20190427-PRESS RELEASE MR G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. ISSUE - Re The Theft of Our Democracy, Etc, & The Constitution-Supplement 46-Shorten-Etc

z3
ISSUE: 20190427- Re: The theft of our democracy, etc & the constitution-
Supplement 46- Shorten-etc
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST my concern is the true meaning and application of the constitution.
* Gerrit, I get the impression you are going to decimate Bill Shorten, are you?
**#** INSPECTOR-RIKATI®, the Framers of the Constitution did state:
HANSARD 4-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Sir HENRY PARKES:
The resolutions conclude:
An executive, consisting of a governor-general, and such persons as may from time to time be
appointed as his advisers, such persons sitting in Parliament, and whose term of office shall depend
upon their possessing the confidence of the house of representatives expressed by the support of the
majority.
What is meant by that is simply to call into existence a ministry to conduct the affairs of the new nation as
similar as it can be to the ministry of England-a body of constitutional advisers who shall stand as nearly as
possible in the same relation to the representative of the Crown here [start page 27] a her Majesty's imperial
advisers stand is relation to the Crown directly. These, then, are the principles which my resolutions seek to
lay down as a foundation, as I have already stated, for the new super structure, my object being to invite other
gentlemen to work upon this foundation so as to best advance the ends we have in view.
END QUOTE
As I understood it from an article in the Herald Sun Friday 26-4-2019 “ALP plan for sport
research” and well I ask Bill Shorten where in the constitution is there a legislative power
provided to fund sport? Surely as having been a Minister and pursuing to become Prime Minister
he could be expected to know there is absolutely no provision in the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), our governing constitution, to put monies toward sport.
HANSARD 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. CARRUTHERS:
Mr. Barton first of all recites Dicey to show what occurs under the unwritten Constitution of
England. But here we are framing a written Constitution. When once that Constitution is framed we
cannot get behind it.
END QUOTE
Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for
the whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the
whole of these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal
constitution which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the
several colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the
royal prerogative exercised, in their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be
practically vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the
p1 27-4-2019 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
Email: admin@inspector-rikati.com. For further details see also my blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati
full power and dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies
that will be in existence concurrently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each
assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey
again says-a merely subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority
conferred upon it by the constitution, but invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of
such authority.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The union of these colonies must take place in either one or two ways, namely, either by a unification under
one all-powerful parliament, or by a federation which gives to the central federal parliament certain limited
powers and reserves to the other parliaments all other powers. As I think we may be in danger of overlooking
some of the first principles connected with federation, I may be pardoned if I briefly define some of the
characteristics of a federation. I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its language.
He says:
One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be either legally
immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority above and beyond the ordinary
legislative bodies, whether federal or state legislatures, existing under the constitution.
That opens up a matter of very large consideration for this Convention. In the first place, what is the
authority above and beyond the legislatures which is to have the power of changing the law of the
constitution, or of regulating it in any form? The answer, of course, is that it is the people of these colonies
who are to be charged with that important function; and I would, therefore, point out-and I think
several hon. members who have had considerable experience in leading what may be called democratic
parties in these colonies have forgotten for a moment-what the democracy of Australia is to be.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get £100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may
be amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have
this provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the
Ministers of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask
permission to occupy a few minutes in discussing it. Not that I believe that it will be carried, but I think it
is an echo of a widespread misapprehension which prevails outside as to the duties and functions of the
Supreme Court. It very often seems hard to a layman that that which has been enacted by Parliament should
be declared to be illegal by a Supreme Court when the statute is called into question during litigation between
two citizens. It is hard, but like everything else in politics, it is a choice of evils. The question is: Whether it
would not be of much greater disadvantage to the whole community to bring in the Supreme Court as an
interpreter of the Constitution before any precise case was taken before it, than it is to leave the individual
to suffer the hardship of finding that the Act upon which he relied was really invalid? I will not use my own
language in explaining the position, but, to have it put upon record, I should like to quote a passage which
occurs on pages 154 and 155 of Dicey's Law of the Constitution. After pointing out that the American
Supreme Court exists to interpret the Constitution, and to see that effect is given to its provisions, the writer
goes on to say that-
The power, moreover, of the courts, which maintains the Articles of the Constitution as the law of the
land, and thereby keeps each authority within its proper sphere, is exerted with an ease and a
regularity which has astonished and perplexed continental critics. The explanation is that the Judges of
the United States control the action of the Constitution, but they perform merely judicial functions,
since they never decide anything but the cases before them. It is natural to say that the Supreme Court
pronounces Acts of Congress invalid, but in fact this is not so. The court never directly pronounces any
opinion whatever upon an Act of Congress.
[start page 1687]
What the court does do is simply to determine A. is or is not entitled to recover judgment against X.;
but in determining that case the court may decide that any Act of Congress is not to be taken into
account, since it is an Act beyond the constitutional powers of Congress.
If any one thinks this is a distinction without a difference he shows some ignorance of politics, and does not
understand how much the authority of a court is increased by confining its action to purely judicial business.
In a book prepared by you, sir, entitled A Manual of Reference for the use of Members of the National
Australasian Convention, to which frequent reference has been made, the matter is further dealt with. You
say, at page 126, in words that I would like to adopt as part of my argument:-
No doubt the power given is very great, but it is exercised in a manner and by a body which affords
the least possible chance of friction and quarrels between the central and the provincial governments.
A veto by the central authority has to be exercised at a time when the public attention of the provincial
electors is directed to the matter; at a time when, perhaps, party spirit runs high, when angry passions
pervade both factions, and when the subject-matter is invested with an importance which is not
intrinsic, whereas a declaration by a court that the statute is invalid is withdrawn from the sphere of
politics. Each individual and each state looks upon it that such declaration is given only in pursuance of
the Constitution. Public attention is probably directed to other matters, and the question has, in many
cases, shrunk into its native insignificance; and "it is to the interest of every man who wishes the
Federal Constitution to be observed that the judgments of the federal tribunals should be respected,
and they take it that the courts are the protectors of the federal compact, and that the federal compact
is, in the long run, the guarantee of the rights of the separate state."
If the proposal of the honorable member (Mr. Gordon) was carried into effect-though of that, I think, there is
not the slightest chance-it would follow that any person who was aggrieved by an unconstitutional enactment
would have to persuade the Attorney-General of the state or of the Commonwealth, as the case might be, to in
some way set the law in motion to ascertain the legality of the enactment, If the enactment was one which
affected a matter exciting strong party feeling, the result would be that the abstract question of its
validity would have to be argued before the court at a time when public feeling was excited, although it
would be of the utmost importance that the decision of the court should be entirely free from all
suspicion of political bias. Then, too, the enactment might be valid in parts and invalid in other parts,
or it might be impossible to interpret it in the abstract. It is impossible to foresee the bearing of a
statute upon all possible cases, and it is only when a case comes for determination before a court that
the court is able to say that in that particular case the statute does or does not afford protection to the
citizen who has relied upon it. The honorable member's proposal would remove at once the greatest of all
safeguards to the impartiality and usefulness of the Federal Court, by taking away from it its right to deal
with matters which are brought, as lawyers term it, to a distinct issue, and with precise and definite points, in
regard to which the full bearing of every word of the judgment could be appreciated? Instead of the court
being able to determine the legality of an enactment in its bearing upon any particular case, there
would be considerations introduced which were utterly foreign to the atmosphere of the tribunal, and
that would seriously impair the public confidence in a court which, with us, as in America, will, I
believe, prove to be the ultimate protector of the liberties of the people. Then, too, the amendment is in its
form so complicated that its practical working will be impossible. The honorable member said truly that the
Attorney-General constantly intervenes now. But he intervenes at the expense of the individual. The
individual presents his case, and gives a guarantee for costs. Under this proposal all that would happen would
be that the individual who wanted to assert [start page 1688] his right would have a barrier placed between
him and the obtaining of justice. He would have to satisfy the Attorney-General for the time being that he
would be able to pay the costs of any action, and he would have to bring sufficient political pressure to bear
upon that officer to get him to move in the case, and finally he would be left to contest the matter in his own
interests and in his own name. The result would be that the rights and liberties of every citizen in the
community would be placed at the mercy of a chance parliamentary majority.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS.-
. I should prefer to rest on the fact that the powers of the Federal Parliament are limited under the
Constitution itself, and that the Federal Parliament has no power to do anything except what is
expressly given to it, or what is by implication necessary.
END QUOTE
Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates

QUOTE
Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am trying to get at the ideas which are underlying the argument of hon.
gentlemen. I confess I have not got at them yet. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, talks about the powers
exercised by the ministers of the Crown in Great Britain. They do not differ in any respect from the
powers exercised by ministers of the Crown in any other country.
Dr. COCKBURN: They are much superior to the powers of ministers here!
Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH': Not in the east.
Mr. DEAKIN: The powers of our ministers are limited, and theirs are unlimited!
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-No; I do not think that there is anything in the Bill that takes it away. Very well, then, if a
state law, or the action of the state, or the action of a citizen of a state, does not contravene Commonwealth
legislation under that power of legislation, granted in this Bill. the state law is still valid, and cannot be
touched or interfered with, and that I conceive is sufficient for the purpose of New South Wales under this
Constitution. Now, my honorable friend (Mr. Isaacs) yesterday, in that remarkably able and statesmanlike
speech which he made-one of the best speeches addressed to this Convention since it began its sittings in
Adelaide-mentioned state laws with regard to irrigation in the United States, especially state laws passed with
reference to the and country, and with reference to California. Now, while my honorable friend mentioned
those in support of his argument, all those instances are evidences that, under the operation of the trade and
commerce clause in America, the right is retained to the states, under the United States Constitution, to deal
with these matters, and is recognised by the courts. And if there were any doubt about that in our own' case,
we have only to refer to clause 99 of this Bill, which tells us that-
All powers which at the establishment of the Commonwealth are vested in the Parliaments of the
several colonies, and which are not by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the
Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliaments of the several states, are reserved to, and shall
remain vested in, the Parliaments of the states respectively.
Mr. KINGSTON.-That is the reservation clause.

Mr. BARTON.-Yes, the reservation clause. Now, that clause has a twofold operation. It means, first, that
the power to deal with water conservation and irrigation, which, if you rely on sub-section (1) alone,
finds no mention in this Constitution, and, therefore, is not a power given to the Commonwealth, but a
power retained in the states absolutely. And it means, in addition to that, that the states will retain
their power of dealing with the navigation of their rivers, except so far as those rivers fall under the
domination-if you like to use that large word-of the legislation of the Commonwealth, when the
Commonwealth chooses to legislate on the subject of navigation. So that the position of the state is
secure as regards the conservation and use of its waters, except to the extent that there may be an
actual navigation law passed by the Commonwealth, which may have the effect of limiting the state use
of the water of the rivers within that state.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?
Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
My only desire is to give power to the Federal Parliament to achieve a scheme for old-age pensions if it be
practicable, and if the people require it. No power would be taken away from the states. The sub-section
would not interfere with the right of any state to act in the meantime until the Federal Parliament took
the matter in hand.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-There seems to be some doubt as to whether the exclusive power arises upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth or on the exercise of the power of legislation. The doubt seems to
be removed by clause 84. It is said that if we put this provision in clause 52 the exclusive power may be
postponed until legislation takes place. But may you not then have a concurrent power, and may not the
competence of the local Legislature to legislate in the matter be continued as long as the legislation is not in
contradiction of federal legislation?
Mr. DEAKIN.-That is the point.
Mr. GLYNN.-Yes, and there is still a vagueness in the word "exclusive." If it is doubtful whether the
exclusive power commences with the foundation of the Commonwealth, and if it is possible that it may
only come into being on the passing of legislation, may it not still be said that on the passing of exclusive
legislation the power of the local Parliaments to legislate is extinguished, but that on the passing of
concurrent legislation that power does not cease?

Mr. REID (New South Wales).-I think that enough has now been said on this subject by honorable
members both sides of the chamber, and I have only a very few remarks to offer. It appears that if the
sub-section remains where it is state laws will be valid until federal legislation, but the states will not be
able to alter or improve those laws during the possibly long interval between federation and federal
legislation. Under these circumstances, as we leave to the states for an indefinite time the power of
maintaining the laws they have, we should grant to them the power of improving those laws. It would
recommend the Constitution more to a large number of persons if we put the sub-section in clause 52,
thus enabling each state to legislate on this matter until the Federal Parliament comes in and legislates
for all.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-
That this is not like an Act of Parliament which we are passing. It is not in the position which Mr. Barton has
described, of choosing or setting up a code of laws to interpret the common law of England. This
Constitution we are framing is not yet passed. It has to be handed over not to a Convention similar to
this, not to a small select body of legislators, but to the whole body of the people for their acceptance or
rejection. It is the whole body of the people whose understanding you have to bring to bear upon it, and
it is the whole body of the people, the more or less instructed body of the people, who have to
understand clearly everything in the Constitution, which affects them for weal or woe during the whole
time of the existence of this Commonwealth. We cannot have on the platform, when this Constitution is
commended to the people, lawyers on both sides, drawing subtle distinctions, which may or may not be
appreciated by the people.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: The moment the commonwealth exercises the
power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. REID:
We must make it clear that the moment the Federal Parliament legislates on one of those points
enumerated in clause 52, that instant the whole State law on the subject is dead. There cannot be two
laws, one Federal and one State, on the same subject. But that I merely mention as almost a verbal
criticism, because there is no doubt, whatever that the intention of the framers was not to propose any
complication of the kind.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: We ought to be careful not to load the
commonwealth with any more duties than are absolutely necessary. Although it is quite true that this
power is permissive, you will always find that if once power is given to the commonwealth to legislate
on a particular question, there will be continual pressure brought to bear on the commonwealth to
exercise that power. The moment the commonwealth exercises the power, the states must retire from
that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-Directly it is exercised it becomes an exclusive power, and there is no doubt that it will
be exercised.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Dr. QUICK.-Certainly, with regard to constitutional questions. I am prepared, if necessary, to give up the
subject's right of appeal; but I emphatically assert that there should be a right of appeal from the decision of
the High Court in regard to this Constitution, a Constitution embodying novel provisions and giving
important powers, including the power of the Federal Court to review the procedure of Parliament. The
Federal High Court is empowered to-declare a law passed by both Houses and assented to by the
Crown ultra vires, not because the Legislature has exceeded its jurisdiction, but because of some fault
of procedure. Appeals would be made only when there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
responsible advisers of the Commonwealth that the decisions of the High Court were open to question. The
knowledge of this right of appeal would be an incentive to the High Court to be most careful in its decisions,
and especially in its early decisions. I need not enumerate the cases in which, if the amendment is carried,
there will be no right of appeal. There will be no right of appeal in regard to the letter of the Constitution
itself. There will be no opportunity to review a decision, for instance, in regard to legislation under clause 52,
sub-section (1)-"The regulation of trade and commerce." Then, again, it is provided that all taxation is to
be uniform, and all legislation under this provision will be taken out of the purview of the Privy Council.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but the
general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the question of
ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-The position of my honorable and learned friend (Mr. [start page 2092] Higgins)
may be perfectly correct. It may be that without any special provision the practice of the High Court, when
declaring an Act ultra vires, would be that such a declaration applied only to the part which trespassed
beyond the limits of the Constitution. If that were so, it would be a general principle applicable to the
interpretation of the whole of the Constitution.
END QUOTE
It must be clear that the Commonwealth cannot simply take up legislation not provided for
within S51and 52 of the constitution.
* Can’t the stated provide jurisdiction to the Commonwealth?
**#** Only if the relevant state electors within Section 123 approve to refer legislative e power
to the Commonwealth.
* Why section 12e3 and not 128?
**#** Because to refer legislative power to the Commonwealth would mean to reduce the State
Supreme Court judicial powers and this cannot be done without a Section 123 referendum due to
the separation of powers the State Parliament has no legislative powers to reduce the judicial
powers of its Supreme Court without the consent of the State electors.
* Is this why French J (later French C.J.) wrote that Section 51(xxxvii) only provides the
Commonwealth to accept reference of legislative powers but for the state to refer legislative
powers to the commonwealth must be found in another constitutional provision?
**#** That is correct.

QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he
will see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court
the court is bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may
be a good law passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which
I do not care much about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the
Constitution we will have to wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of
parliamentary sovereignty, leaving it to the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
It therefore should be clear, at least in my view, that Bill Shorten despite previously having been
Minister still seems to lack competence in constitutional issues. And he proposes to be Prime
Minister?
In my view he is using other people’s monies (that of the taxpayers) to try to be nice to promote
some 15 million towards the joint project between Monash University and Collingwood million
dollars towards women sport, even so no constitutional powers exist for this. As set out above if
the Commonwealth was to obtain legislative powers as to sport then the States would have to
retire from this and that hardly they contemplate to do.
The absurdity is that the same Bill Shorten is complaining about increasing pensions by $150 a
week as if this is not affordable.
So let it be clear those people entitled to a pension may have worked their whole life paying
about 7% during their working life toward a pension funds which the politicians then robbed of
them. That 7% payment would likely have afforded double the pension if the monies had not
been stolen by the politicians. Yet the politicians are creating for themselves a pension nest egg
in my view in violation of s44. In fact at this time Bill Shorten is not even a member of
parliament at all and if he has no ordinary job then he is actually unemployed. Yet if he is
travelling about at taxpayers cost for the election then I view he is defrauding the
Commonwealth as most other politicians are I expect doing. To me Bill Shorten is grossly
incompetent to be a Prime Minister or even a Minister because as long as he doesn’t conduct
himself within the provisions of the constitution then he cannot be deemed a competent
constitutional advisor.
* Isn’t Bill Shorten a lawyer?
**#** As the Framers of the constitution stated:
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. TRENWITH.-And yet this clause is throwing legislation into the hands of those people who cannot
agree.
MR. REID.-The lawyers.
Mr. MCMILLAN.-The lawyers?
Mr. TRENWITH.-Yes, thrusting it on them.
Mr. MCMILLAN.-That is one of those commonplaces which are always used. There is no clause or sub-
clause of any Bill in the world, even if it were framed by an angel from Heaven, that would not be the subject
of litigation.
Dr. COCKBURN.-The disagreement is not legal, but constitutional.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-You do not got lawyers from Heaven.
Mr. ISAACS.-No, lawyers are sent there; they are not drawn from there.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. MCMILLAN: According to the amendment proposed, it would prevent any mere slip of procedure
from making invalid an Act which may affect the whole country and its financial operations, but nothing
which we may enact with regard to procedure will prevent any suitor from going to the High Court if
the Act is essentially unconstitutional. That is the way I look at it, and it seems to me that either putting in
"proposed" before "laws," or adding an amendment somewhere or other making it clear that no mere slip of
procedure can invalidate the law, would meet all the difficulties.
Mr. BARTON: This is not proposed to cover mere slips, but everything.
Mr. MCMILLAN: I do not think that could be the intention. We are attempting to legislate for a very
limited possibility. You will get disputes so long as there are lawyers in the world. I do not know
whether Federation will do away with lawyers.
Mr. BARTON: Not until merchants will cease to quarrel.
Mr. MCMILLAN: If so it would simplify our arrangements very much. At the same time it does seem that
there ought to be something introduced to prevent the law being put into operation for a mere breach of
procedure, if there is such a chance.
Mr. SYMON: There is no chance.
Mr. MCMILLAN: I do not suppose that any ordinary moral layman would do it, unless he were
instructed by a less moral lawyer.

END QUOTE
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Of course it will be argued that this Constitution will have been made by the Parliament of
the United Kingdom. That will be true in one sense, but not true in effect, because the provisions of this
Constitution, the principles which it embodies, and the details of enactment by which those principles
are enforced, will all have been the work of Australians.
END QUOTE
The following will also make clear that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have CIVIL
RIGHTS and LIBERTIES principles embedded in the Constitution;

QUOTE Mr. CLARK.-
the protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to
claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member of a
state Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a sentry.
As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a sentry, and the whole
constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
END QUOTE
Again I ask Bill Shorten to prove where in the constitution the legislative powers is provided for!
If his proposal is to be Prime Minister ignorant to constitutional limitations then for sure we will
be heading for a disaster.
If his proposal is to deceive electors as to afterwards to renege on his promises then again we are
heading for a disaster.
He has been a Member of Parliament for many years and still seems to me to be ignorant if not
totally ignorant as to what the constitution stands for and I view only a fool would vote for him.
We need to return to the organics and legal principles embed in of our federal constitution!
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® (Our name is our motto!)


20190427-PRESS RELEASE MR G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. ISSUE - Re The Theft of Our Democracy, Etc, & The Constitution-Supplement 46-Shorten-Etc

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

20190427-PRESS RELEASE MR G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. ISSUE - Re The Theft of Our Democracy, Etc, & The Constitution-Supplement 46-Shorten-Etc

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

z3

As a CONSTITUTIONALIST my concern is the true meaning and application of the constitution.

The resolutions conclude:

Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

[start page 1687]

HANSARD 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 7-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS.-

Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates

Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH': Not in the east.

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. KINGSTON.-That is the reservation clause.

p4 27-4-2019 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Hansard 27-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 27-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

Hansard 7-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 28-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. DEAKIN.-That is the point.

p5 27-4-2019 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Hansard 22-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-

Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

[start page 2004]

Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.

Hansard 9-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

MR. REID.-The lawyers.

Mr. MCMILLAN.-The lawyers?

Mr. TRENWITH.-Yes, thrusting it on them.

Dr. COCKBURN.-The disagreement is not legal, but constitutional.

Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-You do not got lawyers from Heaven.

Hansard 14-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. BARTON: Not until merchants will cease to quarrel.

Mr. SYMON: There is no chance.

p9 27-4-2019 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p10 27-4-2019 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

You might also like