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Cachero v.

Manila Yellow

Gr No. L-8721

Facts: On December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxi driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion. The taxicab bumped
a Meralco post. The plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to the ground and sustained slight physical injuries. On January 6, 1953, plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant, demanding payment for the sum of P79, 245.65 covering actual transportation and medical expenses,
monetary loss, compensatory and exemplary damages. Defendant offered to settle the case amicably, but the parties were not able
to agree on the settlement amount. Plaintiff instituted an action for damages on February 2, 1953. The Court of First Instance awarded:
(1) P700 for medical and transportation expenses, (2) P3,200 unearned professional fees, and (3) P2,000 moral damages. The plaintiff
filed this instant appeal.

Issue: Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article
2219 of the Civil Code says the following:

ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and


analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35.
xxx xxx xxx

Ruling: NO Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the
case at bar. We find, however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection
with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries".

The one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already
prosecuted and punished therefor. Although (a) owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 2180 of the Civil Code); and (c) employers
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed by their
employees in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this
action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned and against all the persons who
might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against
the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of
paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi delict causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219 par. 2, of the Civil
Code). From the report of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code We copy the following:

A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the term
"quasi-delict" for those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts quasi-contracts or criminal offenses.
They are known in Spanish legal treatises as "culpa aquiliana", "culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The
phrase "culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-contractual fault" was eliminated because it did not
exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations. "Aquilian fault" might have been selected, but it was thought
inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as the "Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen, which more nearly
corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations, and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of
liability.

In the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation derived
from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of a contract. Thus, We said:

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that
the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is
direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal view point from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted
by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection or supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligation
arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations or — to use the technical form of expression, that
article, relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.

The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab (82 Phil., 359, 46 Off. Gaz., Na. 5, p. 2023); Lilius et al. vs.
Manila Railroad, (59 Phil. 758) and others, wherein moral damages, are awarded to the plaintiffs, are not
applicable to the case at bar because said decisions were rendered before the effectivity of the new Civil Code
(August 30, 1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were based on different causes of
action.

In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages by the trial Court has to be eliminated, for
under the law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.

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