Hydrotechnical Construction, Vol. 34, No.

10, 2000

NEOTECTONICS AND DAMS: A SURVEY OF DOCUMENTS FROM

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON LARGE DAMS

A. N. Marchuk

In recent years, catastrophic earthquakes have become more frequent, as have instances of damage to water-
power installations, so the International Commission on Large Dams ICOLD has urgently devoted much attention
to geodynamic effects on dams and related structures in order to provide for resistance to strong earth movements.
The topics have been surveyed regularly at ICOLD congresses and at annual meetings of the Committee on Seismic
Aspects of Designing Dams, while the important topic has also been considered at special international forums in
Tokyo (1995), Luxembourg (1997), Barcelona (1998), and New Zealand (2000). International collaboration in the
ICOLD framework led to the issue of four bulletins on these topics in 1998-9: ”Neotectonics and dams,” ”Guidelines
on seismic observations on dams,” ”Guidelines on designing seismically resistant dams and auxiliary structures,” and
”Guidelines on designing dam features to resist seismic movements of the ground effectively.” In this brief survey, I
present only the major ICOLD approaches to geodynamic effects on large dams.
Most existing dams were designed by methods now outdated, and the exact extent of their seismic resistance
is unknown. Some of them may be unsafe. Recent measurements have shown that shocks with magnitude M = 6-6.5
can give rise to accelerations up to 1.0g, whereas quasistatic design methods used accelerations of about 0.1g. The
ICOLD position is that the sites of dams can be located in seismic regions with potential M = 8 on the Richter scale
under certain conditions, where there may be accelerations up to 1.0g and shallow hypocenters provided that the
following conditions are met.
Active faults represent the main hazard for dam reliability, particularly if they intersect the site or pass near
it. Extensive statistics from field studies show that only a few dams have been damaged by the direct effects of
crustal creep and movements on faults at the base, as well as experiencing damage from earthquakes. Nevertheless,
even very rare cases of damage to dams from geodynamic factors make it necessary to define acceptable designs for
dams capable of resisting strong ground movements. This is the more necessary because engineers are being required
to exploit sites of increasing tectonic complexity in mountains and in seismically active regions, while there is an
ongoing increase in the number of dams.
The site should be chosen mainly for tectonic stability, which means that it is chosen only when one has
estimated the activity of a fault near the site or intersecting it, especially the tendency for movement during the
life of the dam. An example is a fault identified and defined in the locality that was formed in the Holocene (11000
years ago) and that has shown movements in the Quaternary period. One has to consider the fractal kinematics:
normal fault, overthrust, or downfault. The uplifted flank of an overthrust or the depressed flank of a downfault can
substantially restrict the pattern of adverse effects from the fault (San Andreas). The effects make themselves felt
as follows:
1) seismic activation (including movement excited by the dam), with tremors transmitted to the structures;
2) hydrogeological effects, including the possibility that the reservoir might be drained;
3) flank instability;
4) creep possibly affecting the dam site; and
5) movement on a fault at the base of the dam threatening the safety.
Research on fault activity begins with the study of the regional seismotectonics within a radius of 150-200
km from the site, followed by more detailed studies within a radius of 50 km, and very detailed ones on faults and
the like intersecting the site. One employs paleoseismological methods, aerial photographs, geomorphological and
seismological analysis, geological studies, and geodesic observations. It is strictly recommended that seismic stations
and geodesic markers should be installed before building starts and at least two years before the reservoir is filled.
The recommended documentation for the site should include the following:
1) a detailed map of the faults classified as regards length, kinematics, chronology, and activity;

Translated from Gidrotekhnicheskoe Stroitel’stvo, No. 10, pp. 67-70, October, 2000.

520 0018-8220/00/3410-0520$25.00
2001

c Plenum Publishing Corporation
 2) a map of any epicenters showing the magnitudes, intensities, and depths of the hypocenters, together with
the seismological map of the accelerations and frequencies, a neotectonic map showing the blocks and differential
movements, including isolines for the movement amplitudes, and a map showing the active and potential landslide
areas on scales from 1:5000 to 1:50000.
During the last 150 years, there have been movements on 200 faults. It is possible that the displacements
have not been detected for many faults. The danger from displacements is governed by the kinematics of the fault;
in the case of a normal fault, there may be stretching in the crust and in the body of the dam, so the site should be
considered as unacceptable. In downfaulting and overthrusting, the danger of large horizontal displacements is slight,
and one can accommodate the movement in the dam from adjacency with a fault, as in the case of Crystal Springs
in the San Andreas fault. An upfault, as in Alaska (1964) and Chile (1971, 1985), causes complicated displacements,
and such a site is unacceptable.
Earthquakes are not the only form of tectonic stress effect. More often, the stresses produce creep, which
extends to large crustal blocks and involves various components of the stress tensor. If a dam is located in such
a block, problems do not arise, but they do when a dam is at the boundary of a mobile block and the local creep
involves part of the dam structure. That is the case at the Bajna Bata dam (Yugoslavia), where it was necessary to
strengthen two left-bank sections. If the rates of differential movement on the fault are high, such a site should be
ruled out.
When a fault intersects the dam site, there are two aspects to consider: whether it is active and if so, what
displacements may be expected on it? The answer to the first question has been considered above, while the second
may be answered from the standard relations between fault length, earthquake magnitude, and displacement:

M = a + b log L; M = c + d log D,

in which L is fault length, D displacement, and M Richter magnitude.

Similarly, log D = e log L is the relation between D and L; the parameters a, b, c, d, and e are determined
iteratively by least-squares fitting for M and the logarithmic dependence. From D, one evaluates the scope for
building a dam and the type that should be used to be capable of absorbing such displacements without loss of
safety. Preference is given to earth-fill dams with extensive protection from water infiltration.
If it is found that there may be large movements, it is best to abandon the site for a less dangerous alternative.
There are no dams that could have been designed to absorb such fault movements and withstood the test. In the
zone influenced by the San Andreas fault in California, there are earth fill dams: San Andreas, Crystal Springs,
Hogben (height up to 30 m), and the Lower Crystal Springs gravitational dam (43 m), which have withstood strong
earthquakes with magnitudes from 7.1 in 1951 to 8.6 in 1906 with the reservoirs full. The settlement in the crest
has been as much as 2.5-3 m, and there was a surface escape through the Hogben dam. All the dams continued to
be used after repair. The Baldwin Hill dam failed in 1963 as a result of creep on the fault and suffosion. The light
gravitational Bajna Bata dam of height 90 m and length 450 m has paired buttresses and is located in a calcareous
schist anticline in the valley of the R. Drina, and this was subject to irreversible tangential displacements (along the
site) to the left of more than 52 mm. Two cracked sections at the left side had to be strengthened with a reinforced
concrete sheet equipped with prestressed anchoring. The cause of the failure was creep produced by pressure from
the Tara ridge on the right bank, together with a fault on the left bank and induced seismicity. During the 30 years
in which the dam has been operated, about 70 shocks were recorded with magnitudes from 2 to 4.7 in a region of
radius 30 km around the dam. The creep continues and new repairs may be needed.
The Mratinje arch dam on the R. Piva in Yugoslavia was built on strong limestones containing an extensive
fault system. Seismic monitoring was organized for 3.5 years before the reservoir was filled and revealed a branching
arrangement of epicenters along the line of the principal fault in the riverbed and right bank. The Mratinje reservoir
caused induced seismicity and increased the number of shocks and raised the magnitude of them to 4.1 with its peak
in May 1978. All the nearby hypocenters were extremely shallow. The strongest tremor occurred immediately after
the first drainage of the reservoir and was accompanied by surface disturbances and new landslips along the line of
the main fault. In subsequent years, the seismic activity returned to the level usual for the region. However, in 1994,
when there was rapid depletion of the reservoir and subsequent refilling to meet the power system requirements, the
induced seismicity occurred again with a peak magnitude of 3.8 in May 1994. The foci were again grouped along the
main fault and were shallow and had the same consequences as in 1978. The dam was not destroyed.
The rock fill Matahina dam in New Zealand has a height of 80 m and has its central core on the Edgenumbe
fault, and in 1987 it withstood an earthquake having M = 6.3 with acceleration at the crest up to 0.4g. The core
as damaged by cracking and suffosion was restored in 1988. To ensure the safety of the dam, a calculation was
performed for magnitude 7.2 earthquakes with displacements of 2.7 m horizontally and 1.3 m vertically. This led
to the decision to strengthen the dam, which required the additional emplacement of 5.5 million m3 of earth in the

521
downstream prism and construction of a four-layer filter with drainage facilities of total width 5 m. It was considered
that these changes will provide for self-healing in the body of the dam when there is any damage.
The following conclusions are drawn from the damage to dams after major earthquakes: San Andreas 1906;
Kanto 1923; Santa Barbara 1925; Kern County 1952; Hogben 1959; Takashi Oka 1968; San Fernando 1971; Chile
1971 and 1985; Mexico 1979, 1981, and 1985; and Edgenumbe 1987; magnitudes from 6.3 (Santa Barbara) to 8.3
(San Fernando):
1. Earth-fill dams do not withstand strong crustal movements satisfactorily, particularly if they are old and
poorly consolidated structures, or where the dams and the tailing areas lie on soft rocks. Most of the earth-fill dams
built in recent decades with high-quality fill on rocky bases have shown minimal damage.
2. Rock-fill dams, particularly ones equipped with concrete and asphalt-concrete screens, resist seismic loads
well.
3. Concrete dams of all types are the most seismically resistant. Arch dams are preferable in regions of high
seismicity.
The basic concepts are as follows in ”Guidelines on designing features of dams to resist seismic ground
movements.”
The earthquake in Kobe (Japan) on 17 January 1995, magnitude 6.9, destroyed completely three small earth-
fill dams of old design in the epicenter zone. During the Kanto earthquake in 1923, the Ono earth dam of height 40 m
was partially destroyed, with the formation of a tear of length 21 m and a crack of width up to 60 m involving local
landslides of length up to 18 m on the downstream side. Major damage to earth-fill dams has been described after the
earthquakes in Santa Barbara in the USA in 1925, in Chile in 1971 and 1985, and in Mexico in 1979, 1981, and 1985.
Analysis of these and high-grade instrumental recordings give rise to recommendations on basic design features for
seismically resistant earth-fill dams. The main danger from dynamic loads on such structures is breakaway through
the base or unconsolidated material. The basic design recommendations are as follows:
1) the base should be prepared down to very firm sound rock, and any soil at the base should be consolidated
until it is completely impermeable;
2) all zones in the dam should be carefully consolidated;
3) the base in the core zone should be horizontal or slightly inclined towards the upstream side. There should
be an impermeable contact without layers of deposited material at depths not less than 30 m at the side junctions;
4) the shapes of the base and core at the contact should not have sharp reentrant angles. The through
inclinations of the base intersecting the core zone should have tilts not steeper than 4:1 from the upstream side to
the downstream one and preferably should be 2:1 along the longitudinal axis of the dam to prevent there being any
tendency to through cracking;
5) all rockfill dams and special homogeneous material in them should have extensive systems of internal
drainage to prevent infiltration and suffosion through cracks arising on earthquakes, while repair measures exceeding
design specifications may be needed in the case of cracks arising in tremors;
6) wide filter and drainage zones should be used to provide self-healing in the cracks arising from earthquakes.
The material of the upstream side and the core should be capable of self-healing;
7) the contacts of the core with the flanks should be broadened to lengthen the infiltration paths;
8) brittle or impermeable material should not be used in fillings or else should be mixed with more plastic
materials more resistant to tremors; and
9) to compensate out possible settlement and crack healing, there should be a reserve of material at the crest
that should exceed the maximum possible water level. That reserve should extend over the width of the crest where
through cracks and suffosion may occur.
Concrete dams of all types (arch ones in particular) have good resistance. There are no examples of substantial
damage to arch dams even in the extremal accelerations such as occurred at the Pakoima dam of height 113 m (San
Fernando earthquake, 1971, M = 6.5, acceleration from 0.7 to 1.25g).
The following recommendations are made on arch dam design:
1) improved and developed geometry (symmetry, but not obligatory);
2) uniform continuous base loading in the formation of the concrete-rock contact;
3) restricted ridge length;
4) providing compression in the joints with adequate adaptation;
5) improving the dynamic resistance and the consolidation of the rocky base by preparation of the flanks,
replacing rotten rock by concrete, and cementation;
6) providing well-prepared concrete levels during the construction to ensure maximal restriction of tensile
stresses, including dams made with smoothed concrete; and
7) minimizing the volumes in the upper part of the dam.

522
 For other types of concrete dam, it is additionally recommended that one should avoid concentrations of
local stresses and minimize the effects of discontinuities. In the case of buttress dams, allowance should be made
for their sensitivity to earthquakes along the site. When a combined dam is built (concrete dam with earth or
rock fill), the main attention must be given to the earth structures and the coupling of them to the concrete. It
is recommended that one should use plastic materials, broad filters, and careful consolidation in order to provide
compatible joints between the components. In all cases, the design for a seismically resistant dam must include
considering the possibility of slumping and landslips into the reservoir, which can give rise to ejection waves, together
with monitoring for induced seismicity during the reservoir filling and analyzing the consequences of earthquakes by
accumulating a database.

523