G.R. No.

203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO
SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto
Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise
known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under
the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-
mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government,
the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitutionally protected
rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as
the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure;

• Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any
violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;

• Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in
real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the
Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well
as the right to the privacy of communications;

• Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or
restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an
undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates
the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and

• Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the
penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes
upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a
prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block
access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon
the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties,
plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a
“chilling effect” upon protected speech.

No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore
cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant
to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Rulling:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original
author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the
post and react to it; and

2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D
and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System

Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-
related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect
to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to
actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy;
as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.