NO.

18-_____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

IAN S. GOLDENBERG, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
v.

TRANSCONTINENTAL
GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN CHRISTOPHER CLARK THOMAS H. CAMP

COUNSEL OF RECORD THE CAMP FIRM, LLC
CLARK & SMITH LAW FIRM LLC P.O. BOX 2349
150 COLLEGE STREET NEWNAN, GA 30264
MACON, GA 31201 (678) 464-1366
(478) 254-5040 HARRY@THECAMPFIRM.COM
CHRIS@CLARKSMITHLAW.COM

MARCH 6, 2019 COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

SUPREME COURT PRESS ♦ (888) 958-5705 ♦ BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
 i

QUESTION PRESENTED
The Court has long emphasized the strict construc-
tion of condemnation statutes, especially as against
corporate delegatees of this sovereign power. By the plain,
undisputed terms of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(h), a pipeline company obtains title and any
incident rights of possession in property it seeks to
condemn only upon entry of judgment and payment
of compensation in such an action. A growing number
of Circuits have nevertheless upheld grants of full
possession to pipeline companies at the outset of these
actions through mandatory preliminary injunctions—
the Seventh Circuit has demurred. In this case, the
Eleventh Circuit further expanded the reach of these
injunctions in holding that a pipeline company need
not even pay estimated just compensation, by posting
a cash bond, before obtaining possession. As a result,
Petitioners have now been deprived of their property
without any compensation for over two years, even as
Respondent profits from its use—pumping as much
as 44.8 million cubic feet of natural gas through it
every day. This case thus raises an important and
frequently recurring issue never addressed by the
Court as to the constitutional limits of equitable pro-
cedures in eminent domain actions at law.
THE SPECIFIC QUESTION PRESENTED IS:
Whether a judicially-conferred right of possession
to a pipeline company before judgment and without
compensation in a Natural Gas Act taking improperly
invades the exclusive authority of Congress to legislate
how eminent domain is exercised and violates the just
compensation clause.
 ii

PARTIES TO THE PETITION

PETITIONERS

 Ian S. Goldenberg.
 Handy Land and Timber L.P.
 Christine Marie Cali
 Gene A. Terrell
 Joyce Bailey Terrell
 Thomas W. Smrcina
 Jeannie F. Smrcina
 Donald Morris

RESPONDENT

 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

 iii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

None of the petitioners has a parent corporation
or shares held by a publicly traded company.
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i 

PARTIES TO THE PETITION .................................. ii 
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ......................................... iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi 
OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1 
JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION,
STATUTES, AND JUDICIAL RULES ................ 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2 
A.  Natural Gas Act Takings ................................. 2 
B.  District Court Proceedings .............................. 6 
C.  Appellate Court Proceedings ........................... 9 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 10 
I.  THE DECISION BELOW AND RECENT DECI-
SIONS IN THREE OTHER CIRCUITS, CONFLICT
WITH THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT ON FUNDA-
MENTAL ISSUES OF EMINENT DOMAIN, EQUITY,
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRU-
DENCE .............................................................. 10 

A.  Eminent Domain Is an Exclusively Leg-

islative Function ....................................... 10 
B.  Eminent Domain Statutes Are Strictly
Construed .................................................. 12 
 v

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

C.  Equity Cannot Supply Substantive Right

to Immediate Possession in Straight Take
Condemnations ......................................... 14 
II.  REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE GRANT OF
INJUNCTIVE ACCESS WITHOUT PAYMENT OF
CASH BOND WORKS A JUDICIAL TAKING IN
VIOLATION OF JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE .. 18 
III.  THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR
REVIEW OF AN IMPORTANT AND RECURRING
PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUE ................................. 20 
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 21 

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit

(December 6, 2018) ............................................. 1a 
Order of the Northern District Court of Georgia
(November 10, 2016) ........................................ 88a 
Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Statutes and Judicial Rules ........................... 119a 
Transcript of Motions Proceedings—
Relevant Excerpts (October 26, 2016) ........... 137a 
 vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page

CASES 
Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954) ............................................. 11
Callaway v. Block,
763 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir. 1985) ......................... 10
Chapman v. Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621,
70 S.Ct. 392, 94 L.Ed. 393 (1950) ..................... 14
City of Cincinnati v. Vester,
281 U.S. 439 (1930) ............................................. 12
E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage,
361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004) ....................... 5, 9, 18
Green v. Biddle,
21 U.S. 1 (1823) ................................................. 12
Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States,
467 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2187 (1984) .............. passim
Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996) ............................................. 14
N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land,
520 F. Supp. 170 (D.N.D., 1981) ............................ 4
N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land,
144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998) ........................... 5, 16
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) ............................................. 14
O’Brien v. United States,
392 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1968) ............................. 10
 vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107,
22 L.Ed. 72, 86 U.S. 107 (1873) ........................... 14
S. Natural Gas v. 2.0 Acres Cullman County,
197 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................... 4
Secombe v. R.R. Co.,
90 U.S. 108 (1874) ............................................. 11
Sweet v. Rechel,
159 U.S. 380 (1895) ...................................... 18, 19
Transwestern Pipeline v. 17.19 Acres of Property,
550 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2008).............................. 2, 3
United States v. Carmack,
329 U.S. 230 (1946) ........................................... 12
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R. Co.,
195 U.S. 540 (1904) ............................................. 12
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) ........................................... 11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. Amend. V ..................................... 1, 18, 19

STATUTES 
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) ............................................. passim
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).................................................. 9
40 U.S.C. § 3118 .......................................................... 3
 viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
JUDICIAL RULES 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ................................................ 1, 6, 13
Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 .......................................... 2, 4, 13
Sup. Ct. R. 29.6 .......................................................... iii

PUBLICATIONS 
Pub. L. 100–474, § 2,
Oct. 6, 1988, 102 Stat. 2302 ................................ 4
Pub. L. 95–617, Title VI, § 608,
Nov. 9, 1978, 92 Stat. 3173 ................................. 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Robert Meltz,
Delegation of the Federal Power of
Eminent Domain to Nonfederal Entities,
Cong. Research Serv., RS2288
(May 20, 2008) ................................................... 12
The Anti-Federalist No. 82 (Brutus) ....................... 20
 1

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals is found at Appendix, App.1a. The order of
the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia granting Transcontinental Pipe
Line Company LLC’s motions for partial summary
judgment and preliminary injunction is found at
App.88a.

JURISDICTION
Petitioner seeks review of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
entered on December 6, 2018. This Court’s jurisdiction
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION,
STATUTES, AND JUDICIAL RULES
The following provisions are presented in the
appendix:
 U.S. Const. Amend. V (App.119a)
 15 U.S.C. § 717f—Construction, Extension, or
Abandonment of Facilities (App.119a)
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65—Injunctions and Restraining
Orders (App.125a)
 2

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1—Condemning Real or

Personal Property (App.128a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Natural Gas Act Takings

The method of taking prescribed by Congress
through Section 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”)
has never been in dispute. NGA takings are “straight
take” condemnation actions. Transwestern Pipeline
v. 17.19 Acres of Property, 550 F.3d 770, 774 (9th Cir.
2008) (“All courts examining the issue have agreed that
the NGA does not authorize quick take power, nor
can it be implied, because eminent domain statutes are
strictly construed to exclude those rights not expressly
granted.”).
As this Court has explained, Congress delegates
two statutory methods of condemnation: (1) “straight
take” authority, which is the ordinary statutory method
of condemnation, and (2) “quick take” authority. Kirby
Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-4, 104 S.Ct.
2187, 2190-91 (1984).
Where Congress has delegated straight take
authority, the condemnor can take possession of the
subject property only after just compensation is judi-
cially determined and paid to the owner. Id. In a
straight take action, the “practical effect of final judg-
ment on the issue of just compensation is to give the
[condemnor] an option to buy the property at the
adjudicated price.” Id.
 3

Importantly, if the condemnor “wishes to exercise

that option, it tenders payment to the private owner,
whereupon title and right to possession vest in the
[condemnor].” Id. (emphasis added). If the condemnor
“decides not to exercise its option, it can move for dis-
missal of the condemnation action.” Id.
In other words, a condemnor with straight take
authority cannot take possession from the property
owner before (1) obtaining this option after a judicial
determination of just compensation and (2) exercising
this option by tendering payment in the amount
determined as just compensation.
The quick take authority confers an “additional
. . . right.” Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at
774-75; see also 40 U.S.C. § 3118 (“Declaration of
Taking Act”). In a quick take action, the condemnor
has the right to take possession of the subject property
before just compensation is judicially determined but
only if at the time of filing the action the condemnor
deposits, for the use of the condemnee, “an amount of
money equal to the estimated value of the land. Kirby
Forest, 467 U.S. at 4-5, 104 S.Ct. at 2191. Upon doing
so, “[t]itle and right to possession thereupon vest
immediately in the [condemnor].” Id.
Despite the consensus that the NGA confers no
quick take authority and the fact that Congress has
not modified the language of Section 717f(h) since its
adoption three-quarters of a century ago, the procedures
applied to takings actions under the NGA have trans-
formed in the intervening years to the point they now
bear little resemblance to those Congress originally
had conceived.
 4

Section 717f(h) provides that applicable state

eminent domain practices and procedures govern even
NGA condemnation actions brought in a United States
district court. In spite of this clear mandate, the
clause was read out of the NGA with the adoption of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 in 1951. The courts have reasoned
that “a more recent statute prevails over an older
conflicting statute” and so Congress must have intended
to replace the state practice and procedure clause in
the NGA with Rule 71.1. S. Natural Gas v. 2.0 Acres
Cullman County, 197 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.
1999).1 Among other things, the absolute right many
property owners would previously have had to jury
trials in NGA condemnations disappeared with the
advent of Rule 71.1. Id.
But that was just the beginning of the procedural
transformation. Despite that Congress delegated no
quick take authority to pipeline companies through
the NGA, a district court in 1981 conferred this right
anyway. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land,
520 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D.N.D., 1981). In granting imme-
diate possession, the district court justified the relief
solely on the basis of its inherent equitable authority.
Id. at 172.

Almost two decades later, a unanimous panel of the

Seventh Circuit that included Judges Frank H.
Easterbrook, Joel M. Flaum, and Kenneth F. Ripple

1 Interestingly, Congress has amended other provisions in the

NGA numerous times since the promulgation of Rule 71.1, while
leaving the state practice and procedure clause untouched. See,
e.g., Pub. L. 95–617, title VI, § 608, Nov. 9, 1978, 92 Stat. 3173;
Pub. L. 100–474, § 2, Oct. 6, 1988, 102 Stat. 2302. Yet no court
has ever suggested this logic might apply in reverse.
 5

seemed to squelch the notion of judicially-conferred

injunctive possession in NGA takings. N. Border
Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471
(7th Cir. 1998). In a well-reasoned defense of the need
for “a substantive entitlement” to equitable relief, the
court noted that for a pipeline company to obtain imme-
diate possession it would have to “claim[ ] an ownership
interest in the property that, if it existed at all, was
fully vested even before initiation of the lawsuit”
because it was asking the court to “predict[] what
future proceedings would reveal about the ex ante
state of affairs between the parties, i.e., that the
[pipeline company], not the [landowner], had the right
to possess the property.” Id. at 472.
Despite the sound reasoning in N. Border Pipeline
Co., the idea of mandatory injunctive possession in
favor of pipeline companies gained new traction in
2004. The Fourth Circuit held that a pipeline company
can establish a pre-judgment, substantive right in
property sought to be condemned under the NGA. E.
Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir.
2004). The pipeline company can do so, the argument
goes, by obtaining partial summary judgment as to its
right to condemn. Id. at 823. Then, the company has
“an interest in the landowners’ property that could be
protected in equity if the conditions for granting
equitable (in this case, injunctive) relief were satisfied,”
which according to that court, they easily were. Id. at
823, 829-830. Five Circuits have adopted Sage’s rea-
soning, including now the Eleventh Circuit. (App.40a-
41a).
Thus completed the transformation of the statutory
straight take authority delegated by Congress under
 6

the NGA into a judicially-conferred quick take proce-

dure. Now, according to the Eleventh Circuit in this
case, a pipeline company exercising this equitable quick
authority need not even pay the condemnee estimated
just compensation before taking possession—as would
be required of a condemnor exercising the statutory
quick take authority—since Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(a) leaves the issue of surety to the dis-
cretion of the district court. (App.84a).

B. District Court Proceedings

Petitioners are all homeowners and residents
(“Landowner-Petitioners”) of a rural area in western
Coweta County, Georgia, which is bisected by Respond-
ent Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC’s
(“Transco”) 115-mile natural gas pipeline, known as
the Dalton Expansion Project.
After a four-year regulatory review process, which
Transco unilaterally delayed at least once for eleven
months, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) issued a certificate of public need (“FERC
Certificate”) for the project on August 3, 2016. (App.
18a-19a, 21a, 76a) Transco immediately began filing
the condemnation actions at issue in this appeal
later that same month. (App.23a) On the same day
Transco initiated these actions, Transco filed motions
for partial summary judgment and a mandatory pre-
liminary injunction that would convey immediate
possession of the subject properties. (App.24a).
Transco filed three declarations in support of
these motions. (Id.). A land agent stated that offers
had been made to acquire by contract the easement
areas now sought to be condemned. (App.25a). An
 7

engineer stated that the easement areas were approved

by FERC. (Id.). And the project manager stated that
Transco would lose millions of dollars if construction
did not proceed immediately. (App.25a-26a).
Over Landowner-Petitioners’ objections, the district
court consolidated all of the cases in the Atlanta Di-
vision, despite that all of their rural properties are
within ten miles of another federal courthouse in
that same district. Also over Landowner-Petitioners’
objection, the district court refused to allow expedited
written or deposition discovery prior to a hearing on
Transco’s motions. (App.28a-29a). The district court
further denied Landowner-Petitioners’ request to
take and present evidence at the hearing, even though
Landowner-Petitioners’ had already subpoenaed several
of Transco’s declarants. (App.28a, 138a).
These limitations notwithstanding, Landowner-
Petitioners did submit the declaration of a Georgia-
licensed real-estate appraiser. (App.27a). He testified
that the easements sought by Transco were not fixed
to a particular location on the ground, as required by
FERC. (Id.). He concluded that the easements as pro-
posed could not be appraised without making extraor-
dinary assumptions. (App.27a).
At the hearing, Landowner-Petitioners also called
into question Transco’s averred in-service deadline of
May 1, 2017. (App.25a). Landowner-Petitioners sub-
mitted a letter from Transco that had previously
stated the in-service date as August 2016. (App.28a).
Without producing any contracts, Transco had also
declared that it would owe irrecoverable contractual
penalties to purchasers of its gas if the in-service
deadline were not met. (App.25a-26a). Landowner-
 8

Petitioners obtained and produced at the hearing a

certified copy of a contract from one of the alleged
contractual purchasers that contained no provision
for such penalties due to a construction delay.
(App.137a-139a).
Finally, landowners showed that the offers made
by Transco to acquire the subject properties by contract
would have required landowners to convey rights far
in excess of those Transco is permitted to condemn.
(App.30a).
Two weeks after the hearing, the district court
granted Transco’s motions. (App.31a-35a). The dis-
trict court granted partial summary judgment as to
Transco’s right to condemn because (1) it held a valid
FERC Certificate; (2) the property to be condemned
was necessary for the project; and (3) it could not
acquire the necessary easements by contract, all of
which are necessary pre-requisites to bringing any
condemnation action under Section 717f(h) of the
NGA. (App.31a).
The district court also issued a mandatory pre-
liminary injunction to convey immediate possession of
the subject properties to Transco to the full extent
authorized by FERC but declined to make a determi-
nation as to specific easement terms. (App.33a). The
district court, and later the Eleventh Circuit, concluded
that Transco had shown “actual success” on the “merits
of its condemnation claim.” (Id.). The district court
found that the potential for largely monetary irrep-
arable harm Transco could suffer outweighed any risk
of harm to landowners from giving up their property
immediately. (App.34a). Finally, the district court
found the mandatory injunction in the public
 9

interest, largely based on FERC’s findings in issuing

the FERC Certificate in the first place. (Id.).
Transco proposed bond amounts based on its own
appraisals of the easement rights to be taken. 35.
Transco’s proposed bond amount for one of the Land-
owner-Petitioners was based on a valuation of $198.00
for the easement rights to be taken. Landowner-
Petitioners proposed their own bond amounts and
requested clarification that Transco would be made to
file cash bonds that could be drawn upon during the
litigation, much like a deposit of estimated just com-
pensation in a quick take case. (App.36a). The dis-
trict court rejected this request, requiring only a
surety bond, and adopted Transco’s proposed bond
amounts as to Landowner-Petitioners. (App.36a-37a).
This appeal followed on December 12, 2016. (App.
38a). Although Transco did not make the critical May
1, 2017 in-service deadline, the pipeline has now
been fully operational for over a year. (App.39a).
Landowner-Petitioners have been out of possession
and without compensation since February 2, 2017.
(Id.).

C. Appellate Court Proceedings

In a 90-page opinion, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the reasoning of Sage, allotting just six paragraphs to
its discussion of the availability of injunctive posses-
sion in NGA takings, and affirming the district court
in all respects. (App.17a, 40a-44a).
Jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit was grounded
in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which permits an immediate
appeal from an order granting or denying an injunction.
Pendent jurisdiction was exercised to review the district
 10

court’s partial summary judgment ruling since it pro-

vided the basis for its finding that Transco had
satisfied the first prong of the preliminary injunction
analysis. (App.44a). The Eleventh Circuit further
exercised jurisdiction over the district court’s deci-
sion not to require a cash bond under Callaway v.
Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985), since
that order involved matters “closely related” to the
interlocutory order being appealed. (App.81a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW AND RECENT DECISIONS IN

THREE OTHER CIRCUITS, CONFLICT WITH THIS
COURT’S PRECEDENT ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF
EMINENT DOMAIN, EQUITY, AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE

A. Eminent Domain Is an Exclusively Legislative

Function
Congress—not any court—has exclusive control
over how and when eminent domain authority is dele-
gated and exercised. “As a general and fundamental
principle, the exercise of the sovereign right of
eminent domain is within the legislative power and
mere questions of its range and extent in particular
cases are ordinarily not subject to judicial correction
and control.” O’Brien v. United States, 392 F.2d 949
(5th Cir. 1968). Accordingly, and as this Court has
held, Congress is the only branch of the federal govern-
ment with authority to delegate the power, or author-
ize the use of, eminent domain. See Youngstown Sheet
 11

& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (prohibit-

ing President from seizing possession of private prop-
erty even in wartime absent Congressional authoriza-
tion); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 36 (1954)
(“not for the courts to determine whether [exercise of
eminent domain] is necessary” for a particular public
purpose as this is for “Congress and Congress alone
to determine”). This includes the manner in which
eminent domain authority is exercised. Secombe v.
R.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1874) (“It is no longer
an open question in this country that the mode of ex-
ercising the right of eminent domain . . . is within
the discretion of the legislature.”) (emphasis added).
As a result, when Congress delegated only straight
take authority to pipeline companies under the NGA,
no other branch of government can alter that statutorily
prescribed method of taking. The courts certainly
cannot permit quick takes in equity through novel
applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court’s actions in this case did just
that and effected a quick take in favor of Transco.
Since this result intrudes on the exclusive authority
of Congress to prescribe the method of taking, con-
trary to this Court’s precedent, it is due to be
reversed. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit’s review
should not have proceeded beyond this point.
If Congress had felt quick take authority was
warranted under the NGA, then it certainly could have
delegated this authority to pipeline companies. As a
2008 Congressional Research Service report noted,
however, “we find [no] instances where Congress has
authorized purely private delegatees to use the ‘quick
take’ mechanism available to federal condemnors, by
 12

which the condemnor may obtain title and possession

of land expeditiously, without awaiting the conclu-
sion of the condemnation trial.” Robert Meltz, Cong.
Research Serv., RS2288, DELEGATION OF THE FEDER-
AL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO NONFEDERAL
ENTITIES, 2 (May 20, 2008). The historical reticence of
Congress to delegate quick take authority to private
entities makes the courts’ willingness to confer a judi-
cially-created quick take procedure on natural gas
companies all the more extraordinary. For that reason
alone, the issue merits review by this Court.

B. Eminent Domain Statutes Are Strictly Construed

This Court has also consistently held that statutory
delegations of eminent domain authority must be
construed strictly. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S.
439, 448 (1930); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 195
U.S. 540, 569 (1904) (holding eminent domain authority
must “be given in express terms or by necessary
implication”). This is especially so where Congress
has delegated eminent domain authority to a private
entity, such as a utility. United States v. Carmack,
329 U.S. 230, 243 n.13 (1946) (explaining grants of
eminent domain to public utilities and private corpora-
tions “are, in their very nature, grants of limited
power” and “do not include sovereign powers greater
than those expressed or necessarily implied”). Where
an eminent domain statute is silent, therefore, a court
cannot infer legislative acquiescence in a remedy
simply on the basis it was not prohibited. Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 41 (1823) (“The doctrine of acquies-
cence cannot apply to the exercise of such a sovereign
power.”).
 13

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit disregarded

these rules of construction for eminent domain statutes:
“There is nothing in § 717f(h), or anywhere else in
the Natural Gas Act, indicating that Congress intended
to foreclose the district court from issuing a preliminary
injunction granting a pipeline company immediate
access to property for which it has established a right
to condemn under the Act.” (App.42a). This construc-
tion of the NGA runs directly contrary to this Court’s
guidance regarding the interpretation of eminent
domain statutes. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
erred in reading a right to mandatory injunctive
possession into the NGA.
The Eleventh Circuit doubled-down on the doctrine
of acquiescence by also noting that “nothing in Rule
71.1 indicates that Congress intended to limit a district
court’s authority to issue a preliminary injunction in
condemnation proceedings under the Natural Gas Act.”
(App.43a). This statement ignores the language of Rule
71.1 itself, which, of course, was approved by Con-
gress. Subpart (f) provides that “[w]ithout leave of
court, the plaintiff may—as often as it wants—amend
the complaint at any time before the trial on compen-
sation.” It is hard to reconcile this free amendment
provision with the sweeping injunctive rights of pos-
session sanctioned by the Eleventh Circuit under
Rule 65(a). The ability of a condemning authority to
amend rights it has already taken—but not paid for—
is inconceivable under traditional notions of eminent
domain practice. Incidentally, Transco has already
filed a unilateral amendment to the easement terms
in these cases since the Eleventh Circuit handed down
its opinion. The Court should grant review to provide
 14

guidance and restore proper rules of construction in

eminent domain cases.

C. Equity Cannot Supply Substantive Right to

Immediate Possession in Straight Take Con-
demnations

1. No Substantive Right to Condemn

As shown by the foregoing, the well-established
principle that equity must follow the law as a remedy
of last resort, which this Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed, is even more critical in the eminent domain
context. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385
(1996) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“Principles of federalism
and separation of powers impose stringent limitations
on the equitable power of federal courts.”); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742-43 (1971)
(Marshall, J. concurring) (“[T]he Constitution . . . did
not provide for government by injunction in which the
courts . . . can make law without regard to the action
of Congress. . . . ”). Accordingly, equity cannot intervene
without a legal right to protect. See Chapman v. Coal
Co., 338 U.S. 621, 70 S.Ct. 392, 94 L.Ed. 393 (1950)
(denying injunctions where action presented no
breach of contract right, invasion of property right, or
violation of law); Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall.
107, 22 L.Ed. 72, 86 U.S. 107 (1873) (“The very ground
of the jurisdiction of equity is that there is a legal
right and no legal remedy . . . .”).
As outlined in Kirby Forest, the condemnor’s right
of possession arises, if at all, in a straight take action
only after just compensation is judicially determined
and paid, where the “practical effect of final judgment
on the issue of just compensation is to give the
 15

[condemnor] an option to buy the property at the

adjudicated price.” 467 U.S. at 3-4, 104 S.Ct. at 2190-
91. Only upon the exercise of that option and tender
of payment to the private owner do “title and right to
possession vest in the [condemnor].” Id. (emphasis
added).
Thus, establishing a substantive right to condemn
in the straight take context is entirely beside the
point. Looked at another way, once a pipeline company
demonstrates the right to condemn and obtains an order
confirming same, typically by way of partial summary
judgment on this issue, all that means is the company
does, in fact, have standing to proceed through the
compensation process and, ultimately, to obtain an
option to purchase the condemnee’s property at the
adjudicated price. But since there is typically no
potential threat to a condemning pipeline company’s
right to condemn that foreseeably could arise during
this process, it is difficult to see an appropriate
manner for equity to protect this right.
The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the right to
condemn (as opposed to the right to possess) as the
basis for allowing Transco’s preliminary injunctive
possession of Landowner-Petitioners’ properties is
the fundamental flaw in their analysis. (App.40a,
43a). As already discussed, the right to condemn only
permitted Transco to pursue and obtain an option to
possess the subject properties upon payment of just
compensation. The Eleventh Circuit’s failure to make
this distinction is fatal to their analysis, because
without any substantive right to possession there can
be no equitable right to injunctive access.
 16

In sum, even if equity were a potential remedy

in this context, there was no substantive right to pro-
tect as to possession, and there was no potential
harm to prevent as to any right to condemn.

2. Contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s

Reasoning in N. Border Pipeline Co.
Further Illuminates the Flaws in the
Eleventh Circuit’s Approach
In N. Border Pipeline Co., the Seventh Circuit
correctly identified the substantive right required
before preliminary injunctive access could issue as “a
substantive entitlement to the [condemnees’] land
right now,” or in other words an “ownership interest
in the property that, if it existed at all, was fully
vested even before initiation of the lawsuit” 144 F.3d
at 471. The panel further found any entitlement as to
the pipeline company would arise only “at the conclu-
sion of the normal eminent domain process” and that
meant the company was “not eligible for [injunctive]
relief.” Id. The panel explained that in considering
such a request for injunctive relief, a court is being
asked to “predict[ ] what future proceedings would
reveal about the ex ante state of affairs between the
parties.” Id. at 472.
The Eleventh Circuit stopped after the first part
of the analysis—predicting what future proceedings
may reveal about Transco’s rights to possess Land-
owner-Petitioners’ properties. Whether or not such pre-
dictions may prove accurate, they do not demonstrate
that Transco has a pre-existing entitlement, present
right, or vested interest in Landowner-Petitioners’
properties worthy of protection through mandatory
injunctive relief.
 17

3. Transco Is No Different than Any Other

Option Holder
To refine an analogy used at oral argument before
the Eleventh Circuit, suppose Transco has an option
to purchase several residential tracts at a future date
in order to construct a manufacturing facility. Through
a successful lobbying effort, Transco unexpectedly
obtains the necessary zoning and permitting approvals
ahead of schedule. Transco estimates that if the plant
can open before the original option date, an additional
$450,000,000.00 in tax revenues and other economic
activity will be generated for the local economy.
Neither party to the option contract disputes that it
is binding and enforceable.
Even still, no court could issue a mandatory
injunction on these facts to oust the homeowners and
allow construction to proceed in advance of the con-
tracted closing date—all without requiring Transco to
tender payment. Yet that is precisely the nature of
the relief the Eleventh Circuit has afforded Transco
in this case. As in the example above, however, Transco
has no present right of possession to Landowner-
Petitioners’ properties. This Court made clear in
Kirby Forest that Transco, as a mere delagatee of the
federal straight take authority, obtains “an option to
buy the [condemned] property at the adjudicated price”
upon entry of “final judgment on the issue of just
compensation” that can be exercised by “tender[ing]
payment to the private owner, whereupon title and
right to possession vest in the [condemnor].” 467 U.S.
at 4. Review is necessary to correct the lower courts’
departure from this distinction.
 18

II. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE GRANT OF

INJUNCTIVE ACCESS WITHOUT PAYMENT OF CASH
BOND WORKS A JUDICIAL TAKING IN VIOLATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
The district court’s refusal to require a cash
bond in this case was, at best, an abuse of discretion
and, at worst, a separate, unconstitutional taking
without just compensation. The Eleventh Circuit’s
approval of this action represents a departure even
from Sage, whose panel observed that potential harm
to landowners from granting injunctive possession “is
blunted by [the landowners’] right to draw down the
money [the pipeline company] has deposited with the
Court.” Sage, at 361 F.3d at 829. This expansion of
judicially-conferred immediate possession untethers
it from the traditional eminent domain framework
altogether and leaves landowners in an even more
tenuous position. In short, it is a judicial quick take
but without the cash deposit requirement of a statutory
quick take.
As this Court has long held, the Fifth Amendment
does not “require that compensation shall be actually
paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be
taken. But the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain,
and adequate provision [for such payment] before his
occupancy is disturbed.” Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S.
380, 403 (1895). This means “it is a condition precedent
to the exercise of such power that the statute make
provision for reasonable compensation to the owner.”
Id. at 399.
The Court also held in Kirby Forest that the Fifth
Amendment does not require compensation for the time
between the filing of the action and the date title
 19

ultimately transfers in a straight take proceeding.

See 467 U.S. at 10-16. This is because the date title
transfers is the date for which just compensation is
determined and on which it is paid, even though it
occurs at the end of a straight take proceeding. Id.
As has been established, this case is a straight take
proceeding. According to Kirby Forest, Landowner-
Petitioners cannot obtain compensation for the time
period before transfer of title in such a proceeding.
Since transfer of title will not occur until the end of
this proceeding, a separate taking has occurred for
the period beginning when Transco took possession
and will continue until the date title ultimately trans-
fers. This taking, moreover, violates the Fifth Amend-
ment either because it will go entirely uncompensated
under Kirby Forest, or because there is no “reasonable,
certain, and adequate provision” for compensating
Landowner-Petitioners. Sweet, 159 U.S. at 403. The
district court could have, but did not, make provision
for this taking by requiring a cash bond or otherwise.
And Congress certainly did not make provision for
this sort of compensation since no quick take author-
ity was delegated in the NGA. In any event, since “it
is a condition precedent to the exercise of such power
that the statute make provision for reasonable com-
pensation to the owner,” id. at 403 (emphasis added),
Landowner-Petitioners urge the Court to grant this
petition in order to address this unconstitutional
taking.
 20

III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR REVIEW OF

AN IMPORTANT AND RECURRING PROPERTY RIGHTS
ISSUE
This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the
question presented. The Court is unlikely to benefit
from further development of this issue in the lower
courts. As the Anti-Federalist feared, so too do Land-
owner-Petitioners, that without immediate review “[o]ne
adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this
to a following one. . . . so that a series of determina-
tions will probably take place before even the people
will be informed of them.” THE ANTI-FEDERALIST NO.
82 (Brutus). This procedural trespass has bedeviled
property owners and confounded eminent domain prac-
titioners far too long already.
Review is also timely because of the significant
increase in the number of FERC-authorized pipeline
projects in recent years. Review now will provide
much needed guidance to the lower courts, pipeline
companies, and property owners at a time when the
number of NGA takings is on a steep rise.
Finally, as of the due date for this petition, appel-
lant-property owners in appeals pending in the Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits still have time remaining
to petition this Court for writs of certiorari seeking
review of the respective decisions in their cases, all of
which permitted immediate possession under the NGA
on identical grounds to this one. Landowner-Petition-
ers anticipate that additional petitions will be filed
by at least some of these appellant-property owners.
Accordingly, Landowner-Petitioners respectfully urge
the Court to defer any determination as to this peti-
 21

tion until all related petitions out of the other circuits

are ripe for consideration.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, this Court should grant the
petition.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN CHRISTOPHER CLARK

COUNSEL OF RECORD
CLARK & SMITH LAW FIRM LLC
150 COLLEGE STREET
MACON, GA 31201
(478) 254-5040
CHRIS@CLARKSMITHLAW.COM

THOMAS H. CAMP
THE CAMP FIRM, LLC
P.O. BOX 2349
NEWNAN, GA 30264
(678) 464-1366
HARRY@THECAMPFIRM.COM

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

MARCH 6, 2019