Wireless Netw (2016) 22:1505–1511
DOI 10.1007/s11276-015-1032-y
A modified algorithm to improve security and performance
of AODV protocol against black hole attack
Sina Shahabi1 • Mahdieh Ghazvini1,2 • Mehdi Bakhtiarian3
Published online: 20 August 2015
Ó Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Abstract Ad Hoc network is a temporal network which is
managed by autonomous nodes which have the ability to
communicate with each other without having fixed network
infrastructure or any central base station. Due to some
reasons such as dynamic changes of the network topology,
trusting the nodes to each other, lack of fixed substructure
for the analysis of nodes’ behaviours and loss of specific
offensive lines, this type of networks is not supportive
against malicious nodes’ attacks. One of these attacks is
black hole attack. In this attack, the malicious nodes absorb
data packets and destroy them. Thus, it is essential to
present an algorithm against the black hole attacks. This
article suggests a new algorithm which enhances the
security of AODV routing protocol to encounter the black
hole attacks. This algorithm tries to identify malicious
nodes according to nodes’ behaviours in an Ad Hoc net-
work and delete them from routing. The suggested algo-
rithm is simulated by NS2. The simulation results show
some improvements in end-to-end delay and packet
delivery rate in the suggested algorithm.
Keywords Ad Hoc networks
AODV routing protocol

Security
Black hole attack
& Sina Shahabi
sina_shahabi6@yahoo.com
1
Young Researchers and Elite Club, Baft Branch, Islamic
Azad University, Baft, Iran
2
Computer Engineering Department, Shahid Bahonar
University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
3
Tehran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran
1 Introduction
Ad Hoc networks do not have any access point to network
accessibility. Wireless devices such as notebooks, laptop
and cell phones connect to similar equipments and form an
Ad Hoc network. Since nodes are not controlled by any
central entity, they have unrestricted mobility and con-
nectivity to others. Routing and network management are
done by each other nodes, cooperatively. In other words,
the nodes’ communications are formed based on the
cooperation and some trust among them. In these networks,
each node works as a host as well as a router that forwards
packets for other nodes.
The most important property of these networks is their
dynamic and variable topologies that is the result of the
nodes’ mobility [1, 2].
Security is one of the main research topics in computer
networks. The wide usage of Ad Hoc networks in martial
environment and other security sensitive usages have made
the security a basic requirement for these networks.
Because nodes participate in the routing process, they can
destroy the network. As routing is based on some kind of
trust between nodes, it provides a good chance for attackers
to disorder routing process. As these networks are formed
without any pre plan and for a short period of time;
therefore, the security in these networks is investigated
separately [3].
One of the most famous attacks is Black Hole attack. A
black hole attack is done by a single node or a combination
of nodes. A black hole is a malicious node that replies for
any route requests without having any active route to
specified destinations and purges all the receiving packets.
In black Hole, attacker nodes tend to advertise and spread
fake routes, absorb network traffic towards their selves and
drop packets.
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The rest of this article is organized as follow: the basic
concepts and preliminaries including AODV routing pro-
tocol and black hole attack are provided in Sects. 2 and 3,
respectively. Section 4 discusses the related works. The
proposed method is given in Sect. 5. Simulation and results
are presented in Sect. 6 and finally Sect. 7 concludes the
paper.
2 AODV routing protocol
AODV routing protocol makes the paths by using an
enquiry of wanting a path request and path answer. When a
source node requests a path to end (destination), that node-
which now does not have the paths to destination-sends
RREP-like broadcast all over the network. All the nodes
that give this pack update their data depending on the
source node data and create an entrance of reverse path for
source node in the path charts.
The node which receives the RREQ if it is a destination
node or has a path to destination with bigger sequence
number or equal sequence number will send a RREP in
reverse vector for the source node in mono cast form.
Otherwise the receiver nodes resend the RREQ in broad-
cast form. If some nodes receive a RREQ before throwing
it away, they will not direct it.
If a source node receives a RREQ that contains 1 bigger
sequence number or equal sequence number with less step
count, it updates the routing information about the desti-
nation and uses the path in a better form. As long as the
path being active, the past stable is kept. When the links
Fig. 1 Making path between node A and node G [6]. a RREQ
broadcast, b RREP forwarded path
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Wireless Netw (2016) 22:1505–1511
become disconnected, this protocol announces the nodes
which make the path about the losing path and inform them
that the nodes can cancel the path by using the losing link.
One of the special features of AODV routing protocol is
the use of sequence a number to destination for the entry of
each path. Destination can be sure of the no ring by using
the sequence number and it will be easy to program.
Suppose that there are two paths to request destination. The
path with many sequence numbers will be selected [4, 5]
(Fig. 1).
3 Black hole attack
The black hole invader should enter to broadcast group to
be able to separate the packs from the multicast. This kind
of attack deletes some or all of the recipient packs instead
of sending them and consequently it makes the result of
packet delivery rate really low. Black hole attack is divided
into two groups: single black hole attack is applied via one
of the existence nodes in the network and total black hole
attack that corporates together for an attack more than one
node [7].
The node which executes the black hole attack waits to
receive a RREQ. With the receipt of this RREQ, the
invader node without regarding its routing list or even
considering any path to the destination, answers positively
to that recipient RREQ and makes sending this RREP
shorter than other nodes. The invader node cheats the node
which sends the RREQ by putting the most number of
sequences and the least number of hops in the RREP.
Fig. 2 The black hole attack [8]
Wireless Netw (2016) 22:1505–1511
The node which sends the RREQ supposes that it has
found the best path when receiving this RREP. Therefore,
this node is considered as a short and fit path to send the
packet. Because of that a black hole is created and each
node- which is known as a black hole- instead of sending the
packets to destination gets their data or throws them away.
The invader node does not check its routing list, so it
answers to the RREQ node before the other nodes. If the
invader node introduces itself as a fit path for the total network
nodes and succeed to gain all network traffic, so it can destroy
all network paths and prepare a DOS attack [8] (Fig. 2).
4 Related works
Computer networks are threatened by a lot of security
attacks such as modification, denial of service attack, fab-
rication attack, IP spoofing, etc. Therefore, a lot of research
has been done in this regard [9–15].
Black hole attack is a dangerous active attack on Ad
Hoc networks, thus this section only addresses the works
done in the field of the black hole attacks in AODV pro-
tocol. Various researches have been conducted to design
methods and intrusion detection systems to identify the
black hole attack [16–19].
Tamilselvan and Sankaranarayanan [20] suggested a
method to prevent cooperative black hole attack in
MANETs. Their idea was to use a Fidelity Table wherein
each participating node was assigned a fidelity level to
measure the reliability of that node. If the level of any node
dropped to 0, it could be considered as a black hole node.
A methodology for identifying multiple black hole nodes
cooperating as a group with slightly modified AODV protocol
by introducing Data Routing Information (DRI) Table and
Cross Checking was proposed [21]. Simulation of this method
was implemented in [22]. Authors added some changes to the
algorithm to enhance the accuracy in preventing the black hole
attacks. They suggested checking the current intermediate
node for black hole if the next hop was not reliable.
Intrusion detection in sensor networks was studied and a
lightweight distributed scheme was proposed [23]. In the
proposed method, nodes monitor their neighbourhood and
collaborate with their nearest neighbours to return the
network back to its normal operational condition. The
authors applied their scheme for the black hole and selec-
tive forwarding attacks.
Su [24] extended several intrusion detection system
nodes in MANETs in order to detect and prevent selective
black hole attacks. A selective black hole is a node which
may optionally and alternately do a black hole attack or act
as a normal node. The IDS nodes are set in sniff mode in
order to estimate the suspicious values of nodes according
to the abnormal difference between the routing messages
1507
transmitted from the nodes. In case of exceeding threshold,
a near IDS asks all nodes on the network to cooperatively
isolate the malicious node. The value of the threshold plays
an important role in this study [24].
In [25], an efficient approach for detection and removal of
single and cooperative black hole attacks in MANET was
presented. The algorithm not only detects the black hole
nodes in case when the node is not idle but it can also detect
the black hole nodes in case when a node is idle as well. To
check if a node is idle, the authors used a threshold for the
Interval. In case of exceeding the threshold, the malicious
procedure is invoked. For this, a source node looks at its
route cache and then sends RREQ packets and waits for the
replies. Based on the replies, the black hole detection pro-
cedure is called. In this method, RREQ packets are sent in
Fibonacci series pattern till the Flow count Threshold
(which is set to 34 ms) is not reached [25].
Araghi et al. [26] provided a solution to prevent the
black hole attack. In this study the basic authentication of
intermediate nodes that send the path response message but
get the confirmation from the destination was reviewed. If
the confirmation is not received from the destination, these
malicious intermediate nodes will be saved for arbitration
at a later time. CL parameter is a counter that shows the
miss behaviour of intermediate nodes when they send a
wrong path response. If CL becomes more than 3 for each
node, that node is considred as malicious and the path
introduced by this node is avoided.
Madadian et al. [27] proposed a method to detect black hole
attacks. In this method, when a node sends the path response
package, a consultation process takes place around that node.
Then, according to the comments by neighbour nodes, a
decision is made about the maliciousness of the responsive
node. One method to detect the black hole attack using a timer
was presented [28]. Another method called CDSM (Code
Division Security Method) based on code division to avoid the
black hole attack was proposed [29] as well. Moreover, some
methods to avoid the black hole attacks were compared in
[30]. Filling gaps in measuring the severity of this attack,
Mandala [31] proposed new black hole attacks, namely
Independent Hybrid Black Hole Attack (IHBHA) and Coop-
erative Hybrid Black Hole Attack (CHBHA); and then mea-
sures the severity of both CBA and HBHAs.
Considering the principles and characteristics of the active
black hole attacks, an effective approach which can detect and
defend active black hole attacks was proposed by improving
the AODV routing protocol combining flow analysis [32].
Another approach was proposed to detect black hole
nodes in the MANET. In the proposed method, as soon as
detecting a misbehaving node, the detecting node tries to
avoid the misbehaving node [33].
In [34], to overcome the black hole attack, authors
proposed to ignore the first RREP packet reaching the
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source node. They implemented this solution by imple- currency of the node until neighbours cannot corporate to
menting RREP packet caching mechanism. mentioned node in the operation of black hole attack.
A cluster-based scheme to prevent black hole attacks in The principles of proposed algorithm are as [27, 39, 40]:
MANETs was presented in [35], which elects cluster heads
1. Information about the node’s activities including the
to prevent black hole attacks. Then the authors proposed a
number of missioned data, the number of received data
cluster-based countermeasure to prevent the black hole
and the number of received responses will be saved
attacks by identifying those black hole nodes.
and analysed.
In another clustering black hole attack detection and
2. The request packet has been sent to the neighbour’s
prevention approach, each member of a cluster ping the
ideas about the node which sends RREP.
cluster head to detect the peculiar difference between the
3. Saved information has been received in neighbour’s
numbers of data packets received and forwarded by the
nodes related to sender node RREP.
node. If anomalousness is detected, all the nodes will delete
4. Received information about the destructive node has
the malicious nodes from the network [36].
been considered.
In summary, many different detection techniques pro-
5. A packet of danger alarm for quarantining the
posed different types of detection schemes. Some good
destructive node has been sent and it has been
surveys on the existing solutions were conducted in [37, 38].
developed in all networks.
6. The nodes in quarantine have been deleted from the
Routing process.
5 The proposed algorithm
In the proposed algorithm, we use this rule to identify
In this study, the authors proposed an algorithm on AODV the destructive nodes:
protocol. In this algorithm, we tried to attend more to the 1. The node which sends a RREP to sender node RREQ
behaviour of nodes in Network, identify destructive nodes and may be a destructive node.
delete them from Routing. By increasing the Traffic, the 2. The node which has the least number of hops in RREP
destructive nodes increase. The heavier the traffic, the delay is and the most number of sequences may be a destruc-
increased more too. So, if the number of destructive nodes tive node.
increases, the identification of destructive nodes gets more 3. The node which sends the number of packet may be a
difficult. Thus, we can reduce the rate of delay and increase the destructive node.
rate of delivery by better identification of the destructive nodes. 4. The node which receives a great number of packets
When one node receives the RREP from its neighbour as and sends only one packet may be a destructive node.
a respondent node to RREQ, it is a middle node, not a 5. The node which receives a few number of packets
target node. It is considered whether the respondent node is and does not send them, is absolutely a destructive
one of the nodes in which it is in quarantine. If the node is a node.
destructive one, the RREP is scraped; otherwise, the pall-
ing process around the respondent node has been done until
it can receive all the node’s activities. Then, the accuracy
of the node in base of the received information and the 6 Environment and the simulation conclusions
rules for the definition of the destructive node in source
node are considered. If the node is a destructive node, the Simulator software NS2
alert message is broadcast in the network until the men- The time of simulation 200S–1000S
tioned node is put into the quarantine. The number of system’s node 20
In the proposed algorithm, we have used protocol The number of destructive node 1
IDSAODV by some changes, which has resulted to earn new The environment of simulation 700 9 700
rules to identify the destructive nodes. By using this method, Navigation of the protocol AODV
the security and efficiency of AODV protocol against the The kind of traffic CBR
black hole attack has improved and so the identification The range of send 10 kb
percentage of the destructive nodes is higher. In contrast to The size of packets 512b
previous methods, the identification of the destructive nodes
by source node has been done in the proposed method.
Probably one of the neighbour’s nodes is a destructive
node and its attitude to represent error information creates In different scenarios, the proposed algorithm has been
the black hole attack. So, the source node is considered the compared to AODV protocol in which it has been attacked.

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The conclusion of simulation has been shown in the fol-

lowing graphs. In these graphs, the aim of AODV, is
standard AODV protocol in which it has been attacked and
the aim of IDSNSODV is proposed algorithm in which it
can identify the destructive nodes when black hole attack.
In simulation, different parameters have been used to
officially consider the proposed algorithm. These parame-
ters include: end-to-end delay; the packet delivery rate, the
loss of packet rate, and throughput.

The packet delivery rate in the proposed algorithm is

improved more than AODV protocol because of better
operation of the proposed algorithm in identifying the
destructive nodes and also quarantine and delete them from
Routing.

When there are destructive nodes in the network, the

proposed algorithm by low end-to-end delay can identify
the destructive nodes and aware another nodes, but AODV
protocols are disable because it has more end-to-end delay.

Because the proposed algorithm has more power in

identifying the destructive nodes and the high packet
delivery rate, so the throughput in the proposed algorithm
is more than AODV protocol.

7 Conclusion

All the wireless networks are vulnerable against security

AODV protocol has lost more packets than a proposed
attacks and confronting them is one of the main challenges
algorithm and it shows the success of destructive nodes in
of developer of such systems. Other systems create the
operating the attack of black hole on this protocol. In
security in case the system has one of the proposed prob-
general, because of rules and computation of the proposed
lems in designing these systems. Different methods have
method for identifying the destructive nodes, the loss of
been proposed to solve this problem in the past years.
packet rate in the proposed algorithm decreases compared
Because of variable and dynamic nature of these networks
to AODV protocol.

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along with the lack of central station and also its function
in areas by important and secretary information, the secu-
rity of data and information has more importance in these
networks. The aim of the proposed algorithm in this article
is that we can identify the destructive node and delete them
from Routing in accordance to the behaviour of nodes in
the system. In this algorithm, the authors used a number of
new rules to identify the destructive nodes, which caused a
considerable decrease in the range of lost packets and end-
to-end delay in the proposed algorithm than AODV pro-
tocol. So the range of delivery packet and throughput of
this algorithm increased more than the AODV protocol. In
general, we can say that the proposed algorithm has better
operation against hostile nodes than the AODV protocol.
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31. Mandala, S., Jenni, K., Ngadi, M. A., Kamat, M., & Coulibaly, Y. Mahdieh Ghazvini received
(2014). Quantifying the severity of blackhole attack in wireless her B.Sc. from Shahid Bahonar
mobile adhoc networks. In Security in computing and commu- University of Kerman, Iran in
nications, Springer (pp. 57–67). 2000, and her M.Sc. and Ph.D.
32. Gao, H., Wu, R., Cao, M., & Zhang, C. (2014). Detection and from the University of Isfahan,
defense technology of blackhole attacks in wireless sensor net- Isfahan, Iran in 2004 and 2013,
work. In Algorithms and architectures for parallel processing, in Computer Architecture Engi-
Springer (pp. 601–610). neering, respectively. Currently
33. Jaisankar, N., Saravanan, R., & Swamy, K. D. (2010). A novel she is assistant professor of
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217–223). University of Kerman. She is
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works. In Pervasive computing (ICPC), 2015 international con- telecommunications journals
ference on (pp. 1–6). and conferences. Her research interests are wireless networks, game
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attack in MANETS. International Journal of Computer Science of Tehran, Iran in 1999, and his
Trends and Technology (IJCST)-Volume, 2, 204–209. M.Sc. from the Tehran Univer-
37. Tseng, F.-H., Chou, L.-D., & Chao, H.-C. (2011). A survey of sity of Science and Technology,
black hole attacks in wireless mobile ad hoc networks. Human- Iran in 2011, in Al Engineering.
Centric Computing and Information Sciences, 1, 1–16. Currently he is Ph.D. Student of
38. Jain, S., & Khunteta, A. (2015). Detection techniques of black- Al and Robotic at Tehran
hole attack in mobile adhoc network: A survey. In Proceedings of University of Science and
the 2015 international conference on advanced research in Technology.
computer science engineering & technology (ICARCSET 2015)
(p. 47).
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neering and information technology management, Iran.

Sina Shahabi received his B.Sc.

and M.Sc. from Islamic Azad
University, Baft Branch, Baft,
Iran in 2012 and 2014, in
Computer Software Engineer-
ing, respectively. He is the
author of several technical
papers in Different journals and
conferences. He is Young
Researchers Club Member and
his research interests Wireless
Networks (Ad Hoc Network,
Sensor Network, MANET).

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