SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF CLIENT, NOT A VALID JUSTIFICATION. — A
GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano
C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; STATUS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT; DUTY
OF RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE. — As categorically spelled out in Sec. 20 (b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, lawyers should observe and maintain respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics
provides that "it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." It is incumbent
upon them to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds them to a conduct that should be "with all good
fidelity . . . to the courts." The duty of an attorney to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO PROMOTE DISTRUST IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. — The
language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme
Court as a "civilized democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that
it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false,
erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being interested in the
decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the
Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the
petitioners including the President — constitute disrespectful language to the
Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since
"lawyers are administrators of justice, oath- bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their client, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct
ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ABSTAIN FROM OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY AGAINST A
PARTY OR WITNESS. — A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession. It is the duty of a member of the bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS MOTU PROPRIO. — That the Solicitor General or
his assistants may not be considered as offended parties in this case, is
unavailing as a defense. The Supreme Court may motu proprio start
proceedings of this nature. For, inherent in courts is the power "to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO MISLEAD THE JUDGE; USE OF DISTORTED
QUOTATIONS, IMPROPER. — The act of intentionally omitting the qualification
to the rule quoted is not proper. Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to
misquote."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO COUNSEL TO MAINTAIN SUCH ACTIONS OR
PROCEEDINGS ONLY AS APPEAR TO BE JUST. — A lawyer has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client take should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics provides that "a
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to de, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors and
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation."

9. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; IMPROPER
CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; USE OF
IMPROPER LANGUAGE IN MOTION TO INHIBIT. — Where counsel, in his
motion to inhibit, called petitioners as "vulturous executives" and spoke of the
Supreme Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would
suggest that it is not; categorized its decision of July 31, 1968 as "false,
erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner; warned the Court that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country "although the process had already begun"; mentioned
"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent and "unjudicial favoritism" for
petitioners, and that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board —
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including that President" should inhibit
themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in law, he is guilty of
indirect contempt for use of language tending to degrade the administration of
justice. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to
create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY DELETION OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE;
EFFECT OF. — The deletion of paragraph 6 which contained disrespectful
language did not erase the fact that it has been made. The explanation that the
deleted portion was included in the motion filed in Court only because of mere
advertence, does not make much of a distinguishing difference. It erects no
shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature
appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISBEHAVIOUR OF AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND
IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE IN PLEADINGS. — Where
counsel, in his pleadings, accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous
and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur"; describing such efforts as "scattershot desperation" and the
proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face," laying bare "the immortal
and arrogant attitude of the petitioners"; and charging petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only from case to case
but from pleading to pleading in the same case, he is guilty of indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehaviour as an officer of
the court in the performance of his official duties and under Sec. 3(d) of the
same rule for improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice. Such language is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant. It offends the court before which it is made.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT; FACT OF BEING A NON-LAWYER IS
NO DEFENSE. — A person who admitted having prepared the motion for
reconsideration which contained contemptuous language is guilty of contempt.
The fact that he is not a lawyer is no defense.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNING A CONTEMPTUOUS PLEADING WITHOUT
READING IT IS NO EXCUSE. — Counsel's insistence that he had nothing to do
with the contemptuous motion for reconsideration and had not even read it
does not excuse him. As counsel of record, he has control of the proceedings.
RESOLUTION*
SANCHEZ, J p:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention
statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy,
Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the
suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21,
1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the
memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
"a. `They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called
`scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27,
1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. `Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners.' (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13,
1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. `The herein petitioners . . . opportunistically change their claims and stories
not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.'
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17, sixth, seventh and
eighth lines from bottom of the page)."
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala
and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the
following statements:
"d. `. . . ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. `. . . Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)."
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was
rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who
is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January
31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-
entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat
the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The
appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial
favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as
follows:
"(a) said decision is in violation of the law; which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to
adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel
nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law — but only
served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but
destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which
the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
decisions, and the main issue `right to reject any or all bids' is being treated on a
double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows
better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars
by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn
all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary."
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys.
Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in Writing pointed out to this
Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted
out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable.
Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was
stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client
would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2
of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of
the said motion, which in full reads:
"6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities
believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come
before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be
the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a
party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to
proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly
totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle
involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a
criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials are just amoral?"
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-paragraphs (f) and (h) of
paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance
with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the
motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive
making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further
elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he
already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his
rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur,
registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr.
Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but
three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of
July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October
7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of
the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps
(sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say
that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and
were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission,
though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient
basis for a finding that Section 20 (f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto.
He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the
charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the
charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4
and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not
signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the
Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended
party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2,
1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither
authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14,
1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services,
which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in
this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise
turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to
terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in
any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other
document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his aide of the case. In brief, he
denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21,
1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1,
1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he
gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's
pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 8, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent
MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special
appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised,
and contained the following paragraphs:
"4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-
entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court —
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: `Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months
or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will
inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1960, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court of
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on
the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law —
and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made."
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty.
Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice
hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that
the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate
MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on
the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of
the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton
F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there way nothing wrong with the motion
he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so
signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially
the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. this Court, on August 4,
1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in
writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to
show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not
be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and . . . to
direct that the three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and
Morton Meads, personally appear before this Court on Thursday, August 27,
1969, at 9:80 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them
will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He
disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced
Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day
Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby
who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago)
mentioned Atty. Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling
of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never
prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15. 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On
July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for
reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion
and in fact began to make some changes in pencil in the first or second
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not
Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one.
They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to
Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the
motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed
therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he
entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for
about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the
quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is
precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and
that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations.
Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World
Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the
World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito
Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt
incident.
We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He
speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro because his brother
is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he
proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim
that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be
less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause
or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
"although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained
language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been
made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing
difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included
paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are,
their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them
as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first
instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial
prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism"
for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph
9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a
sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any
board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should
also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact
and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also
asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as
follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance
thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as
a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be `with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.'
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts `can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold.'"
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity
of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus has
it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was
necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an
attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always
keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of
justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success
is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the
power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or
more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial
position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be
a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater
knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over
the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the
part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice." 7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section
3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice 8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements
pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses
petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as corrupt
on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners."
He charges petitioners with opportunity changing their claims and stories not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt
towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to
say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language
should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged."
10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where
counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw
language in his brief: "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a
poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in
his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in
exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that
"[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may
not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio
start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of
this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in
courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under
Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section
3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was
improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty.
Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist
— and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not
participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did
not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of
Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt
citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth
motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made
why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1
was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication . . .." However, the provision in its entire thought
should be read thus —
"SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court
for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members
of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect
in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission." 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain
this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation
came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS", which is a
common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to
misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court.
There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was
intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected.
More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . . .
raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965; . . . to the World Court" and would invoke "the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more
than fifty million dollars annually . . ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the
case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied
in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the
move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a
party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet. it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to
effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be
exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer
of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration
before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it
was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to
pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion
for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to
do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the
same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of
circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced
him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations
thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship
with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads
states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and
even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that
according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with
Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago
did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this
case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge
and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not
to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing
the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is
the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before
a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason,
this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against
respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur
did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For,
this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds
will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not
require the admit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond,
contrary to the instructions to bidders. is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a
unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had
not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have
been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reason given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000,
and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and
Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads
and Atty. Juanito M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meals, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M.
Caling. P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of
Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against
Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor
General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or
suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to
the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
||| (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072
(Resolution), [January 9, 1970], 142 PHIL 1-23)
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN,
respondents.
Ruperto G. Martin and Donardo R. Paglinawan for petitioner.
Jose V. Marcella for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner is the transferee of a lot subject of a complaint for quieting of title
and declaration of nullity between private respondents and Central Dyeing and
Finishing Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on Petitioner's
title. Judgment was rendered in favor of private respondents. It was affirmed by
both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. When a writ of
possession/break open order was issued by the trial court, petitioner opposed
the same contending that it was a buyer in good faith and not impleaded as
party. The motion, however, was granted. Petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari which rendered judgment dismissing the
petition as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Its appeal to this
Court was denied and attained finality. When an alias writ of execution was
issued subsequently by the court, petitioner again filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals arguing among others that it was not a party to the
case, that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central
Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; and
that private respondent's title is being questioned in another case. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on ground of finality of judgment of the lower
court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, again this
recourse by petitioner. In the meantime the alias writ of possession and alias
writ of execution was duly implemented by the Sheriff. cSITDa
Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the
parties are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any
matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued
by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the
purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the
Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment
had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition
was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of
the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994
and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31,
1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private
respondents took possession of the subject property. aCHDST
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; IN A FINAL JUDGMENT,
ALL ISSUES ARE DEEMED RESOLVED. — It is a settled rule that once a court
renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter
related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL NECESSARY AND LOGICAL EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES
INCLUDED THEREIN. — Placing private respondents in possession of the land
in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in
Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As
correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute
another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
SEAHID
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION FOR
ANNULMENT OF TITLES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND PREDECESSOR. —
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the
Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment
had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition
was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PETITION RENDERED MOOT AND
ACADEMIC WHERE WRIT OF EXECUTION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. — Be
that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the
fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and
the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31,
1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private
respondents took possession of the subject property.
5. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; BOUND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO
ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — While
lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. ISEHTa
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J p:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
has come to this Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24,
1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the
issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of
previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write
finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as
we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1
". . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being
essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any
scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy
and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.
Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium."
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin
and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration
of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of
said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. cdphil
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R.
No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5,
1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents
moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ
of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was
opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is
completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central
Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the
same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another
Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the
judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of
defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On
September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the
petition, excerpts of which read:
"We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to
disturb the same. Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property
from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-
9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent
Judge. cdtai
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite
does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 5
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on
February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7
Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated
October 21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a
second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order
of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion
was initially granted 9 on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo
Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who
succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued:
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed
a petition for certiorari 11 with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed
against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision
of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver
possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and
circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the
execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed
writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and worship; and
that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's
decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled,
thus: Cdpr
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision
in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent
court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a long
time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . .
. Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final
judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in
its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant
petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs,
although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their
favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting
the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of
the Revised Rules of Court)
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the
instant petition has already become moot and academic as the property in
question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the
writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the
legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the
same line of arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court
of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues
between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come
to an end.
Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred
(100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the
property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case
between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:
"Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central
Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
"Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite
does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 14
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and
attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to
belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession
should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued
by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the
purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. LLpr
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after
the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the
execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency or
Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by
the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of
22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution
of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property
should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final
resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the
Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment
had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition
was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and
destroyed once the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than
real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of
the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been
taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions
as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13,
1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are(sic) however not completely without recourse or
remedy because they can still go after the original party-defendant or
transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it
be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in
possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments
that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be
incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-
respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to
avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial
lots." 15
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
LLjur
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and
as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion
of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the
demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with
the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made." 16
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20,
1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal
Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved
ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest
of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break
open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the
factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the
resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said
memorial park." 17
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status
of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of
the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994
and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," 18 dated March
31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that
private respondents took possession of the subject property.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment
for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the
meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot
has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the
whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of
justice. cdrep
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients
and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they
are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules
of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et al. vs.
Cerna, et al., 21 we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law
should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed
to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance
the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
DIGEST
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and
JOSESEELIN,
respondents.
FACTS
: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the
cemetery to the rightful owners, private respondent sps. Seville. Despite the
final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent the execution for filing
petitions for certiorari arguing that the judgment cannot be executed against
it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297;that the decision of the
trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession
of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and
circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render
the execution highly unjust,illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the
assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another
case to the cause that the case to be pending for 17 years, and thus render
the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions
for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that
it would never prosper as the trial court’s decision had longbecome final
before the said petitions were filed.
HELD:
Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the
clientand zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they are also officers of
the court, bound toexert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justiceor unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse courtprocesses.
The facts and the law should advise them that a case such as this should
notbe permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They donot advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts. The mere continuation of petitioners’ dilatory tactics
to that the respondents will notbenefit from the final judgment. The fear
of the petitioner regarding the disturbance of thegrave lots was more
imagined than true because in the writ of execution, the presiding judge
imposed that
the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be
applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side
nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the
defendant(Central Dyeing) is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace
of the resting souls over the graves the parcels of land within the said memorial
park
.It has been known that the petition of the private respondents has been
moot and academic and that they had took possession of the lot. To the end
that:

This case delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)years
to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner
has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot haslong
been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole
lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private
respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice