Protests in Germany

The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989
Author(s): Ruud Koopmans

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 637-658
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096279
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THIE DYNAMICS OF PROTEST WAVES:
WEST GERMANY, 1965 TO 1989*
RUUD KOOPMANS
University of Amsterdam
The dynamics of social movements after their initial emergence is still largely terra in-
cognita. I develop a theory of the dynamics of protest waves by comparing data on pro-
tests in West Germany between 1965 and 1989 with similar data from the Netherlands,
Italy, and the United States. Striking similarities are noted among these different protest
waves in the development of action repertoires, levels of repression andfacilitation, and
the involvement of different types of organizations. An explanation for these dynamic
patterns combines external and internal factors: The interplay between facilitation, re-
pression, and the chance of success defines a set of external constraints that combine
with activists' choices among three strategic options - innovation, increased participa-
tion, or increased militancy.
The fluctuation between periods of conten- test face formidable difficulties. Social move-
tion and periods of acquiescence has long ments are characterized by a low degree of in-
been a source of fascination and scientific institutionalization, high heterogeneity, a lack of
terest. Protests usually occur in waves that clearly defined boundaries and decision-mak-
wash over a country, but in many cases they ing structures, and a volatility matched by few
have an international character. "What needs to other social phenomena. Moreover, the dynam-
be explained is not why people periodically pe- ics of protest are shaped by many actors. So-
tition, strike, demonstrate, riot, loot, and burn, cial movements usually consist of informal,
but rather why so many of them do so at par- shifting, and often temporary coalitions of or-
ticular times in their history, and if there is a ganizations, informal networks, subcultures,
logical sequence to their actions" (Tarrow and individuals. In many cases, several such
1989b, p. 13). Tarrow (1988) called this "the coalitions exist, each representing a usually
largest current problem in collective action re- vaguely bounded "current." In addition, social
search" (1988, p. 435), and McAdam, Mc- movements engage in cooperative or conflic-
Carthy, and Zald (1988) cited "our relatively tive interactions with other actors, e.g., other
underdeveloped knowledge about the dynam- social movements (including countermove-
ics of collective action past the emergence of a ments), allies within established politics, the
movement" among "the most glaring deficien- police, and governments.
cies in the literature" (p. 728; see also Rucht Given this complexity, a search for patterns
1990, p. 168; McAdam 1983, p. 735). One rea- in protest waves may appear doomed to fail-
son for this lack of attention for movement de- ure. The sheer number of possible combina-
velopment may be that dynamic processes of tions of strategies and developmental trajecto-
interaction are difficult to grasp theoretically ries make it unlikely that regularities will
and analyze empirically. This is already the emerge among different protest waves. Any
case for relatively simple interactions, involv- regularities that do exist may be buried under
ing a few, clearly circumscribed actors, which idiosyncrasies and be as easy to identify as a
suggests that analyses of the dynamics of pro- needle in a haystack.
However, recent studies of protest waves -
* Direct all correspondence to Ruud Koopmans, the American civil rights movement (McAdam
Department of Political Science, University of
1982), the Italian protest wave of the 1960s and
Amsterdam, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237, 1012
1970s (Tarrow 1989b), and new social move-
DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands. I thank Jan
Willem Duyvendak, Hanspeter Kriesi, Sophie de ments in Western Europe (Duyvendak, van der
Schaepdrijver, and the Editor and reviewers of ASRHeijden, Koopmans, and Wijmans 1992;
for their helpful comments. Koopmans 1992b, 1992c) - indicate that such
American Sociological Review, 1993, Vol. 58 (October:637-658) 637
638 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
skepticism may be premature. These studies Giugni 1992 for Switzerland; and Koopmans
reveal striking similarities among protest 1992c for West Germany). Together, this evi-
waves of different movements in different po- dence indicates that NSMs form a "social
movement family" (Della Porta and Rucht
litical contexts, which suggest that, at least for
stable, Western democracies in the postwar pe- 1991) that is distinct, though perhaps not dra-
riod, recurrent patterns can be traced. matically different from other movement fami-
Identifying such patterns is one thing, ex- lies (e.g., movements of the traditional left or
plaining them is more difficult. The shortage the extreme right).
of theories of protest development, let alone Figure 1 shows that NSM protests in Ger-
the lack of clearly specified hypotheses, im- many were concentrated in two periods - one
plies that the explanations presented here must in the late 1960s and one in the 1980s. Protests
be tentative and based primarily on inductive by other movements, in contrast, were infre-
and exploratory analyses rather than rigorous quent throughout the period and were hardly
tests of hypotheses. My aims are to sketch the affected by the ups and downs in the level of
broad contours of the terra incognita of pro- NSM protest. For this reason, I exclude protest
test dynamics and to point at some main roads events produced by other movements from the
for exploring it. analyses.
Both waves of NSM protest originated in
changes in the political opportunity structures
DATA
confronting these movements, particularly
The analysis focuses on protest events pro- changes in the position of the West German
duced by "new social movements" (NSMs) in Social Democrats (Koopmans 1992c; Kriesi,
West Germany between 1965 and 1989. New Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1992).1
social movements include the peace, ecology, My interest here, however, is in how the two
Third World solidarity, squatters', women's, protest waves developed after their emergence
gay, and student movements (including the and the factors that contributed to their ultimate
radical Communist and terrorist groups that decline.
sprang from the student movement). These Data on protest events were obtained by con-
movements became the major form of social tent coding the Monday issues of the Frank-
protest in Western Europe after the mid-1960s. furter Rundschau, one of West Germany's
This is especially true for West Germany, leading daily newspapers. The concentration
where they account for more than two-thirdson Monday issues of the newspaper differs
of all protest events in the period studied (seefrom other newspaper-based studies of pro-
Koopmans 1992c, p. 63). tests, which generally have included all issues
The validity of the concept of "new social of a newspaper or are based on newspaper in-
movements" is hotly debated and can only be dexes. Whereas sampling is the dominant form
touched upon here (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; of data gathering in many fields, protest event
D'Anieri, Ernst, and Kier 1990; Tucker 1991). analysis is haunted by what Tarrow called "the
I do not necessarily subscribe to the idea ad- fetish of thoroughness" (1989b, p. 363). How-
vanced by Touraine (1978) and Offe (1985) ever, sampling protest events substantially re-
that these movements represent a new political duces the amount of time and resources needed
paradigm whose form and content differ radi- for data gathering and thus may permit more
cally from those of "old" social movements, studies and the inclusion of more movements,
like the labor movement. What matters for my longer time periods, or several countries. For
present purpose is that empirical research has the analysis of many forms of protest (labor
shown that these movements share a common
social base in sections of the new middle class 1 This political opportunity perspective also sug-
and that levels of support for the various NSMs gests why the developmental trajectories of other
movements are unrelated to those of the NSMs. The
are strongly correlated at the individual level
labor movement, the extreme right, and farmers'
(Kriesi 1989, 1993). Moreover, the peaks and
movements have their own unique opportunity
valleys in the levels of mobilization achieved structures, so that political situations that stimulate
by the different NSMs tend to be strongly clus- the mobilization of NSMs may be totally irrelevant,
tered in time (see Duyvendak et al. 1992 for or even detrimental, to the mobilization of these
the Netherlands; Duyvendak 1992 for France; other movements.
DYNAMICS OF PROTEST WAVES IN GERMANY 639
300
*-4 New Social Movements
250 O-O OtherMovements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l
50
(L.
.0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

Year
Figure 1. Number of Protests by Year for Types of Social Movements: West Germany, 1965-1989
strikes are the main exception) the use of Mon- period 1965 to 1974 were weighted by a factor
day issues is a particularly efficient way of 4.33. The burden of proof, therefore, mainly
sampling. In modern Western democracies, rests on the data for 1975 to 1989; the data for
protests are heavily concentrated on week- the earlier period were included to test the gen-
erality of trends found in the second wave.
ends.2 This is especially true for important pro-
tests like mass rallies and demonstrations. Be- I also systematically compare the West Ger-
cause some important protests take place on man findings to similar data on protest waves
weekdays, I have also coded all weekday pro- in the Netherlands, Italy, and the United States.
tests referred to in the Monday paper.3 Impor- These data on protest waves of different move-
tant events that had taken place during the ments in different countries provide a broad
week were often referred to in announcements basis for generalizations on the dynamics of
or follow-up articles in the Monday papers (for protest waves.
details of the sampling and coding procedures
and the methodological issues involved, see
Variables
Koopmans 1992c, pp. 247-69).
For 1975 through 1989, the period of the sec- The analysis concentrates on the dynamic in-
ond protest wave, the sample included all Mon- terplay of four variables: two characteristics of
day issues of Frankfurter Rundschau. For the social movement mobilization (the action
period 1965 to 1974, the sample was limited to forms employed and the degree and type of or-
issues on the first Monday of each month. Thus, ganizational support) and two types of exter-
for the time series reported below, data for the nal interference in protest (repression and fa-
cilitation).
2 In Germany and most Western European coun- Action forms. I distinguish four main action
tries, Monday newspapers report the news of both
strategies on the basis of increasing radical-
weekend days. If a Sunday newspaper were pub-
ness.4 Demonstrative actions are legal actions
lished, the appropriate method would be to code
Sunday and Monday issues.
3 In such cases, the original report of the event 4 This categorization is similar to that employed
was consulted to code the necessary information. by Tarrow (1989b), except that Tarrow's "conven-
Non-weekend events constitute about one-fifth of tional" category is here termed "demonstrative." I
the sample (Koopmans 1992c, p. 258). reserve the label "conventional" for those political
that usually aim at mobilizing large numbers external allies, e.g., established political par-
of people. Examples of such actions are dem- ties, labor unions, or churches.
onstrations (legal and nonviolent), rallies, and Repression. Repression was measured using
petitions. Confrontational actions are also non- a simple dichotomous variable indicating the
violent, but they aim to disrupt official policies presence or absence of repressive intervention
or institutions, and for that reason are usually by the authorities. The most frequent types of
illegal. Confrontational actions are associated repression reported were police interventions,
with the strategy of "civil disobedience," e.g., such as arrests and violence. In other cases, re-
blockades, occupations, illegal (but nonviolent) pression was indicated if authorities depicted
demonstrations, and disturbances of meetings activists or organizers as criminals. In the case
of political adversaries. Actions involving light of conspiratorial forms of heavy violence (e.g.,
violence include limited forms of movement- bombings or arson), the reports usually did not
initiated violence, e.g., breaking windows or report a repressive reaction because the au-
throwing stones at the police during a demon- thorities' responses took place outside the
stration. A demonstration was coded as violent public's view (police investigations), or only
only if it was clear from the report that demon- became known some time after the event (ar-
strators initiated the violence. Peaceful demon- rests, convictions). Therefore, I excluded these.
strations that turned violent because of violent conspiratorial action forms when computing
intervention by the police were coded as peace- levels of repression.
ful demonstrations. If the report contained con- Facilitation. This variable indicates the pres-
flicting versions of who initiated violence or if ence or absence of support from established
the evidence was inconclusive, the coders were political actors for an action. In the case of the
instructed to give the demonstrators the ben- NSMs, such support came primarily from left-
efit of the doubt and to code the action as a wing political parties, labor unions, or
peaceful demonstration. Finally, actions in- churches. A protest event was coded as facili-
volving heavy violence include severe and usu-tated if an established organization was men-
ally conspiratorial violence, directed against tioned as an organizer or co-organizer, or if the
property (arson, bombings, sabotage) or people protest was organized by a peak SMO that in-
(political murders, kidnappings). cluded one or more established organizations
Organizational support. This variable indi- among its members.
cates types of organizations mentioned in the
newspaper report as organizers of a protest
TWO THEORIES
event. Protests for which no organizer was
mentioned were coded as no organization. Of Two theories provide a promising starting poin
course, some of these protests may have been for a search for patterns in waves of protest.5
organized by a social movement organization
(SMO) or by an external ally the newspaper
Karstedt-Henke: The Counterstrategies of
failed to mention. Nevertheless, I assume that
Authorities
such events had a significantly lower level of
organization than did protests for which an ex- In her analysis of the emergence of terrorism
plicit organizer was reported. For protests for in West Germany, Karstedt-Henke (1980) ar-
which an organizer was mentioned, four types gued that protest waves typically pass through
of organization were distinguished. Among so-
cial movement organizations, terrorist organi- 5 Three other bodies of theory also address as-
zations and Communist vanguard groups were pects of the dynamics of protest: "natural history"
distinguished from the much larger category of models of revolutions (Edwards 1965; Brinton
other SMOs. The fourth category consists of 1959); theories within the resource mobilization
protests organized by or organized jointly with perspective on the development of social movement
organizations (Zald and Ash 1966); and the popu-
lation ecology model of organizational develop-
actions that are usually associated with conven- ment (Hannan and Freeman 1987; Carroll 1988).
tional or established politics, e.g., lobbying, litiga- However, these theories are not very helpful here.
tion, and press conferences. For a full list of the ac- Revolutions are a unique type of protest, and, in
tion forms included in each category, see addition, natural history models are descriptive and
Koopmans 1992c, p. 264. deterministic at the same time (for a devastating cri-
four phases. In the initial phase of mobiliza- ization lead to a decline in protests - moder-
tion, authorities overreact to the emergence of ates are no longer interested in protest activity
protest. In an attempt to quell unrest, they fol-as their attention shifts to conventional chan-
low a strategy of repression, but because they nels of political participation, while the ex-
are caught off guard they do so in an inconsis- treme actions of radicals become too costly for
tent and undifferentiated way that provokes most social movement participants. Moreover,
public outrage and leads to further protests radical groups become closed to new partici-
(1980, pp. 200-209). Their initial strategy of pants because they are forced underground and
repression having failed, authorities, in the sec-because they develop an exclusive ideology
ond phase, combine continued repression of and organizational structure. The combined re-
some actions and organizations with efforts to sult of these tendencies is the fourth phase: la-
appease other parts of the protest movement tency of the potential for protest (1980, pp.
with concessions or facilitation. However, this 217-20).
double strategy cannot yet be implemented ef-
fectively because the authorities still have dif-
Tarrow: Competition Among Organizations
ficulty differentiating between "good" and
"bad" protesters, and sometimes apply the Tarrow's (1989a, 1989b) theory of protest dy-
wrong measures to the wrong group (1980, pp. namics is more complex than Karstedt-Henke's
209-13). Thus, the radical and moderate wings model. According to Tarrow (1989a), social
of the movement continue to grow, but become movements emerge "when new opportunities
increasingly distinguishable. In the third phase, are at hand - such as a less repressive climate,
this differentiation among activists, which of- splits within the elite, or the presence of influ-
ten provokes internal conflicts, offers the au- ential allies or supporters" (p. 51). Subse-
thorities opportunities to exploit the double quently, protests spread through the diffusion
strategy. Moderate wings are integrated into of tactical innovations developed by early pro-
the political system and will gradually aban- testers to other themes, groups, and locations.
don protest activities, while radical wings are Such diffusion is not a spontaneous process,
not satisfied with the gains that have been however, but:
made, and decisions about further protest ac-
follows an organized logic through competition
tivities increasingly become their exclusive do- and tactical innovation within the social move-
main. This radicalization of a movement's ac- ment sector .... Competition intensifies the evo-
tions is reinforced by the authorities' reactions. lution of the repertoire toward more radical forms,
Robbed of their moderate allies within and out- as movements try to show they are more daring
side the movement, radicals are now con- than their opponents .... At the peak of mobiliza-
fronted with full-scale repression. The result is tion the increased propensity to engage in disrup-
tive collective action leads to the formation of new
spiraling violence and counterviolence, which
movement organizations and draws old organiza-
produces terrorist organizations (1980, pp.
tions into the social movement sector. The com-
213-17). Ultimately, integration and radical- petition between these SMOs for mass support
leads to a radicalization of tactics and themes. The
tique, see Rule and Tilly 1972). Theories of SMO resulting intensification of conflict reduces the
development, like resource mobilization theory in audience for social movement activity and trig-
general, address only organizational aspects of so- gers a spiral of sectarian involution, on the one
cial movements. Moreover, the development of hand, and of goal displacement, on the other....
SMOs is not representative of the development of [As a result,] the cycle declines through a symbi-
protest waves at large. As I show below, the growth otic combination of violence and institutionaliza-
of SMOs is more a product than a cause of protest tion. (1989a, pp. 8, 54; 1989b, pp. 14, 16)
waves. This problem is shared by the population
ecology model. Moreover, the population ecology Tarrow thus shares Karstedt-Henke's belief
model's basic assumption of a relatively stable that violence and institutionalization are linked
"carrying capacity" (Hannan and Freeman 1987, p. products of protest waves and that the combi-
912; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, p. 59; for a critique,
nation of these processes is the main cause of
see Young 1988) of the social systems it analyzes
their decline. However, the explanations for
seems to be untenable for the social movement sec-
tor, which, as Figure 1 indicates, is characterized these developments differ. In Karstedt-Henke's
by sharp fluctuations over relatively short periods model, factors external to the social movement,
of time. particularly the shifting counterstrategies of the
authorities, determine the development

gains in memberships for professional social o
test. Tarrow, on the contrary,
movement organizations. emphasizes
nal factors and sees Similar competition
developments can be tracedamong
in the s
movement organizations and between SMOs two German protest waves. Figure 2 shows the
and established political organizations as the occurrences of the four main strategies used by
crucial mechanism. NSMs between 1965 and 1989. As in the Ital-
ian, American, and Dutch cases, confronta-
tional actions were heavily concentrated in the
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTION
initial stages of the two waves, around 1968
REPERTOIRE
and 1981, respectively. As McAdam (1983)
From the available studies of protest develop- and Tarrow (1989a, 1989b) noted, these strate-
ment, a surprisingly regular pattern emerges gies often included important tactical innova-
that conforms to Karstedt-Henke's and tions that enabled movements to transcend the
Tarrow's hypotheses about the shifts in action constraints attached to traditional repertoires of
repertoires that occur over the course of pro- contention (Tilly 1986, p. 4). In the 1960s, a
test waves. whole range of new action forms were intro-
In his study of the Italian protest wave be- duced in West Germany. Many of these actions
tween 1965 and 1975, Tarrow found that non- crossed the Atlantic, having been developed
violent, confrontational actions like blockades first by the civil rights and anti-Vietnam-War
and occupations peaked early in the wave. movements in the United States: teach-ins, sit-
More moderate, demonstrative actions peaked ins and go-ins, occupations of universities and
a few years later, and they increasingly in- an overarching strategy of nonviolent civil dis-
volved established allies like unions. Violence, obedience. The tactical innovations that helped
finally, was most common in the late stages of launch the second wave partly consisted of the
the wave, after other forms of action had be- extension of these forms of protest outside the
gun to decline (1989b, p. 70). Moreover, mass student milieu and their adaptation to new
violence was increasingly replaced by more goals. In addition, new tactics were introduced,
extreme forms of violence by small groups of which site occupation6 and squatting were
(Della Porta and Tarrow 1986, pp. 618-19; the most important (see Koopmans 1992c, pp.
Tarrow 1989b, p. 306). 132-36). The authorities were generally unpre-
McAdam's (1982) study of the American pared for such strategies, whose novelty and
civil rights movement provides additional evi- spectacular nature ensured wide coverage in
dence for these basic trends. Here as well, the the media. Thus, these innovations partly off-
wave started with confrontational actions like set the unequal balance of power between chal-
bus boycotts and sit-ins, gradually took on a lengers and authorities, and their initial success
mass character, and subsequently began to dis- contributed to the rapid diffusion of protests in
integrate as radicalization (e.g., ghetto rioting) the early stages of the two waves.
and institutionalization (e.g., increased external However, as their novelty waned and au-
support for the more moderate NAACP) set in thorities learned to respond more effectively,
(McAdam 1982, pp. 209, 222, 253). confrontational actions declined, although they
Analyses of Dutch protests for the period made a modest comeback in the late stages of
1975-1989 also confirm this pattern (Koop-
mans 1992a, 1992b). The initial protests 6 The strategy consists of occupying the site of a
around 1980 were disruptive, e.g. squattingfuture and nuclear power plant, runway, or road. This
blockading nuclear power stations and ammu- strategy had the advantage that, in most cases, the
nition transports. This was followed by a se- protesters were not immediately evicted because the
ries of mass demonstrations by the peace authorities lacked a legal basis to intervene. Subse-
movement that were strongly supported by po- quently, the occupiers often constructed makeshift
"hut villages" on the site, which developed into
litical parties, churches, and labor unions. In
small, self-sustaining worlds serving as organiza-
the second half of the 1980s, protests declined,
tional centers and as places where solidarities could
and violent action forms became more com- be forged, bridges between moderates and radicals
mon and increased in intensity to include ar- could be built, and the continuity of mobilization
son and bomb attacks. At the same time, insti- could be assured (Ehmke 1987, pp. 67-76;
tutionalization set in, which led to spectacular Himmelheber and Philipp 1982).
200
0
1 5 0- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
i.0
.00 100
E-0
50
50
C)
0
200
0>
. 100 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0 -71I
o~
00
-W0
W 25
0-
0 2
&~.2)
M 15
1.
.0
25
0
195 17095 18 9518
I-> 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - Year- -
Fiue2 ye fAtosUedb e oilMvmns y er etGray 9518
the two waves. In the periods

wave, immediately
the increase in heavy violence was also f
lowing the 1968 and 1981 outbreaks of pro- particularly pronounced for violence against
tests, more moderate, demonstrative actions people. Of the protests involving heavy vio-
that often mobilized large numbers of people lence between 1980 and 1984, only 4 percent
increasingly dominated the stage. As I will involved violence against people, whereas
from 1985 onwards 25 percent involved vio-
show below, this tendency reflects the increas-
ing involvement of professional SMOs and ex- lence against people. Thus Della Porta and
ternal allies. Tarrow's (1986) findings on the development
Protests involving light violence followed a of different forms of violence are confirmed by
trajectory similar to confrontational protests, the German data.
with a somewhat stronger resurgence in the Whether this tendency toward radicalization
waves' final stages. Activists often turned to in the late stages of the two protest waves was
light violence as a response to increasing re- accompanied by a trend toward institutionaliza-
pression of confrontational tactics. Thus, 1969 tion can be answered only to a limited extent by
was the peak year for occurrences of light vio- the protest event data. The increasing domi-
lence in the first wave, i.e., one year after the nance of demonstrative actions in the years
peak year for confrontational protests. In the around 1972 and 1983 and the increasing in-
second wave, confrontational protests and pro- volvement of established allies in these actions
tests involving light violence both peaked in are the first signs of institutionalization. After
1981. Confrontational actions, however, de- these years, however, the relative importance of
clined sharply during the second half of the demonstrative actions and the involvement of
year while the number of protests involving allies in protests declined again. However, the
light violence reached a maximum intensity in movements did not de-institutionalize. At first,
late 1981 and early 1982, after the authorities institutionalization may lead to a shift towards
started an offensive against squatters (resulting more moderate goals and actions and increased
in the death of one activist) and violently involvement of established allies and profes-
cleared an occupied runway construction site sional SMOs in unconventional protest. As in-
near Frankfurt (Mulhak 1983; Rucht 1984; stitutionalization proceeds, however, the move-
Koopmans 1992c, pp. 178-94). ment increasingly turns toward conventional
Thus, the seeds of institutionalization and strategies and exits from the protest scene. This
radicalization were planted by the growing in- may take several forms. SMOs may institution-
volvement of professional SMOs and external alize themselves by substituting a reliance on
allies on the one hand, and the increasing re- access to the media and the conventional policy
pression of confrontational actions, on the process for mobilization of their constituency,
other. In the late stages of the waves, these and by replacing the active involvement of ad-
trends became increasingly prominent - herents with that of a few professionals, who
heavy violence peaked late in the two waves, are paid with the membership contributions of
after the aggregate number of protests had al- an otherwise passive constituency.
ready declined substantially. This trend is not Institutionalization may also find expression
immediately clear for the first wave because within the party system, either in the emergence
most actions involving heavy violence oc- of new parties, or in increased support for es-
cuffed relatively early, between 1969 and 1972. tablished parties. In the first wave, institution-
However, these figures obscure the radical- alization was primarily reflected in increased
ization that occurred within this category: Of support for the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
the protests involving heavy violence between and its reform program. After 1968, the SPD
1968 and 1973, only 8 percent involved vio- made large electoral gains and it even became
lence against people, whereas between 1974 the largest party in the elections of 1972. More-
and 1977, 50 percent were directed against over, hundreds of thousands of new members
swelled the ranks of the party, particularly its
people. This trend culminated in a series of ter-
rorist attacks by the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red youth organization, the Jusos.7 The most im-
Army Faction, RAF) and other groups between
1975 and 1977, in which several dozens people 7 Similarly, in Italy the Communist Party enlisted
were killed, many of them high-ranking politi- several hundred thousand new members (Tarrow
cians, judges, and businessmen. In the second 1990, p. 269). In the Netherlands, the New Left par-
portant form of institutionalization in the sec-

for the seemingly contradictory development
ond wave was the success of the Green Party. of protest waves toward institutionalization and
Federal election results for the Green Party in- radicalization, although perhaps incomplete, is
creased from 1.5 percent in 1980 to 5.6 percent quite convincing. Political elites can choose
in 1983 and 8.3 percent in 1987.8 Moreover, between two basic reactions to protest: con-
since 1985 - when the first coalition between frontation or integration. Both repression and
the SPD and the Green Party was formed in facilitation typically are selective: Activists
Hesse - the Green Party has increasingly par- with radical goals and strategies are more
ticipated in government on the state level. Fur- likely to be subjected to repression, whereas
ther signs of the institutionalization of protest moderate wings are more likely to receive fa-
were the inclusion of NSMs' themes in the cilitation. Thus, different wings of social move-
SPD's program and the co-optation of several ments receive different strategic cues.
movement leaders among its personnel. This Radical wings, which disproportionally con-
time, however, institutionalization was not lim-front repression, are likely to be further
ited to party politics. The late 1980s also saw radicalized and develop anti-systemic identities
strong membership increases for several na- that may escalate violence on both sides. Mod-
tional, professional SMOs, primarily within theerates, on the other hand, receive cues that work
ecology movement. The total membership of toward further moderation (see also Koopmans
such SMOs increased from about 100,000 in 1990, 1992c). Political parties may support the
1975 to well over one million in 1989. Mem- moderate sections of a movement conditional
bership gains were strongest after 1985, when upon de-radicalizing demands and the strate-
mass participation in unconventional protests gies used to advance them. State facilitation or
had begun to decline. co-optation of social movement organizations
Thus the two German protest waves reveal may occur as well, but again, it is unlikely to be
striking parallels in the development of their granted unconditionally. Thus, the reactions of
action repertoire. In turn, the two German established political actors typically reinforce
waves parallel the development of NSM pro- divisions among the activists, which leads to a
tests in the Netherlands, the Italian protest twin process of moderation and radicalization.
wave of the 1960s and early 1970s, and the This development need not be the result of a
American civil rights movement. Each of theseconscious "divide and rule" strategy by the au-
protest waves started with confrontational ac-thorities, as is suggested by Karstedt-Henke.
tions, subsequently entered a phase dominated Members of the polity may themselves be in-
by more moderate mass mobilization, and ternally divided, e.g., among government par-
ended in a twin process of institutionalization ties, between government and opposition or
and radicalization. between political authorities who prefer inte-
grative strategies and law enforcement authori-
ties who prefer more repressive strategies.
REPRESSION AND FACILITATION
Nevertheless, the data suggest that repres-
Although Karstedt-Henke's model may hinge sion and facilitation are also employed strate-
too much on a single explanatory factor - the gically in attempts to create or reinforce divi-
reactions of political elites - and is somewhat sions among protesters. Figure 3 shows, for the
deterministic in that it sees terrorism as an in- period 1975 to 1989, the percent of protests
evitable outcome of protest waves, it nonethe- using each of three main social movement
less offers valuable insights. Her explanation strategies that were repressed or facilitated (ac-
tions involving light violence or heavy vio-
ties and the Communist Party were the main ben- lence are combined).9
eficiaries of the institutionalization of protest
(Koopmans 1992a). 9 Because the numbers of violent protests and
8 The Green Party was less successful in the elec-confrontational protests were low in some years, I
tions of 1990, in which they received (in former combined data for the periods 1975-1977, 1978-
West Germany) only 4.8 percent of the vote. How- 1980, 1981, 1982-1984, 1985-1987 and 1988-
ever, these elections were unusual because they 1989. (Figures for 1965-1974 are not shown for the
were heavily dominated by the issue of unification.same reason). The figure for 1981 refers to that year
In state elections, support for the Green Party has only, to permit a test of Karstedt-Henke's idea of
been relatively stable since 1987. initial overreaction.
100
80 l_ ------ . -- 2.v.-s....- --- -------.....,
0CC 60 - - -- - -- -- - -- -- - --------__ _ _
IL
0
-w
(L 20 - -
1975 1980 1985 1989

Year
0
0~ 100
la 8 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U . 6 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IL
q - 4 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1975 1980 1985 1989
Year
|-- Demonstrative Protests X Confrontational Protests 0........ Violent Protests|
Figure 3. Percent of Protests Repressed and Facilitated by Year for Three Types of
1989
Clearly, repression increases with increas- established political parties,11 labor unions, or
ingly radical strategies used by protesters. churches rose from 4 percent in the 1975 to
More interesting, here, however, is the devel- 1977 period to a maximum of 30 percent in the
opment of repression over time. Karstedt- 1982 to 1987 period. By contrast, external sup-
Henke's hypothesis that authorities overreact to port for confrontational protests increased
initial protests receives only limited support: slightly from 3 percent in the 1975 to 1977 pe-
For all three strategies, repression is somewhat riod to 7 percent between 1982 and 1989. Fa-
higher in 1981 than it is in the preceding years, cilitation of violent protests was negligible
but the differences are rather small. However, throughout the wave. Thus, intensified repres-
the changes in the use of repression after 1981 sion increased the relative costs of nonviolent
are more significant. The percent of violent disruptions over the course of the wave, while
protests and demonstrative protests that en- facilitation by established actors decreased the
counter repression remains relatively stable relative costs of moderate protests.12
throughout the period - about 75 percent of On the other hand, increased repression may
violent protests and 20 percent of demonstra- have provoked some activists to turn to vio-
tive protests. However, repression against con- lence. Repression against nonviolent protest
frontational protests changes considerably over de-legitimizes the state's monopoly on vio-
the course of the protest wave. Initially, repres- lence and strengthens the position of those ac-
sion against such actions resembles that for de- tivists who see reactive violence as legitimate.
monstrative actions, but then increases sub- Moreover, the shift to violence is facilitated
stantially and ends up at a level close to that because the cost of violence compared to the
for violent protests. Interestingly, a similar pat-cost of nonviolent disruption decreases. The fi-
tern can be traced for the 1980s protest wave nal result of these countervailing pressures is
in the Netherlands (Koopmans 1992b). an erosion of the middle ground of the action
Thus, instead of a general rise or decline in repertoire - nonviolent confrontations - and
repression over the course of the wave, only the simultaneous development of moderation
repression against confrontational but nonvio- and radicalization as hypothesized by Karstedt-
lent protests increases. This strategic increase Henke.
in repression is perfectly suited to the creation
of divisions within movements.10 As nonvio-
lent disruption becomes more costly and its ORGANIZATION AND SPONTANEITY
practitioners are depicted and treated as crimi-
Two Views on the Role of Organizations
nals, protesters who use such strategies are in-
creasingly forced to choose sides. The in- Tarrow's explanation for the changing reper-
creased costs of nonviolent disruptions favor toire
a of protest emphasized the role of organi-
turn to more moderate actions, a trend that zations
is and the competition among them. In the
often reinforced by the involvement of estab- early phase of a protest wave, competition
lished actors in the protests. Figure 3b shows among SMOs, which try to outbid each other in
that the increase in facilitation by established radicalness and determination, still plays a posi-
political actors in the course of the 1980s wave
II The Green Party is not included within this cat-
was heavily concentrated on the more moder-
egory. Including the Green Party does not signifi-
ate demonstrative protests. The percentage of
cantly alter the results. The main difference is that
demonstrative protests that were supported by the increase in facilitation for confrontational pro-
tests is somewhat larger, from 3 percent in 1975 to
1977 to a maximum of 15 percent between 1982
10 That such a strategy was at least partly delib- and 1984.
erate is indicated by a "New Internal Security Strat- 12 McAdam (1982) found similar patterns in the
egy for the 1980s," that was unfolded by a leading reactions of authorities and external supporters to
police theorist in an article in the journal of the Ger- the civil rights movement. Repression focused on
man police and in a book published in early 1982. the more radical organizations like SNCC and
Although this strategy envisaged a more tolerant CORE, whereas the NAACP received more be-
approach to moderate sections of the NSMs, a nevolent treatment. The sharp increase in external
tougher line was recommended against militant mi- support after 1964 benefited the NAACP, while
norities to isolate them from the rest of the move- support for the other groups declined (McAdam
ments (Brand 1988, p. 212). 1982, pp. 209-17).
tive role and accounts for the diffusion of dis- These two diametrically opposed views of
ruptive tactics: "The expanding phase of the the role of organizations cannot both be true.
cycle is the result, not of pure spontaneity, but Tarrow's interpretation implies two hypoth-
of the competition between movement organi- eses: (1) Disruption should be highest when or-
zations and their old competitors for mass sup- ganizational competition is strongest; (2) pro-
port" (Tarrow 1989b, p. 10; see also pp. 186, tests in which organizations are involved
193). However, as new organizations are at- should be more disruptive than "unorganized"
tracted by the successes of pioneer SMOs, the protests. The first hypothesis is proven wrong
social movement sector becomes increasingly by Tarrow's own data: Nonviolent disruptions
crowded, and organizers are forced to adopt peaked early in the Italian protest wave, in
1968 and 1969 (Tarrow 1989b, p. 81). How-
more radical strategies in order to maintain their
organization's positions or to create a niche forever, in those same years, unorganized protests
themselves. "In a competitive social movement peaked as well (Tarrow 1989b, pp. 65-66). In
sector, when the most extreme groups adopt other words, organizations declined in impor-
violent stands, it is difficult for any group to tance at a time when protests spread spectacu-
come out against violence" (Tarrow 1989b, p. larly and their disruptiveness peaked. It is hard
284). This violence turns people off and ulti- to see how competition can be strongest at a
mately draws the protest wave to a close.13 time when the "market" expands dramatically
Tarrow's view of SMOs as sources of dis- and the number of competitors is at its lowest
ruption and violence differs sharply from the point relative to the size of the market.
view of Piven and Cloward (1977), who ar- With regard to the second hypothesis, how-
gued, "Whatever influence lower-class groups ever, the Italian evidence seems to confirm
occasionally exert in American politics does Tarrow's expectation: Protests that involved no
not result from organization, but from mass organizations were the least disruptive; protests
protest and the disruptive consequences of pro- in which a union was involved were slightly
test .... Protest wells up in response to mo- more disruptive; protests in which an "external
group" was involved were much more disrup-
mentous changes in the institutional order. It is
not created by organizers and leaders" (p. 36). tive; and protests involving a union and an "ex-
Thus, organizations are not the driving force ternal group" were even more disruptive.
behind protest expansion and disruption, but on Therefore, Tarrow concluded that "competition
the contrary, take the disruptive sting out of for worker support was a direct cause of dis-
protests, by diverting resources into more con- ruption and thus of the high point of social
ventional - and in the view of Piven and movement mobilization" (Tarrow 1989b, p.
Cloward less effective - channels.14 186). However, apart from the fact that this
conclusion contradicts Tarrow's other findings,
13 Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) explained the other reasons cast doubt on this conclusion.
particularly high level of violence in the Italian pro- Tarrow's claim would have been strong if his
test wave in a similar manner: "To the extent that data referred only to attempts to mobilize a
violence is a tactical differentiation within an over- worker constituency. However, Tarrow com-
crowded social movement sector, it is the size of
bined all protests, including the many protests
the "market" for social protest that determines the
in which "extreme left- and extreme right-wing
extent of violence that will result from it. And
groups attacked one another's headquarters or
Italy's was surely a highly developed social move-
ment sector" (p. 629). This is not confirmed in the engaged in physical confrontations in the
German data. Although the protest wave of the streets" (Tarrow 1989b, p. 232). In other
1980s was more "developed" in every respect than words, not all protests between 1966 and 1973
the wave of the 1960s, and thus more "over- were designed to mobilize workers. In fact, a
crowded," violence played a much larger role in the sizable proportion of the "external groups"
action repertoire of NSMs in the first wave were mobilizing against that constituency. Vio-
(Koopmans 1992c, pp. 89, 100).
lent conflicts between left-wing and right-wing
14 Adherents of the resource mobilization ap-
groups can hardly be interpreted as competi-
proach have challenged this position and have dem-
onstrated the important role of organizations in the tion for a single "market."15
diffusion of disruptive protests, even in the cases
studied by Piven and Cloward (Gamson and 15 Tarrow remarked that almost all violent con-
Schmeidler 1984; Morris 1984; Valocchi 1990). flicts in his sample were of this type (Tarrow
Organization and Spontaneity in the West However, organizations were more impor-
German Protest Waves tant before and after these peak years. Thus,
organizations were heavily involved in the
What is the relation between the spread of pro- early stages of the 1960s' protest wave. Until
tests, organization, and the radicalness of the 1966, most protests were organized by two na-
action repertoire in Germany? Is the diffusion tional SMOs, the Socialist German Student
of protests the work of SMOs, or is it sponta- League (SDS), and the peace movement's
neous? Are disruption and violence a result of Campaign For Disarmament. However, after
competition among organizations, or does or- 1967, the roles of these organizations declined
ganization lead to a moderation of the action sharply. After the SDS and the Campaign For
repertoire? Figure 4 shows the development of Disarmament had cleared the ground, protests
the number of protests that involved particular began to diffuse much more spontaneously, of-
organizations. Consistent with Tarrow's data, ten as a direct reaction to repression, e.g., the
for each wave the year with the greatest in- shooting of a demonstrator in June 1967 and
crease in the number of protests (1968 and the assault on student leader Rudi Dutschke in
1981) was also the year in which the propor- April 1968. By 1970, both the SDS and the
tion of protests that were unorganized16 wasCampaign For Disarmament dissolved because
highest (56 percent in 1968; 64 percent in they had lost control of events and were torn
1981). These years were also characterized by apart by factional strife (Fichter and
a particularly high level of confrontational Lonnendonker 1977, pp. 140ff.; Otto 1977, pp.
events (see Figure 2). In other words, as in 172ff.).
Italy, the involvement of organizations and the As Figure 4 indicates, their place in the pro-
competition among them cannot account for test scene was taken over by other, rather dif-
the rapid spread of protests or their disruptive ferent, organizations. The increase in protests
characters brought more moderate external allies into the
social movement sector. Most prominent
1989b, p. 304). In other words, violence within the among these were the youth organizations of
Italian protest wave can only to a limited extent be the SPD, the liberal Free Democratic Party
seen as the result of competition for a single con- (FDP) and the unions. Although the goals sup-
stituency. This violence can more aptly be de- ported by these allies were generally much
scribed as a "war" between the extreme left and the more moderate than the goals of the period
extreme right. Of course, wars can be interpreted in
around 1968, facilitation was an important ve-
terms of competition, but competition that aims to
hicle for extending protests to a mass public:
destroy competitors differs sharply from the com-
petition among parties for the support of the elec-
On average, facilitated protests mobilized over
torate or the competition among SMOs for the sup- four times as many people as unfacilitated pro-
port of a constituency. In the case of war, the most tests. These tendencies toward institutionaliza-
violent competitor is indeed likely to win. In a com- tion were accompanied by radicalization of
petition for a constituency, violence is only one op- sections of the movements. Like their com-
tion and probably not the most effective choice, rades in Italy, these radical sections saw the
since competition for a constituency often hinges
creation of tightly structured vanguard organi-
on winning the support of the moderate center.
zations as a prerequisite for the continuation
16 "Unorganized" protests are not purely sponta-
and radicalization of protests. Thus, from 1969
neous outbursts of collective action by isolated in-
dividuals, as suggested by "classical" models of on, the number of protests produced by radical
collective behavior. In many cases, such protests Communist groups or terrorist organizations
originate in informal networks and subcultural andincreased.
countercultural infrastructures, i.e., in the social or- Figure 4 illustrates the transitional character
ganization of a movement's constituency. The term of the mid-1970s, which bore the imprint of the
"unorganized" conveys only that such protests are
not the result of mobilization by formal SMOs, al- [wildcat strikes] was to a degree characteristic of
though they may be an unintended by-product of all the major strike waves scrutinized in this vol-
such efforts. ume" (Haimson and Brian 1989, p. 39). Cronin
17 The analyses of strike waves in Haimson and summarized the conclusion of his contribution as
Tilly 1989 confirm this conclusion. In their intro- follows: "Strike movements built unions, but
duction to the volume, Haimson and Brian con- unions did not overall do a great deal to increase
cluded: "This process of 'deinstitutionalization' strike propensity" (Cronin 1989, p. 98).
200
C 150
0
N
co
100 _ -----
C 120
280
60 - - -
E
0
10 -5 - - - - -- -- -- - - - -- -- --+-
0
CI) 0
40
co 35 - - - - 1989
^i________-- - - - -1- - - -
8 0 - - - - - - - __ - - - - - - __ - - -0 _
20
0 co
;Ew 15 - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
2 0
I- 5
0~
100
< 60 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
S..
20 40 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
w
20 - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

Year
Figure 4. Number of Protests by Year Involving Different Organizations: West Germany, 1965-1989
decline of the first wave and

on signaled the
the commitment rise of of activ-
and imagination
the second wave. Protests that were supported ists than on other resources (e.g., the SDS and
by an external ally declined sharply after 1972 the civic initiatives) are important at the start
as a result of the SPD's turn toward conserva- of a protest wave. In this initial phase, protests
tism following the resignation of Chancellor require strategic planning and patience. How-
Willy Brandt. The involvement of Communist ever, once early protests have shown the way,
groups reached its zenith around the middle of the costs and difficulties of staging subsequent
the decade, but subsequently these groups were protests decrease. Actions that might require
quickly marginalized. The actions of terrorist months or even years of preparation in less
groups increased until the fall of 1977, but de- conducive circumstances may be accomplished
clined rapidly after the suicides of the RAF's almost instantaneously at these times of gen-
leaders in Stammheim prison. Meanwhile, eral arousal. Leaflets, rumors, intensified me-
however, protests organized by other SMOs dia coverage, or brutal police repression may
began to increase, dominated in this period by a then do the job of movement organizers, who
new type of organization, the so-called BUrger- often are unable to control the energies their
initiativen (civic initiatives), which were lo- pioneer actions have unleashed. In that sense,
cally-based, nonideological, loosely organized the diffusion of protests is neither spontaneous
groups that mobilized heretofore acquiescent nor organized, but rather an often uneasy com-
sections of the population. Thus, as in the bination of the two.
1960s, organizations played an important role After disruptive protests have peaked, the im-
in the initial phase of the second protest wave. portance of organizations increases again.
Again, the role of organizations was more mod- However, the organizations that dominate in
est in the period during which protests spread this period often differ from the organizations
most spectacularly: Between 1978 and 1981, that started the wave. Basically, these later or-
the increase in unorganized protests was over ganizations reflect the twin tendencies toward
five times greater than the increase in protests radicalization and institutionalization. External
organized by SMOs. allies try to profit from the mobilization by en-
The BUrgerinitiativen had experimented with tering the social movement sector, which ex-
new forms of action and organization, and their tends protests to a wider public and exerts a
successes had raised the public's belief in the moderating influence on goals and actions. In
efficacy of protest. Nevertheless, in doing so, addition, pre-existing or newly founded profes-
they had opened up space for protests that to a sional SMOs may try to get a slice of the protest
large extent was filled by others - initially by pie. Radicalization may be accompanied by the
relatively spontaneous actions (e.g., the squat- formation of new organizations, too, although
ters' movement), and later by the Green Party, the high degree of organization characteristic of
the SPD, the churches, and the unions, as well the radicalism of the 1970s seems to be a result
as professional SMOs. of the Marxist theories and Leninist models of
Radicalization in the second wave differed organization that predominated at the time.
from that in the first wave. The confrontational Table 1 shows the relationship between the
and violent protests after 1968 were dominatedinvolvement of organizations and the action
by Communist vanguard organizations and ter-repertoire. Contrary to Tarrow, moderate pro-
rorist groups, but the radicals of the 1980s tests more often involved SMOs or external al-
tended to reject organization, not least because lies than did the more radical protests. Two-
of the failure of their radical predecessors' or-thirds of demonstrative protests were supported
ganizational models. Thus, although Figure 4 by established allies, "other SMOs," or a com-
shows a modest increase in the actions by ter- bination of the two. The large majority of the
rorist organizations in the second half of the more radical protests did not involve an or-
1980s, the majority of the violence in this pe- ganization: Only one-third of confrontational
riod was produced by small and nameless events and one-fifth of the protests involving
light violence were supported by an SMO or
circles of activists, as reflected in the revival
of unorganized protests. an established ally.18
Summarizing, the role of organizations var-
ies over the course of a protest wave. Informal,
18 The relation between organizations and type
loosely-structured organizations that rely more
of protest seems to change at the far radical end of
Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Protests by Involvement of Organizations, for Types of Protest: West Germany,
1965-1989
Protests Protests
Type of Demonstrative Confrontational Using Light Using Heavy Total
Organization Protests Protests Violence Violence Protests
No organization 37.3 63.8 79.7 63.6 47.7
Communist 1.2 2.4 2.0 0.0 1.5
Terrorist 0.0 2.7 2.7 30.7 2.9
Other SMO 27.4 20.1 11.5 4.3 23.1
External ally 15.6 5.8 1.4 0.7 11.5
Other SMO + external ally 18.5 5.1 2.7 0.7 13.3
Total percent 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9
Number 1,296 412 148 140 1,996
The patterns role

of of SMOsinvolvement
in the American protest wave of
the 1960s, concluded:
that appear in the two German protest waves
are confirmed by studies of other protest
Created hastily and expanding rapidly, SMOs
waves. Dutch protests in the period 1975 to controlled but a small part of their total social in-
1989 reveal a remarkably similar pattern: teraction field. Only a small fraction of the total
Loosely-structured organizations and ad hoc resources expended upon movement activity by
initiatives dominated in the initial phase of the transitory teams and the wider circles of sympa-
wave, but few organizations were involved in thizers actually passed directly through a central
the rapid spread of protests between 1980 and leadership group with a resource allocation ca-
pacity. The communications network between the
1982. Subsequently, professional SMOs and
leadership and rank and file was rudimentary, and
external allies dominated, while protests - or-
relied heavily on the mass media over which
ganized and unorganized - involving violence SMOs had little direct control. (p. 267)
also increased. As in Germany, unorganized
protests were the most radical in the Nether- McAdam's (1982, pp. 147-48) study of the
lands, while protests involving SMOs or exter- civil rights movement found that the grassroots
nal allies were more moderate (Koopmans organizations that dominated the movement's
1992b). early phase gradually became less prominent,
Killian's (1984) analysis of two campaigns while the involvement of formal movement or-
of the civil rights movement in Tallahassee, ganizations and external support increased.
Florida, also found that the initial phase of a These findings support Piven and Cloward's
protest wave is characterized by a "mixture of argument that the involvement of organizations
planning and spontaneity .... Spontaneity is has a moderating influence rather than a dis-
especially likely to be important in the early ruptive influence as Tarrow suggests. The
stages of a social movement and during periods blockades and violent demonstrations after the
of transition from one type of action to another"assault on Dutschke in April 1968 were not or-
(pp. 777-80). Oberschall (1978), studying the chestrated by organizations. Similarly, the
1981 squatters' protests were more a result of
spontaneous imitation and the mobilization of
the action repertoire. Protests involving heavy vio- pre-existing networks of activists than of care-
lence were more organized than protests involving ful planning and organization. Nevertheless,
light violence. Moreover, among protests involving
the role of spontaneity in the spread of disrup-
heavy violence, those directed against people in-
tive protests should not be overemphasized.
volved an organization in two-thirds of the cases, a
These episodes would never have occurred
level similar to that for demonstrative protests. This
is, of course, related to the conspiratorial nature of without the groundwork laid by organizations
such protests, which require careful planning: like the SDS and civic initiatives, which suc-
Kidnappings or political murders do not happen cessfully experimented with new strategies and
spontaneously. introduced new issues into the political agenda.
Only after the peak of disruption do organiza- Nardo (1985), on the other hand, emphasized
tions become a moderating force, as profes- the "power of numbers," although he acknowl-
sional SMOs and established allies join the edged that "violence can be used to compen-
movements to exploit the pool of members, sate for inadequate support" (p. 200). Tarrow
adherents, and voters revealed by the eruption (1989a) argued that "the power of protest lies
of protests. Thus, Piven and Cloward's stress neither in its numbers . . . nor in its level of
on the spontaneity of disruptions and the mod- violence,... but in its threat to burst through
erating influence of organizations, and their the boundaries of the accepted limits of social
critics' emphasis on the importance of organi- behavior" (p. 7; Piven and Cloward [1977] ar-
zations in preparing the ground for disruption, gued in a similar vein). Rochon's (1990, p.
both contain an element of truth. The main dif- 108) view that all three elements of movement
ference between these interpretations is their power - which he labels militancy, size, and
focus on different types of organizations and novelty - are important seems more realistic
different periods in the mobilization process. than a reductionist emphasis on one of these
elements. These three elements are particularly
relevant here because they can be easily linked
DISCUSSION: DETERMINANTS OF THE
to the three main action strategies: Demonstra-
RISE AND FALL OF PROTEST WAVES
tive protests aim primarily to mobilize the
The findings presented point to striking regu- power of numbers; confrontational protests are
larities in the development of protest waves most suited to capitalize on the advantages of
that are independent of the particular themes novelty; and violence clearly aims to change
addressed and movements involved and that policies through a display of militant force and
can be found in countries as divergent as Ger- determination.
many, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United Social movements derive power from large
States. Karstedt-Henke's explanation for these size because the more people who are mobi-
regularities, which emphasizes the effects of lized, the more the legitimacy of the authori-
repression and facilitation by established politi- ties and their policies is called into question.
cal actors, finds more support in the data than Moreover, in democracies, participants in so-
does Tarrow's focus on competition among or- cial movements and their sympathizers are also
ganizations. voters, so that size can become a considerable
Nevertheless, Karstedt-Henke's explanation electoral factor.
is not wholly satisfactory: It assumes that the The power of novelty lies, apart from the
fragmentation of social movements into mod- media attention it attracts, in its unpredic-
erate and radical components and the ensuing tability and the insecurity it provokes among
decline in protests are the result of cunning established actors about the limits and conse-
counterstrategies devised by the authorities, andquences of protests (Tarrow 1989b, p. 59).
that social movements are powerless victims in Moreover, novelty gives protesters a strategic
their hands. Although repression and facilita- advantage - authorities are unprepared for
tion can have powerful effects on the relative new strategies, political actors, and themes.
costs and benefits of different strategies open to Given the inertia of institutional politics, effec-
social movements, Karstedt-Henke's explana- tive responses develop slowly, whereas in the
tion ignores the fact that authorities cannot early phase of rapid diffusion, social move-
force activists to institutionalize or build terror-ments are highly flexible - they appear and
ist organizations. The theory must consider disappear in ever-changing guises at unpredict-
why, within the constraints set by their environ- able times and places.
ments, social movement activists consciously Militancy is the most direct power available
choose one strategy and not another. to social movements. Radical protests, espe-
What are the basic strategic options available cially when they involve violence, almost in-
to social movements in their efforts to change variably attract media coverage. Moreover, the
existing policies? Different answers have been authorities are forced to react to serious distur-
proposed to this question. Some authors, espe- bances of law and order that challenge their
cially those working in the classical tradition, monopoly on the use of violence. However,
have stressed violence as the basic resource violence employed by social movements is a
available to social movements (Gurr 1970). De risky tool. The individual costs are likely to be
high for those arrested, and the probability of the media, mass membership, subsidies, sala-
backlash is high. Nevertheless, if the violence ried staff, etc.). Nor are the pioneers of protest
is sufficiently enduring and massive, it may waves likely to opt for formal organizations
succeed. Repression can backfire, especially because such organizations require an already
when it is excessive and badly directed. More- mobilized mass constituency that offers mem-
over, repression is costly, and in some situa- bers and funding. Oberschall (1979) argued
tions these costs may induce authorities to give that in a group that is not yet represented by an
in to the movement's demands. existing SMO or political organization, "the
These three sources of power for social first individuals to attempt organization run
movements are also associated with specific high personal risks as a result of innovator-loss
phases in the development of protest waves. dynamics; there are free rider tendencies; and
Clearly, in the initial phase of a wave, novelty the sheer length of time that would pass before
is the most important basis of power. Because SMO efforts might bring relief, even if they
the public at large is not yet mobilized, pioneer could get under way, . . . make an organized
movements attract few participants, which rules challenge unlikely" (p. 63). Moreover, formal
out strategies that depend on large size. Vio- organization would not be fruitful strategically.
lence is also not an attractive option because Unpredictability, novelty, and fluidity are an
the public and the media have serious moral emergent movement's main resources, whereas
objections and will consider violence only as a the involvement of formal organizations makes
last resort. Moreover, in the initial phase, pro- a movement's boundaries clearer, its leaders
testers can attract attention with less militant identifiable and accountable, and its strategies
and less risky actions. Thus, pioneer activists more predictable.
are likely to opt for actions that are novel and However, this initial strategic model is inher-
unconventional enough to attract media atten- ently unstable, and alternative strategic options
tion and militant enough to concern authorities gradually become more attractive. Tactical in-
but that do not depend for effectiveness on large novations, like site occupation and squatting,
numbers of participants. Confrontational pro- lose their ability to surprise and are no longer
tests, like occupations, sit-ins, and blockades, attractive to the media - and authorities learn
satisfy these criteria and thus are important in to deal with such actions more effectively
the expansive phase of a protest wave.19 (Freeman 1979, p. 186; Hilgartner and Bosk
Similar considerations affect the organiza- 1988, pp. 62-63; Rochon 1988, p. 186).
tional support for protests. Formal, profes- Similarly, the initial model of loosely struc-
sional movement organizations do not play tured organizations is difficult to sustain
dominant roles in the initial phase of a protest(Oberschall 1979, p. 67). In the initial phase of a
wave. Such organizations, if they exist when protest wave, such organizations often have the
protests start, tend to suffer from the same field to themselves. However, as the wave
structural inertia as do established political ac- progresses, they are increasingly faced with
tors. Therefore, they are unlikely to spawn tac- competition from professional SMOs and exter-
tical and thematic innovations. Also, in the face nal allies on the one hand, and from radical
of insecurity about the outcomes of such "ex- groups on the other. Because they lack the re-
periments," they are reluctant to risk their resources and internal coordination to compete
sources (e.g., access to decision makers or to effectively with professional SMOs and estab-
lished allies for media access and mass support,
19 Of course, what is novel and unconventional and because they lack the strong identity that
may vary over time and among countries. Thus, underlies the mobilization capacity of radical
civic initiatives in West Germany initially attracted groups, these organizations become increas-
attention by their mere existence, although their ac- ingly marginal. As Oberschall (1978) argued,
tion repertoire initially mainly consisted of moder- this marginalization will be reinforced by the
ate actions like petitions and small demonstrations. reactions of the media and the authorities, who
In West Germany, the average citizen has long been
are interested in "structuring" protests by focus-
politically passive. Thus, the fact that citizens who
ing on a few identifiable leaders and organiza-
did not belong to the small radical fringe were chal-
lenging decisions of the authorities was novel tions - "the media contributed in making lead-
enough to be of interest to the media and to con- ers out of some who otherwise might not have
cern the authorities. been, and created more structure in the move-
ments than they actually possessed" (p. 272). when professional SMOs gain acceptance as
When protests begin to decline, the positions of representatives of a movement's demands in
the loosely structured parts of social move- the media and in policy making, many move-
ments become even more precarious. To sur- ment sympathizers find protests less urgent.
vive declining participation, social movements Because participation in social movements is
must have either an enduring organizational relatively costly and time-consuming com-
structure with resources that do not depend onpared to voting for a sympathetic party or join-
mass participation (McAdam et al. 1988, pp. ing an SMO, institutionalization leads many to
716ff.), or a strong identity that allows themshift
to to such alternatives.
continue to mobilize even under unfavorable Increased radicalism may also lead to a de-
circumstances. The organizations and sponta- cline in protests. Few activists are prepared to
neous collectives that dominate the initial phase endure the repression that radical actions en-
of protests possess neither of these traits and are tail. Moreover, the increasingly hostile reac-
therefore likely to be the first victims of decline
tions of the authorities and the increased effi-
(Jenkins and Eckert 1986, p. 816). ciency of repressive measures push radical
Social movements must compensate the loss groups toward covert actions involving a small
of novelty by increased numbers or increased activist core. The repression and marginal-
militancy. A strategy to increase numbers is fa- ization of these groups also stimulates sectar-
vored if established political actors, pre-exist- ian conflicts and distrust among activists,
ing SMOs, and social movement entrepreneurs which diverts energy from external activities
are interested in allying themselves to move- and discourages outsiders from participating
ments. However, support from these groups is (De Nardo 1985). Finally, if radicalization es-
often accompanied by a moderation of strate- calates to extreme violence or terrorism, it may
gies and goals, which may lead to friction with provoke a backlash that undercuts the general
the more radical activists who do not wish to legitimacy of protests.
compromise on the original strategies and de- A decline in protests may be reinforced by a
mands. Since these radicals are unable to out- decline in the chance of success of protests,
strip the moderates and their allies in numbers,which makes participation less attractive. I hy-
they resort to increased militancy, and some of pothesize that the chance of success erodes over
them ultimately to violence, to make them- the course of a protest wave. Social movements
selves heard. The presence of a radical minor- tend to succeed first when opportunities are
ity may in turn strengthen the moderate most favorable, e.g., by focusing on issues with
faction's tendency toward moderation and in- large public support and on which elites are di-
stitutionalization. "The presence of 'extremist' vided. Being rational actors, activists focus on
SMOs can actually help to legitimate and such "ripe apples" first. As a printed guide for
strengthen the bargaining position of more movement organizers stated, "It is desirable to
moderate SMOs [and may encourage] funding make the first organized project of the group a
support for the 'moderates' as a way of under- short term one that has a high probability of
cutting the influence of the radicals" (McAdam success. Your first issue should be an attainable
et al. 1988, pp. 718-19). goal which will provide you with your first vic-
Thus, over the course of a protest wave so- tory" (as quoted in Fireman and Gamson 1979,
cial movements split over strategy, and the p. 30). Once success has been attained or a com-
moderate and radical wings are increasingly promise has been reached on these initial de-
separated. This division need not have imme- mands, the movement must continue mobiliza-
diate negative consequences on the protests. tion on issues for which opportunities and pub-
Initially, the involvement of allies may broadenlic support are less favorable. Thus, subsequent
public support for the movement's activities successes are increasingly difficult, which
and enhance the media presence of the move- gradually erodes the motivation to participate.
ment. Nevertheless, if institutionalization and The increasing lack of success may reinforce
radicalization continue, protests will ultimately tensions between moderates and radicals.
decline. When established allies incorporate a While the prospects for success are favorable,
movement's demands into their programs, different factions may find a common ground,
when "movement parties," like the Green or at least agree to a "peaceful co-existence."
Party, enter parliaments or governments, and Once things go wrong, however, strategic de-
bates often erupt in full force,

RUUD KOOPMANS and fellow
is a research these inter-
of the Dutch
nal conflicts can substantially weaken a move- Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) at the
ment. This happened to the German peace University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He par-
ticipates in a research project on the development
movement after the government decided to de-
of new social movements in Western Europe, and
ploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in 1983
in that context has co-authored a book on the Neth-
(Koopmans 1992c, pp. 201-206).
erlands and completed a dissertation on West Ger-
Summarizing, my explanation for the dy- many. Together with the other members of the re-
namics of protest waves combines external and search group, he is currently working on a book
internal factors. The progress of a protest wave comparing social movements in France, Germany,
is the outcome of the interplay between the ex- the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In addition, he
ternal constraints of facilitation, repression, has begun a study focusing on the roles of political
elites and social movements in the recent revolu-
and success chances, and activists' choices
tion in the Soviet Union.
among the different strategic options. These
factors provide a plausible explanation for the
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The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989

Author(s): Ruud Koopmans

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

American Sociological Review, 1993, Vol. 58 (October:637-658) 637

*-4 New Social Movements

250 O-O OtherMovements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

authorities, determine the development

the two waves. In the periods

portant form of institutionalization in the sec-

80 l_ ------ . -- 2.v.-s....- --- -------.....,

1975 1980 1985 1989

1975 1980 1985 1989

|-- Demonstrative Protests X Confrontational Protests 0........ Violent Protests|

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

decline of the first wave and

No organization 37.3 63.8 79.7 63.6 47.7

Communist 1.2 2.4 2.0 0.0 1.5

Terrorist 0.0 2.7 2.7 30.7 2.9

Other SMO 27.4 20.1 11.5 4.3 23.1

External ally 15.6 5.8 1.4 0.7 11.5

Other SMO + external ally 18.5 5.1 2.7 0.7 13.3

Total percent 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9

Number 1,296 412 148 140 1,996

The patterns role

bates often erupt in full force,

contexts can show whether the trends found in sity Press.

can Journal of Sociology 94:1078-1116. Western Democracies, edited by R. J. Dalton and

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