affected, even if the holder is given the option to extend time of payment by mere
inaction or indulgence for an indefinite time depending on his will, because with or without this
provision, the holder may always choose to be indulgent.
o Exception: Where a note with a fixed maturity provides that the maker has the option to extend time of
payment until the happening of contingency, instrument NOT negotiable. The time for payment may never
come at all.

STATE BANK OF HALSTAD V. BILSTAD (1912). A note made payable at a fixed time, or at an earlier fixed time
at the option of the maker, would be negotiable, because there could be no just distinction drawn between such a case
and one where the instrument was to be paid on or before.
A note that is payable at a determinable future time, or that is payable on or before a fixed period after the occurrence
of a specified event which is certain to happen, is negotiable.

 Flexibility in fixing the time of payment, provided only that there shall certainly come a time when the note
is, by its terms, due.
 This rule recognizes the right of the parties to an instrument to contract for their mutual benefit; if the contract
made is certainly to be performed at some definite time in the future, its negotiability is not destroyed.
A determinable future time (as used in the foregoing points) is a time that can be determined after the execution
of the note.

SECURITY NAT'L BANK, SIOUX CITY V. GUNDERSON (1927). In this case, the note provides that the makers
of the note waive notice as regards extension of time of payment. The Court ruled that said provision did not render
the note non-negotiable. Said provision did not alter the date of maturity.

6. Must be Payable to Order or to Bearer/ Must contain Words of Negotiability

 words of negotiability - serve as an expression of consent that the instrument may be transferred.
o But the instrument need not follow the language of the law; any term which clearly indicates an intention
to conform with the legal requirements is sufficient.

WETTLAUFER V. BAXTER (1910). Without words of negotiability, purchasers take the bill or note subject to all defenses
which were available between the original parties; and if it was originally non-negotiable, as against the original parties, it
will not be rendered negotiable by subsequent transfer in negotiable form.
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CALTEX VS. CA. The Certificates of Time Deposits (CTDs) are NIs. The documents provide that the amounts deposited
shall be repayable to the depositor. And who, according to the document, is the depositor? It is the "bearer." The documents
do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts deposited are repayable specifically to him; The
negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the face of the instrument itself. The duty of the court
in such case is to ascertain, not what the parties may have secretly intended but what is the meaning of the words they
have used.

 Postal money order, not negotiable, because it does not contain words of negotiability.
 Where words "or bearer" printed on a check are cancelled by the drawer, instrument not negotiable.
 Bearer instrument may be negotiated by mere delivery.
o When instrument is payable to bearer (Sec. 9, NIL):
1. Expressed to be so payable - ex: "I promise to pay the bearer the sum…."
2. Payable to a person named therein or bearer – ex. "Pay to A or bearer."
3. Payable to the order of a fictitious person or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable - ex: "Pay to John Doe or order."
4. Name of payee does not purport to be the name of any person - ex: "Pay to cash;" "Pay to sundries."
5. Only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.

ANG TEK LIAN V. CA (1950). A check drawn payable to the order of cash is a check payable to bearer, and the bank
may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement.
A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder. Where the check is in the ordinary form and is payable
to bearer, so that no indorsement is required, a bank, to which it is presented for payment, need not have the holder
identified, and is not negligent in failing to do so.

 Order Instrument, negotiation requires delivery and indorsement of the transferor.

o When instrument is payable to order
1. Drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order (Sec. 8, NIL).
2. Without the words "to order" or "to the order of," the instrument is payable only to the person designated
therein and is therefore non-negotiable.

7. Parties must be designated with Certainty

1. Maker and drawer
 Sign the instrument at the lower right-hand corner.
2. Payee
 When negotiating, sign at the back; same with indorsers.
3. Drawee
 Name usually at the lower left-hand corner, or across the top.
 If instrument addressed to drawee, he must be namedor indicated with reasonable certainty.

8. Provisions not Affecting Negotiability, (Sec. 5, NIL):

1. Authorizes sale of collateral securities;
2. Authorizes confession of judgment if instrument not paid at maturity;
3. Waives the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor; or
4. Gives holder election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money. (if in addition to money – not NI)
 Negotiability affected, when instrument contains a promise or order to do any act in addition to the payment
of money.

PNB V. MANILA OIL REFINING (1922). In this case, the note contains a provision that in case that it would not be paid at
maturity, the "maker authorizes any attorney to appear and confess judgment thereon."
The Court ruled that said judgment note is illegal and inoperative as such is against public policy. It noted that it is in derogation
of the constitutional safeguards (a day in court). Such judgment note can only be valid if given express legislative sanction.

In common law, two kinds of judgment by confession:

 Judgment by cognovit actionem

 Confession relicta verificatione
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9. Omissions not Affecting Negotiability, (Sec. 6, NIL):

1. Non-dating of the instrument
2. Non-specification of value given, or that any value had been given
3. Non-specification of place where it is drawn or place where it is payable
4. Bears a seal
5. Designation of particular kind of currency in which payment is to be made

10. Rules of Construction, (Sec.17,NIL):

1. Sum expressed in words takes precedence over sum in numbers; BUT where words are so ambiguous or uncertain,
reference to the figures should be made
2. Where interest is stipulated, without specification of the starting date, the interest runs from the date of the instrument,
and if undated, from the issue thereof
3. An undated instrument is considered dated as of time issued.
4. Written provisions prevail over printed provisions
5. Where the instrument is ambiguous as to whether it is a note or a bill, the holder may treat it as either at his election
6. When the capacity of signatory is not clear, he is to be deemed an indorser
7. “I promise to pay” when signed by two or more persons is deemed to be jointly and severally signed

CONTINENTAL ILINOIS BANK V. CLEMENT. Where an instrument containing the words "I promise to
pay" is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.
If an instrument worded in the singular is executed by several, the obligation is joint and several one.

II. TRANSFER

1. Delivery and Issuance

 Delivery means transfer of possession of instrument by the maker or drawer, with intent to transfer title to the
payee and recognize him as holder thereof. (de la Victoria v. Burgos)
 NI incomplete and revocable until delivery for the purpose of giving effect thereto as between (Sec. 16, NIL):
a. immediate parties
b. a remote party other than holder in due course
 delivery, to be effectual, must be made by or under the authority of the party making/drawing/accepting/indorsing
 delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring
the property in the instrument
 PRESUMPTION OF DELIVERY
o Where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved
o if it is in the hands of a HDC, the presumption is conclusive
o Camposes: Should an undelivered instrument come into the hands of a holder in due course, the maker is liable
to him regardless of any proof of the lack of valid delivery.
 PRESUMPTION AS TO DATE
o Date is not an essential element of negotiability
o An undated instrument is considered to be dated as of the time it was issued

IN RE MARTEN’S CASE. The decedent had executed a promissory note in favor of his daughter, but he never delivered the
same to her. After his death, an envelope containing the note was discovered in his safe. HELD: There could be NO delivery, as
contemplated by the NIL. It was immaterial whether or not the decedent really wanted to pay his daughter, and in fact intended
the note to be the payment. Without delivery, the contract on the note was incomplete and revocable.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL VS.SIMA WEI. Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the
drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be
intended to give effect to the instrument.
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2. Negotiation
 When an instrument is transferred from one person to another as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof.
 If payable to BEARER, negotiated by delivery; if payable to ORDER, negotiated by indorsement of holder + delivery
(Sec.30, NIL)

SESBREÑO VS. CA, A NI may, instead of being negotiated, ALSO be assigned or transferred. A non-NI may not be negotiated;
but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the
instrument.

INDORSEMENT
 The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or on a paper attached thereto (allonge). The signature of
the indorser, without additional words, is sufficient indorsement. (Sec.31, NIL)

CLARK V. THOMPSON, ET AL. (1915). A mortgage was held not to be an allonge because:

1. it was not fastened to the note and

2. there was room in the instrument for further indorsements

YOUNG V.HEMBREE (1937). In this case, the payee of the

check being Horn and Faulkner Oil Trust, the indorsement which
reads : Horn and Faulkner by L.H. Horn is prima facie insufficient on
its face, the indorsement is NOT that of the payee. Without a
showing that the two are one and the same form or legal entity, the
indorsement cannot be considered a negotiation.
 Indorser generally enters into two contracts (Implied contracts by Indorser):
1. sale or assignment of instrument
2. to pay instrument in case of default of maker
 Indorsement must be of entire instrument (can’t be indorsement of only part of amount payable, nor can it be to two
or more indorsees severally. But okay to indorse residue of partially paid instrument) ( Sec. 32, NIL)

BLAKE V. WEIDEN (1943). The promissory notes on which Charles Weiden based his counterclaim was indorsed as
follows : “pay to the order of Charles R. Weiden and Frank J. Weiden, share alike as tenants in common.” HELD: 1. The
court held that such indorsement did NOT operate as a negotiation of the instrument, as per Sec. 32 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law: An indorsement…which purports to transfer the instrument to two or more indorsees severally,
does NOT operate as a negotiation of the instrument.

2. However, though indeed there was no negotiation of the instrument, it does not necessarily mean that the Weiden
brothers have no rights under the instrument (and purported indorsement) at all. The court held that the
irregularindorsement coul be treated as an ORDINARY ASSIGNMENT.

RULE: When there has been a purported indorsement of the whole instrument,in separate parts to two or more transferees,
the purported indorsees take LEGAL TITLE to their SEVERAL SHARES and may sue provided all the other indorses are
brought in as parties.

Applied in the CAB, Charles therefore has legal title to one third of the value of the PNs, and, as he did bring in the two
other indorsee (Hermann and Frank) as parties to the action, he may use such one third as basis for his counterclaim.
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 KINDS OF INDORSEMENTS (Sec. 33, NIL)

1. as to manner of future method of negotiation(Sec. 35, NIL):
a. special – specifies the person to whom/to whose order the instrument is to be payable; indorsement of such
indorsee is necessary to further negotiation.
b. Blank – specifies no indorsee, instrument so indorsed is payable to bearer, and may be negotiated by delivery
o the holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the signature of
the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement

2. as to kind of title transferred:

a. restrictive – such indorsement either:
i. prohibits further negotiation of instrument,
ii. constitutes indorsee as agent of indorser, or
iii. vests title in indorsee in trust for another
o rights of indorsee in restrictive ind.:
i. receive payment of inst.
ii. Bring any action thereon that indorser could bring
iii. Transfer his rights as such indorsee, but all subsequent indorsees acquire only title of first indorsee
under restrictive indorsement

WHITE V. NATIONAL BANK (1880). Payee indorsed:

“Pay White for account of Miner’s Bank”. HELD: White does
not have personal right to the payment. He is a mere agent
of the bank yo collect money. Indorsement means that the
acceptor of the draft is to pay White (indorsee) for the use of
Miner’s Bank (indorser).

b. non-restrictive
3. as to kind of liability assumed by indorser
a. qualified-constitutes indorser as mere assignor of title (eg. “without recourse”) (Sec. 38, NIL)
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FAY V. WITTE (1933). Witte, the payee in the promissory note

executed by Witte Inc. had indorsed the note to Fay in the following
manner: I hereby assign all my right and interest in this note to
Richard Fay, in full. Was Witte an unqualified or qualified indorser?
HELD: Witte was an UNQUALIFIED INDORSER. It must be
emphasized that liability as an indorser attaches automatically to him
who signs at the back of the instrument, at the moment of signing.
The placing of one’s name on the note constitutes one as an indorser.,
without need of express terms setting forth such relation. It is when
he wishes to negate his liability that words are imperative. As per the
NIL, such words as: without recourse or words of similar import should
be used.
An indorser is presumed to be an unqualified indorser. For him to be a qualified indorser, he must indorse “without recourse”
or words of similar import.

Indorser’s liability cannot be limited (qualified) by implication. Words expressing assignment of title to the instrument cannot by
implication exclude his second contract (i.e., to be liable in case primary party does not pay).

COPELAND V. BURKE (1916). “I transfer my right, title and

interest in the same”. HELD: To limit the indorser’s personal liability,
an endorser must indorse with words clearly expressing such intent.

HUTSON V. RANKIN (1922).1. In case this note is collected by an

attorney, either with or without suit, the makers agree to pay a
reasonable attorney’s fee’.
No effect on negotiability because amount payable is certain up to the time of maturity.

2. Interest will increase from 8% to 10% if instrument is not paid when due.

Plus : acceleration clause at payee’s option to declare the whole amount due in case of default.

No effect on negotiability. Sec 1 still met.

3. Notation at the back of the note: “For value received, we hereby guarantee the within not including interest and costs at
maturity or any time thereafter demanded”.

RULE : An indorsement written on the back of the note in the form of a guaranty of the payment thereof, and signed by the
payee, passes title to the paper the same as on an indorsement in blank.

In this case then, the notation operates as a transfer of the note, and as an indorsement thereo with enlarged liability.

b. unqualified
4. as to presence/absence of express limitations put by indorser upon primary obligor’s privileges of paying the holder

a. conditional – additional condition annexed to indorser’s liability. (Sec. 39, NIL)
o Where an indorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may disregard the condition,
and make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether condition has been fulfilled or not
o Any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated will hold the same/proceeds subject to
rights of person indorsing conditionally
b. unconditional
5. other classifications:

a. Absolute – One by which the endorser binds himself to pay, upon no other condition than the failure of prior
parties to do so, and of due notice to him of such failure
b. Joint - Where instrument payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees not partners, all must
indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to endorse for the others (Sec. 41, NIL)
c. Irregular - Where a person, not otherwise a party to the instrument, places thereon his signature in blank
before delivery, he is liable as indorser

 Other rules on indorsement

1. Indorsement by Collecting Bank - holder deposits check with a bank other than the drawee, would in effect
be negotiating the check to such bank, since he would have to indorse the check before the bank will accept it for
deposit. In most cases, the bank is acting as a mere collecting agent.

LEONARDI V. CHASE NATIONAL BANK (1942). Leonardi

endorsed a check to Bank of Biscayne (“for deposit”). BBB mailed
it to Chase National bank OF NY (its NY correspondent) to collect
from drawee bank of Manhattan Trust Co. The amount was
collected. Chase Manhattan now wants to claim set-off vis-à-vis
the amount collected and a larger amount owed by BBB to them.
If the amount collected, upon collection, still belonged to Leonardi
as indorser of the check, then Chase Manhattan is guilty o
conversion because it cannot claim set-off against Leonardi who
did not owe them anything. On the other hand, if the money
because it had been collected, now belongs to BBB, Chase
Manhattan can rightly claim set-off and would therefore not be
guilty of conversion. HELD: Upon the collection of the money,
the agency relatuionship etween the Leonardi and the BBB by
virtue of the restrictive indorsement on the check was
extinguished. A new relationship then arose, that of debtor (BBB)
and ceditor (Leonardi). Such is the relation between bank and
depositor. Thus, BBB was then, as debto, the owner of the
proceeds and Chase Manhattan rightly claimed set-off against it.

2. Negotiation by Joint or Alternative Payees or Indorsees - all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has
authority to endorse for the others
3. Unindorsed instruments - Where holder of instrument transfers for value without indorsing, transfer vests in
transferee:
a. such title as transferor had therein, subject to defenses and equities available to prior parties
o ex: transferee can sue the transferor, though he does not thereby automatically become a HDC ( Furbee
v. Furbee, 1936)
b. right to have indorsement of transferor, after which, he becomes a holder or possibly a HDC
o For purposes of determining whether or not the transferee becomes a HDC after securing the transferor’s
indorsement, note that Sec. 52 must be met at the time of the negotiation, i.e., when indorsement is
actually made.

SIMPSON V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROSEBURG (1919). 1. When an unendorsed negotiable

instrument is transferred, the transferee acquires the legal title to the instrument, and in addition the right to have
the indorsement of the transferor. The purpose of this is to preserve the negotiability of the instrument.

2. The transferee is entitled to an UNQUALIFIED IBNDORSEMENT. This is the type of indorsement most used in
the commercial world and the one generally expected by the transferee unless the parties have agreed to the
contrary. The burden of proof is upon the party who alleges that the transferee is entitled only to a qualified
indorsement.

The court is careful to note though that it does NOT follow that the law requires an unqualified indorsement in
every case. The trans feree will be granted the kind of indorsement to whichhe is entitled, according to the
circumstances of the particular case.

Transferee may compel transferor (Bank of Roseburg) to indorse the instrument and this implies an UNQUALIFIED
indorsement.

WHISTLER V. FORSTER (1863).Griffiths gave the check to

Whistler for value but did not indorse it : Whistler at the time
ghe received the check, had no notice of the fraudulent
manner in which Griffiths obtained it from the defendant
Forster. But before Whistler obtained the indorsement of
Griffiths, he had notice of such fraud. HELD: Before
Griffithindorse the check, Whistler had the same rights as if
ordinary chattel had passed to him by an equitable assignment.
He had all the rights which Griffiths could convey to him.
However, Griffiths, being guilty of fraud, could not pass any
right by merely handing the instrument to another. Thus,
before the instrument was indorsed to him, he has not title as
transferee of the bill.
RULE: The transfer/delivery of a negotiable instrument passes to the transferee all the rights which the transferor
could convey to him. If in addition to the delivery, the instrument is also indorsed, the transferee acquires GOOD
AND CLEAN TITLE regardless of his predecessor’s title, PROVIDED he (transferee) acquires the instrument for
value and without notice of fraud. NOTE : The indorsement subsequently obtained by W from G had no curative
 
effect because when it was obtained, W (holder) already knew of the defect in title and of the dishonor. Remember
Sec.52 must be met at the time of actual indorsement.

o NOTE : In BOTH Whistler and Simpson, the indorsement obtained subsequently has no curative effect because
when it was made, holders already knew of the defect in title and of the dishonor. Sec. 52 must be met at
the time of the negotiation, i.e., when indorsement is actually made.

4. Cancellation of Indorsements - Holder may strike out indorsements not necessary to his title. The endorser
whose endorsement was struck out, and all endorsers subsequent to him, are relieved from liability on the
instrument (Sec. 48, NIL)
5. Indorsement by Agent - agent should make it plain that he is signing in behalf of a principal otherwise he may
be made personally liable
6. Presumption as to Indorsement
o Time (Sec.45, NIL) - Every negotiation deemed prima facie effected before instrument was overdue, except
where indorsement bears date after maturity of the instrument.
o Place (Sec.46, NIL) - Every indorsement is presumed prima facie made at place where instrument is dated
o Where instrument drawn or indorsed to person as cashier (Sec.42, NIL) - deemed prima facie to be payable
to the bank or corporation of which he is such officer; may be negotiated by either the indorsement (1) of the
bank or corporation or (2) of the officer.
7. Continuation of Negotiable Character - An NI, although overdue, retains its negotiability unless it has been
paid or restrictively indorsed to prevent further negotiation ( Sec. 47, NIL)
8. Indorsement of bearer inst.
o Where an instrument payable to bearer is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery
o Person indorsing specially liable as indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement

III. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

HOLDER (Sec. 191, NIL) - Payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.
RIGHTS OF HOLDER (Sec. 51, NIL)
1. sue thereon in his own name
2. payment to him in due course discharges instrument

A. REQUISITES to become a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE(Sec.52, NIL) – HDC is one who has taken the instrument under
the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face
 When is an instrument complete? If an instrument contains all the requisites for making it a negotiable one , it
should be considered as complete even if it may have blanks as to non-essentials .
 When is an instrument INcomplete? When it is wanting in any material particular or particular proper to be inserted
in a NI without w/c the same will not be complete.
 What are material particulars? A change in the ff. is considered a material alteration (Sec. 125, NIL):
a. The date;
b. The sum payable, either for principal or interest;
c. The time or place of payment:
d. The number or the relations of the parties;
e. The medium or currency in which payment is to be made;
f. Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified,
IN GENERAL: any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect
 What are the rights of a HDC of an instrument that has been materially altered? enforce payment thereof according
to its original tenor IF not a party to the alteration. (Sec. 124, NIL)

MILES CITY BANK v. ASKIN (1947). It will not be presumed that any alteration was made prior to delivery, and
with assent of the maker. The ancient rule of alterations and erasures or written instruments were presumed to have
been made at or prior to the time of their execution. The trend of authority is still in favor of the rule as thus declared.
However when an alteration or erasure appears suspicious on its face, it demands explanation. In the presence of
this, or equally cogent circumstances of a suspicious nature, the law presumes nothing, and the question as to the

time when the person by whom, or the interests for which, the alteration was made are matters of fact to be found by
the jury upon proof adduced by the party offering the instrument in evidence.
Should the jury find that the instrument had been materially altered after its execution and delivery, but nevertheless
the plaintiff was a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, then the plaintiff should be allowed recovery
according to its original tenor.
Should the jury find that the alteration was so obvious as to impart notice thereof to plaintiff, it might well conclude
that plaintiff’s action amounted to bad faith toward the defendant; certainly in such event, it must conclude that cashing
the check amounted, at the least, to gross negligence.
Judgment reversed; remaded for new trial.

BRONSON v. STETSON (1930). Under Section 16, if defendant is a HDC, the note is good in her hands, although
it was not filled by Mears strictly in accordance with the authority given by the plaintiffs to him. If defendant is not a
HDC, then, as plaintiffs became parties before completion, the note may not for reasons stated be endorsed against
them.
In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a
party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given within a
reasonable time.
Defendant not HDC. The note (and mortgage) in her hands is open to the plaintiff’s equities which must prevail.

2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, without notice of any previous dishonor
 Therefore the ff. cannot be HDCs: (Sec. 53, NIL)
o A holder who became such after the date of maturity of the instrument (instrument is overdue);
NOTE: An overdue instrument is still negotiable, but it is subject to the defense existing at the time of the
transfer.
o In case of demand instruments, a holder who negotiates it after an unreasonable length of time after its issue
 An instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ANTE-DATED OR POST-DATED provided not done for an
illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto
as of the date of delivery. (Sec.12, NIL)

BLISS v. CALIFORNIA COOP. PRODUCERS, A transferee of a note is a HDC as to the installments to mature in the
future when the transfer is made after one or more but not all of the installments are due on its face, unless the past
due installments have not in fact been paid and he had notice of that fact.

BARBOUR v. FINKE, The mere fact that interest due is unpaid, the principal not being due, does not render the note
dishonored. Therefore, even if plaintiff had notice of such non-payment, it would not prevent him from becoming a
HDC.

LE DUE v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF KASSON (1883). The general rule is that a bill must be presented for
payment within a reasonable time, having in view ordinary business usages, and the purposes which paper of that
class is intended to subserve. OVERDUE  a right of action against drawer or indorser; OR a bill which has come into
the hands of an indorser so long after its issue as to charge him with notice of its dishonor, and thus subject it in his
hands to the defenses which the drawer had against it in the hands of the assignor. In the CAB, it may be said to be
overdue, although it has never been in fact presented to the drawee for payment. The draft in the CAB was, without
any explanation of the reason, found outstanding nearly 5 months after its date.

IDAHO STATE BANK v. HOOPER SUGAR CO., The instrument takes a new lease of life with respect to an indorser
after maturity, and his equitable defenses are not let in until a reasonable time after he indorses, although the paper
is apparently overdue.

DUNN v. O’KEEFE (1816). The drawer who issued his bill into the world, without procuring its acceptance, is not
without some degree of blame. Upon the whole, it appears that no authority has pronounced that a bill of exchange
shall be void security, in the hands of an innocent indorsee, who has knowledge that the bill has ever been dishonored,
because a former holder has omitted to give notice to the drawer that the drawee has refused acceptence.

 Effect of Postdating or Antedating

TRIPHONOFF v. SWEENEY (1913). However we may designate the instrument in suit, there can be no question
but that it complies with all the necessary requirements of the law as to a negotiable instrument. It is full and complete
upon its face. The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated, provided this is not
done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires title thereto
as of the date of delivery.

Independent of any statutory regulation, it makes no difference whether a check be postdated or antedated, it is still
payable according to its express terms.

3. That he took it in good faith AND for value

a. HOLDER FOR VALUE - (a) Where value has at any time been given for the instrument, the holder is deemed a
HFV in respect to all parties who become such prior to that time ( Sec.26, NIL) and (b) Where the holder has a
lien on the instrument, he is deemed a HFV to the extent of his lien (Sec.27, NIL).
 PRESUMPTION – Every NI is deemed prima facie issued for valuable consideration; and every person whose
sig appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value (Sec. 24, NIL)
 VALUE - any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt
constitutes value, whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time. (Sec.25, NIL)

ELGIN NATIONAL BANK v. GOECKE, ET.AL. (1920).The cancellation and surrender of notes evidencing
indebtedness is sufficient consideration. An indorsee of a negotiable note who has taken it, before its maturity,
as a collateral security for a pre-existing debt and without any express agreement, is also deemed a holder for a
valuable consideration.

BAYANI VS.PEOPLE (2004).The petitioner cannot escape criminal liability by denying that he received the
amount of P55,000.00 from Rubia after he issued the check to her. The evidence on record shows that Evangelista
rediscounted the check and gave P55,000.00 to Rubia after the latter endorsed the same. As such, Evangelista is
a holder of the check in due course. Under Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), absence or failure
of consideration is a matter of defense only as against any person not a holder in due course.
Moreover, Section 24 of the NIL provides the presumption of consideration. Such presumption cannot be overcome
by the petitioner’s bare denial of receipt of the amount of P55,000.00 from Rubia.

 Bank credit as value - When the holder of a check deposits it with his bank (assuming it is not the drawee
bank) and the bank credits it to his account, is the bank at this stage a HFV?
o Majority View  first money in is presumed to be the first money paid out
o Minority View  as long as the balance in the depositor’s account equals or exceeds the amount of the
instrument deposited, the latter cannot be considered as withdrawn for the purpose of treating the bank
as a HFV.
o (So far, there has been no decision by the SC on this issue.)

MERCHANTS’ NATIONAL BANK OF ST. PAUL v. STA. MARIA SUGAR CO. (1914) WON by discounting
the note and by the subsequent transactions on the account it can be considered that value passed therefor.
HELD: The mere discounting of the note and placing the amount of said discount to the credit of the HFV
would not then have constituted a transfer for value. But if the sum had subsequently been checked out,
then value would have passed.

The general rule as to the application of payments, there being no special facts to interfere, is that the first
payments apply to the oldest debts.

The first debits are to be charged against the first credits. It follows therefore, upon the facts as found, that
the bank was a bona fide HFV without notice, and, in accordance with the stipulation, judgment should be
entered for the plaintiff upon the note.

Judgment reversed.

NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE v. MORGAN (1921).National Hay Co. [H] deposited draft on WM Cosby
Flour & Grain Co. [W] with the National Bank of Commerce [C]. Account of [H] credited with the full amount
of the deposit. Draft forwarded by [C] to the First National Bank [F] for collection and remittance to [C].
Draft paid by drawee to [F]. Prior to remittance to [C].Attachment proceedings by Morgan [M] against [H].
Garnishment directed to [F]. [C] propounded its claim to said fund. Circuit court judgment for [M]. HELD:
Evidence failed to show that [C] was a bona fide purchaser for value. [C] credited the amount of the draft to
the deposit account of the drawer, [H], and did not become a bona fide purchaser of the same as against
[M], a creditor of [H], unless it showed that the amount so credited was absorbed by existing debts or

subsequently checked out, but affirmatively shows the contrary, by establishing a balance on deposit to the
credit of [H], in excess of the amount of the draft, continuously from the negotiation for same to the service
of the garnishment.

Judgment affirmed.

 What constitutes a holder for value

Illustration I Illustration II
A maker A maker
 w/o consideration  w/o consideration
B indorses B negotiates
 w/o consideration  for value
C indorses C negotiates
  by way of gift
D gives value to C; D holder for D HFV vs. A & B, but not vs. C
value as regards A, B and C

b. HOLDER IN GOOD FAITH

 BAD FAITH - does not require actual knowledge of the exact fraud that was practiced; knowledge that there
was something wrong about the assignor’s acquisition of title is sufficient. The burden is upon the defendant
to show that notwithstanding the SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, it acquired the check in actual good faith.
(De Ocampo & Co. v. Gatchalian)

UNAKA NATIONAL BANK v. BUTLER. To constitute notice of an infirmity in an instrument, or defect of the
title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of
the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.
The purchaser of a negotiable instrument owes no duty to the former holders to actively inquire into the title of
the party in possession, and that circumstances of suspicion and gross negligence are not of themselves bad faith,
but only evidence tending to establish it.

VICENTE R. DE OCAMPO & CO. v. GATCHALIAN, ET. AL. (1961). In order to show that the defendant had
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith, it is not necessary to prove
that the defendant knew the exact fraud that was practiced upon the plaintiff by the defendant’s assignor, it being
sufficient to show that the defendant had notice that there was something wrong about the assignor’s acquisition
of title, although he did not have notice of the particular wrong that was committed.
Under the circumstances of the CAB, instead of the presumption that payee was a holder in good faith, the fact is
that it acquired possession of the instrument under circumstances that should have put it to inquiry as to the title
of the holder who negotiated the check to it. The burden was, therefore, placed upon it to show that
notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances, it acquired the check in actual good faith.
One line of cases had adopted the test of the reasonably prudent man and the other that of actual good faith. It
would seem that it was the intent of the Negotiable Instruments Act to harmonize this disagreement by adopting
the latter test. Negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or suspicious circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man
on inquiry, will not of themselves prevent a recovery, but are to be considered merely as evidence bearing on the
question of bad faith.
Defendants absolved from the complaint.

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET. AL. (1989). A check with 2
parallel lines in the upper left hand corner means that it could only be deposited and may not be converted to
cash. Consequently, such circumstance should put the payee on inquiry and upon him devolves the duty to
ascertain the holders’ title to the check or the nature of his possession. Failing in this respect, the payee is declared
guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal absence of good faith and as such the consensus of authority is to
the effect that the holder of the check is not a holder in good faith.
Effects of crossing a check: the check may be negotiated only once – to one who has an account with a bank;
and the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite
purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise he is not a HDC.
The NIL does not provide that a holder who is not a HDC may not in any case recover from [W] if the latter has
no valid excuse for refusing payment. The only disadvantage of a holder who is not in due course is that the
negotiable instrument is subject to defenses as if it were non-negotiable.

YANG VS.CA (2003). The Negotiable Instruments Law is silent with respect to crossed checks, although the
Code of Commerce (Art 541) makes reference to such instruments. Nonetheless, this Court has taken judicial

cognizance of the practice that a check with two parallel lines in the upper left hand corner means that it could
only be deposited and not converted into cash. The effects of crossing a check, thus, relates to the mode of
payment, meaning that the drawer had intended the check for deposit only by the rightful person, i.e., the payee
named therein. In Bataan Cigar, the rediscounting of the check by the payee knowingly violated the avowed
intention of crossing the check. Thus, in accepting the cross checks and paying cash for them, despite the warning
of the crossing, the subsequent holder could not be considered in good faith and thus, not a holder in due course.
Our ruling in Bataan Cigar reiterates that in De Ocampo & Co. v. Gatchalian.
The factual circumstances in De Ocampo and in Bataan Cigar are not present in this case. For here, there is no
dispute that the crossed checks were delivered and duly deposited by David, the payee named therein, in his bank
account. In other words, the purpose behind the crossing of the checks was satisfied by the payee.

 A FINANCING COMPANY that is the indorsee of a note issued by a buyer payable to the seller of goods is
NOT a holder in good faith as to the buyer. In case the goods sold turn out to be defective, it cannot recover
the purchase price of the goods from the buyer. (Consolidated Plywood v. IFC)
o In installment sales, the buyer usually issues a note payable to the seller to cover the purchase price.
o Many times, pursuant to a previous arrangement with the seller, a finance company pays the full price of
the property sold and the note is indorsed to it by the seller, subrogating it to the right to collect the price
from the buyer.
o RULE  In such cases, the tendency of the courts is to protect the buyer against the finance company
in the event that the goods sold turn out to be defective. The finance company will be subject to the
defense of failure of consideration and cannot recover the purchase price from the buyer. NOTE:
Consolidated Plywood v. IFC  rule applied; Salas v. CA  rule not applied

SALAS v. CA (1990). in this case, words of negotiablility was found in the PN as well as the other requirements
for negotiablility. The PN was negotiated by indorsement. Therefore, the indorsee was a HDC, having taken the
instrument under the following conditions: (1) it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) it became the holder
thereof before it was overdue; (3) it took the same in good faith and for value; and (4) when it was negotiated to
the indorsee, the latter had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the previous
indorser.

COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORP v. ORANGECOUNTYMACHINE WORKS (1950). There is no good reason

why the concurrent execution of a note and a conditional sales contract should deprive an otherwise negotiable
instrument of the characteristics which give it commercial value. That factor alone should not defeat negotiability.
Nor in the absence of fraudulent misrepresentation is there reason to hold that the physical attachment of a note
and a conditional sales contract at the time of execution renders the note non-negotiable where the contract
clearly shows the facts in regard to it.
When a finance company actively participates in a transaction of this type from its inception, counselling and aiding
the future vendee-payee, it cannot be regarded as a HDC of the note given in the transaction and the defense of
failure of consideration may be properly be maintained.

 Purchase of an instrument at a DISCOUNT does not, of itself, constitue bad faith. However, if the instrument
is pruchased at a heavy discount, this fact together with other facts, mey be taken into account in deciding
the issue of purchase in good faith. (Ham v. Meritt)
 Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating the same before he has paid the full amount agrees to be paid therefor, he will be deemed a
holder in due course only to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by him. (Sec. 54, NIL)

PENNOYER v. DUBOIS BANK (1926). Dubois acquired the notes wo notice of any fraud. He issued certificates
of deposit in exchang for the notes. He later discovers the infirmity. HELD: Where the holder has given for the
negotiable paper his promise which he must perform, as for instance, when he has incurred liability to a third
person, it is quite clear that he is in the same position, and is entitled to the same protection as one who paid for
the paper in money/property at the time of the transfer.
Plaintiff was a HDC.

 Constructive notice not sufficient; Just as a purchaser of a negotiable instrument is not put on inquiry, neither
is he charged with notice of defenses or equities disclosed by public records, nor is he affected by the doctrine
of lis pendens. However, notice to an agent is chargeable against the principal.

FOSTER v. AGUSTANNA COLLEGE (1932). Where a mortgage is given to secure a negotiable PN, the note
imparts its negotiable character to the mortgage, and both are brought within the purview of the statutes dealing
with commercial paper, and that the mortgage is a mere incident to the note, and an indorsement of the note
 
automatically assigns the mortgage, and the attempted assignment of the mortgage without a transfer of the debt
it secures is a nullity.
The doctrine of constructive notice is applicable only to aperson who is dealing with the land itself, and since the
purchaser of a negotiable PN, secured by a mortgage, is not dealing in land, there is no field for operation of the
registry laws in cases of this kind. The doctrine of constructive notice has never been applied to commercial paper;
the true test as to negotiable paper being that of good or bad faith.
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the
person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.

4. That at time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of:

a. any infirmity in instrument
b. any defect in title of person negotiating; title DEFECTIVE when (Sec. 55, NIL):
i. instrument/signature obtained by fraud, duress, force or fear or other unlawful means OR for an illegal
consideration; or
ii. instrument is negotiated in breach of faith, or fraudulent circumstances
 NOTICE of infirmity or defect - actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect OR knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith (Sec.56, NIL)
 What are the rights of a transferee who receives NOTICE of any infirmity or defect BEFORE he has PAID THE
FULL amount for the instrument? He will be deemed a HDC only to the extent of the amount therefore paid by
him (Sec.54, NIL)
 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (ex. notice of defenses disclosed by public records, doctrine of lis pendens) is not
sufficient to charge a purchaser of a NI with notice. However, notice to an AGENT is chargeable against the
principal.
 Notice of an ACCOMODATION PARTY is not notice of a defect. Thus, an accomodation party (one who has
signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or endorser, without receiveing value therefor, and for the
purpose of lending his name to some other person) is liable on the instrument, notwithstanding the fact that the
holder knew him to be an accomodation party.

B. EFFECT OF QUALIFIED, CONDITIONAL AND RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENTS

 The status of a holder as a HDC is not affected by his taking under a qualified indorsement.
 A conditional indorsement does not deprive the conditional indorsee or subsequent holder of the rights of a HDC. If
he fulfills all the requisites in Sec. 52 then he is immune from all the personal defense.
 A restrictive indorsement which prohibits further negotiation will not prevent the indorsee from being a HDC. BUT,
if he further indorses the instrument, then the subsequent indorsee will not be a due course holder.

C. PAYEE AS HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

HOWARD NATIONAL BANK v. WILSON. A payee is capable of being a HDC. The payee named in a note may be so
separated from the consideration thereof as to have the rights of a purchaser for value; on the other hand a transferee may be
so associated with the transaction as not to be within the intended protection of the NIL.

D. WHO IS DEEMED HDC (BURDEN OF PROOF)(Sec.59, NIL)

 General Rule: Prima facie presumption in favor of holder
 Exception: Burden is reversed (burden on holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired
title as HDC) when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated instrument was defective
 Exception to exception: There will be no reversal if the party being made liable became bound prior to the acquisition
of such defective title (i.e., where defense is not his own) – presumption in favor of holder

E. RIGHTS OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

1. to sue on the instrument in his own name (Sec. 51, NIL)
2. to receive payment on the instrument – discharges the instrument (Sec. 51, NIL)
3. holds instrument free of any defect of title of prior parties (Sec. 57, NIL)
4. free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves (Sec.57, NIL)
5. may enforce payment of instrument for full amount, against all parties liable (Sec.57, NIL)

BPI v. ALFRED BERWIN & CO. Only a HDC may enforce payment on the PN. In CAB, it is not clear whether A (the payee) is
still the HDC since D (the maker) believed that A may have negotiated it. Thus, to compel D to pay would expose him to pay a
second time to the HDC (in case A was no longer one).

F. RIGHTS OF PURCHASER FROM HOLDER IN DUE COURSE(Sec.58, NIL)

 
 General Rule: In the hands of any holder other than a HDC, NI is subject to same defenses as if it were non-
negotiable.
 Exception: A holder who derives title through a HDC and who is NOT himself A PARTY TO ANY FRAUD or illegality
has all rights of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to the latter EVEN though he himself does not satisfy
Sec.52

PIERCE v. CARLTON. The principle that one who acquires title from a HDC may recover, though he himself may not have
had notice of the infirmty when he acquired the instrument from such holder, was recognized before the enactment of the NIL.
But this rule is subject to the single exception that, if the note were invalid as between the maker and the payee, the payee
could not himself, by purchase from a bona fide holder, become successor to his rights, it not being essential to such bona fide
holder’s protection to extend the principle so far.
Affirmed.

LILL v. GLEASON (1914). The general rule is that payment by a party other than the principal debtor does not discharge
parties prior to the one making the payment, and the payment, instead of extinguishing the instrument, operates as a transfer
of it to the party paying.
The contract of an indorser for the accomodation of the payee is wholly independent of that of the maker, and such indorser,
upon making payment, succeeds to the title and rights of the holder as against the maker.
Having derived title from the bank, which was a HDC, and not having been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the
instrument, the transferee became possessed of all the rights of the bank against the maker.
When a negotiable instrument once passes into the hands of a holder by indorsement in due course, the maker’s right to
interpose defenses good against the payee is cut off as to all subsequent holders not parties to fraud or illegality affecting the
instrument.

FOSSUM v. FERNANDEZ (1923). If the original payee of a note, unenforceable for lack of consideration repurchases the
instrument after transferring it to a HDC, the paper again becomes subject in the payee’s hands to the same defenses to which
it would have been subject if the paper had never passed through the hands of a HDC.

G. PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF DUE COURSE HOLDING, Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is
on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course. But the
last mentioned rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such
defective title. (Sec.59., NIL)

ASIA BANKING CORP. v. TAN SEN GUAN (1923). If it be a fact, as the evidence tends to show, that the plaintiff is not a
bona fide holder of the draft, and that it was held for collection only, it follows that the defendants would have a right to make
any defense to the draft which they would have a right to make against the maker.
The trial court found and the evidence sustains the finding that the acceptance of the draft by the defendants was conditional,
and that oral evidence was admissible to explain the terms and conditions of the acceptance. That would specially be true
where the plaintiff held the draft for collection. It also found, in legal effect, that the plaintiff released and discharged the
defendants from any liability upon the draft, and the evidence sustains the finding.

VAN SYCKEL v. EGG HARBOR COAL AND LUMBER CO. (1932). The CAB is barren of any proof of the genuineness of
the signature of the payee, which was an essential part of the plaintiff’s case. At common law, one who sues upon a written
contract is obliged, in the absence of admission, to prove the signature of the defendant before the instrument can be received
in evidence.
The presumption in favor of due course holding should be viewed in relation to other pertinent provisions of the negotiable
instruments law. The rule is: the holder is deemed a HDC, only upon his presentation of proof of the genuineness of the maker’s
and the payee’s signatures. What is the reason for such a prerequisite? In the absence of such proof, there would be nothing
to indicate that the instruments had in fact been negotiated, or that the person possessed of the physical paper had title thereto,
or the proceeds thereof.

BEACON TRUST CO. v. RYDER (1931). It is wrong to say that when testimony warranting a finding that the note was
negotiated in breach of faith by the payee has been introduced, the burden of proof is then upon the plaintiff to show that he
is a HDC. Defective title in the payee is not “shown” by the introduction of “testimony warranting” such a finding unless the
testimony is believed so that the fact is proved. The burden of establishing that the payee’s title was defectivewas on the
defendant. If they failed to sustain this burden, no burden rested upon the plaintiff to support his prima facie case that he was
a HDC.
It is likewise error to say that if it was “understood” that once the note was not paid at mayurity, the account of the payee will
be charged and the plaintiff would not be a HDC. A right in the plaintiff to charge the account of the payee was not necessarily
inconsistent with the plaintiff’s being a holder in due course.
 
FARMERS’ STATE BANK v. KOFFLER (1930). The fraudulent putting in circulation of a negotiable instrument which
operates to change the burden of proof and call upon the plaintiff to prove his title as a bona fide holder, is where this is done
fraudulently as to the defendant or maker, and not where it is so done as to the payee or some intermediate holder or party to
the paper.
Sec. 59 (“Every holder is deemed prima facie to be HDC xxx”) considered as a whole, does not have the effect of shifting to the
plaintiff the burden of proving that he is a HDC of the note on which he sues merely by a showing on the part of the defendant
that the title to the instrument was defective as against some intermediate indorsee.
It follows then that in the instant case the presumption that the plaintiff had received the instrument in due course operated in
his favor and was sufficient to make his case and entitle him to a recovery, unless the stipulated facts had the effect of
affirmatively establishing notice of the defect in the title or lack of good faith.

H. TRANSFEREE OF UNINDORSED INSTRUMENT

COMMERCIAL BANK OF LAFAYETTE TRUST CO. v. BARRY (1934). A transferee of a note payable to order cannot obtain
legal title thereto, except by indorsement of the payee; a holder without such indorsement takes it subject to all the equities
vested in prior parties.
In the CAB, since the note was acquired by the Commercial Bank of La Fayette unindorsed, no title on indorsement is vested in
the former.

IV. DEFENSES & EQUITIES

1. DEFENSES IN GENERAL
1. REAL defense – attaches to instrument on the principle that there was no contract at all; available against ALL holders
including holders in due course. They are those which attach to the instrument itself and generally, disclose an absence
of one of the essential elements of a contract.
2. PERSONAL defense – grows out of the agreement or conduct of a particular person in regard to the instrument which
renders it inequitable FOR HIM, though holding the legal title, to enforce it against the party sought to be made liable;
not available against a HDC. can be raised only against holders not on due course. Here, the true contract appears ,
but for some reason , the defendant is excused from the obligation to perform.
 Equities or claims of ownership are of 2 kinds:
1. Legal – one who has legal title to the instrument may recover possession thereof even from holder in due course
2. Equitable – may only recover from a holder not in due course

2. SPECIFIC DEFENSES
1. REAL DEFENSES
a. INCAPACITY: REAL defense but available only to the incapacitated party (ex. minor or corporation); the
indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corp. or by an infant passes the property therein,
notwithstanding that from want of capacity, the corp. or infant may incur no liability thereon. ( Sec.22, NIL)

MURRAY v THOMPSON (1916).In stipulating in Section 22 of the NIL that the indorsement of the instrument by
the infant “passes the property therein” , it was meant to provide that the contract of indorsement is not void , and
that his indorsee has the right to enforce payment from all parties prior to the INFANT indorser .

The incapacity of the minor cannot be availed by prior parties.

The said section was not intended to provide that the indorsee shall become the owner of the instrument by title
indefeasible as against the infant, or to make the act of indorsement an irrevocable one.

b. INCOMPLETE, UNDELIVERED INSTRUMENT

 Instrument will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of ANY
holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery. ( Sec. 15, NIL)
 Who may be estopped from raising the real defense under Sec 15? A drawee bank whose negligent
custody of the checks, after partial execution, contributed to its escape

PAVILIS v FARMER’S UNION. Maker claims that he signed an instrument in blank which was stolen by his
bookkeeper and clerk prior to its delivery. The thief , without maker’s knowledge or express consent, inserted the
date, amount and payee. The said check was transferred to a holder by the payee named thereon. Holder wants to

recover from maker. HELD: The check was an incomplete instrument when stolen and cannot be enforced in the
absence of conduct on the part of the drawer creating an estoppel.
While there can be no question that the provisions of the NIL do not prevent an inquiry into the question of the
negligent custody of the incomplete instrument , and that if as a result of such negligence the instrument came to be
in the hands of a holder in due course , the holder may recover, YET based on the circumstances in the present case
,the maker is not negligent.
The loss did not result from the completion and negotiation of the check by one entrusted with its possession .

WEINER v PENNSYLVANIA CO. (1947). The drawer signed her name on a check. Except for her signature
nothing was written on it. The check was stolen and completed by filling in the amount, the date and the name of the
payee. This fictitious payee indorsed it. Drawer sued drawee bank. HELD: As between two innocent parties , the bank
and the depositor, liability should be borne by one who made the loss possible. This is estoppel in pais.
In the instant case , the depositor-drawer signed the check in blank , thus putting it in the power of an unauthorized
person to fill it in and present it for payment. The depositor’s act made the loss possible and enabled the thief to
commit the fraud.
CAMPOS: The court seems to hold here that the mere signing of check in blank is negligence itself. Is this inconsistent
with the Pavilis case.Note ,however, that Pavilis was between a holder and make, the Weiner is between drawer and
drawee.

LINICK v A.J. NUTTING (1910). Drawer signed his name to a blank check. Thereafter ,it was stolen and thieves
filled in the name of payee , the amount and then presented it to the drawee bank for certification. Thieves then
indorsed it to the holder who took it for value. HELD: The delivery of an instrument by the drawer/maker is necessary
to a valid inception of the contract. The possession of the note /bill by the payee or indorsee is prima facie proof of
delivery; but if it appears that the note has never been actually delivered and that without any confidence , or
negligence , or fault of the maker , but by force or by fraud , it was put into circulation , there can be no recovery upon
it , even when in the hands of an innocent holder

2. PERSONAL DEFENSES
a. COMPLETE, UNDELIVERED INSTRUMENT
 CONCLUSIVE presumption of a valid delivery – where the instrument is in the hands of a HDC
 PRIMA FACIE presumption of a valid delivery – where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party
whose sig appears thereon (Sec. 16, NIL)

COHN v CITY OF TAUNTON (1939). Bearer bonds which were uncancelled and were without any notation upon
them had been stolen. A holder in due course , to whom they were negotiated, demands from the maker. HELD:
Maker is liable to holder in due course.
A valid delivery is conclusively presumed in favor of a holder in due course.
An instrument that has once been issued, returned, discharged and then stolen would stand no differently in the hands
of the holder in due course than an instrument that has been prepared and stolen before being issued.

SMITH v DOTTERWEICH (1911). Renewal notes executed by the maker were not paid at maturity. The payee
now claims for recovery. Payee claims that the original note ,which were renewed by the ones in dispute , was for the
payment of premium for life insurance policies taken by the maker. The maker alleged an oral agreement to the effect
that the notes and the policies would not become valid and enforceable obligations , unless the payee (an insurance
agent) would secure for the maker a loan of money. This was never made. HELD: The oral agreement plainly imports
a condition which was to be performed before the transaction and the delivery of the policies and the receipts are to
be regarded as consummated and binding. In this case , there is a failure of the precise condition which must determine
the existence or non-existence of any contract between the maker and the payee.

b. INCOMPLETE, DELIVERED (Sec.14, NIL)

 This is a personal defense only because provision states that if any instrument so completed is negotiated to
a holder in due course , it is valid and effectual for all purposes.
 2 Kinds of Writings:
i. Where instrument is wanting in any material particular: person in possession has prima facie authority
to complete it by filing up blanks therein
ii. Signature on blank paper delivered by person making the signature IN ORDER that the paper may be
CONVERTED into a NI  operates as prima facie authority to fill up as such for any amount
 The authority to fill up is limited by the following:
i. When completed, it may be enforced upon the parties thereto only if it was filled strictly in accordance with
the authority given
ii. The filling up must be within a reasonable time

NOTE: If the signature on a paper is given only for autograph purposes and the same is converted into a NI, this
will amount to forgery, constituting thus a valid defense even against a HDC
 This provision contemplates delivered instruments , so the person in possession cannot be a thief or a finder
but a person in lawful possession- one to whom the instrument has been delivered.
 In order that any such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against any person who became a party
thereto prior to its completion:
i. must be filled up strictly in accordance w/ AUTHORITY given
ii. within a REASONABLE TIME – in determining what is reasonable time, regard is to be had to the (1) nature
of the instrument, (2) usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to such instruments, and 3) the facts
of the particular case
 BUT if negotiated to HDC, may enforce it as if it had been filled up properly
 What details may be filled up?
i. Amount, as to a signed blank paper
ii. Date (Sec 13 “… The insertion of a wrong date does not void the instrument in the hands of a subsequent
holder in due course…”)
iii. Place of payment
iv. Name of payee

SIMPSON v NATIONAL BANK OF ROSEBURG (1919).The note was executed with the name of the payee
left blank. The note was still in that condition when the holder received it. HELD: When the maker of the note
leaves the name of payee blank and delivered the instrument to another person for value , then the person to
whom the note was delivered or any subsequent holder could insert his own name or that of a transferee , as
payee.

c. LACK OF CONSIDERATION(Sec. 28, NIL)

 ABSENCE or failure of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a HDC.
 PARTIAL FAILURE of consideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated
amount or otherwise .

DOUGHERTY v. SALT (1919). An aunt filled out and signed a note in favor of her nephew for $ 3,000 payable at
her death or before . The printed form contained the words “value received”. The issue is whether said note has
consideration. HELD: The inference of consideration to be drawn from the form of the note has been overcome and
rebutted. The note was merely a voluntary and unenforceable promise of an executory gift.
The child was not a creditor nor was the aunt a debtor. The promise was also neither offered nor accepted.

WILLIAM BARCO & SON v FORBES, One who gives a note in renewal of another, with knowledge at the time of
the partial failure of the consideration for the original note, or of the false representations by the payee, waives such
defense and cannot set it up to defeat or to reduce the liability on the RENEWAL NOTE.

d. ILLEGALITY
 In general, a PERSONAL defense even if CC1409 provides that a contract with an illegal cause is void.

RODRIGUEZ v MARTINEZ (1905). Maker cannot be relieved from the obligation of paying the holder the amount
of the note alleged to have been executed for an unlawful consideration. (Illegality is personal, so defense only against
a holder not in due course)
The holder paid the value of the note to its former holder . He did so without being aware of the fact that the note had
an unlawful origin. He accepted note in good faith , believing the note was valid and absolutely good. The maker even
assured the holder before the purchase that the note was good and that he would pay it at a discount .

REAL when the law expressly provides for illegality as a real defense (Statutory declaration of illegality)
e. DURESS
 In general, PERSONAL defense.
 REAL if duress so serious as to give rise to a real defense for lack of contractual intent
 CAMPOS: Normally, fraud is a personal defense as it is considered as a defect in title under Sec 55. There
may be cases where the duress employed is so serious that it will give rise to a real defense because of the
lack of contractual intent . Although the signer may know what he is signing , there may be wanting the intent
or willingness to be bound. Then it becomes a real defense.
3. SOMETIMES REAL, SOMETIMES PERSONAL
a. FORGERY (Sec. 23, NIL): made without authority of person whose signature it purports to be
 In general, a REAL defense: … Effects
i. signature is wholly inoperative

ii. no right to retain instrument, or give discharge, or enforce payment against any party thereto, can be
acquired through or under such signature (unless forged signature unnecessary to holder’s title)
iii. No subsequent party can acquire the right against any party thereto (prior to the forgery) to:
a) Retain the instrument
b) Give a discharge there for
c) Enforce payment thereof
 PERSONAL if the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is PRECLUDED from setting up
forgery/want of authority; Who are PRECLUDED?
i. parties who make certain warranties, like a general indorser or acceptor after forgery (Sec. 62, NIL)
ii. estopped / negligent parties
iii. parties who ratify (BUT there are conflicting views whether “precluded” includes ratification)
 One view holds that a forged signature cannot be ratified because ratification involves the relation of agency
and a forger does not assume to act for another.
 Where an instrument is generally payable to BEARER, the holder who did not know of the forgery can still
enforce it against the drawer or maker because he can cancel the forged indorsement as not being necessary
to his title. (Sec. 48, NIL)
 What happens when there is acceptance and payment of a forged instrument? The rights and liabilities of the
parties depend on whether the forgery pertains to the drawer/maker’s signature or merely of an indorsement.

GLUCKMAN v DARLING (1914). It is true that silence and acquiescence alone does not
estop a defendant upon an alleged forged instrument from proving the forgery , where the
plaintiff had not been prejudiced or damaged thereby.
But where the holder of the note has been willfully misled as to the genuineness of an indorsement thereon by
one who purports to be the indorser and sustains damage , the alleged indorser will be estopped from denying
the validity of the signature.

STRADER v HALEY (1943). Maker claims that her signature on several checks had been
forged. Defendants interposed the defenses of estoppel, ratification and negligence. Checks
were allegedly indorsed by the maker herself with directions to cash them, to purchase
supplies for her and to return the balance to her. Can a maker set up the defense of
forgery? HELD: SC adopted the view that “precluded” includes ratification. A party may be
precluded by a ratification under NIL Sec 23. Ratification can be substitute for a precedent
authority. Ratification occurs when a party with full knowledge of the material facts
confirms, approves or sanctions the other’s acts.
Where a principal(maker) accepts and retains benefits of the unauthorized agent , he thereby ratifies the act.

Only forgery not amounting to a crime (those without intent to defraud) may be ratified.

 ACCEPTANCE & PAYMENT UNDER MISTAKE – What happens when a forged instrument is accepted and
paid?
(a) When it is the sig of the drawer/maker that is forged:
(i) PRICE v NEAL, The drawee who had paid an accepted bill as well as a non-
accepted bill, each of which was forged, could NOT recover the money paid out
on the bill. The neglect was on the part of the drawee.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK v US NATIONAL BANK OF PORTLAND ,The doctrine of Price v Neal is not
available to:
1. holder guilty of bad faith - if he participated in the forgery or if he knew the check was forged, or
knew of circumstances causing the suspicion
2. a negligent holder

PNB v NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, (Minority view)

1. That were a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn , the bank is estopped
to deny the genuineness of the drawer’s signature and his capacity to issue the instrument

2. That if the drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified, it
cannot recover from the holder who did not participate in the forgery and did not have actual notice
thereof.
3. That the payment of a check does not imply its acceptance (Sec 62)
4. That in the case of payment of a forged check, even without former acceptance, the drawee cannot
recover from the holder in due course NOT CHARGEABLE with any act of negligence or disregard of
duty
5. Payment is different from acceptance. Payment discharges the instrument and converts it to a mere
voucher.
6. Acceptance implies its continued existence and its possible negotiation.

PNB v CA (1968). Drawee paid amount of the check to the collecting bank and debited it against the
account of the drawer . Check had not been accepted. Subsequent discovery of forgery of the signature
of officers of the drawer resulted in the re-crediting of the said amount. HELD: Drawee cannot recover
from collecting agent. Acceptance and payment under the NIL are essentially different things. Acceptance
is a promise to perform an act . It is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the
drawer . Payment is the actual performance of the act. It is the compliance with the obligation itself. ‘
Upon payment the check ceased to become a negotiable instrument and has become a mere voucher or
proof of payment.
The warranty guaranteed only all prior indorsements , not the authenticity of the signatures of the drawer.

RP v EQUITABLE,BPI (1964). Where a loss , which must be borne by one of two parties alike,
innocent of forgery ,can be traced to the neglect or fault of either; it is reasonable that it would be borne
by him through whose means the fraud succeeded.
Generally, where a drawee bank , otherwise would have a right of recovery against a collecting or
indorsing bank for its payment of a forged check , its action will be barred if it is guilty of an unreasonable
delay in discovering the forgery and in giving notice thereof.

SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. VS.FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. AND CA (2004).The
general rule remains that the drawee who has paid upon the forged signature bears the loss. The
exception to this rule arises only when negligence can be traced on the part of the drawer whose signature
was forged, and the need arises to weigh the comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee
to determine who should bear the burden of loss. The Court finds no basis to conclude that Samsung
Construction was negligent in the safekeeping of its checks. For one, the settled rule is that the mere
fact that the depositor leaves his check book lying around does not constitute such negligence as will free
the bank from liability to him, where a clerk of the depositor or other persons, taking advantage of the
opportunity, abstract some of the check blanks, forges the depositor’s signature and collect on the checks
from the bank. And for another, in point of fact Samsung Construction was not negligent at all since it
reported the forgery almost immediately upon discovery.
Still, even if the bank performed with utmost diligence, the drawer whose signature was forged may still
recover from the bank as long as he or she is not precluded from setting up the defense of forgery. After
all, Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law plainly states that no right to enforce the payment of
a check can arise out of a forged signature. Since the drawer, Samsung Construction, is not precluded
by negligence from setting up the forgery, the general rule should apply. Consequently, if a bank pays a
forged check, it must be considered as paying out of its funds and cannot charge the amount so paid to
the account of the depositor. A bank is liable, irrespective of its good faith, in paying a forged check.

(ii) Extensions Of The Price v Neal Doctrine: The bar to recovery (Price v Neal
doctrine) is extended to overdrafts and stop payment orders.
 Overdraft occurs when a check is issued for an amount more than what the drawer has in
deposit with the drawee bank. RULE: The drawee who pays the holder of the bill cannot recover
from the holder what he paid under mistake

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PORTLAND v NOBLE (1946). A teller mistook the rejection symbol
on the check for a symbol authorizing payment. Drawee bank paid on check of depositor who had
no enough funds to cover the amount of the instrument. HELD: Drawee cannot recover. The
representative of the drawee should have been put to an inquiry concerning the meaning of the
symbol and the state of its depositor’s account

LIBERTY TRUST CO. v HAGGERTY.Depositor who had insufficient funds conspired with drawee
bank’s employee to manipulate books so that checks drawn by him can be paid out. Depositor issued
checks as payment for a loan even if he had actually no funds to his credit. Drawee bank paid. Can

drawee recover? HELD: No, drawee cannot recover. Creditor became a bona fide holder for value.
As holder , the creditor had no legal right to exact payment on the drawee because there is no
contract between them. The drawee has the right to determine whether to pay the checks or not.
Having exercised its option to pay, the drawee cannot recover the money back from the payee. The
payment of a check by a bank upon which it is drawn , under the mistaken belief that the maker
has sufficient funds to his credit to pay the check , is a FINALITY .
The reasons for the rule are:
1) because there is no privity between the payee and the drawee bank
2) because the bank always has the means of knowing the state of the depositor’s account by an
examination of its books
3) because to permit the bank to repudiate the payment would destroy the certainty that must
pertain to commercial transactions and give way to uncertainty, delay and annoyance

 Stop Payment Order is one issued by the drawer of a check countermanding his first order to
the drawee bank to pay the check. RULE: The drawee bank is bound to follow the order,
provided it is received prior to its certification or payment of the check
 SOME EXCEPTIONS:
o If the payment to holder is a legitimate debt of the drawer which the holder in due course
could have recovered from the drawer anyway.
o If stop order comes after the bank has certified or accepted the check, the bank is under
the legal duty to pay the holder and will not be liable to the drawer for doing so.
(iii) Effect Of Negligence Of Depositor - If proximate cause of loss, the bank
(drawee) is not liable.
 It is the duty of the depositor/drawer to carefully examine bank’s statements, cancelled checks,
his check stubs, and other pertinent records within a reasonable time and to report any errors
without unreasonable delay.
 If a drawer/depositor’s negligence and delay should cause a bank to honor a forged check,
drawer cannot later complain should bank refuse to recredit his account.
(b) When it is the sig of the indorser that is forged – drawee and drawer CAN recover vs holder
 The drawee can recover the amount paid by him in cases where only an indorsement has been
forged . This is because drawee makes no warranty as to the genuineness of any indorsement.
 Generally, the drawee may only recover from the holder. Should he fail to do so(for instance due to
insolvency) he cannot recoup his loss by charging it to the drawer’s account
 Although a depositor/drawer owes a duty to his drawee bank to examine his cancelled checks , he
has no similar duty as to forged indorsements.
 The drawer , as soon as he comes to know of the a forged indorsement should promptly notify the
drawee bank
 When drawee may recover from DRAWER
o Where the instrument is originally a bearer instrument , because the indorsement can be
disregarded as being unnecessary to the holder’s title
o Indorsement forged by an employee or agent of the drawer
o If due to the drawer’s negligence /delay, the forgery is not discovered until it is too late for the
bank to recover from the holder or the forger
 When drawee may not recover from holder
o If drawee fails to act promptly , if he delays in informing the holder whom he paid
o Where the instrument is originally a bearer instrument , because the indorsement can be
disregarded as being unnecessary to the holder’s title
 Between Drawee Bank and Collecting Bank
o Where the negligence of the drawee bank is the proximate cause of the collecting bank’s
payment of a check with a forged indorsement , the drawee bank may be held liable to the
collecting bank .
o When both are guilty of negligence , the degree of negligence of each will be weighed in
considering the amount of loss which each should bear .

SAN CARLOS MILLING v BPI &CHINABANK (1933). A collecting bank honored a manager’s check
in which the signature/indorsement of the agent for the payee/corporation was forged. HELD: The
signatures of the check being forged, under Sec 23 of the NIL they are not a charge against the payee
nor are the checks of any value to the collecting bank

The proximate cause of the loss was the negligence of the collecting bank.


PNB v QUIMPO (1988). Person forged the signature of the drawer and encashed check in drawee
bank. Drawee debited the account of drawer. Drawer/depositor demanded that the amount be returned
to his account. HELD: A bank is bound to know the signatures of its depositors . If bank pays a forged
check it must be considered as making the payment out of its own funds and cannot charge the account
of the depositor whose signature was forged.

The prime duty of a bank is to ascertain the genuineness of the signature of its depositors. It is expected
to use reasonable business prudence in accepting and cashing a check.

(i) Effect Of Payment Under Forged Indorsements

REPUBLIC v EBRADA, drawee can recover. It is not supposed to be the duty of the drawee to ascertain
whether the signatures of the payee or indorsers are genuine or not.

JAI-ALAI v BPI, Jai-Alai deposited checks (that turned out to be with forged indorsement) with a
collecting bank which provisionally credited the amount to its account. JUDGMENT: (1) Collecting bank
to reimburse drawee bank; (2) Depositor-holder to pay collecting bank

BANCO DE ORO v EQUITABLE BANK, [Philippine Clearing House Rules] In presenting the checks for
clearing the collecting agent, made an express guarantee on the validity of “all the prior endorsements”.
Collecting bank or last indorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the
genuineness of all prior indorsements

GEMPESAW v CA, PBC, [Note: This is not a suit by the party whose signature was forged . The payees
are not parties to the case rather, it is the drawer, whose signature is genuine, who instituted this action
to recover from the drawee bank .] While there is no duty resting on the drawer to look for forged
indorsements on his cancelled checks, in contrast to the duty imposed upon him to look for forgeries in
his own name, a depositor is under a duty to set up an accounting system and business procedure as are
reasonably calculated to prevent or render the forgery of indorsements difficult, particularly by the
depositor’s own employees. As a rule the drawee bank who has paid the check with forged indorsement
, cannot charge the drawer’s account for the amount of the said check. An exception to this rule is where
the drawer is guilty of such negligence which causes the bank to honor the check.

GREAT EASTERN LIFE v HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK (1922). Drawee debited the depositor-
drawer’s account the amount it paid to collecting agent upon whom a check with forged indorsement was
presented and deposited. HELD: The legal presumption is that the drawee bank would not honor the
check without the genuine indorsement of the payee. The drawee bank had no legal right to pay except
as to the drawer or to its order
The collecting bank also had no license or authority to pay money to forger or to anyone upon a forged
indorsement. It was its legal duty to know that the indorsement was genuine before cashing the check.
“Where a check is drawn payable to the order of one person and is presented to a bank by another and
purports upon its face to have been duly indorsed by the payee of the check , it is the duty of the bank
to know that the check was duly indorsed by the original payee and where the bank pays the amount of
the check to a 3rd person , who has forged the signature of the payee , the loss falls upon the bank who
cashed the check , and its remedy is against the person to whom it paid the money.”

CANAL BANK v BANK OF ALBANY (1841). Drawee bank paid a holder upon a forged indorsement
of the payee. There were several other prior holders. HELD: Neither acceptance nor payment is an
admission that the indorser’s name is genuine. The remedy is by action over each against his respective
indorser.

BPI v CA (1992). Drawer-Drawee issued checks on the basis of misrepresentation of a woman who
preterminated a money market placement. This same woman opened a current account and deposited
the checks with the collecting bank. Collecting bank paid the two checks on the basis of the verification
of the signature with the specimen signature on file..The guaranty of prior imdorsements was stamped
to the checks. Collecting bank sent the checks for clearing . The drawee bank cleared checks on the
same day. Upon discovery of the forgery, drawee bank returned the checks to the collecting agent for
the reason of forged indorsements. HELD: Section 23 of the NIL has 2 parts . The first part states the
general rule that a forged signature is wholly inoperative and payment made through or under such

signature is ineffectual . The second part admits of exception. In this jurisdiction , the negligence of the
party invoking the forgery is an exception to the general rule.
Both drawee and collecting bank were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees
resulting in the encashment of the checks by the impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees
Considering the comparative negligence of the parties , the demands of substantive justice are satisfied
by allocating the loss and the costs on a 60-40 ratio.

TOLMAN v AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK (1901). It is a fundamental rule of banking that, when a
bank receives money to be checked out by a depositor, it is to be paid only as the depositor shall order.
If the bank pays money out of a forged signature , the depositor being free from blame or negligence,
the bank must bear the loss.
It is a perversion of words to say that the the check was intended for the impostor simply because he
impersonated the true payee.

SNYDER v CORN EXCHANGE (1908). Maker authorized an employee to draw checks in his name ,
against his deposit for special purposes ..Agent drew checks in favor of a payee who turned out to be a
non-existent person. The checks were subsequently indorsed , the first indorsement is now being
questioned as a forgery. Drawee paid these checks to the last indorser upon the guarantee of the previous
indorsements. The amount was charged to the account of maker. HELD: A check is payable to bearer
when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to person
making it so payable.
(The drawer shall bear the loss and the drawee is without any liability with respect to originally bearer
instruments. In such cases the forged indorsement can be easily cancelled as it is not necessary to the
title of the holder.)

(ii) Effect of negligence of drawee in informing collecting agent of forgery

CLEARFIELD TRUST v US, The collecting agent is allowed to shift the loss to the drawee only on a
clear showing that the drawee’s delay in notifying him of the forgery caused damage.

(iii) Effect of negligence of drawER in case of forged indorsements on checks

DETROIT PISTON v WAYNE, If payment is made on a check on which the indorsement of the payee
is forged , no amount of care on the part of the drawee bank, will entitle it to charge the payment against
the account of the depositor. BUT the drawee bank may justify such payment by showing that the drawer
was negligent in carrying out some duty which it owed to the drawer.

b. MATERIAL ALTERATION (Sec.124, NIL)

 PERSONAL defense when used to deny liability according to the tenor of the instrument
 REAL defense when relied on to deny liability according to the altered terms.
 What constitutes material alteration? Review Sec.125, NIL
a) change date
b) sum payable, either for principal or interest
c) time or place of payment
d) number/relations of parties
e) medium/currency of payment, adds place of payment where none specified,
f) other change/addition altering effect of instrument in any respect
 The enumeration seems to be exclusive. Camposes say any other alteration would be non-material and would
not affect the liability of any prior party . Note that #7 is a catch-all provision such that 125 may still have
broad applicability.

MONTINOLA v PNB ,The insertion of the words “Agent PNB” converted the bank from a mere drawee to a
drawer and therefore changes its liability, constitutes material alteration of the instrument without consent of the
parties liable thereon and so discharges the instrument.

BANK OF COMMERCE v WEBSTER, The addition of the name of the wife of the maker to the note, changed
the identity, effect and operation of said note. Such alteration being made without the assent and knowledge of
the guarantors operated to discharge them from any liability on their guaranty.

 General Rule: Where NI materially altered w/o the assent of all parties liable thereon it is AVOIDED

 Exception: Not avoided as against
1. party who has himself made, authorized or assented to alteration
2. subsequent indorser because by indorsement he warrants that the instrument is in all respects what it
purports to be and that it was valid and subsisting at the time of his indorsement (Secs. 65 and 66,
NIL)
 When an instrument that has been materially altered is in the hands of a HDC not a party to the alteration,
HDC may enforce payment thereof according to orig. tenor
 Alteration must NOT be apparent on the face of the instrument for the holder then would not be a holder in
due course
 When alteration is of the amount or the interest rate is altered, the holder can recover the ORIGINAL
AMOUNT/interest rate.
 DRAWER’S NEGLIGENCE, before or after the alteration, may estop him from setting up alteration as a
defense. (ex. drawer leaves spaces making it possible to insert figures) BUT the drawer is not bound to so
prepare the check that nobody else can successfully tamper with it (ex. a drawer cannot be expected to
foresee that his clerk will use acid to alter his checks, Critten v. Chemical Natl Bank)
o The general rule is that the drawee cannot charge against the drawer’s account the amount of an altered
check.
o But the drawer’s negligence , before or after the alteration , may estop him from setting up alteration as
a defense.
o Where the negligence of the drawer consists in failing to discover alterations previously made which he
could have discovered by a comparison of the cancelled checks and check stubs or by diligent observation
of his records and could thus have prevented the drawee bank from subsequently cashing other altered
checks , the drawee can charge the subsequent check against the negligent drawer’s account.

FOUTCH v ALEXANDRIA BANK (1941). Drawer has the practice of having checks which he gave filled out by
the parties to whom his checks were made . Payee filled out wholly the check with pencil, which the drawee bank
cashed upon the apparent order. HELD: The great weight of authority recognizes the exception to the general
rule that the drawee bank must suffer the loss where it cashes a check which has been altered.
This exception is where the drawer of the check has been guilty of such negligence in its issuance as to facilitate
and induce its alteration so as to proximately cause its payment in altered form.

SAVINGS BANK v NATIONAL BANK (1925). Drawer issued a draft on non-sensitized paper and without
the impression thereof of any safety device. HELD: Under Sec 124 , recovery could be only had against the
drawer by the holder in due course for the original face value of the draft.
Where a negotiable note was delivered in completed form , the possibility that it might be raised or altered by the
willful fraud or forgery of another was too remote to afford the basis of an action either in tort or in contract.
The suit as upon a contract could not be maintained upon a note in its forged and altered state , because it was
not the contract of the maker of the instrument.
In case at bar , the issuing of the note could not be construed as the proximate cause of the loss. It arose from a
supervening cause viz. the forging and altering of the draft

CRITTEN v CHEMICAL NATIONAL BANK (1902). Drawer’s clerk obliterated by acids the name of the payee
and amount specified in the checks , then made the check payable to cash and raised its amount. Clerk would
draw the money from the drawee and pocket all the excesses. Drawer brought action to recover the difference
between the altered and the original checks. HELD: While the drawer of the check may be liable where he draws
the instrument in such an incomplete state as to facilitate or invite the fraudulent alterations , it is not the law
that he is bound to so prepare the check that nobody else can successfully tamper with it.
In the present case, the fraudulent alteration was the obliteration and substitution of the word cash which the
drawer could not have been expected to guard against.
The drawer owes his bank the duty of reasonable verification of the returned checks . It would not prevent a loss
by the bank in the case of the payment of a single forged check but it would prevent the successful commission
of continuous frauds by exposing the first forgeries.
The liability of the depositor for the neglect of his duty to examine and verify his account with the bank is limited
to the damages sustained by the bank in consequence of such neglect

 Where the interest rate is altered , the holder in due course can recover the principal sum with the original
rate of interest
 Who is excepted from this rule ? A subsequent indorser, because by the indorsement he warrants that
the instrument is in all respects what it purports to be and that it was valid and subsisting at the time of his
indorsement (Sec 65 and 66)
 What happens when drawee ACCEPTS OR PAYS on the altered check? Can drawee bank recover?
 
o Prevailing view - Yes, bec. of (1) payment under mistake, (2) Sec. 124 and (3) Sec.62 in relation to Sec.
132
o Minority view – No, bec. of (1) estoppel, (2) stability of transactions and (3) bank is in a better position
to shoulder the loss.

MONTINOLA v PNB (1951). The insertion of the words “Agent Philippine National Bank” converted the bank
from a mere drawee to a drawer and therefore changes its liability , constitutes material alterationof the instrument
without consent of the parties liable thereon and so discharges the instrument.
Drawee bank is not liable.

BANK OF COMMERCE v WEBSTER (1918). The addition of the name of the wife of the maker to the note ,
payment of which was guaranteed , changed the identity of said note and its effect and operation , and such
alteration being made without the assent and knowledge of the guarantors operated to discharge them from any
liability on their guaranty. HELD: The reason why the addition o f name to a note , as a joint maker , after its
issuance , materially alters it , is because it changes the rate of contribution and it changes the character and
description of the instrument . The original obligor may be subjected to a suit in a county other than that of his
residence and suffer inconveniences and injury.

HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK v PEOPLES BANK (1970)1, The failure of the drawee bank to call the
attention of the collecting bank as to such alteration until after the lapse of 27 days would negate whatever right
it might have had. The remedy of the drawee bank is against the party responsible for the forgery or alteration.

REPUBLIC BANK v CA, The collecting bank is protected by the24-hour clearing house rule from the liability to
refund the amount paid by the drawee bank. [Note: A much recent Circular changed the point of reckoning for
the return of the altered check from within 24 hours from the clearing to within 24 hours from the discovery of
the alteration]

MARINE NATIONAL BANK v NATIONAL CITY BANK (1874). A check was altered by erasing the date ,
payee and amount but still the drawee bank paid to the collecting bank. Drawee bank requested for repayment
upon the discovery of the alteration. HELD: An acceptor of the bill (drawee) only admits the genuineness of the
signature of the drawer and does not admit the genuineness of the indorsements, whether of the drawe of the
same bill or of any other person whose name appears on it.
Money paid upon checks and drafts which have been forgeries , either in the body of the instrument or in the
indorsements or in any respect , except the name of the drawer , have uniformly been held recoverable as money
paid by mistake.
There is no ground for presuming the body of the bill to be in the drawer’s handwriting or in any handwriting
known to the acceptor. This demand is unreasonable and would be requiring an impossibility. Majority View:
Drawee can recover.

WELLS FARGO BANK v BANK OF ITALY (1931). Without the consent of the drawer the name of the payee
was erased and another name substituted . The check was certified by the drawee and there was after wards
indorsed thereon the name of another. It was presented to a collecting bank which was paid the amount therein
indicated. Alteration was discovered and drawee seks to recover from the collecting bank. HELD: The drawee
by its certification admitted the genuineness of the body of the check ,that the payee named therein had capacity
to indorse and that the collecting bank was a holder in due course.
According to Sec 62, the acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor
of his acceptance and admits the (1) existence of the drawer , the genuineness of his signature and his capacity
and authority to draw the instrument and (2) the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
The words “according to the tenor of his acceptance” must be construed as referring to the instrument
as it was the time it came to the hands of the acceptor for acceptance, for he accepts no other instrument than
the one presented him-the altered form- and it alone he engages to pay. Minority View: Drawee cannot recover.

REPUBLIC BANK v CA (1991). Drawee bank informed the collecting bank of the alteration almost 2 months
after the check was paid and cleared. The check had already been cleared before the drawee knew of the
alteration. HELD: The collecting bank is protected by the24-hour clearing house rule from the liability to refund
the amount paid by the drawee bank.
[Note: A much recent Circular changed the point of reckoning for the return of the altered check from within
24 hours from the clearing to within 24 hours from the discovery of the alteration ]

1Affirmed the minority view that drawee cannot recover

 
c. FRAUD
 fraud in inducement (knows it is NI but deceived as to value/terms): PERSONAL defense
 fraud in execution / fraud in factum (didn’t know it was NI): REAL defense
 There now arises a question of NEGLIGENCE on the part of the maker or signer (in determining what type of
fraud had been done). Three factors are typically used in determining the existence of negligence:
1. legal character of the instrument which the signer thinks he is signing
2. the physical condition of the signer and his ability to read
3. whether the signer had the opportunity at the time of signing, to ascertain the legal nature of the paper
he is executing

V. LIABILITY OF PARTIES

IN GENERAL:

Parties primarily liable: unconditionally liable; duty bound to pay the holder at date of maturity, WON holder demands
payment from him, and he is not relieved from liability even if the instrument should become overdue due to failure of holder
to make such demand. Person primarily liable: person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the
same.
 Maker of promissory note
 Acceptor of bill of exchange
Parties secondarily liable: conditionally liable; not bound to pay unless the following has been fulfilled: (1) Due
presentment or demand from primary party for payment or acceptance;(2) Dishonor by such party; and (2) Taking of
proceedings required by law after dishonor.

 Indorsers, both note and bill

 Drawer of bill

A. PRIMARY PARTIES
 Presentment for payment not necessary to charge primary party
 if the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, such
ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. (Sec. 70, NIL)

1. Liability of MAKER
a. Promises to pay it according to its tenor
b. Admits existence of payee and his then capacity to indorse
 Therefore, PRECLUDED from setting up the following defenses:
i. the payee is a fictitious person
ii. the payee was insane, a minor, or a corporation acting ultra vires

FIRST NAT'L BANK V. UTTERBACK (1917). The maker cannot deny either the existence of
payee or its capacity to indorse and cannot claim the defense of the failure of the payee to
comply with a statute in the making of a contract for which the note was executed.

2. Status of DRAWEE prior to acceptance or payment

 A bill/check of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee/bank, and the
drawee/bank is NOT LIABLE on the bill unless and UNTIL he/it ACCEPTS (or certifies) the same. (Sec. 127, NIL)
 Before payment or certification by the drawee bank, drawer of the check may countermand the order, and payment
thereafter to the payee by the bank is wrongful.
 sec. 189 (when check operates as assignment)
 Drawee - person on whom a bill of exchange or check is drawn and who is ordered to pay it.
 not liable on the instrument until he accepts it; once accepted, becomes primarily liable under Sec. 62, NIL.

ARANETA V. BANK OF AMERICA(1971). This was an action by a depositor against a bank for damages resulting
from the wrongful dishonor of the depositor's checks. HELD: Araneta's claim for temperate damages is legally justified
because of the adverse reflection on the financial credit of a businessman, a prized and valuable asset, w/c constitutes
material loss.

WOODY V. NAT'L BANK (1927). Notwithstanding the relation of the bank to its depositors is that of a debtor and
creditor, a bank may be held liable in tort to its depositor whose check is has wrongfully refused or failed to pay.

SINGSON V. BPI (1968). The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.

SPEROFF V. FIRST CENTRAL, Obtaining from the plaintiff of a purported release from liability for inadvertency or
oversight as a condition of the order to stop payment of the check is contrary to public policy and did not relieve the
defendant from its duty to act in good faith and exercise reasonable care.

CHASE V. BATTAT (1948). In the absence of ratification, the drawee has no cause of action against the drawer if
the former paid the payee by mistake.

HSBC VS. CATALAN (2004): HSBC claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under Section 189 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit
of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies it.” However,
HSBC is not being sued on the value of the check itself but for how it acted in relation to Catalan’s claim for payment
despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to recognize the check the latter issued. Catalan may have
prayed that she be paid the value of the checks but it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action, as
well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Her allegations in the complaint that the
gross inaction of HSBC on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its
continued inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear
abuse of right for which it may be held liable under Article 19 of the Civil Code for any damages she incurred resulting
therefrom. HSBANK’s actions, or lack thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the
recovery of her claim while the latter was alive.

3. Liability of ACCEPTOR (Sec.62, NIL)

 Drawee is not liable unless he accepts the bill and in doing so, he engages to pay the bill according to the tenor
of his acceptance.
 Admits the following:
a. existence of drawer
b. genuineness of his signature
c. his capacity and authority to draw the instrument
d. existence of payee and his then capacity to endorse
 Question as to the meaning of "according to the tenor of his acceptance" and "the admission of existence
of payee:"
 Interpretations of “according to its tenor”
o Majority and prevailing view: Where alteration consists in raising the amount payable, acceptor liable to
HDC only as to its original amount; if the alteration of payee's name, paying banks cannot charge drawer's
account with the amount of the check because its duty is to pay only “according to the order of the drawer.”
o Common law rule: Acceptor of altered check not liable to innocent holder except for the original amount
 FORMAL REQUISITES OF ACCEPTANCE:
a. the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer
b. "Acceptance" completed by delivery or notification (Sec. 19, NIL)
c. inwriting and signed by the drawee; must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any
other means than the payment of money. (Sec.132, NIL); does not change the implied promise of
acceptor to pay only in money
o Thus, there is no valid oral or implied acceptance except in case of Sec. 137 (Constructive Acceptance)
 holder of a bill may require that the acceptance be written on the bill, if request refused, may treat the bill as
dishonored. (Sec. 133, NIL)
 A bill may be accepted:
a. before it has been signed by the drawer, or
b. while otherwise incomplete, or
c. when it is overdue, or
d. after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to accept, or by non payment.
 But when a bill payable after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance and drawee subsequently accepts it, the
holder, in the absence of diff agreement, is entitled to have bill accepted as of date of the 1 st presentment. (Sec.
138, NIL); Sec. 138, NIL allows acceptance to be made while the bill is incomplete.

LAWLESS V. TEMPLE (1926). Drawee may be charged against acceptor although he writes merely his name upon
the bill and that any one taking the bill has the right to fill up a blank acceptance on the same principle that any holder
may fill up a blank indorsement.

KILGORE V. MOORE BROS. (1937). An oral promise to pay, standing alone, is insufficient to charge the bank with
liability to pay.

 CONSTRUCTIVE ACCEPTANCE:
o The drawee is allowed 24 hours after presentment to decide WON he will accept the bill; the acceptance, if
given, dates as of the day of presentation. (Sec. 136, NIL)
o Under the clearing house rules, the failure to return within the prescribed time will be deemed payment or
acceptance of the check.
o Where the drawee (1) destroys the bill, or (2) refuses within 24hrs or such other period as the holder may
allow, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, deemed to have accepted the same. ( Sec.
137, NIL)
o Where bill is duly presented and is not accepted within prescribed time, the person presenting it must treat
the bill as dishonored by nonacceptance or he loses right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers. ( Sec.
150, NIL)
o If there is not demand for the return of the bill and the drawee keeps it until after the expiration of said period
without expressly accepting or refusing it; two views:
a. Constitutes constructive notice
b. Constitutes dishonor because Sec.137, NIL uses the word "refuses"
o Acceptance, if given, will retroact to date of presentation.

URWILLER v. PLATTE (1908). The failure or neglect of a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for
acceptance to return the bill, accepted or not accepted to the holder within the 24 hours after
delivery makes the drawee an acceptor of the bill.

SUMCAD v. PROVINCE OF SAMAR (1956). There was implied acceptance in view of the
circumstances of the case (furnishing of photostatic copies, presentment for certification) by
voluntary assuming the obligation of holding so much deposit as would be sufficient to cover
the amount of the check.

 ACCEPTANCE ON A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT

o Extrinsic acceptance - acceptance is written on a paper other than the bill itself; doesn’t bind the
acceptor except in favor of a person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith thereof, receives the bill for
value. (Sec. 134, NIL); acceptance of an existing bill
o Virtual acceptance - unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill before it is drawn; deemed an
actual acceptance in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof, receives the bill for value. (Sec. 135,
NIL); acceptance of future bill
o In both cases, the acceptancemust clearly and unequivocally identify the bill to which the acceptance
refers.

COOLIDGE V. PAYSON (1817). A letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date the bill of
exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who
afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a virtual acceptance binding on the person who makes the promise.

 KINDS OF ACCEPTANCE: An acceptance is either (1) general or (2) qualified.

(1) GENERAL - assents without qualification to the order of the drawer. ( Sec.139, NIL); Includes acceptance
to pay at a particular place; unless expressly states that bill is to be paid there only and not elsewhere. ( Sec.
140, NIL)
(2) QUALIFIED - in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn. (Sec. 139, NIL)
(a) Conditional; payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a condition therein stated;
(b) Partial; to pay part only of the amount for which the bill is drawn;

(c) Local; to pay only at a particular place;
(d) Qualified as to time;
(e) The acceptance of some, one or more of the drawees but not of all. (Sec. 141, NIL)
o The holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance; may treat the bill as dishonored by non-
acceptance.
o Where a qualified acceptance is taken, the drawer and indorsers are discharged from liability on the bill
unless they have authorized the holder to take a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent thereto.
o When the drawer or an indorser receives notice of a qualified acceptance, he must, within a reasonable
time, express his dissent to the holder or he will be deemed to have assented thereto. ( Sec. 142, NIL)
(3) TRADE - a draft or bill of exchange with a definite maturity, drawn by a seller on a buyer for the purchase
price of goods, bearing across its face the acceptance of the buyer; always states upon its face the transaction
from which it arose.
(4) BANKER'S acceptance - a negotiable time draft or bill of exchange drawn on and accepted by a commercial
bank.
 CHECKS
o A check is an instrument in the form and nature of a BE, but an unlike an ordinary bill, always payable on
demand and always drawn on a bank.
o Cashier's or manager's - drawn by a bank on itself and its issuance has the effect of acceptance; since the
drawer and drawee are the same, the holder may treat it is either a BE or PN.
o Memorandum check - where the word "memorandum" or "memo" is written across its face, signifying that
the drawer will pay the holder absolutely, without need of presentment.
o Traveler's check - upon which the holder's signature must appear twice -- first when it is issued, and again
when it is cashed.
o Crossed – when the name of a particular banker or a company is written between the parallel lines drawn…

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE V. IAC, Crossed check should put the payee on inquiry to ascertain the holders’ title
to the check or the nature of his possession. Failing this, the payee is declared guilty of gross negligence to the effect
that the holder of the check is not a holder in good faith. Effects of a crossed check: (a) the check may not be encashed
but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once – to one who has an account with the bank;
and (c) the act serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must
inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise, he is not a HDC.

BATAAN CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, INC. VS. CA, the negotiability of a check is not
affected by its being crossed, whether specially or generally. It may legally be negotiated as
long as the one who encashes the check with the drawee bank is another bank, or if it is
especially crossed, by the bank mentioned between the parallel lines.

RP V. PNB (1961).Demand drafts have not been presented either for acceptance or for payment, thus the bank
never had any chance of accepting or rejecting them; as such, these cannot be subject of escheat.
Cashier's check is the substantial equivalent of a certified check and is thus subject to escheat.

Telegraphic transfers are likewise subject to escheat because upon making payment complete the transaction
insofar as he is concerned, though insofar as the remitting bank is concerned, the contract is executory until the credit
is established.

PAL V. CA (1990). A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, and an offer of a check in payment of
a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
The issuance of the check to a person authorized to receive it operates to release the judgment debtor from any further
obligations on the judgment.

FORTUNADO V. CA (1991). The tender of a check is sufficient to compel redemption but it is not in itself payment
that relieves the redemptioner from his liability to pay the redemption price.
 
MESINA V. IAC (1986). The holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder id due course cannot enforce such
check against the issuing bank which dishonors the same.

o CERTIFICATION PRINCIPLES: Certification - an agreement by which a bank promises to pay the check
at any time it is presented for payment; must be in writing which may be made on the check or on another
instrument.
1. When check certified by bank on which it is drawn, equivalent to acceptance
2. Where holder of check procures it to be accepted/certified, drawer and all indorsers discharged from all
liability (versus ordinary bill of exchange – not discharged)
3. where procured at request of drawer: secondary parties not released
4. Bank which certifies liable as an acceptor
5. Checks cannot be certified before payable
6. The refusal to certify a check doesn’t constitute dishonor; the holder at that stage cannot exercise his
right of recourse against the drawer and the indorsers.
7. Where the check is certified at the request of the holder, the bank becomes the solidary debtor and the
drawer and indorsers are discharged.
8. Where certification is obtained at the request of the drawer, secondary parties are not released.

NEW PACIFIC TIMBER V. SENERIS.Since the check had been certified by the drawee bank, by the certification,
the funds represented by the check are transferred from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder,
and for all intents and purposes, the latter becomes the depositor of the drawee bank, with rights and duties of
one in such a situation.

WACHTEL V. ROSEN (1928). When the bank certifies a check at the request of the holder, the drawer and all
the indorsers are discharged from liability thereon. When a bill of exchange is accepted, the drawer is not
discharged.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP V. IAC (1990). A certified personal check is not legal tender nor is it the currency
stipulated, and therefore cannot constitute valid tender of payment.

BULLIET V. ALLEGHENY TRUST (1925). The effect of the bank's certifying a check at the request of the
holder is to create a new obligation on the part of the bank to that holder, the amount of the check passes to the
credit of the holder, who is thereafter a depositor to that amount.
SUTTER V. SECURITY TRUST.A drawer of a check, which had been certified at his request before delivery, may
recall the same and require the certifying bank to refuse payment to the payee named therein if such payee is not
a bona fide holder for value, but has obtained the check by fraud perpetuated by him upon the maker.

o The surrender of the check by the holder to the drawee bank upon its payment is not negotiation. By
paying the check, the drawee bank extinguishes it as a negotiable instrument and converts it into a mere
voucher.
o Distinction between surrender of check upon payment thereof and negotiation
a. The delivery of the check by the holder to the drawee bank upon its payment is not negotiation. By
paying the check, the drawee bank extinguishes it as a negotiable instrument and converts it into a mere
voucher.
b. In the case of a deposit of a check by the holder thereof in a bank other than the drawee bank, the
signature at the back of the check would constitute an indorsement, unless otherwise indicated. The
holder in negotiating the check to the depositary bank, which in turn will collect on the check from the
drawee bank, through the clearinghouse.
o Clearing of checks
 Clearing - check collection process
 Clearing house - where representatives of different banks meet every afternoon of every business day
to receive the envelopes containing checks drawn against the bank he represents for examination and
clearance.

B. SECONDARY PARTIES
1. Liability of DRAWER (Sec. 61, NIL)
a. Admits existence of payee and his then capacity to endorse
b. Engages that on due presentment instrument will be accepted, or paid, or both, according to its tenor

c. That if it be dishonored + necessary proceedings on dishonor duly taken, will pay the amount thereof to the holder
or to a subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it
 drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negativing / limiting his own liability to holder

PNB v. PICORNELL (1922).Picornell obtained money from PNB Cebu to purchase tobacco to be shipped to Manila.
Picornell then drew a bill of exchange drawn against his principal, Hyndman, Tavera & Ventura (HTV), in favor of PNB or
his order. Upon presentation of the bill, HTV accepted it. However, HTV subsequently refused to pay the bill because some
of the tobacco shipped were damaged.

HELD:

A. Liability of Acceptor (HTV)

 PNB is a holder in due course and the partial want of consideration does not exist with respect to the bank who
paid full value for the bill of exchange.
 The want of consideration between the acceptor and drawer does not affect the rights of the payee who is a
remote party. The payee or holder gives value to the drawer, and if he is ignorant of the equities between the
drawer and acceptor, his is in the position of a bona fide indorsee.
B. Liability of Drawer (Picornell)
 As drawer of the bill, he warranted that it would be accepted upon proper presentment & paid in due course. As
it was not paid, he became liable to the payment of its value to PNB.
 The fact that Picornell was an agent of HTV in the purchase of the tobacco does not necessarily make him an
agent of HTV in drawing the bill of exchange. These are 2 different contracts. He cannot claim exemption from
liability by invoking the existence of agency.
 Drawer received notice of protest in fulfillment of the condition set by law for his liability to arise.
 Drawer's liability is only secondary as the liability of the acceptor is primary.

BANCO ATLANTICO v AUDITOR GENERAL (1978), B fraudulently altered checks payable to her drawn by the Embassy
by increasing the amounts. B negotiated these checks by indorsement to BA w/c paid the full amount of the checks without
first clearing with the drawee bank, contrary to normal banking practice. HELD: Drawer (embassy) not liable. BA is guilty
of negligence in giving B special treatment as a privileged client, in disregard of elementary principles of prudence that
should attend banking transactions. Hence, it should suffer the loss. BA could not have been a HDC.

NOTE: The Camposes note that the drawer was not held liable because the decision was based on §23 on forgery instead
of §124 on material alteration. If BA had been a HDC, the Embassy could have been held liable for the original amount of
the checks

MCCORNACK v CENTRAL STATE BANK,Through the misrepresentations of H, M drew a check payable to the order of
K, who turned out to be a fictitious person. Only 4 years after the transaction was the fraud discovered. The drawer (M)
now seeks recovery from the drawee bank. HELD: While the drawer admits the existence of the payee & his capacity to
indorse, it cannot be construed in the ff manner:
1. As rendering an instrument payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious person & the maker is in
ignorance of that fact;
2. As imposing on the drawer an admission of the validity & genuineness of an indorsement of the payee's name by one
to whom it cannot be said he intended payment to be made; or
3. As relieving the drawee of the duty to ascertain the identity of the indorser & the genuineness of the indorsement.
The drawee cannot invoke as a defense that the drawer warrants the existence of the payee & his capacity to indorse
because the statute is designed for the protection of holders, in case the drawee refuses to pay, and not the drawees.

 CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR BOUNCING CHECKS

a. Under BP 22
b. Estafa under the RPC

LOZANO v MARTINEZ (1986).Questions constitutionality of BP 22

HELD:

A. Non-imprisonment for debt
This provision was intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex
contractu. It was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of making & issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. Any practice tending to destroy the confidence on checks as currency substitutes
should be deterred, for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles & the banking
community.

B. Non-impairment of contract
Checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts as they have become convenient substitutes for money. It forms
part of the banking system & therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
C. Equal protection of the law
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals & the law may validly accord different treatment to the
drawer from the payee.
D. Undue delegation of legislative power
What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, the power to define the offense.

PEOPLE v NITAFAN(1992). Lim issued a memorandum check which was subsequently dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. A memorandum check has the same effect as an ordinary check and within the ambit of
BP 22. What the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check & not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms & conditions relating to its issuance.

2. Liability of INDORSERS:
 Indorser - person placing his signature upon an instrument other than as a maker, drawer, or acceptor unless he
indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity (Sec. 63, NIL)
 Where a person places his signature on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liabilities of an
indorser. (Sec. 67, NIL)
 Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement warrants: ( Sec. 65, NIL)
a. Instrument genuine, in all respects what it purports to be
b. He has good title to it
c. All prior parties had capacity to contract
d. He has no knowledge of any fact w/c would impair validity of instrument or render it valueless
o in case of negotiation by delivery only, warranty only extends in favor of immediate transferee
3. Liability of a General or Unqualified Indorser: Every person who indorses without qualification, warrants to all
subsequent HDCs: (Sec. 66, NIL)
a. instrument genuine, good title, capacity of prior parties
b. instrument is at time of indorsement valid and subsisting
c. on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, according to tenor
d. if it is dishonored, and necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amt. To holder, or to any
subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it

RAMISH v WOODRUFF.The test whether the undertaking constitutes a general indorsement is the intention of the
transferor to assume the obligations of a general indorser. Words of guaranty being words of enlargement rather than
words of limitation, it may fairly be inferred that the transferor's intent was to assume the burdens of indorsement and, in
addition, the unconditional liability of one who guarantees payment.

WACHOVIA BANK v CRAFTON.Carver gave a promissory note to Crafton for money won by the latter in a gambling
transaction. Crafton indorsed the note to Wachovia Bank. Crafton denies liability claiming the note is void. HELD: The
contract of indorsement is a substantive contract, separable & independent of the instrument on which it appears. A HDC
can recover from the indorser, though the instrument is rendered void by statute.

HOROWITZ v WOLLOWITZ (1908). Cohen gave a promissory note to Jormack which was subject to usurious rates.
Wollowitz was an irregular indorser. Jormack subsequently indorsed the note to Horowitz. The note was not paid at
maturity. Wollowitz denies liability claiming the note as void for usury. HELD: Every indorser who indorses without
qualification warrants to all subsequent holder in due course that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid &
subsisting. In indorsing the note the indorser warranted its validity, & he cannot be heard now to assert that it is void for

usury, any more than forger or any other cause. It is an established rule that the obligation of an indorser is a new &
independent contract, separate & distinct from the contract evidenced by the note.

4. Liability of Irregular Indorser (Sec. 64, NIL)

 Where a person not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he
is liable as an indorser, in accordance w/ these rules:
a. Instrument payable to order of 3rd person: liable to payee and to all subsequent parties
b. Instrument payable to the order of maker/drawer, or payable to bearer: liable to all parties subsequent to
maker/drawer
c. Signs for accommodation of payee, liable to all parties subsequent to payee

Sadaya v. Sevilla.(a)a joint and several accommodation maker of a negotiable PN may demand from the principal debtor
reimbursement for the amt. that he paid to the payee; (b) a joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said
PN may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker without first directing his action vs. the principal
debtor provided:
1. he made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand
2. or the principal debtor is insolvent

 Order of Liability among Indorsers (Sec. 68, NIL):

a. among themselves: liable prima facie in the order they indorse, but proof of another agreement admissible
b. but holder may sue any of the indorsers, regardless of order of indorsement
c. joint payees/indorsees deemed to indorse jointly and severally

5. Liability of an ACCOMODATION PARTY - Liable on the instrument to HFV even if holder knew he was only an AP
 Accomodation Party: one who signed instrument as maker/drawer/acceptor/ indorser w/o receiving value thereof,
for the purpose of lending his name to some other person

INGALLS v MARSTON (1922).Marston made a promissory note payable to Ingalls. Before the delivery of the note to
the payee, Smith & Foss placed their signatures on the back of the note. There was no demand at maturity nor notice of
dishonor given to Smith & Foss. Ingalls seeks to recover from Smith & Foss as original promissors. HELD: Smith & Foss
placed their signatures at the back of the note & are deemed as indorsers. Both regular & irregular indorsers are entitled
to have demand made upon the maker & due notice of dishonor given to them.

WEST RUSTLAND TRUST v HOUSTON (1932).Buck Lumber Co. gave a promissory note as collateral security for its
indebtedness with West Rustland Trust. Jones, the treasurer of the bank, asked Buck to execute a renewal note signed
also by Houston, promising to return it after the examination of the bank books by the bank examiner. This action was
brought to recover on the renewal note. HELD: It is against public policy to permit the parties to rely upon the illegality
of the transaction as a defense.

Notwithstanding the fact that the holder knew a party had signed for accommodation only, the accommodation party
remains liable to a holder for value. He is not to be treated as a surety (guarantor in Phils).

The liability of the accommodation parties on the note is primary & absolute.

GOODMAN v GAUL, The party for whose accommodation a note is given cannot enforce it against the accommodator as
it is a mere gratuity. Since the indorser signed for the accommodation of the payee, the latter cannot recover from the
former.

CLARK v SELLNER (1921).Sellner signed a promissory note as joint maker but only as an accommodation party. He
received no part of the amount of the debt. Payee now seeks recovery on the note although the instrument was not
presented for payment to Sellner. HELD: The liability of a joint maker is not dependent on whether or not he has received
any part of the amount of the debt.

Presentment for payment is not necessary to charge the person primarily liable on the note, i.e. maker.

He lent his name to his co-makers placing himself with respect to the creditor in the same position & with the same liability
as the other signers.

"Without receiving value" means "without receiving payment for lending his name." It is immaterial, so far as the creditor
is concerned, whether one of the signers has, or has not, received anything in payment of the use of his name.

Payee is a "holder for value" for he had paid the money to the signers at the time the note was executed & delivered to
him. As such, he has the right to demand payment of the debt from the signer of the note, even though he knows that
the person is merely an accommodation party.

MAULINI v SERRANO (1914).Serrano is a broker in the business of acting as a mediary between those who had money
to loan & those who desired to borrow money. Maulini agreed to lend money to Moreno but did not want to appear on the
books of the borrowing company as a lender of money. Maulini asked that the promissory note of Moreno be made to the
order of Serrano to be indorsed to Maulini eventually. HELD: There never was a moment when Serrano was the real owner
of the note.

Serrano was not an accommodation indorser. In accommodation indorsement, the indorser makes the indorsement for the
accommodation of the maker. Such an indorsement is generally for the purpose of better securing the payment of the
note, i.e. he lends his name to the maker not to the holder. An accommodation note is one which the accommodation
party has put his name, without consideration, for the purpose of accommodation some other party who is to use it and is
expected to pay it.
Note: Campos disagrees with this ruling, referring to the case of Goodman v Gaul, supra, where an accommodation
indorsement may be made for the accommodation of the payee or holder.

PNB v MAZA (1925). Mecenas & Maza executed promissory notes to the order of PNB. They claim that Echaus requested
them to sign blank promissory notes so that he might negotiate them with PNB. HELD: As accommodation parties, the
defendants having signed the instruments without receiving value therefore & for the purpose of lending their names to
some other person, are still liable on the instruments.

It is not necessary that any consideration should move to the accommodation maker. The consideration which supports
the promise of the accommodation maker is that parted with by the person taking the note & received by the person
accommodated.

Accommodation parties have a right of reimbursement against the accommodated party, since the relation between them
is that of principal & sureties.

ACUÑA v VELOSO(1927). Xavier asked Veloso to become a co-maker of a note to obtain a loan in order to purchase a
piece of real estate. Payee negotiated the note to Acuña after it fell due. HELD: Acuña is not a holder in due course but
merely acquired the rights of his transferor, the payee of the note. However, the payee paid in full value for the note at
the time of its creation. Therefore Acuña is entitled to enforce the note.

Where the accommodation maker draws a note payable to the accommodated payee & the payee negotiates the note after
the date of maturity, the accommodation party cannot be held liable. But in CAB, the accommodating party & the
accommodated party unite in making the joint & several note to a person who advances the face value of the note to one
of its makers at the time of the note's creation.

The consideration for the note was the money which the payee advanced to one of the makers. It cannot be said that the
note was lacking in consideration as to Veloso because he received none of the money. Value was given for the note &
this was enough.

ANG TIONG v TING (1968).Ting issued a check payable to cash with Ang's signature appearing at the back. Ang Tiong
presented it to the drawee bank who dishonored it. Both Ting & Ang refused to pay upon demand by the holder. HELD:
Ang is a general indorser. Assuming arguendo that Ang is a mere accommodation party, he is still liable on the instrument
to a holder for value. The accommodation party is liable to a holder for value as if the contract was not for accommodation.
It is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration when he executed the
instrument. Nor is it correct to say that the holder for value is not a holder in due course merely because at the time he
acquired the instrument, he knew that the indorser was only an accommodation party.

The fact that the accommodation party stands only as a surety in relation to the maker is a matter of concern exclusively
between accommodation indorser & accommodated party. It is immaterial to the claim of a holder for value. The liability
of the accommodation party remains primary & unconditional.

SADAYA v SEVILLA (1967).Sevilla, Varona, & Sadaya executed, jointly & severally, in favor of BPI a promissory note.
The proceeds of the note was received by Varona alone. Sevilla & Sadaya signed the note as co-makers only as a favor to
Varona. BPI collected from Sadaya the balance of the note. Varona failed to reimburse Sadaya despite repeated demands.
Sevilla died. Sadaya filed a creditors' claim upon the estate of Sevilla for the amount paid to BPI. HELD: The solidary
accommodation maker who made payment has the right of contribution from his co-accommodation maker. This right
springs from an implied promise between the accommodation makers to share equally the burdens that may ensue from
their having consented to stamp their signatures on the promissory note. The following are the rules on reimbursement:

1. A solidary accommodation maker of a note may demand from the principal debtor reimbursement for the amount he
paid to the payee; and
2. A solidary accommodation maker who pays on the note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-
accommodation maker without first directing his action against the principal debtor provided that :
(a) he made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand or
(b) the principal debtor is insolvent.

TRAVEL-ON, INC. v CA.Travel-On was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption that it
was a HDC, that the checks were supported by valuable consideration. The only evidence private
respondent offered was his own testimony that he had issued the checks to Travel-On as payee to
"accommodate" its General Manager; this claim was in fact a claim that the checks were merely
simulated, that private respondent did not intend to bind himself thereon. Only evidence of the
clearest and most convincing kind will suffice for that purpose.

PRUDENCIO v CA (1986).P agreed to mortgage their property to secure the loan of CTC with PNB. They likewise signed
the PN covering the loan. P seeks to be released from obligation on the note. HELD: The accommodation party is discharged
because PNB is not a HFV. PNB did not act in good faith when it allowed the violation of the Deed of Assignment which
principally moved Prudencio to sign the PN.

CRISOLOGO-JOSE VS. CA, Section 29 of the NIL does not apply to corporations which are
accommodation parties because the issue or indorsement of negotiable paper by a corporation
without consideration is ultra vires. Hence, one who has taken the instrument with knowledge of
the accommodation can’t recover against a corporation - accommodation party EXCEPT if the
officer or agent of the corp. was specifically authorized to execute or indorse the paper for the
accommodation of a third person. BUT as in CAB, corporate officers, such as the president and
vice-president, have no power to execute for mere accommodation a NI of the corporation for their
individual debts or transactions in which the corporation has no legitimate concern. It is the
signatories thereof that shall be personally liable therefor.

6. Liability of an AGENT
 Signature of any party may be made by duly authorized agent, established as in ordinary agency
 Where person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs on behalf of a principal, not liable if he was duly
authorized, BUT mere addition of words describing him as an agent without disclosing his principal, not exempt
from personal liability.
 Signature per procuration operates as notice that the agent has limited authority to sign, and the principal is bound
only in case the agent in so signing acted within the actual limits of his authority
 Where a broker or agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all liabilities in Sec. 65, unless
he discloses name of principal and fact that he’s only acting as agent. (Sec. 69, NIL)
 
AUSTIN v GROSS, Parol evidence is admissible to prove that G was authorized to sign the check. As to the whether or
not the check contains words that the party signs in a representative capacity, if words appear on ANY part of the check,
such as at the head or on its margin, indicating that the party signed in behalf of a principal, it will be sufficient.

NEW GEORGIA NATIONAL BANK v LIPPMANN (1928). Bank is the owner through indorsement of a promissory note
signed "J&G Lippmann, LJ Lippmann, Pres." Bank seeks to make the president personally liable if he signed the note
without authority. HELD: Whenever the form of the paper is such as fairly to indicate to the eye of common sense that
the maker signs as agent or in a representative capacity, he is relieved of personal liability if duly authorized.

Prior to the NIL, the remedy against an agent signing a note without authority was not upon the note itself but for breach
of implied warranty. But under the NIL, if the party signs without authority, he is liable on the instrument, even though he
did not mean to contract as an individual.

PRATT v HOPPER.In NIs, an undisclosed principal cannot be charged at any time. Parol evidence cannot be introduced
to charge the principal although the agent executed the instrument as an agent.

INSULAR DRUG v PNB, The right of an agent to indorse commercial paper will not be lightly inferred. A salesman with
authority to collect money does not have the implied authority to indorse checks received in payment. Any person taking
checks made payable to a corporation does so at his peril & must abide by the consequences if the agent who indorses the
same is without authority.

PBC v ARUEGO (1981).Aruego obtained a credit accommodation from PBC. For every printing of the publication, the
printer collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against PBC, which will later be sent to Aruego for acceptance. PBC
seeks recovery on these drafts. Aruego invokes the defense that he signed the document in his capacity as President of
the Phil. Education Foundation & only as an accommodation party. HELD: Aruego is personally liable because nowhere in
the draft did he disclose that he was signing as a representative of the Phil Education Foundation. Neither did he disclose
his principal.

As an accommodation party, Aruego is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the
time of the taking of the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party. Aruego signed as a drawee/acceptor.
As drawee, he is primarily liable for the drafts.

The contention that the drafts are not bills of exchange but mere pieces of evidence of indebtedness because they were
payments were made before acceptance is untenable. As long as a commercial paper conforms with the definition of a bill
of exchange, that paper is considered a bill of exchange. The nature of acceptance is determinative of liabilities of the
parties but not of the character of a commercial paper.

C. PRESENTMENT- means: (a) the production of a BE to the drawee for his ACCEPTANCE, or to the drawer or acceptor for
PAYMENT; or (b) the production of a PN to the party liable for payment
1. PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE
 When necessary (Sec. 143, NIL)
a. bill payable after sight, or in other cases where presentment for acceptance necessary to fix maturity
b. where bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance
c. where bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at residence / place of business of drawee
o In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render any party to the bill liable.
 Effect of non-presentment [w/in reasonable time] (Sec. 144, NIL) - discharges the drawer and all indorsers.
 Reasonable Time: considerations
a. nature of instrument
b. usage of trade or business with respect to instrument
c. facts of each case
 How made (Sec. 145, NIL)
o BY or ON BEHALF of the holder
o AT a reasonable hour,
o ON a business day and before the bill is overdue,

o TO the drawee or some person authorized to accept or refuse acceptance on his behalf; and
 bill addressed to drawees not partners, MUST be made to them all unless one has authority to accept or
refuse acceptance for all;
 drawee is dead, MAY be made to his personal representative;
 drawee has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent or has made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, MAY be made (1) to him or (2) to his trustee or assignee.
 When made (Sec. 146, NIL) on any day on which NIs may be presented for payment under:
o Sec. 72, NIL – at a reasonable hour on a business day
o Sec. 85, NIL –
 at the time fixed therein without grace.
 Instruments falling due or becoming payable on Saturday - next succeeding business day
 EXCEPT instruments payable on demand [at the option of the holder] – before twelve o'clocknoon on
Saturday WHEN that entire day is not a holiday.
 Where the holder has no time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to present the bill for acceptance before
presenting it for payment, delay is excused and doesn’t discharge the drawers and indorsers. (Sec. 147, NIL)
 When Excused(Sec. 148, NIL) Bill may be treated as dishonored by non-acceptance:
a. Where the drawee is (1) dead, (2) absconded, (3) fictitious, (4) does not have capacity to contract by bill.
b. Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, presentment can not be made.
c. Where, although presentment has been irregular, acceptance has been refused on some other ground.
 Dishonor and Effects
o Dishonor by nonacceptance:
a. When duly presented for acceptance – acceptance is refused or can not be obtained; or
b. When presentment for acceptance is excused – bill is not accepted. (Sec. 149, NIL)
o Duty of holder where bill not accepted — must treat the bill as dishonored by nonacceptance or he loses
the right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers. (Sec. 150, NIL)
o Rights of holder where bill not accepted. — immediate right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers
and no presentment for payment is necessary. (Sec. 151, NIL)
o To whom notice of dishonor must be given - Except as herein otherwise provided, (1) to the drawer and
(2) to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given is discharged. (Sec.89,
NIL)
o Effect of omission to give notice of non-acceptance - does not prejudice the rights of a HDC subsequent
to the omission. (Sec. 117, NIL)
2. PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT
 Where necessary (Sec. 70, NIL) in order to charge the drawer and indorsers
 Where NOT necessary
a. to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument (Sec. 70, NIL)
b. to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the
instrument. (Sec. 79, NIL)
c. to charge an indorser where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation and he has no
reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented. (Sec. 80, NIL)
d. Excused:
a. Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, presentment cannot be made;
b. Where the drawee is a fictitious person;
c. By waiver of presentment, express or implied.
e. when a bill is dishonored by nonacceptance – immediate right to recourse accrues to holder (Sec. 151, NIL)
f. in case of waiver of protest, whether in the case of a foreign bill of exchange or other NI – deemed to be a
waiver not only of a formal protest but also of presentment and notice of dishonor. (Sec. 111, NIL)
 Date and time of presentment
a. bearing fixed maturity / not payable on demand – on the day it falls due
o if day of maturity falls on Sunday or a holiday, the instruments falling due or becoming payable on
Saturday are to be presented for payment on the next succeeding business day (Sec.85, NIL)
b. payable on demand – within a reasonable time after its issue,
o at the option of the holder, may be presented for payment before twelve o'clocknoon on Saturday when
that entire day is not a holiday (Sec. 85, NIL)
c. demand bill of exchange – within a reasonable time after the last negotiation. ( Sec. 71, NIL) (NOTE:
though reasonable time from last negotiation, it may be unreasonable time from issuance thus holder may
not be HDC under sec. 71)

COLUMBIAN BANKING v BOWEN (1908).On 10 June, Farmer's Merchant Bank sold to Bowen a draft dated on
that day. Bowen then indorsed it to Trabert, to whom it was forwarded by mail on 16 June & received on 20 June. As
Trabert had been travelling, he was able to indorse the draft to Columbian Banking only on 14 July. Columbian Banking

sent the draft by mail to the drawee bank which received it on 28 July. Upon presentment, the draft was dishonored.
HELD: As regards the indorsers, presentment for payment is sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last
negotiation. The delay in presenting the paper for payment between its date & the negotiation to the bank is
immaterial.

The fact that Trabert was a traveler sufficiently explained the lapse of time between his reception of the paper & his
negotiation, preserving its circulating character.

Presentment for payment must be made at a reasonable hour on a business day. What constitutes business hours of
a bank has reference to the general custom at the place of the particular transaction.

d. Check - must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its issue or drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to extent of loss caused by delay
o How time computed. — When payable at a (1) fixed period after date, (2) after sight, or (3) after that
happening of a specified event, exclude day from which the time is to begin to run, include date of payment.
(Sec. 86, NIL)
o Where the day, or the last day for payment falls on a Sunday or on a holiday – may be done on the next
succeeding secular or business day. (Sec. 194, NIL)

FICK v JONES (1936).Jones drew a check payable to the order of Fick. It was not alleged or proven that Fick
presented the check to the bank for payment. Drawer Jones refused to pay the check when Fick presented it to him.
HELD: Presentment, demand, & notice of dishonor are essential prerequisites to an action against the drawer on a
check.

GORDON v LEVINE (1907).Levine drew a check dated on a Saturday. Despite the drawer's request not to present
the check for a couple of days, payee Gordon presented it on Monday & was told there were no funds. On the same
day, the check was indorsed to Saievitz. On Tuesday, it was indorsed to Rootstein who deposited it for collection on
Thursday. The collecting bank attempted to present it on Friday but the drawee bank had already failed. HELD: A
check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after it is issued. If it is not so presented & the drawer
sustains a loss by reason of the failure of the drawee he will be discharged from liability to the extent of such loss.
This results from the nature of the instrument which is intended for immediate use & not to circulate as a promissory
note.

Where the drawer & drawee & payee are all in the same city or town a check to be presented within a reasonable time
should be presented at some time before the close of banking hours on the day after it is issued & that its circulation
from hand to hand will not extend the time of presentment to the detriment of the drawer.

MORRISON v MC CARTNEY.McCartney drew a check on 02 Oct which was indorsed to Morrison. The check was
not presented until 29 Jan. Payment was refused because the drawee closed on 03 Oct. McCartney was able to
withdraw his deposits on 06 Oct. HELD: The drawer of a check is not a surety, but the principal debtor, as much as
the maker of a promissory note. It is an absolute appropriation of money in the hands of his banker to the holder of
the check.

The drawer of a check will at all times be liable to pay the check, if the holder can show that the drawer has sustained
& can sustain no loss or damage from the omission to demand payment at an earlier date.

PNB v SEETO (1952).On 13 March, Seeto indorsed to PNB-Surigao a bearer check dated 10 March drawn against
PBC-Cebu. PNB-Surigao mailed the check to its Cebu branch on 20 March & was presented to the drawee bank on 09
April. The check was dishonored for insufficient funds because the delay in presentment cause the exhaustion of the
drawer's funds. Indorser Seeto asked that the suit be deferred while he made inquiries. He assured PNB that he would
refund the value in case of dishonor. HELD: The indorser is discharged from liability by reason of the delay in the
presentment for payment, under §84.

Drawer had enough funds when he issued the check because his subsequent checks drawn against the same bank had
been encashed.

The assurances of refund by the indorser are the ordinary obligation of an indorser which are discharged by the
unreasonable delay in presentation of the check.

NOTE: Camposes note that the discharge of the indorser should have been based on §§ 66 & 71 on presentment as
a condition to the indorser's liability & presentment for payment of a demand bill made within a reasonable time from
its last negotiation.

CRYSTAL v CA (1976).Crystal used a check in paying the redemption price of the property sold at an execution sale.
The value of the check had never been realized because it had either been dishonored or become stale. The validity
of the redemption is in question. HELD: If the check had been dishonored, the redemption is void. But if it had only
become stale through no fault of the redemptioner, then it would be unfair to deprive him of the rights he had acquired
as redemptioner, particularly if the value of the check has otherwise been received or realized. There is a strong
showing that the party had already been paid in full.

 Where DELAY excused - when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not
imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence; when the cause of delay ceases to operate, presentment must
be made with reasonable diligence (Sec. 81,NIL)
 Manner of Presentment
o The instrument must be exhibited; when paid, must be delivered up to the party paying it.(Sec. 74, NIL)
o What constitutes a sufficient presentment. (Sec. 72, NIL)
a. BY WHOM: the holder, or by some person authorized to receive payment on his behalf;

CHAN WAN v TAN KIM(1960). Tan Kim drew specially crossed checks payable to bearer. Chan Wan
presented the checks for payment to the drawee bank but they were dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Chan Wan seeks recovery on these checks. HELD: Checks crossed specially to China Banking should have
been presented for payment by that bank, not by Chan Wan. Inasmuch as Chan Wan presented them for
payment himself, there was no proper presentment & the liability did not attach to the drawer.

But there was due presentment as clearance endorsements by China Bank can be found at the back of the
checks. However, some of the checks were stamped account closed.

As Chan Wan filed to indicate how the checks reached his hands, the court held him not to be a holder in due
course who can still recover on the checks but subject to personal defenses, such as lack of consideration.

NOTE: Camposes note that despite the addition of the words "non-negotiable" on the specially crossed
checks, the Court considered the checks as negotiable instruments. A check on its face normally has all the
requisites of negotiability, and the addition of the above words should not change its character as a negotiable
instrument.

ASSOCIATED BANK v CA & REYES (1992).Different department stores issued crossed checks bearing "for
payee's account only" payable to Melissa's RTW. Sayson, acting without authority, deposited & encashed the
checks with Associated Bank. HELD: Citing State Invt House v IAC, the effects of crossing a check are:

1. check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank;

2. check may be negotiated only one -- to one who has an account with a bank; and
3. the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a
definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose.
The effects of crossing a check relate to the mode of presentment for payment.

The law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it, for the
purpose of determining their genuineness & regularity.

b. TIME: reasonable hour on a business day;

 where instrument payable at bank. — must be made during banking hours, UNLESS the person to
make payment has no funds there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case presentment
at any hour before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient (Sec. 75, NIL)
c. PLACE: proper place as herein defined: (Sec. 73, NIL)
 
1) place of payment specified – at place of payment;
2) no place of payment specified but address of the person to make payment is given in the instrument
– at the address given;
3) no place of payment and no address is given – at the usual place of business or residence of the
person to make payment;
4) in any other case – wherever person to make payment can be (1) found, or if presented (2) at his
last known place of business or residence
d. TO WHOM: (1) person primarily liable on the instrument, or if he is absent or inaccessible, (2) to any
person found at the place where the presentment is made.
 where principal debtor is dead and no place of payment is specified – to his personal representative,
IF any AND IF he can be found with the exercise of reasonable diligence (Sec. 76, NIL)
 where persons primarily liable are partners and no place of payment is specified, presentment for
- to any one of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the firm. (Sec. 77, NIL)
 joint debtors and no place of payment is specified - to them all (Sec. 78, NIL)

Dishonor by nonpayment
 When: (a) duly presented for payment + payment refused or cannot be obtained; or (b) presentment is excused +
instrument is overdue and unpaid. (Sec. 83, NIL)
 Effect:: [subject to NIL provs] an immediate right of recourse to all parties secondarily liable accrues to the holder.
(Sec. 84, NIL)

D. NOTICE OF DISHONOR

Definition:
 To bring either verbally or by writing, to the knowledge of the drawer or indorser of an instrument, the fact that a specified
NI, upon proper proceedings taken, has not been accepted or has not been paid, and that the party notified is expected to
pay it
 General rule: MUST be given to drawer and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given
is discharged

ARTERBURN v WAKEFIELD, One of the distinctions between a bill of exchange and a check is the effect of failure to give a
notice of dishonor to the drawer. When notice of dishonor of a bill of exchange is not given to the drawer, he is released; but
when there is delay in presenting a check for payment, the maker is only released to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.

 When necessary

GULLAS v PNB (1935).Gullas indorsed the treasury warrant which was sold to PNB. Gullas also maintained an account with
the bank. The warrant was subsequently dishonored by the Insular Treasurer. The bank sent notices of dishonor to by mail to
Gullas which could not be delivered to him at that time because he was in Manila. The bank set off Gullas' deposits as payment
of the warrant. This resulted in the non-payment of checks he had issued. HELD: A notice of dishonor is necessary to charge
an indorser & that the right of action against him does not accrue until the notice is given.

As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part
of a depositor. However, prior to the mailing of notice of dishonor & without awaiting any action by Gullas, the bank made use
of the money standing in his account to make good for the treasury warrant. Gullas was merely an indorser & notice should
actually have been given to him in order that he might protect his interests.

 Form - in writing or oral; Contents - in any terms which sufficiently (1) identify the instrument, and (2) indicate that it
has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment; delivered personally or through the mails. (Sec. 96, NIL)
 The ff. notice still sufficient: (Sec. 95, NIL)
(1) a written notice, not signed
(2) insufficient written notice, supplemented and validated by verbal communication
(3) instrument suffering from misdescription UNLESS the party to whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby.
 Time - as soon as the instrument is dishonored and within the time fixed by NIL, unless delay excused (Sec. 102, NIL)
o Where parties reside in same place (Sec. 103, NIL): Must be given w/in the ff. times…
 If given at the place of business of the person to receive notice - before the close of business hours on the day
following
 If given at his residence - before the usual hours of rest on the day following
 
 If sent by mail - deposited in the post office in time to reach him in usual course on the day following.
o Where parties reside in different places (Sec. 104, NIL).:
 If sent by mail - deposited in the post office in time to go by mail the day following the day of dishonor, or if there
be no mail at a convenient hour on last day, by the next mail thereafter
 If given otherwise - within the time that notice would have been received in due course of mail, if it had been
deposited in the post office within the time specified above

STATE BANK OF EAST MOLINE v STANDAERT.Spouses Standaert made a promissory note to the spouses De Vos who
subsequently sold the note to the bank before maturity. The note was not paid at maturity. Bank claims it was its unswerving
custom to send notice on the date of maturity. The teller-bookkeeper testified on the existence of the bank custom but not on
the preparation nor sending out of the particular notice of dishonor to the indorser De Vos. HELD: To charge an indorser with
the payment of a note, the holder must establish that the notice of dishonor was addressed & actually mailed.

There is a liberalizing tendency with reference to the proof required to establish the posting of the letter. While the courts may
not require a distinct recollection of the particular letter, there must be some evidence on the part of the person whose general
practice it was to post the mail that the custom was complied with on the date in question. In CAB, there was a failure to
establish, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the holder mailed the notice fo dishonor to the indorser when the
obligation was due which discharged the latter from his obligation.

ARTERBURN v WAKEFIELD (1949).Arterburn drew a check payable to the order of Wakefield. The check was dishonored
upon presentment. The payee sued the drawer. Drawer alleges that there was a failure to state a cause of action as the
petition filed by plaintiff did not allege that notice of dishonor had been given. HELD: One of the distinctions between a bill of
exchange and a check is the effect of failure to give a notice of dishonor to the drawer. When notice of dishonor of a bill of
exchange is not given to the drawer, he is released; but when there is delay in presenting a check for payment, the maker is
only released to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. The law places the drawer of a bill of exhange & the maker of a
check on a different plane since the maker of a check is regarded as the principal debtor & the check supports to be drawn
upon a fund deposited to meet it.

Failure to give notice to the maker of the non-payment of the check should be required to set out in his answer the damage
which has resulted to him by reason of such failure.

 When sender deemed to have given due notice. — Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the post
office, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the mails. (Sec. 105, NIL)
o What constitutes “deposit in post office” — when deposited in any branch post office or in any letter box under the
control of the post-office department. (Sec. 106, NIL)
 Where notice must be sent (Sec. 108, NIL). — to the address, if any, added by the party to his signature; if address not
given:
a) to the post-office nearest to his place of residence or where he is accustomed to receive his letters; or
b) If he lives in one place and has his place of business in another, to either place; or
c) If he is sojourning in another place, to the place where he is so sojourning.
But where the notice is actually received by the party within the time specified in this Act, sufficient, though not sent in
accordance with the requirement of this section
 Delay in giving notice; how excused. — when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and
not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, notice must be given
with reasonable diligence. (Sec. 113, NIL)
 By Whom Given
o (1) By or on behalf of the holder or (2) any party to the instrument who may be compelled to pay it to the holder, and
who, upon taking it up, would have a right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice is given ( Sec. 90,
NIL)
o Notice of dishonor may be given by an agent either in his own name or in the name of any party entitled to give notice,
whether that party be his principal or not (Sec. 91, NIL)

SIMON v PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF PASSAIC (1936). Robert Simon made a note payable at the
Passaic Bank. This note was indorsed by Frucht & held by Ruth Simon. Ruth left the note with the Paterson Bank for
collection. The Paterson Bank forwarded the note to Passaic Bank. Upon presentment, the note was dishonored. The
notices of dishonor for all parties liable on the instrument were received by Paterson Bank. Paterson Bank mailed all the
notices to Ruth Simon. Ruth failed to collect against the maker & indorser. Ruth brought this action against the Passaic
Bank & the Paterson Bank alleging negligence. HELD: Passaic Bank was a mere agent of Paterson Bank for effecting
 
collection. Its duty was to give due notice of dishonor to Paterson Bank. It knew nothing concerning the indorsers or their
residences.

Paterson Bank was a mere agent of Ruth Simon & presumably knew nothing concerning the indorsers or their residences.
The bank's duty was fully performed when it gave timely notice of the dishonor to its principal so that the principal could
notify the prior parties to be charged.

Where the instrument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable
thereon or he may give notice to his principal. If he gives notice to his principal, he must do so within the same time as if
he were holder, and the principal upon the receipt of such notice has himself the same time for giving notices as if the
agent had been an independent holder.

o Where instrument has been dishonored in hands of agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable
thereon, or he may give notice to his principal (within the same time as if agent were holder) (Sec. 94, NIL)
 To whom notice MAY be given
o to his principal, in case of an instrument dishonored in the hands of an agent (Sec. 94, NIL)
o to the party himself or his agent in that behalf (Sec. 97, NIL)
o where party is dead and death known to the party giving notice – (1) MUST be given to a personal representative, if
there be one, and if with reasonable diligence, he can be found; (2) no personal representative – MAY be sent to the
last residence or last place of business of the deceased. (Sec. 98, NIL)
o partners — to any one partner, even though there has been a dissolution. (Sec. 99, NIL)
o persons jointly liable. — to each of them unless one of them has authority to receive such notice for the others. (Sec.
100, NIL)
o bankrupt. — to the party himself or to his trustee or assignee (Sec. 101, NIL)
 In whose favor notice operates
1. when given by/on behalf of holder: inures to benefit of (Sec. 92, NIL)
a. all subsequent holders and
b. all prior parties who have a right of recourse vs. the party to whom it’s given
2. where notice given by/on behalf of a party entitled to give notice: inures for benefit (Sec. 93, NIL)
a. holder
b. all parties subsequent to party to whom notice given
 Waiver
o Waiver of notice. — either (1) before the time of giving notice has arrived or (2) after the omission to give due notice;
may be expressed or implied. (Sec. 109, NIL)
o Where the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself - binding upon all parties; where written above the signature of
an indorser - binds him only. (Sec. 110, NIL)

PEOPLE’S NATIONAL BANK OF YPSILANTI v DICKS (1932). Ives & Dick signed on the face of a promissory note. Directly
opposite Dicks' name was the word "indorsed" stamped thereon. A waiver of demand & notice of non-payment or protest was
on the face of another part of the note (presumably at the back). There was no presentment of the note for payment to Ives,
no demand of payment made of him, no dishonor by Ives, no notice of dishonor to Dicks, no protest of the note. Bank sued
Dicks & Ives on the note. HELD: Dicks is deemed merely an indorser as his signature was so placed upon the instrument that
it is not clear in what capacity he intended to sign.

The law distinguishes between a waiver embodied in the instrument itself & a waiver upon the back thereof above the signature
of an indorser. An indorser is bound by a waiver that is embodied in the body of the instrument.

'Embodied in the instrument' means 'embodied in the original contract.' Detached words on the back of the instrument at the
time it is issued are not embodied in the contract expressed on the face of the instrument.

 Where not necessary to charge drawer (Sec. 114, NIL)

a. drawer/drawee same person
b. drawee fictitious, incapacitated
c. drawer is person to whom instrument is presented for payment
d. drawer has no right to expect/require that drawee/acceptor will honor instrument
e. drawer countermanded payment
 
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE v CA (1993).Moulic issued 2 checks to Victoriano as security for pieces of jewelry to be sold
on commission. Victoriano negotiated these checks to State Investment. As Moulic failed to sell the jewelry, she returned them
to Victoriano. However, she failed to retrieve her checks. Moulic withdrew her funds from the drawee bank. Upon presentment,
the checks were dishonored. HELD: State Investment is a holder in due course & is not subject to the personal defense of lack
of consideration.

There is no need to serve the drawer a notice of dishonor because she was responsible for the dishonor of her checks. After
withdrawing her funds, she could not have expected her checks to be honored.

 Where not necessary to charge indorser (Sec. 115, NIL)

a. drawee fictitious, incapacitated, and indorser aware of the fact at time of indorsement
b. indorser is person to whom instrument presented for payment
c. instrument made/accepted for his accommodation

E. PROTEST
 Definition: testimony of some proper person that the regular legal steps to fix the liability of drawer and indorsers have
been taken
 When necessary: in case of a FOREIGN BILL appearing on its face to be such; protest for non-acceptance if dishonored
by nonacceptance & protest for nonpayment if not previously dishonored by nonpayment. If not so protested, the drawer
and indorsers are discharged. (Sec. 152, NIL)
 Form – (1) annexed to the bill or must contain a copy thereof, and (2) must be under the hand and seal of the notary
making it; Contents – (a) The time and place of presentment; (b) The fact that presentment was made and the manner
thereof; (c) The cause or reason for protesting the bill; (d) The demand made and the answer given, if any, or the fact that
the drawee or acceptor could not be found. (Sec. 153, NIL).
 By whom - (a) A notary public; or (b) any respectable resident of the place where the bill is dishonored, in the presence
of two or more credible witnesses. (Sec. 154, NIL)
 Time - on the day of its dishonor unless delay is excused; when duly noted, the protest may be subsequently extended as
of the date of the noting. (Sec. 155, NIL); Place - at the place where it is dishonored, EXCEPT bill drawn payable at the
place of business or residence of person other than the drawee has been dishonored by nonacceptance, it must be protested
for non-payment at the place where it is expressed to be payable, and no further presentment for payment to, or demand
on, the drawee is necessary. (Sec. 156, NIL)
 Protest for better security against the drawer and indorsers — where the acceptor has been adjudged a bankrupt or an
insolvent or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors before the bill matures (Sec. 158, NIL)
 When delay excused – when caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to his default,
misconduct, or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, the bill must be noted or protested with reasonable
diligence.; When protest dispensed with - by any circumstances which would dispense with notice of dishonor. ( Sec.
159, NIL)

ELLENBOGEN v STATE BANK (1922).State Bank drew a draft to the order of Ellenbogen's agent upon the Polish Natl Loan
Bank. The check was duly presented but was refused payment on the ground of insufficient funds. An action was filed to
recover on the draft but was dismissed for failure to plead that the draft was protested. HELD: Neither presentment nor notice
of dishonor is required to be given to the drawer where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor
will pay or honor the instrument. Since neither presentment nor notice of dishonor was necessary, therefore protest was also
not required.

TAN LEONCO v GO INQUI(1907). In exchange for the abaca from Tan Leonco's plantations, Go Inqui drew a bill of exchange
against Lim Uyco. Upon presentment of the draft, it was refused payment due to a stop order from the drawer. The bill was
not protested. HELD: The action is not brought upon the bill of exchange which was used only as evidence of the indebtedness.
Under these conditions, protest & notice of nonpayment are unnecessary in order to render the drawer liable.

NOTE: The ruling of the Court on protest is merely obiter dictum.

 Waiver of protest: deemed to be a waiver not only of a formal protest but also of presentment and notice of dishonor.
(Sec. 111, NIL)

F. ACCEPTANCE or PAYMENT FOR HONOR

 
 When bill may be accepted for honor. — When a BE has been (1) protested for dishonor by non-acceptance or protested
for better security and (2) is not overdue  any person not being a party already liable may, with the CONSENT of the
holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of any party liable thereon or for the honor of the person
for whose account the bill is drawn.
 The acceptance for honor may be for part only of the sum for which the bill is drawn;
 where there has been an acceptance for honor for one party, there may be a further acceptance by a different person for
the honor of another party. (Sec. 161, NIL)
 Referee in case of need — person whose name is inserted by the drawer of a bill and any indorser to whom the holder
may resort in case bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment; option of the holder to resort to the referee (Sec.
131, NIL)
 PAYMENT FOR HONOR - any person may intervene and pay bill protested for non-payment supra protest (Sec. 171,
NIL)

G. LIABILITY OF PARTY ON INDORSEMENT AFTER MATURITY

BISHOP v DEXTER (1817).Dexter, as payee of a note against Whittlesey, indorsed it to Converse after it was due. The note
was further indorsed until it reached the hands of Bishop. Bishop seeks to recover on the note although no demand was ever
made of the maker, Whittlesey, nor notice ever given to Dexter. HELD: The indorsement of a bill or note after due is equivalent
to drawing a new bill payable at sight. Demand must be made by the indorsee of the drawer or maker & notice given to the
indorser, otherwise the indorser will be discharged of his liability.

One cannot rightly presume that a proper demand had been made & notice given when the note fell due & is not bound to
make demand or give notice to enable him to recover of the first indorser. This is repugnant to the principle that the indorsement
after due is equivalent to drawing a new bill.

H. INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE AT BANK

BINGHAMPTON PHARMACY v FIRST NATIONAL BANK(1915).There is a distinction between the drawer of a check & the
maker of a note payable at a bank:
Note payable at bank Check

maker of a note is primarily liable on the instrument drawer of a check is only liable after dishonor

law excuses presentment of the instrument requires presentment within a reasonable time at the peril of
discharging the drawer

obligation of the maker of a note is not a conditional promise Breach of the duty of the holder of a check to present for
to pay only at a special place, but is a promise to pay payment at the place where it is payable at a reasonable time
generally, even though a place of payment discharges the drawer from liability to the extent he is
damaged by the breach.

I. BILLS IN SET - composed of various parts being numbered, and containing a reference to the other parts, all of which
parts constitute one bill of lading
 Bills in set constitute one bill. (Sec. 178, NIL)
 Right of HDCs where different parts are negotiated. — the holder whose title first accrues is the true owner of the bill.
But nothing in this section affects the right of a person who, in due course, accepts or pays the parts first presented to him.
(Sec. 179., NIL)
 Liability of holder who indorses two or more parts of a set to different persons. — liable on every such part, and every
indorser subsequent to him is liable on the part he has himself indorsed, as if such parts were separate bills. ( Sec. 180,
NIL)
 Acceptance - may be written on any part and it must be written on one part only. If the drawee accepts more than one
part and such accepted parts negotiated to different holders in due course, he is liable on every such part as if it were a
separate bill. (Sec. 181, NIL)
 Payment - When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it without requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be
delivered up to him, and the part at maturity is outstanding in the hands of a holder in due course, he is liable to the holder
thereon. (Sec. 182, NIL)
 Effect of discharging one of a set. — Except as herein otherwise provided, the whole bill is discharged. (Sec. 183, NIL)
 

VI. DISCHARGE

DISCHARGE - is the release of all parties, whether primary or secondary, from the obligation on the instrument; renders the
instrument non-negotiable

A. OF THE INSTRUMENT (Sec. 119, NIL) – How discharged:

1. payment in due course by or on behalf of principal debtor
a. by whom made

FOX v. KROEGER (1931). Mrs. Fox was the principal and Kroeger was the surety of a note executed and payable
to LeviState bank. Mrs. Fox died before the note matures. Upon maturity, Kroeger execute4d and delivered his own
note to the payee for the amount of the principal note. The principal note was assigned to Kroeger. Kroeger sued the
plaintiff herein, B. Fox who was the executor of the estate of Mrs. Fox. The action was on the NOTE and NOT on the
implied contract of REIMBURSEMENT. B.J. Fox argues that the 2 year period of limitations has already set in (this
governs the implied reimbursement between the surety and the principal debtor. WON the principal debtor was
discharged. HELD: YES. Where a surety pays the debt of the principal, he is subrogated all the rights remedies,
equities, and securities of the principal and can bring an action on the very debt itself. In such a case, the surety has
an election of remedies. In the promissory note in this case, Kroeger was compelled to pay the note and on doing so
took an assignment thereof, and brings this action on the note itself.

b. at or after maturity
c. to the holder thereof

EQUITABLE BANK vs. IAC ,The subject check was also ambiguous and equivocal. By making the check read,
“payable to Equitable bank Order of A/C Casville Enterprises, Inc.”, the payee ceased to be indicated with reasonable
certainty and thus in contravention of sec. 8 of the NIL. This ambiguity should be construed against Nell. 2

IN RE: HARBAUGH’S ESTATE (1936). A claim was being put forward form the estate of Harbaugh. A check made
by the decedent which was indorsed to Jessie Harbaugh before it matured. Three days after, Flora was given by the
decedent a check which covered the amount of the previous indorsed note. Claimant was alleging that the obligation
for the 1st note was still demandable. HELD: Payment to a payee of a negotiable instrument when the title and
possession of the instrument has passed to another before maturity will not protect the maker. If the maker thinks
that it should be right to pay the payee, without the production of the note, he does so in his own peril, and the holder
who has legal title to said instrument may recover payment form him.

In the CAB, It was found by the auditor that payment was made to the assignor/indorser and such was given to
indorsee/holder. Thus, such would operate as a discharge of the instrument.

d. in good faith and without notice that his title is defective

2. payment in due course by party accommodated where party is made/ accepted for accommodation
3. intentional cancellation by holder
 if unintentional or under mistake or without authority of holder, inoperative; where instrument or sig appears to
have been cancelled, burden of proof on party which alleges it was unintentional, etc. ( Sec. 123, NIL)

2
For our purpose, “ payment to one of several payees or indorsees in the alternative discharges the instrument…”(see p. 826 of Campos)


JONES’ ADMINISTRATORS v. COLEMAN (1917). A claim was made

against the estate of Reps Jones upon a promissory note which
appeared to be mutilated (the note was burned). There was neither
the date nor the signature of the decedent maker because it
appeared to have been destroyed by the burning. Evidence tended
to show that the handwritten name of the payee, Coleman, was
made in the handwriting of the decedent. HELD: A cancellation
made unintentionally or under a mistake, or without the authority of
the holder is inoperative; but where the instrument, or any
signature thereon, appears to have been cancelled, the burden of
proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made
unintentionally or under mistake or without authority.

4. any other act which discharges a simple contract for payment of money

MANCHESTER v. PARSONS (1915). Parsons executed a note payable to Burton for value, 18 months from the date
it was executed. The note was negotiated to plaintiff about two months after it was executed. After 11 months, Colts were
delivered to Burton with the understanding that these Colts would pay the note and the difference of the value of the Colts
and the note would have to be paid by Burton. Plaintiff-indorsee now sues Defendant-maker who argues that he has already
paid the obligation. HELD: Evidence shows that the note was indorsed to plaintiffs for value, thus payment to the original
holders (Burton) by the maker (Parsons) did not discharge the instrument. The acts which will discharge a simple contract
for payment of money, in order to effect a discharge of the instrument within the contemplation of the law, must therefore
be limited to such acts as relate to and affect the holder of a paper demanding payment thereof. It does not include a
holder in due course.

5. principal debtor becomes holder of instrument at or after maturity in his own right

SCHWARTZMAN v. POST (1903). Post executed a note (for $5,000) payable to his order on demand, indorsed by hem,
his father and by defendant Postalwalsky. This was delivered to Schwartzman in payment of his interest in a partnership of
which plaintiff and defendant are members. The defendant and a third party paid ($3,250) on the condition that the note
be surrendered to him. This was done. Plaintiff now sues defendant for the difference. Defendant argues that the surrender
is tantamount to discharge. HELD: When a principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in
his own right, then the note is discharged. Post was the maker of the note, and primarily liable thereon. It was surrendered
to him, and he became the “holder” thereof without fraud or mistake “in his own right.” Thus, under the law (during this
time in 1899, pre-NIL), the note would be discharged.

6. renunciation of holder: (Sec. 122, NIL)

 holder may expressly renounce his rights vs. any party to the instrument, before or after its maturity
 absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against PRINCIPAL DEBTOR made at or after maturity
discharges the instrument
 renunciation does not affect rights of HDC w/o notice.
 Renunciation must be in writing unless instrument delivered up to person primarily liable thereon
 
MCGLYNN v. GRANSTROM (1926). Plaintiff-payee sues defendant-indorser on a promissory note.
The defense alleged that the plaintiff was party to an oral contract where the maker was to be
discharged. Since it was an oral contract, the plaintiff invokes Sec. 122 of the NIL where it is
required that a renunciation by the holder of an instrument of his rights therein must be made in
writing. HELD: The defendant, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, is no longer liable. This is a
case where the indorser is discharged because the maker is discharged (under Sec. 120 not, as
argued by plaintiff, under sec.122). Schwartzman Under section 122, there cannot be a
renunciation without writing or delivery back. There is a change of designation from secs. 119 and
10 to 122 where the terminology was changed from “discharge” to “renunciation.”

7. material alteration – review Sec. 125, NIL: what constitutes material alteration (Sec. 124, NIL: material alteration w/o
assent of all parties liable avoids instrument except as against party to alteration and subsequent indorsers)

B. OF SECONDARY PARTIES (Sec. 120, NIL)

1. by discharge of instrument
2. intentional cancellation of signature by holder

MCCORMICK v. SHEA (1906). This action was brought on the promissory note by Thomas Shea as maker and
Defendant Annie Shea as Indorser. Before the maturity of the note, Annie was cancelled by a representative of the
defendant’s attorney in the presence of plaintiff. Plaintiff argues he never authorized such cancellation. HELD: A
cancellation made unintentionally or under a mistake or without the authority of the holder is inoperative; but where an
instrument or any signature thereon appears to have been cancelled, the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges that
the cancellation was made unintentionally, or under mistake or without authority.

3. discharge of prior party

ROBERTS v. CHAPELL. The Dailys executed a note payable to the order of Chappell which the latter indorsed to Roberts
one year before the maturity date. Upon due presentment, the note was dishonored. This was made known to Chappell.
The holder sued the indorser who argued that one of the makers was solvent at the time of his death and had he presented
the note to the administratrix, the note would have been paid. For the reason of the plaintiff’s failure, the indorser was
thereafter discharged. HELD: The mere failure of a creditor to present his claim against the estate of a deceased principal
will not release the surety, even though the claim against the estate may be barred by reason of such omission. The liability
of the surviving party is not discharged by mere delay on the part of the creditor to prosecute his suit against the estate of
the principal within the prescribed statute.

4. valid tender of payment by prior party

CORLEY v. FRENCH (1927). Coley was the payee-holder of a note for $2500 sued French and the other indorsers
thereon. The note contained a waiver of presentment and notice and was made payable to the American National Bank. At
the day of maturity, the note was not presented to the bank. The corporate maker had refunds on the deposit in the bank
at the date of maturity of the note sufficient to pay it. The defendants argue that there was constructive tender of payment
and laches. HELD: The effect of the waiver was to make the indorser liable absent presentment. He continues to be
secondarily liable but without the right to interpose the defense of lack of presentment. As regards the liability of the maker,
it must be shown that the maker was able to pay at the time the note matured and that there was willingness on the part
of the maker to apply the funds in deposit to such obligation.

5. release of principal debtor, unless holder’s right of recourse vs. 2ndary party reserved
6. any agreement binding upon holder to extend time of payment, or to postpone holder’s right to enforce instrument,
UNLESS (1) made with assent of party secondarily liable, or (2) right of recourse reserved.
 
MAGLIONE v. PENTA (1929). A payee(defendant) of a note secured by a mortgage indorsed the note and assigned
the mortgage to plaintiff who paid the amount therefor. The indorser waived presentment and notice. Plaintiff wanted to
foreclose but the mortgagor paid $300. Defendant-indorser then asked plaintiff whether the note and the mortgage had
been paid and the plaintiff told him that the had an arrangement with the mortgagor-maker. Because of the default of the
mortgagor subsequently, the holder sued the indorser. The TC found that there was an extension of the time of payment
agreed upon by the makers and the plaintiff. HELD: If the plaintiff made a valid and binding agreement with the makers
of the note extending the time of the payment without the knowledge and consent of the surety, the surety is thereby
discharged. In these circumstances, the defendant (indorser) appears to have been discharged).

7. Failure to make due presentment (Secs. 70, 144, NIL)

8. failure to give notice of dishonor
9. certification of check at instance of holder
10. reacquisition by prior party
 where instrument negotiated back to a prior party, such party may reissue and further negotiate, but not entitled
to enforce payment vs. any intervening party to whom he was personally liable
 where instrument is paid by party secondarily liable, it’s not discharged, but
a. the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regard to all prior parties
b. and he may strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate instrument, except
o where it’s payable to order of 3rd party and has been paid by drawer
o where it’s made/accepted for accommodation and has been paid by party accommodated

VII. OTHER FORMS OF COMMERCIAL PAPER

 Commercial papers - also NIs; merely special forms of either PNs or BEs; also governed by the NIL
 Quasi-negotiable - include commercial paper which though not governed by the NIL, have certain attributes of
negotiability.
Negotiable Documents of Title

 as distinguished from negotiable instruments, refer to goods and not to money; the sale of goods covered is effected by
the transfer of said document.
 not governed by the NIL but by the Civil Code.
 includes any bill of lading, dock warrant, “quedan”, or warehouse receipt or order for the delivery of goods, or any other
document used in the ordinary course of business in the sale or transfer of goods, as proof of the possession or control of
the goods, or authorizing or purporting to authorize the possessor of the document to transfer or receive, either by
indorsement or by delivery, goods represented by such document.
 Documents of title negotiable when goods represented thereby are deliverable to a specified person , to order or to bearer.
 valuable in commerce because it facilitates the sale and delivery of goods.

A. KINDS

1. Warehouse receipts an agreement by a warehouseman to store goods and deliver them to a named person or his order
or to bearer.
2. Bill of Lading a similar contract by a carrier to ship goods and deliver them to the person named therein or his order or
to bearer; negotiable bill of lading is useful not only as evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier but as evidencing
title to goods covered by it. It also facilitates the purchase of goods by one person from another who is physically remote
and probably unknown to him.
 “straight” bill where the goods are to be delivered to a specified person, it is not negotiable and is called a “straight”
bill. Otherwise, it is referred to as an “order” bill.
3. Certificate of Deposit
 a receipt of a bank for certain sum of money received upon deposit; generally framed in such FORM as to constitute a
promissory note, payable to the depositor, or to the depositor or order, or to bearer.
 it is taken when depositor does not need his money for some extended period of time and wants it to earn interest;
more of an investment paper than a commercial paper because it is not attendant to a commercial transaction the way
a check or a promissory note is.
 it is negotiable if it meets all the requirements of Sec 1 NIL
4. Bonds and Debentures
 Bonds
o evidences of indebtedness, in the nature of a PNs
 
o usually accompanied by a mortgage of the property of the issuer
o issued by the government (municipal & other public corporations) & private corporations;
o though not to mature for a long time, assure some regular income to bondholders in the form of interest*, usually
payable annually
o bonds and interest coupons (evidences interest obligations)*
 may be negotiable in form, therefore governed by NIL (Sec 65);
 both are actually promissory notes
o they run for long periods of time, and are often sold to the public in general
o funds generated by such bonds are used to finance corporate projects and public works;
o there is no warranty on the part of such indorser or negotiator that prior parties had capacity to contract. The
qualified indorser & negotiator by delivery of a bond do not warrant therefore that the corporation which issued
the bonds has any judicial capacity to act. A general indorser thereof however would be liable for such want of
capacity.
 Debentures
o similar to bonds except that they are usually for a shorter tem and may or may not be accompanied by a mortgage.
o they are often issued on the general credit of the issuer corporation

MERCER COUNTY v HACKETT, When a corporation covenants by means of bonds and obtains funds for the accomplishment
of the useful enterprises of the day, it cannot be allowed to evade the payment by parading some obsolete judicial decision that
a bond cannot be made payable to bearer.

MANKER v AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, Bonds in this case provide that the payment is to be made only out of a particular
fund & do not contain an unconditional promise to pay, therefore, non-negotiable. The appellant from whom they were stolen
would be entitled to the bonds as against the respondent bank which came into possession of them through a chain of transfers
from the thief.

ENOCH v BRANDON, References in the bond to the trust mortgage do not constitute modification of the promise to pay,
hence the bonds are negotiable. A possibility of the acceleration of the date when the bonds are due, if there is default under
the mortgage does not make the bonds non-negotiable.

5. Drafts and Letters of Credit - The draft and the letter of credit are generally used together to effect payment in
international transactions.
 Drafta form of BE generally used to facilitate the transactions between persons physically remote from each other.
 Letters of Credit
o one person requests some other person to advance money or give credit to a third person, and promises that he
will repay the same to the person making the advancement, or accept bills drawn upon himself for the like amount.
o must be issued in favor of a definite person, and not to order.
o under our law, a letter of credit cannot be a negotiable instrument because (a) it may not contain the words of
negotiability; (b) may be issued for an undetermined amount. See Art 568 Code of Commerce.
o “INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE”: Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contract(s),
even if any reference whatsoever to such contract(s) is included in the credit. Consequently, the undertaking of
a bank to pay, accept and pay draft(s) or negotiate and/or fulfill any other obligation under the credit is not subject
to claims or defenses by the applicant resulting from his relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary. A
beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the contractual relationships existing between the banks or between the
applicant and the issuing bank.
- Thus, the engagement of the issuing bank is to pay the seller or beneficiary of the credit once the draft and
the required documents are presented to it. This principle assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt
payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining
whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Under this principle, banks assume no liability or
responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents,
or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do
they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing,
delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or
omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or
any other person whomsoever.
- The independent nature of the letter of credit may be: (a) independence in toto where the credit is
independent from the justification aspect and is a separate obligation from the underlying agreement like for
instance a typical standby; or (b) independence may be only as to the justification aspect like in a commercial
letter of credit or repayment standby, which is identical with the same obligations under the underlying
 
agreement. In both cases the payment may be enjoined if in the light of the purpose of the credit the
payment of the credit would constitute fraudulent abuse of the credit.(Transfield vs. Luzon Hydro)

 Pertinent Code of Commerce provisions:

o Art 567. Letters of credit - issued by one merchant to another for the purpose of attending to a commercial
transaction.
o Art 568. The essential conditions of letter of credit shall be:
1. issued in favor of a definite person, and not to order.
2. limited to a fixed and specified amount, or to one or more undetermined amount, but all within a maximum
the limit of which has to be stated exactly.
Note: Those which do not have any of these last circumstances shall be considered as mere letters of
recommendation.
 Art 569. The drawer of a letter of credit shall be liable to the person on whom it was issued, for the amount paid by
virtue thereof, within the maximum fixed therein.
Letters of credit may not be protested even if not be paid; bearer cannot acquire any right of action by reason of non-
payment against the person who issued it.
The person paying shall has right to demand the proof of the identity of the person in whose favor the letter of credit
was issued.
 Art 570. The drawer of a letter of credit may annul it, informing the bearer and the person to whom it is addressed
 Art 571. The bearer of a letter or credit shall pay the amount received to the drawer without delay. Should he not do
so, an action involving execution may be brought to recover it, with legal interest and the current exchange in the
place where it is repaid.
 Art 572. If the bearer of a letter of credit does not make use thereof within the (1) period agreed upon with the
drawer, or in default of a period fixed, (2) within 6 months, counted from its date, in any point in the Philippines, and
within 12 months anywhere outside thereof, it shall be void in fact and in law.


GREGORIO ARANETA INC. v PNB (1954). An alleged banking custom whereby a draft should be paid at the rate exis1ting
on the date of its maturity is immaterial since there is an express contract between the parties embodied in the application for
commercial letter of credit. The application specifically provides that what is to be paid at maturity in Philippine currency is the
equivalent of “the amount or such portion thereof as may be drawn or paid upon the faith” of the plaintiff’s credit; and it is
admitted that the defendant bank actually paid for the draft the amount of P33,727.92. There is also an agreement of the
plaintiff to “reimburse” the defendant bank – a term that requires the return of something paid.

NAT’L RICE & CORN v PAN-PHIL SHIPPING. The letter of credit is in strict accord with the terms of Nat’l Rice’s contract
with Pan-Philippine. Accordingly, the mere refusal of the beneficiary (NG&S’s which relinquished its interest in the letter of credit
upon alleged ground of violation with conditions of the sales contract) cannot be force majeure within the meaning of the law
Nat’l Rice could not have used that letter of credit for some other purpose because it is an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of
a specified party (NG&S), the same could not be changed by Nat’l Rice or the bank without the consent of the beneficiary
(NG&S).

BPI v DE RENY FABRIC (1970). The company and its officers cannot shift the burden of loss to the bank because of the
terms of their Commercial Letter of Credit Agreement with the bank provides that latter shall not be responsible for the any
difference in character or condition of the property. Furthermore, the bank was able to prove the existence of a custom in
international banking and financing circles negating any duty of the bank to verify whether what has been described in letters
of credits or drafts or shipping documents actually tallies with what was loaded aboard ship. Banks, in providing financing in
international business transactions do not deal with the property to be exported or shipped to the importer, but deal only with
documents.

TRANSFIELD VS.LUZON HYDRO (2004).Can the beneficiary invoke the independence principle? Yes.

Given the nature of letters of credit, petitioner’s argument—that it is only the issuing bank that may invoke the independence
principle on letters of credit—does not impress this Court. To say that the independence principle may only be invoked by the
issuing banks would render nugatory the purpose for which the letters of credit are used in commercial transactions. As it is,
the independence doctrine works to the benefit of both the issuing bank and the beneficiary.

Letters of credit are employed by the parties desiring to enter into commercial transactions, not for the benefit of the issuing
bank but mainly for the benefit of the parties to the original transactions. With the letter of credit from the issuing bank, the
party who applied for and obtained it may confidently present the letter of credit to the beneficiary as a security to convince the
beneficiary to enter into the business transaction. On the other hand, the other party to the business transaction, i.e., the
beneficiary of the letter of credit, can be rest assured of being empowered to call on the letter of credit as a security in case the
 
commercial transaction does not push through, or the applicant fails to perform his part of the transaction. It is for this reason
that the party who is entitled to the proceeds of the letter of credit is appropriately called “beneficiary.”

Petitioner’s argument that any dispute must first be resolved by the parties, whether through negotiations or arbitration, before
the beneficiary is entitled to call on the letter of credit in essence would convert the letter of credit into a mere guarantee.
Jurisprudence has laid down a clear distinction between a letter of credit and a guarantee in that the settlement of a dispute
between the parties is not a pre-requisite for the release of funds under a letter of credit. In other words, the argument is
incompatible with the very nature of the letter of credit. If a letter of credit is drawable only after settlement of the dispute on
the contract entered into by the applicant and the beneficiary, there would be no practical and beneficial use for letters of credit
in commercial transactions.

6. Certificate of Stock
 orshare certificate is the customary and convenient evidence of the holder’s interest in the corporation which issues
it.
 not a NI, but is included in the term “securities” bec does not contain any promise or order to pay money;
 described as Quasi-Negotiable bec oftentimes, by application of the principles of estoppel, and to effectuate the
ends of justice and the intention of the parties, the courts decree a better title to the transferee than actually existed
in his transferor, and is the same as would be reached if the certificate were negotiable.
 When the shareholder signs the back of certificates of stock without filling in the blanks (for the name of the transferee
and attorney-in-fact) and the certificate is delivered to another, the latter appears to be the owner thereof. A bona
fide purchaser of value without notice, will be protected in his acquisition, although such third person has diverted the
certificate from the purpose for which he was entrusted therewith. (Principle of Estoppel)
 The same rule is applicable if the certificate is in bearer form.
 The rule is applicable where the certificate is lost or stolen while signed in blank. Even a purchaser in good faith cannot
acquire title as against the true owner. (?)
 At common law, stock certificates are given the attributes of negotiability only where the owner thereof has entrusted
the wrongdoer with the possession of such certificate and clothed him with apparent ownership thereof.

SANTAMARIA v HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK (1951). Plaintiff, in failing to take the necessary precaution upon
delivering the certificate of stock to her broker, was chargeable with negligence in the transaction which resulted to her own
prejudice, and as such, she is estopped from asserting title to it as against the defendant bank.
A certificate of stock, indorsed in blank, is deemed quasi-negotiable, and as such the transferee thereof is justified in believing
that it belongs to the holder and transferor.

DE LOS SANTOS, McGRATH, A share of stock may be transferred by endorsement of the stock certificate, coupled with its
delivery. However, the transfer shall not be valid except as between the parties, until it is entered and noted upon the books
of the corporation (Sec 35 Corporation Law). Although a stock certificate is sometimes regarded as quasi-negotiable, it is
well settled that the instrument is non-negotiable, because the holder thereof takes it without prejudice to such rights or defense
as the registered owner or credit may have under the law, except in so far as such rights or defenses are subject to the
limitations imposed by the principles governing ESTOPPEL.

DE LOS SANTOS, McGRATH (1955). A share of stock may be transferred by endorsement of the stock certificate, coupled
with its delivery. However, the transfer shall not be valid except as between the parties, until it is entered and noted upon the
books of the corporation (Sec 35 Corporation Law). No such entry in the name of the plaintiffs having been made, it follows
that the transfer effected by Campos and Hess in their favor is not valid, except as between themselves. It does not bind
Madrigal or the Mitsuis who are not parties to the transactions.
Although a stock certificate is sometimes regarded as quasi-negotiable, in the sense that it may be transferred by endorsement,
coupled with delivery it is well settled that the instrument is non-negotiable, because the holder thereof takes it without prejudice
to such rights or defense as the registered owner or credit may have under the law, except in so far as such rights or defenses
are subject tot eh limitations imposed by the principles governing estoppel.
In the case at bar, the certificates of stock were in the name of Madrigal. Therefore, the alleged sellers (Campos and Hess)
were not registered owners. Plaintiffs must have been conscious of the infirmities in the title of the supposed vendors. Therefore,
plaintiffs assumed those risks and hence, cannot validly claim, against the registered stockholder, the status of purchasers in
good faith.

CAPCO v MACASAET (1990). Certificates of stocks are considered as quasi-negotiable instruments. When the owner or
shareholder signs the printed form of sale or assignment at the back of every stock certificates without filling in the blanks
provided for the name of the transferee as well as for the name of the attorney-in-fact, the said owner or shareholder, in effect,
 
confers on another all the indicia of ownership of the said stock certificates. In this case, the petitioner signed the printed from
at the back of both stock certificates and without filling in the blanks at the time the said stock certificates were delivered to
Macasaet. Hence, the petitioner’s acts of indorsement and delivery conferred on Macasaet the right to hold them as thought
they were his own. It was not irregular of Macasaet to deliver the stock certificates to Feliciano for consideration.

B. Negotiation - same as those used in NIs; to order=delivery + indorsement, to bearer = delivery

 The means of negotiating a document of title are the same as those used in negotiable instruments.
 If by the terms of the document, the goods are deliverable to the order of a specified person, then it should be indorsed
by such person, either specially or in blank.
 If the goods are deliverable to bearer, or the document has been indorsed in blank, then negotiation may be by mere
delivery.

C. Rights of a Holder
1. When free from personal defenses
 Under Art 1518 Civil Code, a holder of a negotiable document of title in good faith, for value and without notice
is placed on the same level as a HDC of a negotiable instrument – i.e., personal defenses enumerated in said
article are not available against him. Personal defenses include: negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of
the person making the negotiation, owner of the document was deprived of the possession of the same by loss,
theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress or conversion.
 Note Art 1518’s conflict with Art 1512. (see p 915)
2. What title acquired (NOTE: see Arts 1513, 1514 and 1519 Civil Code)
a. A person to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated acquires the title of the person
NEGOTIATING it as well as the title of the ORIGINAL BAILOR or depositor of the goods.
ex. if the original bailor had no authority from such owner to deposit the goods, then the holder of the negotiable
document, even if the negotiation to him was valid, cannot acquire title to the goods; AND even if the original
bailor had authority, if the negotiation to the present holder’s transferor was not valid, such holder, even if in good
faith and for value, does not acquire any right to the goods. the holder’s remedy if any, is against his transferor
and/or the guilty party.
 Thus, if the original bailor or depositor of the goods was not the owner thereof or had no authority from such
owner to deposit the goods, then the holder of the negotiable document, even if the negotiation to him was
valid, cannot acquire title to the goods.
 On the other hand, even if the original bailor or depositor was the owner or had authority from the owner, if
the negotiation to the present holder’s transferor was not valid, such holder, even if in good faith and for
value, does not acquire any right to the goods.
 In both cases, the holder’s remedy if any, is against his transferor and/or the guilty party.
b. The person to whom the document has been negotiated acquires the obligation of the bailee to make delivery
to him, as if they had contracted directly with each other.
 By issuing a negotiable document of title, such bailee had given in advance his consent to hold the goods for
any person to whom such document is negotiated.
 If document non-negotiable, notice of any transfer should be given to the bailee otherwise bailee or any other
person other than the transferor not bound
 Thus, the transferee’s rights may be defeated by a levy of attachment on the goods or by a notification to the
bailee of a sale of the goods to another purchaser.
 A sale of the goods without the document will not prejudice a subsequent purchaser who takes the document
in good faith and for value.
 The bailee’s delivery to the legal holder of the document would relieve him of any further responsibility for
the goods.

D. Liability of Indorser
 The indorsement of a negotiable document of title carries with it certain implied warranties by the indorser.
 As to the document, his warranty covers its genuineness, his legal right to negotiate it and his lack of knowledge of
any fact which would impair its validity.
 As to the goods, he warrants that he has the right to transfer title thereto and that they are merchantable.
 However, unlike the indorser of a NI who is liable if the primary party fails to pay, the indorser of a negotiable document
of title is not liable for the failure of the bailee to fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods.

ROMAN v ASIA BANKING CORP. (1922). A warehouse receipt must be interpreted according to its evident intent and it is
obvious that the deposit evidenced by the receipt in this case was intended to be made subject to the order of the depositor
and therefore negotiable. The indorsement in blank of the receipt with its delivery which took place on the date of the issuance
of the receipt demonstrate the intent to make the receipt negotiable. Furthermore, the receipt was not marked “non-negotiable.”
 

JOHN S. HALE CO. v BELEY COTTON CO. (1927). 1. One without title to cotton could not pass title thereto by depositing
the cotton in a warehouse and undertaking to sell non-negotiable clearance certificates issued on account of the same.
2. Receipts, being order receipts and none of them bearing the indorsement of the depositor to whom they were issued, the
receipts were not negotiable. Warehouse receipts in such form can only be transferred, not negotiated.

SOUTHERN PAC. CO v BANK OF AMERICA (1928). Here, by its fraudulent representations, the vendee persuaded the
delivering carrier to surrender the goods. It follows that the purchaser from the vendee stands in the position of the purchaser
from any fraudulent vendee, whose rights by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel are well recognized as being superior to those
of the vendor or parties in privity with him. In this situation, it would be contrary to the established law to allow the plaintiff,
who has purchased its title with full knowledge of the facts, to prevail against the bona fide purchaser, for its act, through its
agent, made possible the procurement of the negotiable warehouse receipts and the sale thereof by the vendee.

W.S. BROWN v YIELDING BROS. (1917). The expression “or had ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value”
clearly means providing such person was a purchaser in good faith for value. If the purchaser had actual notice, he is not a
purchaser in good faith. Registration laws were enacted for the purpose of giving notice, and the mortgage here, having been
duly recorded, gave the purchaser a constructive notice so as to prevent him from being a purchaser in good faith.

DUNAGAN v GRIFFIN (1941). Whitehead (in possession by virtue of contract to haul) could not, by negotiation to intervener
of the warehouse receipt, pass any better title to the beer than he had in it. It follows that the intervener acquired no better
right or title to the goods than Whitehead had when he stored them.

LUHRS v VALLEY RANCH CO.The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act’s purpose is to protect the warehouseman who comes
into possession of the property and issues a negotiable receipt therefore from being liable to two parties. But this protection
only applies to the warehouseman when the goods are delivered by the owner or by a person whose act in conveying the title
to them to a purchaser in good faith, would bind the owner.

SIY CONG BIENG v HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK.If the owner of the goods permits another to have the possession or
custody of negotiable warehouse receipts running to the order of the latter, or to bearer, it is a representation of title upon
which bona fide purchasers for value are entitled to reply, despite breaches of trust or violations of agreement on the part of
the apparent owner.