G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 ...
1942 ... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it
is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal
Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's
brief states on page 10:
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to
prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on
applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability
arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
"those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by
law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him
in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been
exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or
negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost
in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our
inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise
guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the
consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
 ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused
by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the
latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following
rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one
shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall
be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
 Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period;
if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or
omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent
acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas
also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance,
Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . .
en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of
obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of
the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil,"
Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p.
414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable
de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons.
Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any
criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a
result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte.
An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question
asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6,
pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y
menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y
que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que
acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la
Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes
legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la
de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de
las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades
civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen
extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que
sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice;
La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la
enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se
observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales
con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y
condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el
Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de
21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba,
que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse
que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian
jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a
la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in
the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise
to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor
upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the
prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired,
the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does
not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and
regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
 make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued
and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch
as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub
judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained
intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after
the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and
the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and
is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to
those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it
implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in
the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer)
is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de
aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a
esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero
semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas
son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de
que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por
causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del
dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que
enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan
un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues,
responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se
exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it
is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there
is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion
would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of
the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor
or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed
an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act
of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such
responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says
in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina
del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas
con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta
responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
 That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts
of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles
above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon
Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric
Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted.
Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the
amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the
Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final
judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain
dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el
Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la
muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia
absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto
que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo
criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era
constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan,
segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los
daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo
civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se
ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni
contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different
aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence,
and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers
of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this
latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the
damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with
article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company.
This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil
action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on
the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was
found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from
the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been
held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary
responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article
1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they
preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater
reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed
against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in
the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was
acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against
a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly
and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of
Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe
de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de
estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en
cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes
por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian
hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran
este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que
nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de
la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en
que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los
daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa
del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in
relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery
of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of
considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company,
because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of
economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore
could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a
civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial
court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently
failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported,
and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only
in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable
and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should
have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing
the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily
by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
 "SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a
should be responsible. third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them. Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of
xxx xxx xxx prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability
arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can
may be employed or in the performance of their duties. not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here
whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated
it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
xxx xxx xxx
Philippines.
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
avoid the damage."
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be
and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal
found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual
originate in the negligent act itself.
force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111
of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately,
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child,
penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same
subject. If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along
the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
 way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he
was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana
Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering
Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the
latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred
in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body
had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of
about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street
from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso
vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child,
Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns
caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had
come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter
with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that
she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric
plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was
no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the
time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in
part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte,
on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must
again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of
the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an
automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear.
The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used
by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court
to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on
the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming
the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
 From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]).
In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an
automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for
the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing
him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of
defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence
and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
[1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six
cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila
vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a
street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount
of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to
indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable
to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was
governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms
its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in
the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense
to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In
other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in
the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and
sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then
brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action
there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal
Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the
importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is
as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it
might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished
by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of
the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility
of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate
remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the
plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of
right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers
who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of representing the children, namely: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, BERSAMIN,
equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN DEL CASTILLO, and
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12,
p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of MONSALUD, LEONARDO B.
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
MONSALUD, Promulgated:
747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad,
por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality Respondents. April 25, 2012
by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is
need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles. DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on
this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and
for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenges the Decision[2] dated
grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him liable for damages to the heirs
crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless of the victims who were run over by the said vehicle.
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of Factual Antecedents
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high
time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that
its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud,
make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep
was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner. the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.

FIRST DIVISION
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347[3] for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., G.R. No. 173870 Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
Petitioner,
23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.[4]
- versus - Present:
 During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the
six minor children[5] of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,[6] an independent civil action for damages
based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the
spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner
of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as
the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and loss
of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death.[7]
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds
have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were never the
[8]
employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his
friends[9] stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a
vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The
vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on.[10] And implying that this was the manner by which
the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements[11] of Jemar
Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the
accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because
of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case against Allan and his
[12]
companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380. The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.[13]
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother, Rodrigo Maglasang
[14]
(Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver. In any event, Allans employment as conductor was already severed
before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first week of
[15]
December until December 14, 1992. In support of this, Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo
(Faustino) and Cresencio Junior Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded
the jeep heading to Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed
that Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.[16] Cresencio, for his part, testified that
he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his
driver.[17] He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he never bothered to verify the
news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his
employment with Oscar Jr.[18]
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be parked beside
Rodrigos rented house[19] for the next early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to December
14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro
(Jose).Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave
and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately
before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of his house.[20] Jose likewise attested
that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-
December of 1992.[21]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[22] dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for
insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC
anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part
of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury is shown to be under his management and that in
the ordinary course of things, the accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of care. Said
court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his
driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that
the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus
concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence making the registered
owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
 Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for
defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and
NORMA DEL CARMEN.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration[24] contending that the provision on vicarious liability of the employer
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code[25] requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and that the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming
that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope
of his employment when he drove the jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at the time of the
accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not have been taken
by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his experience,
the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by at least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the
vehicles mass and the deep canal which separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a
[26]
house.
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order[27] dated June 21, 2000 granted the Motion
for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have
committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in
Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner cannot be
made responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then
adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from
all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its July 11, 2006 Decision,[29] the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was an employer-
employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave
more credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and
Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided
in Poblacionand thus has limited knowledge of the place. His testimony was also unreliable considering that he only
rode the subject jeep twice[30] during the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the
appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the
subject of an accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar Jr.s
asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain
Sumagang Jr.[31]
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third
parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only
because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the
circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that the
support its conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees CA erred in:
assigned to the said jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and
also lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not
conjectures; misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the
fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition trial court;
key.
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the
disposition of the appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case.[33]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
Order dated 21 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN,
Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs- Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in
appellants: accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should have been done
within the scope of his assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr.,
and Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving the subject vehicle was not within the
amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
scope of his previous employment as conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) that the liability of a registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa
each for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
loquitur,should not apply to him. He asserts that although Allan and his companions were not found to have
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); committed the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was
illicitly taken by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for
the death of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition key.
(P150,000.00);

4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Our Ruling

No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that
his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged
SO ORDERED. [32] cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.

Issues
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was
stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried out by the
clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the
parking area and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard
of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was
unlawfully taken.
On direct examination,[36] Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him about the
accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did he carry
with him if any and turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.[37]

Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key should then
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before the police that
be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours
when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should have also returned the key to the operator

04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where were you? together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur. key was allegedly handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not available from the records.
Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together
with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot.[34]
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key
to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
xxxx
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he turned it over to
the police.
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on December 31,
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it was driven by
1992, where were you?
Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily given by Rodrigo
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
A: I was not there.
happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1,
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?
1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.[38]
with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.[35]

Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the
jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No.
93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five people so that it could start without the ignition key.
 Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely:
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing
Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada, for
carnapping. Is that correct? speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the
A: Yes Sir.
jeep was parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your jeep was
carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown
correct?
A: Yes Sir. to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things,
would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir. the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care.[40] Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the co-accused of
Allan Maglasang, is that correct? procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a
A: Yes Sir. specific proof of negligence.[41] It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,

Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct? thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along
A: Yes Sir. with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or

Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no
A: Yes Sir. negligence on his part.[42] The doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in charge of the

Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was carnapped, is that instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
correct? ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general
A: Yes Sir.[39]
terms.[43]

While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was stolen,
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the headlights were not on at the
time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights were not
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities negligent;
such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and

Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the defense of 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.[44]
unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence on record
brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in
charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct
him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware
that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to
instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence against
Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing
strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied
permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that
the parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he
entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to
Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict
instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion
as to the vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily
responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries
consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the
employee drove the registered owners vehicle in
connection with his employment.
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan
drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article
2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
[45]
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, the car of therein
respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite
Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled
doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.[46] We have already ratiocinated
that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest
of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways.[47]
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use[48] or that the subject vehicle was stolen[49] which are valid
defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps
use.
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In addition, pursuant
to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts
awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and
twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 11, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONthat an interest of
six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent
(12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPIN E HAWK G.R. No. 166869
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint,[3] in her own behalf and in behalf
COR P OR AT I ON ,
Petitioner, Present: of her children, in the civil case for damages against petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of
indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses,
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR., medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just
NACHURA, and equitable reliefs.
-versus- PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus
Promulgated:
February 16, 2010 was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
VIVIAN TAN LEE,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x In its Answer,[4] petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino
Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
DECISION supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.

PERALTA, J.:
[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70860, promulgated on August 17, 2004, affirming with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102, dated March 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. Q-91-
9191, ordering petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to jointly and severally pay
respondent Vivian Tan Lee damages as a result of a vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint[2] against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages
On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial Order[5] stating that the parties manifested
that there was no possibility of amicable settlement between them. However, they agreed to stipulate
on the following facts:
1. On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while on board a motorcycle with [P]late No.
DA-5480 driven by the latter, and a Metro Bus with [P]late No. NXR-262 driven by
Margarito Avila, were involved in an accident;
2. As a result of the accident, Silvino Tan died on the spot while plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan suffered physical injuries which necessitated medical attention and
hospitalization;
3. The deceased Silvino Tan is survived by his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and four
children, three of whom are now residents of the United States; and
4. Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee of defendant Philippine Hawk. [6]

based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan,
and caused respondent physical injuries.
The parties also agreed on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident causing physical injuries
upon the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and resulting in the death of the latters husband
 was the recklessness and negligence of Margarito Avila or the deceased Silvino
Tan; and
2. Whether or not defendant Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
driver Margarito Avila.[7]
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem
with her husband, who was on the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline station in Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from the Pasumbal Machine
Shop, where they inquired about the repair of their tanker. They were on a stop position at the side of
the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed
coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as
well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was
confined for a week. She was later transferred to St. Lukes Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered
a fracture on her left chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high blood
[8]
pressure.
Respondents husband died due to the vehicular accident. The immediate cause of his death
was massive cerebral hemorrhage.[9]
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing[10] and operating a Caltex gasoline
station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one million pesos a year in revenue. They also had a copra
business, which gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year.[11]
Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident, testified that in the
afternoon of March 17, 1991, his jeep was parked on the left side of the highway near the Pasumbal
Machine Shop. He did not notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus dragging the
motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep and sped away.[12]
For the defense, Margarito Avila, the driver of petitioners bus, testified that on March 17,
1999, at about 4:30 p.m., he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the Maharlika
Highway. When they were at Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, a motorcycle ran from his left
side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he
turned the bus to the right. He heard a loud banging sound. From his side mirror, he saw that the
motorcycle turned turtle (bumaliktad). He did not stop to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and
surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the motorcycle.[13]
Avila further testified that he had previously been involved in sideswiping incidents, but he
forgot how many times.[14]
Rodolfo Ilagan, the bus conductor, testified that the motorcycle bumped the left side of the
bus that was running at 40 kilometers per hour.[15]
Domingo S. Sisperes, operations officer of petitioner, testified that, like their other drivers,
Avila was subjected to and passed the following requirements:
(1) Submission of NBI clearance;
(2) Certification from his previous employer that he had no bad record;
(3) Physical examination to determine his fitness to drive;
(4) Test of his driving ability, particularly his defensive skill; and
(5) Review of his driving skill every six months.[16]
Efren Delantar, a Barangay Kagawad in Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, testified that the bus
was running on the highway on a straight path when a motorcycle, with a woman behind its driver,
suddenly emerged from the left side of the road from a machine shop. The motorcycle crossed the
highway in a zigzag manner and bumped the side of the bus.[17]
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and
defendant Margarito Avila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, MARGARITO AVILA is adjudged guilty of simple negligence,
and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and h[er]
husbands heirs ordering the defendants Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila to pay them jointly and solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of
earnings and actual damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.[18]

The trial court found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of the road,
just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running position moving
toward the right side of the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus driver that the motorcycle was
moving ahead of the bus from the left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but disagreed
that the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right side of the
road.[19]
The trial court held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway, and Margarito Avila
turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle, then the bus would not have hit
the passenger jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact that the bus also hit the
passenger jeep showed that the bus must have been running from the right lane to the left lane of the
highway, which caused the collision with the motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the left side
of the road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw the motorcycle before the collision, he should
have stepped on the brakes and slowed down, but he just maintained his speed and veered to the
left.[20] The trial court found Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him
discipline and correct behavior on the road.[21]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in the
award of damages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated March 16, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Philippine Hawk and Avila are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally appellee the following amount: (a) P168,019.55 as actual
damages; (b) P10,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P590,000.00 as unearned income; and (e) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.[22]
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1) The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in passing upon an issue, which had not been raised on appeal, and which had,
therefore, attained finality, in total disregard of the doctrine laid down by this Court
in Abubakar v. Abubakar, G.R. No. 134622, October 22, 1999.
2) The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its finding that the petitioners bus
driver saw the motorcycle of private respondent executing a U-turn on the highway about
fifteen (15) meters away and thereafter held that the Doctrine of Last Clear was applicable
to the instant case. This was a palpable error for the simple reason that the aforesaid
distance was the distance of the witness to the bus and not the distance of the bus to the
respondents motorcycle, as clearly borne out by the records.
3) The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in awarding damages in total disregard of
the established doctrine laid down in Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 447 and Viron
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 138296, November 22, 2000.[23]
In short, the issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether or not negligence may be attributed to
petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident,
resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent; (2) whether or not
petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and (3) whether or not the damages awarded by
respondent Court of Appeals are proper.
Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the
Court of Appeals, that petitioners driver was negligent in driving the bus, which caused physical injuries
to respondent and the death of respondents husband.
The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [24] The Court has
carefully reviewed the records of this case, and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court, thus:
The Court agree[s] with the bus driver Margarito that the motorcycle was
moving ahead of the bus towards the right side from the left side of the road, but
disagrees with him that it crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on
the right side of the highway.
 If the bus were on the right side of the highway and Margarito turned his bus
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting it, then the bus would not have hit the
passenger jeep vehicle which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in
that the bus hit the jeep too, shows that the bus must have been running to the left
the selection or supervision of its employees.[29] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
lane of the highway from right to the left, that the collision between it and the parked
jeep and the moving rightways cycle became inevitable. Besides, Margarito said he employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
saw the motorcycle before the collision ahead of the bus; that being so, an extra- exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
cautious public utility driver should have stepped on his brakes and slowed
down. Here, the bus never slowed down, it simply maintained its highway speed and employee.[30]
veered to the left. This is negligence indeed.[25]

The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in stating that the bus driver saw liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the

respondents motorcycle about 15 meters away before the collision, because the said distance, as selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in

testified to by its witness Efren Delantar Ong, was Ongs distance from the bus, and not the distance of him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were concentrated on the

the bus from the motorcycle. Petitioner asserts that this mistaken assumption of the Court of Appeals ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved

made it conclude that the bus driver, Margarito Avila, had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, in sideswiping incidents.

which was the basis for the conclusion that Avila was guilty of simple negligence. As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it was the only one
that appealed the decision of the trial court with respect to the award of actual and moral damages;

A review of the records showed that it was petitioners witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was hence, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent, who did

about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular accident.[26] Nevertheless, this fact does not appeal from the trial courts decision.

not affect the finding of the trial court that petitioners bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple
Petitioners contention is unmeritorious.
negligence as affirmed by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence.[27] To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.[28] jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors,
or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary
precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat[31] cited the book[32] of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to explain
parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane,
the section above, thus:
causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
 In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section, thus:
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now the Civil Code.[34] Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of
includes some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic
procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered capacity to earn money.[35]
by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this
exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
from or the proceedings therein.
for loss of earning capacity.[36] By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his
assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and
error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by the earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be
court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has
been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if laws.[37]
they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely
In this case, the records show that respondents husband was leasing and operating a Caltex
related to an error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or
upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual income
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld
assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June 30,
1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983). at Source for the Year 1990,[38] which showed that respondents husband earned a gross income of

It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is
authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the
appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be
sacrificing substance for technicalities.[33]
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded respondent the sum
of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00
for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner
assigned as error the award of damages by the trial court on the ground that it was based merely on
suppositions and surmises, not the admissions made by respondent during the trial.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual damages, although the
amount of the latter award was modified.
P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondents testimony as bases for
fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before respondents husband died
on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived
from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be
considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be
considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or
income, less living and other incidental expenses.[39] In the absence of documentary evidence, it is
reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent
of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less
necessary expenses).
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
 Net Earning = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income Reasonable and
Capacity [2/3 (80-age at the (GAI) Necessary
time of death)] Expenses
(80% of GAI)
X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 - P100,000.00
(Living Expenses)
X = 30/3 x P100,000.00
X = 10 x P100,000.00
X = P1,000,000.00
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection
with the death, wake, and interment of respondents husband in the amount of P154,575.30, and the
medical expenses of respondent in the amount of P168,019.55.
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to
prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim[40] or the physical injuries sustained by the
victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed that the funeral and related
expenses amounted only to P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only
to P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of respondents husband. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.[41] They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to
the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. [42]
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount
of P10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondents motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The cost of the repair of
the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence presented was
merely a job estimate[43] of the cost of the motorcycles repair amounting to P17, 829.00. The Court of
Appeals aptly held that there was no doubt that the damage caused on the motorcycle was due to the
negligence of petitioners driver. In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage caused on the
motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in
the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the circumstances.[44]
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the physical
injuries she sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, [45] moral
damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[46]
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the death of
her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00.[47] The award is proper
under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.[48]
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondents
husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in
addition to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding
the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The
appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 17,
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and Margarito Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee
Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the
amount of One Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five
Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d)
indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e)
temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
 THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could have been avoided if
Costs against petitioner.
the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked properly and equipped with an early warning device. It
SO ORDERED. is high time We sounded the call for strict enforcement of the law and regulation on traffic and vehicle
registration. Panahon na para mahigpit na ipatupad ang batas at regulasyon sa trapiko at pagpapatala
ng sasakyan.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
modifying that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Butuan City finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Limbaga liable to petitioner Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. for damages.

Facts

On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., G.R. No. 161803
Petitioner, Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National
Present: Highway in BarangaySumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by
CORONA,*
private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.[3]
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire
JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY
FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO Promulgated: blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a
M. LIMBAGA,
substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime
Respondents. February 4, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and
DECISION
the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. [4] The prime mover was not equipped
with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under Letter of
REYES, R.T., J.: Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear
portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed
kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.[5]
 To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring
headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to
avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit
parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the
the rear of the prime mover.[6]
vehicle, thus:
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable
as a result of the incident. After the collision, SPO4 Teofilo Pame conducted an investigation and
submitted a police traffic incident investigation report.[7]
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages[8] against
private respondents prime mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula
passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint.
RTC Disposition
On August 7, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing, ordaining and ordering:
a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga pay,
jointly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading, Inc. the
amounts of P279,832.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation;
b) That all money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or
the case against him dismissed;
d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and
e) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to
pay, jointly and solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was improper
The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the negligence
and carelessness attributable to the defendants. When the trailer being pulled by the
prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at Sumilihon, the prime mover and trailer were
parked haphazardly, as the right tires of the prime mover were the only ones on the
sand and gravel shoulder of the highway while the left tires and all the tires of the
trailer were on the cemented pavement of the highway, occupying almost the whole
of the right lane on the direction the prime mover and trailer were traveling. The
statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into
the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were banana
plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit F. The picture shows that there
was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and prudent
enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance forward
so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder
rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked.x x x The court has
some doubts on the statement of witness-driver Limbaga that there were banana
trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in front of the
prime mover and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses Rogelio C.
Ortiz, driver of the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the ice van, and Police
Traffic Investigator SPO3 Teofilo M. Pame show that there were no banana trunks
with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene of the incident. But even assuming that
there were banana trunks with leaves but they were placed close to the prime mover
and trailer as they were placed 3 strides away which to the mind of the court is
equivalent approximately to 3 meters and with this distance, approaching vehicles
would have no sufficient time and space to make a complete stop, especially if the
vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were lighted tin cans, it was not explained by
the defendants why the driver, especially driver witness Ortiz, did not see them.
xxxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in managing and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it
failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the required early warning devices
with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance and condition of the prime
mover and the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided with
 wornout tires and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked Exhibit 3
and 4 show that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were
attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer
which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location of the 2 I-
beams, it would have the other I-beam that would have suffered the flat tires as it has
to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded
directly above the two (2) I-beams as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at the far
rear end of the trailer.
xxxx
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as there is no
showing that he is the manager or CEO of defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. Although in
the answer, it is admitted that he is an officer of the defendant corporation, but it is
not clarified what kind of position he is holding, as he could be an officer as one of the
members of the Board of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the
corporation. Witness Limbaga in his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the
Manager but it was never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose
Ching is one and the same person.[10]
Private respondents appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated August 7, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City in Civil Case No. 4360 is hereby PARTLY
MODIFIED by absolving the defendants-appellants/appellees of any liability to
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees by reason of the incident on July 4, 1995.
The dismissal of the case against Jose Ching, the counterclaim of defendants-
appellants/appellees and the money claim of Rogelio Ortiz STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC decision, the CA held that the proximate cause
of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way of the
passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on collision
with the truck, sideswept the parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence on its lane of
the parked trailer with bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to occupy what was
left of its lane and part of the opposite lane. The truck occupying the opposite lane
failed to give way or yield the right of way to the oncoming bus by proceeding with
the same speed. The two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat each other in
occupying a single lane. The bus was the first to occupy the said lane but upon
realizing that the truck refused to give way or yield the right of way, the bus, as a
precaution, geared to its right where the trailer was parked. Unfortunately, the bus
miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer and its rear right side hit the
protruding blade of the bulldozer then on the top of the parked trailer. The impact of
the collision on its right rear side with the blade of the bulldozer threw the bus further
to the opposite lane, landing its rear portion on the shoulder of the opposite lane.
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to give the
Joana Paula bus the space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped its rear
right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw the bus directly on
the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude
that the Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck,
to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.
xxxx
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out. With a
bulldozer on top of the trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be dangerous and
quite impossible for the trailer to further park on the graveled shoulder of the
road. To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and may cause the bulldozer to fall from
where it was mounted. In fact, it appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best
to park on the graveled shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled
shoulder of the road.
 The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the left of the
truck because it did not see the parked trailer due to lack of warning sign of danger of
any kind that can be seen from a distance. The damage suffered by the Joana Paula
bus belied this assessment. As stated before, the Joana Paula bus, with the intention
of passing first which it did, first approached the space beside the parked trailer,
veered too close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the
protruding bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most of the bus, it
was clearly on the space which was wide enough for a single passing vehicle but not
sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The bus was thrown right to the path of the
truck by the impact of the collision of its rear right side with the bulldozer blade. [12]
The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an early warning device. The
appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that Limbaga placed kerosene lighted tin cans
on the front and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] may act as
substitute early warning device. The CA stated:
Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no warning sign
of danger of any kind, most probably referring to the absence of the triangular
reflectorized plates. The police sketch clearly indicated the stack of banana leaves
placed at the rear of the parked trailer. The trailers driver testified that they placed
kerosene lighted tin can at the back of the parked trailer.
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning device allowed by
law. The Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals) held that:
x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any
early warning device at the scene of the accident. They were
referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow
issued by the Land Transportation Office. However, the evidence
shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at
the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as
an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section
34(g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code x x x
Baliwags argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not
substantially comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law
clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the
triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares
visible one hundred meters away. x x x.
This Court holds that the defendants-appellants/appellees were not negligent in
parking the trailer on the scene of the accident. It would have been different if there
was only one flat tire and defendant-appellant/appellee Limbaga failed to change the
same and left immediately.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the damages suffered by
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees. Whatever damage plaintiffs-appellants/appellees
suffered, they alone must bear them.[14]
Issues
Petitioner raises two issues[15] for Our consideration, to wit:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE CONCRETE
EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE EARLY WARNING DEVICES
PLACED IN FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/APPELLEES
TRUCK AND FLAT CAR TO WARN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO ORTIZ OF
THEIR PRESENCE.
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY
WARNING DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered
by the Nissan van. The RTC ruled in the affirmative holding that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on the national highway without an
early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate
 of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. (Underscoring
cause of the collision was the negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger
supplied)
bus.

The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
reasonable person would have used in the same situation.
delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side
between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff. [16]
of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of
the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the cemented
There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by the records and conceded by
highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that
the parties. The outstanding issues are negligence and proximate cause. Tersely put, the twin issues
the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming
are: (a) whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle; and (b)
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least
whether or not his negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
minimize it.

Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime

mover on the national highway; he failed to We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion it would have been dangerous and quite impossible to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming
further park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt
motorists.
and the bulldozer may fall off. The photographs taken after the incident show that it could have been
possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover completely on the shoulder of the national road without
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
risk to oncoming motorists. We agree with the RTC observation on this point, thus:
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.[17] The Supreme Court stated the test of negligence in the landmark
x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer
case Picart v. Smith[18] as follows: deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there
were banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit F. The picture shows
that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and
The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular
prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in
shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked. Although at
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
the time of the incident, it was about 4:45 in the morning and it was drizzling but
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever travels along the highway must
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which the Nissan ice
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
van was properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man
because the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked prime mover and
 trailer on the bus proper lane because there was no warning signs of danger of any
kind that can be seen from a distance.[19]
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the
prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because he had only
one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana leaves on
the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept
on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was
sleeping on the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact
of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover. [20]
Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the prime mover
with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer.[21] We find that private respondent Liberty Forest,
Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck
loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly
failed to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover
in proper condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had worn out tires. It was only
equipped with one spare tire. It was for this reason that Limbaga was unable to change the two blown
out tires because he had only one spare. The bulldozer was not even loaded properly on the prime
mover, which caused the tire blowouts.
All told, We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the
prime mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in
failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.
The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals is inapplicable; Limbaga did not put
lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear of
the prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the CA erred in accepting
the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the
prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim. The CA reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[22] as authority for the proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute
early warning device is misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the prime mover or
within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves were placed on the prime mover. The
report reads:
VIII RESULT OF INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with Body No. 7788, with Plate No.
LVA-137, driven by one Temestocles Relova v. Antero, of legal age, married and a
resident of San Roque, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, while traveling along the National
Highway, coming from the east going to the west direction, as it moves along the way
and upon reaching Brgy. Sumilihon, Butuan City to evade bumping to the approaching
Nissan Ice Van with Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one Rogelio Cortez y Ceneza. As the
result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally busideswept (sic) to the parked Prime Mover
with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer without early warning device, instead placing only
dry banana leaves three (3) meters at the rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to
place at the front portion, and the said vehicle occupied the whole lane. As the result,
the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the Bulldozer. Thus, causing the said
bus swept to the narrow shouldering, removing the rear four (4) wheels including the
differential and injuring the above-stated twelve (12) passengers and damaged to the
right side fender above the rear wheel. Thus, causing damage on it. While the Nissan
Ice Van in evading, accidentally swerved to the left lane and accidentally bumped to
the front bumper of the parked Prime Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer. Thus,
causing heavy damage to said Nissan Ice Van including the cargoes of the said van. [23]
Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only banana leaves were
placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see any lighted tin cans in the immediate
vicinity of the collision.

Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime
mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation to this effect was made by
private respondents in their Answer to the complaint for damages. Petitioners counsel promptly
objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:
ATTY. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at the rear of the
prime mover with trailer, will you please describe to us what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil. And these tin
cans were lighted and they are like torches. These two lights or torches were
placed in front and at the rear side of the prime mover with trailer. After each
torch, we placed banana trunk. The banana trunk is placed between the two (2)
torches and the prime mover, both on the rear and on the front portion of the
prime mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime mover.
ATTY. ASIS:
At this point, we will be objecting to questions particularly referring to the alleged tin
cans as some of the warning-sign devices, considering that there is no allegation
to that effect in the answer of the defendants. The answer was just limited to
the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And, therefore, if we follow the rule of the
binding effect of an allegation in the complaint, then the party will not be
allowed to introduce evidence to attack jointly or rather the same, paragraph 5
states, warning device consisting of 3 banana trunks, banana items and leaves
were filed. He can be cross-examined in the point, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the plaintiffs are
interposing continuing objections. But the Court will allow the question.[25]
We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on the front and rear of
the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report and the testimony of SPO4 Pame
that only banana leaves were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] thus
finds no application to the case at bar.
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the
proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. [27]
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. [28] Plaintiff must, however, establish a
sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable
result of the act or omission. In the precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court
discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage or
injury, viz.:
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of
the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
 because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers bus, the trapping
of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the
proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or omission. Here,
We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of
the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime
mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The
skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly
the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that resulted
from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those damages resulting from
precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime
mover. As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane
of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The driver of the Nissan
van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane of the passenger bus, hitting the parked
prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying
his vans lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not
for the prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the
damage to the Nissan van.
In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this Court held that a similar
vehicular collision was caused by the skewed parking of a dump truck on the national road, thus:
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in
other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable
relationship between petitioner Carbonels negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondents injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly
different manner, the collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers negligence.
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck drivers negligence far from being a
passive and static condition was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the private respondents car would in all
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any
warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the truck drivers negligence
and, therefore, closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. What the Petitioner describes as an intervening cause was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the
truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver
owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to
impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.Dionisios negligence was
not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate or
contributory liability of the passenger bus, if any,
because it was not a party to the case; joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The appellate court noted that
the passenger bus was aware of the presence of the prime mover on its lane, but it still proceeded to

occupy the lane of the Nissan van. The passenger bus also miscalculated its distance from the prime
mover when it hit the vehicle.
We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the Joana Paula
passenger bus vis--vis the prime mover because it was not a party to the complaint for damages. Due
process dictates that the passenger bus must be given an opportunity to present its own version of
events before it can be held liable. Any contributory or proportionate liability of the passenger bus must
be litigated in a separate action, barring any defense of prescription or laches. Insofar as petitioner is
concerned, the proximate cause of the collision was the improper parking of the prime mover. It was
the improper parking of the prime mover which set in motion the series of events that led to the
vehicular collision.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not necessarily absolve private
respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private
respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold
either of them liable for damages from the collision. In Philippine National Construction Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[31] this Court held:
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though
his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor x x x.
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the liability of
joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person
liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate
cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.(Underscoring supplied)
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA
erred in absolving private respondents from liability for the vehicular collision.
Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been easily avoided by
following basic traffic rules and regulations and road safety standards. In hindsight, private respondent
Limbaga could have prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he had properly parked the prime
mover on the shoulder of the national road. The improper parking of vehicles, most especially along the
national highways, poses a serious and unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and
passengers. Drivers owe a duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and regulations and to observe road
safety standards. They owe that duty not only for their own safety, but also for that of other
motorists. We can prevent most vehicular accidents by simply following basic traffic rules and
regulations.

We also note a failure of implementation of basic safety standards, particularly the law
on early warning devices. This applies even more to trucks and big vehicles, which are prone to
mechanical breakdown on the national highway. The law, as crafted, requires vehicles to be equipped
with triangular reflectorized plates.[32] Vehicles without the required early warning devices are ineligible
SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732
for registration.[33] Vehicle owners may also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the law.[34] AGENCY, INC., and ADMER
PAJARILLO,
Petitioners,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure that all vehicles on YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
the road meet basic and minimum safety features, including that of early warning devices. It is most CALLEJO, SR., and
unfortunate that We still see dilapidated and rundown vehicles on the road with substandard safety CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
features. These vehicles not only pose a hazard to the safety of their occupants but that of other
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,
motorists. The prime mover truck in this case should not have been granted registration because it VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
failed to comply with the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the road.
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:
Respondents. December 14, 2006
It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly enforce all pertinent
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
laws and regulations within their mandate.

DECISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated August 28, 2003 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated August 7, 2001 is REINSTATED IN FULL. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

SO ORDERED.
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
(Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
Resolution[2]dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the banks cashier as she
following:
would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to
carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages
the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. 2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing 3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary
her death. damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorneys fees; and
6. costs of suit.
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a SO ORDERED. [8]
separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA, the RTC The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim that he

decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen

Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the
head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for

complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted

failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in

security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. the instant case.

In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable

Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the

supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the latter acted selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that

only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that

fees. Safeguards evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is
not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of
their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.s civil
liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No
pronouncement as to costs.[9]
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions
are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on
civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found
guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa,
he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since
the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because
said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from
which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict,
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only
subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution
dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and other
money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with
petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any liability. [10]
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline;
and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo.However,
since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it
should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil
action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which
case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code [12] is
subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available
to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same
on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide,
for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by
the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. [13]
It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature of a cause
of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. [14] The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in
the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under
employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee
relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who
brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary
caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his
shotgun, fired andburst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and
severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover
damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillos act of
shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held: was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil
action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far
in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held
that:
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
xxxx
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the diligence of a good father of the family.
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
law." (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final
and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. [21] It would have been
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in
entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the
the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
Penal Code.[22]
case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is based
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed
on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the
by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over
the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No.
him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial
court: Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-
 We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question
of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[23] Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed
by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are
[24]
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate
from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the bank was to renew
her time deposit.[25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and
aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter
or one arms length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her. [27] It is
however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was
already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot
him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere
apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his
own testimony.Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly
over which was about 10 meters away from the bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that
she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for
the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near
the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no
evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the banks branch manager regarding his
concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters
from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already
apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there
were two guards inside the bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she
really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank
and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there
were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[31]
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in
the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from
the contentions raised in petitioners petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline
approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was
suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of
pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun
was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created in the mind of
petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real
[34]
and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillos claim of
self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that
Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the
alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillos imagination which caused such
unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a
licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people
would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have
warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside
the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident.
Evangelines death was merely due to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that
Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it
had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it
had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications
and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found
that it did not exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to
routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or not they
are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees
performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure
is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise
error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision
of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee.
 In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection
of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted,
submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and
NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt.
James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and
regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons
[38] [39]
Training, Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan, Disciplinary/Corrective
Sanctions,[40] it had also been established during Cameros cross-examination that Pajarillo was not
[41]
aware of such rules and regulations. Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the
[42]
instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,
records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of
the security guards performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1,
1997conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security
of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees. [43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever
conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different
nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different
from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. [44]
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm for
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on
how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around
the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there
was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made,
the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the
amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of
Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse,
legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to
the enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed
at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or
means of the offender.[46]
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangelines death was
so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at
the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one million pesos as moral damages
to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the
parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a
vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are
also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her
husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. [49] It is awarded as a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the
[50]
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the
instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144274. September 20, 2004]
NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA petitioner, vs. PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO and LEANDRO LUIS R.
DOMINGO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52203
affirming in turn the decision of the trial court finding petitioner liable to respondent for damages. The
dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED except the award of attorneys fees including
appearance fees which is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
[Respondent] Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer Car model 1980
bearing plate No. NDW 781 91 with [co-respondent] Leandro Luis R. Domingo as authorized driver.
[Petitioner] Nostradamus Villanueva was then the registered owner of a green Mitsubishi Lancer
bearing Plate No. PHK 201 91.
On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a green traffic light, [respondent] Priscilla
Domingos silver Lancer car with Plate No. NDW 781 91 then driven by [co-respondent] Leandro Luis R.
Domingo was cruising along the middle lane of South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to
south. Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201 91 driven by Renato Dela Cruz
Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street towards the South Superhighway directly into the path of NDW
781 91 thereby hitting and bumping its left front portion. As a result of the impact, NDW 781 91 hit two
(2) parked vehicles at the roadside, the second hitting another parked car in front of it.
Per Traffic Accident Report prepared by Traffic Investigator Pfc. Patrocinio N. Acido, Renato dela Cruz
Ocfemia was driving with expired license and positive for alcoholic breath. Hence, Manila Assistant City
Prosecutor Oscar A. Pascua recommended the filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting to
(sic) damage to property and physical injuries.
The original complaint was amended twice: first, impleading Auto Palace Car Exchange as commercial
agent and/or buyer-seller and second, impleading Albert Jaucian as principal defendant doing business
under the name and style of Auto Palace Car Exchange.
Except for Ocfemia, all the defendants filed separate answers to the complaint. [Petitioner]
Nostradamus Villanueva claimed that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the mishap
because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. For her part,
Linda Gonzales declared that her presence at the scene of the accident was upon the request of the
actual owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer (PHK 201 91) [Albert Jaucian] for whom she had been working as
agent/seller. On the other hand, Auto Palace Car Exchange represented by Albert Jaucian claimed that
he was not the registered owner of the car. Moreover, it could not be held subsidiary liable as employer
of Ocfemia because the latter was off-duty as utility employee at the time of the incident. Neither was
Ocfemia performing a duty related to his employment.[3]
After trial, the trial court found petitioner liable and ordered him to pay respondent actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus appearance and attorneys fees:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering Nostradamus Villanueva to pay
the amount of P99,580 as actual damages, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00 plus appearance fees of P500.00 per hearing
with legal interest counted from the date of judgment. In conformity with the law on equity and in
accordance with the ruling in First Malayan Lending and Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(supra), Albert Jaucian is hereby ordered to indemnify Nostradamus Villanueva for whatever amount
the latter is hereby ordered to pay under the judgment.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The CA upheld the trial courts decision but deleted the award for appearance and attorneys fees
because the justification for the grant was not stated in the body of the decision. Thus, this petition for
review which raises a singular issue:
MAY THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM A
VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIS MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE BEING OPERATED BY THE EMPLOYEE OF
ITS BUYER WITHOUT THE LATTERS CONSENT AND KNOWLEDGE?[5]
Yes.
We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated. [6] The rationale behind such
doctrine was explained way back in 1957 in Erezo vs. Jepte[7]:
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under the
Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the
actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have
for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required
to prove who the actual owner is. How would the public or third persons know against whom to enforce
their rights in case of subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do not imply by his doctrine, however,
that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to
third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service,
should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets. The members of the Court are in agreement that the
defendant-appellant should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter
because of the negligence of the driver, even if the defendant-appellant was no longer the owner of the
vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to another. What is the legal basis
for his (defendant-appellants) liability?
There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the defendant-appellant as he is the
registered owner in the Motor Vehicles Office. Should he not be allowed to prove the truth, that he had
sold it to another and thus shift the responsibility for the injury to the real and actual owner? The
defendant holds the affirmative of this proposition; the trial court held the negative.
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no vehicle may be used or
operated upon any public highway unless the same is property registered. It has been stated that the
system of licensing and the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number,
conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury to pedestrians
and other travelers from the careless management of automobiles. And to furnish a means of
ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the speed and
operation of machines upon the highways (2 R.C.L. 1176). Not only are vehicles to be registered and
that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated without being properly registered for the current
year, but that dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish thee Motor Vehicles Office a report showing the
name and address of each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the
manufacturers serial number and motor number. (Section 5(c), Act No. 3992, as amended.)
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does
not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and
Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway
(section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways:
One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification of the vehicle and of the
operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always
available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and
safe operation. Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the
primary purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not
escape because of lack of means to discover him. The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the
displayed number becomes a share and delusion, if courts would entertain such defenses as that put
forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most
outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to pace a middleman between them and the
public, and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense servants. (King vs. Brenham
Automobile Co., Inc. 145 S.W. 278, 279.)
With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is: should not the
registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in accordance
with such proof escape or evade responsibility by and lay the same on the person actually owning the
vehicle? We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and
policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him
as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility
by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others
or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who
possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of
recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually
causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the
Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to
him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by
disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner
should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that
a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the
responsibility to the injured person.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem to conflict with
truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a
vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover
for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of
the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure
to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.
In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible
for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right
to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage
for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant.[8]
Petitioner insists that he is not liable for damages since the driver of the vehicle at the time of the
accident was not an authorized driver of the new (actual) owner of the vehicle. He claims that the ruling
in First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation vs. CA[9] implies that to hold the registered owner
liable for damages, the driver of the vehicle must have been authorized, allowed and permitted by its
actual owner to operate and drive it. Thus, if the vehicle is driven without the knowledge and consent
of the actual owner, then the registered owner cannot be held liable for damages.
He further argues that this was the underlying theory behind Duavit vs. CA[10] wherein the court
absolved the registered owner from liability after finding that the vehicle was virtually stolen from the
owners garage by a person who was neither authorized nor employed by the owner. Petitioner
concludes that the ruling in Duavit and not the one in First Malayan should be applicable to him.
Petitioners argument lacks merit. Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is
irrelevant to determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and
highways. To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before
the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle
legislations are enacted in the first place.
Furthermore, there is nothing in First Malayan which even remotely suggests that the driver must
be authorized before the registered owner can be held accountable. In First Malayan, the registered
owner, First Malayan Corporation, was held liable for damages arising from the accident even if the
vehicle involved was already owned by another party:
This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner is of a motor vehicle might be,
the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as
such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law,
the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being
considered merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10, citing
Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aquino, 105 Phil. 949).
We believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of
record. It is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of the
driver is. Granting that, in this case, the father of the driver is the actual owner and that he is the actual
employer, following the well-settled principle that the operator of record continues to be the operator
of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third person, and as such is responsible
for the consequences incident to its operation, we must hold and consider such owner-operator of
record as the employer, in contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect to this policy of law as
enunciated in the above cited decisions of this Court, we must now extend the same and consider the
actual operator and employer as the agent of the operator of record. [11]
 Contrary to petitioners position, the First Malayan ruling is applicable to him since the case
involves the same set of facts ― the registered owner had previously sold the vehicle to someone else
and was being driven by an employee of the new (actual) owner. Duavit is inapplicable since the vehicle
there was not transferred to another; the registered and the actual owner was one and the same
person. Besides, in Duavit, the defense of the registered owner, Gilberto Duavit, was that the vehicle
was practically stolen from his garage by Oscar Sabiano, as affirmed by the latter:
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
Defendant Sabiano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of
defendant Duavit without the consent and authority of the latter. He testified further that Duavit even
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
filed charges against him for the theft of the jeep but which Duavit did not push through as his
SALVA, respondents.
(Sabianos) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.[12]
D E C I S I ON
As correctly pointed out by the CA, the Duavit ruling is not applicable to petitioners case since the
circumstance of unauthorized use was not present. He in fact voluntarily delivered his car to Albert
MENDOZA, J.:
Jaucian as part of the downpayment for a vehicle he purchased from Jaucian. Thus, he could not claim
that the vehicle was stolen from him since he voluntarily ceded possession thereof to Jaucian. It was the
latter, as the new (actual) owner, who could have raised the defense of theft to prove that he was not This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
liable for the acts of his employee Ocfemia. Thus, there is no reason to apply the Duavit ruling to this 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and
case. awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage.
The ruling in First Malayan has been reiterated in BA Finance Corporation vs. CA[13] and more
recently in Aguilar, Sr. vs. Commercial Savings Bank.[14] In BA Finance, we held the registered owner The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
liable even if, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was leased by another party and was driven by the
lessees employee. In Aguilar, the registered owner-bank answered for damages for the accident even if
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
the vehicle was being driven by the Vice-President of the Bank in his private capacity and not as an
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
officer of the Bank, as claimed by the Bank. We find no reason to deviate from these decisions.
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
responsible for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. Easy identification prevents door at the rear end of the vehicle. Sclaw
inconvenience and prejudice to a third party injured by one who is unknown or unidentified. To allow a
registered owner to escape liability by claiming that the driver was not authorized by the new (actual) On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
owner results in the public detriment the law seeks to avoid. was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion
Finally, the issue of whether or not the driver of the vehicle during the accident was authorized is of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
not at all relevant to determining the liability of the registered owner. This must be so if we are to
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg
comply with the rationale and principle behind the registration requirement under the motor vehicle circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
law. from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate
is AFFIRMED. in crutches during said period.

SO ORDERED. On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck. Korte
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-
appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of
Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would
be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the
award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner
of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No.
3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has
as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar
as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting
the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose,
and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care
of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which
the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that
the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is
an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. [3] This requires that
the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will;
(b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the
injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis
in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that school
year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling,
because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise
decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my
left leg x x x has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As an exception,
such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas
contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly
indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that
he was the one at fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
vs. manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee. damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge,
he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
Alejo Mabanag for appellant. moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done;
G. E. Campbell for appellee. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front
of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile
STREET, J.: was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff
to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or,
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of
seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from
on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the
liability the plaintiff has appealed.
horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable
risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on
under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to
the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the
this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
rule of the road.
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably
approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected
pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing
to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and
his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence
adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a
point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in
dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs.
Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and
lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are
remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.

The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be
mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of
the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge
in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which
were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason
of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in
consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the
supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to
repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of
contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held
that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep
the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of
the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case
consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the
dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually
present and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt
to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the
degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case
the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court
of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred,
the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the
defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the
acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense