Civ1 D (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (11), (16) Art. 26.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
1 medina v koike
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
Facts: Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June
14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. On June 14, 2012, Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
filed for divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even spousecapacitating him or her to remarry, the
date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate 7 and the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of remarry under Philippine law.
Michiyuki Koike. The RTC ruled that while the divorce
documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she
nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her
husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
Issue: whether the national law of alien of divorce decree
must be proven
Held: yes, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in
our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
2 mendez v sharia district
Facts: Mendez and Maliga were married under Muslim
rites. Prior to their marriage, the couple was already
blessed with a daughter, Princess Fatima M. Maliga
(Princess Fatima). Their marriage, however, soured
shortly after their wedding. Maliga filed with the ShCC a
petition4 for the judicial confirmation of talaq from
Mendez, with a prayer for the grant of probational
custody of their minor child pending the resolution of the
case. the ShCC noted that Mendez never questioned the
validity of the talaq and found that it was caused by the
irreconcilable religious differences between the spouses
as to the upbringing of their daughter. For said reason, it
ruled that, in the best interest of the child in all aspects of
life - economic, social and religious, the care and custody
of Princess Fatima should remain with Maliga. Mendez
argues that the ShCC acted in excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled on Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of
temporary custody, considering that the motion was a
mere scrap of paper for lack of notice of hearing. She
reiterates that she never received any summons in
connection with the urgent motion. She never received a
copy of the ShCC order granting the said motion either.
Issue: Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had
jurisdiction to rule on the issue of custody
Held: It is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who have
been married in accordance with the Muslim law,
involving disputes relating to divorce under P.D. No.
1083. There is, therefore, no doubt that the ShCC had
jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and
Maliga.
Art. 143. Original jurisdiction. —
(1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship,
legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;
(b)All cases involving disposition, distribution and
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment
of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or
the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and
for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim
Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which
the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which
law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a
District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family
home, change of name and commitment of an insane (g) Restitution of marital rights.
person to an asylum;
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in properties.
paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Court; and

(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory

relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property
involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.ch

xxxx

Art. 155. Jurisdiction. — The Shari'a Circuit Courts

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished

under this Code.

(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties

who are Muslims or have been married in accordance
with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:

(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts,
(mut'a); and
4 del Socorro v van wilsem on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such
Facts: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent
that they are governed by their national law with respect
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage
to family rights and duties. The obligation to give support
in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994,
to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as
marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
home to the Philippines. That sometime in the year 1995
and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive
his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen
(14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him,
resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY
TO LAW.
Issue: Whether a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law
Held: we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot
rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code
5 osb v Suzuki conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with
the consent of both spouses
Facts: In the first week of August 2003, respondent
Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met Held: Philippine Law governs the transfer of real
with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a property. It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang or state where it is located.21 The reason is found in the
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident very nature of immovable property — its immobility.
Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. Suzuki took possession of Immovables are part of the country and so closely
the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit. center of gravity there. This principle even governs the
Kang thereafter made several representations with capacity of the person making a deed relating to
Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were immovable property, no matter what its nature may be.
then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to
Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, by the law of the place where the instrument is actually
prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties made, his capacity is undoubted.
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. RTC found
that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose
rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s. The
RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the
status of the properties but he did not find any existing
encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to have
purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago,
Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he
bought the properties because Orion never bothered to
register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos.
18186 and 9116.
Issue: whether The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in
favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
6 ando v dfa national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and
like any other fact. While it has been ruled that a petition
Facts: On 16 September 2001, petitioner married
for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, 11 we
wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. On 16
are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held
September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan,
by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or
and was validly granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce
evidence presented on record of both the national law of
in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the
her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the
Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General
divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence, any
of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of
declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be
Foreign Affairs, Manila. Believing in good faith that said
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving
divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding
celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga.
Issue: does obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of absolute divorce in our country a requisite to
remarry?
Held: yes, the recognition of her second marriage as
valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first
husband. we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
11 catalan v catalan nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and
Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not
Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American
an interested party in the estate of Orlando. It appears
citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a
the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the
second marriage with petitioner herein. On 18 November
United States and the marriage between petitioner and
2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy,
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
evidence to establish the fact of divorce. Should
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the
Bristol on 12 December 1959. On 6 August 1998, the
subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be
RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. [3] The trial court
issued the letters of administration over the estate.
ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to
citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78
petitioner was not valid.
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding
that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists
that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
Held: At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married
to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that,
because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that
the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was
valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
16 roehr v recio court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules
and resident of Germany, married private respondent
of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Procedure. It is essential that there should be an
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
25, 1987, respectively. On August 28, 1996, private
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of
merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
the contrary. the divorce judgment was issued to
dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its
petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to
order7 dated May 28, 1997. Meanwhile, petitioner
the effect that when a couple lived separately for three
obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on
decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
December 16, 1997.
spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent
Issue: does the decision of a foreign court relating to the is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
award of the custody, care and support of child be was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
enforceable in our jurisdiction? the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.
Held: the present controversy mainly relates to the award This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and
of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. As a general rule, paramount consideration in all questions concerning his
divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries care and custody. 28
are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts
can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German