■ Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of
Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due
to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of
the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels
and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill
up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due
process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase
in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be
unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and
the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption
by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments,
and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."

■ Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty and due process

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain
there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application
for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they
had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.
Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of
the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to
determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the
provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give
discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-
Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing
times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the
liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable;
it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all
of a class.”

■ Nebbia v. New York

Brief Fact Summary. New York’s Milk Control Board’s price control regulation survived a
Constitutional attack because it was not found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy adopted by the legislature.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Price controls that are arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policies of the legislature, are unconstitutional because they are unnecessary and
unwarranted interferences with individual liberty.

Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk Control Board that was vested with the power
to “fix minimum and maximum retail prices” for milk sold within the state. Appellant, Mr.
Nebbia, an owner of a New York grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in excess
of the price set by the Board.

Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from fixing the selling price of milk?

Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of
the state and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract
rights are not absolute in nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price controls were
not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant” to the policy adopted by the legislature
to promote the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution.

Dissent. This statute not only interferes arbitrarily with the rights of the little grocer to conduct his
business, but it also takes away the liberty of twelve million consumers to buy a necessity of life
in an open market.

■ Tumey v. Ohio
Tumey v. Ohio was a case considered by the United States Supreme Court in 1927. The court
struck down an Ohio law that denied citizens their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process
by financially rewarding public officials for successfully prosecuting cases related to Phohibition.
Following the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1919,
the Ohio government implemented stringent measures to enforce Prohibition within the state's
borders. One law, the Crabbe Act, compensated mayors, justices of the peace, various judges, and
other law enforcement officials with additional money beyond their normal pay whenever they
arrested, convicted, and fined violators of the Eighteenth Amendment. Many legal officials sought
to extend their jurisdiction into nearby cities to arrest and prosecute more violators and to enhance
the judges' own paychecks.

This particular law became the foundation for Tumey v. Ohio, a case before the United States
Supreme Court, in 1927. In North College Hill, Ohio, a man was arrested for illegally possessing
alcohol, a violation of the Eighteenth Amendment. This man contended that the law compensating
officials with additional money for liquor cases violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution by depriving him of "due process of law." Attorneys for the accused man
claimed that judges were more likely to convict accused people because convictions increased the
judges' and other law enforcement officials' salaries. In March 1927, the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff over the defendant, the State of Ohio.

Upon losing the case before the Supreme Court, the Ohio legislature attempted to enact another
law that would compensate judges for hearing additional cases beyond a normal number. It would
not matter how the judges ruled in the cases; the state and local governments would guarantee the
judges' additional pay. This legislation was never implemented. Ohio voters defeated the measure
in a referendum in the autumn of 1927 by a two-to-one advantage.

Tumey v. Ohio and the events that resulted from it illustrate the divisions among Ohioans over
Prohibition.

■ Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police
Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June
1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of
which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for
the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the
RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said
that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is
no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

■ Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador

Due Process – impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd
Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to
proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd
Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986,
during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.

■ Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

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