F R O M C H I N E S E T O FILIPINO:

C H A N G I N G IDENTITIES O F T H E C H I N E S E IN T H E PHILIPPINES

by

DOROTHY ANG CHUA

B.A., Eckerd College, 1993

A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF
T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S FOR T H E D E G R E E OF

M A S T E R OF A R T S

in

T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES

(Department O f Anthropology and Sociology)

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A

April 2004

© Dorothy A n g Chua, 2004

 Library Authorization

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced

degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for
extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the
head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that
copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without
my written permission.

Dorothy Ang Chua 26/04/2004

Name of Author (please print) Date (dd/mm/yyyy)

Title of Thesis: From Chinese to Filipino: Changing Identities of the Chinese in

the Philippines

Degree: Master of Arts Year: 2004

Department of Anthropology and Sociology

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, B C Canada
 ABSTRACT

This paper is an examination of the changing identities of the Chinese in the

Philippines through three generations - the China-oriented first generation, the

Philippine-born second generation, and the Philippine-oriented third generation.

This paper explores the differential constructions of Chinese Filipino identity by

colonial and postcolonial governments, the factions representing the Kuomintang

and the Chinese Communist Party, Philippine opinionmakers, and the Chinese

Filipinos themselves. This paper also examines the construction of a Chinese

racial category in the Philippine context, and how a racialized construction of

class has constituted the identity formation of Chinese Filipinos. Racially

triangulated vis-a-vis the colonizers and the Filipinos, the Chinese were valorized

relative to the natives for their economic skills but ostracized from the body

politic due to their perceived foreignness. Throughout their history, they have

been racialized as 'alien' and 'economically privileged' - the intersection of race

and class at the center of Chinese Filipino identity.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Table of Contents iii

Introduction 1

Research Methods 6
A B r i e f Overview 6

Chapter I Discourses on Chinese Identities

and the Social Construction of Race 10

The Concept of Race 18

Constructing Chineseness 22

Chapter II Changing Identities of Chinese Filipinos 27

From Generation to Generation 29

First Generation 31
Second Generation 36
Third Generation 41

Chapter III The Racialized Construction of Class

in the Formation of Chinese Filipino Identity 48

From Drooling Chinaman to Taipan 49

Race as a Process 52

Conclusion 62

Bibliography 67

iii
 Introduction

A s a third-generation Chinese, born and raised in the Philippines, I have had to deal

with issues o f identity throughout my life. I was raised as a 'Chinese,' which at that time

meant that I should speak Chinese, socialize with Chinese friends, and have 'Chinese' values.

I attended Chinese schools during primary and secondary schools, where the medium o f

instruction was English, and the afternoon Chinese classes were conducted in Mandarin. It

was not until I attended a Philippine university that I met and developed friendships with

Filipinos. It was also in university where I learned that although my ancestors came from

China, the Philippines is now my home and that as much as I am Chinese, I am also Filipino.

I have been asked many times whether I am more Chinese or Filipino, as i f being more

Chinese means being less Filipino, and vice versa. The tendency o f dichotomizing Chinese

and Filipino identities has lead Peter Pojol, S.J. (2003) to reflect on his own experience:

H o w am I Chinese? ... I have slits for eyes, my skin is yellow, and my native

tongue is Hokkien. Other answers get a bit entangled: I've been to Chinese

temples but I hardly know what goes on inside; I studied in a Chinese school

but must shamefully admit that I cannot read Chinese news; I value discipline

and hard work, but which culture doesn't?

N o w , how am I Filipino? Instinctively, I think o f how I am "not Chinese

enough", not fluent in Mandarin, not well versed in Chinese worship, not

immersed in Chinese entertainment - as i f being Filipino were a negation o f

my being Chinese. In some ways, therefore, my being Chinese remains to be

my point o f reference, which does not do justice to my being Filipino, (xxi)

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This binarism reflects the relational nature of identities (Rutherford, 1990). Our identities are

oftentimes constructed in relation to others. However, there are material consequences when

differences are polarized. A s Rutherford (1990) argues, "difference in this context is always

perceived as the effect of the other" (p. 10). These polarities create hierarchies and

consequently, inequality and discrimination. A s we shall see throughout the paper,

hierarchies and discriminatory acts are oftentimes created due to the'construction of polarities

between groups.

A s I examine my own identity as a Chinese Filipino, the quote from A n g ' s (2001)

book, O n Not Speaking Chinese, resonates deeply in my subjective experience: "...'identity'

[is] a double-edged sword: many people obviously need identity (or think they do), but

identity can just as well be a strait-jacket. ' W h o I am' or 'who we are' is never a matter of

free choice" (Preface). I have realized that identity is indeed a double-edged sword - it gives

me a sense of belonging, and yet 'who I a m ' is never entirely up to me to define. Sometimes

'who I should be' captures the condition of identity more than 'who I am.' N o matter how

' F i l i p i n o ' I have become, culturally and politically, my Filipino friends still see me as

'Chinese' and think that my 'culture' is different from them. They expect me to give them a

tour of Manila's Chinatown even though I have never lived there in my life and I often get

lost whenever I go there. First and second-generation Chinese think I am not 'Chinese'

enough because I have already been 'Filipinized' and 'Westernized.' To them, I have lost a

considerable amount of my 'Chineseness' because I speak better English and Filipino than

Mandarin. Even among my Chinese Filipino friends, we tend to characterize the Chineseness

of others by labeling those who are 'too Chinese' as ' G . I.' or 'genuine instik? {instik being a

derogative term used by Filipinos to refer to people of Chinese origin). These are the

2
traditional Chinese who are not 'modern' enough in our eyes because their attitudes and

outlook are similar to earlier-generation Chinese.

Even though I also see myself as Chinese, and other people perceive me as one, I

know we do not share the same concept of Chineseness, in the same way that my

grandparents, my parents and I have different views of what it means to be Chinese today,

especially to be Chinese Filipino. If my grandfather had the option to return to China i f

things did not turn out well in his adopted country, I don't think my father had that choice

readily. Even though my father reads Chinese newspapers and keeps abreast with news from

China, he no longer sees himself as a sojourner in a foreign land. Despite holding citizenship,

however, the specter of racial taunts and anti-Chinese legislation during his time has

constantly reminded him of the precarious state of being Chinese in the Philippines. I did not

grow up in such an oppressive environment. Being Chinese to me meant I have to deal with

annoying stereotypes, such as my family is rich and I am forbidden to marry non-Chinese.

Although in my formative years I was ambivalent about being a Filipino, I realized at some

point that I had nowhere else to call my home but the Philippines, and I had to embrace it as

my own in order for me to belong. A n d yet, the terms 'Filipino' and 'Chinese' by

themselves, do not seem to capture the collective experience of an ethnic minority whose

identity has been constantly redefined by itself and by others through various historical,

political and social circumstances. A n d so the search for a Chinese Filipino identity begins.

In this paper, I examine the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through three

generations. The different meanings my grandfather, my father, and I have of being

'Chinese' illustrate how identity is "constituted out of different elements of experience and

subjective position" (Rutherford, 1990, p. 19). It demonstrates how historical processes shape

3
our identities as Chinese in the Philippines and reveal how we ultimately become 'creatures

of our times.' This does not mean that 'Chineseness' has always been externally imposed, or

that we are mere products of external forces, over which we have no control. On the contrary,

growing up in different historical contexts means that members of a particular generation

experienced their identities differently from members of another generation. I therefore focus

on the interaction between the host government and the Chinese Filipino community in

shaping a Chinese Filipino identity by showing how the social and political structures of the

host country both promote and contain the expression of Chinese identities in the Chinese

Filipino community, as well as how the community responded to these challenges.

Identity, like race, is a construct that has always been bitterly contested and

negotiated by individuals, state authorities and interest groups. It is also constantly changing

and "contains traces of its past and what it is to become. It is contingent, a provisional full

stop in the play of differences and the narrative of our own lives" (Rutherford, 1990, p. 24).

When Chang (1994) talks about inheriting a legacy of discrimination when he immigrated to

the United States, he is also talking about how "each individual is the synthesis not only of

existing relations but of the history of these relations. He is a precis of the past" (Gramsci, as

cited in Rutherford, 1990, pp. 19-20). B y looking at how Chinese Filipino identities have

evolved over three generations, I have realized that as a third-generation Chinese, I am also

inheriting a legacy of social relations between and among Chinese, Filipino and colonial

groups.

I also focus my analysis on the intersection of race and class in the identity formation

of Chinese Filipinos. The racial taunts that my grandparents and my parents experienced

during their times were those that made fun of old Chinese men who worked as manual

4
laborers and street vendors. M y generation still gets racial taunts, but of a different kind.

People assume that I am rich just by looking at my physical features and my last name. These

assumptions and stereotypes are also carried over in transnational settings. I remember being

at a dentist's office in Vancouver and meeting the dental assistant who was Filipino. When

she found out that I was Chinese Filipino, she remarked matter-of-factly, " Y o u must be rich."

It was not a question but a statement. H o w could she have come to that conclusion, other

than basing it on my Chinese features and the meanings associated with being Chinese in the

Philippines?

This leads me to the theoretical approaches I have used in my analysis of Chinese

Filipino identities. I utilize the theory of racial formation, as defined by O m i and Winant

(2001), in developing the construction of a 'Chinese race' in the identity formation of

Chinese Filipinos both by colonial governments and the Chinese government. They define

racial formation as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,

inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (p. 372). I also utilize Gotanda's (2000) framework

for analyzing race through the analysis of the racial profile in examining the various factors

that led to the racialization of the Chinese in the Philippines. Racial profiling includes a

particular characterization of a group and the "culturally situated understandings associated

with the racial category" (p. 1691). The third approach captures the Philippines' history of

colonialism and how that has played a major part in the racialization of Chinese vis-a-vis

Filipinos. K i m ' s (1999) discussion on the racial triangulation of Asian Americans is useful in

my study. She observes that "public discourse about racial groups and their relative status

generates a field of racial positions in a given time and place" (p. 106). In the case of the

Chinese in the Philippines, I argue that they have been racialized relative to and through

5
interaction with the colonial rulers and Filipinos. The racial triangulation of Chinese occurs

through the dual processes of relative valorization and civic ostracism ( K i m , 1999). B y

utilizing these theories, I have been able to develop a racialized construction of class in the

identity formation of Chinese Filipinos.

Research Methods

In the course of doing my research for the paper, I have mainly used secondary

sources in documenting the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos. Although personal

interviews and archival data would have enriched my analysis by affording me my own

interpretation of events, I have dealt with this limitation by attempting to consult as many

sources as possible to document the history of the Chinese in the Philippines. A t various

times in the paper I have cited several authors for one specific historical event in order not to

depend on one scholar's interpretation. I have also performed a review o f the existing

literature regarding the construction of Chinese identities in Southeast A s i a and the theories

surrounding identity and race. I have utilized them to inform my analysis o f the evolution of

Chinese Filipino identities and the racialization of Chinese in the Philippines.

A Brief Overview

The first chapter situates the Chinese in the Philippines in the broader context of

Southeast Asia. I problematize the ways Chinese identity is defined in Southeast A s i a

through the use o f terms and labels that do not fully capture the various experiences of the

Chinese in their own geographical, social and political contexts. I review the existing

literature on Chinese identities in Southeast Asia, comparing the works of Wang (1988),

Hirschman (1988), Gosling (1983) and Tan (2001). I note the strengths and weaknesses of

their works and relate how their works can inform my analysis of Chinese Filipino identities.

6
I also discuss the importance of Barth's (1969) study on the boundary maintenance of ethnic

groups. He analyzes the boundaries of groups, instead of their so-called cultural differences,

in order to explain how social relations are maintained between the dominant and minority

groups despite the increased interaction and reduced cultural differences.

I compare the earlier scholarship that linked Chinese identities to a 'Cultural China'

with the more recent scholarship that view Chinese identity as a site of contestation,

operating in different historical and geographical contexts. In addition, I discuss the concept

of race and its social construction by reviewing the literature on race, particularly by O m i and

Winant (2001) and Lopez (2000). I show how theories of race inform my analysis of Chinese

Filipino identities through three generations.

In the second chapter, I examine the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through

three generations. I briefly describe the history of the Chinese in the Philippines from the

Spanish colonial period to the present time. I try to demonstrate the different constructions of

'Chinese,' 'Filipino,' and 'Chinese Filipino' by various groups, such as colonial regimes, the

Philippine government, factions representing China and Taiwan, various Chinese-related

organizations, and the Chinese people themselves in each generation. I illustrate how Chinese

Filipino identities were contested and negotiated by different groups and I also try to portray

the struggles of these groups to represent the Chinese community. I explore the various

historical, social, economic and political factors that shape Chinese Filipino identities. I try to

show the transformation of the Chinese in the Philippines from sojourners to naturalized

Filipinos and finally, to Filipinos of Chinese descent whose orientation is entirely towards the

Philippines. I try to show the fluidity and multiplicity of identities within generation and

between generations. I note that despite the varied experiences of Chinese Filipinos brought

7
about by their different locations and social classes, as well as their cultural and political

orientations, Chinese as a group were generally viewed as 'aliens' and 'economic

opportunists' by the Philippine mainstream society for most of the 2 0 th

century.

The third and final chapter is an analysis of the multiple racialization processes of the

Chinese in the Philippines throughout their history in the Philippines. The 'Chinese race' has

been constructed through various political projects by colonial rulers, the Philippine

government, and the Chinese government. In particular, I explore the intersection of race and

class in the formation of Chinese Filipino identity. I apply O m i and Winant's (2001) theory

o f racial formation and Gotanda's (2000) study of racial profiling in the creation of the

Chinese racial category. I also utilize K i m ' s (1999) theory of racial triangulation, particularly

the field o f racial positions, in analyzing the relative status of Chinese Filipinos vis-a-vis

ethnic Filipinos and colonial rulers in Philippine history. I argue that throughout the history

of Chinese Filipinos, their identity has been formed through a racialized construction of

class. O n the one hand, they have always been racialized as alien and foreign; on the other,

being 'Chinese' has evolved from the poor, sojourning Chinaman to the economically

privileged members of the middle and upper classes.

B y looking at how Chinese Filipino identities have evolved through three generations,

I hope to demonstrate how identities are shaped by competing publics and counterpublics,

which affirm the fluidity and multiplicity of identities. B y also examining how these

identities have been affected by multiple racialization processes throughout history, I hope to

illustrate how the categories of race are produced by conflicting social and political forces.

Even though there has not been any scientific basis for dividing groups into racial lines, race

continues to play an important role in structuring and representing the world. A s Wildman

8
and Davis (2000) point out, there are patterns of domination and subordination within each

classification. Although racial tensions have always been present throughout history, calling

someone racist "lays the blame on the individual rather than the forces that have shaped that

individual and the society that the individual inhabits" (p. 657). This paper is not about the

racist attitudes of Filipinos, Chinese, or the colonizers. It is about exploring the systemic

nature of power systems like race in perpetuating patterns of domination and subordination,

and the material consequences of these systems on the identity formation of a minority

group.

9
 Chapter 1:

Discourses on Chinese Identities and the Social Construction of a 'Chinese Race'

This chapter is a review o f the existing literature on Chinese identities and the social

construction o f race. While the changing identities o f the Chinese in the Philippines are the

focus o f the second chapter, the first chapter w i l l situate their experiences in the broader

context o f Southeast Asia. The first part o f this chapter examines the different discourses on

Chinese identities, including the various constructions o f Chineseness in Southeast Asia. The

second part o f this chapter focuses on the literature surrounding the social construction o f

race in order to examine the influence o f a 'Chinese race' and the racialized construction o f

class on the formation o f Chinese Filipino identity, which is the focus o f the third chapter.

O f the almost 31 million Chinese living outside o f mainland China, Hong K o n g and

Taiwan in 1990, the vast majority is found in Southeast A s i a (Pan, 1998). The Philippines

has one o f the smallest Chinese populations in Southeast A s i a , and an even smaller

proportion o f Chinese in the country compared to other Southeast Asian nations. In 1999, the

Chinese population in Southeast A s i a was estimated at 23 million and distributed as follows:

27 percent in Indonesia, 24 percent in Malaysia, 23 percent in Thailand, 12 percent in

Singapore, 5 percent in Vietnam, 4 percent in the Philippines and the remainder in Myanmar,

Laos, Cambodia and Brunei. The proportion o f Chinese in each country also differs with the

largest proportions in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei (Armstrong and Armstrong, 2001).

Most o f the early Chinese who migrated to Southeast A s i a came from the

southeastern provinces o f China, such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, and speak various

kinds o f spoken Chinese, such as Hokkien, Cantonese and Hokchiu. They were regarded as

sojourners, aliens and temporary residents. Some came to provide trading services while

10
others were recruited to work in mines and plantations for the colonial regimes in the region.

They were mainly oriented to China and not directly active in local politics until the

twentieth century. Instead, they allied themselves with those holding political power that

served their own interests. The independence of new nation-states in the mid-twentieth

century forced the Chinese to redefine themselves as participants within a new national

context, and later took up citizenship offered in their host countries. Historically, they

managed to thrive under colonial rule and modern nation-states although their economic

success and wealth brought jealousy from the indigenous population. Chinese in Southeast

A s i a over many centuries have contributed substantially to the economic development and

growth of the region. They continue to be in transition from 'overseas Chinese' to fully

integrated local citizens of their adopted countries. They also found their identity as

'Chinese' to be an asset for doing business with China and overseas Chinese communities

(Armstrong and Armstrong, 2001; Wang, 1988, Parmer 2001).

The various experiences of Chinese in Southeast A s i a make it difficult to define a

single Chinese identity. Scholars of Chinese communities in Southeast A s i a have generally

acknowledged that there is no single Chinese identity but multiple Chinese identities - each

formed by its unique and historical circumstances (Wang, 1988; Hirschman, 1988; Gosling,

1983). Wang (1988) even maintains that "the Chinese have never had a concept of identity,

only a concept of Chineseness, of being Chinese and of becoming un-Chinese" (p. 1). If that

is the case, how then do we define the term 'Chinese?' A n d how do we measure the degree

of a person's 'Chineseness?' Many attempts have been made to define 'Chinese identity' and

to measure one's degree of'Chineseness.' A salient feature of being Chinese is to trace one's

biological line, as the legend goes, to the Y e l l o w Emperor. Another feature is simply being

11
born in China. Being Chinese also means the ability to speak Mandarin or any of the Chinese

'dialects.' It can also mean practicing a code of ethics, such as filial piety, toward one's

'mother country.' If being born in China is a condition of Chinese identity, it w i l l

immediately exclude millions of overseas Chinese who consider themselves as ethnically

Chinese (Tu, 1994).

There is also the problem of labels and language - what to call the people who are the

subject of study. Armstrong and Armstrong (2001) sum up the dilemma quite articulately in

the following paragraph:

When we speak and write in English are the Chinese populations of Southeast

A s i a Overseas Chinese? Are they diaspora Chinese? Is ethnic Chinese the

appropriate label? ... Is it acceptable to speak collectively of Southeast Asian

Chinese? ... Should we be guided by what people call themselves? (p. 9)

These issues highlight the importance of treating Chineseness as a construct. A s the identities

of Chinese in Southeast A s i a are oftentimes imposed by political circumstances as well as

defined by the Chinese themselves, the meaning of being Chinese is constantly changing (Tu,

1994).

The fluidity of Chinese identities can been seen in Wang's (1988) study of the

changing Chinese identities in Southeast Asia. He examines the ways different identities

were used to define a sense of Chinese identity during particular periods. Instead of

constructing a fixed identity of the Southeast Asian Chinese, he argues that the Chinese in

Southeast A s i a assume multiple identities throughout their history in the region. Before the

Second World War, the historical identity was used to define who was Chinese through the

emphasis of their family system, place of origin, traditional family values, as well as symbols

12
of a glorious Chinese past. During the 1920s and 1930s, however, a predominant Chinese

nationalist identity was found among the overseas Chinese (Nanyang huaqiao) who

responded to the idea that their racial origins should enable them to identify with the new

nationalism in China propagated by Sun Yat-sen. A s can be expected, not all Chinese

changed in favor of Chinese nationalism. Some chose to identify with local indigenous

nationalist movement, while others found a new kind of identity that focused on economic

class. The national (local) identity in each of the new nation-states became the third kind of

Chinese identity. Whether it was merely a change in official label or a willingness to

assimilate and politically integrate is a matter of deep contention.

This leads us to the cultural aspect of identity. The new awareness of culture

recognized the ways the Chinese communities could learn from modern non-Chinese

cultures. W i t h the establishment of the modern nation-states in Southeast A s i a , Chinese

found that they had to choose between assimilation and integration - co-existence was no

longer a viable option. The concept of cultural identity enabled researchers to examine the

willingness of the Chinese to accept the local national identity even as they sustain their

Chinese identity, and to some extent accept a totally new non-Chinese identity. Some of

these cultural values included religious conversion, non-Chinese language skills, and

behavioral patterns influenced by non-Chinese customs. However, there were limits to the

usefulness of the concept of cultural identity. It did not address the relations between politics,

race and minority groups in Southeast A s i a in the late 1960s. The concept of ethnic identity

was used to deal with issues relating to racial origins and minority rights. In the 1980s there

was class identity, which crossed racial boundaries and was used to explain the role of

Chinese enterprise in the rapid growth of Southeast Asian economies and the willingness of

13
most Southeast Asian Chinese to embrace Western capitalist institutions - events that could

not be satisfactorily addressed by ethnicity or culture (Wang, 1988).

In a critique of Wang's theories, Hirschman (1988) points out that there is insufficient

attention given to the causes of ethnic change, such as how and why the shift from traditional

to modern Chinese culture occurred. He argues that the study of identities needs to be linked

to the interaction between subjectivist approach (how people define themselves and are seen

by others) and objective conditions. The questions regarding the definition of ethnic groups

and the boundaries that divide them also need to be addressed. He pushes for the

measurement of differences between ethnic groups and how these differences narrow or

widen over time. He suggests three dimensions to be considered in studying Chinese

ethnicity in Southeast Asia. The first is socioeconomic inequality, which includes the

distribution of valued resources and rewards (i.e. education, occupation, income, power,

prestige). The second dimension is cultural differences, which include subjective identities

and ethnic variations (i.e. language, religion, values and beliefs). The third is structural

differentiation, which is the degree of ethnic participation in the social institutions of society.

Furthermore, Hirschman argues that the Chinese in Southeast A s i a "can be better understood

as minority groups who happen to be Chinese rather than as Chinese who happen to be living

outside o f C h i n a " (p. 30).

Tan's (2001) study on the nature of Chinese identities in Southeast A s i a and in the

changing global context affirms the multiplicity of local Chinese identities. Because Chinese

in Southeast A s i a have adapted to different local cultural, social, and political environments,

they have developed their own local cultural identities. Tan terms this concept of state-bound

ethnic identity as national ethnic identity. In most cases, the state-sanctioned expression of

14
ethnicity is the highest level of ethnic identification. It is the "expression of ethnic identity by

an ethnic group at the national level" (p. 230), such as Chinese Malaysians or Chinese

Filipinos.

Aside from one's national ethnic identity, Tan (2001) identifies another type of

identity that addresses the relationship of ethnic Chinese with China and the international

networks among ethnic Chinese. The concept of civilizational ethnic identity focuses on the

" ' c o m m o n ' identification as 'Chinese' by people of Chinese descent everywhere in the

transnational setting" (p. 212). He argues that "because of the identification with Chinese

civilization, the original source of Chinese cultures, Chinese worldwide can be said to have a

civilizational ethnicity" (p. 225). This particular identity does not involve a sense of

attachment to a global Chinese community, nor to the state of China. Instead, it is an

identification with Chinese civilization as expressed through their respective national ethnic

identities.

Chinese ethnic identity in Southeast A s i a differs in language, occupation, and varying

degrees of acculturation and accommodation to indigenous cultures. Some, such as the Baba

in Malaysia, even developed a 'new' identity. Gosling (1983) identifies the different forms

that shifts in Chinese identities acquire: there could be adaptation, accommodation or

assimilation into indigenous societies and cultures. There could be a renewed emphasis on a

common Chinese culture or it could shift toward a Western or modern model of Chineseness,

one that is based on class rather than ethnicity. He also names several factors that could

influence the shifts in identity: the size of the Chinese community, economic role of the

Chinese, local political policies, intermarriage and the availability of Chinese partners,

communication within the Chinese community, and the Chinese perception of the local

15
population. O n the extreme end is total assimilation and on the other end is the maintenance

of a distinct Chinese community and identity.

In between these two extremes is what Gosling (1983) refers to as intermediate

identities or situational ethnicity, the mixing of Chinese and indigenous cultures. He then

identifies three different levels of use of local identities by the Chinese and the

interchangeability of these identities. The first is the unconscious use of local identity, which

signifies a high degree of acculturation. This results from intermarriages, the use of native

language, and socialization by local domestic servants and peers. Those who use this identity

are more local than Chinese. The second level of use of local identities is the conscious use

through adoption of public behavior to offset the negative stereotypical view of the Chinese,

while maintaining 'Chinese' behavior in private. The third is the manipulative use of

alternative identities, where it involves a selective use of Chinese identity to achieve certain

results. He uses the example of a Chinese shopkeeper who appeared to be acculturated to

Malay culture, including the wearing of sarong, the use of 'quiet and polite' Malay speech,

and having a 'humble and affable' disposition (p. 4). A t harvest time, when he would go to

the field to collect crops, he would put on his Chinese 'costume' and speak in a much more

abrupt manner, acting 'just like a Chinese.'

While Gosling (1983) talks about the interchangeability of identities to match

particular situations and to achieve certain results, Wang (1988) offers a simultaneous

presence of many kinds of Chinese identities. Hirschman (1988), on the other hand, cites the

importance of studying the interaction between socio-political structures and the subjective

definition of identity, and the measurement of differences between the dominant and the

minority groups over time. The problem with the approaches of Gosling and Hirschman is

16
that they tend to essentialize Chinese and native identities and present them as static and

unchanging. Hirschman assumes that by measuring the differences between groups that the

dominant group itself is not undergoing any changes and that the interaction between the two

cultures does not have an effect on the dominant society, only on the ethnic minority.

Although these approaches address certain aspects of Chinese identity, they fail to capture

the complexities in the construction of Chinese identity and account for its fluidity and

permeability.

The various Chinese identities Wang (1988) explores in his study demonstrate how

identities change over time. These identities are not discrete categories but overlap in a

person's lifetime. Wang recognizes that while these identities have been used as a new way

of representing Chinese identity, what most Chinese really have is not a single, fixed identity,

but a mixture o f identities. Tan (2001) takes it further by stressing the importance of one's

local experiences in providing historical and geographical contexts to a person's cultural

identity. In my examination of the changing identities of Chinese in the Philippines, I try to

show the causes of these changes over particular periods in Philippine history and

demonstrate the unfixed and multiple natures of Chinese identities.

I also try to address the boundaries that divide the Chinese minority and the

mainstream Philippine society, as pointed out by Hirschman (1988). Barth (1969) explores

the different processes that take place in generating and maintaining ethnic groups. He

focuses on the ethnic boundary that defines the group and not on the 'cultural stuff that

comprises it. He argues that even though there may be a drastic reduction of cultural

differences between ethnic groups, as exemplified by the Chinese and Filipino ethnic groups

in the Philippines, this does not mean there is a "reduction in the organizational relevance of

17
ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-maintaining processes" (p. 33). In fact, even

though there is frequent social interaction between ethnic groups, discrete categories may

still be maintained "despite changing participation and membership in the course of

individual life histories" (p. 10). A s Barth (1969) points out: "one finds that stable, persisting,

and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are

frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses" (p. 10).

In this paper, I explore the historical processes o f Chinese identities and their

negotiation by individuals, state authorities and interest groups. Like Wang (1988) and Tan

(2001), I try to demonstrate that there is no fixed Chinese Filipino identity but multiple

identities, each shaped by various political, social and cultural factors. I use Barth's essay in

studying the boundary-maintaining processes o f the Philippine society. Despite increasing

social interaction between ethnic Chinese and Filipinos, I argue that there can be found

'stable and persisting social relations' that define the boundaries between the two ethnic

groups based on 'dichotomized ethnic statuses' (Barth, 1969). These social relations are

based on the mainstream society's view o f ethnic Filipinos as the dominant majority and the

ethnic Chinese as foreign and economically privileged. These 'ethnic statuses' are based on

the racialization processes o f Chinese and Filipinos throughout history. The concept o f race

and its construction w i l l be discussed in the next section.

The Concept of Race

The concept o f race usually invokes biologically based human characteristics.

Although scientists have tried to distinguish human groups along the line o f race, there has

been no biological basis for the categories employed to differentiate human groups along

racial lines. O m i and Winant (2001) defines race as " a concept which signifies and

18
symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (p.

371). Lopez (2000), on the other hand, defines it as " a vast group of people loosely bound

together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their morphology and/or

ancestry" (p. 165). These two definitions provide a link between physical features and

personal characteristics as constructed by contested systems of meaning (Lopez, 2000). The

selection of particular human features as signifiers of race has always been a social and

historical process (Omi and Winant, 2001).

There is a continuous temptation to think of race as something "fixed, concrete and

objective" (Omi and Winant, 2001, p. 371), as well as an opposite temptation to think of it as

a "mere illusion, a purely ideological construct which some ideal non-racist social order

would eliminate" (p. 371). O m i and Winant (2001) argue that there is a need to challenge

these two positions and transcend the seemingly rigid and bipolar relationships between

them. Lopez (2000) in fact argues that 'race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather

an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing, plastic process" (p. 165). Although there is no

scientific basis for racial categories, O m i and Winant (2001) insist that we cannot simply get

rid of the concept of 'race' because it continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and

representing the world. Instead, we should think of race as "an element of social structure

rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human

representation rather than an illusion' (p. 372).

In my analysis of Chinese Filipino identities in Chapter 3,1 have used the theoretical

approach called racial formation in developing a racialized construction of class in the

identity formation of Chinese Filipinos. Racial formation is defined as the "sociohistorical

process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (Omi

19
and Winant, 2001, p. 372). Race is a matter of both social structure and cultural

representation. It has no fixed meaning, but is constructed and transformed through " a

process of historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are

represented and organized" (p. 372), and via the power of hegemony - how society is ruled

and organized. Gramsci argued that in order to consolidate their hegemony, "ruling groups

must elaborate and maintain a popular system of ideas and practices - through education, the

media, religion, folk wisdom, etc. - which he called 'common sense.' It is through its

production and its adherence to this 'common sense'... that a society gives its consent to the

way in which it is ruled" (p. 377).

Anderson (1991) demonstrates the concept of cultural hegemony in her study of

Vancouver's Chinatown. She argues that classifications of identity "bear the... stamp of a

dominant community conferring identity" (p. 8) and that the perception of the Chinese in

Canada as a different and distinct group is a "comparable cultural abstraction that belongs to

the beliefs and institutional practices of white European society..." (p. 8). Assumptions about

Chinese difference were then used to inform government policies toward the Chinese enclave

and its inhabitants. According to Anderson, race should not be invested with its own

explanatory status: race itself must be explained.

Lopez (2000) uses the term 'racial fabrication' in explaining the social construction of

race. He argues that "races constitute an integral part of a whole social fabric that includes

gender and class relations" (p. 168). Races are also constructed relationally against one

another. In Chapter 3,1 argue that colonial rulers have racially triangulated the Chinese in the

Philippines vis-a-vis ethnic Filipinos ( K i m , 1999). Through the process of racialization

20
(Gotanda, 2000), Chineseness in the Philippine context has come to signify alienness and

economic privilege.

The power o f racial formation is illustrated in W u ' s (1994) essay on the two

sentiments that identify all who see themselves as 'Chinese.' The first is a nationalist

sentiment, which is a feeling o f connectedness with the fate of China as a nation. It is also

associated with a "sense o f fulfillment, o f being the bearers o f a cultural heritage handed

down from their ancestors, o f being essentially separate from non-Chinese" (p. 149). The

second sentiment is membership o f a 'Chinese race' or the 'Chinese people,' a concept I have

been discussing in this section. According to W u , both sentiments represent " a n identity

based on concepts o f cultural and historical fulfillment rather than the more conventional

modern notions o f nationality or citizenship" (p. 150).

The overseas Chinese or huaqiao are considered to have identified with these two

sentiments. Different factors have contributed to the creation o f a strong China-oriented

identity outside o f China. These include rising nationalism since the early Republic, the

threat o f Japanese invasion, and discrimination experienced by overseas Chinese in most host

countries. The influence o f Chinese schools in propagating a 'Chinese race,' and eventually a

Chinese identity, has been profound in Southeast Asia. This nationalist ideology was brought

to overseas Chinese schools v i a branch organizations o f the Kuomintang party and other

overseas Chinese organizations (Wu, 1994). Overseas Chinese were subject to racialization

not only by their host countries and colonial rulers, but also by the Chinese government that

claimed them.

21
Constructing Chineseness

A discussion about Chineseness always leads inevitably to a reference to China.

According to T u (1994), the "meaning of being Chinese is intertwined with China as a

geopolitical concept and Chinese culture as a lived reality" (p. 1). It is associated with ethnic,

territorial, linguistic, and ethical-religious terms. However, it is no longer confined to the

center, which in this case is China. The periphery, which consists of the communities outside

China, presents powerful and persistent economic and cultural challenges as well. Tu

suggests that the Chinese culture, or what is referred to as 'Cultural China,' can be examined

in terms of a continuous interaction of three symbolic universes. The first consists of

societies populated predominantly by cultural and ethnic Chinese (mainland China, Taiwan,

Hong K o n g and Singapore). The second consists of Chinese communities throughout the

world, and often referred to by political authorities in Beijing and Taipei as huaqiao

(overseas Chinese). They have also defined themselves as members of the Chinese diaspora.

These communities rarely exceed three percent of their country's population. The third

symbolic universe consists of scholars, journalists, industrialists and writers who try to

understand China intellectually and who continually attempt to shape the international

discourse on cultural China.

In his book, The Living Tree, T u (1994) attempts to examine the "fluidity of

Chineseness as a layered and contested discourse, to open new possibilities and avenues of

inquiry, and to challenge the claims of political leadership in Beijing, Taipei, Hong K o n g , or

Singapore to be the ultimate authority in a matter as significant as Chineseness" (Preface,

viii). A n g (2001) takes it further by arguing that "Chineseness is not a category with a fixed

content - be it racial, cultural or geographical - but operates as an open signifier whose

22
meanings are constantly renegotiated and rearticulated in different sections o f the Chinese

diaspora" (p. 38). B y conceiving Chineseness as a discursive construct, there is a disruption

of the stability and certainty o f Chinese identity, but it does not "negate its operative power

as a cultural principle in the social constitution o f identities as Chinese" (p. 40).

W u (1994) focuses on how Chinese conceptualize their own Chineseness in the

diaspora, demonstrating the complexity o f incorporating indigenous language and culture

without losing their sense o f Chinese identity. H e points out that many Chinese who have

acculturated to the indigenous population are still labeled Chinese and subject to suspicion,

discrimination or exclusion from social and political participation. This is particularly true

for overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who were behind the region's economic growth but are

still viewed with suspicion. This reflects the ongoing negotiation o f Chinese identity, both

within and outside the overseas Chinese community, depending on their host countries'

politics and conventional thinking about race and culture.

Wang (1999) expresses his reservations about the use o f the term 'diaspora' in

relation to overseas Chinese. This was brought about by the problems the Chinese

encountered with the concept o f huaqiao and the political use o f the term by China and

hostile governments:

From China's point o f view, huaqiao was a powerful name for a single body

of overseas Chinese. It was openly used to bring about ethnic i f not nationalist

or racist binding o f all Chinese at home and abroad. In the countries which

have large Chinese minorities, that term had become a major source o f the

suspicion that the Chinese minorities could never feel loyalty towards their

host nations, (p. 2)

23
For Wang (1999), there is not a single Chinese diaspora but many different diasporas, just as

there are many kinds of Chinese. This is an important point because it allows us to see how

each Chinese community develops its own distinctive identity different from the one that

nationalist Chinese scholars and officials, as well as various governments, had tried to

impose on them. Political conditions in Southeast A s i a during the 1950s were crucial in

forcing the Chinese to re-consider what nationalism meant for them outside China.

In recent years we have also witnessed Chinese remigration, from a Southeast Asian

country to the United States, Canada or Australia. Globalization and more liberal

immigration policies have made it possible to affiliate with a new country. Identification with

a state is now becoming a matter of affiliation by choice. The experience of living in

different parts o f the world w i l l continue to shape Chinese identities. Ethnic identities are

dynamic and can be transformed and redefined. A s Tan (2001) predicts, "the trend is towards

global networking with each country as a base for national identity and Chinese civilizational

identity as a principle of association" (p. 233).

In a departure from the mainstream tendency of ascribing contemporary Chinese

identity to long-standing roots in China or to China's civilization, Ong and Nonini (1997b)

seek to deconstruct modern Chineseness by arguing that identity is formed "out of the

strategies for the accumulation of economic, social, cultural, and educational capital as

diasporic Chinese travel, settle down, invest in local spaces, and evade state disciplining in

multiple sites throughout the A s i a Pacific" (p. 327). Although groups and persons in

Southeast A s i a have long engaged in movements of all kinds, what is new about the modern

Chinese transnationalism that started to occur in the last 20 years is its links to the "dynamics

of globalization, the workings of flexible Asian capitalism, and the related forms of cultural

24
production which generate new group and personal identities" (Nonini, 1997, p. 260). The

identity formation o f modern Chinese transnationalists is becoming "increasingly diaspora-

based rather than land-based" (Ong and Nonini, 1997b, p. 326):

Our approach opens up the question of identity - racial, ethnic, cultural,

spatial, gender, and personal - as a politics rather than as an inheritance... as

fluidity rather than fixity, as based on mobility rather than locality, and as the

playing out of these oppositions across the world... The varieties of Chinese

identity thus emerge out of the continuous invention and reinvention of

Chineseness as a product of the multiple and contradictory effects of

ultramodernist attitudes, transnational subjectivities, and the nostalgic

imaginaries marketed by late capitalism and its culture industries, (p. 327)

This approach seeks to reconceptualize the relationship between Chinese identities

and place-bound theorizations implied in such terms as territory, region, nationality and

ethnicity. Chineseness is not measured by the 'Chinese' values or norms a person or group

possesses, but is understood only in terms of the multiple ways in which it is an "inscribed

relation of persons and groups to forces and processes associated with global capitalism and

its modernities" (p. 4). Modern Chinese transnational!sm decenters China as the ultimate

analytical reference for understanding diaspora Chinese and treats it as only one of many

sites in which Chinese transnational practices are played out. It is an "interplay between

strategies of accumulation and the experiences of dislocation... and the different

constructions of modernity by capitalist interests and by nation-states" (p. 16).

Ong and Nonini (1997a) also mention the constraints on the strategies of

accumulation of the diaspora Chinese, which they call 'regimes of truth and power.' These

25
are the regimes o f the Chinese family, the capitalist workplace, and the nation-state. Each of

these regimes "disciplines persons under its control in different ways to form acceptable and

normal subjectivities" and requires "the localization of disciplinable subjects - that persons

be locatable and confinable... to specific spaces defined functionally by these regimes: the

home, the factory, the nation" (p. 23). Chinese transnationalists try to resist the localizations

imposed on them by these regimes by playing with different cultural fragments " i n a way that

allows them to segue from one discourse to another, experiment with alternative forms o f

identification... or evade imposed forms o f identifications" (p. 27). This has lead to the

proliferation o f various ways o f being Chinese, which has "engendered complex, shifting,

and fragmented subjectivities that are at once specific yet global" (p. 26).

The discourses on Chineseness and Chinese identities in Southeast A s i a are important

in studying the changing identities o f Chinese Filipinos from the late 19 century to the late
th

20 th
century. These discourses provide historical context and background to the formation

and transformations o f Chinese identity in the Philippines. Treating Chineseness as a

discursive construct also opens up various forms o f inquiry, including the racial formation o f

the Chinese in the Philippine context and the effects o f this process on their identity. It also

demonstrates the complexity o f studying an ethnic group that is unbounded to a single place

nor defined by a single identity.

26
 Chapter 2: Changing Identities of Chinese Filipinos

The Chinese have a long history in the Philippines. They are said to have been in the

country much earlier than the Spanish, although knowledge about Chinese trade and

residence in the Philippines dates only from the 1 6 century. During this time, a sojourning
th

pattern prevented permanent settlement. It was only near the end o f the 1 9 century that a
th

steady stream o f Chinese immigrants began to settle permanently in the country. A n

exception is the case o f the Chinese mestizos, the mixed offspring o f male Chinese sojourners

and Filipina women during the Spanish period, whose history and unique status in Philippine

society is not within the scope o f this paper (Wickberg, 1998). The overwhelming majority o f

Chinese in the Philippines trace their regional origin to Fujian province. Hokkien, as they are

commonly called, make up 85-90 percent o f the Chinese population, mostly from South

Fujian regions such as Jinjiang, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Shishi. A significant number also

came from Nan'an county and the Tongan-Xiamen area. The dialect spoken is Minnan, also

known as Hokkien. The Cantonese from Guangdong Province are the only other regional

Chinese group in the Philippines. They began to arrive in the Philippines only in the 19

century and comprise 8.8 percent o f the Chinese population (Wickberg, 1998; Pan, 1998).

This chapter primarily deals with the Hokkien and their changing identities as

Chinese Filipinos. They came to the Philippines in the 16 century and established trading
th

connections brought about by the development o f a lucrative connecting trade between

M a n i l a and M e x i c o in the 1570s. They provided silk and porcelain goods and monopolized

commercial and service occupations (Wickberg, 1998). B y 1600, there were 20,000 Chinese

in the M a n i l a area. The Philippines was considered as a "Hokkien hinterland o f jobs and

remittances. Chain migration o f individual family members from Fujian was the principal

27
historical feeder of the Philippine Chinese population" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 187). Fellow

villagers usually joined migrant pioneers who had established a base in the host country (Pan,

1998).

Both Spanish and American colonial policies have had a significant impact on the

cultural, political and economic orientation of the ethnic Chinese. These colonial regimes

sought to contain the Chinese population in order to exert control and management over the

country (Carino, 1994). The Spanish were ambivalent about the Chinese presence, resulting

in the creation of inconsistent policies and actions. O n the one hand, the Chinese were valued

for their skills as they monopolized commercial and service occupations. On the other hand,

their indispensability aroused suspicion from the Spaniards. They feared that the Chinese

would try to overthrow Spanish rule in the Philippines. A series of uprisings and massacres

as well as immigration controls and expulsions contained the Chinese population to about

5,000 to 10,000 by the late 18 century. However, in the mid-19 century, the Chinese were
th th

allowed to immigrate in greater numbers as Spain opened the Philippines to world trade and

needed their expertise. When the United States assumed colonial control over the Philippines

in 1898, the Chinese had already numbered around 100,000 and had dominated the export

and import business, rice and corn processing and sales. In 1946, Philippine independence

gave rise to increased Filipino nationalism, which was partly directed against the Chinese. A

number of anti-Chinese measures were passed aimed at reducing their economic power (Tan,

1972; Wickberg, 1998; Parmer, 2001).

Today, there are over a million Chinese in the Philippines, or roughly 1.5 percent of

the total population. More than half live in Metro Manila, while smaller groups can be found

in provincial cities such as Cebu and Davao. About 90 percent of Chinese are citizens of the

28
Philippines. The size of the Chinese population in the Philippines is among the smallest in

Southeast A s i a (Wickberg, 1998). The relationship of the Chinese to Philippine society has

been oscillating from that of being excluded to that of being included at various times

throughout the country's history (Wickberg, 1998). Their economic clout and their perceived

cultural 'alienness' have made the Chinese a target of discriminatory laws and a scapegoat

for the country's poverty. A s Hau (2003) points out, "the contradiction between formal

political equality and actual economic equality... plagues Philippine nationalism and is

resolved only when it is expressed and manifested as anti-Chinese sentiment" (p. 279). Their

race and class have constantly been used by various administrations, whether colonial or

Filipino, to justify their exclusion from the dominant society. However, Wickberg (1998)

argues that the period from 1975 to present offers the most potential for inclusion. Almost all

ethnic Chinese are citizens and "there is every indication that most ethnic Chinese are in the

Philippines to stay and identify themselves with it" (p. 191). Although there has been some

progress in the past two decades towards the integration of ethnic Chinese into Philippine

society, they are still not completely accepted by the majority of Filipinos. Chinese are still

viewed as outsiders who dominate the Philippine economy. The next section w i l l examine

the factors that contributed to the multiple identities of Chinese Filipinos throughout their

history in the Philippines.

From Generation to Generation

Scholars have sought to capture the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through

the passing of generations. Tan (1988) classifies these identities as the China-oriented, first

generation, the increasingly Philippine-oriented second-generation Chinese, and the fully

Philippine-oriented, third-generation Chinese. Focused on slightly different time periods,

29
Wickberg (1998) calls them the Oldest, Middle and Youngest generations. Both scholars

have examined the factors that have influenced each generation's identity and cultural

orientation. Other scholars have tried to capture the multiple identities of Chinese Filipinos

through different stages. In a study on the political integration of Chinese Filipinos, Teresita

A n g See (1994) identifies three stages of transition of the Chinese community from the

huaqiao or sojourner stage to the Filipino-Chinese stage in post-World War II, where some

had acquired citizenship but had not socially and economically integrated with mainstream

society, and to the Chinese Filipino stage, where most have obtained citizenship and have

largely integrated with the mainstream society.

Other factors have also influenced the identity formation of Chinese Filipinos.

Chinben See (1988b) distinguishes between the China-born and the local-born Chinese, as

well as the Manila-based and province-based Chinese. Those who lived in the provinces had

more contact with the Filipino community due to their small numbers and were said to be

more Philippine-oriented than their Manila-based counterparts. Class is also an important

factor in shaping one's identity within the Chinese community. The upper-class, local-born

Chinese tended to identify with the 'Westernized' Filipino upper class rather than with the

Chinese community. Because half of the Chinese population lives in Metro Manila, they run

the Chambers, schools and major Chinese associations. They have played a major role in

shaping 'Philippine Chinese culture.' Carino (1994) argues that a crucial element in shaping

identity has been the attitude of government and its policies toward the Chinese. Decades of

integration or assimilation can be easily undermined by reversals in state policies. The

process of integration depends partly on government perceptions and intentions, not only

with regard to the Chinese minority but also in terms of relations with China.

30
 In the next section, I depict the changing identities of Chinese in the Philippines

through three generations. I have chosen to do an intergenerational comparison in order to

show how various identities were formed and contested by various groups within each

generation, and how these processes has influenced the identity formation of succeeding

generations. I try to show how Chineseness has been differentially constructed and

negotiated by state authorities, individuals and interest groups. It is not my intention to

present each generation as a homogenous group. There were often marked and bitter

differences regarding the cultural orientation and political loyalty of Chinese within a single

generation. Although most members of the first generation were culturally and politically

oriented towards China, there were others who had already identified with the host country.

Yet despite the varied experiences of Chinese Filipinos as well as their various locations and

social classes, most of them, whether they were in M a n i l a or the provinces, whether upper

class or lower class, male or female, were viewed as 'aliens' by the Philippine government

for most of the 2 0 century.

th

I have chosen to use the label(s) of Chinese in the Philippines depending on the

particular historical period. For example, while the term 'Chinese Filipino' is now commonly

used among the third generation, the term 'Overseas Chinese' were often used during the

time of the second generation. The next sections focus on the historical and social factors that

shaped the changing identities o f Chinese in the Philippines.

First Generation

The members of the first generation were born either in the Philippines or China.

Some were brought to the Philippines while they were very young. They came to maturity

during the 1930s and 1940s. Some came to the country to earn a living then returned home,

31
while others settled in the Philippines. The first-generation Chinese had more of the

'sojourner' mentality. Their orientation was towards their hometown in China, and they

regularly sent remittances to support their relatives who were left behind (Tan, 1988; Carino,

1994; Wickberg, 1998). Some invested in Fujian's local industries and supported its schools.

In the 1930s, Philippine remittances to China averaged over $6 million per year, up to 30

percent of which were sent to Fujian. The first-generation Chinese maintained ties with their

home community since they had minimal contact with the host population (Pan, 1998). The

major markers of Chinese identity for the first generation were family clan, native village,

and one's orientation towards the homeland. Pan (1998) explains the idea of native place in

the following paragraph:

To a Chinese sojourner abroad, 'home' or 'native place' may not be ' C h i n a '

so much as the county or village in Fujian where M i n is spoken - and not just

M i n either, but the particular variety or dialect of M i n which he and his

parents speak, (p. 24)

Because of this orientation, many Chinese established surname and native-place associations,

as well as Chinese newspapers and Chinese schools to express and, at the same, preserve

their culture. Chinese education was a very important factor in the maintenance and

propagation of a Chinese ethnic identity (Tan, 1988; See, 1988a; Wickberg, 1998).

It was during the Spanish era that Chinese started becoming conscious of their status

as a minority group. Tan (1972) argues that "grievances generated by Spanish colonial

policies and practices prepared the seedbed for the later development of nationalist

sentiment" (p. 39). These included discriminatory taxation, a system of travel pass that

restricted their mobility, and legal discrimination. The anti-Chinese policies made them

32
aware of their common fate and "made them more conscious of their ancestral ties, aroused a

sense of responsibility for assisting other Chinese in trouble, and stimulated a sense of
rt

identity" (p. 69). It was in 1880 that the local Chinese first appealed to China for consular

protection against the discriminatory practices of the Spanish colonial rule. Until then, China

had largely disregarded the overseas Chinese. A t the end of the Spanish rule, China started to

claim responsibility for the overseas Chinese and established its first consulate in M a n i l a in

1899. The first Chinese school was opened that same year and many more followed during

the American occupation (Tan, 1972; Pan, 1998).

The American occupation of the Philippines in 1898 was a mixed blessing to the

Chinese. O n the one hand, the discriminatory Chinese Exclusion Act that was initially

implemented in the United States was extended to the Philippines in 1902. The purpose of

this legislation was to prohibit people of Chinese ancestry from entering the United States,

where a very strong anti-Chinese sentiment prevailed during that period. There were

exceptions to this rule, but it was enacted primarily to prevent an influx of Chinese

immigrants to the United States and later, to the Philippines. Although the Americans did not

object to the presence of Chinese immigrants in the Philippines, the Act was nonetheless

extended to the Philippines in order to prevent Chinese immigrants from using the colony as

a gateway into the United States (Tan, 1972; Tan, 1988).

In order to make the exclusion law applicable to the Philippines, the American

administration portrayed this act as preserving 'the Philippines for the Filipinos' (Tan, 1972;

Tan, 1988). O n the other hand, it was under the American occupation that the Chinese

immigrants were first granted the equal protection of the laws that enabled them to live in

relative freedom and economic security. The Chinese were permitted by the American

33
colonial regime to establish their own institutions and to expand their business networks all

over the Philippines. The Chinese settled in most parts o f the Philippines and entered new

types o f occupations. Having dominated the import and export business and rice and corn

mills, they went into the labor contractor business and the retail trade. This success brought a

backlash from the Filipino population. The Philippine legislature passed the Bookkeeping Act

of 1921 against the Chinese business community by requiring that all business accounts must

be kept in English, Spanish or a local dialect. This legislation was officially declared to end

the "defrauding o f the public treasury o f millions o f pesos annually by the 15,000 small

Chinese shopkeepers" (Purcell, 1965, p. 543) due to the inability o f Filipino officials to

check their books. The Chinese business community fought to repeal the law in the

Philippine legislature, and having failed to do so, took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court

which declared the Act unconstitutional (Purcell, 1965; Wickberg, 1998).

Although the first Chinese daily newspaper appeared in 1888, it was not until the

1920s that the local Chinese press started to flourish. B y the 1930s there were five Chinese

daily newspapers and one weekly with a combined circulation o f 32,000. The Chinese press

was also used by different factions within the Chinese community to pursue political ends,

both locally and those involving events in China. The Chinese press was mostly divided into

pro-Kuomintang or pro-Communist mouthpieces (Tan, 1972). The Chinese General Chamber

of Commerce o f the Philippines was established in 1904 in order to nurture and protect

Chinese commerce. Its membership consisted o f trade associations, business firms and

individuals and worked closely with charitable organizations in Manila. The Chamber of

Commerce also organized protest actions against anti-Chinese laws and practices and was

34
instrumental in fending off the Bookkeeping Act of 1921. A s this organization became more

powerful, it represented the Chinese community as a whole (Tan, 1972; Wickberg, 1998).

Events in China also influenced Philippine Chinese identity. In 1909, the Nationality

L a w was passed in China, which was based on the principle of jus sanguinis - any person

born o f a Chinese father or mother was a Chinese citizen regardless o f birthplace. Interest in

overseas Chinese became stronger during Sun Yat-sen's Republican government. This was in

part due to the contributions o f the overseas Chinese to the Kuomintang party. In 1927 the

Sun Yat-sen government established an Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau and in succeeding

years passed numerous laws and regulations dealing with overseas Chinese education,

investment, migration and voluntary associations. It also guaranteed the protection and

political participation o f overseas Chinese in the country's draft constitution. In 1937, there

were more than 2,000 overseas Chinese schools to strengthen the emigrants' cultural and

patriotic ties to China (Pan, 1998). The growth o f Chinese schools in the Philippines

coincided with the development o f modern educational systems in China and the Philippines.

In 1935, there were 7,214 Chinese students enrolled in 58 Chinese schools. A s the Chinese in

the Philippines sought their identity in the host country, they turned to Chinese education as

one o f the means to achieve it. It served to instill 'Chineseness' and promote 'Chinese

culture' and, in a sense, assured the community's very survival (Tan, 1972; See, 1988a).

Most o f the first-generation Chinese identified with the growing nationalism in China

as they followed, and some even participated in, political events and movements in China

especially against Japanese aggression in the 1930s. After the war ended, the Kuomintang

and the Chinese Communist Party brought their battle overseas, in the schools and

community organizations. Various Chinatown organizations in M a n i l a emerged reflecting the

35
politics in China, with some taking a 'pro-Kuomintang' or 'pro-Communist' stance (Tan,

1988; Wickberg, 1998). It almost seemed like most Chinese had no choice but to identify

with the nationalism in China. They realized that their fate as overseas Chinese was

somehow linked to the future of their homeland. Although there were 'pure-blooded'

Chinese who fought side by side with Filipinos against the Japanese, and there were those

who consider themselves as Filipinos, most of them were excluded from the political and

social structures of the country, and were resented by the Filipino population because of their

success in business (Pan, 1998; Tan, 1988; Wickberg, 1998). The Chinese were considered

"obnoxious because they were economically dominant, strange because they were culturally

alien, repulsive because they were socially clannish, and disloyal because they were

politically unreliable" (Tan, 1988, p. 179). In turn, the Chinese looked down on the Filipinos

and referred to them as 'barbarians' (Wickberg, 1998).

Second Generation

The second-generation Chinese were those who were born in the Philippines between

the early 1920s and late 1930s. They were raised as 'Chinese,' both culturally and politically,

by the China-oriented first-generation elders. This meant that they attended Chinese schools

and were taught to regard China as their native land (Tan, 1988). However, many of them

were also increasingly being acculturated to the Filipino way of life, which prompted some

first-generation Chinese to regard them as neither truly Chinese nor truly Filipino - "they

were suspended between two cultures neither which claimed them" (p. 183). Yet a closer

look into the history of this generation reveals that it was actually this generation of Chinese

Filipinos that was being vigorously 'claimed' by various governments. These governments,

with their various ideologies and political interests, played pivotal roles in shaping the

36
identities of the second generation, as well as subsequent generations. The members of the

second generation reached maturity between 1946 and 1975, which was a crucial period in

the history of the Philippines. Major historical factors made tremendous impacts on the

structure and identity of the second-generation Chinese. These included the growing

nationalism of the new modern nation-state, the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic

of China, the growing influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan on the overseas

Chinese, and the mass naturalization granted to 'alien' Chinese in 1975 by then-President

Ferdinand Marcos.

The declaration of Philippine independence from American rule in 1946 ushered in a

new kind of Filipino nationalism, which sought to preserve the Philippines for the Filipinos

and which also reinforced the identity of the Chinese as 'alien.' Laws were enacted to

nationalize various trades, occupations and professions. These policies were meant to

exclude those who were not Filipino citizens, and indirectly, the local-born Chinese who

controlled most of the retail trade and who were not citizens of the Philippines. The 1935

Constitution had already excluded 'foreigners' from owning land, developing natural

resources and running public utilities. The Retail Trade Nationalization A c t provided that

only Filipino citizens were allowed to engage in retail trade after M a y 1954. The

Nationalization of Rice and Corn Industries in 1960 required 'aliens' to liquidate their

businesses within two to three years from the date of the passage of the act. A number of

lawmakers continued to file more bills proposing the nationalization of lumber, the import

and export business, the restaurant business, among many others. This culminated in the

young nation-state's 'Filipino First' policy in 1961. Its aim was to enable the Filipinos to

37
obtain a substantial share of commerce and industry (Tan, 1988; See, 1994; Suryadinata,

1994; Carino, 1994).

The government also differentiated between natural-born citizens and naturalized

citizens. In 1957, the Central Bank required that commercial banks must be fully owned by

natural-born citizens, which was later modified to 80% owned by natural-born citizens and

2 0 % owned by naturalized citizens. These laws severely affected the Chinese who dominated

the retail, rice, and corn trades, as well as in the import and export business. The second

generation who sought professional degrees from Philippine colleges and universities were

effectively locked out of certain occupations and professions. A n increasing number of

Chinese applied for naturalization. Before 1975, many Chinese immigrants had difficulty in

obtaining citizenship which created a large number of 'aliens' (Tan, 1988; See, 1994;

Suryadinata, 1994; Carino, 1994).

There were other factors that contributed to the shift in identity. When M a o Zedong's

People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in 1949, the Nationalists

fled to Taiwan. The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland led to the

termination of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and China and meant that the Chinese

community was cut off from the mainland. Immigration from China virtually stopped. In the

meantime, the Nationalists established the Republic of China on Taiwan under the

Kuomintang government. Using the overseas Chinese communities as their battleground, the

Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party resumed their rivalry and vied for supremacy

in the schools and community organizations in these communities and the ultimate authority

to represent the 'Chinese race' (Pan, 1998).

38
 In 1955, the government of the People's Republic of China showed its willingness to

renounce its claim to overseas Chinese who wished to take up local nationality. Bent on

gaining the widest diplomatic recognition, this was considered a gesture o f goodwill towards

the newly independent nations in Asia, where overseas Chinese communities were "feared as

sources of subversion and a fifth column" (Pan, 1998, p. 102). The government in China also

encouraged overseas Chinese to take up local citizenship and integrate and assimilate into the

societies of the host countries. This move was viewed by the Kuomintang Party as a 'sell-

out' and an abandonment of the overseas Chinese (Pan, 1998). The government in Taiwan

quickly took up the role of a 'substitute C h i n a ' by recognizing citizenship on the basis of jus

sanguinis. This enabled those Chinese born in the Philippines to be citizens of the Republic

of China. It painted the image of communism in China as 'un-Chinese' because of its attitude

towards many aspects of the Chinese cultural tradition (Wickberg, 1998).

The shared hostility towards China between the Philippines and Taiwan led to a close

relationship between the two governments and paved the way for Taiwan to define

'Chineseness' in the Chinese Filipino context. The Kuomintang maintained branches in the

Philippines, published newspapers, operated schools, and influenced Chinatown politics. It

encouraged the overseas Chinese to remain 'Chinese.' The Overseas Chinese Affairs

Commission of the Republic of China identified Chinese education as the main thrust of its

work. It supervised the curriculum of the Chinese schools in the Philippines by requiring

them to follow the curriculum set by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, which stressed the

teaching of Mandarin, Chinese culture and literature. Local Chinese teachers were trained

and systematically retrained in Taiwan. The schools were also used by the Kuomintang to

create political loyalty to the nationalist government in Taiwan. The version of 'Chineseness'

39
taught was the one sponsored by Taiwan. A t their height in the 1950s, there were 43,000

students in over 160 schools in the Philippines (Tan, 1988; Carino, 1994; See, 1994,

Wickberg, 1998).

In another development, the Chinese middle class had expanded over the 1954-1975

period. Their way of life was increasingly similar to middle-class Filipinos in terms of their

cultural and political orientation. Although most of the members of the second generation

attended Chinese schools, increasing numbers were attending Philippine universities as well.

In a bid to establish relations with China, the Philippines, under then-President Marcos,

granted mass naturalization to the Chinese in 1975. This policy has had the most dramatic

impact on Chinese identity in the Philippines. This also came at a time when China had

rescinded its policy of dual citizenship and encouraged overseas Chinese to adopt the

citizenship of their host countries. Although citizenship does not automatically endow a

Philippine national identity, as some Chinese acquired it out of economic necessity, it

nonetheless provides a condition to nurture this identity. For the first time, most Chinese

became officially 'Filipinos' and could practice within a wide variety of professions and

participate in the electoral process (Carino, 1994). This was significant since it created a

sense of security. Citizenship opened the way to integration and assimilation, as well as a

reevaluation of the ethnic group's place in Philippine society. Unlike the first-generation

Chinese who felt their future was tied up with China, the second-generation Chinese realized

that their fortune and future were now tied up with the adopted country (See, 1988b;

Suryadinata, 1994; Tan, 1988).

The members of the second generation created organizations that were modeled after

Western institutions, such as the Lions Club in the 1960s. There were various trade and civic

40
organizations that were established to voice the concerns o f the ethnic minority, such as the

Federation o f Chinese Chambers o f Commerce in 1954 and Pagkakaisa in 1970. One notable

organization is the Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran (or Kaisa), established in the mid-1980s and

composed o f middle-class, university-educated professionals and business people. It sought

to hasten integration and enhance the mutual understanding between Chinese and Filipinos

(Wickberg, 1998; Wickberg, 1993; See, 1994).

Despite the legal status o f Chinese as citizens o f the Philippines, they were not fully

accepted by many Filipinos. Tensions, as well as stereotypes, remained between the two

groups. Being a predominantly business community, they were often accused o f price

manipulation and unfair trade practices. Another source o f conflict is the relation between

Chinese employers and Filipino employees. A s a letter writer to the Daily Globe explains her

husband's decision to leave a company owned by an ethnic Chinese: " . . . my husband left the

company for we have realized that no matter how hard one works for a Chinese, one would

never find upliftment in life, but have to remain slaves to these opportunists" (as cited in See,

1997, p. 20). Chinese were still being perceived as outsiders and immigrants from a foreign

land. A s another letter writer put it: "The Philippines is for us Filipinos. W h y don't you just

go home where you belong and leave the Filipinos at peace with whatever they may have?"

(as cited in See, 1997, p. 21). Ironically, many o f the second-generation Chinese had no

firsthand experience o f China, and know no other home but the Philippines (See, 1997).

Third Generation

If the first-generation Chinese was oriented towards China and the members o f the

second generation were torn between China and the Philippines, there seems to be an

overwhelming consensus that the third generation was oriented towards the Philippines. They

41
came to maturity during the 1980s and 1990s amidst unrestricted opportunities in the

Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). Their outlook, attitudes and values were more ' F i l i p i n o ' than

those of the second generation, and were further removed from the China-oriented first

generation (Tan, 1988). There is a tendency to homogenize the 'Filipino' society just as there

has been a tendency to 'Occidentalize' Europe and its construction of the Oriental (Anderson,

1991). It must be noted that Filipino culture and identity were simultaneously undergoing

changes during this time and were constantly being redefined. For the third-generation

Chinese, the main determinants in shaping their identity were the Filipinization o f Chinese

schools in 1973, the reopening of China, and the concerted actions of Chinese Filipino

groups to identify with the Philippines (See, 1997).

In an effort to assimilate the Chinese into Philippine society, in 1973 the Philippine

government prohibited the ownership and operation of 'alien' schools in the country. Chinese

schools were given four years to be phased out. Permits of the Chinese schools were revoked

and all schools had to be administered by Philippine citizens. The teaching of Chinese was

made optional and classes were reduced to 120 minutes a day or 10 periods per week (from

18 periods). Since 1976, all Chinese schools in the Philippines had been 'Filipinized,' and the

medium o f instruction had been Filipino (based on Tagalog). The reduction of the Chinese

curriculum and the relegation of Chinese to the status of a foreign language affected the

young generation's command of the Chinese language and their appreciation of traditional

Chinese culture (See, 1994; Suryadinata, 1994; Tan, 1988).

Other factors also contributed to this generation's decline in Chinese language skills.

B y this time, many families had moved out o f Chinatowns and were living in Filipino

neighborhoods. Most of the members of the third generation learned to speak the Filipino and

42
local dialects before they learned to speak Chinese. Hokkien might be spoken at home but an

increasing number had been unable to obtain a good command o f Mandarin, which was the

language taught in Chinese schools. Many students had difficulty in reading and writing

Chinese characters, and very few students read Chinese newspapers and other literature.

They were more fluent in English or Filipino and other local dialects than in Mandarin. The

shift in the language skills of third-generation Chinese reflected their increasing cultural

orientation to the Philippines rather than to China or Taiwan. Increasing numbers o f Chinese

in M a n i l a and the provinces attended Philippine schools at all levels. They interacted with

Filipino classmates and friends (Wickberg, 1998; Tan, 1988). Their acculturation to the

Filipino way of life was such that it led Tan (1988) to comment: "they think like Filipinos,

talk like and dress like them" (p. 190).

The mass naturalization of the Chinese provided many new economic opportunities to

the members of the third generation that were previously denied to the previous generations.

These opportunities often required a university education and English language skills, not

Chinese language skills. Many Chinese learned English at the cost of mastering Chinese,

whether Hokkien or Mandarin. This also affected the pool of qualified teachers for Chinese

schools since many graduates did not have the language skills to continue their education in

Taiwan and many preferred to stay in the Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). Intergeneration

conflicts occurred. Those who had chosen paths other than commerce faced disappointment

from their parents. Dy (2003) explains his parents' negative reaction to his decision to

become a priest as follows: "my parents were simply being creatures o f their times, times

when the Chinese in this country had very limited educational and professional opportunities

43
and practically all Chinese went into commerce to survive" (p. 182). After a long time, his

parents eventually accepted his decision to join the priesthood.

The opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1975 had

lead to the resumption of travel to China and allowed many first-generation Chinese to revisit

their ancestral home and relatives in Fujian Province. It had also lead to the establishment of

a pro-Beijing faction in Chinatown, or what Tan (1988) called the anti-Kuomintang faction.

The absence of diplomatic relations with Beijing had enabled the pro-Taiwan group to

maintain power and influence in the Chinese community in the Philippines. The pro-Beijing

faction tried to undercut the power and influence of the Kuomintang on the Chinese

community by openly challenging its leadership in organizations like the Federation of

Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and its various branches. These

include various trade groups, charitable organizations, family associations, among others.

The cultural exchanges that had been sponsored by Taiwanese organizations were now also

possible with the mainland. There had even been talks about 'resinification' as some overseas

Chinese started to look towards China as it joined the global economy (Wickberg, 1998, Tan,

1988; See, 1988b).

The identification of the third-generation Chinese with the Philippines occurred at a

time when the country was also experiencing a shift in its attitude toward its ethnic minority.

This generation did not experience the discriminatory policies in the same way as the earlier

generations. They grew up in an environment where they enjoyed the same legal rights as the

Filipino population. They had taken part in elections and some Filipinos of Chinese descent

had been elected to public office. This shift is reflected in the change of terminology by

which the Chinese in the Philippines now identify themselves. The Chinese used to be known

44
as 'Filipino Chinese.' This implied that their primary identity was Chinese and they

happened to be living in the Philippines. It was in the 1980s that the new terminology,

'Chinese Filipinos' or Chinoys, was used to capture the new kind of Chinese living in the

Philippines: "primarily Filipino in nationality and allegiance, integrating into the mainstream

society without sacrificing their culture and legacy... in reversing the order of the modifier

and modified, proclaimed they are Filipinos, who happen to be o f Chinese origin" (Palanca,

2003a, p. 5). This new term was coined by Kaisa, an organization that has evolved into a

civic movement and a cultural institution documenting all aspects o f the Chinese in

Philippine life. It also plays a visible leadership role in the public affairs of the Chinese

community. It maintains a library on the history o f the Chinese Filipinos and a Chinese

heritage center. The founder, Teresita A n g See, also leads a crusade against the kidnappings

o f ethnic Chinese and other ethnic groups by kidnap-for-ransom gangs (Palanca, 2003b). Its

credo reads:

The Philippines is our country, it is the land of our birth, the home our people.

Our blood may be Chinese but our roots grow deep in Filipino soil, our bonds

are with the Filipino people. We are proud of the many cultures which have

made us what we are, it is our desire, our hope and aspiration - that with the

rest of our people, we shall find our rightful place in the Philippine sun. (Kaisa

para sa Kaunlaran, 2001)

Although there is more interaction and acceptance than ever on both sides,

relationships between Chinese and the Filipinos today are at times still clouded with mutual

suspicion and resentment. There are still some Filipinos who are ambivalent about the

presence of the Chinese minority. They suspect that the Chinese exploit the Philippine

45
economy without any commitment to the development of Philippine society (Wickberg,

1998). Chinese are still viewed as outsiders of the Philippine polity, as evidenced by the

campaign against candidates of Chinese ancestry by an anti-Chinese group called Kalipi

(Filipinos o f same blood and race). This group maintained that the Chinese already controlled

the Philippine economy and called on 'Filipinos' to resist the attempts of the Chinese to

control Philippine politics as well (See, 1997).

Their status as an outsider, in addition to their perceived wealth, has made Chinese

Filipinos vulnerable to kidnap-for-ransom gangs. Some Filipinos do not think that the

Chinese deserve any sympathy for their vulnerability to kidnappings and other problems

because they are economically better off than most Filipinos (Wickberg, 1998). The failure

of traditional Chinese organizations to demand the government into taking action against the

kidnappings is a reflection of the continued political marginalization of the Chinese

community. The traditional leaders of the community are still "wary about taking action that

could be interpreted as political in nature" (See, 1997, p. 128). Instead, these organizations

"used the old way of meeting and discussing the problem with the top-ranking government

officials, who often demanded logistics or financial support for solving the problem" (p.

128), to no avail.

The death of a high school student on January 7, 1993 was the catalyst that mobilized

the Chinese community. Members of the community, headed by Kaisa, organized a funeral

march to protest the government's inaction on the kidnapping problem. Chinese schools and

Chinese-owned businesses closed that day to allow their students and employees to join the

mass action. More than 25,000 people joined the funeral march. It was considered a

significant milestone in the history of Chinese Filipinos. A month later, the Citizens Action

46
Against Crime, a multi-sectoral organization composed of middle-class Filipinos, joined

forces with more than a hundred Chinese-Filipino organizations to protest the rising

criminality and kidnappings in the country. The mass actions forced then-President Ramos to

order a revamp of the Philippine National Police in order to solve the kidnapping problem

(See, 1997).

Some Chinese feel that they will always be treated as an ethnic minority that is

subjected to all kinds of harassment and discrimination - perennial scapegoats for the

problems facing the nation. There are others who would rather identify themselves with the

'diasporic' Chinese community than identify with a Third-world nation. However, there is a

growing number of Chinese Filipinos who are beginning to assert their rights as Filipino

citizens and to demand protection from the government against racism and harassment. The

pro-active approach of groups like Kaisa to construct the ethnic Chinese identity as part of a

Filipino identity is an interesting development. It is a concerted effort of one group to

integrate the ethnic Chinese to the dominant society - socially, culturally, politically and

economically.

47
 Chapter 3:

The Racialized Construction of Class in the Formation of Chinese Filipino Identity

The depiction of the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos in the previous chapter

allows us to examine how Chineseness as a discursive construct operates in the contexts of

colonial and postcolonial Philippines. For instance, it enables us to see how various

governments, journalists, commentators, and interest groups have shaped the category of

Chinese in the Philippines. This highlights the constructed nature of categories and

classification systems and focuses on the process of cultural classification itself (Ang, 2001).

By looking at the construction of Chinese Filipino identities, the purpose is "not to dispute

the fact that Chineseness exists... but to investigate how this category operates in practice, in

different historical, geographical, political and cultural contexts" (Ang, 2001, p. 40). It is

meant to demonstrate "how Chineseness is made to mean in different contexts, and who gets

to decide what it means or should mean" (p. 39) and the way it becomes the "object of

intense contestation, a struggle over meaning with wide-ranging cultural and political

implications" (p. 39). This approach also addresses the question of identity "as fluidity rather

than fixity" (Ong and Nonini, 1997b, p. 327) and shows how different identities - race, class,

nationality, subculture, dominant culture - intersect in and constitute an individual (Ong and

Nonini, 1997b).

The focus on Chinese Filipino identity brings us back to the study of race, particularly

the differential constructions of a 'Chinese race,' and its enduring effects on group identity.

Lopez (2000) explains that racial formation includes "both the rise of racial groups and their

constant reification in social thought" (p. 168). Sustained by the power of a hegemonic

culture, racial formation also has material consequences. As Anderson (1991) explains it,

48
"negative representations of racially defined people shaped adverse attitudes and repressive

policies in colonial and post-colonial states" (p. 26). It is important that we address "how

such categories came to be reproduced as dominant ideological and material forms" (p. 20).

Whereas racial ideology in North America has constructed Chinese identity as alien

and as a source of cheap labor (Anderson, 1991; K i m , 1999; Gotanda, 2000), the construction

of Chineseness in Southeast A s i a is slightly different: "In the Asian context, in South-East

A s i a especially... Chinese identity is never a simple issue: it is both an expression of political

marginalization in the postcolonial nation-state and an indication of (real and imagined)

economic privilege" (Ang, 2001, p. 12). In order to understand the marginalization of

Chinese in different spaces, whether economic, political or social, it requires "recognition of

both the force of ideological conceptions of the Chinese as a category and the effectiveness

of official representations of them as alien" (Anderson, 1991, p.22). It also requires the

tracing of the historical construction of Chinese categories "in such a way as to expose their

changing form and demonstrate their enduring connection to structures of domination" (p.

18). Examining the historical construction of Chinese categories in the Philippines enables us

to analyze how Chinese Filipino identities have developed in the historical and contemporary

periods. It also allows us to see how racial ideology had been institutionalized through

government policies and territorial arrangements (Anderson, 1991). Finally, it enables us to

see how the category of race is constructed, through its negotiation and contestation by

different interest groups, individuals and state authorities.

From Drooling Chinaman to Taipan

Scholars on Chinese-Filipino relations have argued that the tensions between the two

groups are not merely based on racial bias but on class differences as well (See, 1997; G o ,

49
1996). Most Chinese immigrants who came to the Philippines i n the 19 century were not

rich - they worked as manual laborers and peddlers o f Chinese goods. Filipinos have always

referred to Chinese as Instik, a word which originally meant 'your uncle' but became

increasingly charged with negative connotations. They were discriminated by the Filipino

population and were subjected to racial taunts. Instik beho tulo loway describes the image o f

'an old drooling Chinaman,' usually peddlers and manual laborers, who dozed off in the

middle o f their sixteen-to-eighteen-hour days while instik baboy ('Chinaman pigs') made fun

of their personal appearance and physical hygiene (Tan, 1988).

Hau (2003) argues that the phrase Instik beho tulo laway is not simply a racial taunt,

"but one that carries within it a hidden class bias against manual labor and the kind of people

who submit to it" (p. 279): the " o l d , drooling Chinese... [whose] face [is] worn not by the

prosperous merchant but by the bottle collector or taho vendor or stevedore eking out a

living i n the only way he knows how and with the only means he has: by the sinew o f his

own physical labor" (p. 278). The evolution of Chinese upward mobility, from lowly laborers

to members o f a merchant middle class, has changed the attitudes o f Filipinos toward the

Chinese. Although these racial taunts are rarely used against the Chinese today, the issue o f

class remains. Hau (2003) reflects on her own reaction to that phrase and the construction o f

Chinese in today's society:

Conversely, the ethnic Chinese's negative reaction (shame, outrage,

humiliation) to that word is simply the flipside o f the same class bias against

the Instik, a bias sharpened by the distancing effects of upward mobility and

the so-called generational gap. In reacting so defensively to the negative

connotation o f that phrase, I ended up assuming the very logic that I tried to

50
 criticize, the one that said that being Chinese necessarily meant being well-

off, (p. 279)

The impression that the Chinese in the Philippines are rich and the resentment by

Filipinos over the 'Chinese control' of their economy have lead several writers to address

these stereotypes. While the Chinese are predominantly involved in the trade and light

industry, See (1997) disputes the claim that they control the economy of the country. She

points out that not all Chinese are rich and that there are some who are also poor. See (1997)

further argues that racial tension between Chinese and Filipinos is caused mainly by

differences in economic status, which leads to disparities in class and ways of life. She

maintains that "cultural conflict can also arise out of the cultural differences spawned by

disparities in social and economic status. Such differences give rise to racial biases" (p. 8).

The racialized construction of class has often plagued Chinese Filipino identity:

...the equation o f Chineseness with money, an identification forged by the

Chinese's long history of economic specialization, and an equation that

remains the unresolved question at the heart not just o f Chinese-Filipino

efforts to claim an identity for themselves within the Philippines but also of

Philippine nationalism itself. (Hau, 2003, p. 279)

In this chapter, I examine the intersection of race and class in the identity formation

of Chinese Filipinos by tracing the historical processes of the racialization of Chinese as

'foreign' and 'economically privileged' in the Philippine context. I argue that the Chinese

have been racialized as 'foreign' by colonial administrations and because of this

racialization, were permitted by those in power to form extensive business networks in the

country so long as they remain 'outsiders' in the Philippine polity. In the process, they were

51
racially triangulated relative to the colonizers and the Filipino people during the colonial

period. They were valorized relative to the natives for their economic skills but ostracized

from the body politic due to their perceived foreignness. In a parallel development, the idea

of a 'Chinese race,' promoted by the Nationalist government in China during the 1920s in a

bid to obtain the support of overseas Chinese, also contributed to the multiple racialization of

Chinese as permanently foreign and unassimilable in their host country, whose loyalty

belonged to their homeland. The "ongoing practices of racial triangulation laid an ideological

foundation" ( K i m , 1999, p. 115) that allowed for the passage of nationalization laws aimed at

excluding the Chinese from Philippine society especially after the birth of the Philippine

nation-state in 1946. Even as full-fledged Philippine citizens, Chinese Filipinos today still

have to wrestle with the issues o f race and class as they negotiate their changing identities in

the Philippines.

Race as a Process

The current use of the phrase racial profiling has been articulated by Gotanda (2000)

on his work on America's racialization of Asians. The profile, which is " a particular

characterization or social stereotype," is "linked to the raced individual's racial category" (p.

1691) and is "linguistically and conceptually separable from the racial classification or racial

category of the person being profiled" (p. 1691). Racial profiling does not necessarily

characterize the racial 'other' as inherently inferior - "instead of biological inferiority, the

associations attached to the racial category are properly identified as a racial profile" (p.

1691). Racial profiling is applied to culturally situated contexts and produces social and

political consequences. This is especially applicable to the Chinese in the Philippines, as

racial profiling has allowed for the racialized construction of class. Chinese Filipinos have

52
been racialized as 'alien' and 'economically privileged' and these stereotypes have political

and material consequences, as evidenced by the nationalization laws aimed at this ethnic

group.

Taking it a step further, K i m (1999) points out that "racialization processes are

mutually constitutive of one another" (p. 106), in the sense that "groups become racialized in

comparison with one another and that they are differently racialized" (p. 107). In the context

of the United States, she argues that " A s i a n Americans have been racially triangulated vis-a-

vis Blacks and Whites, or located in the field of racial positions with reference to these two

other points" (p. 107). She describes the field of racial positions as " a normative blueprint for

who should get what... [it] profoundly shapes the opportunities, constraints, and possibilities

with which subordinate groups must contend, ultimately serving to reinforce White

dominance and privilege" (p. 107). It is also "continuously contested and negotiated within

and among racial groups, both at the elite level and at the level of popular culture and

everyday life" (p. 107). Racial triangulation occurs through the processes of 'relative

valorization' and 'civic ostracism.' O n the one hand, relative valorization refers to the

process whereby the dominant group valorizes one subordinate group relative to another

subordinate group on cultural and/or racial basis in order to dominate both groups. On the

other hand, civic ostracism is a process whereby the dominant group constructs the valorized

subordinate group "as immutably foreign and unassimilable with [the dominant group] on

cultural and/or racial grounds in order to ostracize them from the body politic and civic

membership" (p. 107).

The racial triangulation of Chinese in the Philippines during the colonial period is

similar to that of Asian Americans in the late 19 century to the mid 2 0

th th
century. While

53
Asian Americans have been racially triangulated vis-a-vis Blacks and Whites, Chinese

Filipinos have been racially triangulated vis-a-vis the colonizers and the colonized. In a field

of racial positions, Chinese Filipinos were considered inferior to the colonizers but superior

to Filipinos. B y positioning Chinese immigrants as superior to the native population yet

foreign and unassimilable, racial triangulation processes created a merchant class that would

fulfill an economic purpose "without making any enduring claims upon the polity" ( K i m ,

1999, p. 109). Although most Chinese chose to be sojourners during this period, the Spanish

and American colonizers, just like the White elites in the United States, "embraced and

reinforced this arrangement for their own purposes" (p. 109). One of these purposes is for

Chinese to serve as 'middlemen' for the ruling class.

Although many scholars offer various causes of this phenomenon, middleman

minorities have been known for the economic role they play in their adopted countries. In

contrast to other ethnic minorities, middleman minorities "occupy an intermediate rather than

low-status position" (Bonacich, 1973, p. 583). They specialize in certain occupations,

particularly in trade and commerce, and "play the role of middleman between producer and

consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses" (p. 583). They thrive

in societies characterized by a marked division between elites and masses, and, as in the case

of the Philippines during colonial period, in "colonial societies with a gap between

representatives of the imperial power and the 'natives'" (p. 583). They are economically

dominant but feel essentially alien in their adopted countries. The native population resents

their power since they believe that their country is being 'taken over' by a foreign group.

Bonacich (1973) explains the functions of middleman minorities as follows:

54
 ... their foreignness enables them to be "objective" in the marketplace; they

do not have familistic ties with the rest o f the society which can intrude on,

and destroy business... [and] they act as a buffer for elites, bearing the brunt

of mass hostility because they deal directly with the latter, (p. 584)

Many o f the Chinese who came to the Philippines were merchants who traded goods

with the indigenous population and who eventually returned to China. During the Spanish

colonization o f the Philippines, the emergence o f a cash economy expanded the market for

Chinese goods in the country. Those who settled in the country were mostly laborers. These

were the 'drooling Chinamen' being referred to in the racial taunt Instik beho tulo law ay.

They provided manual labor and worked as peddlers o f Chinese goods, becoming the

"inheritors o f the early Filipino-Chinese trade" (Go, 1996, p. 45). They laid the earliest

foundation for Chinese economic expansion in the country. Before long Chinese had become

indispensable to the local economy which aroused the suspicions o f the Spaniards, who

"feared their economic power, cultural difference, and the possibility they might seek aid

from nearby China to overthrow Spanish rule i n the Philippines" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 188).

They were confined to a segregated residence called the parian, subjected to discriminatory

taxation and forced labor drafts, and pressured to convert to Catholicism. Their

"monopolization of economic activities, their cultural alienness, apparent ties to a nearby and

powerful China and the obvious mutual antipathies o f Spaniards and Chinese" (p. 189) also

influenced Filipinos to adopt "Spanish stereotypes and to despise the Chinese as a pariah

group" (p. 189).

The series o f expulsions and massacres that targeted the Chinese during the Spanish

period drastically reduced their population to 5,000 - 10,000, most o f which were converted

55
Catholics living in Manila. Their economic roles were taken over by the Chinese mestizos,

the mixed offspring o f a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. B y the early 19 century they
th

had become the most powerful and influential group under Spanish rule, and regarded, rather

ironically, "not as a special kind o f Chinese but as a special kind o f F i l i p i n o " (p. 190). They

were born in the Philippines, promoted Spanish and Filipino values and practices, and were

not seen as a political threat. However, as Spain opened the Philippines to world trade in the

middle o f the 19 century, Chinese were allowed to immigrate in greater numbers than ever
th

and this time, were permitted to settle not just in Manila's parian but also in every part o f the

Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). During the Spanish colonial regime, Chinese were valorized

for their economic skills but were ostracized due to their 'cultural alienness' arising from

their resistance to genuine conversion to Catholicism and their ties to China. The Filipinos,

on the other hand, were racialized as 'inferior' and were called indios bravos ('savage

indians') by the Spanish regime (Tan, 1972).

When the United States assumed colonial rule in 1898, Chinese were now settled in

most parts o f the Philippines and established business networks all over the country. That

subordinate groups are differentially racialized in order to serve the interests o f the dominant

group could not be more evident in the racialization o f Chinese by the U . S . government.

Although Chinese in both the United States and the Philippines were racialized as 'foreign'

by the United States (the Chinese Exclusion A c t was applied to both countries), the

consequences were vastly different. In the United States, Chinese were valorized relative to

Blacks because their 'unassimilability' made them "more docile and less demanding than

Black labor" ( K i m , 1999, p. 110). Their civic disenfranchisement also made them "useful

pawns in the game o f reasserting White dominance over Blacks" (p. 111). In the Philippines,

56
the Americans needed the business networks of the Chinese to promote its economic policies,

particularly the distribution of U.S.-made goods. The U.S. Department of Trade had even

credited the Chinese for being the "most important links in wholesale and retail trading" (Go,

1996, p. 76). G o (1996) argues this was the reason why the colonizers encouraged, instead of

restricted, the business activities of the Chinese. The Filipinos were not ready to take on that

function, so the Chinese had to fill the role of middleman:

While the Americans controlled the Philippine economy from behind the

scenes, they gladly allowed the ethnic Chinese businessmen to be the front

liners, thus hitting two birds with one stone. The ethnic Chinese not only sold

the goods for the Americans, they also took the risks and became convenient

scapegoats, (pp. 76-77)

Scholars have generally acknowledged that the Chinese community became fully

developed during the American colonial period (Go, 1996; See, 1997; Tan, 1972, See,

1988b). Chinese schools were established and Chinese language newspapers were published

creating a sense of community. Numerous Chinese-related organizations were created to look

after the community's affairs. However, it was also during this period that people in China

and the overseas Chinese were subjected to a racial conception of their homeland, "with its

emphasis on a people united by common Han ancestry" (Pan, 1998, p. 103). The Kuomintang

government, ushered to power by Sun Yat-sen's 1911 revolution, adopted the Nationality

L a w first enacted by the Qing in 1909 (Pan, 1998). It ruled that all persons of 'Chinese race'

were Chinese subjects, regardless of place of birth (Tan, 1988).

Despite the strong anti-Chinese sentiments in the United States during that time, the

American regime tolerated the development of national consciousness of the Chinese in the

57
Philippines and their allegiance to the Nationalist government in China led by Sun Yat-Sen.

Apparently, this was not considered a threat by the Americans as long as it affected the

Chinese in the Philippines. G o (1996) opined that this was even beneficial to American

colonial rule in the country, and not simply due to the "spirit of 'freedom' and 'democracy'

which Americans profess to promote" (p. 78).

Both Spanish and American colonial regimes have been accused of promoting

physical segregation between Chinese and the Filipinos, thus creating a gap between the two

groups. These territorial arrangements further contributed to the racialization of Chinese. The

Spaniards confined the Chinese to a parian, where Filipinos can go to shop but not to live

(Wickberg, 1998; G o , 1996; See, 1997). Although the Americans allowed the Chinese to

move freely around the country, they nevertheless permitted the Chinese to create their own

ethnic communities and their own institutions separate from the rest o f the population,

prompting G o (1996) to comment that "the whole country was actually transformed into a

'big parian'" (p. 79). Through these territorial arrangements, "the racial category 'Chinese'

became inscribed, both on the ground and in people's minds" (Anderson, 1991, pp. 27-28).

Chinese racialization emerged in the Philippines with the rise of colonialism. Their

racial profile of cultural alienness and economic dominance were perpetuated by the colonial

powers and adopted by the Filipino population. When the Philippines became fully

independent in 1946, Filipinos had a dilemma: although "the Chinese were indispensable to

the desired national development... they seemingly were alien at a time when nationalism

was at its height" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 188). O n hindsight, it seemed the implementation of

Nationalization laws was inevitable. After centuries of colonialism, "nationalism was equated

with being anti-foreign and [therefore] anti-Chinese" (See, 1997, p. 37).

58
 Subordinate groups are not passive participants in the racialization process. They do

not merely adopt the dominant group's racialization of themselves and other subordinate

groups. They also form their own racialization about themselves and other groups. A s K i m

(1999) maintains, "racialization is clearly a reflexive as well as externally imposed process"

(p. 129). Many Chinese chose to identify with the growing nationalism in China and this

enhanced their perceived 'disloyalty' to the host country. Although it can be argued that they

did not have any choice but to identify with the only country that claimed them, Chinese

nationalism produced not only the idea of a Chinese race but also a sense of cultural

superiority on the part of the Chinese in the Philippines over the colonized Filipinos. Because

of their marginalization from the mainstream society, most of the personal contacts first-

generation Chinese have had with Filipinos were limited to "their workers, their employees,

their maids at home, corrupt policemen and firemen, Bureau of Internal Revenue agents and

city hall inspectors who harass them regularly, and politicians who befriend or lambaste

them, depending on personal conveniences and purposes" (See, 1997, p. 39). Their economic

status relative to the Filipinos and their limited contacts with the native population led

Chinese to racialize the Filipinos as lazy, corrupt and inferior.

Filipinos, on the other hand, perceived the Chinese as aliens - "they are immigrants

from foreign soil, and they are merely guests in the Philippines" (See, 1997, p. 8) - and

resented their economic success, which was facilitated by the colonial rulers. See (1997).

argues that "ambivalent feelings of nationalist pride combined with the reality of class and

status differences complicate the relationship" (p. 9). The racialization of Chinese as foreign

and economically privileged laid the ideological framework for the implementation of the

Nationalization laws targeted against the Chinese. Racial ideology gave the 'ruling sector' of

59
the newly independent country the power to define, in cultural and ideological terms, who

were included in and excluded from the Philippine society. These consisted of politicians,

police, bureaucrats, owners of capital, and other influential members of society. A s we have

seen throughout the racialization of Chinese in the Philippines, "their moral and legal

authority helped to give the race concept its remarkable material force and effect, embedding

it in structures that over time reciprocally reproduced it" (Anderson, 1991, p. 24).

Despite the mass naturalization of the Chinese in 1975, contemporary public

discourse on the Chinese still hint on their foreignness and economic privilege. Politicians

and government officials, as well as opinion makers, have often blamed Chinese

businessmen for the economic problems afflicting the nation. Chinese have been accused of

"price manipulation, hoarding, unfair trade practices, or profiteering" (See, 1997, p. 9).

Journalists and community leaders have also portrayed Chinese as leaders of crime

syndicates. Even though they are Philippine citizens, Chinese Filipinos are still seen as being

unfit for public office. Groups have been formed to reject candidates of Chinese ancestry

during the past elections. Various stereotypes of the Chinese continue to persist, such as their

control of the Philippine economy, their enormous wealth, and the homogeneity and

inscrutability of the Chinese community. The refusal of some Chinese to marry outside the

community is considered 'proof of their inability to assimilate to the mainstream society,

even though intermarriages are increasingly common (See, 1997).

Even as more Chinese Filipinos integrate into the mainstream society through their

participation in the cultural, political and economic activities of the country, there are still

incidents involving the Chinese Filipino community that continue to remind them of their

precarious status in the country. The kidnappings targeted against Chinese Filipinos have

60
been a recent 20 century phenomena. Although kidnap-for-ransom had been a problem ever

since, it had only become rampant against middle-class Filipinos of Chinese origin in the

early 1990s (See, 1997). Most of these kidnappings may be motivated by money, but the

targeting of Chinese victims reveals a racial bias. In one sense, it exposes the continued

vulnerability of Chinese Filipinos to harassment and their marginalization from mainstream

society. In another, it exemplifies the racialized construction of class that has constituted

Chinese Filipino identity.

The upward mobility of the Chinese in the Philippines has produced a successful

group of Chinese businessmen, whom the Philippine press has recently referred to as

'taipans.' These taipans have expanded to non-traditional Chinese industries, such as

banking, property development, telecommunications, airlines, among others, to challenge the

long-standing domination of these industries by the Spanish and other foreign elite

(Wickberg, 1998). The word 'taipan' means " a powerful businessman and especially

formerly a foreigner living and operating in Hong K o n g or C h i n a " (Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary, 2004). The connotation of the term 'taipan' as foreigner and its connections to

Hong K o n g or China implies that the success of Chinese Filipino entrepreneurs is still not

considered home-grown. This has prompted See (1997) to write that "the concept of the

Chinese as an ethnic and not an alien minority has not yet taken hold... growth in the

Chinese sector of the Philippine economy is not yet perceived as a growth in the domestic

economy" (pp. 126-127). The Chinese may have shed the image of a drooling Chinaman in

the minds of the Filipinos, but that has been replaced with a different kind of racialization,

which is that of the Chinese as foreign and economically privileged - the intersection of race

and class at the center of Chinese Filipino identity.

61
 Conclusion

A s the Chinese in the Philippines move closer towards integrating into the Philippine

society, they have started to become conscious of their identity and place in the mainstream

society. Yet "many Chinese Filipino themselves do not understand their own identity. Some

have not come to terms with their identity, much less understand the culture that they

practice" (Palanca, E., 2003, xxvi). Their culture, heritage and the dilemmas surrounding

their identity are the subject of a recent coffee-table book entitled Chinese Filipinos. This

book "celebrates the coming of age of the Chinese - from being Filipino Chinese, who were

ambivalent about their status and loyalty, to the present generation of Chinese Filipinos, who

know only the Philippines as their home and country" (xxvi). Wickberg (2003) contrasts the

new immigrant Chinese from the long-time resident immigrant as follows:

The new immigrant has no time, experience, or inclination to reflect on either

the cultural environment he is entering or the nature of the Chinese cultural

environment he comes from. B y contrast, the long-time resident or member of

a local-born generation has all those qualities, (xxiv)

A s Chinese Filipinos become more confident of their status in mainstream Philippine society,

they would like their cultural heritage to be shared and remembered (Palanca, E., 2003).

This paper is a contribution to the discourse surrounding Chinese Filipino identities in

Philippine mainstream society. It addresses the entrenched dichotomy between 'Chinese' and

'Filipino,' as well as the various constructs within each of these categories. Throughout this

paper, I have argued for the importance of racial formation in understanding how identities

are formed by various groups, and more importantly, as a means of perpetuating patterns of

domination and subordination (Omi and Winant, 2001; Lopez, 2000). Racial profiling leads

62
to an analysis of how racial categories are formed and the cultural meaning that came to be

attached to the racial category (Gotanda, 2000). Racial triangulation, on the other hand, helps

us to grasp that "racialization processes are mutually constitutive of one another" ( K i m ,

1999, p. 106) and these processes generate hierarchies based on racial groups. The racialized

construction of class as applied to the Chinese in the Philippines allows us to examine the

marginalization of Chinese Filipinos throughout most of the last century, and their continued

vulnerability in today's modern Philippine society.

B y conceiving Chinese Filipino identity as a contested discourse, it enables us to open

new avenues of inquiry and challenge the stereotypes and myths that have surrounded this

ethnic minority. A s K i m (1999) points out, "the field of racial positions has now been

rearticulated in cultural terms: rather than asserting the intrinsic racial superiority of certain

groups over others, opinionmakers now claim that certain group cultures are more conducive

to success than others" (p. 117). The 'unique' characteristics of ethnic Chinese, based on

Confucian values and Chinese culture, have been largely credited for the economic success

of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The emphasis on education, hard work, and other

'Chinese' qualities are supposed to be the 'formula' for their success (Go, 1996). Instead of

addressing the structural inequality present in the Philippines, the example of the ethnic

Chinese has been used to put the blame for the country's poverty squarely on the Filipinos

themselves. A s one writer puts it:

So how does one explain an ethnic underclass that succeeds in hurdling

prejudice, poverty, and cultural isolation to turn their ghettoes into today's

prime real estate while the indigenous people bred chaos, mutual oppression,

and decay? ... The bottom line is that the Chinese community in the

63
 Philippines is a shining example of the precept that we, as a people, have not

worked hard enough at overcoming obstacles to development. (Get Real

Philippines, 2004)

Despite appearances, the racialization of Chinese in the Philippines as 'economically

privileged' becomes a 'tool of oppression' (Chang, 2000) by "denying the existence of

present-day discrimination ... and the present-day effects of past discrimination" (p. 359).

Worse, the racialization of Chinese Filipinos as 'alien' strips them of their right to demand

for protection against harassment and discrimination. Thus, like the A s i a n American

experience, when they complain about discrimination and call for remedial action, these are

seen as 'unwarranted and inappropriate' (Chang, 2000). In the United States, the model

minority myth does not claim that Asian Americans have been culturally assimilated into

White society. Instead, "it posits their material success and attributes this to their ongoing

cultural distinctiveness" ( K i m , 1999, p. 118). Racial formation allows us to examine past and

present forms of racialization and discrimination of the Chinese in the Philippines that

contribute to the ongoing formation of their identity and status in mainstream Philippine

society.

This paper has mainly focused on the role of government policies in shaping the

racialization processes of the Chinese in the Philippines. Admittedly, this is just one side of

the story. The other side of the story is the role of agency, on the part of Chinese Filipinos

and ethnic Filipinos, in contesting imposed racial meanings through movements and political

struggle. This study can serve as a prelude for future research on the agency of Chinese

Filipinos and ethnic Filipinos in resisting externally imposed racialization processes. The

other limitation of this paper is the lack of discussion on the gendered construction of the

64
'Chinese race' in the Philippine context. The images of the old, drooling Chinaman and the

successful taipan are masculine constructions of 'Chineseness.' This raises a lot of interesting

research questions, such as exploring the agency of Chinese women in forming their own

identities in the Philippine society, and the gender relations among Chinese Filipinos.

This past century has seen Chinese Filipino identities evolve from the Chinese

sojourner who was culturally and politically oriented to his native place in China, to the

Philippine-born Chinese who was politically marginalized from the mainstream Philippine

society, and finally, to the third-generation Chinese Filipino who has Philippine citizenship

and who has now fully identified with the country of her birth. Changes in the country's

political structure, its relations with China and Taiwan, among others, have lead to changes

in policies toward the Chinese in the Philippines, and these in turn have affected the

formation of their identities. Increased social interaction between ethnic Chinese and

Filipinos has also contributed to the transformation of Chinese Filipino identities as well.

So how are we to define the Chinese Filipino today? D o we still use McCarthy's

definition of the ethnic Chinese as "someone with a measure of Chinese immigrant parentage

who is sufficiently influence by Chinese culture, can use a Chinese language, and observes

Chinese customs enough to rightly call himself, and to be regarded by his neighbors, as

Chinese" (as cited by See, 1994, p. 141)? If this is the case, many of the members of the third

generation are immediately excluded from this definition. D o we identify them with the

modern Chinese diaspora, the 'imagined community' of huaren (Chinese) that binds all the

Chinese in the world together as one people? This is also problematic since 'Chineseness' as

a category does not have a fixed content; its meanings are constantly renegotiated and

rearticulated in various sections of the Chinese diaspora. The imagining of the 'Chinese race'

65
also tends to suppress the differences which have been constructed by heterogeneous

diasporic experiences (Ang, 2001). The full integration of the Chinese into the Philippine

society is also problematic since "even the Filipinos themselves do not as yet have a national

identity that could embrace different ethnic identities, indigenous or alien, into its f o l d " (See,

1988, p. 331). A n d as Hau (2003) points out, there is also a need to question the mainstream

into which the Chinese Filipinos are supposed to be integrating:

This Filipino mainstream is, like Chineseness, a construct which belies a

social reality defined by class, ethnic, religious, sexual, and educational

differences. Being mainstream often means being middle-class, western-

educated, Christian, heterosexual, and lowland. Which is to say that, as much

as mainstream is inclusive, it can also be exclusive, (p. 279)

These issues are complex and need to be carefully examined in order to allow for the

integration, not just of Chinese Filipinos, but of other ethnic groups as well into Philippine

society. Recognizing the entrenched processes of racialization and patterns of domination

and subordination in the Philippines "does not mean surrendering to it, but rather exposing it

once and for all to meaningful and effective challenge" ( K i m , 1999, p. 130). This paper

hopes to challenge existing constructions of Chinese Filipino identities so that they can break

down the barriers to their full integration into Philippine society.

66
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