STANDING

PACU v. Secretary
97 Phil 806
Date: October 31, 1955
Ponente: J. Bengzon
(Allauigan)

FACTS: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) and other

petitioning colleges and universities questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act. No. 3075 and CA No. 180. These laws regulate the ownership of the
private schools in the country

The assailed law provides that owners must secure permits from Secretary of Education.
Petitioners contended that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval
or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of
previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government.

The respondents contended that the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy

exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions

Issue: W/N the assailed is constitutional.

Ruling: NO.

The Court stated that there is no justiciable controversy. The petitioners has no cause to
present this issue because they have suffered no wrong or injury. All of the petitioners
have permits to operate private schools. To invoke judicial power is to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is
interest common to all members of the public.

Gonzalez v. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
Date:
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
(Ang)

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary Rufino Hechanova authorized the importation

of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon
Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him
sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has legal standing?

RULING: YES. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares,
in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of
these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and
landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will
afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to
this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, is entitled
to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.

Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public
funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to
seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to
unlawfully disburse said funds.

People v. Vera
65 Phil 58
Date:November 16, 1937
Ponente:
(Briones)
FACTS:
Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is
one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim
of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application
of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing
Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil
action to the offended party, HSBC.

Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27
days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a
motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied
on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December
1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this case.

HELD:
YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal
of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule
is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates
the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Flast v. Cohen
392 US 83
Date: 1968
Ponente: Chief Justice Warren
(Cantolino)
FACTS:
Florence Flast and others objected to federal expenditures ultimately destined for
sectarian religious schools. They brought suit against Wilbur Cohen, then Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, alleging that use of federal funds generated through
taxation to support religious institutions violated the Establishment Clause. Flast and the
other Plaintiffs attacked, specifically, the constitutionality of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to the extent it financed the purchase of materials for
religious schools. Flast sought a declaration that such expenditures were not authorized
by the Act or, in the alternative, that the Act was unconstitutional if it allowed expenditure
of funds to benefit religious institutions. A three-judge panel ruled in favor of Cohen,
concluding that Flast and the other plaintiffs lacked standing premised on their status as
taxpayers alone, relying on Frothingham v. Mellon (262 U.S. 447 (1923), holding that
taxpayer status alone is insufficient to confer standing as plaintiffs must allege
particularized injury).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners as taxpayers have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Congressional expenditures?

HELD:
Yes they have standing. Also, the plaintiffs (taxpayers) must demonstrate that the
Congressional action in question exceeds specific constitutional limitations rather than
being generally beyond Congress’s Article I powers.
Chief Justice Warren explained that taxpayer status alone is not an absolute bar to
Article III standing requirements. Rather, plaintiffs may meet standing requirements
based on their status as taxpayers so long as other, traditional standing requirements
are met. First, plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation. While taxpayer status may be sufficient to confer standing, plaintiffs must also
allege more than generalized grievances. When, as here, plaintiffs allege that
Congressional action exceeds a direct limitation on Congressional authority (here the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment), they must prove a link between their
status as taxpayers and the injury allege. Standing should be limited when taxpayers
can only show incidental expenditure of funds in furtherance of regulatory statutes.
However, when as here Plaintiffs allege an essential nexus between Congressional
action and specific limitations on Congressional authority, they have satisfied standing
requirements. In this case, Flast and others claim that Congress, through exercise of its
broad power to tax and spend, has violated the First Amendment limitations of the
Establishment Clause and have therefore alleged a constitutional violation in which they
have a sufficient stake to confer standing. The Court distinguished Frothingham,
explaining that the grievances here are not generalized but sufficiently concrete to
invoke federal jurisdiction and satisfy standing requirements. The Court expressed no
opinion on the merits of the underlying suite, limiting its holding to the issue of standing
alone.

DISSENTING:
Justice Harlan: the majority failed to provide any perceivable limitation on newly
liberalized standing requirements. He argued that taxpayers should always be free to
challenge federal taxation, by way of defense to enforcement actions, and would be
more sympathetic to cases in which plaintiffs allege that Congressional action affected
them directly (i.e. raised their taxes). Harlan pointed out that the recent history of the
Court aptly demonstrated that Establishment Clause issues were already capable of
judicial resolution without the need to resort to allowing a new class of plaintiffs, in
particular where the new class of plaintiffs was seemingly without limitation.

Francisco v. House of Representatives

G. R. No. 160261
Date: November 10, 2003
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.
(Nunez)
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.”

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has
not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First
District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution,
respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the
collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted
the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first
complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint may be
filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE:
1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated?
2. W/N the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD:
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,
to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The
Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified
complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the
procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the
impeachment complaint.

2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
RIPENESS
Tan v. Macapagal
43 SCRA 678
Date: February 29, 1972
Ponente: J. Fernando
(Allauigan)

Facts:
The five page- petition was filed by Eugene Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V.
Fernandez for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of
themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido
Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
would have this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which
seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government
other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being]
merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering
the general plan laid down therein." The petition was dismissed by the Court in a
resolution. Then the petitioners filed a 32-page reconsideration. Based on the motion, it
was concluded that the petitioners are oblivious of the authorative precedents of this
jurisdiction.

Issue: W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling. NO. The Court denied the motion for reconsideration. The case was not yet ripe
for judicial review since it was filed when the resolution to alter the 1935 Constitution
was not yet finalized. The case will be ripe for judicial review if the 1971 Consti
COnvention has done something already. Afterwhich, the Court may acquire jurisdiction.

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is
no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it
intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the
courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted
by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new
precedent being announced, it is controlling.

Poe v. Ulman
367 US 497
Date:
Ponente:
(Ang)

FACTS:
This lawsuit against Ullman (defendant), attorney for the State of Connecticut, combined
three separate actions, each challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut state
statutes which prevented the use of contraceptive devices, even by married couples,
and the giving of medical advice in the use of such devices. The first suit was brought by
Paul and Pauline Poe (plaintiffs), a married couple that had experienced three previous
pregnancies end in children born with severe birth defects and causing severe physical
and emotional trauma to the plaintiffs. The Poes consulted with Dr. Buxton who
suggested the use of contraceptive devices to prevent future pregnancies. The second
suit was brought by Jane Doe (plaintiff), a married woman whose previous pregnancy
had caused her extreme physical illness. She also consulted with Dr. Buxton who
recommended she use contraceptive devices. The third suit was brought by Dr. Buxton
(plaintiff) who sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the Connecticut statutes
deprived him of his liberty and property. The Connecticut Court of Errors dismissed the
case, and plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court seeking declaratory
relief.

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner’s claim is ripe for judicial review?
RULING:
NO. The appeals are dismissed, because the records in these cases do not present
controversies justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue. The Supreme Court
seems to articulate that a penal statute that has not been enforced is not ripe for judicial
review.

Only once since 1940 had the laws giving rise to this claim been enforced. The plaintiffs
in this case have not been charged or threatened with being charged with a violation.
Since there is no immediate injury, there is no standing to confer jurisdiction.

This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty shadows.

DISSENT:
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) argues that the mere threat of prosecution is injury
in fact, that it is “not the choice worthy of a civilized society” to require individuals to risk
penalty for their behavior to have their constitutional rights determined.

United States v. Richardson

No. 72-885 ;418 U.S. 166
Argued October 10, 1973
Decided June 25, 1974

FACTS:
Richardson, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Plaintiff) sued Congress. He alleged that public
reporting under the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Act of 1949 violates Article I, s 9,
cl. 7 (the Act) of the United States Constitution (Constitution), the statement and account
clause.

Plaintiff sued Congress, hoping to compel release of detailed funding records of CIA
funding. Plaintiff based his standing to sue on his status as a United States taxpayer.

ISSUE: W/N A taxpayer status sufficient to establish standing to bring suit in this case?

HELD:
Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit.

(a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the requirements of Art. III, did not
"undermine the salutary principle . . . established by Frothingham \[v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447] . . . that a taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in
the Federal System.'"

(b) Respondent's challenge, not being addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to
the statutes regulating the CIA's accounting and reporting procedures, provides no
"logical nexus" between his status as "taxpayer" and the asserted failure of Congress to
require more detailed reports of expenditures of the CIA.

(c) Respondent's claim that, without detailed information on the CIA's expenditures, he
cannot properly follow legislative or executive action, and thereby fulfill his obligations as
a voter, is a generalized grievance insufficient under Frothingham or Flast to show that
"he has sustained or is immediately in danger of

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
MOOTNESS
Lacson v. Perez
G. R. No. G.R. No. 147780
Date: May 10, 2001
Ponente: MELO, J.
(Cantolino)

FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on
May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress
the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters
of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also
contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

HELD:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain
regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1,
2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to
the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity
of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the
country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio
must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for
relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas
corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners
are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking

earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacañang.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

G. R. No. 159085
Date: February 3, 2004
Ponente:Tinga, J.
(Nunez)

FACTS:
In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP,
heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation
of the President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation
427 dated 27 July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the
same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were
directed to suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the
Constitution. The soldiers returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of
state of rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435. In the
interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to
call out the armed forces. Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there
exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been
rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare General order No 4?

HELD:
Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has rendered the
case moot.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review. The case at bar is one such case. The mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The presidential
issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights

De Funis v. Odegaard
416 US 312
Date: April 23, 1974
Ponente:
(Allauigan)

Facts:
Marco De Funis (white guy) applied as a law student in University of Washington. De
Funis was notified that he was denied admission. He therefore brought a suit against the
school, contending that the procedures and criteria employed by the Law School
Admissions Committee invidiously discriminated against him on account of his race in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.The trial court granted De Funis’ petition of mandatory injunction
against the school. DeFunis was, accordingly, admitted to the Law School and began his
legal studies there in the fall of 1971. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the Law School admissions policy
did not violate the Constitution. By this time, DeFunis was in his second year at the Law
School. Defunis then issued a petition a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The SC
heard the case when Defunis was already in his third and final year.

Issue:
W/N the above case is already moot and outside the scope of judicial review because of
De Funis’ admission in the university.

Ruling:
The case is already moot. The Court reasoned that "federal courts are without power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." The
inability of the federal judiciary "to review moot cases derives from the requirement of
Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the
existence of a case or controversy." In the case at bar, DeFunis was already in his final
year when the Court heard this case. The Court provided that since he was in his final
year, he is given the chance to complete all academic and other requirements for
graduation, and, if he does so, will receive his diploma regardless of any decision this
Court might reach on the merits of this case. In short, all parties agree that DeFunis is
now entitled to complete his legal studies at the University of Washington and to receive
his degree from that institution.

With that said, the controversy between the parties had ceased to be "definite and
concrete," and no longer "touch[es] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests."