BERNARDO DE LEON vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY has no title to the subject land, mere prior possession is only
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardo De Leon filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City against respondent
Public Estates Authority ("PEA"), a government-owned
corporation, as well as its officers, herein private respondents
Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Pena and Reymundo Orpilla. The
suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of
De Leon’s fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155
containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San
Dionisio, Parañaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the
possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De
Leon prayed that – one, lawful possession of the land in
question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay
damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on
Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin
PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and
peaceful possession of the subject premises.
The court a quo found merit in De Leon’s application
for writ of preliminary injunction. PEA sought recourse before
the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion against the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court therein affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a
Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage
zone until it was reclaimed through government efforts in
1982. The Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public
land so that De Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long
ago, could not confer ownership or possessory rights and that
no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leon’s nebulous
right of possession.
De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and
quashal of the writ of execution. He adamantly insisted that
the court a quo’s Order for the issuance of the writ of
execution completely deviated from the dispositive portion of
the Supreme Court’s previous decision as it did not
categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in
favor of PEA. However, both motions were denied by the trial
court. Dissatisfied, De Leon filed another Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. De Leon
then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the orders of the RTC of Makati City. In the same
proceeding, De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction but the same holding that an earlier
decision promulgated by the Supreme Court, finding the
subject property to be public and that De Leon has no title and
no clear legal right over the disputed lot, has already attained
finality. De Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied the same. De Leon questions the Decision of the CA on
the following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the
subject land through ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision
of The Supreme Court in G.R. No. 112172 merely ordered the
dismissal of De Leon’s complaint for damages in Civil Case No.
93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner and
required for the establishment of his right.
Issues:
I. Whether PEA is really entitled to possess the subject
property; and
II. Whether the RTC should proceed to hear PEA’s
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition
Held:
I. Yes. The question of ownership and rightful
possession of the subject property had already been settled
and laid to rest in The Supreme Court’s Decision dated
November 20, 2000 in G.R. No. 112172 entitled, Public Estates
Authority v. Court of Appeals (PEA v. CA).
In this case, the land in question is admittedly public. The
respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all. His
claim of ownership is based on mere possession by himself and
his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in
question, under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of
at least fifty (50) years. However, the survey plan for the land
was approved only in 1992, and respondent paid the realty
taxes thereon on October 30, 1992, shortly before the filing of
the suit below for damages with injunction. Hence, respondent
must be deemed to begin asserting his adverse claim to Lot
5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 was certified as alienable
and disposable on March 27, 1972, per certificate of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is
obvious that respondent’s possession has not ripened into
ownership.
II. As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform
to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ
of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular
of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of
the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the
terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an
essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a
parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the
possession of the land should be considered included in the
decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the
possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership.24 Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would
include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not
shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim
of ownership which was rejected. The Supreme Court had
already declared the disputed property as owned by the State
and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land
independent of his claim of ownership.
In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in
possession of the property.26 If the defendant refuses to
surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party,
the sheriff or other proper
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to
what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.30 In the
present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court
and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to
possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s claims, the
issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not
constitute an unwarranted modification of The Supreme
Court’s decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary
complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential
consequence of The Supreme Court’s ruling affirming the
nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same
time dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and possession.
To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon
and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect,
amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
It is true that there are instances where, even if there
is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower
court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the
precept of judicial courtesy.33 The principle of judicial courtesy,
however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As
held by The Supreme Court in Go v. Abrogar, 34 the precept of
judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and
haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, a new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule
65, which provides as follows:
The public respondent shall proceed
with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari with
a higher court or tribunal, absent a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of
the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an
administrative charge.
While the above quoted amendment may not be
applied in the instant case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made
effective only on December 27, 2007, the provisions of the
amendatory rule clearly underscores the urgency of
proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
This urgency is even more pronounced in the present
case, considering that The Supreme Court’s judgment in PEA v.
CA, finding that De Leon does not own the subject property
and is not entitled to its possession, had long become final and
executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution, as well as
the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course,
in the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact,
the writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry
out the Order previously made by the RTC for the execution of
The Supreme Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. It is a logical
consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.
Neither can De Leon argue that he stands to sustain
irreparable damage. The Court had already determined with
finality that he is not the owner of the disputed property and
that he has no right to possess the same independent of his
claim of ownership.
Spouses NOCEDA vs. DIRECTO
G.R. No. 178495 July 26, 2010
FACTS:Sometime in 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo
filed a complaint against her nephew, petitioner Rodolfo
Noceda, for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership and
Rescission/Annulment of Donation." She donated a portion of
her hereditary share to her nephew, but the latter occupied a
bigger area, claiming ownership thereof since September
1985. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent on
November 1991. On appeal, CA still ruled in favor of the
respondent. Spouses Noceda elevated the case to the
Supreme Court but their petition was denied. A writ of
execution was issued against the petitioners on March 2001.
Petitioners Noceda then instituted an action for quieting of
title against Directo. In the complaint, petitioners admitted
that previous case was decided in favor of respondent and a
writ of execution had been issued, ordering them to vacate the
property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which
was the subject matter of the previous case, was the same
parcel of land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they
purchased a portion; and that a title was issued in their name.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res
judicata but her motion was denied for lack of identity of
causes of action. During the trial, respondent filed a Demurrer
to Evidence, stating that the claim of ownership and
possession of petitioners on the basis of the title emanating
from that of Dahipon was already raised in the previous case.
The trial court granted the demurrer which was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable
in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Under Sec. 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, there are
two main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence. The first general rule embodied in
paragraph (b) is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while
the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of
the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Bar by former judgment bars the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action, whileconclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
In the previous case, it has been established that petitioners
have no right of ownership or possession over the land in
question. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the
parties. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them.
INFANTE vs. ARAN BUILDERS INC.
FACTS: Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City was
an action for revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran
Builders, Inc. against Adelaida Infante.
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which became final and
executory, in an action for specific performance and damages.
The judgment rendered was in favor of Adelaida Infante.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of
judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
The Muntinlupa RTC issued an order dismissing the Motion.
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal
action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein
is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue
of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or
Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner
respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that
the subject action for revival judgment is “quasi in rem
because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a
real property”; and that, consequently, venue lies in
Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.
The CA ruled in favor of herein private respondent
reasoning that the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment
is then an action in rem which should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the place where the real property is located.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for revival of judgment is
an action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the
place where the disputed real property is located.
RULING: Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the
determination of whether the present action for revival of
judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the
afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival of
judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with
the court of the place where the real property is located. If
such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it
is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of
the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a
final and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to
execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang
Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all
pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed
of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private
respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent
to pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's
compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further
alleged that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment
obligations despite private respondent's repeated requests
and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the
action for revival of judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared
private respondent's right to have the title over the disputed
property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that
private respondent has an established interest over the lot in
question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The
sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement
of private respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty.
Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for
it affects private respondent's interest over real property.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real
action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
NOTE: Section 18 of Batas PambansaBilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each
branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The
territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of
the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all
suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of
the different parts of the region and making the attendance of
litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over
a particular territory defined by the Supreme Court.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial
jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section
Fourteen of BatasPambansaBilang 129, Otherwise Known As
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on
September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of a
branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is
now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has
territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and
processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES LINDO
FACTS: Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores
amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and
surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of
real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan.
 Edna issued three checks as partial payments which
were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This
prompted petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of
mortgage with damages against the respondents.
RTC branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the
Deed was executed by Edna without her husband’s consent.
Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days
after the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores
was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he
could file a personal action against her.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money
with damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42.
Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of
Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of
improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch
42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC
Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute
two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage,
but not both.
Issue: WON Flores can no longer file complaint for collection
of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits
Held: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that the
mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action
to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of the first
bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from
one venue to another depending on the location of the
mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties. In this
case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes
into consideration.
Accordingly since the Deed was executed by
respondent Edna without the consent and authority of her
husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent
shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors." The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by
the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a
binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract. But, as noted by CA,
petitioner allowed the the decision of RTC Branch 33 to
become final and executory without asking for an alternative
relief. Nevertheless, the petitioner is not without remedy. The
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another applies. Article 22 of the Civil Code
provides: Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience." The
principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1)
that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification,
and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
The principle against unjust enrichment, being a
substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on
multiplicity of suits. The Court directed RTC Branch 42 to
proceed with the trial of collection of sum.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION v. RTC of MAKATI, BR. 66,
and G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION
FACTS: GPS agreed to transport thirty (30) units of Condura
refrigerators from CII to Central Luzon Appliances. However,
the delivery truck collided with another truck resulting in the
damage of said appliances. FGU Insurance Corporation, the
insurer of the damaged refrigerators, paid CII, the insured.
FGU, in turn, as subrogee of the insured’s rights and interests,
sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
The RTC ruled, among others, that FGU failed to
adduce evidence that GPS was a common carrier and that its
driver was negligent, thus, GPS could not be made liable for
the damages of the subject cargoes. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. When elevated to the
Supreme Court, it agreed with the lower courts that GPS was
not a common carrier but nevertheless held it liable under the
doctrine of culpa contractual.
GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution with
the RTC, praying that FGU’s motion for execution be denied on
the ground that the latter’s claim was unlawful, illegal, against
public policy and good morals, and constituted unjust
enrichment. The RTC issued an order granting GPS motion to
set case for hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC unlawfully neglected the
performance of its duty when it re-opened a case which
already attained finality.
HELD: Petition lacks merit. Immutability of judgment:
Where the judgment of a higher court has become final and
executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only
function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final
and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding
thereto a relief not originally included.
But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
The Court agreed with the RTC that there is indeed a
need to find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators.
For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue
of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject
refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. DISMISSED.