4th Amity National Moot Court Competition, 2019: R-16 Team Code: 016

R-16
Team code: 016

4th Amity National Moot Court Competition, 2019
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
WRIT JURISDICTION
(U/A 32, 136, 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA)
IN THE MATTER OF:
PETITION NO ........... /2019
MR. AJAY TRIPATHI .............................................................………...PETITIONER

KADAM…………………………………………………...............…PETITIONER
PT. KALICHARAN AND OTHERS……………………..................PETITIONER
UNION OF INDIANA .............................................................................. RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT
4TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION-2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………….2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………..3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………....4
TABLE OF CASES……………………………………………………………………….5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………6
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………..…7-9
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED…………………………………………………………...10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………….......11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………........12
1. Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord

Jogeshwara Temple is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Const.
of Indiana, and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
religious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality?...............................................................................................................................12
1.1 The right to exclude women of a particular age group from entering the temple flows
from the religious rights of the devotees under Article 25 of the Const. and the
character of the deity as a Nasthik Brahmachari, and can be regarded as an Essential
Religious Practice……………………………….…………………………...….…12
1.2 Lord Jogeshwara temple is a denominational temple and the exclusion of women is in
exercise of denomination rights under Article 26 of the Const. of Indian….......…16
1.3 The exclusionary practice does not violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Const. of Indiana
1.3.1 No violation of Article 14…………………………………………………...18
1.3.2 No violation of Article 15……………………….…………………………..19
2. Whether all practices discriminatory to women, and also to men, of all faiths will be
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 2

made an act of discrimination contrary to Constitutional values, and penal offences?

.............................................................................................................................................21
2.1 Interfering with religious rights, or essential religious practices, will be violative
of Articles 25 and 26 of the Const. of Indiana…………………………………....22
2.2 Scope of Article 13 of the Const. of Indiana with regard to these customs and
practices Article 12 of the Consti……………………….…………………....…..23
3. Whether The Crime of Murder, Rape & Abduction of Riya and Murder & Abduction
of Reema took place or not?.............................................................................................23
3.1 Whether Murder of Reema & Riya was Committed………………...……......24
3.2 Whether Reema & Riya were Abducted…………………………...…………24
3.3 Whether Riya was raped/gang-raped or not?....................................................25
4. Whether the Accused committed the acts relating to Murder of Deceased and in
accordance of other Crimes or not?
4.1 The Daratis & The Lathis used for Bodily Injury………………..……....…..25
4.2 Extra Judicial Confession in the Present…………………………..…………26
4.3 The SUV Vehicle’s Role in Present……………………………………..…...28
5. Whether the Accused had the Mens Rea of Causing all the Aforementioned Actions
& their Motives thereof :-
5.1 The Act of Criminal Intimidation and the Intention Causing Bodily Hurt…..29
5.2 The Events Transpiring in the past relating to Apex court’s judgement……..29
5.3 Statement of Accused per Annexure 5……………………………………….30
PRAYER…….……………………………………………………………………31-32

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
PIL Public Interest Litigation
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Dr. Doctor
SCC Supreme Court Cases
J. Justice
Arts. Articles
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
No. Number
Ors. Others
Prof. Professor
i.e. That is
Ltd. Limited
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
IPC Indian Penal Code
IEA Indian Evidence Act
Const. Constitution
RAAHEE Regional Association for Awareness in

Health, Education, and Environment
WP Writ Petition

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS REFERRED
Books on Constitutional Law

1. Dr. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law Of India (42nd Ed. Cent. Law Agency 2005).
2. Durga Das Basu, Indian Constitutional Law (3rd Ed. Kamal Law House Kolkata 2011).
3. Mp Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th Ed. Lexis Nexis 2015).
4. Narendra Kumar, Constitutional Law Of India (9th Ed. Allahabad Law Agency 2015).
Dictionaries Referred
1. Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2001).
2. Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed. 2009).
3. Webster’s New International Dictionary.
Statutes Referred
1. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
2. Constitution of Indiana, 1949
Websites Referred
1. www.eugdpr.org
2. www.lawctopus.com
3. www.legalserviceindia.com
4. www.meity.gov.in
5. www.scconline.com
6. www.manupatra.com

TABLE OF CASES
1. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India)…………………………………………………………12
2. Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 255 (India)...12
3. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1964) 1 SCR 561 (India).....12
4.Seshammal and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11 (India)………………………….13
5. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India)…………………………………………………………14
6. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388 SCR 1035 (India)……………14
7. Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 615 (India)……………………15
8. S.P Mittal v. Union of India and Ors., 1983 AIR, 1 1983 SCR (1) 729 (India)………………..16
9. Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors., 1961 AIR 1402 , 1962 SCR (1) 383
(India)……………………………………………………………………………………………….16
10. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 75 (India)……………16
11. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 (India)…..17
12. Budhan Chaudhary and ors. V the State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045 (India)…………………..18
13. Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India (Manager
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948) available at
http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/966/7/Fundamental%20Rights% 20%285-
12%29.pdf ………………………………………………………………………………………….20
14. Statement of Professor K.T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)……20
15. Statement of Vice-President, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)………….20
16. Statement of Mr. Mohd. Tahir, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)………..20
17. Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)……………………………………………20
18. 1954 AIR 282, 1954 SCR 1005…………………………………………………………………...21
19. 1987 AIR 748, 1986 SCR (3) 518………………………………………………………………....22
20. Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 748 (India)……23
21. Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa, (2006) 13 SCC 627 (India)……………….23
22. Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors, (2008) 13 SCC 119 (India)…………….23
23. For the sake of better Assistance of Justice, the major issues have been condensed into 1 issue and
being put forth that way……………………………………………………………………………….23
24. Piara Singh vs State Of Punjab 1969 AIR 961………………………………………………....28
25. Kishore Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh 1990 AIR 2140…………………………………..28

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 321, 1362 and
1373 of the Constitution of Indiana, 1949.
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
2
Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
3
Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament
or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced
or order made by it.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The temple was built around 900 B.C. and the deity in the temple is in the form of Yogi or
Bramhachari. Since the deity is in the form of Nasthik Bramhachari it is therefore believed
that young women between the age of 11 to 51 years should not offer worship in the temple
so that even the slightest deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not
caused by the presence of such women. In short, women after menarche up to menopause are
not entitled to enter the temple and offer prayer at any time of the year.
Const. also emphasizes on the secular nature of Indiana’s polity which the const. makers of
the country considered to be the very basis of the Const. The Upper House of Indiana,
considering it necessary and expedient in national interest, passed a resolution in 1985 that
parliament of Indiana should make law prohibiting the entry of women at Lord Jogeshwara
temple. The parliament of Indiana, by virtue of power conferred to it through Const. of
Indiana, enacted the Lord Jogeshwara Temple (Prohibition on Entry of Women) Act in 1985.
The said Act was enforced till 2016 as the said resolution of Upper House was renewed many
times till 2016.
In 2013 Pt. Ram Kishan died because of cardiac arrest therefore, with unanimous consent of
other priests in the temple, Pt. Kali Charan was appointed as the new pontiff. Pt. Kali Charan
made a divulgation that women are not only prohibited to enter in the temple for offering
prayers but they are also not allowed to go to any other land which belongs to Jogeshwara
Akhara. Reema and Riya were the two daughters of Pt. Ram Kishan, who were law graduates
from National Law College, Katra. After completing their graduation in year 2013 they,
along with some other women of Katra, registered an NGO with the name of “KADAM EK
PEHAL.”
On 01.05.2013 Reema and Riya, in the name of their registered NGO, filed a PIL before the
Supreme Court of Indiana seeking issuance of direction against the Government of Arya
Pradesh, Lord Jogeshwara Trust and District Magistrate of Katra to ensure entry of female
devotees between the age group of 11 to 51 years to Lord Jogeshwara.
On 23.12.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana pronounced judgment with 2:1 majority
allowing the petition filed by KADAM and held that “The equality doctrine enshrined under
Article 14 does not override the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 25 of the Const. ”
The Court further held that “The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified
age does not violate their Fundamental Rights.”
On 24.12.2016, Reema and Riya with some other women tried to enter Lord Jogeshawara

Temple for offering their prayers. They were stopped by devotees who were shouting that “If
Any Women Will Step Into The Temple Of Lord Jogeshwara She Will Face Dire
Consequences And Their Entire Family Will Be Killed.”
Reema and Riya reached the gate of temple where thousands of people had gathered to stop
them from stepping into the pious temple. Pt. Kali Charan had blocked the gate of the temple
and directed the other priests Bhawani and Jagga to bring lathis from the temple for teaching
a life lesson to the women, particularly Reema and Riya, who were trying to enter in the
temple and committing a disgraceful and ignominious act. At around 1:00 a.m. on
30.12.2016, Mrs Radha informed the police that her daughters have not arrived home till now
and requested police to lodge a missing complaint and investigate further. However, the
police denied to lodge FIR but started searching for the twin sisters. While patrolling, the
police discovered a suspicious SUV in an abandoned jungle. In the morning, at around 5:30
a.m., Pt. Kali Charan called the police and informed about a dead body lying near the
Sanctum Sanctorum of Lord Jogeshwara temple. The police immediately reached the temple.
As Mrs. Radha approached the police for registering the missing complaint of her daughters,
they called her, and she identified the body as that of Reema. Subsequently, the body was
sent for post mortem.
After the identification of Reema‟s body, the police arrested Pt. Kali Charan and his sons
from the temple but Bhawani and Jagga were missing. During preliminary investigation, the
police discovered a dead body from the jungle near Mohini Bazar on 31.12.2016 which was
later identified as that of Riya. The FIR was subsequently amended and all the accused were
charged for murder of both Reema and Riya. The Government of Indiana ordered CBI
inquiry into the incident. During that CBI recovered 3 Daraatis and 2 Lathis and sent the
same for forensic investigation. The matter was tried by CBI Court and the Court found all
accused guilty of abduction and murder of Reema and Riya, and also for the rape of Riya.
The Court sentenced all of them to death. All the accused preferred an appeal against the
order before the High Court of Arya Pradesh. The High Court upheld the order of the Trial
Court and sentenced all the accused to death. An appeal against the order of High Court of
Arya Pradesh was filed before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indiana in December, 2018,
which had agreed to hear the appeal. After the conviction order passed by the High Court of
Arya Pradesh, KADAM filed a Curative Petition against the order of Supreme Court passed
in year 2016, which the Honourable Supreme Court has agreed to hear. A petition had been
moved before the High Court of Arya Pradesh by Mr. Ajay Tripathi, a social activist and
director of an NGO, RAAHEE (Regional Association for Awareness in Health, Education,

and Environment), seeking an end to all practices discriminatory to women and also to men
of all faiths and make the act of discrimination a penal offence. The Apex Court of the
country is satisfied that this petition also involves substantially the same question of law of
general importance and has withdrawn it from the High Court for disposing it off by itself.
Realizing that the outcome of all the three cases (Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018), (CP. No. 111
of 2018) and (Petition No. 1008 of 2018) are interrelated, the Chief Justice of Indiana
clubbed them and placed them before the appropriate bench for hearing on 10.03.2019.

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED
ISSUE I
Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara Temple
is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Const. of Indiana, and the claim
for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in religious text, is subordinate to
the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and Equality?
ISSUE II
Whether all practices discriminatory to women, and also to men, of all faiths will be made an
act of discrimination contrary to Constitutional values, and penal offences?
ISSUE III
Whether The Crime of Murder, Rape & Abduction of Riya and Murder & Abduction of
Reema Took place or not?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord
Jogeshwara Temple is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Const.
of Indiana, and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
religious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that The right to exclude women of a
particular age group from entering the temple flows from the religious rights of the devotees
under Article 25 of the Constitution and the character of the deity as a Nasthik Brahmachari,
and can be regarded as an Essential Religious Practice and also Under Article 26(b),
therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter
of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential. Further, there is no violation of
Articles 14 and 15. Thus, this exclusionary practice cannot be held to be violative of the
Constitution of Indiana.
2. Whether all practices discriminatory to women, and also to men, of all faiths will be
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Interfering with religious rights, or
essential religious practices, will be violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of
Indiana. Further, these essential religious customs can be treated as law within the ambit of
Article 13 since they are being followed since time immemorial. Thus, these practices are not
discriminatory or contrary to Constitutional values, and should not be made penal offences.
3. Whether The Crime of Murder, Rape & Abduction of Riya and Murder & Abduction
of Reema Took place or not?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Abduction and murder of the Deceased
and the Rape of Deceased 2 was committed, and beyond any reasonable doubt was
committed by the Accused in the present case. This can be further shown and confirmed via
the counsel’s presentation of the Existence of a crime being committed, Actus Reus of the
Accused and also of Mens Rea in the present case.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE I
Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Temple is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Const. of Indiana,
and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in religious
text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and Equality?
1.4 The right to exclude women of a particular age group from entering the temple flows
from the religious rights of the devotees under Article 25 of the Const. and the character
of the deity as a Nasthik Brahmachari, and can be regarded as an Essential Religious
Practice
Article 25 of the Const. of Indiana gives the right to freedom of religion to all persons,
subject to public order, morality and health. With respect to Article 25(1), the worshippers of
Lord Jogeshwara are entitled to the freedom of conscience, and the right to profess, practise
and propagate their religion. The right to profess their faith by worshipping at Lord
Jogeshwara Temple, can be guaranteed only if the character of the deity as a ‘Naishtik
Brahmachari’ is preserved. If women between the ages of 11 to 51 years are permitted entry,
it would result in changing the very character/nature of the deity, which would directly
impinge on the right of the devotees to practise their religion guaranteed by Article 25(1) of
the Const.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Swamiar Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt4 gave the definition of religion from
an American case i.e. :
“the term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relation to his Creator and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His
Will”.
In the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.5,it was held that:
“The Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and their worship at home and in temples is
ordained as certain means of attaining salvation.”
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 6, emphasis was laid on
4
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
5
Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 255 (India).
6
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1964) 1 SCR 561 (India).

the mode of worship adopted when Lord Krishna was worshipped in the form of a child.
Article 25(2)(b) declares that nothing in Article 25(1) shall prevent the State from making
any law providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The ‘throwing open’ to
‘all classes and sections of Hindus’ was intended to redress caste based prejudices and
injustices in society. Article 25(2)(b) cannot be interpreted to mean that customs and usages
forming an essential part of the religion, are to be overridden. Article 25(2)(b) would have no
application since there is no ban on the entry of women entirely, but only a limited restriction
during the notified period, based on faith, custom and belief, which has been observed since
time immemorial.
In Seshammal and others v. State of Tamil Nadu7, the Supreme Court observed that:
“On the consecration of the image in the temple, the Hindu worshippers believe that the
divine spirit has descended into the image and from then on, the image of the deity is fit to be
worshipped and the rules with regard to daily and periodical worship have been laid down for
securing the continuance of the divine spirit and as per the Agamas, an image becomes
defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of the rules relating to worship.”
The deity being worshipped at Lord Jogeshwara Temple is in the form of a Nasthik
Brahmachari, because of which, the restriction on the entry of women from ages 11 to 51
becomes justified in order to preserve the religious beliefs and practices of that religious sect,
as they believe that this restriction should be observed in order to preserve the celibacy and
austerity observed by the deity and the followers. This restriction can be considered to be an
essential religious practice of the devotees who worship Lord Jogeshwara. The essential
religious practices test is a doctrine evolved to give protection to certain religious beliefs and
practices which are so essential that they form the core of a religion and without such
practices, the religion would not remain the same and its fundamental character would be
affected. Essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded.
Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to the religion is - to find out whether
the nature of religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that
part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its
belief, then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. It is such permanent
essential parts is what is protected by the Const.
The Supreme Court formulated the essential practices test in the case of Commissioner,
7
Seshammal and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11 (India).

Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt8. in the following words:
“20…what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the
day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the
year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all
these would be regarded as parts of religion…all of them are religious practises and should be
regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b)…
…23. Under Article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys
complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction
to interfere with their decision in such matters.”
The ‘essential practises test’ was reiterated in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of
Bombay & Ors.9, where the narrow definition of “religion” given by the Bombay High Court
was discarded. It was held that all religious practises or performances of acts in pursuance of
religious beliefs were as much a part of religion, as faith or belief in particular doctrines. The
Supreme Court re-iterated the ‘essential practises test’ in the following words:
“13…Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites and
ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said
that these are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic character simply
because they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of marketable
commodities. No outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of
religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in
any manner they like under the guise of administering the trust estate…We may refer in this
connection to the observation of Davar, J. in the case of Jamshed ji v. Soonabai and although
they were made in a case where the question was whether the bequest of property by a Parsi
testator for the purpose of perpetual celebration of ceremonies like Muktad bag, Vyezashni,
etc., which are sanctioned by the Zoroastrian religion were valid and charitable gifts, the
observations, we think, are quite appropriate for our present purpose. If this is the belief of
the community thus observed the learned judge, and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief
8
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
9
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388 SCR 1035 (India).

of the Zoroastrian community, - a secular judge is bound to accept that belief – it is not for
him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a
donor who makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of the religion
and the welfare of his community or mankind. These observations do in our opinion afford an
indication of the measure of protection that is given by Article 26(b) of our Const. ”
In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.10, the Supreme Court emphasised that
for a religious practise to receive protection under Article 25(1) it must be “genuinely”, and
“conscientiously” held by persons claiming such rights. The Court had noted that such
religious beliefs and practises must be consistently and not “idly” held, and should not
emanate out of “perversity”. In doing so, it reaffirmed that the Constitutional fabric of our
country permits religious beliefs and practises to exist, regardless of whether or not they
appeal to the rational sensibilities of this Court, or others.
Worship has two elements – the worshipper, and the worshipped. The right to worship under
Article 25 cannot be claimed in the absence of the deity in the particular form in which he has
manifested himself. The limited restriction on the entry of women from 11 to 51 years is a
matter of ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith and practise’, and the fundamental principles
underlying the ‘prathishtha’ (installation) of the Temple, as well as the custom and usage of
worship of the deity - Lord Jogeshwara.
The limited restriction on access of women during the notified age of 11 to 51 years, is a
religious practise which is central and integral to the tenets of this shrine, since the deity has
manifested himself in the form of a ‘Nasthik Brahmachari’. The practise of celibacy and
austerity is the unique characteristic of the deity in Lord Jogeshwara Temple. The form of
the deity in any temple is of paramount importance. In the case of Lord Jogeshwara Temple,
the manifestation is in the form of a ‘Nasthik Brahmachari’. The belief in a deity, and the
form in which he has manifested himself is a fundamental right protected by Article 25(1) of
the Const. The religious practise of restricting the entry of women between the ages of 11 to
51 years, is in pursuance of an ‘essential religious practise’. Hence, it is a plausible case that
the practise of restricting entry of women between the age group of 11 to 51 years is an
essential religious practise of the devotees of Lord Jogeshwara at this temple being followed
since time immemorial. On the basis of all these considerations, this exclusionary practice is
justified in order to protect the deity and the mode of worship of the followers under Article
25 of the Const. of Indiana.
10
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 615 (India).

1.5 Lord Jogeshwara temple is a denominational temple and the exclusion of women is in
exercise of denomination rights under Article 26 of the Const. of Indiana
Under Article 26 (b) of the Const. of Indiana, religious denominations or sections thereof,
have the right to manage their own religious affairs. The words ‘religious denomination’ in
Article 26 must take their colour from the word “religion”; and if this be so, the expression
‘religious denomination’ must satisfy three conditions as laid down in S.P. Mittal v. Union of
India & Ors.11:
“80. (1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines
which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
(2) common organisation; and
(3) designation by a distinctive name.”
Religious maths, religious sects, religious bodies, sub-sects or any section thereof have been
held to be religious denominations. Reliance was placed on the judgments in Commissioner,
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt; Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.12, and Dr. Subramanian
Swamy v. State of T.N. & Ors.13 Relying on the judgment in Sri Venkataramana Devaru &
Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors., it can be seen that religion, in this formulation, is a much
wider concept, and includes:
• Ceremonial law relating to the construction of Temples;
• Installation of Idols therein;
• Place of consecration of the principle deity;
• Where the other Devatas are to be installed;
• Conduct of worship of the deities;
• Where the worshippers are to stand for worship;
• Purificatory ceremonies and their mode and manner of performance;
• Who are entitled to enter for worship; where they are entitled to stand and worship;
and,how the worship is to be conducted.
The devotees of Lord Jogeshwara constitute a religious denomination, because they follow a
separate dharma, with their own distinct beliefs and practices. A devotee has to abide by the
customs and usages of this Temple, if he is to undertake the pilgrimage and enter Lord
Jogeshwara Temple.
11
S.P Mittal v. Union of India and Ors., 1983 AIR, 1 1983 SCR (1) 729 (India).
12
Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors., 1961 AIR 1402 , 1962 SCR (1) 383 (India).
13
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 75 (India).

Unlike Article 25, which is subject to the other provisions of Pat III of the Const., Article 26
is subject only to public order, morality, and health, and not to the other provisions of the
Const. As a result, the Fundamental Rights of the denomination is not subject to Articles 14
or 15 of the Const.
A religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in matters of deciding
what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of that religion. The devotees
of Lord Jogeshwara Temple constitute a religious denomination, or a sect thereof, and are
entitled to claim protection under Article 26 of the Const. Article 26 refers not only to
religious denominations, but also to sects thereof. The followers of Lord Jogeshwara Temple
constitute a religious denomination having a distinct faith, well- identified practises, being
followed since time immemorial. They have a common faith, common beliefs and practises.
These beliefs and practises are based on the belief that Lord Jogeshwara has manifested
himself in the form of a ‘Nasthik Brahmachari’.
Ayyangar, J. in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay14, in his separate
judgment, expressed this term to mean identity of its doctrines, creeds, and tenets, which are
intended to ensure the unity of the faith which its adherents profess, and the identity of the
religious views which bind them together as one community. If there are clear attributes that
there exists a sect, which is identifiable as being distinct by its beliefs and practises, and
having a collection of followers who follow the same faith, it would be identified as a
‘religious denomination’. In the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Mittal v. Union of
India & Ors., it was held that the judicial definition of a religious denomination laid down by
the Court is, unlike a statutory definition, a mere explanation. It was observed that any
freedom or right involving the conscience must be given a wide interpretation, and the
expressions ‘religion’ and ‘religious denomination’ must be interpreted in a “liberal,
expansive way”:
“It will be noticed that these sects possess no distinctive names except that of their
founder-teacher and had no special organisation except a vague, loose – un-knit one. The
really distinctive feature about each one of these sects was a shared belief in the tenets
taught by the teacher-founder. We take care to mention here that whatever the ordinary
features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal
importance and surely the common faith of the religious body is more important than the
other features…”
14
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 (India).

The Supreme Court has identified the rights of a group of devotees as constituting a
religious denomination in the context of a single temple: the Sri Venkataramana Temple
at Moolky was considered to be a denominational temple, and the Gowda Saraswath
Brahmins were held to constitute a religious denomination. Similarly, in Dr.
Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Podhu Dikshitars were held to
constitute a religious denomination in the context of the Sri Sabanayagar Temple at
Chidambaram.
The Const. ensures a place for diverse religions, creeds, denominations and sects thereof
to co-exist in a secular society. It is necessary that the term ‘religious denomination’
should receive an interpretation which is in furtherance of the Constitutional object of a
pluralistic society. The religious practises being followed in this Temple are founded on
the belief that the Lord has manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtika Brahmachari’.
As a result, this exclusionary practice related to women should not be seen as violative
of constitutional principles; rather, it should be safeguarded as an important right under
Article 26 (b) of the Const. of Indiana.
1.3 The exclusionary practice does not violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Const. of Indiana
1.3.1 No violation of Article 14

Article 14 provides for all persons to have equality before the law and the equal protection of
laws. This doctrine of equality can be violated only on reasonable grounds. This was
highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of Budhan Chaudhary and ors. V the State of
Bihar15, paragraph 7:
“It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of
permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,
(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group and
(ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to
objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the
basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.”
15
Budhan Chaudhary and ors. V the State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045 (India).

In light of the given case, if women as a class were prohibited from participation, it would
amount to social discrimination. However, this is not so in the present case. Girls below 11
years, and women after 51 years can freely enter this Temple, and offer worship. The
classification of women between the ages of 11 to 51 years, has a reasonable nexus with the
object sought to be achieved, which is to preserve the identity and manifestation of the Lord
as a ‘Nasthik Brahmachari’. The prescription of the age-band from 11 to 51 years is not
arbitrary, but rather, the only practical way of ensuring that the limited restriction on the entry
of women is adhered to.
It would compel the Supreme Court to undertake judicial review under Article 14 to delineate
the rationality of the religious beliefs or practises, which would be outside the ken of the
Courts. It cannot be held for the courts to determine which of the practises of a faith are to be
struck down, except if they are pernicious, oppressive, or a social evil, like Sati.
Religious customs and practises cannot be solely tested on the touchstone of Article 14 and
the principles of rationality embedded therein. Article 25 specifically provides the equal
entitlement of every individual to freely practise their religion. Equal treatment under Article
25 is conditioned by the essential beliefs and practises of any religion. The issue of what
constitutes an essential religious practise should be left for the religious community to decide.
Hence, the exclusionary practice cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Const. of
Indiana.
1.3.2 No violation of Article 15
Article 15 of the Const. of Indiana prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
caste, sex and place of birth. The exclusion of women in Lord Jogeshwara Temple is not
absolute or universal. It is limited to a particular age group, with the view to preserve the
character of the deity. Women outside the age group of 11 to 51 years are entitled to worship
at the Temple. The usage and practise is primary to preserve the sacred form and character of
the deity. Article 15 of the Const. prohibits differential treatment of persons on the ground of
‘sex’ alone. The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age-group lies
in the deep-rooted belief of the worshippers that the deity in Lord Jogeshwara Temple has
manifested in the form of a ‘Nasthik Brahmachari’.
In order to preserve the character of the deity, and the sanctity of the idol at Lord Jogeshwara
Temple, the limited restriction is imposed on the entry of women. There is no absolute
restriction on women per se. Such practise is consistent with the ‘Nishta’ or ‘Naisthik
Buddhi’ of the deity. This being the underlying reason behind the custom, there is no
derogation of the dignity of women. It is only to protect the manifestation and form of the

deity, which is sacred and divine, and preserve the penance undertaken by the devotees.
The temple should not even be considered to be a “place of public resort”, as mentioned
under Article 15 (2) (b). To corroborate this, Draft Article 9, which corresponds to Article 15
of the Const., holds:
“9. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex – The State shall
not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of
them.
(1) In particular, no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them,
be subject to 31 any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— a. access to
shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments, or b. the use of wells,
tanks, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of the revenues of the
State or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
women and children16.”
Professor K.T. Shah proposed Amendment No. 293 for substitution of sub-clauses (a) & (b)
as follows: “any place of public use or resort, maintained wholly or partly out of the revenues
of the State, or in any way aided, recognised, encouraged or protected by the State, or place
dedicated to the use of general public like schools, colleges, libraries, temples, hospitals,
hotels and restaurants, places of public entertainment, recreation or amusement, like theatres
and cinema-houses or concert-halls; public parks, gardens or museums; roads, wells, tanks or
canals; bridges, posts and telegraphs, railways, tramways and bus services; and the like.17”
The Vice-President took up Amendment No. 296 for vote, which was moved for addition to
sub-clause (a). The Amendment was proposed as under: “After the words of Public
entertainment the words or places of worship be inserted18. Amendment No. 301 was also
proposed by Mr. Tajamul Hussain for inclusion of: “places of worship”, “Dharamshalas, and
Musafirkhanas” at the end of sub-clause (a)19.
All these proposals were voted upon, and rejected by the Constituent Assembly20. The
Assembly considered it fit not to include ‘places of worship’ or ‘temples’ within the ambit of
Draft Article 9 of the Const. The conscious deletion of “temples” and “places of worship”
16
Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India (Manager Government
of India Press, New Delhi, 1948) available at
http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/966/7/Fundamental%20Rights% 20%285-12%29.pdf .
17
Statement of Professor K.T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948).
18
Statement of Vice-President, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948).
19
Statement of Mr. Mohd. Tahir, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948).
20
Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948).

from the Draft Article 9(1) should be given due consideration. Thus, Lord Jogeshwara
Temple should not be considered within the ambit of “places of public resort”
Hence, the restriction on the entry of women from ages 11 to 51 cannot be considered to be a
violation of Article 15 of the Const. of Indiana, as it does not discriminate against the entire
class of women. Moreover, this practice becomes necessary in order to preserve the celibacy
and austerity observed by the deity at Lord Jogeshwara Temple, and the piety observed by his
followers.
Issue II
Whether all practices discriminatory to women, and also to men, of all faiths will be
2.1 Interfering with religious rights, or essential religious practices, will be violative of
Articles 25 and 26 of the Const. of Indiana
Articles 25 and 26 are religious rights which guarantee the right to freedom of religion given
by the Const. of Indiana. Article 25 allows for the free practice, profession and propogation
of every religion, while Article 26 gives religious denominations various rights, including the
right to manage their own religious affairs, under part (b) of Article 26. This shows the
importance accorded by the Const. to customs and traditions when it comes to religious
practices, which are left only to the interpretation and decisions of religions and religious
denominations. Not only the state, but even Courts should not interfere when it comes to
deciding matters related to essential religious practices, because doing so would violate the
constitutional principle of “secularism”, highlighted in the Preamble to our Const.
All the practices highlighted in Petition No. 1008 of 2018, averred to be discriminatory in
nature by the petitioners, actually constitute essential religious practices of various religions.
Without these core practices, the nature of these religions cannot be the same, and their
fundamental character will be affected. Moreover, these practices are followed since time
immemorial, and have inextricably become a part of these religions.
Even in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt21, the Supreme Court affirmed this in the
following words:
“20…what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the
21
1954 AIR 282, 1954 SCR 1005.

day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the
year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all
these would be regarded as parts of religion…all of them are religious practises and should be
regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b)… …23. Under Article
26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the
matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the
religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision
in such matters.”
In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.22, the Supreme Court emphasised that
for a religious practise to receive protection under Article 25(1), it must be “genuinely”, and
“conscientiously” held by persons claiming such rights. The Court had noted that such
religious beliefs and practises must be consistently and not “idly” held, and should not
emanate out of “perversity”. In doing so, it reaffirmed that the Constitutional fabric of our
country permits religious beliefs and practises to exist, regardless of whether or not they
appeal to the rational sensibilities of this Court, or others.
Therefore, these practices should not be considered to be discriminatory, and should not be
made penal offences, as they constitute an important part of religions under Articles 25 and
26 of the Const. of Indiana.
2.2 Scope of Article 13 of the Const. of Indiana with regard to these customs and practices
Article 13 of the Const. states the following:
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this
Const., in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of
such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the
contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or
usage having in the territory of India the force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent
authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Const. and not previously
repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation
22
1987 AIR 748, 1986 SCR (3) 518.

either at all or in particular areas.

1[(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Const. made under article
368.]
A practise started in hoary antiquity, and continued since time immemorial without
interruption, becomes a usage and custom. This can be seen through the judgments of
Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors.23, Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi
(Smt) Alia Janawwa24, and Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors25. The custom
and usage of restricting the entry of women in the age group of 11 to 51 years followed in
Lord Jogeshwara Temple is preconstitutional, and so are the other practices highlighted with
regard to various religions in Petition No. 1008 of 2018. As per Article 13(3) (a) of the
Const., “law” includes custom or usage, and would have the force of law.
Hence, since most of these customs and practices can be considered as “laws” because of
being in existence since time immemorial, judicial review of these customs cannot be
considered valid, as it would violate not only Article 13, but also, Articles 25 and 26 of the
Const. of Indiana.
ISSUE III
Whether The Crime of Murder, Rape & Abduction of Riya and Murder & Abduction
of Reema Took place or not26?
The cold evening of Katra on 30th December, 2016 could not have even remotely planted the
feeling in the Young activist & Law Graduate Reema, that in the next few hours, the
shattering cold night that was gradually stepping in would bring with it the devastating hour
of darkness when she, alongwith her Sister Riya, and possibly could not have imagined that
she would be a prey to the savage lust of a gang of people, face brutal assault and become a
playful thing that could be tossed around at their wild whim and her private parts would be
ruptured to give vent to their pervert sexual appetite, unthinkable and sadistic pleasure. The
Young Women’s Lifeless Bodies were Subsequently Found on 30th December at 5:30 a.m.
near the Sanctum Sanctorum of Lord Jogeshwara temple & her Sister’s from the jungle near
Mohini Bazar on the Following Day of 31st December 2016.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Dead Body of Reema was Found on
30th December at 5:30 a.m. near the Sanctum Sanctorum of Lord Jogeshwara temple.
23
Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 748 (India).
24
Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa, (2006) 13 SCC 627 (India).
25
Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors, (2008) 13 SCC 119 (India).
26
For the sake of better Assistance of Justice, the major issues have been condensed into 1 issue and being put
forth that way.

Futhermore Riya’s dead body from the jungle near Mohini Bazar on the Following Day of
31st December 2016.
3.1 Whether Murder of Reema & Riya was Committed :-
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that The Murder of Reema & Riya was
Committed as per the Post Mortem Report’s Manner of Deaths in Annexure’s 2-A & 2-B
which states that Homicide was the Manner of Death.
The 8th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines homicide as “the killing of one person by
another.” The killing of another, whether lawful or not lawful, is homicide; there is no “crime
of homicide”
Having Submitted that, the Counsel shall further prove that all the elements of murder were
present in the Case with the forthcoming Contentions.
3.2 Whether Reema & Riya were Abducted :-
Section 364 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 states that :-
“Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in
order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of
being murdered, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for
a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
It is humbly submitted that on 29.12.2016 the Deceased didn’t return home until late night,
henceforth their Mother Mrs. Radha contacted the Police Station and Filed a Missing
Complaint, although FIR wasn’t registered at that time, it was subsequently registered upon
discovery of Abduction Vehicle vide. Annexure 1-A & 4, and the Discovery of Reema’s
Body.
According to the PW 3’s statement per Annexure 4 which states:-
“When I was walking on the road near Mohini Bazaar at around 11:30 p.m. on 29.12.2016, I
heard two girls screaming. As it was a very foggy night, I was unable to apprehend from
where the noise was coming. However, I tried to follow the direction from which noise was
coming and started moving towards it. I ran towards the main gate and saw four men
dragging two girls into an SUV car. I observed that all of them were wearing saffron dhotis.
As I could not speak, I was unable to call for help and I saw them racing the car towards
west.”
The deceased had been missing since evening on 29.12.2016, and the factsheet is slient if any
other reports of abduction were filed that day or not, so its logical to conclude that the Girls
in question were Reema and Riya.
Also the White SUV found Suspiciously in the Jungle according to para 12 of the Fact sheet

was registered to Accused 5, which was reportedly stolen on 27.12.2016. According to

Accused 5 statement per FIR in Annexure 1-A :-
“I went to visit my relative who lives in Gali No. 5 Disawar at around 5:30 pm. I reached
there and parked my white SUV registered, AP 05 XS 8K8K outside the closed shop area.
The street was not busy that evening. When I came outside at about 8:15pm after meeting my
relative, I couldn‟t find my car where I had parked it. I thought my co-priests Bhanu and
Kalu were pranking me, because they have a duplicate key of it but I called them and asked
about the incident and they were also unaware about it. After repeated search done by me and
my co-priests we were unable to find the vehicle. Then I came to the police station.”
This further confirms that only two other people aside from Accused 5 had access to the
SUV, I.e, Accused 2 & 3. All this with the subsequent commitance of the Crimes of Murder
& henceforth strongly portray their Intention, which will be further proven beyond
Reasonable Doubt in forthcoming contentions.
3.3 Whether Riya was raped/gang-raped or not?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that According to Post Mortem Report of
Riya per Annexure 2-B, the Vaginal Examination revealed that :-
“The nature of vaginal injuries suggests forceful penetration by more than two persons.”
This Indicates Forceful Intercourse by two or more People which Further Constitutes Gang
Rape.
Section 376(D) Of IPC States that:-
“Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in
furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed
the offense of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine.”
With this the Counsel has proven beyond Reasonable Doubt that such Acts were Indeed
committed Against the Deceased in Present Case.
4. Whether the Accused committed the acts relating to Murder of Deceased and in
accordance of other Crimes or not?
4.1 The Daratis & The Lathis used for Bodily Injury:-
It is humbly Submitted before this Hon’ble Court that As per Forensic Science Laboratory
Report per Annexure 6 revealed that :-
I.) 2 Lathis stained with Blood were recovered from the Abandoned SUV in the Jungle.
II.) 1 Darati was recovered from the House of Accused -1, 2 more were Recovered from

Temple Premises.
Also As per CBI Investigative Report in Annexure 3:-
“Two daraatis were recovered from the temple premises- one under the neem tree, having
some blood stains on it and the other was recovered from the gutter tank of the Temple”
Upon Examination of the Lathis and the Blood Sample of the Deceased, it was found that the
blood stains on the Lathis, matched the Blood Samples of the Deceased, making them one of
the Weapons of Criminal Offence Vide Section 8 & 27 of the IEA, 1872.
Furthermore the Examination of the two Daratis found in the Temple Premises Revealed that
they were Sharp enough to possibly have Caused the Nail Abrasion Marks Per Post mortem
Report of Deceased No. 2 in Annexure 2-B. Per the Examining officer’s statement in
Annexure 6.
“Two daraatis recovered from the temple premises were sharp and sufficient in nature to cut a
soft object like skin. The cut on the victim‟s neck measuring of 1.5 inches is possible to be
caused by the weapons recovered.”
The Vehicle Being Registered to Accused 5, Its only other Plausible Access available to
Accused 2 & 3 and the Criminal Weapon linking Directly to the Deceased, Furthermore The
Daratis being Found in Temple Premises all link the Accused to the Various Crimes of
Causing Grevious Hurt to the Deceased.
4.2 Extra Judicial Confession in the Present Case :-
It is Humbly Submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Accused 4 made an Extra Judicial
Confession Before his Wife As per her Statement in Annexure 4.
According to Section 26 of The IEA, 1872
“Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. –– No
confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be
made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.”
Also according to Chapter 1 of the Same Act:-
“Evidence”. ––“Evidence” means and includes –– (1) all statements which the Court permits
or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such
statements are called oral evidence;
Also According to Section 30 of the Aforementioned Act :-
“Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial
for same offence. –– When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same
offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of
such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such

other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.”
Furthermore According to Section 108 of IPC, 1860:-
“Abettor.—A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the
commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.”
It is Humbly Submitted before this Hon’ble Court that As per the statement by PW-2 W/o
Accused 4, in Annexure 4, which can be Treated as an Oral & Written Evidence As per being
put on Record by the Trial Court:-
“My name is Savita w/o Bhawani. On the night of 30.12.2016, he came home at around 3:00
a.m. It was very cold and windy that day. I asked him from where he was coming from so late
at night, but he didn’t reply. After continuous questioning, he asked me to pack the bags and
said that we were going somewhere out for few days. I asked him the reason for the same, to
which he answered that a sinful act had been committed by him and God will never forgive
him for that act, which he had committed because Pt. Kali Charan had brain-washed him and
instigated him by saying wrong things about the sisters. On the very next day we went to our
relative”s house outside Katra. I observed him for few days and he was acting weirdly. Later,
when I came to know about the brutality of the crime committed by my husband from
newspapers and posters, I quickly informed the police after which they came and arrested
him.”
Further analysing the above Statement reveals a few facts that ––
4.2.1.).The accused No. 4 came home around the Expected time of Death As per Annexure
2A
4.2.2.) Furthermore, His actions instructing PW 2 to make arrangements for travel are
corroborative to his act of absconding after the Heinous Crime vide Section 172 of IPC,
1860.
4.2.3.) Furthermore, The Accused confesses to Having Committed ‘A sinful Act’, so Heinous
in nature that even him being a Devotee of God would never be Forgiven for Committing
such Act.
4.2.4.) Furthermore, He States before PW-2 that he was ‘Brainwashed’ by Head Priest I.e,
Accused 1 for the said Act by accused 1’s act of Instigating by “Saying Wrongful things
about the Sisters”.
It is Humbly Submitted before this Hon’ble Court that As per the statement by PW-5
Watchman stationed at Accused 4’s Colony , in Annexure 4, which can be Treated as an Oral
& Written Evidence As per being put on Record by the Trial Court :-

“My name is Shyam Sunder and I am the watchman of the Green Avenue Colony where the
family of Pt. Bhawani resides. I remember that Pt. Bhawani did not come home on
30.12.2016. As it was very cold and I was feeling sleepy, I went to the nearest tea stall for
half hour at 3:00 a.m.”
4.2.5.) In accordance with 4.2.1.) - It can be further concluded that the Accused 4 hadn’t
entered his House premises Anytime Before 3 a.m. on 30.12.2016, neither after 3:30 a.m. on
30.12.2016 after PW-5 came back from the Tea Stall.
As ruled by this Court in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab27 :-
“A law does not require that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases
be corroborated.”
Further in Kishore Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh28, It was stated :-
“An unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it
emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it
is free from suspicion and suggestion of its falsity.”
However, coming to the facts of the case, the confession of the respondent is aptly
corroborated by their past Acts of Criminal Intimidation, Absconding which is further
corroborated by PWs and also by the medical evidence.
It is further submitted that all this Links Accused 4 to the Direct Actus Reus and also links
Accused 1 to the crime as per Section 30 of Indian Evidence Act being the Instigator of the
said Crime per 4.2.4).
4.3 The SUV Vehicle’s Role in Present Case :-
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the present case, the Vehicle placed
at the place of Crime for Abduction & further Acts in this heinous Crime was a White SUV
registered to Accused – 5, V/No. AP 05 XS 8K8K.
According per Para. 12 of the Fact sheet of the Present Case :-
“At around 1:00 a.m. on 30.12.2016, Mrs Radha (mother of Reema and Riya) informed the
police that her daughters have not arrived home till now and requested police to lodge a
missing complaint and investigate further. However, the police denied to lodge FIR but
started searching for the twin sisters. While patrolling, the police discovered a suspicious
SUV in an abandoned jungle, near Mohini Bazar and towed the same to Mohini Bazar Police
Station.”
According to the FIR lodged on 27.12.2019 as per Annexure 1-A, whose Description of
27
Piara Singh vs State Of Punjab 1969 AIR 961
28
Kishore Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh 1990 AIR 2140

Crime of Theft under Section 379 of The IPC, 1860 reads as follows:-
“I went to visit my relative who lives in Gali No. 5 Disawar at around 5:30 pm. I reached
there and parked my white SUV registered, AP 05 XS 8K8K outside the closed shop area.
The street was not busy that evening. When I came outside at about 8:15pm after meeting my
relative, I couldn‟t find my car where I had parked it. I thought my co-priests Bhanu and
Kalu were pranking me, because they have a duplicate key of it but I called them and asked
about the incident and they were also unaware about it. After repeated search done by me and
my co-priests we were unable to find the vehicle. Then I came to the police station.”
The person who Filed the Complaint was Accused 5, who is still in a state of Absconding and
hasn’t been found till now. Furthermore The Blood Stained Lathis being found in the Ceased
SUV per Annexure 3, I.e, CBI Investigative Report & further confiming that the SUV was in
Fact the allegedly Stolen Vehicle.
5. Whether the Accused had the Mens Rea of Causing all the Aforementioned Actions &
their Motives thereof :-
5.1 The Act of Criminal Intimidation and the Intention Causing Bodily Hurt
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that as per the Fact Sheet On 24.12.2016,
“Reema and Riya with some other women tried to enter Lord Jogeshawara Temple for
offering their prayers. On the way from their residence to temple they were stopped by
devotees (including men and women) who were shouting that “IF ANY WOMEN WILL
STEP INTO THE TEMPLE OF LORD JOGESHWARA SHE WILL FACE DIRE
CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR ENTIRE FAMILY WILL BE KILLED”....
.......He directed the other priests Bhawani and Jagga to bring lathis from the temple for
teaching a life lesson to the women, particularly Reema and Riya, who were trying to enter in
the temple and committing a disgraceful and ignominious act.”
It be sincerely noted that at this Juncture the Accused, as being part of the Devotees are in
Violation of Section 506 of The IPC, 1860 regarding to Criminal Intimidation. Not only that
The actions of Accused 1-5 show clear Intention of Causing Bodily hurt to the Deceased by
their actions of bringing Lathis to Teach a “Life Lesson” to the Deceased.
Further Vide. Zala Jayvantsinh Faljibhai vs State Of Gujarat on 9 December, 2003 :-
“Section : 506 - Criminal intimidation - Simple criminal intimidation is punishable upto 2
years imprisonment or fine, or both, the same is non-cognizable, bailable and triable by any
Magistrate, and if threat to cause death or grievous hurt, is there then it is an offence u/s. 506
punishable upto 7 years, or fine, or both. The same is non-cognizable and bailable and triable
by Magistrate of the First Class.”

5.2 The Events Transpiring in the past relating to Apex court’s judgement:-
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Deceased in Present Case were
trying to enter the Temple Premises of Lord Jogeshwara Temple as per known via Para 10 of
the Fact Sheet.
It is further submitted that the Head priest I.e, Accused 1 in the present case was greatly
aggravated by it. Furthermore he directed his fellow priests and subsequently Accused 4 & 5
to bring Lathis and teach the Young Girls a Lesson which he considered that the Deceased
were committing a Disgraceful Act.
Furthermore the Crowd of Devotees that Blocked the path of entry for Deceased and their
Supporters were touting them as trying to become leaders and being the instigators of this
entire situation. They were infact so aggravated that they said the girls would die and face
consequences in hell.
All these establishes the general environment and the situations anteceding the said Crimes,
and even so the Priest had in past per Para 11 of Factsheet shown intention of Causing bodily
Injury to the Deceased.
5.3 Statement of Accused per Annexure 5:-
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Accused 1’s Statement as per
Annexure 5 which says:
“I am very sad about the incident that happened to my friend’s daughters. I live inside Lord
Jogeshwara Akhara.....
.........They both have been punished by Lord Jogeshwara for their sinful acts and the same
will be done against any other person who will raise voice against the Lord.”
The Accused 1 while putting forth the notion that he is sad for their Deaths, still feels that
they were justified and the Deceased were “rightfully punished” by Lord Jogeshwara. The
same Intent is further shown in Accused 4’s Statements:-
“I live inside Lord Jogeshwara Akhara....
..... but I only know that Lord Jogeshawara has punished them.”
This statement by Accused 4 while showing again the notion of “being punished by lord
Jogeshwara”, also shows Contradictory statements that the Accused 4 was instructed in the
past on 24.12.2016 to teach a lesson to the deceased and was an active part of the Temple
Priests, and henceforth must have had an ample amount of knowledge about who they were
and what they had done.
Section 319 of IPC 1860 further states that:-
“Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.”

Also Section 34 & 120(A) further state that:-

34. - Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act
is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons
is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
120(A) - When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done:
1.an illegal act, or
2.an act which is not illegal0 by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy;
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a
criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to
such agreement in pursuance thereof.
All of this further proves that the accused had sufficient reason of removing the Deceased
from their way in regards to keeping the Age old Traditions, furtherance of Their sense of
leadership, and their instant Acts of Criminal intimidation & Intention of Causing hurt.
Conclusion:
It is hereby submitted that u/s Section 101 and 102 of IEA, 1872, the Respondents have
fulfilled their burden of proof, and proven beyond any reasonable doubt the existence,
commitment and prescene of mens rea in this grevious crime. We further seek reliefs which
shall be presented in the prayer forthcoming.
Vide IEA :-
101. Burden of proof. –– Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or
liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of
proof lies on that person.
102. On whom burden of proof lies. –– The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on
that
person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and the
authorities cited, the hon'ble court may be pleased to;
HOLD
1. That the practice of prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord
Jogeshwara temple, not to be discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights
enshrined under the const. Of Indiana;
2. Dispose off the claim of the petitioners to declare all practices discriminatory to women,
and also to men, of all faiths to be penal offences as they are not contrary to constitutional
values;
3. Uphold the decisions of the trial court and high court of arya pradesh in the conviction of
all the accused who are held to be guilty of the abduction and murder of reema and riya,
under sections 34, 109, 120 b, 302, 354 of the IPC;
4. Uphold the decisions of the trial court and high court of arya pradesh in the conviction of
all the accused who are held to be guilty of the rape of riya, under sections of the 376 – d of
IPC;
MISCELLANEOUS
And any other relief that this hon'ble court may be pleased to grant in the interest of justice,
equity, good conscience and for this act of kindness the respondents shall as in duty bound
ever pray.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Sd/-
Counsel for Respondents

4th Amity National Moot Court Competition, 2019: R-16 Team Code: 016

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

4th Amity National Moot Court Competition, 2019: R-16 Team Code: 016

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

R-16

Team code: 016

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

(U/A 32, 136, 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA)

IN THE MATTER OF:

PETITION NO ........... /2019

MR. AJAY TRIPATHI .............................................................………...PETITIONER

UNION OF INDIANA .............................................................................. RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

1. Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 2

made an act of discrimination contrary to Constitutional values, and penal offences?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 3

PIL Public Interest Litigation

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

IPC Indian Penal Code

IEA Indian Evidence Act

RAAHEE Regional Association for Awareness in

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 4

Books on Constitutional Law

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 5

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 6

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 7

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 8

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 9

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 10

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 11

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 12

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 13

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 14

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 15

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 16

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 17

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 18

1.3.1 No violation of Article 14

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 19

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 20

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 21

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 22

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 23

either at all or in particular areas.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 24

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 25

was registered to Accused 5, which was reportedly stolen on 27.12.2016. According to

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 26

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 27

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 28

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 29

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 30

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 31

Also Section 34 & 120(A) further state that:-

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 32

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS Page 33

You might also like