W.P.(C) No. 6558 of 2013 Decided On: 19.06.2015 Appellants: C.S.H.N. Murthy Vs. Respondent: Tezpur University and Ors. Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. Counsels: For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R. Mazumdar, Amicus Curiae For Respondents/Defendant: N.C. Das, Sr. SC and B. Choudhury JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1 . In this writ petition, the petitioner is questioning the legality of the office order dated 8.11.2013 issued by the Vice-Chancellor of Tezpur University (respondent 1) removing him from the post of Professor with immediate effect, the proceedings of the departmental enquiry in connection therewith as well as the direction requiring him to leave the University Campus forthwith. The case of the petitioner, shorn of unnecessary details, is that he was appointed as an Associate Professor in the Department of Mass Communication and Journalism (MCJ) of Tezpur University in October, 2008, for which an agreement was executed between him the University with respect to his appointment, service conditions, emoluments, termination, etc. He claims that he is an international personality possessing great dexterity and expertise in his field of teaching. He refers to the number of achievements and recognition he received from time to time, but I am not concerned with such laurels and distinction he might have possessed in this case. His misfortune is said to have started on 25.5.2013 when one Miss Daisy Kalita, a student of 4th Semester, Department of MCJ lodged a written complaint with the Chairperson of the Sexual Harassment Cell of the University by alleging that he had given to her "implicit proposal" in return for good grade and completion of her dissertation which was seemingly sexual in nature. Two other complaints in the nature of collective representations pertaining to class room teaching matters which happened during 2011 (autumn) and 2012 (spring and autumn) without referring the context or date or time to the incident were also lodged against him. One of the complaints was filed by the students of 4th Semester, Department of MCJ with the Sexual Harassment Cell of Tezpur University and the other in the form of E-Mail dated 27.5.2013 was filed by three students of PGDMMC Department of MCJ, namely, Smt. Reema Kundu, Smt. Anusua Chatterjee and Smt. Supriya Ghosh addressed to Ms. Joya Chakraborty, Asst. Professor, Department of MCJ. 2 . It is also the case of the petitioner that the said Daisy Kalita again filed another complaint dated 27.5.2013 with the Chairperson, Sexual Harassment Cell of the
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respondent-University against him, and the same was forwarded to the Complaints Committee on 27.5.2013 by three faculty members and three students of the Department of MCJ along with the signatures of 31 students of the Department regarding the alleged incident. On the basis of such complaints, the Complaint Committee on Sexual Harassment ("the Committee" for short) of the respondent- University held a meeting on 28.5.2013 in which the complainant, four student representatives, the petitioner and two faculty members of the Department of MCJ in a highly biased, unfair and questionable proceedings recommended his termination from service with immediate effect as per University Service Rules Guidelines. On the recommendation of the Committee, he was placed under suspension with effect from 1.6.2013 vide the office order dated 31.5.2013 issued by the respondent-University. Following the said recommendation, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him by issuing the show cause dated 18.6.2013 asking him to respond to that He promptly submitted his reply by giving proper explanation to the show cause on 4.7.2013, but the respondent-University was apparently not satisfied whereupon a departmental enquiry was launched against him by appointing an Inquiry Officer. To avoid unwarranted humiliation and the ordeal of going through lengthy enquiry, he put in his resignation paper, which was, however, rejected by the Board of Management, which proceeded to pursue the inquiry against him. 3 . The inquiry officer thereafter proceeded with the inquiry on 12.8.2013 in which the petitioner participated. The Department examined the witnesses, who are also the complainants but did not examine him at all. According to the petitioner, he demolished the case against him in the cross-examination of these witnesses. However, the inquiry officer, without any reason, served him with another notice dated 19.8.2013 to appear before him for another round of inquiry to be held on 23.8.2013 wherein few witnesses of the complainant were to be examined though their names were not among the list of witnesses in the charge sheet. He, therefore, vide his letter dated 20.8.2013 raised his objection and expressed his apprehension against the kind of proceedings being conducted. The petitioner participated in the inquiry on 23.8.2013 and cross-examined the new witnesses. He also exhibited additional documentary evidences. He also asked the inquiry officer to supply him copies of the depositions of the witnesses after the recording of each and every witnesses, but the respondent No. 3 (inquiry officer) refused to do so. He, therefore, made written request on three occasions, namely, on 26.8.2013, 27.9.2013 and 9.10.2013 to the respondent No. 3 and the Vice-Chancellor of the respondent- University to supply him copies of those depositions to enable him to compare the same and prepare his defence. He was, however, furnished with the certified copies of the written statements of the witnesses without the cross-examination portion, which were withheld. The reason for withholding the cross-examination portions, according to the petitioner, is not far to seek, namely, the respondent No. 3 wiped out the major and vital portions of the cross-examinations done by him. This was a device adopted by the respondent-University to deny the petitioner the Opportunity to compare the cross-examinations with the ones recorded by him. The objection raised by him in this behalf vide his notice dated 21.10.2013 and his request for fresh inquiry were simply rejected by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that there is no provision in law for doing the same vide his letter dated 31.10.2013. The petitioner thereafter approached this Court in WP(C) No. 6513/13, but the respondent- University without waiting for the decision of this court, expedited the whole process of accepting the inquiry report and terminated the service of the petitioner vide the order dated 8.11.2013. The petitioner, therefore, contends that the inquiry resulting in the termination of his service is vitiated by procedural impropriety, partiality and illegality and seeks the intervention of this Court.
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4. The writ petition is contested by the respondent-University by filing their affidavit- in-opposition through the Registrar. It is the contention of the answering respondent that the petitioner is bound by the agreement, the statutes, ordinances, regulations and the rules in force in the respondent-University that his service can be terminated if he is guilty of misconduct. The respondents admit to the fact that several complaints were lodged against the petitioner by different students as stated by him in the writ petition. According to the answering respondent, subsequent to the suspension of the petitioner on 31.5.2013, a show cause was issued upon him on 18.6.2013 along with the list of documents to be relied upon against him. In the show cause, it was alleged that he had made some sexually coloured remarks and engaged in un-welcome verbal conduct of sexual nature with a student of 4th semester of the Department of MCJ and that continuously for sometime, he has been making sexually implicit remarks in the classroom as well as sexually coloured remarks, etc. to other girl students of the Department, which amounted to misconduct under the service rules of the respondent-University. In the show cause, he was given an opportunity to inspect the documents relied upon by the University within seven days. Thereafter, the answering respondent received an e-mail dated 19.6.2013 from the petitioner requesting him to allow him to inspect the documents having relevance to the charges, and the same was allowed by him during office hours between 26.6.2013 and 28.6.2013: he was also provided with copies of the documents to be relied upon by the Department. 5 . As his explanation was found to be not satisfactory, the inquiry was proceeded with against him by appointing the respondent No. 3 as the inquiry officer and the Assistant Registrar (Estt.) of the respondent-university as the presenting officer for the inquiry. His resignation was received but was not accepted considering the seriousness of the charges levelled against him, more so, when the Committee found the allegations levelled against him to be genuine and recommended termination of his service. It is asserted by the answering respondent that the inquiry was conducted against the petitioner by the inquiry officer freely and fairly and in accordance with law by giving him adequate opportunity to defend himself. On completion of the inquiry, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 11.9.2013 and found that the charge against him was proved. He was duly furnished with the inquiry report and was also asked to submit his representation against the inquiry report. However, even before the inquiry came to an end, the petitioner finding himself to be guilty raised objections against the inquiry report on frivolous grounds and demanded fresh inquiry, which was naturally rejected vide the letter dated 31.10.2013. The inquiry report was thereafter placed before the Board of Management, which after careful deliberation accepted the same. As authorised by the Board of Management, the Vice-Chancellor by the impugned order removed him from service with immediate effect He was also directed to leave the campus immediately. It is submitted that no injustice was done to the petitioner which calls for the interference of this Court. 6. The petitioner subsequently filed his reply affidavit to the counter-affidavit of the respondent-University, which, in turn, filed its additional affidavit through the Registrar responding to the allegations of the petitioner in his reply affidavit. In my considered view, it is not really necessary to allude to those averments, which are mostly repetition of their earlier pleadings and are argumentative. 7 . I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties. Having heard Mr. R. Mazumdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. N.C. Das, the learned standing counsel for Tezpur University, the question to be determined is whether the
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departmental enquiry culminating in the dismissal of the petitioner from service is vitiated by procedural impropriety? Unfolding his submissions, Mr. R. Mazumdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the impugned departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner suffers from serious procedural improprieties inasmuch as he was denied of adequate opportunity of hearing to defend himself. It is his contention that there is absolutely not an iota of evidence to substantiate the charges made against him in the complaints, more so, when the charges are vague and virtually left them for his imagination. The proceedings, right from the beginning, according to the learned counsel, were tailor-made for the complainants by the respondent-authorities who were bent upon inflicting maximum penalty and are, therefore, biased. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, in particular, pointed out the following infirmities in the proceedings of the departmental enquiry: 1. While issuing the memorandum of charges, the petitioner was never given the list of witnesses and documents which were proposed to be relied on by the Complaint Committee ("the Committee" for short) against him in the enquiry. 2. The complaints dated 25.5.2013 lodged by the students are vague and do not contain the date on which the incidents complained of took place. 3 . The complaint dated 27.5.2013 received by e-mail also does not contain any date or time of the incidents and out of the three complainants, two of them, namely, Reema Kundu and Ansua Chatterjee neither appeared before the Committee nor before the second enquiry: in any case, this complaint is an after-thought and an improvement of the original complaints. 4 . The enquiry conducted by the Committee on 28.5.2013 was in contravention of the procedure laid down in the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1964 ("the Rules"). 5. By cross-examining the petitioner by the Committee, in the absence of the presenting officer, on 28.5.2013 vide para 7 of the counter-affidavit of the respondent filed in October, 2014, the Committee has played the role of the presenting officer thereby vitiating the enquiry. 6. Professor S.K. Datta, who was one of the members of the Committee, was also the complainant in Case No. 4 and should not have taken part in the enquiry inasmuch as he is an interested person: this alone is sufficient to hold the enquiry illegal on the ground of bias. 7 . The depositions of the complainant and other witnesses before the Committee were not recorded in verbatim, and the petitioner was never given any opportunity to go through those depositions. 8 . The second enquiry was initiated by the order dated 18.6.2013 on the basis of the same charges for which an enquiry was already conducted on 28.5.2013 where the petitioner had already divulged his entire defence, and another enquiry on the same set of charges has seriously prejudiced the case of the petitioner: this is merely an attempt to plug the loopholes found in the first enquiry, which is unfair and illegal. 9 . The provision of Section 9(1) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at
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Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 provides that a complaint of sexual harassment should be filed within three months from the date of the incident, but when the complaint lodged by the complainant did not even mention the date of the incidents of complained of, the petitioner is handicapped from taking the plea that the complaint is hopelessly time- barred: this vital omission has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner and exposed him to unwarranted and illegal proceedings. 1 0 . The objection raised by the petitioner on 20.8.2013 against the examination of new witnesses in the enquiry without recording any reason was ignored by the Committee. 1 1 . The petitioner was never given any opportunity to authenticate the statement of the witnesses in violation of the established practice and procedure adumbrated in clause (17) of Director General P & T Orders contained at page 83 of Swamy's Compilation of CCS CCA Rules, 2010 Edn. 8 . Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-University submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner after scrupulously adhering to the procedure laid down by law, and no interference is called for. He remind this Court of the settled law in the matter of domestic enquiry that a writ court can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority only if there is material irregularities in the proceedings of the enquiry or if the findings are based on no evidence. In the instant case, he contends, when there are some evidences, which support the conclusion of the disciplinary authority, no infirmity of the nature calling for the interference of this Court is established by the petitioner. On completion of the enquiry, submits the learned senior counsel, a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to him and he was asked to submit his representation against the findings of the enquiry officer, but the petitioner asked for fresh enquiry which was turned down by the disciplinary authority by his letter dated 31.10.2013: there is also no provision under the statutes to enable the disciplinary authority to direct fresh enquiry on the same set of charges against which a proceeding is already pending. These are the sum and substance of the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the respondent-University. 9. At the outset, it may be noticed that Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 came into force on 9.12.2013. An elaborate mechanism has now been made to deal with and punish the growing menace of sexual harassment against women at workplace. However, the instant case cannot be governed by this Act as the incidents complained of took place prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid Act. In that case, we shall have to fall back on the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0786/1997 : (1997) 6 SCC 241. In compliance with the aforesaid guidelines, the Central Government has amended the provisions of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 by inserting Rule 3-C therein, which reads: "3-C. Prohibition of Sexual Harassment of working women.- (1) No government servant shall indulge in any act of sexual harassment of any women at her work place. (2) Every government servant who is in charge of a work place shall take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to any woman at such work place.
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Explanation. - For the purpose of this rule, "sexual harassment" includes such an unwelcome sexually determined behaviour, whether directly or otherwise, as- (a) physical contacts and advances; (b) demand or request of sexual favour; (c) sexually coloured remarks; (d) showing any pornography; or (e) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature." 10. Again taking cue from the judgment of the Apex Court in Medha Kotwal Lele Vs. Union of India, MANU/SC/0898/2012 : (2013) 1 SCC 311,the Central Government made corresponding amendment to Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 by incorporating a proviso thereto, which is as follows: "Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 3-C of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the Complaints Committee established in each Ministry or Department or Office for inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the Inquiring Authority appointed by the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of these rules and the Complaints Committee shall hold, if separate proceeding has not been prescribed for the Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry into the complaints of sexual harassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance with the provisions laid down in these rules." 11. There is no dispute at the bar that the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 ("Conduct Rules" for short) and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 ("CCA Rules") in so far as sexual harassment of women at work place is concerned, at least, by virtue of the guidelines/directions issued by the Apex Court in Vishaka case (supra) and Medha Kotwal Lele case (supra). Before proceeding further, it can now be safely concluded that there was no statutory limitation of period for filing a complaint of sexual harassment against the petitioner: the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in his behalf fails. However, his contention that the complaint is vague and does not even mention the date and time of the incidents complained of deserves deeper consideration. To appreciate this contention, I may refer to the English translation of the first complaint dated 25.5.201-3 (Annexure-6), which reads thus: "To The Sexual Harassment Cell, Tezpur University. Dated 25th May, 2013. Sub: Complaint against harassment. Respected Ma'am,
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This is to inform you that I am a student Mass Communication and journalism, 4th Semester. I would like to make a complaint against the HOD, Dr. C.S.H.N. Murthy, for his implicit proposal towards me for the sake of grade and the completion of my dissertation, which seemed to be sexual in nature. I, hereby, request you to strictly probe into the matter and take necessary action immediately. Yours faithfully, (Daisy Kalita) MCM 11026 (List of people in support on the complaint is hereby enclosed) Not mentioned * 12. The second complaint was filed by some students of 4th semester purportedly 25.5.2013 [Annexure-7(1)], the relevant portions whereof are reproduced below: "To The Sexual Harassment Cell, Tezpur University, Napaam, Tezpur. Sub: Complaint against the sexual harassment of a certain faculty. Respected Cell, With regret we have to inform you that there have been continuous cases of sexual harassment of many girls students of our batch, the cases being this is not an isolated incident that has happened out of the blue. Rather it is the tip of the iceberg. The latest being the event of one girl being tried to be coerced in illicit activities with the HOD in the guise of clearing her dissertation and asked her to meet the HOD. The HOD in turn asked to indulge her in that. Even were lots of lascivious comments made in the classroom and profanities that were uttered in the classroom. There has been a litany of misdemeanours that were conducted by certain individual. The order of the different comments and the activities of the person has been transcribed and attached with this letter in support of the complaint. Thus we would lie to lodge a formal complaint against the individual faculty Prof. CSHN Murthy, HOD who is the source of this all the misdemeanours. For students of 4th Semesters 1 3 . On going through the first and second complaint, interestingly, not even a whisper of statement is made on the date and time of the incidents complained. However, on the basis of such vague complaints, the Complaints Committee on Sexual Harassment of the University entertained the case. Interestingly, another complaint, which is more elaborate and in greater detail was filed by the said Daisy Kalita on 27.5.2013. For the first time, the date of incident was mentioned as 24.5.2013, which did not find a place in her earlier complaint. In my opinion, the said detailed complaint is an after-thought and an improvement on the earlier complaint which did not, as already noticed, contain any material particulars and,
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therefore, should be taken with a pinch of salt. This appears to be a device to plug a loophole in the case of the complainant, who was soon joined by other complainants. The petitioner was left to imagine by himself the charges to be met by him. Nevertheless, the Committee proceeded with the enquiry on 28.5.2013 without even framing the articles of charges, purportedly examined the complainant, two witnesses and the petitioner and proceeded to recommend the termination of the service of the petitioner on the same day. Never was a departmental enquiry held so fast and completed so soon. The Complaints Committee apparently functioned like a Kangaroo Court or what they called lynching in the wild west to punish the petitioner. In my opinion, the Complaints Committee have sacrificed all elements of fairness in their proceedings against the petitioner. This reminds me of the observations of the Apex Court in Surath Chandra Chakraborty Vs. State of W.B., MANU/SC/0493/1970 : (1970) 3 SCC 548, which is quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Anil Gilurkar Vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, MANU/SC/1083/2011 : (2011) 14 SCC 379, the relevant portion whereof are in the following terms: "5......The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. By way of illustration one of the grievances of the appellant contained in his letter, dated March 24, 1950, to the Enquiry Officer may be mentioned. This is what he said though the language employed is partly obscure and unhappy: "Regarding the first charge, I beg to submit that the allegation is vague. In the charge it has not been specifically stated as to where, when and before whom I circulated false rumours, regarding retrenchment policy of the Government and thereby spread insubordination. In fact if one goes through the statements of PWs made to D.F.S. as submitted before my suspicion, it will appear that no specific case could have made with all material particular as to date, time and person. Having been able to take deposition and to conduct enquiry keeping me in dark and finally put me out of office, Sri S. Bose was able to win over the witnesses and was able to shape his case to suit his purpose." 6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. The appellant repeatedly and at every stage brought it to the notice of the authorities concerned that he had not been supplied the statement of allegations and that the charges were extremely
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vague and indefinite. In spite of all this no one cared to inform him of the facts, circumstances and particulars relevant to the charges. Even if the Enquiry Officer had made a report against him the appellant could have been given a further opportunity at the stage of the second show-cause notice to adduce any further evidence if he so desired after he had been given the necessary particulars and material in the form of a statement of allegations which had never been supplied to him before. This could undoubtedly be done in view of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as they existed at the material time. The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit." 14. In my opinion, by proceeding against the petitioner on the basis of such vague complaints, the petitioner has been denied of reasonable opportunity of hearing. This then takes me to the manner in which the enquiry was conducted by the Complaint Committee on 28.5.2013 as evident from Annexure-9 to the writ petition. In the enquiry proceeding held by the Complaint Committee, the evidence was, to say the least, taken in a crude way. No opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him. Yet, the Complaint Committee made the following observations against the petitioner: 1. Ms. Daisy Kalita's case and her appeal for justice was genuine. During the 4 hour interrogation the facts that came before the Committee the 'aggrieved' was genuinely shattered and shocked by the behaviour of the HOD. 2 . The complaint committee observed that student are not safe with an individual like Prof Murthy who is obsessed with 'sex'. From interaction with the 'aggrieved' and the content of the mail sent by the PGDMMC students, also aggrieved, and interaction with the student representatives it was evident that on a regular basis the 'respondent' Prof. Murthy has made sexual innuendos' and 'sexual advances' and 'physical contact' with the girl students and research scholars. 3. His manipulative nature is evident in the manner in which he intimidates and confuses all his students. This is evident how he makes the students give their suggestions for a 'good working' environment of the department. Then he sends his suggestions to the university authority requesting to constitute an all female faculty 'Inquiry Committee' to investigate the problems the students are facing with some of the department faculties. At the same time he instructs the students not to say anything adverse to the 'Inquiry Committee' as the prestige of the department is at stake. He also spreads rumour that that some students have made allegations of sexual harassment against some teachers of the department. So when the 'Inquiry Committee' visits the department on 13.05.2013 the students are wary and confused and deny any such allegation was made and there is no problem in the department. From this it is evident that he not only manipulated the department students but also the university authority and made the 'inquiry'
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as farce. 4. Prof Murthy is in the habit of making/discussing matters in the classroom which are unbecoming of a teacher and detrimental to a healthy academic environment by telling fictitious stories of other faculties/person's private life. This reflected his perverted bent of mind. 5. Prof Murthy proves to be a habitual 'liar' as is evident from deciphering of the coded text message EGFCXXs as 'Easy fucks' which the students said was not true. Secondly, his vile allegations against his colleagues within and outside the department. When asked for evidence he could not provide any concrete proof to put before the committee. 6. In general he has no respect for women, particularly those of North East India as is evident from Ms. Daisy's grievance letter as well as from his conduct during the inquiry. 7 . His past record indicates that he is an individual not fit to be in an academic institution. There is a case against him. In 1995 he was dismissed from his job because of his abusive behaviour towards young children, students and women. 15. It is on the basis of the foregoing observations that the Complaint Committee had recommended the termination of the service of the petitioner. However, on reading and re-reading the entire proceedings recorded by Complaint Committee at Annexure-9 to the writ petition, it is obvious that the enquiry was conducted and concluded on a single day i.e. on 28.5.2013. The complainant was perfunctorily examined by the Complaint Committee, who appeared to ask leading questions, that too, not in narrative form. There is no evidence to show that the petitioner cross- examined, or was given any opportunity to cross-examine, the witnesses. No charge- sheet or list of witnesses or documents was furnished to the petitioner by the respondent authorities. Moreover, there is absolutely no legal evidence to support the aforesaid observations of the Complaint Committee, yet their recommendation was to terminate the service of the petitioner. As already noticed, the Central Government has now amended Rule 14(2) of the CCA Rules by inserting a proviso thereto which says that the Complaint Committee on Sexual Harassment constituted in each Ministry or Department or Office should be deemed to the Inquiry Authority for inquiring into such complaints, and the Complaint Committee should hold the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in the CCA Rules. What exactly is status of the report of the Complaint Committee on Sexual Harassment is explained by the Apex Court in Medha Kotwal Lele (supra) in the following manner; "44.1. The States and Union Territories which have not yet carried out adequate and appropriate amendments in their respective Civil Services Conduct Rules (by whatever name these Rules are called) shall do so within two months from today by providing that the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report in a disciplinary action under such Civil Services Conduct Rules. In other words, the disciplinary authority shall treat the report/findings, etc. of the Complaints Committee as the findings in a disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employee and shall act on such report accordingly. The findings and the report of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as a mere preliminary investigation or inquiry leading to a disciplinary action but shall be treated as
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a finding/report in an inquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent." 1 6 . The respondent authority should have treated the report of the Complaint Committee and then examined as to whether the findings recorded therein constitute sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of the charge. If the answer is in the affirmative, the respondent authority would hold him guilty of the charges and award appropriate punishment. Conversely, if the findings are not based on evidence, they would exonerate the petitioner from all the charges. However, without doing anything of that nature, they apparently treated the report of the Complaint Committee as a mere preliminary investigation or enquiry and proceeded to place the petitioner under suspension on the ground that a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against him vide the Office Order dated 31.5.2013 and subsequently issued the charge memo against him requiring him to submit his written statement of defence against the allegations made against him vide the show cause dated 18.6.2013. No cogent reason was given for not treating the report of the Complaint Committee as the enquiry report against the petitioner. However, without rhyme or reason, the report of the Complaint Committee was apparently brushed aside by the respondent authority, who proceeded to issue the latest show cause, which amounts to holding a second enquiry after the petitioner had already disclosed his defence. 1 7 . Moreover, the report of the Complaint Committee dated 28.5.2013 did not disclose any evidence to support their findings that the allegations made against the petitioner were proved: there was thus no basis for recommending the termination of the service of the petitioner. Perhaps, the respondent authority had to take resort to holding another enquiry as there was no legal evidence to support the findings of guilt recorded by the Committee against the petitioner and they did not at the same time want to exonerate him of the charges against him. The legality of a second enquiry after abandoning the first enquiry on the same set of charges came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey Vs. Union of India, MANU/SC/0847/2014 : (2014) 10 SCC 589, and the Apex Court observed: "24. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the enquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring authority (multimember)? The issue is not really whether the enquiring authority should be a single member or a multi-member body, but whether a second inquiry such as the one under challenge is permissible. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.R. Deb v. CCE, examined the question in the context of Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where an enquiry was ordered against a Sub- Inspector, Central Excise (the appellant before this Court). The enquiry officer held that the charge was not proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority appointed another enquiry officer "to conduct a supplementary open inquiry". Such supplementary inquiry was conducted and a report that there was "no conclusive proof" to "establish the charge" was made. Not satisfied, the disciplinary authority thought it fit that "another enquiry officer should be appointed to inquire afresh into the charge". 25. The Court in K.R. Deb held that: (SCC p. 105, paras 12-13) "12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into
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the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the inquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the Rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on 13.2.1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the Rules but was harassing to the appellant." (emphasis supplied) and allowed the appeal of K.R. Deb. 26. It can be seen from the above that the normal rule is that there can be only one enquiry. This Court has also recognised the possibility of a further enquiry in certain circumstances enumerated therein. The decision however makes it clear that the fact that the report submitted by the enquiring authority is not acceptable to the disciplinary authority, is not a ground for completely setting aside the enquiry report and ordering a second enquiry." 18. In the instant case, the position obtaining here is the reverse of what happened in the case of K.R. Deb case (supra) inasmuch as the findings in the instant case are against the petitioner. But then, the principle remains the same. Even if some serious defect has crept in the course of inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of inquiry or not examined at all for other reason, all that the respondent-University could do was to ask the Complaint Committee to record further evidence. In the absence of any provision for holding de novo inquiry, which is the case under the CCA Rules, the respondent-University could not have abandoned the report of the Complaint Committee, which was to be treated as the inquiry report by virtue of the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCA Rules. Moreover, no reason was assigned by the respondent authority to hold fresh inquiry when the Complaint Committee had already concluded the inquiry. Consequently, the subsequent inquiry conducted against the petitioner in terms of the show cause dated 18.6.2013 cannot be sustained in law. 19. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the second departmental inquiry conducted against the petitioner in terms of the show cause dated 18.6.2013 is permissible also, there are procedural improprieties in this inquiry for four reasons, namely, (1) the inquiry was conducted on the basis of the same vague and after-thought complaints, which were full of embellishment; (2) the petitioner was never given an opportunity to authenticate the statements of the witnesses examined by the enquiry committee: this in contravention of the established practice and procedure contained in D.G., P & T, Letter No. 6/66/60-Disc, dated 14th April, 1961 and Para 92, P & T Manual Vol. III, and (3) subjecting the petitioner to the second departmental enquiry on the same set of facts and evidence has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner inasmuch as he had already disclosed his defence in the
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“Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 is nothing more than statutory ‘window dressing’. It adds nothing at all of substance to the director’s traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty. It is also confusing and creates unnecessary uncertainty for directors with regard to their legal liability risk.”