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Republic vs Bacas

[Note: the law covering this registration is Act No. 496]

 The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud
 The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when the Land Registration Court
had no jurisdiction over the land in question
 The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and
extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void.
 Any title to an inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the
filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired
jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void
and, hence, did not create any legal effect.
 A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain finality.
 The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration
of title in favor of private applicant.
 Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government
is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
 The necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land registration are the
following:

1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession
and occupation of the subject land;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and

4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

 When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and


outside the commerce of man. It may not be the subject of a contract or of a compromise
agreement. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government
to withdraw it from being such
 A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial
enclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State
 unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept
of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title

Valino vs Adriano
 the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the
family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner

Mallilin vs Jamesolamin
 Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved
 sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity
 guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. x x x.

Geromo vs La Paz Housing


 the petitioners observed big cracks on the walls and floors of their dwellings within two years
from the time they purchased the units. The damage in their respective houses was substantial
and serious. They reported the condition of their houses to La Paz, but the latter did not present
a concrete plan of action to remedy their predicament. They also brought up the issue of water
seeping through their houses during heavy rainfall, but again La Paz failed to properly address
their concerns. The structural cracks and water seepage were evident indications that the soil
underneath the said structures could be unstable. Verily, the condition of the soil would not be
in the checklist that a potential buyer would normally inquire about from the developer
considering that it is the latter's prime obligation to ensure suitability and stability of the ground
 the Court is of the considered view that the petitioners were justified in abandoning their
dwellings as they were living therein under unsafe conditions
 Considering the nature of the damage sustained by the structures, even without the findings of
the local governmental agency and the MGB-DENR, La Paz is still liable under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption
that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such
as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
 In this case, the subdivision plan/layout was prepared and approved by La Paz. The actual
excavation, filling and levelling of the subdivision grounds were exclusively done under its
supervision and control. There being no contributory fault on the part of the petitioner, there
can be no other conclusion except that it was the fault of La Paz for not properly compacting the
soil, which used to be an old creek.
 Due to the indifference and negligence of La Paz, it should compensate the petitioners for the
damages they sustained
 the petitioners failed to prove with concrete evidence the amount of the actual damages they
suffered. For this reason, the Court does not have any basis for such an award
 temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.31 The
amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable,
bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than
compensatory.32 In this case, the petitioners suffered some form of pecuniary loss due to the
impairment of the structural integrity of their dwellings. In view of the circumstances obtaining,
an award of temperate damages amounting to P200,000.00 is just and reasonable
 The petitioners are also entitled to moral and exemplary damages
Saberon vs Ventanilla
 documents, like the certificates of title do not effect a conveyance of or encumbrances on a
parcel of land. Registration is the operative act that conveys ownership or affects the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. By virtue of registration, a constructive notice to the
whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument or court writ or processes, is thereby
created
 suspicion should have been aroused by the circumstance that the seller, who was not engaged
in the buy-and-sell business and had the property for only a few months, would offer the same
for sale. Although the RTC found that the buyers may not be considered as innocent purchasers
for value because of this circumstance, it, nonetheless, ruled that they, who might well be
unwilling victims of the fraudulent scheme employed by the seller, were entitled to actual and
compensatory damages
 the one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice
only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. "All persons dealing with property
covered by Torrens certificate of title are not required to explore further than what the Torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto." These rules remain as essential features of the Torrens
system.
 Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-established in
jurisprudence. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor
and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a
contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the
vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from becoming effective

Pilipinas Total Gas vs CIR


Facts: Total Gas filed its Amended Quarterly VAT Returns. Total claims that they incurred unused input
VAT credits. On May 15, 2008, Total filed an administrative claim for the refund. On August 28, 2008,
Total submitted to the BIR additional documents. On January 23, 2009, Total elevated the case to the
CTA. The CTA dismissed the case citing that the case was prematurely filed as the neccesary documents
were incomplete; that the 120 day period allowed to the CIR to decide on the claim under Section 112 of
the NRC has not started to run. With the CTA en banc, the case was again dismissed reiterating the
decision of the Division. The en banc also stated that the reckoning point of the 120 day period was on
May 2008 thus the petition filed on January 2009 was considered belatedly filed.

Issue: Whether the claim has prescribed.

Ruling: The claim has not prescribed. Total timely filed its judicial claim on January 2009. The NIRC
provides that the CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents to decide on the
claim for tax credits. Upon inaction of the BIR after 120 days, the taxpayer may, within 30 days, appeal
on the CTA. The BIR did not give notice to Total with regard to the documents submitted on August
2008. Thus the counting of the 120 day period should start from August 2008 or when Total made its
submission of complete documents to support its application. The BIR had until December 2008 to
decide. Because of the BIR's inaction, Total had until January 25, 2009 to file their judicial claim.

Total Gas filed its judicial claim due to the inaction of the BIR. Considering that the administrative claim
was never acted upon; there was no decision for the CTA to review on appeal per se. Consequently, the
CTA may give credence to all evidence presented by Total Gas, including those that may not have been
submitted to the CIR as the case is being essentially decided in the first instance. The Total Gas must
prove every minute aspect of its case by presenting and formally offering its evidence to the CTA, which
must necessarily include whatever is required for the successful prosecution of an administrative claim

Spouses Pacquiao vs CTA


 an appeal to the CTA from the decision of the CIR will not suspend the payment, levy, distraint,
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by
existing law. When, in the view of the CTA, the collection may jeopardize the interest of the
Government and/or the taxpayer, it may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer
either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond.
 Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 is therefore premised on the assumption that the collection
by summary proceedings is by itself in accordance with existing laws; and then what is
suspended is the act of collecting, whereas, in the case at bar what the respondent Court
suspended was the use of the method employed to verify the collection which was evidently
illegal after the lapse of the three-year limitation period.
 the CTA has ample authority to issue injunctive writs to restrain the collection of tax and to even
dispense with the deposit of the amount claimed or the filing of the required bond, whenever
the method employed by the CIR in the collection of. tax jeopardizes the interests of a taxpayer
for being patently in violation of the law. Such authority emanates from the jurisdiction
conferred to it
 Absent any evidence and preliminary determination by the CTA, the Court cannot make any
factual finding and settle the issue of whether the petitioners should comply with the security
requirement under Section 11, R.A. No. 1125. The determination of whether the methods,
employed by the CIR in its assessment, jeopardized the interests of a taxpayer for being patently
in violation of the law is a question of fact that calls for the reception of evidence which would
serve as basis. In this regard, the CTA is in a better position to initiate this given its time and
resources. The remand of the "case to the CTA on this question is, therefore, more sensible and
proper. For the Court to make any finding of fact on this point would be premature. On the
fourth issue:

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