Cumulative radicalisation and progressive

self-destruction as structural determinants of

the Nazi dictatorship
Hans Mommsen

The National Socialist regime is in many respects a peculiar phenom-

enon which does not fit theories of comparative government. There
have been numerous attempts to arrive at a consistent description of the
Nazi state, among them Franz Neumann's model of the 'Behemoth'
state, alluding to Thomas Hobbes,1 and Ernst Fraenkel's theory of the
'dual state', distinguishing between a normative and an arbitrary sector
of state power.2 Both depicted only the early stages of Nazi dictatorship,
while the diversity of explanations based on the concept of totalitarian-
ism, including the assumption that Nazism was essentially 'Hitlerism',
as Hans Buchheim claimed, accentuated the personal aspects of Hitler's
rule.3 All these patterns of explanation tend to omit the point that the
Nazi dictatorship was characterised by an inherent tendency towards
self-destruction. It did not so much expand governmental prerogative
through bureaucratic means as progressively undermined hitherto
effective public institutions through arbitrary use of power. An acceler-
ating fragmentation of the administrative apparatus was increasingly
accompanied by the formation of new independent administrative
bodies controlled by the party and promoting their own agendas. While
this procedure of creating new ad hoc agencies increased the regime's
short-term efficiency, it ultimately led to a dissolution of the unity and
authority of the government. In some respects, Nazi expansionist policy
accelerated the process of internal dissolution, because the methods of
rule in the occupied territories were subsequently transferred to the
Reich itself and contributed to the progressive destruction of public
administration, which became more and more controlled by party
functionaries.4
1
Franz Neumann, Behemoth (London 1942); cf. Ernst A. Menze, Totalitarianism Recon-
2
sidered (London 1981). Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (London 1981).
3
Hans Buchheim, Totalitare Herrschaft, Wesen und Merkmale (3rd edn, Munich 1964).
4
Cf. Dieter Rebentisch, Fiihrerstaat und Venvaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart 1989),
pp. 175-6.

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 HANS MOMMSEN

Thus, National Socialism, by exploiting all the elements of a fully

shaped modern state, eventually developed into the opposite of one,
and formed an anti-state. This development, however, could not be
visualised when Hitler came to power. In fact, the Dictator avoided any
open break with the Weimar Constitution and in 1935 rejected the
proposal of Wilhelm Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, to replace
the Enabling Act by a constitution for the German Reich, since he
regarded this as a revolutionary step which he wanted to avoid.5 Nor
did Hitler formally replace the republican state apparatus, whose
foundations had been laid in preconstitutional Prussia, despite the
expectations of his followers that he would grant the executive func-
tions to the Nazi Party in line with the assurance in Mein Kampf that the
'transfer of National Socialist ideas of law' to the state would be
achieved.6
Contrary to such expectations of the party radicals, represented
especially by Ernst Rohm and the SA-leadership, Hitler did not give
the Nazi Movement immediate access to executive functions. He
transferred the party leadership to the weak but loyal Rudolf Hess,
who acted as his Deputy Leader and entered the cabinet as minister
without portfolio. It took several years, however, until Hess could
secure for his staff a certain amount of control and an effective veto
power over the legislative process. In general, the party rank and file
felt pushed into the background by an ever more self-confident state
administration 7
The influence of the party was exerted rather by frequent cases of
personal union on the level of the Oberprdsidenten and minister in Lander
administration. But in principle the Reich government remained inde-
pendent of the political organisation of the NSDAP, which had merely
informal control. The role of Rudolf Hess and, until June 1934, of Ernst
Rohm as ministers without portfolio in the cabinet was insignificant. As
a mass organisation, the party's prerogatives were restricted to a certain
influence at the municipal level, control over ordinary citizens, and
propaganda tasks.
This changed during the later war years when party agencies
achieved an increasing influence at the regional and municipal levels
5
See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entzvicklung seiner inneren
Verfassung (Munich 1969), pp. 316-2; cf. Giinter Neliba, Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates:
Wilhelm Frick, Line politische Biographie (Paderborn 1992), pp. 155 ff.
6
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf67th edn (Munich 1933), p. 657.
7
Symptomatic are the complaints by the Hoheitstrager at their meeting with Hess at the
end of the party rallies; cf. Hans Mommsen, "Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen
Herrschaftssystem', in Der 'Fiihrerstaat": Mythos und Realitat, Studien zur Struktur und
Politik des Dritten Reiches, eds. Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (Stuttgart
1981), p. 44.

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

and the Gauleiter, in their function as Reich Defence Commissioners,

took over substantial parts of the internal administration. Before that,
party-controlled agencies such as the police apparatus, the Four-Year
Plan, and, not least, the Reich Propaganda Ministry extended their
spheres of control at the cost of the traditional ministries of state. In
contrast to Stalin, who in 1936 proclaimed the Soviet Constitution,
Hitler avoided any institutional changes that could restrict his un-
limited political power. He rejected Frick's proposal to bring about a
comprehensive restructuring of the Nazi state, to be reflected in a new
constitution. He preferred to prolong the Enabling Law despite the fact
that it had been repeatedly violated and partly disrupted through the
merger of the office of the Reich President with that of the Reich
Chancellor. Surprisingly, as one of his last acts before his suicide, Hitler
decided again to separate the offices of the Reich President and the
Reich Chancellor.8
The political process was affected by a continuous erosion of inherit-
ed institutional patterns through increasingly informal modes of deci-
sion-making. This started with Hitler's apprehension about cabinet
meetings, at which he disliked debate with ministers on political issues,
thereby exposing him to their specific expertise regarding legislative
measures. Hence, he induced them to settle interdepartmental conflicts
before a matter was to be presented in cabinet, which therefore
functioned merely as an affirmatory board for legislative proposals put
forward by individual government departments. Hence, the cabinet lost
its function of coordinating competing departmental interests, and
consequently ceased to be a means of political integration.9
Hitler lost all interest in cabinet meetings, therefore, and they were
eventually abolished and replaced by a less formalised legislative
procedure based on written communication between the departments
involved. This proved to be extremely slow, and for urgent matters
special meetings of the undersecretaries of state sought, by replacing the
cabinet, to achieve the necessary coordination. The most notable
example of such routine meetings is the Wannsee Conference in January
1942 to coordinate the measures for the deportation of the European
Jews.
While institutionalised political integration at the level of the minis-
tries became almost exceptional, their coordinating function was not
8
Cf. Reimer Hansen, Das Ende des Dritten Reiches. Die deutsche Kapitulation 1945 (Stuttgart
1966), pp. 93-4; Marlis G. Steinert, Die 23 Tage der Regierung Donitz (Dusseldorf 1967), pp.
19-20.
9
See Lothar Gruchmann, 'Die "Reichsregierung" im "Fiihrerstaat". Stellung and
Funktion des Kabinetts im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem', in Klassenjustiz
und Pluralismus, Festschriftfiir Ernst Fraenkel, eds. Giinther Doecker and Wilfried Steffani
(Hamburg 1973), pp. 187-223.

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 HANS MOMMSEN

replaced by party agencies. In complete contrast to what took place

under Communist regimes, Hitler prevented the formation of any
mechanism to achieve integration within the party. Especially when
they refounded the NSDAP in 1925, following its temporary prohibition
on account of the Putsch of November 1923, Hitler and his intimate
followers within the Munich organisation were resolved to extinguish
any surviving element of democracy within the party, enforcing the
unrestricted leadership principle. The authoritarian rule of the Munich
local party organisation implied the prohibition of the election of
subleaders, who were installed from above. Functionaries on all levels
were nominated by the central apparatus in Munich. The totalitarian
party structure achieved by this measure, however, also precluded any
debate on political issues within the party.
The motive for these organisational provisions was the prevention of
any internal party opposition to the predominant Munich local party,
which was deeply committed to Adolf Hitler. The long-term conse-
quence was the elimination of any institutionalised means of conflict-
regulation within the party apparatus, except for the party courts. While
securing the unlimited impact of the leadership principle, the prohib-
ition of any collective decision-making, or even exchange of views
(other than in an informal fashion) on controversial issues, resulted in
an extreme personalisation of politics, with the inevitable consequence
that political controversies turned into personal feuds among the
subleaders.
During the crucial period of the movement's growth after 1929,
Gregor Strasser, then Reich Organisation Leader, had tried to integrate
the expanding party apparatus by creating central steering agencies and
by nominating inspectors (Landesinspektoren) for the different party
regions, whose task was to control the local and regional party
organisation. Without the highly bureaucratised party leadership estab-
lished by Gregor Strasser - by far the most talented subleader of the
NSDAP - the party would never have gained its spectacular successes
during the election campaigns between 1930 and 1932.
Strasser failed, however, to eliminate the direct relations between
the individual Gauleiter and Hitler, who regarded his provincial
leaders as his personal chieftains and rejected Strasser's attempts to
establish an uninterrupted line of command between the local or-
ganisations and the top leadership. Thus, Strasser had to accept the
intermediate role of the group of the Gauleiter. And after Strasser's
decision to resign his party offices on 8 December 1932, Hitler did not
hesitate to withdraw the former's organisational reforms and to re-
place the office of the Reich Organisation Leader by a weak leadership
structure divided between Rudolf Hess as head of the party organisa-

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

tion and Robert Ley as head of a newly established central party

commission.10
Consequently, following the seizure of power the party lacked a
strong and efficient leadership, while Hitler was no longer preoccupied
with party affairs. Hence, Jeremy Noakes' observation that, following
Hitler's intervention to undermine Strasser's organisational planning,
the NSDAP consisted virtually of thirty-two fairly autarkic Gau or-
ganisations, is crucial for any understanding of the Nazi regime.11 Not
before Hess's spectacular flight to Britain and the establishment of the
Party Chancellery under Martin Bormann, who had been the head of
administration in Hess's department and acted as Hitler's private
secretary, were serious attempts undertaken to restore a central leader-
ship over the party's rank and file.12 Despite Bormann's assiduous
endeavours to reestablish an efficient party control, however, he was
never strong enough sufficiently to curtail the influence of those
Gauleiter who had direct access to the Dictator.13
Although the leading figures in the party were eager to usurp state
offices in order to strengthen their personal position, they had no
respect for the inherited framework of public administration and
especially no inclination to preserve the formal legality of administra-
tive procedures. Their mentality was rather reflected in a predilection
for what was called the principle of' Menschenfiihrung' (literally, 'leader-
ship of men') over 'Verwaltung' ('administration'), which was based on
fixed legal rules and was now denounced as purely bureaucratic and
politically sterile.14
The reduction of politics to a matter of purely personal allegiance had
been quite efficient during the period of the party's fight for power, the
so-called 'Kampfzeit' when all its energies could be concentrated on
continuous election campaigning and mass mobilisation. But these
qualities were far less necessary once the NSDAP had achieved political
power and the average functionary had to fulfil primarily administra-
10
See Peter D. Stachura, "Der Fall Strasser": Gregor Strasser, Hitler and National
Socialism', in The Shaping of the Nazi State, ed. P. Stachura (London 1978), pp. 88-130;
Udo Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 178 ff.
11
Jeremy Noakes, Government, Party and the People in Nazi Germany, Exeter Studies in
History (Exeter 1980), p. 15.
12
See Peter Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter. Fuhrung der Partei und Kontrolle des Staatsap-
parats durch den Stab Hess und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann (Munich 1992), pp. 166 ff.
13
See Peter Hiittenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefiiges in der NSDAP
(Stuttgart 1969), pp. 195 ff; Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich.
Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung, 2nd
edn (Munich 1971), pp. 34 ff.
14
See Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Teppe, Verwaltung contra Menschenfiihrung im Staat
Hitlers. Studien zum politisch-administrativen System (Gottingen 1986), pp. 25 ff and Jane
Caplan, Government without Administration, State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi
Germany (Oxford 1988), pp. 325 ff.

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 HANS MOMMSEN

tive tasks. Moreover, in the long run this mentality could not be
reconciled with any governmental continuity and coordination.
However, after the seizure of power and the Gleichschaltung ('coor-
dination') of public and private institutions, the NSDAP did not change
its specific political approach which had emerged from the organisa-
tional patterns of the 'time of struggle' and was primarily characterised
by the absolute dominance of the leadership principle on all levels.
Hitler strongly supported the relative autonomy of the subleaders while
securing their unrestricted personal loyalty. During the election cam-
paigns before 1933 that system of combining charisma and factionalism
increased the dynamism of Nazi politics. After 1933, extended to the
entire political system, it necessarily contributed to widespread antag-
onism and rivalry within the party.15
The virtual absence of any interest representation within the party
organisation intensified conflict and inefficiency. The informal leader-
ship structure was retained after the seizure of power and transferred to
the political system as a whole. Already during the Weimar era party
rallies had been reduced to merely propagandistic mass meetings
without any exchange of opinion of discussion and programmatic
issues. During the early years of the regime, they became gigantic
celebrations of the party's growth and the omnipotence of the Fiihrer,
symbolising the complete aesthetisation of politics.16
Nor did the Reich Leadership (Reichsleitung), founded in 1932, ever
function as a steering body, remaining purely decorative and confined
to propaganda functions. Despite repeated promises by Hitler, the Party
Senate, which could have been the counterpart of the Fascist Grand
Council that deposed Mussolini in July 1943, never came into being
(though a Senate Hall was created for it in the 'Brown House': in
Munich). Initiatives by Wilhelm Frick or Alfred Rosenberg, aimed at
establishing at the very least a body responsible for selecting the future
leader after Hitler's death, did not find the Dictator's approval. The rare
meetings of the Gauleiter or, in the first years, of the Reichsstatthalter
(Reich Governors), were not institutionalised, and in any case were
largely confined to a forum for a speech by Hitler but without any
platform for political consultation.17 The increasing informality of
political decision-making in the Third Reich was for Hitler first and
foremost a matter of personal convenience which exonerated him from
15
CF. Wolfgang Horn, Fiihrerideologie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (1919-1933)
(Diisseldorf 1972), pp. 220 ff.: Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi
Party (Minneapolis 1967), pp. 76 ff.
16
See Hamilton T. Burden, The Nuremberg Party Rallies 1933-1939 (London 1967).
17
See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren
Verfassung (Munich 1969), p. 262: Dieter Rebentisch, Fuhrerstaat und Verwaltung im
Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart 1989), pp. 422-3.

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

the tasks of day-to-day administration. It corresponded, however, to his

concept of politics, since he saw the task of the statesman as the setting
of visionary goals rather than the handling of detailed matters of
government. Thus, he did not support Strasser's attempts to prepare in
concrete fashion for participation in government and to outline a future
legislative programme.18 Consequently, apart from a few preliminary
studies by Strasser's Reichsleitung, and Hitler's notions of a huge Reich
Propaganda Ministry to function as a coordinating agency above the
traditional departments,19 only vague ideas for a governmental pro-
gramme of the NSDAP existed. This reveals Hitler's overwhelmingly
propagandistic understanding of politics which, as David Schoenbaum
has pointed out, often led him to confuse ends with means.20
The informalisation of politics relied partially upon Hitler's predilec-
tion not only for avoiding regular office hours, but increasingly, too, for
avoiding taking decisions. The influence of non-official advisers on his
decisions curtailed, therefore, almost all attempts of the Reich Chancel-
lery under Hans-Heinrich Lammers to guarantee the previously indis-
pensable participation of the responsible departments. In many cases,
the ministerial bureaucracy was outflanked by high-ranking party
leaders, especially by Goebbels, Himmler and Ley. By using their direct
access to Hitler, such figures deliberately circumvented the Reich
Chancellery, which was officially in charge of coordinating Hitler's
legislative activity.
The struggle among leading chieftains to obtain Hitler's approval in
controversial issues led to the disruption of any controlled decision-
making process at the head of the regime. Apart from the fragmentation
of legislation, leading to an ever increasing number of ordinances
decreed without sufficient coordination between the different minis-
tries of state, there was as good as no systematic communication among
the leading elite. Even this situation deteriorated under wartime
conditions, when Hitler disappeared into his held headquarters. Otto
Ohlendorf, a sectional head within the Sicherheitsdienst (SD, Security
Service of the police), tried to compensate for the lack of official
information through editing the so-called 'Reports from the Reich'
('Meldungen aus dem Reich'), based on the systematic monitoring of
rumours, public reactions to events, and the like. But this did not stop
the growing flight from reality among leading officials.
Originally, the widespread lack of communication among the leaders
18
See Hitler's December 1932 'Memorandum on the internal reasons for the measures to
increase the striking power of the Movement' (BA Koblenz NS 22/110).
19
See Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels, ed. Elke Frohlich, vol. II
(Munich 1987), pp. 218-19 (entry for 9 August).
20
See David Schoenbaum, Die Braune Revolution. Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reiches,
2nd edn (Cologne 1968), p. 26.

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 HANS MOMMSEN

of the Nazi regime emanated from Hitler's inclination to provide his

subleaders only with the fragmentary information necessary to fulfil
their specific functions. The splintering of governmental bodies magni-
fied this tendency. Thus, even those with high standing had increasing
difficulties in obtaining a realistic picture of the Reich's political and
military situation, quite apart from the fact that they acquired only
informal knowledge of secret operations, such as policies of genocide.
The assumption that the fragmentation of politics arose from a
deliberate divide-and-rule strategy on Hitler's part is, however, mis-
leading. Rather, this was a reflection of the social-darwinist conviction
that the best man would ultimately prevail. The consequent technique
of operating through special emissaries promised short-run efficiency,
but meant in the long run that a great deal of energy was dissipated in
personal feuds and taken up by increasing inter-departmental rivalries,
as well as between party and state agencies. These mechanisms were,
however, of the utmost importance for the internal development of the
regime. This social-darwinist struggle led to an escalating ruthlessness
in pursuit of the extreme goals of the movement, and thus to a process of
cumulative radicalisation. Owing to the lack of institutional guarantees,
individual chieftains felt compelled to fight competitors with all the
means at their disposal. Each office-holder tried to gain the special
sympathies of the Flihrer by appearing as a fanatical fighter for the
realisation of the visionary and extreme goals of the Weltanschauung.
This tendency was interwoven with a 'selection of the negative
elements' of the Nazi Weltanschauung, as Martin Broszat observed, since
'positive' objectives generally encountered resistance from vested
interests. Jews, Gypsies and other target groups became declared
enemies once Communists and Socialists had been eliminated as a
political threat. Hence, the destructive impetus of Nazi ideology was
continuously on the increase while more moderate targets were drop-
ped or postponed.21 Above all, anti-Jewish policy, culminating in the
systematic liquidation of European Jewry, pushed competing interests
completely into the background. In the treatment of the occupied
countries, a similar radicalisation was evident, blocking any path to a
modus vivendi with the subjugated peoples.
The structural inability of the Nazi regime to accept political compro-
mise instead of pursuing visionary 'final goals' (Endziele) prevented any
consolidation of its rule over continental Europe and made it impossible
to achieve any lasting arrangements, at least with France and the
Benelux countries. Consequently, Hitler prohibited for the time being
any deliberation about the future restructuring of the European conti-
21
Martin Broszat, 'Soziale Motivation und Fuhrer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus', in:
Nach Hitler. Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte (Munich 1986), pp. 11-33.

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

nent and wanted to postpone any decision on this until the 'final
victory'.22 This attitude implied a dramatic over-extension of the
available economic and manpower resources, leading ultimately to
military defeat.
The progressive fragmentation of the Nazi political system was
closely connected with territorial expansion. In the annexed and
occupied territories, party and SS representatives were able to shrug off
any restraint by public law and administrative regulation and exercise
an arbitrary rule that attempted to enforce the total compliance of the
subjugated population through repeated use of violence and terror.
Hitler expressly welcomed the new type of leadership, characterised by
harshness and unbureaucratic methods, that was emerging in the
East.23
The arbitrary power structures which developed in the former Soviet
territory and the General-Gouvernement were taken by Hitler as a
model for a future German Reich. Robert Koehl coined the term
'Neo-Feudalism' to describe the conditions in the occupied eastern
territories which led to a total personalisation of the politics and gave
the local commanders unrestricted power.24 Consequently, growing
corruption emerged within their entourage, preventing efficient admin-
istration. When the Wehrmacht was eventually forced to retreat and the
now superfluous civil administrators withdrew from the occupied
territories, the atavistic political style which they represented was
transferred to the 'Old Reich'.
To what extent this decay of modern statehood had a parallel in the
Soviet Union is an open question. Unlike the Stalinist system, the Nazi
regime did not try to enlarge its political base through the restoration of
its former alliance with the traditional elites, as Stalin attempted to do by
proclaiming the 'Great Patriotic War'.25 Though exploiting conserva-
tive-Prussian traditions and invoking their nationalistic elements to the
very end, the Nazi leadership, confronted with pending defeat, cut all
its ties to the conservative elites and returned to its socio-revolutionary
origins and aims, which for tactical reasons had been pushed aside after
the seizure of power.
From now on, the party deplored the fact that it had ended the
revolutionary process in 1933 and had accepted a compromise with the
conservative elites and the higher civil service. In 1944, the so-called
'Gitter-Aktion' ('Iron Bars Action') led to the arrest of several thousand
22
Hans Werner Neulen, Europa und das 3. Reich. Einigungsbestrebungen im deutschen
Machtbereich 1939-45 (Munich 1987), p. 163.
23
Rebentisch, Fuhrerstaat und Verwaltung, pp. 26-7 and 312.
24
Robert Koehl, 'Feudal Aspects of National Socialism', in Nazism and the Third Reich, ed.
Henry Turner (New York 1972), pp. 151-74.
25
See Ronald Suny, 'Stalin and his Stalinism', in this volume pp. 26-52.

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 HANS MOMMSEN

people regarded as sympathisers with the Weimar Republic and

potential political opponents.26 The Nazi elite was convinced that the
absence not only of racial, but also of ideological, homogeneity was the
very source of Germany's military crisis and political backlash. In
accordance with this assumption, Nazi chieftains retained the illusion
that only a complete take-over of public administration by the party
could turn the tide and secure Germany's final victory.
Symptomatic of this mentality was the continual reference in propa-
ganda to the 'time of struggle' ('Kampfzeit') and, especially to the
abortive Munich Putsch in November 1923, seen as proof that the party
had mastered severe crises in its history and that it would be able to
overcome the military crisis if it took things in hand. The memory and
myth of the 'Kampfzeit' served, therefore, to conceal the prospect of a
bleak future. At the same time, the legacy of the War of Liberation
against Napoleon and the Fridericus Rex (Frederick the Great) myth
were reactivated by Goebbels' propaganda in order to strengthen the
'stick-it-out' mentality.
Under the impact of the battle of Stalingrad, Goebbels, Bormann, and
Ley realised that the survival of the regime depended on the reform of
the NSDAP and that it was crucial to improve its public prestige, which
has been profoundly damaged by the widespread corruption of party
functionaries. To what extent the attempts to renew the party's revolu-
tionary spirit through a wave of party rallies, propaganda marches and
public demonstrations succeeded, is difficult to assess. But Bormann
and Ley were successful in mobilising the party apparatus behind the
shattered regime. At the same time, the functions of the Gauleiter in their
role as Reich Defence Commissioners were massively extended. Most of
the municipal administration, and also police functions, were handed
over to the local and regional party organisations. To this extent, the
process of 'partification', which had been interrupted in summer 1933 in
conjunction with the stoppage of the 'national revolution', was re-
newed.27
The most outstanding example of the mobilisation campaign at the
final hour was the establishment of the Volkssturm - a mass militia
embracing virtually all citizens. Though perceived as a military forma-
tion, its commanding officers were meant to be drawn from the local
and regional party organisation - an absurdity since the party did not
have adequately trained troop commanders. Nevertheless, it was not
26
Cf. Walter Hammer, Die "Gitteraktion" vom. 22. 8. 1944, Freiheit und Recht 8/9 (1959),
pp. 15 ff.
27
See Karl Teppe, 'Der Reichsverteidigungskommissar. Organisation and Praxis in
Westfalen', in Verwaltung contra Menschenfuhrung, pp. 294-5.; Dietrich Orlow, The
History of the Nazi Party, vol. II: 1933-1945 (Pittsburg 1973), pp. 345 ff.

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

the reserve army, which in 1944 stood under the command of Heinrich
Himmler, but the Party Chancellery under Martin Bormann which bore
the responsibility for the Volkssturm - conceived as a representation of
the true 'people's community' and as 'the unified deployment of the
entire people united in the idea of National Socialism'.28
Even before the creation of the Volkssturm, the Party Chancellery had
won Hitler's approval for the introduction of the National Socialist
'Leadership Officer' (Fiihrungsoffizier), a direct copy of the much
disdained Soviet politruk. In the long run, this was directed at the
complete nazification of the army after the war - an ambition that had
been the primary goal of Ernst Rohm in 1934.29 To this extent, the party
returned to its very origins, promulgating total ideological fanatisation
as a pledge for final victory, and believing in the 'cult of the will' which
would ultimately force Germany's enemies to retreat in the face of the
superior principle of National Socialism.30
These deliberations show that, while the party's active elements
underwent a process of continuous radicalisation, the Nazi regime
entered an irreversible phase of internal decay which ultimately
destroyed its very foundations. Attempts by the Ministry of the Interior,
by Goebbels, and by others, to restore the unity of government, either by
reactivating the Reich Defence Council under the authority of Goring or
by establishing new institutions such as the 'Three Men's Committee'
(Dreierausschufi), were of limited success, while the installation of
Goebbels as 'Plenipotentiary for Total War Mobilisation' was also a
failure. In the depths of the bunker below the Reich Chancellery, Hitler
was in the final phase no longer able to keep the reins of government in
his hands. But no one among his entourage - with the possible exception
of Albert Speer - dared confront him with military and economic reality.
There were numerous similarities and parallels between the Stalinist
and Hitler dictatorships - not least in each case the mounting loss of any
sense of reality. Both Hitler and Stalin constantly ignored unwelcome
truth and lived in an increasingly fictitious world. Both tended to turn
night into day, and to prefer informal advisers to competent profes-
sionals in government departments. The deep distrust of their subordi-
nates felt by both dictators induced them repeatedly to dismiss their
military leaders.
But there were also obvious differences which emerged from con-
trasting political backgrounds and structures. Despite the progressive
28
Zeitschriftendienst/Deutscher Wochendienst, ed. by Reichsministerium fur Volksauf-
klarung und Propaganda, vol. 154 (Berlin 20 October 1944).
29
See Volker Berghahn, 'NSDAP und "geistige Fiihrung" der Wehrmacht 1939-1944',
Vierteljahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte 17, 1969; Arne W. G. Zoepf, Wehrmacht zwischen
Tradition und Ideologic Der NS-Fuhrungsoffizier im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt 1987).
30
Cf. J. P. Stern, The Ftihrer and the People (London 1975).

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 HANS MOMMSEN

'partification', the internal splits within the Nazi regime, and the
virtually complete elimination of any administrative unity, the system
inclined towards an ever-increasing political anomie that ended in the
complete collapse which accompanied military defeat. The inability,
too, to end an already lost war, as well as the emerging mass terror now
directed at the German population itself, signified this process of
dissolution. In comparison, the Soviet system preserved its ability to
adapt itself to shifting challenges and changing situations, revealing a
higher level of stability despite also relying on escalating terror.31
The NSDAP differed structurally from Communist parties through
the predominance of the leadership principle and the exclusion of any
political discourse within the party apparatus. Above all, the National
Socialists failed to create new and lasting foundations of rule capable of
transcending the continuous indoctrination, terror, and the relentless
improvisation and dynamic that kept the population in line and
prevented it from recognising the myths of Nazi propaganda. In this
respect, the Nazi Movement differed from the Soviet Communist Party
since, instead of revolutionising the inherited state and German society,
it restricted itself to a mere simulation of social change. It effectively
exploited the potential for protest of sectors of German society which, in
Ernst Bloch's terms, had 'non-synchronised' (nicht gleichzeitigen) -
partly modern, partly pre-modern - interests, in order to create a mass
base.
Nazi politics unleashed an unbridled political, economic, and mili-
tary dynamic with unprecedented destructive energy, while proving
incapable of creating lasting political structures. Significant for the
primarily destructive character of the Nazi regime is the fact that the
quasi-revolutionary goal of reshaping the ethnic map of great parts of
Europe in conjunction with the so-called 'General Plan for the East'
(Generalplan-Ost), while only partially accomplished, was indeed at-
tained in anti-Jewish policy, culminating in the deaths of around five
million people.32 All the related aims, especially the huge settlement
projects in eastern Europe, of which the genocide against the Jews was
but a part, remained unfulfilled.
The assumption that the Thousand-Year-Reich was anything more
than a facade of modernity, that it achieved a real modernisation of
Germany, takes the results of destruction as positive values and
31
For post-war developments in Germany see Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische
Besetzung Deutschlands (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 27, Munich,
1995), pp. 78 ff.
32
Cf. Gotz Aly, "Endlosung". Volkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europaischen Juden
(Frankfurt 1995), pp. 397-8. Gotz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung.
Auschwitz und die deutschen Plane fur eine europaische Ordnung (Hamburg 1991), pp.
121-2, 485 ff.

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 STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

overlooks the regime's basic political sterility.33 The very essence of the
Nazi regime lay in its parasitical character, its purely destructive nature,
that excluded any ability to create a positive future for the German
people, let alone for the millions of repressed and exploited citizens of
the occupied or aligned countries. It seems to me that this essential
substance of Nazism does not match the Stalinist system, whatever the
latter's totalitarian and terroristic traits.
33
For the recent debate on Modernisation see my article on 'Nationalsozialismus und
Modernisierung', in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 21 (1995), pp. 391^02.

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