CIVIL LAW CASES

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

 When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect after the expiration of the 15-day
period following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation (as amended by EO No. 200-June 18, 1987).

 The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the 15-day period and not to the
requirement of publication.

 If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than the 15-day period, then such shorter or
longer period, as the case may be, shall prevail.

Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding?

The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757) that “there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court”.

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

It is significant to note that in their respective affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge Sanchez himself, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated.” The fact that Manzano
and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent judge take refuge on their joint affidavit that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wife for 7 years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Such cohabitation is merely a ground for exemption
from marriage license it could not serve as a justification for respondent judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special application to judges,
who should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Exceptions:

Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.

Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the requisite license so when he married de
Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in good faith that he was capacitated to marry.
Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior marriage was governed by the New Civil Code which does not
require any court decree of nullity if void ab initio.
SC Held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of the same Code is given
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and
Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
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August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that
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“ x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of the passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.”

Carlos vs Sandoval (expressly provides for prospectivity despite being a rule of procedure) December 16,
2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in application.

Cheng vs Sy 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)

-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.

Other exceptions:
 Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual delinquent.
 Curative laws
 Emergency laws
 Laws creating new rights
 Tax laws when expressly declared or is clearly the legislative intent.

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)

Guy vs CA

To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to
the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed
to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, there was
no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution.
It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters “by way
of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against
the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.” The document did not specifically mention minors’ hereditary share in
the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of the children, such waiver will not bar
the latter’s claim. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization.

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This
is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the laws. (6)
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SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court that his name be changed
from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to reflect the result of
said surgery.

The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.

Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of equity?

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

RENVOI DOCTRINE – where the conflict rules of the forum (ex. Philippines) refer to a foreign law (ex. USA),
and the latter refers it back to the internal law, the law of the forum (Philippine law) shall apply (Aznar vs.
Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).

TRANSMISSION THEORY – if the foreign law refers to a 3rd country, the laws of said country should govern;
this situation is a variety of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a nationality of Canada who is a resident of the
Philippines and has properties in Switzerland dies, his estate shall be governed by the laws of Canada based
on Article 15 but if the laws of Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is situated that
will be applied then the laws of the 3rd country will govern in the distribution of his estate.)

Domiciliary Rule – the basis for determining personal law of an individual is his domicile
National Rule – the basis for determining personal law is his citizenship

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.

Is Article 15 applicable to aliens who are married to Filipino citizens?

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality.

However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are
valid according to their national law (Cf. Art. 26 (2) Family Code).

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

Reiterated the Van Dorn decision.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of
status of persons.
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Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio

October 2, 2001

A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15
and 17 of the Civil Code.

But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a
foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be proven as public record of a foreign country
by either:
(1) official publication of the writing or document or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.

ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG

Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend obtained a
divorce from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia, USA.
Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic dissolving the
marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was void
under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an annulment of his marriage
with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily.

Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter in litigation
that was granted by the lower court.

Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily?

SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.

The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite
legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her claim of legal
interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce
decree obtained by Tristan and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between
them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless
of whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.

When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held:

That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country.

SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1st marriage was terminated when his
wife died leaving behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American citizen with

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whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce
was granted in December 1973. He then contracted his 3rd marriage in June 1974 with Felicidad. When he
died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the 1 st marriage filed a
motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married
to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo’s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of the NCC in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.

SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly Article
26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.

In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws
of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign
country where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA and ORLANDO CATALAN and MEROPE BRAGANZA 514 SCRA
607 (February 6, 2007)

Felicitas and Orlando were married in June 1950 in Pangasinan but migrated to the United States after the
marriage. Allegedly, they became naturalized citizens thereof and after 38 years of marriage or in 1988, they
divorced. Two months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas then filed a petition
for declaration of nullity with damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with one Eusebio Bristol. Orlando and Merope moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of cause of action as Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest.
SC: A divorce obtained abroad may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it before it can be recognized by our courts. It must
be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal vs. Badayog
(328 SCRA 122), the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.
Significantly, Section 2 (a) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, which took
effect on March 15, 2003, specifically provides: “A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.”
If it is proved that a divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow Orlando’s remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the petition on the ground that Felicitas lacks legal personality to file the same.
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CHAPTER 2
Human Relations (n)

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs. CA

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.

FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, vs. PACILA

Facts: Pacilan’s current account was closed by FEBTC on the ground that his account was “improperly
mishandled”. This was due to Pacilan’s issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an aggregate of amount
of P7,410.00 but the balance of his current deposit was only P6,981.43 resulting to the dishonor of Check No.
2434886. Pacilan then complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his account and when he did not
receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for damages. He alleged that the closure of his account was
unjustified inasmuch as he immediately deposited the following day an amount sufficient to fund the check.
Moreover, the closure exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The
indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him.
He alleged that he is a prominent and respected leader in the civic and banking communities (as cashier of
Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of the bank besmirched his reputation and caused him “social
humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless nights.”

Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following:

(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;

(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and

(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person
who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in
bad faith or with ill motive. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest
purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives
or interest or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the
exercise of this right, FEBTC committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the 2nd and 3rd elements for abuse of
rights are not attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by the bank negates the existence of bad
faith or malice on its part in closing Pacilan’s account on April 4, 1988 because on said date the same was
already overdrawn. Further, it was shown that in 1986, the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn 156
times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was overdrawn 117
times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances when Pacilan issued
checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with bank. All these
circumstances taken together justified the bank’s closure of Pacilan’s account on April 4, 1988 for “improper
handling.”

UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006)

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Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso surrendered to Quiamco a red Honda XL- 100 motorcycle and a photocopy
of its certificate of registration as settlement of their civil liability. Quiamco asked for the original certificate of
registration but the 3 never came back to see him again. He parked the motorcycle in an open space in his
business establishment – visible and accessible to the public. It turned out however that Gabutero bought the
motorcycle on installments secured by a chattel mortgage from Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was
managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. The mortgage indebtedness was assumed by Davalan but
stopped the payments in 1982 and told the corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had been “taken by
Quiamco’s men”. Nine years later, Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Avesco (the business
establishment of Quiamco) to recover the motorcycle. While the leader of the police team P/Lt. Vendiola asked
for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth uttering “Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle.” Unable to find
Quiamco, and upon Uypitching’s instructions and over the objection of Quiamco’s clerk, they took the
motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
but was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an action for damages against
Uypitching.

SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as
seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on
the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead Uypitching descended on Quiamco’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the
seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure,
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru Uypitching blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts
violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. This basic
principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Also known as the “principle of abuse
of rights”, it prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or
duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. In this case, the manner by
which the motorcycle was taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid
down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to
recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. The precipitate act of filing an
unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the
right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design
to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule Quiamco. Triple costs against petitioners, considering that Ramas
Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs. ELIZAGAQUE

Elizagaque was designated as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI by San Miguel Corporation. In 1996,
Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The price of a proprietary share was
around P5 million, Unchuan however, offered to sell a share for only P3.5 million but Elizagaque bought the
share of a certain Butalid for only P3 million. Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership was deferred
twice by the board and eventually, disapproved his application. Elizagaque wrote the Board thrice for
reconsideration but no reply was ever made by CCCI. In 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages
against CCCI.

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SC: As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the “black ball system” of voting
wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of
an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. A unanimous vote of the directors is required pursuant to
the amendment made in Section 3 © of its articles. Obviously, the board has the right to approve or disapprove
an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions.

In rejecting respondent’s application for membership, the petitioners violated the rules governing human
relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of social order. Petitioners’ committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s
application.

The amendment to Section 3 © of CCCI’s amended by-laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors
present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted
to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3 © which was silent on the required
number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. The explanation that the
amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons, is flimsy and unconvincing.
Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost 20 years
before Elizagaque filed his application. It cannot be fathomed why such a prestigious and exclusive golf
country club whose members are affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.

It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. He
was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored
him. At the very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.

The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When
the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s
application is characterized by bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts.

As to petitioners’ reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same
is misplaced. In Amonoy vs. Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we held that this principle does not apply when there is
an abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES DOYON (March 25, 2010)

The spouses Doyon obtained a 10-million peso loan from DBP secured by real and chattel mortgages. The
obligation remained unpaid despite having the loan restructured. DBP the initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings but was forestalled when the spouses filed a civil action for its nullification claiming payment.
Three years later, DBP withdrew the application for foreclosure while Doyon withdrew the civil case. Weeks
later, DBP demanded the payment of the loan that has now ballooned to 20 million. Doyon still ignored the
demand so DBP applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of Doyon’s real and chattel mortgages and took
constructive possession of the properties, then its sheriff issued notices of sale at public auction.

Meanwhile, Doyon filed a complaint for damages against DBP claiming that by withdrawing the earlier
application for extrajudicial foreclosure and the dismissal of the earlier civil case DBP led them to believe that it
would no longer seek satisfaction of its claims and that their loans had been extinguished. DBP therefore,
acted contrary to Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel mortgages anew.

SC: for an action for damages under Article 19 to prosper, the complainant must prove that: (a) defendant has
a legal right or duty; (b) he exercised his right or performed his duty with bad faith and (c) complainant was
prejudiced or injured as a result of the said exercise or performance by defendant.

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On the 1st requisite, the petitioner had the legal right to foreclose on the real and chattel mortgages. When the
principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on
the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the property to satisfy his credit.

2nd requisite, bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or conscious doing
of a wrong that partakes the nature of fraud.

Nothing in the RTC order, re on withdrawal of the application foreclosure, that stated or even hinted, that
Doyon’s obligation to DBP had in fact been extinguished. Thus, there was nothing on the part of DBP even
remotely showing that it led Doyon to believe that it had waived its claims.

Lastly, the fact that a demand for payment was made negated bad faith on the part of DBP. Despite giving
Doyon the opportunity to pay their long overdue obligations and avoid foreclosure, Doyon still refused to pay.

CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. vs. CLEMENTE, JR. 585 SCRA 300 (April 16, 2009)

Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his failure to pay his monthly dues for more than 60
days. The demand letters that were sent to his mailing address were returned with the postal note that the
address had been closed. A 3rd and final demand was again sent to Clemente in the same postal address were
the 1st 2 demand letters were sent. Clemente’s share was later sold through auction.

SC: Bad faith on Calatagan’s part is palpable. As found by the CA, Calatagan very well knew that Clemente’s
postal box to which it sent its previous letters had been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the
same postal box.

It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along with
residence and office telephone numbers.

The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code under
the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under the law for every
person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not
exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find
themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot
be the charter of dehumanization.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Bunag, Jr. vs. CA

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising
to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with
her for 21 days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions that indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21.

Wassmer vs. Velez

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
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Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos

No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea
of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had she been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage.

BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, March 31, 2005

Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity of the other spouse
entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil Code?

SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another.
There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It is contradictory to characterize
acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage,
but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same.

ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA (July 14, 2008)

The appellate court’s citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only because of the pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly because
we cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.

REPUBLIC vs. LACAP 517 SCRA 255 (March 2, 2007)

In 1992, Lacap, who was doing business under the name Carwin Construction, was awarded the contract for
the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare by the District Engineer of Pampanga. On October 29, 1992, the Office of
the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga found the project 100% completed in accordance with the
approved plans and specification and was then issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Acceptance. When
Lacap sought to collect payment, the DPWH withheld the payment because COA disapproved the final release
of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of Lacap had expired at the time of the execution of the
contract. The District Engineer then sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department twice whether the
contracts of Carwin for various rehabilitation projects were valid although its contractor’s license had already
expired when the projects were contracted. Its Legal Department opined that since RA 4566 known as the
Contractor’s License Law does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and
there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and may
be paid, without prejudice to administrative liabilities that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government employees or officials concerned. Yet, despite such recommendation, no payment was made.
Thus, in July 1995, Lacap filed a complaint for damages and specific performance against the Republic.

SC: The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered
into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of
the fine prescribed therein (Section 35 of said law states: “x x x x. or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than
five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.”). Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies

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the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s
injury).

This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as “basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience, x x x guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law
may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.” The rules thereon apply equally
well to the Government. Since Lacap had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance of
petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project
at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of the respondent.

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
(81,86,91,99,03)

QUIMIGUING v. ICAO GR No. 26795 July 13, 1970

A conceived child although as yet unborn, is given by law provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in article 40 of the Civil Code. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted), even
if the child is only “en ventre de sa mere,” even as yet unborn may receive donations prescribed by Article 742
of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir
that annuls the institution of a testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator (Article 854, Civil Code).”

It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code (now Article 195 of the Family
Code) declaring support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children “does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn, violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the
text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the in the
following article” (i.e. that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).
This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part
of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.”

CONTINENTAL STEEL v. MONTANO, et. al. GR No. 182836 10/13/2009

The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental avers. Without such qualification then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by
will. (32a)

Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights
from one to the other. (33)

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Applies only in cases of succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, all
other cases apply presumption of survivorship under the Rules of Court. Ex. Between a parent and a child.
(98,99,00)

Ex. (2000 Bar) – Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2 children, Rose aged 10 and Patrick, 12 years old.
One summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70, took the 2 children with her on a boat trip to Cebu. Unfortunately,
the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the 3 were never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on
the water. On the settlement of her mother-in-law’s estate, Cristy filed a claim for a share of her estate on the
ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and
she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? Ans. No, her action will not prosper. Since there
was no proof as to who died first, all the 3 are deemed to have died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the NCC. The survivorship provision of Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue
involved is not succession.

(1998 Bar) – Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and married to Wilma, died in a plane crash.
There is no proof as to who died 1st. Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son, Willy, as
the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that ½ of the proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate? Ans.
Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that ½ of the proceeds should belong to
Willy’s estate, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under this presumption, the person between the
ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at the time of their deaths.
The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as beneficiary.

FAMILY CODE

Executive Order No. 209 (August 3, 1988)

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)

One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative transsexual).

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

- Hence, no marriages by proxy under our jurisdiction.

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Sy vs. CA and Sy 330 SCRA 550

-Incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning. Date of issue of marriage license is
September 17, 1974. The date of the celebration of their marriage is November 15, 1973.

Republic vs. CA and Castro 236 SCRA 257

Facts: Husband personally attended to the processing of the documents relating to their application for a
marriage license. The marriage lasted only 4 months. It was discov#ered by the wife that no marriage license
was issued by the LCR of Pasig City who certified to that effect. In her petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the wife presented as evidence the certification issued by the LCR of Pasig City. The SC held that:

-A certificate of “due search and inability to find” unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion issued by
the local civil registrar is sufficient proof that no marriage license is issued to the contracting parties.

-“Secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties.

Sevilla vs. Cardenas 497 SCRA 428 (July 31, 2006)

Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License
No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage null and void ab initio.

Facts: Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Carmelita Cardenas on the
ground that he never applied for a marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license
was presented to the solemnizing officer. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license. As proof, he presented 3 certifications that have, more or less, the same
contents as the first, issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Rizal that reads:

“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage
License Number 2990792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our force locating the above problem.

San Juan, MetroManila

March 11, 1994

(SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar”

SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not
exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.

Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem.” It could easily be implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License
No. 2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed by the testimony of the representative
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, who stated that they could not locate the logbook due
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to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said
person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook
was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. Given the documentary and testimonial
evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the LCR
in issuing certifications is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that the absence
of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Semper praesumitor pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

In Morigo vs. People (422 SCRA376) where the parties merely signed the marriage contract without the
presence of the solemnizing officer and no actual marriage ceremony took place, the SC held that the 1st
element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. In the case at bar,
legally speaking Morigo was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no 1 st marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the 2 were never married “from the
beginning”. The contract of marriage is null, it bears no legal effect.

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract on their own bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which Morigo might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is
done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Instances of irregularity that would not affect the validity of marriage as enunciated by the SC in the case
of Alcantara vs. Alcantara 531 SCRA 466 (August 28, 2007):

1. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties.

2. Issuance of a marriage license despite absence of publication or prior to the completion of

the 10-day period for publication.

Liability of Public Officers

Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr. 237 SCRA 249

-The judge in the case at bar solemnized the marriage without a marriage license, did not sign the marriage
contracts or certificates, no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the
contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent
any copy of the marriage contract.
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As the solemnizing officer, he is responsible for the irregularity and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code the
judge shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

In Aranes vs. Occiano (380 SCRA 402) the SC held citing Navarro vs. Domatoy 259 SCRA 129 where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.

Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for
them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein
required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)

Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

Is failure to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding
the marriage? The Supreme Court held that legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of the respondent, had he duly presented it in court.

-SC also ruled that compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is not necessary; Philippine
personal laws no longer bound respondent Recio after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO October 2, 2001

In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.”

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS IYOY 470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005)

Crasus and Fely’s marriage ended when the latter left for the United States in 1984. In 1985, Fely divorced her
husband and contracted a subsequent marriage with an American. In 1988, she obtained American citizenship.
She now claimed that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.

Is the argument tenable?

SC: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a
foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen. At the time she filed for divorce she was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine

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laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III October 5, 2005 (2012)

Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?

Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to
apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner.

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that par. 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the literal purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of par. 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)

Niñal vs. Badayog

328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000)

-The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of the celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no 3rd party was involved at any time within the 5 years of
continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire 5 years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

-The 5-year cohabitation should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.

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-Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party, that is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

In the case at bar, the SC applied Article 76 of the Civil Code, the subsequent marriage having been
celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

The Supreme Court enumerated the requisites that must concur in order that the provision on legal ratification
shall apply:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
the marriage (underscoring supplied);

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

-In the case at bench, the SC held that the absence of the legal impediment is only required at the time of the
celebration of the marriage no longer during the entire 5-year period of cohabitation. (note per tolentino, dapat
exclusivity and 5 year cohabitation)

De Castro vs. De Castro 545 SCRA 162 (February 13, 2008)

The parties applied for a marriage license but forgot about it. The license expired so parties executed an
Affidavit of Cohabitation in lieu of the license.

SC: Falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. The false affidavit has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT vs. JOSE A. DAYOT 550 SCRA 435 (March 28, 2008)

Jose and Felisa were married in November 1986 and in lieu of a marriage license, the parties executed a
sworn affidavit attesting, among others, that both of them being unmarried lived together as husband and wife
for at least 5 years. It turned out that the statement is a complete falsity for they started living together barely 5
months before the celebration of their marriage.

Issue: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum 5-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of marriage license.

SC: For the exception in Article 76 of the Civil Code to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that a man and a
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years.

- The Civil Code in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of 5 years of cohabitation. No
other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.

-The minimum requisite of 5 years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For
a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in
the law not as a directory requirement, but one that partakes of a mandatory character.
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To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow circumvention of the law.

The falsity of the allegation in the sworn statement relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to the quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn statement is a lie, then it
is merely a scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

CASES:

Santos vs. CA January 4, 1995

-What constitutes psychological incapacity- should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code include their
mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

-Intendment of law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.

-Psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

-Did not meet standards required - the incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity- the party would be
incapable of carrying out the duties required in marriage, b) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage,
and c) incurability or if otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Ching Ming Tsoi vs. CA January 16, 1997

-One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

-In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

-An ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.

Republic v. CA and Molina February 13, 1997

-No clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an “incapacity”. It appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

-SC laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.

-Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

-Made definite and clear as to what are the essential marital obligations of marriage (Articles 68-71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code).

Marcos vs. Marcos 343 SCRA 755

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The personal or medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence presented may serve as basis of the determination of the
merits of the petition.

The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v CA: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Although this court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is no showing that his defects were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was unemployed for 6 years.

And because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner has not faithfully observed them. She failed to show that
the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

Hernandez vs. CA and Hernandez December 8, 1999

Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which made respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to
respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome.

Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of spouse’s psychological
incapacity, if only to show, that it existed at the time of the marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

-May a spouse be declared psychologically incapacitated based on the following grounds?

1. would disappear for months;

2. if with his family, often drunk and in such a state forced the wife to have sexual intercourse,
in case of refusal beats the wife; and

3. had been unheard of since last disappearance although rumored to have escaped from jail.

-In Republic vs. Molina, the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with
Guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband.

PESCA vs. PESCA 356 SCRA 588

In 1994 wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 because of the alleged
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility of her cruel and violent husband. A habitual drinker who, when
advised to stop, would beat, slap and kick her. Prior to the filing of the case, petitioner was battered black and
blue that led to the imprisonment of respondent for 11 days.
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Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in the statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally given the procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all
events petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case
of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, let alone at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the of the
family that the State cherishes and protects (Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

BARCELONA vs. CA

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Void Marriages (effective March 15, 2003). Procedural rules apply to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that
“expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. What the new Rules require the petition to allege are physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.

(Facts: Petitioner merely alleged that his wife was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage which exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage and which incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. In her motion to
dismiss, the wife argued that the petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically
the petition is defective because it failed to allege the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity. It is
also devoid of any reference of the grave nature of her illness to bring about her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage which were not even stated what those marital obligations that she failed to
comply due to psychological incapacity.)

DEDEL vs. CA 421 SCRA 461

Sharon is an immature wife and mother and had extramarital affairs with several men one of whom she ran
away with and had 2 children with him. She was also confined once in a hospital for treatment by a clinical
psychiatrist. During the trial, a doctor testified that Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of anti-social personality disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Held: Sharon’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychologically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that Sharon’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
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of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state, not merely to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

TENEBRO vs. CA 423 SCRA 272

What is the effect of a judicial declaration of nullity of a 2nd or subsequent marriage on the individual’s criminal
liability for bigamy?

Held: A declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of Veronico’s valid marriage to Hilda, Veronico’s marriage to Leticia would be null and
void ab initio completely regardless of Leticia’s psychological incapacity or capacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this 2 nd marriage is not
per se an argument of the avoidance of the criminal liability for bigamy. Although the judicial declaration of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects, Article 54 states that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such
a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

JARILLO vs. PEOPLE 601 SCRA 236 (September 29, 2009).

Jarillo contracted marriages twice. Her defenses were 1.) her marriage with Alocillo was null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to Loretta Tillman at the time of their marriage; and 2.) her marriages to both
Alocillo and Uy were null and void for want of a valid marriage license. While the case was pending appeal,
Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo was declared void under Article 36. She now invoked said declaration as a ground
for the reversal of her conviction.

SC: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment Jarillo contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’s marriage to Uy make any difference. A plain
reading of Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. HAMANO May 20, 2004

Are the norms laid down by the SC in Santos and Molina cases applicable to marriages where one of the
parties to the marriage and alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is a foreigner?

SC: We find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be
a foreign national. The norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

The SC in this case reiterated the complete guidelines, as stated in the Molina case, in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and bar with emphasis on (2) thereof i.e. “The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

In the case at bar, the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
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medical examination, it would greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through expert witness. This Lolita did not do.

As we held in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical illness.

LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES G. R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

Barely 4 years after the marriage, Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Ivonne declared null
and void under Article 36. As manifestations of the wife’s alleged psychological incapacity, Antonio claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, he presented Drs. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and
Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. They concluded that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. During the
pendency of the case, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the catholic marriage of
the parties that was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal with modification stating that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. That respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. The Roman Rota of the Vatican upheld the findings of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.

SC: Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.” Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules.

We find the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently
overcome his burden by proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior. He also presented 2 expert
witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount
to psychological incapacity. Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained
in the trial court’s decision. Dr. Lopez concluded that respondent “is a pathological liar that she continues to lie
and loves to fabricate about herself. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court
had already held in Marcos vs. Marcos that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. Third. Respondent’s psychological
incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of the
marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure
on the part of the respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them were revelatory of respondent’s inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
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adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. Fifth.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity. It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The CA clearly erred
when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was
arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Church rulings will hold sway if they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the
rulings of the Catholic Church on the matter would have diminished persuasive value. Seventh. From the
totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been established by petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.

NOTE: Compare the facts of ANTONIO and NAJERA cases and the decision rendered by the SC in each
case.

NAJERA vs. NAJERA 591 SCRA 542 (July 3, 2009)

Digna prayed that her marriage with Eduardo be declared void by reason of the alleged psychological
incapacity of Eduardo to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In support of her petition she
presented Dr. Gates who testified that Eduardo is afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by
his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo’s psychological impairment as traced to his parent’s
separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to
Digna. Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause
irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time
render his impairment grave and irreversible.

Likewise, during the pendency of the petition, Digna also filed a petition for annulment of her marriage before
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church based on psychological incapacity under
Canon 1095. And twelve (12) days before the decision of the appellate court was issued, the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal declared her marriage annulled stating that “the husband-respondent upon
contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract.” The trial court decreed only the legal separation of the spouses, but not the
annulment of their marriage. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

SC: The totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the CA, Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts
relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus,
her finding is unscientific and unreliable.

The evidence presented by Digna in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent
toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than 1 year are
grounds for legal separation only.

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The basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the 3 rd
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the 2nd paragraph of Canon
1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.

Hence, even if, the factual basis of the decision of the National Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts
established by Digna before the trial court, the decision of the former court is not based on the psychological
incapacity of respondent.

REPUBLIC vs. CUISON-MELGAR 486 SCRA 177

-Reiterated the decisions rendered in Santos vs. CA – that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

-Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic vs. Molina the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36.

In Marcos vs. Marcos, the Court later clarified that that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

In this case, Norma failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio was suffering from a
psychological defect that in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted that her marital woes started only after the birth of their 1st
born and when Eulogio lost his job. It was alleged that Eulogio is a habitual alcoholic, refuses to look for a job
after he was dismissed from work, every so often goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her
and then drags her home because of his unbearable jealousy and had abandoned the family.

Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital
obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, 220, 221 and 225.

While an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is fatal to her position, there can be no
psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS 495 SCRA 396 (July 17, 2006)

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the FC, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage (Santos vs. CA). It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.

In the case at bar, their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations.

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Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called “schizoid”, and why he is the “dependent and avoidant type.” The doctor’s statement lacks specificity; it
seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Inputs about respondent’s problematic history were all
supplied by petitioner herself, hence self-serving. Petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent’s supposed
psychological illness or mental malady existed even before the marriage.

Respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

ZAMORA vs. CA 515 SCRA 19 (February 7, 2007)

-reiterated its ruling in Santos, Molina and Marcos.

-the case of Santos v. CA did not specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is a vital and
mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Even in the subsequent case
of Republic v. CA (also known as the Molina case), examination of the person by a physician in order for the
former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a requirement. What is
important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

REPUBLIC vs. TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 (February 28, 2007)

-SC cited its ruling in Santos, Molina and Ferraris.

-Doctor Tayag’s conclusion about Manolito’s psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied
by Laila which she found to be “factual”. Undoubtedly, the doctor’s conclusion is hearsay. It is “unscientific and
unreliable”.

Dr. Tayag’s psychological report does not even show that the alleged anti-social disorder of Manolito was
already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder nor did it identify its root cause.

Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as
his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. His state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.

NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., vs. CYNTHIA NAVARRO 521 SCRA 121 (April 13, 2007)

Petitioner claims that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question
because he would go insane if he were to go back to his wife. That she was not supportive of his career, and
marriage counseling did not work. He also alleged that if they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and
would tell him to look for other women.

SC reiterated decision in Santos vs. CA on characteristics of psychological incapacity, the guidelines laid in
Republic vs. CA (also known as the Molina case- Zamora vs. CA) and elucidated that;

1. Spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do
not constitute psychological incapacity;

2. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; and

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3. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondents scandalous outbursts in public,
at most, show their immaturity and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.

PARAS v. PARAS 529 SCRA 81 (August 2, 2007)

May factual findings in a disbarment case be considered conclusive in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 where the husband was suspended from the practice of law because of immorality
and abandonment of his own family?

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the
first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
versa. The disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. In the disbarment case, “the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such.” On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a
grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. In the 2000
case of Marcos v. Marcos, the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. What is important is “the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition.”

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support given to the children are true,
nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his
part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

There is no evidence that Justo’s “defects” were present at the inception of the marriage. His “defects”
surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their 2 children died; he lost in the election; he
failed in his business ventures and law practice; and he felt the disdain of his wife and family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s “defects” are incurable or grave.

RENNE ENRIQUE BIER vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and REPUBLIC 547 SCRA 123 (February 27, 2008)

3 years after the marriage, petitioner found out that respondent is no longer the spouse he knew and married.
She became aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing even to
have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also
neglected her husband’s needs and upkeep of the home, and became an absentee wife.

SC: If a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause,
incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must always be
proved.

-This must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

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Even if Molina was never meant to be a check list of the requirements in deciding cases involving Article 36 of
the Family Code, a showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the party’s psychological
incapacity and its existence at the inception of the marriage cannot be dispensed with.

Even if Marcos relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated by a psychiatrist or a psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell failure of
the petition.

HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI 551 SCRA 576 (April 16, 2008)

Petitioner alleged that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to
respondent. That after the wedding they never lived together as they continued to live with their respective
parents although they maintained their relationship. The marriage was never consummated and that they are
constantly fighting.

SC: Although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity the same hardly constitutes sufficient cause for
declaring the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability.

Their not having lived together in one roof does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along with
each other as they constantly fought over petty things. However, there was no showing of the gravity and
incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or
conclusion to that effect in the psychological report which report dismally failed to prove petitioner’s alleged
was grave enough and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

SC reiterated its ruling in the Santos and Molina cases.

HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI 589 SCRA 25 (June 9, 2009)

The SC reversed its earlier denial of Lester Halili’s petition citing the ruling it held in the case of Te vs. Te (G.R.
No. 161793, February 13, 2009).

Lester is suffering from dependent personality disorder by reason of petitioner’s dysfunctional family life.

He had a very abusive and domineering father. The mother was very unhappy and the children never had an
affirmation. Wife and children were practically robots so Lester grew up without self-confidence, very immature
and somehow not truly understanding what it meant it to be a husband, and what it meant it to have a real
family life. Hence, Lester’s personality disorder was grave, incurable and existing at the time of the marriage.

NILDA NAVALES vs. REYNALDO NAVALES 556 SCRA 272 (June 27, 2008)

The totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated.

The psychological report which concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual,
has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual
role as a wife, etc., etc. is insufficient to establish Nilda’s psychological incapacity. It lacked specificity, it failed
to show the root cause of Nilda’s psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a “natal or
supervening disabling factor” or an “adverse integral element” in Nilda’s character that effectively incapacitated
her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or
mental malady existed even before the marriage.

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The standards used by the Court in assessing sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict,
but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.

REPUBLIC vs. LYNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO 556 SCRA 711 (June 30, 2008)

Lynette is married to Martini, a seaman, whom she alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity being
a “mama’s boy” that will endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of establishing a permanent
relationship with the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on his family. The clinical
psychologist concluded that Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-
centered motives

SC: -The mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Nor does the failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons.

-It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting
their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity or
incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

-How the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition,
that such personality disorders of Martini had been existing since Martini’s adolescent years has not been
explained.

-While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychologically

incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be “medically or clinically identified.” There must thus
be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.

DIMAYUGA-LAURENA vs. CA 566 SCRA 154 (September 22, 2008)

Ma. Darlene and Jesse were married on December 19, 1983 and had 2 children. In 1993, Darlene filed for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose. She alleged that the latter’s psychological incapacity was
manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his family’s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity and tendency to
lead a bachelor’s life. During the trial Darlene claimed that the root of Jose’s incapacity was his homosexuality
(during their honeymoon, they were accompanied by a 15-year old boy, and that he had feminine tendencies).

-SC reiterated Santos and Molina decisions. Santos on the 3 characteristics while Molina – on the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36. In the case at bar, both the trial and appellate courts found that
petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case. Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence,
homosexuality, or moral pressure to compel one to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds
for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.

In Marcos vs. Marcos, the court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person
concerned. While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him psychologically incapacitated is
not required, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. Darlene
failed to prove that respondent’s psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. In sum, the totality of the evidence failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA TE G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009

Edward met Rowena in a gathering. 3 months after their 1st meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they eloped
but he refused. She persisted and so they went to Cebu but Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted only a month. Unable
to find jobs, they decided to return to Manila. Rowena went to live in her uncle’s house while Edward returned

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to his parents’ home. Edward however, was forced to live with Rowena and her uncle because she kept on
telephoning him, threatening that she would commit suicide if Edward would not live with her. On April 23,
1996, they got married and continued to stay in her uncle’s house where Edward was treated like a prisoner,
as he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle showed him his guns and warned not to leave
Rowena. When he was able to call home, a brother suggested that they stay at their parents’ home and live
with them. Rowena instead suggested that Edward should get his inheritance so they can live on their own.
When he relayed this to his father, the latter got mad and told him that he would be disinherited and insisted
that he must go home. Edward escaped.

After knowing that Edward does not have any money, she stopped tormenting him and informed him that they
should live separate lives.

The clinical psychologist who examined Edward found both parties are psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. Yet despite said findings, the CA reversed the earlier ruling of
the lower court that granted the petition.

SC: The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken
its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a straitjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court in applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage.

It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathisc personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. We are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.

Hernandez v. CA emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of
a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos
v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented as enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.
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Respondent’s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. Her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed
by society. She is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.

TING vs. VELEZ-TING 582 SCRA 694 (March 31, 2009)

Did the SC abandon the Molina Doctrine in view of its ruling in TE vs. TE?

Far from abandoning Molina, We (SC) simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
inasmuch as “to require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice for poor litigants. It is also a
fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. The need for the examination of the party
or parties by a psychologist or psychiatrist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined
by the court during the pre-trial conference.”

But if the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrist
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity then, such expert
opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition
for nullity of marriage.

MARIETTA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC GR. No. 180668 (May 26, 2009)

Marietta married Rodolfo 2 months after their 1st meeting. The marriage lasted only for 4 years and
subsequently Marietta filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. She alleged that
Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and
perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. He never bothered to look for a job and instead
relied upon his mother for financial assistance including the payment of rentals of the room they were
occupying. He pretended that he found a job but when confronted as Marietta discovered that he really did not
actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother, he
cried like a child and told the wife that he did it so she would stop nagging about applying for a job. When they
discussed about their sexual problem as theirs is an unsatisfactory sex once a month, Rodolfo would always
say that sex is sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because
he was not ready. The psychiatrist testified that Rodolfo was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder
whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people.

SC: The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent
of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his
psychological functioning related to sex, self-confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed
prior to the marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is
considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so
deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe and grave in degree, because it hampered and
interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.

His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mother’s love.
At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his continuous
relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him
psychologically.

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The SC also cited Santos, Marcos, and Te decisions. It further stated that, “there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.”

SO vs. VALERA 588 SCRA 319 (June 5, 2009)

Renato So was a 17-year old high school student while Lorna Valera was a 21-year old college student when
they fell in love. They cohabited for about 19 years before they decided to get married. Five years later, Renato
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also
claimed that Lorna is psychologically incapacitated as shown by her refusal and failure to cohabit and make
love with him, does not love or respect him. If he comes home late, Lorna would refuse to let him in and in
several instances he has to sleep in his car. She also refused to practice her profession by selling her dental
equipment that he bought and provided. Instead she joined him in his electronics business and interfered in his
decisions that would sometimes make him lose face before his employees.

On nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites, Renato alleged that Lorna merely asked him
to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract and that no marriage ceremony took place.

He presented Dr. Gates, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Lorna suffers from Compulsive Behavior
Patterns – evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Renato’s money. That her
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns already existed prior to her marriage to Renato. That it
is continuing and appears to be irreversible.

SC: The allegation on nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage was negated by
the fact that during the trial Renato himself presented a certified true copy of the marriage contract/certificate
duly signed by the officiating officer.

On psychological incapacity, the SC held that “Shorn of any reference to psychology, We conclude that We
have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time;
and who are now tired or each other. to be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are
not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.

The statements made by Dr. Gates merely testify to Lorna’s impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility
and decency in the conduct of her life. Dr. Gates failed to prove that all these emanated from a behavioral
disorder so grave and serious that she would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent’s medical or psychological history before the marriage; and that
a cure was beyond the respondent’s capacity to achieve.

RODOLFO ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA ASPILLAGA G.R. 170925 October 26, 2009

The marriage disintegrated when, after arrival from Japan, Aurora discovered that Rodolfo cohabited
with her cousin in their house and subsequently, left the family abode in favor of the concubine. On the other
hand, Rodolfo, in his petition, alleged that Aurora is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He complained that Aurora is a spendthrift, domineering and frequently humiliated him.
Psychiatrist Maaba explained that the spouses harbor psychological handicaps that could be traced from
unhealthy maturational development. Rodolfo has an unhealthy familial relationship during the early
maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and protective maternal lineage.

Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness, and emptiness hamper Aurora’s objectivity. She also
projected signs of immaturity and has the desire to regress to a lower level of development.

SC: Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While he was
able to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, Maaba failed to link the parties psychological
disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband
and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital obligations
does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the FC. Mere
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difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each party’s condition is
so grave or is of such as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent.

EDWARD LIM vs. MA. CHERYL LIM G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010

Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report stated that, “clinical evidence showed that Mr. Edward Lim is suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder, associated
with immaturity, that render both of them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.”

The conclusion was based on what Villegas termed as “psychodynamics of the case” where he alleged
that Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. His father was exceptionally temperamental and
moody, while the mother was extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive, that repelled him from both
of them.

Cheryl, on the other hand, was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short period of time. Later, her
immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognized realities
in their family set-up and will insist on her fantasized wishes.

SC: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the “psychodynamics of the case” and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity.

Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders were not supported by psychological
test properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been
fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of
people’s intelligence, thinking, or personality.

The SC also cited its rulings in the Santos (characteristics of psychological incapacity and its definition)
and Molina (guidelines) cases.

LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010

Wife had an extra marital affair with whom she subsequently lived with after telling the husband that
she had no more love for him. Thus, the husband came to believe that with the wife’s irresponsible, immature
and immoral behavior, she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.

SC: The psychologist failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained
and established by the totality of evidence presented during the trial.

The acts of the respondent do not even rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law
requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.

OBSERVATIONS: RE. DECISIONS OF THE SC INVOLVING CASES FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 36

The SC almost always would state:

1.What constitutes “psychological incapacity” and its 3 characteristics and the meaning of each (Santos and
Laurena cases);

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2.The intendment of the law as to the meaning of “psychological incapacity”;

3.The essential marital obligations of marriage;

4.The Molina guidelines although the requirement on medical or clinical examination of the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated may be dispensed with if the totality of the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity (Marcos vs. Marcos); and

5.If there is no clinical or medical examination, the alleged psychological incapacity of the spouse must be
proven by independent evidence adduced by the party alleging said disorder (Paz vs. Paz).

*Marriages under the Muslim Code where one party is a non-Muslim:

NOLLORA, JR. v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 191425 09/07/2011

Nollora got married twice. First in 1999 then in 2001. His defense is that as early as 1992 he had
already converted as a Muslim showing a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 as proof. But in his
1st marriage with Jesusa, it was indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ and in his 2nd marriage with
Rowena his religion is Catholic because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his 1 st marriage to keep said
marriage a secret.

SC: Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of
Muslim faith at the time of the celebration of both marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriages were not
conducted in accordance with the Muslim Code or PD No. 1083.

Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case of a marriage between a Muslim and
a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim Law or this Code, [the Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.” Nollora”s
religious affiliation is not an issue. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. He asserted in his marriage Certificate with Rowena that his civil status is “single.” Moreover, both
of Nollora’s marriage contract do not state that he is a Muslim.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n).

Terre vs. Terre 211 SCRA 11

-For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

Husband alleged that the marriage being void ab initio, there is no need for declaring its nullity and hence, the
petition is superfluous and unnecessary and Article is only for purposes of remarriage. Is the husband correct?

-A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required as a cause of action or a ground
for defense.

-For purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

-Where a party desires to enter into another marriage, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was
an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

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-A party may invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage such as
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property as well as custody and support of their
common children.

-The court before which the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr. 243 SCRA 32

-Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage.
-Article 256 on retroactivity applies as Article 40 is a rule of procedure.

Beltran vs. People 334 SCRA 106

-Reiterated Domingo ruling.

-SC also held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.

Carino vs. Carino

February 2, 2001

- For purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise the
second would also be void.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, and TEOFILO CARLOS II GR No. 179922,
December 16, 2008

The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. Both rules have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Only the aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. It cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

The Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage is within
the coverage of the Family Code. The new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in
its application.

ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC GR # 158298 August 11, 2010

May a 3rd person impugn the validity of a marriage?

Isidro alleged that his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato’s marriage celebrated on
December 26, 1949 without a marriage license was void. And being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who
died without any issue entitled him to ½ of the real properties acquired by the deceased before his death,
thereby making a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

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SC: Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet
as well for the order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering it void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage.
According to Carlos vs. Sandoval 574 SCRA 116, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will
be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

-Four requisites that must be met for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41. These are 1. the
absentee spouse must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years if the disappearance is
accompanied by any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 391 of the Civil Code; 2.the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is already dead; 3. there is a judicial decree of presumptive
death; and 4. for the purpose of remarriage.

-Spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leaves the conjugal
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.

Calisterio vs.Calisterio April 16, 2000

-Subsequent marriage was solemnized on May 8, 1958 the law in force at that time was the Civil Code
(Article 83).

-A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence (7 consecutive years or if less, generally considered to be dead and believed to be so) is met. In
contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent marriage may exceptionally be considered
the following conditions must concur: (1) the prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for 4
consecutive years or 2 years where there is danger of death under Article 391 of the NCC, (2) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, (3) there is a judicial declaration of
presumptive death and (4) for the purpose of remarriage.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE November 29, 2005

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Is the spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage still liable
for bigamy despite the absentee spouse having been missing for 21 years?

Facts: Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. She went missing also in the same year and was unheard of since
then. In 1996, he married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001, the latter became curious and made inquiries with
the NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Sued for bigamy, Eduardo avers
that when he married Tina in 1996, Rubylus had been “absent” for 21 years since 1975. He points out that,
under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code she was presumed dead as a matter of law because if
one has been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes
except for succession. Thus, the presumptive death of the absentee spouse arises by operation of law upon
the satisfaction of 2 requirements: the specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the
absentee is dead. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must be a judicial
declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply.

Held: It was the burden of petitioner to prove his defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he was of the
well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the RPC (Bigamy- The penalty x x x x or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings.), in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that petitioner acted in good
faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not
be held guilty of bigamy. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance.

REPUBLIC vs. CA and ALEGRO

December 9, 2005

Alan filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) when barely a month
after the marriage, Lea left their conjugal abode. He then looked for her in his in-laws house, in her friend’s
house where the brother-in-law of Lea’s friend told him that his wife left for Manila. He also inquired from his
friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail. He also sought the help of Barangay Captain Magat who
promised to help him locate his wife. In 1995, he left for Manila and went to the house of Lea’s friend but
despite repeated talks with her, he failed to find her. He also looked for Lea in the malls but to no avail. In
1997, he decided to return to Catbalogan and again looked for his wife but failed. In 2001, he reported Lea’s
disappearance to the local police and also to NBI. Magat corroborated his statements during the trial.

SC: The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is already dead, in
Republic vs. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also a maxim that “men readily believe what they
wish to be true.”

In this case, Alegro failed to present a witness other than Magat. He failed to present Janeth or Nelson
or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. What is
worrisome is that, Alegro failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law considering that Lea’s father was the
owner of DYMS. He did report and seek the help of the local police and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only
an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and the SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC) vs. TERESITA
JARQUE vda. DE BAILON March 24, 2006

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Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted a subsequent
marriage with Teresita in Casiguran, Sorsogon. When Bailon died Teresita claimed the death benefits from the
SSS. It now appears that Alice is very much alive and that it was Bailon who abandoned or deserted the
spouse. Alice alleged that she lived with her parents at Barcelona, Sorsogon because she found out that
Bailon was having an extra marital affair but Bailon used to visit her there after their separation. That she only
recently knew of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead. The SSS denied Teresita’s
claim contending that her subsequent marriage with Bailon is void as it was contracted while Bailon’s marriage
with Alice was still subsisting and that there is no need to require Alice to execute an affidavit of reappearance
as there is no disappearance of Alice. In fact, the CFI order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her (ALICE) “presence” being “contrary proof” against the validity of the order. Teresita, however,
maintains that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful,
hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary. Went to the Social Security Commission but the SSC upheld the denial of the SSS respecting
Teresita’s claim for death benefits.

SC: The 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code specifically Art. 83 which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. Under the said provision, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under
any of the 3 exceptional circumstances (7 continuous years absence or if less than 7 years, generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or disappeared under any of the
circumstances mentioned in Articles 390 or 391) falling under said Article. It bears noting that the marriage
under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” It
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon
sought the declaration of presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for
purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Article 42
provides: “The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, x x x x.” The termination of the subsequent
marriage by affidavit does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentee’s mere appearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the 2nd marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial

declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits: x x x. Generally if a
subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of a valid marriage
shall arise. The good faith or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because as in annullable or
voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned in a direct action for annulment. Such marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. The marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good
ab initio.

VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009

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Sofio, married to Angelita, disappeared in 1972. He returned in 1975 and the spouses agreed to separate and
executed a document to that effect. That was the last time Angelita saw Sofio. After that she did not hear any
news of Sofio, his whereabouts or whether he was alive or not.

Believing that Sofio is already dead, Angelita contracted a subsequent marriage in 1985. Subsequently,
however, Virgilio’s (Angelita’s 2nd husband) application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because Angelita’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting. She then
filed a petition seeking for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

The RTC denied the petition contending that by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately.

SC: The marriages of Angelita to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were
both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.

For purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared
an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its
sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the 7 th year of absence,
Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of
the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the
death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
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(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Articles 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage. (87a)

VILLANUEVA vs. CA

505 SCRA 565 (October 27, 2006)

Orlando and Lilia got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992,
Orlando filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced
him into marrying Lilia, that he never cohabited with her after the marriage. Lilia moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily married her.

SC: The letters admitted to be written by Orlando contained expressions of love and concern for his
wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate
the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result
of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with Lilia
on any of those grounds, the validity of the marriage must be upheld.

MANUEL ALMELOR vs. RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY and LEONIDA ALMELOR 563 SCRA 447 (August 26,
2008)

Leonida filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Manuel based on Article 36. The court
instead, annulled the marriage based on Article 45 (3) in relation to Article 46 (4) of the Family Code. She
alleged that she noticed Manuel to be peculiarly close to his male companions. That she caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller and that she found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Worse, she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips
that she identified as Doctor Nogales.

SC: Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear- a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it
proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he
deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that
vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.

The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. It took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.

The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality
per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. It is only a ground for legal separation.

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

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In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (88a)

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA 424 SCRA 725

Held: The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion
of the respondent. The trial court forthwith rendered judgment against Marietta without a whimper of protest
from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code which states that “In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.” They also ignored Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court now Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997
Rules of Court that “there is no default in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation.”

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Art. 55- Legal Separation (94,97,02,06)

-In cases of legal separation, where violence (physical or sexual or psychological) is alleged by the
petitioner the mandatory 6-month cooling-off period under Article 58 shall not apply [Section 19, RA 9262 or
VAWC Law].

ONG vs. ONG 505 SCRA 76 (Oct. 23, 2006)

SC: The argument that since Lucita abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Article 56 (4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have
given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the FC is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than 1 year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

Art. 56 – grounds when petition for legal separation will be denied.

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Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be
severed;

(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of
Article 213 of this Code; and

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall
be revoked by operation of law. (106a)

On forfeiture of the guilty spouse’s share of the net profits (Article 63 [2])

SIOCHI vs. GOZON 616 SCRA 87 March 18, 2010

Elvira obtained a decree of legal separation against her husband Alfredo. The dispositive portion reads: “x x x
x. Being the offending spouse, respondent (husband) is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.”

ISSUE: Does the forfeiture refer to the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property?

Article 63 shall have the following effects:

(1) x x x x x;

(2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated
but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 42 (2);

(3) X x x x x .

Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:

X x x x.

(1) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
x x x x x x his or her share of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children or, x x x x x;

Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102 (4) of
the FC provides that “for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article
43 (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Afredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

BRIGIDO QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO 675 S 642 (July 4, 2012)

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Parties were legally separated on October 10, 2005 with Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership forfeited in favor of the common children.

Brigido wanted to clarify the meaning of “net profit earned” for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized
under Article 63 of the FC. The other issues raised were: 1) Can Article 256 of the Family Code be given
retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits without impairing vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code; and 2) what properties shall be included in the forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse?

SC: The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of
the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.

Article 102 (4) applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining “net profit”. The provision applies to
both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the
Family Code relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.

When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil
Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or the partnership, the net gains
or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each
of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. Article
129 of the Family Code applies in the liquidation of the couple’s properties. What remains of the separate or
exclusive properties of the husband and the wife shall be returned to each of them.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

On the issue of retroactivity of the Family Code affecting vested rights already acquired, the SC said
“The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary court
action. While one may not be deprived of his “vested right”, he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.”

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. (109a)

Ilusorio vs. Bildner 332 SCRA 169

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriff or by any other mesne process. That
is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage. (133a)

ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al. November 22, 2001

Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel of land. As he was alone, he invited his niece, a
cousin of the niece, and Arcaba to stay with him at his house. Later on, the niece and the cousin of the niece
left Francisco’s home leaving only Francisco and Arcaba. Before his death Francisco donated a 150-sq. meter
lot to Arcaba. The heirs of Francisco are now questioning the legality of the donation. Arcaba contended that
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the property donated is payment for her past services rendered to the deceased. She further contends that
sexual intercourse is no longer possible considering that Francisco is already old.

SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such.

-Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient but that of
exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for
self-improvement;

(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for
the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for
self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)

Ayala Investments vs. CA 286 SCRA 272

-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself.

-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of stocks might have
been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into are
not only incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify the transaction as one “for the benefit” of the
surety’s family.

-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only because said
husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits are not the ‘benefits’ contemplated by
Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The ‘benefits’ contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family

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Code) are those benefits derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate
loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.

CARLOS vs. ABELARDO 380 SCRA 361

May the husband notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent in obtaining a loan be held solidarily liable for
such together with the wife?

While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by the wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and
lot that became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together
with his wife.

CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS 423 SCRA 357

Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso
loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together with 2 other
persons executed a continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos. PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges amounted to
P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied the 100,000
common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching then
moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were acquired by her
and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment Philippines was
established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?

Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of CityCorp
Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in
the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove
this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the “signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in
the business of guaranty or suretyship.”

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be
a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred that when a
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited.

It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of the top 20
stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated
through the loans obtained; that Alfredo’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the
infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code
(Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely a by-product
or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).

PANA vs JUANITE

Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or
conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who
were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; 19 (c) judicial separation of
property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply
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with his obligations to the family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership
of gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but
at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24 the above
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their
conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.1âwphi1

Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether
unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO 453 SCRA 283

Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City and had it titled in the name of the
husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners secured by the house
and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed the security. For failure to redeem, Homeowners
consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the husband died and the wife found out about the
mortgage, foreclosure and consolidation. Claiming absence of knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed
an action to annul the mortgage, certificate of sale, etc. Homeowners moved for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground that the property is the exclusive property of the husband having been titled in the husband’s name
alone. That assuming that the property is conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should be construed in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the co-owner may alienate, assign or mortgage and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment but the effect of the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family as the proceeds thereof were used to fund the husband’s subdivision
projects.

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Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle squarely applies to the instant case. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between
the spouses. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of Marcelino and Miguela
even in a suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted
provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership lies with the
creditor claiming as such. Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family is without adequate proof.
Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records to compel a finding that, indeed, the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family.

GUIANG vs. CA

291 SCRA 372

-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.

-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband
of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. Such contract is void as
one of the essential elements of a contract is absent.

- Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by
the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of events is clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a
complaint for trespassing against Corpuz, after which the barangay authorities secured an “amicable
settlement”. The settlement however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance
of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that Corpuz would vacate the property. By no stretch of
the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA 313 SCRA 493

-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court applied Art. 173 of the Civil
Code.

-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for annulment within 10 years from execution of the
contract and during the subsistence of the marriage.

MANALO vs. CAMAISA 374 SCRA 361

Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wife’s written consent?

Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The properties,
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subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must concur. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct
insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld,
the matter may be brought to court which will give the same if warranted by the circumstances. However, it
should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who
does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity,
court authorization cannot be sought.

HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES 410 SCRA 97

If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with
respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent?

-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning attached to the plain
language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife’s consent,
may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
“prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. To be underscored here is that
upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many
obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal partnership is even subject to the
payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered, if it turns out that
the spouse who is bound thereby, “should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient.” These are the
considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough
for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even
more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of
consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition as
void if done without the conjoint consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouse’s inability, the authority of the
court (footnote).

PELAYO vs. PEREZ 459 SCRA 475

SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space
provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A
wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth
in any particular document, so long as it is given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the
deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of
said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and
consented to the sale.

Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in
effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has
been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife
whose consent was not obtained.

BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)

Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00 representing
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost. Erlinda’s property however, was insufficient to
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answer for the liability so the sheriff levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The husband questioned
the levy and the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the conjugal
property was improper.

SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
“stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.

Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime
of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE 604 SCRA 120 (October 16, 2009).

In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to the land that was acquired
by Pedro while still single. They then introduced improvements on the property. In 1991, Pedro offered to sell
the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of her objections but Pedro,
nonetheless, sold the house and the 2 lots without Mary Ann’s consent.

SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code is void if done a.)
without the consent (written) of both the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one spouse’s inability – the
authority of the court.

If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the contract implementing the
decision to institute the case.

HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ,SR. vs. MINGOA, SR., et. al. 608 SCRA 394 (December 18, 2009)

Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by way of salary deduction. After
full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses. It bears a restriction of any unauthorized sale to 3 rd
persons within a certain period. The heirs learned, after Hernandez’ death in 1983 that TCT No. 107534 was
cancelled in 1982 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of respondents. Apparently,
Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of his right to purchase,
Hernandez sold to Dolores Camisura his rights in 1963. To circumvent the prohibition, the spouses Hernandez
executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to enable Dolores to sell the lot to Plaridel Mingoa without
the need of requiring Hernandez to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold the property to his daughter
Melanie, then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergia’s signature on the SPA was falsified. The forgery is so
blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. Petitioners now contend that
the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence null and void under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration
of the non-existence of a contract under Article 1410 does not prescribe.

SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves conjugal property. The events
occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it
states: “The wife, may during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
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partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.”

The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction necessarily barred her form questioning the sale of the subject property to 3rd persons.

FUENTES vs. ROCA 618 SCRA 702 April 21, 2010

Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses by way of an
agreement to sell. The vendees were to give a down payment with the balance to be paid as soon as Tarciano
clears the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the sale.
Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked on the requirements including Rosario’s consent to the sale. He alleged that
Rosario signed the affidavit of consent in Manila but he notarized it in Zamboanga City. Tarciano then
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.

When Tarciano and Rosario died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since Rosario did not give consent to the sale.
Her signature on the affidavit was forged.

SC: Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have been quite
tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the
sale or demand a stiff price for it.

The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature,
dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land.

While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the FC provides that without the other
spouse’s consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by
ratification or prescription.

Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother
to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.

The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law
gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of conjugal land. But Rosario died in 1990,
the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is lost forever?

No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite the sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
namely, the Rocas. As Lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to exclude any
person from its enjoyment and disposal.

REIMBURSEMENT RE: CONJUGAL FUNDS:

JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL & FLORA FERRER 508
SCRA 570 (November 29, 2006)

Before his marriage to Josefa, Alfredo acquired a parcel of land. Improvements introduced by Alfredo
on the property consisting of a residential house and a 2-door apartment building were made during the
marriage using their conjugal funds to pay off the loan obtained by Alfredo for the construction of said
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improvements. Subsequently, a warehouse was also constructed on the lot using the spouses’ conjugal funds.
Sometime in 1989, when Alfredo was already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer made the former
sign a document purported to be his last will and testament. It turned out however, that it was a sale covering
Alfredo’s lot and the improvements thereon to the herein respondents. Alfredo then instituted an action for the
annulment of the sale but the trial court held that the sale is valid and should be complied with by the parties in
good faith. The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court. Alfredo died in 1999 and relying on the
decision rendered in the previous case where the court held that inasmuch as the lot is of greater value than
the improvements and since Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory
follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and
capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements
at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, Josefa is now demanding reimbursement for the cost
of the improvements from respondents.

SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite allegations contained in the complaint that
they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner’s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the
owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse
who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts,
as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be
reimbursed.

Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to
violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the
spouse as contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the
owner-spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on
the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time
of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the
exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.

Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion
in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property
in any of the following instances:

(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;

(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;

(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration;

(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common
life with the other;

(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof;

(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or

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(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been
judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime.
No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted.

The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. (195a)

ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER August 29, 2006

Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in 1989 in Hamburg, Germany. They initially lived in
Hamburg but in 1992, the spouses decided to move and permanently reside in the Philippines. Helmut sold the
house he inherited from his parents in Germany. With the money, he bought a P528,000.00 lot in Antipolo and
constructed a P2.3 million peso house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in Elena’s name. The
marriage however, did not last due to Helmut’s alleged womanizing, drinking and maltreatment and eventually
the spouses separated. In 1994, Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties. He claims that he is not
praying for the transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property as he is aware of the constitutional prohibition of
aliens acquiring lands of the public domain but merely reimbursement. That the property is titled in the name of
Elena because of said prohibition. That the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his
marriage to Elena; that funds were given to her in trust and equity demands that he should be reimbursed of
his personal funds.

Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?

SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony.

Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. It has been held that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is, likewise proscribed by law.

The CA erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of Helmut’s
marriage to Elena. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut’s disqualification
from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold otherwise would be to allow circumvention of the constitutional
prohibition.

The Court decreed the separation of property between the spouses and ordering partition of the personal
properties located in the Philippines only.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN 524 SCRA 166 (June 8, 2007)

Virgilio and Dita’s marriage that was blessed with one son turned sour when the former discovered that
the latter was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which resulted to the conviction of Dita and her
paramour of the crime of adultery. Thereafter, Virgilio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the pre-trial of said case, they entered
into a Compromise Agreement as partial settlement of their conjugal partnership property. This was given
judicial imprimatur by the judge hearing the case. In an omnibus motion however, Virgilio prays for the
repudiation of the compromise agreement on the ground that it is against law and public policy; that the
proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the
Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property.
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SC: Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise agreement that was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings
for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.

While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of
the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the compromise agreement. There is no exigency
for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State Prosecutor because nothing in the subject
compromise touched into the very merit of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary
of any possible collusion between the parties. The agreement pertains merely to an agreement between
petitioner and respondent Dita to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome
of the pending case.

The conviction of adultery does not carry with it the penalty of civil interdiction that deprives the person
of the rights to manage to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)

Valdes vs. RTC B. 102, Q.C., Gomez-Valdes 260 S 221 July 31, 1996

-Marriage was declared void under Art. 36.

-Property acquired during the union is governed by Art. 147. It applies when a man and a woman so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.

-The term “capacitated” (1st par. of Art. 147) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e. any
“male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the impediment mentioned in Art. 37 and
38 of the Code”.

-If the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions.

-Art. 50 (Family Code) applying pars. (2), (3), (4) and 5 of Art. 43, relates only, by its explicit terms to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Art. 40 of the Code i.e. the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void.
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BUENAVENTURA vs. CA March 31, 2005

Noel and Isabel got married in 1979. The marriage later on was declared void by reason of Noel’s
psychological incapacity. The court, among others, ordered for the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership where the wife was given ½ of Noel’s retirement benefits with 12% int. from date of decision, and
½ of his outstanding shares of stocks with Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. Noel
opposed the sharing claiming that the retirement benefits he received from Far East Bank are gratuitous in
nature and therefore, his exclusive property. He likewise acquired the shares of stocks with the mentioned
companies before his marriage and are, again his exclusive properties.

SC: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article
50 in relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family Code, providing dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rules applies, which is that in case
a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of co-ownership. The trial court did not commit a reversible ruling that petitioner and
respondent own the “family home” and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that,
in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common law
spouses.

Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co-
ownership. Since the properties to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial and appellate
courts, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership.
No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in the
distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned by the parties herein ordered by
the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.

JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN July 31, 2006

In 1986, Juliet and John decided to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During
the cohabitation, they purchased a 2-storey house where the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
Juliet. The house was renovated as annexed to it is a new structure that housed a sari-sari store. In 1991,
Juliet went to Korea and while there she would send money to John who would deposit it in their joint bank
account. When she returned from Korea, they continued to live together, with John working as an employee of
Lepanto Mines and Juliet managing the store. In 1995, they partitioned their properties and executed a
Memorandum of Agreement that was unsigned by the parties but signed by their witnesses where it was
agreed that John shall leave the house with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s
share in the properties. Juliet made a down payment of P232,397.66 with the balance to be paid in 12 monthly
installments. She failed however, to make good the balance so John demanded that she vacate the annex.
When she refused John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet claiming that he alone spent for the construction
of the annex using his own funds with the tax declaration for the structure under his name and thru money he
borrowed from his relatives as proofs. The proof of indebtedness is a 1990 affidavit of one Macaraeg who
stated that John borrowed P30,000.00 from him.

Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of John.

SC: Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed form
his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For
sure, John failed to reveal how much he spent therefore. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged
relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. All he
could offer by way of reinforcing his claim is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit stated that it was in 1990
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when John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The annex structure was constructed in 1992 or 2 years after he
borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support
John’s self-serving allegation that the annex structure was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed
by him. Tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership.

In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. (Cite Article 147 in toto).

The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-
law spouses during the period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts, work
or industry and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules in co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a
co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-
owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. In this case,
evidence is totally wanting to establish John’s or Juliet’s exclusive ownership of the property in question. As
borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure by virtue of being a co-owner thereof. As
such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.

Juliet’s failure however, to pay the balance of John’s share in their common properties could at best
give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for
ejectment.

METROBANK vs. PASCUAL 547 SCRA 246 (February 29, 2009)

The marriage was declared void under Article 36. In the said decision, the court ordered the
partition/dissolution of the conjugal partnership. No liquidation was, however, made. Subsequently, ex-wife
Florencia mortgaged the property to Metrobank to secure a loan. Attached to the loan documents were the
decision of the court nullifying the marriage to Nicholson and a “waiver” purportedly signed by Nicholson where
he waived his share in the conjugal property. Florencia failed to pay the loan so Metro Bank foreclosed the
mortgage. When Nicholson learned of the foreclosure proceedings, he instituted a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the mortgage as it was made without his consent.

SC: While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marriage bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the property acquired before such declaration continue to
subsist as conjugal properties until after the liquidation and partition. Pending its liquidation and citing DAEL vs.
IAC (171SCRA 524), the conjugal property is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.

Hence, Article 493 of the Civil Code shall apply. Florencia has the right to mortgage her ½ undivided
share /interest in the property but not the share of Nicholson.

ALAIN DINO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DINO G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

The court declared the marriage void by reason of wife’s psychological incapacity. The trial also held
that “A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”. This is pursuant to Section 19 (1) of
the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

SC: The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of nullity of marriage shall only be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19 (1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In

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short, Article 50 does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
code, which should be declared without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the FC contemplates a situation where a second marriage or bigamous marriage was
contracted.

Article 45 of the FC, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages. In both instances under Articles 40
and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property. If the property relations is governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. This is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the FC because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the NCC, “partition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in both faith. (144a)

Agapay vs. Palang 276 S 341 July 28, 1997

-Petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the price of the riceland.

-The lawyer who prepared the deed of conveyance of the house and lot testified that the money for the
purchase price was provided for by Miguel and he also directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the
vendee.

-SC also cited Article 87 of the Family Code.

Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo 333 SCRA 628

Both parties were already married when they cohabited together. During the relationship they established a
business enterprise and by reason thereof acquired several properties. The properties however, were all
registered in the name of Castillo. When they decided to end the relationship, Mallilin demanded for his share
in the properties they acquired during the cohabitation. Castillo countered that Article 144 of the Civil Code
cannot be applied as the same covers only properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married or under a void marriage. In their case, their union suffered the legal
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.

SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union
are incapacitated to marry each other.

It applies as all but one property were acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With
respect to the property acquired under the regime of the New Civil Code, then it should be excluded. The legal
relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Article 148 of the Family Code under which all
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properties acquired out of their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-
ownership.

-Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.

-A trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership.

Carino vs. Carino

The nullity of the marriage between Nicdao (the first wife) and the deceased does not validate the second
marriage of Yee and the deceased Santiago without the prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage.

Considering that the marriage between Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of previous marriage then presumed to be valid, the application of Article
148 is therefore in order.

As to the property regime of Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This Article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless is void for other reasons, like the absence of marriage license.
Conformably, even if the deceased alone as a government employee earned the disputed “death benefits”,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto entitling Nicdao to share one-half thereof as there is no
allegation of bad faith.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA June 10, 2003

Under the property regime governed by Art. 148 “x x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions x x x x.” Proof of actual contribution is required.

In the case at bar, nowhere in Gina’s testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on
11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00. With respect to the disputed personal properties both
claimed that the money used in the purchase thereof came partly from their joint account. There is however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares in the said account. And pursuant to Article 148
of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of
which were not questioned by Jacinto, hence, their share therein is equivalent to ½ , P55,687.50 each. And on
the basis of the evidence established, the extent of Gina’s co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to
the amount of P11,413.00 her proven contribution in the construction thereof.

-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.

LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO 508 SCRA 593 (November 29, 2006)

Lupo, married and the president and general manager of 2 corporations, hired the services of Yolanda as
accountant thereof. The 2 became intimate and eventually lived together and had 2 children. The relationship
turned sour and they parted ways. Lupo then filed a petition for judicial partition involving a parcel of land with
improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. He alleged that the property was acquired during
their union and hence, the property is co-owned by them. He claimed that the funds used in the acquisition of
the said property were his exclusive funds and that the title was transferred to Yolanda’s name alone was done
without his knowledge and consent. And since the property was acquired in 1987, therefore Article 144 of the
Civil Code should be applied. That he is not burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition thereof
because with or without contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner of the subject property. He

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added that Article 484 of the Civil Code states that as long as the property was acquired by either or both of
them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed
by the rules on co-ownership, which shall apply in default of contracts or special provisions.

SC: Here although the adulterous relationship commenced in 1983, Article 148 of the Family Code applies
because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of
the FC was enacted, there was no provision governing property property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
FC took effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.

Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase used as consideration for the property,
Lupo diverted the burden upon him to Yolanda as a shrewd and scheming woman without capacity to
purchase any property. Petitioner’s claim of ownership is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his allege contribution but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and
voluminous bank records, which sadly finds no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof.

Respondent had sufficiently established that she derived funds used to purchase the property from her
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money
lending and jewelry retail. She presented clientele and promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her
clients, her bank account statements and bank transactions.

BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR 580 SCRA 175 (February 24, 2009) 2012 Bar

Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with Descallar, a married but separated woman, who was
working as waitress at a local hotel in Cebu City. She was earning P1,000.00 per month and another
P1,000.00 in the form of tips. Subsequently, they bought 3 parcels of land with a house constructed thereon.
The deed of sale originally included Jambrich as buyer but because of the refusal of the Register of Deeds to
register the property in Jambrich’s name on the ground that a foreigner could not acquire alienable lands of
public domain they erased his name but not his signatures appearing in all pages of the document. Jambrich
and Descallar however, separated.

Subsequently, Jambrich incurred debts and to pay the obligation, he sold his rights and interest in the
property that is now registered in Descallar’s name in favor of his creditor. Is the sale made by Jambrich valid?

SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich could have been
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the property to Borromeo. Citing United Church of
Christ vs. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is considered valid.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)

O’Laco vs. Co Cho Chit and CA 220 SCRA 656

-It is well settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to
the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.

Guerrero vs. RTC Br. XVI, Bello, Jr. and Hernando January 10, 1994

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-Requirement is mandatory, so that “if it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, it must be dismissed.”

-Rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between
members of the same family.

Exclusion to the requirement on earnest efforts:

1. Common law relationships;

2. Sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law);

3. Between collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters (Mendez vs. Eugenio);

4. Suit between a woman against her sister and the latter’s husband, the inclusion of the husband is not within
the “family relations” provided for by law (Hontiveros vs. RTC);

5. If included in the suit is a stranger not of the same family as the interest of such stranger may differ from the
interest of the member of the same family ex. A co-owner; and

6. Special proceedings- the term “suit” clearly implies only civil actions (Manalo vs. CA)

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. ACUNA and ALBERTO MORENO 500 SCRA 514 (August 31,
2006)

Moreno filed a case against Hiyas, his wife, spouses Owe and Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not obtain any loan from Hiyas nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage, that his wife, spouses Owe were the ones who benefited from the loan. He could not
have executed and signed the contract because he was then working abroad.

Hiyas moved to dismiss the complaint alleging non-compliance with Article 151 of the Family Code on “exerting
earnest efforts toward a compromise” between members of the same family which members include a
husband and wife.

SC: Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes
it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.

Article 151 is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it
necessarily follows that the same may be invoked by a party who is a member of that same family.

FAMILY HOME

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)

Modequillo vs. Breva (94) 185 SCRA 766

-Family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. No
need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.

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-Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. It does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

-The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

Manacop vs. CA and E & L Mercantile, Inc. 215 SCRA 773

-The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law only under Art. 153 of
the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988.

-The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its
beneficiaries” must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, it may be occupied by the ‘beneficiaries’ enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.

-The enumeration may include in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife.
The law definitely excludes maids and overseers.

Taneo, Jr. vs. CA 304 SCRA 308

-Reiterated ruling in Modequillo and Manacop cases

-In the case at bar, Taneo constituted the house in question as the family home on March 7, 1964 but the
instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus at the time when the “debt” was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered.

-The house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another as by the very definition of the law that
the “family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated.

-The constitution of a family home by Taneo was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their
property.

PERLA PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III 507 SCRA 438 (November 20, 2006)

Marcelino died intestate and survived by his wife Perla and 2 sons, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III.
Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building
constructed thereon located at Oxford St., Cubao, Quezon City. After the heirs extra-judicially settled the
estate, Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III that they intend to partition the property and terminate
the co-ownership but the latter refused on the ground that a minor beneficiary who is Marcelino III’s 12-year old
son and a grandson of the decedent still resides in said home. He contended that as long as the minor is living
in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary comes of age. That despite the expiration
of 10 years from the date of death of Marcelino in 1987 i.e. even after July 1997, the subject property continues
to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, who is a beneficiary of said family home,
still resides in the premises.

SC: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
“any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the
Family Code, which include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the
Code.
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To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Moreover, Art. 159 of the FC provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Thus, may Marcelino Lorenzo IV, minor son of respondent be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of
the FC? As to the 1st requisite, the term “descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and
the great grandchildren of the spouses who constituted the family home. Thus, Marcelino III’s minor son, who
is a grandchild of Marcelino satisfies the 1st requisite.

2nd requisite: minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from
Article 159. Marcelino Lorenzo IV has been living in the family since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of
the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the 3rd requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if
he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino
Lorenzo IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
And only in default of his parents is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus
despite, residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the 3 rd requisite
of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.

CABANG vs. BASAY 582 SCRA 172 (March 20, 2009)

Cabang mistakenly occupied the lot owned by Basay that was the subject matter of a case that was earlier
decided up to the Supreme Court. The writ of execution was opposed on the ground that the houses of
petitioners’ family home was still subsisting and being such, it is not subject to execution.

SC: The family home must be established on a) the absolute community, or b) the conjugal
partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on a property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly
on the community property, or conjugal partnership and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with
the consent of the owner-spouse.

In the case at bar, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home
stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of
the appellate court’s judgment. Thus, Cabang’s continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of
respondents.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

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Badua vs. CA 229 SCRA 468

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 are not applicable in the instant case. These articles govern a situation where
a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife but not where a child is alleged not to be the child
of nature or biological child of a certain couple.

Babiera vs. Catotal 333 SCRA 487

Alleged mother was already 54 years old at the time of her birth. The certificate of live birth was not
signed by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother.

-Article 171 is not applicable to the present case. It applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring
of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. The
prayer is not to declare the petitioner an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not
the latter’s child at all.

-Ruling in Badua case applied.

DE JESUS vs. ESTATE of DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON 366 SCRA 499

In a notarized document Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own illegitimate
children with Carolina Aves de Jesus who were both born during the subsistence of the marriage between
Carolina and Danilo de Jesus. May the children be given due recognition as the illegitimate children of Dizon?

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on a sounder morality and
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the 1st 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child (Articles 164 and
166, Family Code).

Succinctly put, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina. This step cannot be done because the
law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of the child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband
can be rejected.

Indeed, a child born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentence as an adulteress (Article 167, Family Code).

LIYAO, JR. vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO 378 SCRA 563

Husband and wife were separated-in-fact. The wife then lived with William Liyao and had a child with him.
During the birth of the child it was William who attended to the needs of Corazon, visited and stayed with the
mother and child at the hospital. He also shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Corazon and William, Jr.
The children of Corazon with her husband also acknowledged that William, Jr. is the illegitimate child of William
Liyao, Sr.

Whose child is William?

It bears emphasis that only the father may impugn the legitimacy of the child or in proper cases, his heirs under
the conditions set forth in Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, the heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
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Article 168 – rule, in the absence of proof to the contrary, if wife contracted a subsequent marriage within
300 days after termination of prior marriage and gives birth thereafter. (99)

GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE August 31, 2005

Gerardo and Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 and after the marriage lived with Theresa’s
parents at Fairview, QC. Almost a year later or on December 8, 1990 Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. The
marriage turned to be short-lived because on December 19,1991 Gerardo filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with Theresa on the ground of bigamy. It was found out that Theresa married one Mario Gopiao on
December 10, 1980, which marriage was never annulled and that Mario is still alive and is residing in Loyola
Heights, QC. The annulment was granted and declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. Custody was
granted to Theresa but Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Feeling betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo
had their marriage annulled and held him responsible for the bastardization of the child, she moved for a partial
reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling contending that there is nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in
favor of a putative father of an illegitimate child.” She further maintained that the surname of the child should
be changed from Concepcion to Almonte following the rule that the illegitimate shall use the surname of the
mother. The court denied Theresa’s motion applying the “best interest of the child” principle. Theresa went to
the CA that also denied her appeal. She then moved for reconsideration. The appellate court in resolving the
reconsideration ruled that when Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990, Theresa was legitimately
married to Mario therefore Jose Gerardo –under the law- is the legitimate child of Mario and Theresa. Shocked
and stunned Gerardo filed this appeal.

SC: The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised, Article 164 of the Family Code is clear.
A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the
child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: “The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.” Gerardo cannot invoke Article 166 (1) as he has no standing to dispute the status
of the child. Only Mario, Theresa’s husband, or, in a proper case, his heirs who can contest the legitimacy of
the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her
child.

To rebut the presumption of legitimacy it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access
that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Here, during the period that Gerardo and Theresa
were living together in Fairview, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in QC. Fairview and Loyola
Heights are only a scant 4 kilometers apart.

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG vs. MINOR JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ rep. by her mother and guardian JINKY
C. DIAZ 540 SCRA 480 (December 17, 2207)

Jinky, who was already married to a Japanese national Hasegawa Katsuo, had an affair with Rogelio
Ong. They lived together for about 4 years (January 1994 to September 1998) and had a child Joanne Rodjin.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Jinky and Joanne and stopped supporting the minor alleging that he
is not the father of the child. Subsequently Jinky filed a complaint against Rogelio because of his continued
failure and refusal to give support to the child and to acknowledge the child as his. The heirs, who substituted
Rogelio when he died, insisted that the decision of the appellate court remanding the case to the trial court for
DNA testing analysis be set aside and to declare Joanne as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa. It was
established however, that Hasegawa was living outside of the country and comes home only once a year. No
evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne Rodjin.

The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child.

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A child born to a husband and a wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. This presumption of
legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary.

With the advancement in the field of genetics, and availability of new technology, it can be determined with
reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing. DNA analysis
is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The
DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken.
This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.

The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples include blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Fernandez vs. CA 230 SCRA 130

-Photographs showing the presence of the alleged father in the baptism of the child are far from proofs that he
is the father of the child.

-Pictures showing putative father showering affection to the child fall short of the evidence required to prove
paternity.

-Baptismal certificate naming respondent as father of the child has scant evidentiary value. No showing that
he participated in its preparation.

-Certificate of live birth identifying the alleged father as father of the child is not also competent evidence on the
issue of paternity if records do not show that the alleged father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.

FERNANDEZ vs. FERNANDEZ 363 SCRA 811

May filiation be collaterally attack in an action for declaration of nullity of sale of real property?

HELD: While one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
this doctrine finds no application in the instant case as respondents’ claim was that Rodolfo was not born to the
deceased spouses Fernandez, not a situation wherein the respondents’ deny that Rodolfo was a child of their
uncle’s wife.

May an application for Recognition of Back Pay under RA 897 be considered as proof of one’s filiation?

It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay is a public document nevertheless it was
not executed to admit filiation of Jose with Rodolfo. The public document contemplated under Art. 172 refers to
a written admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as
an application for the recognition of rights to back pay, the contents being, only a prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
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The claim that he enjoyed and possessed the status of a legitimate child, the Court in Quismundo vs. WCC,
held that “possession of the status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground
for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.”

LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO December 4, 2001

Is an income tax return that listed her as filer’s daughter sufficient to prove filiation?

-The entries made in an income tax return only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount
thereof.

-Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.

LOCSIN vs. JUAN LOCSIN, JR. December 10, 2001

As between the original certificate of live birth issued in the place where the alleged birth took place and
a certified true copy issued by the civil registrar general but has entries different from the one issued by the
local civil registrar, which copy must prevail?

HELD: Since the records of birth cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to
merely access them in the civil registry general requires expertise. To locate one single record from the mass,
a regular employee, if not more has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro
Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the local civil registry of Iloilo
City.

-Respondent’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

BERNABE vs. ALEJO (2005 Bar Exam) January 21, 2002

The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the child be allowed to prove his filiation
despite the clear provision of Art. 175 of the Family Code which requires that if the action to establish
illegitimate filiation is based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent?

HELD: The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born in 1981, and therefore, his rights are
governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the
child has attained the age of majority. The enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

Art. 285 is a substantive law, as it gives the child the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years after
attaining the age of majority. The Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for
recognition because the right had already vested prior to its enactment. The rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to spurious children. Our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights
of minors who could have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. The State as
parens patriae should protect a minor’s right.

ECETA vs. ECETA May 20, 2004

Vicente predeceased his mother Rosalina. During his lifetime, however, he sired an illegitimate daughter,
Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case for partition, accounting with damages against Rosalina
alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of a certain property
located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City. During the pre-trial both parties admitted their relationship to one
another, that Rosalina is Maria Theresa’s grandmother and vise versa. When Rosalina was ordered by the
court to give 1/8 of the Cubao property to Maria Theresa, the former questioned the latter’s filiation.

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SC – Maria Theresa had successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated
birth certificate which Vicente himself signed thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone,
Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

DE LA ROSA, et. al. vs. HEIRS OF VDA. DE DAMIAN January 27, 2006

Facts: One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia is Guillerma Rustia who claimed to be the
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia where she sought recognition on 2 grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing. As proof of the latter, she presented the report card that identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. Also in Josefa Delgado’s obituary that was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named Guillerma as one of their children.

SC: There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere
ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of
the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In
this case, Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition,
is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent. This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his. Did Guillerma’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo qualify as authentic writings under the Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name
appears there, as her parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa which
was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 2, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping
of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to Guillerma’s claim.

TEOFISTO VERCELES vs. POSADA 522 SCRA 518 (April 27, 2007)

Posada, a young lass from a barrio in Catanduanes, was impregnated by Verceles, the mayor of Pandan,
Catanduanes. Verceles denied fathering the child. He argued that he never signed the birth certificate of Verna
Aiza Posada and that it was Clarissa Posada who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his
consent. Clarissa, on the other hand, presented as evidence the letters sent to her by Verceles starting from
the very time that she missed her menstruation and 3 other handwritten letters, 2 of which were in his
letterhead as mayor of Pandan. There were also pictures Verceles gave her of his youth and as a public
servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back. That she was given P2,000 pocket money and
another P2,000 for her delivery. Clarissa’s testimony was corroborated by her mother.

SC: The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza.
Although petitioner used an alias (Ninoy) in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis
the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced
eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found by
the courts a quo.

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In his memorandum, Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and
his giving her money during her pregnancy.

The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article
172(2) of the FC. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and
testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate
child.

DELA CRUZ vs. GRACIA 594 SCRA 648 (July 31, 2009)

Jenie and Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and stayed in
Dominique’s parents’ house. During his lifetime, Dominique wrote his autobiography that reads in part:

“As of now I have my wife named Jenie dela Cruz x x x. Then we fell in love with each other. x x x x. And as of
now she is pregnant and for that we live together. X x x.”.

After Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration using the deceased’s surname Aquino in support of
which she attached the Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use Surname of the Father (AUSF) signed by Jenie
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father. Attached to the AUSF is the autobiography.
The LCR denied the registration citing that the child cannot use the surname of the father because the child
was born out of wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity. Moreover, the AUSF was unsigned by the father. Jenie argued that Article 176 as amended by RA
9255 does not require the signature of the putative father.

SC: Article 176 of the Family Code (FC) as amended by RA 9255, does not, indeed, explicitly state
that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the FC which require
that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Article 175 in relation to Article 172 particularly paragraph 1 (2). “An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”

The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.

That a father who acknowledges paternity through a written document must affix his signature thereon
is clearly implied in Article 176 of the FC.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s autobiography,
though unsigned substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

1st. Dominique died about 2 months prior to the child’s birth.

2nd. The relevant matters in the autobiography, unquestionably written by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.

3rd. Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father and testimony
of his brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child.

These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements that
“JENIE DELA CRUZ is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”

In the case at bar, the SC adopts the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature
of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

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1.) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2.) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

Araceli, for and in behalf of minor Arhbencel filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Nepomuceno.

She alleged that Arhbencel is the product of her extramarital affair with Nepomuceno but that the latter
refused to affix his signature on the child’s birth certificate. But as proof of his acknowledgment that the child is
his child, Araceli presented as proof a handwritten note where he obligated himself to give financial support in
the amount of P1,500.00 on the 15th and 30th of each month. She claimed that the child’s filiation was
established by the said note.

SC: Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to Nepomuceno as his
illegitimate daughter falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent
on the determination of her filiation.

To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by
the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father
to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to father’s
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism or family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.

In the present case, Arhbencel relies on the handwritten note executed by petitioner:

“I, Ben Hur Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of x x x x x , to
Arhbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand,
subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.”

The above-quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to
Nepomuceno. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172 (2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the FC, which admits
as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child. For
it is not even notarized. And the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of
filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Live Birth,
has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Marquino vs. IAC 233 SCRA 348

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-Effect of death of the natural child during the pendency of action for recognition. Under Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, the action is extinguished. The right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children can never be
transmitted. Article 173 of the Family Code however, superseded the intransmissibility of an action for
recognition.

-But Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench
because vested rights will be prejudiced.

-In the case at bar, the SC said that “in an action for recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the
same is the putative parent himself. The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming
consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in
the family of the putative parent”.

-Article 175 (2) of the Family Code requires that if the action is based on the 2 nd paragraph of Art. 172 the
action maybe brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

De Santos vs. Angeles 251 SCRA 206

-Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimated because of the impediment present at the time of
conception of the child.

Effect of Adoption under RA 8552:

Section 13-“x x x x, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of
adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This
provision shall also apply in case the petitioner dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect
the interest of the adoptee.

In Tamargo vs. CA, 209 SCRA 518, the SC said that “we do not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Put a little differently, no presumption
of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arisen since the adopted child was not in
fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.”

In Lahom vs. Sibulo (July 14, 2003) the SC held that RA 8552 had abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The adopter while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons caused the forfeiture of certain
benefits. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.

Section 18 of RA 8552 does not give the adopter the right of representation because this does not
involve a “reciprocal” right between a parent and child.

LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC June 27, 2006

Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late Manuel Ramos. After
Manuel’s death, the children were left under the custody of their paternal grandmother because Amelia left for
Italy. When the paternal grandmother died, the children were taken cared of by a paternal uncle. Landingin, the
57-year old aunt and sister of the late Manuel and an American citizen residing in Guam, now desires to adopt
the 3 children. In her petition, she alleged that the mother of the children had abandoned them and had not
communicated with her children neither with her in-laws. In fact Amelia has already remarried and has 2
children with her 2nd husband. That petitioner and her other siblings were the ones financially supporting the
children. That she is already a widow and living alone because all her children are already married and are

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gainfully employed. They have given their consent in writing to the adoption, and also promised to help her in
supporting the children financially. Likewise, the paternal uncle where the children are currently staying also
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.

The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Pagbilao stated that the surviving parent
consented to the adoption as evidenced by the Affidavit of Consent executed by the children’s mother Amelia
as the mother came home on May 2, 2002 and stayed for 3 weeks. The minors likewise, consented to the
proposed adoption. Pagbilao then recommended that the children be adopted by petitioner. During the trial
however, Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and also failed to adduce documentary evidence
that, indeed, Amelia assented to the adoption.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the biological mother?

2.Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner’s children sufficiently complies with
the law? and

3.Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?

SC: Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides: Whose consent is necessary to
the adoption:

X x x x.

(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interest of the child.

Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia to the adoption.

Petitioner’s argument that her consent is no longer necessary because she left for Italy and never came
back, hence, Amelia had abandoned the children and it was just by twist of fate that after 12 years Amelia was
on vacation and was able to meet Pagbilao, must be rejected. If, as claimed, that the biological mother had
abandoned them, she should have adduced the written consent of the children’s legal guardian. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others does not constitute abandonment. To
dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.

Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of the 3, to prove that
Amelia abandoned them.

The Home Study Report tends to show otherwise. Elaine during the interview said that “in serious
problems she already consult her mother and petitioner-aunt.” And while petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing for most of their needs and education, Amelia would also send financial
support ranging from P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month through her parents and share P3,000.00 to
P5,000.00 thereof with the children.

Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to permanently sever their
mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children to her
now deceased mother-in-law.

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Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s report and the joint affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. As to her financial capacity,
the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an
hour and tips of around $1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at Quitugua Subd., Yigo, Guam but the
same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it is doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the 3 children in the US. While she claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, no proof was adduced to prove her allegation that her children and siblings are willing to
support the minors herein.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELE P.LIM and MICHAEL JUDE LIM 588 SCRA 98 (May 21,
2009) 2012 Bar

Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in 1983. They were only about 11
days old when they were given to the spouses Lim who had them registered as if they were their own children.
They were reared and cared for and were sent to exclusive schools and used the surname “Lim” in all their
school records and documents. In 1988, the husband died and the surviving spouse entered into another
marriage with an American citizen, Olario. Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed two separate petitions to
adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of the child. Both children, who are already of legal age, gave their
consent including Michelle’s husband to the adoption. Olario likewise executed an affidavit of consent for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael. The lower court denied the petition because inasmuch as Monina has
remarried, her petition should have been jointly filed with her new husband.

ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?

SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She
filed the petition by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 reads “Husband and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the exceptions. The word “shall” means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule is to insure harmony between
the spouses.

Neither would the exceptions apply. 1st the children are not the legitimate children of the petitioner or of her
husband; 2nd the children are not the illegitimate children of the pettioner ; and 3rd, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.

There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. None of the
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. Neither are the requirements on residency and
certification waivable as the children are not relatives within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of
petitioner or Olario.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
years of age-emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption.

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered the legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child as provided for under Article 174 of the Family Code.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

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While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution
of his marriage to petitioner before the Los Angeles Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between Monina and Olario, the marriage still subsists.

SUPPORT

DE ASIS vs. CA 303 SCRA 176

The mother filed an action for recognition and support. The putative father denied paternity and instead filed a
counterclaim. The parties agreed to dismiss the case provided the alleged father would no longer pursue his
counterclaim. Subsequently, the mother filed another case against the alleged father again, for support and
recognition. The putative father moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.

SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent case for support on behalf of the
same child against the same defendant because such manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the case on
condition that the defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a form of renunciation as they
severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the putative parent.

-The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person.

-To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to
allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.

-An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of
the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that cannot be countenanced.

-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially established and cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties.

GAN vs. REYES May 28, 2002

Apprehensive that she would be unable to send her 3-year old daughter to school, she wrote Gan
demanding support for their “love child”. Gan denied paternity of the child. He argued that since the child’s birth
certificate indicated her father as “UNKNOWN”, then there is no legal basis for the claim for support. Gan was
declared in default and was ordered to recognize the child Francheska Joy as his illegitimate child and to
support her. A writ of execution was issued citing as reason the child’s immediate need for schooling.
Meanwhile, Gan appealed the judgment of the CA. He then filed a petition for certiorari insisting that the
judgment sought to be enforced did not yet attain finality. He also seeks the setting aside of the default order
and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that he should be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery.

SC: There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the
legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. The Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial
court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
This is an exception to the general rule, which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the
judgment. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for and makes
no distinction between those that are the subject of an appeal and those that are not. To consider then
petitioner’s argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of judgment would be to
violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.

In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may
be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support
until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. Parenthetically, how could
he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother
of the child.

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MANGONON vs. CA 494 SCRA 1 (June 30, 2006)

SC: The pertinent provision is Article 199 of the FC; “Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support,
the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

Tolentino explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant
prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.

There being prima facie showing that Mangonon and Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, they are
primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support shall be borne by Francisco. Under Article 199 of the FC, as the next
immediate relative of the twins, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It
having been established that he has the financial means to support the twins’ education, he, in lieu of Federico
should be liable for support pendente lite.

While respondents have the option under Article 204 “to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has the right to receive support.
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.” In this case,
Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option. Prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship
between Francisco and the petitioner and daughters was quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged
among them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for another’s well being. The
photographs presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All these, however, are things of the
past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another, the relationships had been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they considered and claimed as family
denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see the twins moving back here
in the Philippines in the company of those who disowned them.

LIM vs. LIM 604 SCRA 691 (October 30, 2009)

Spouses Cheryl and Edward and their 3 children live with Edward’s parents, and his grandmother.
Edward is receiving P6,000.00 from their family business. Cheryl, on the other hand, had no steady source of
income.

In 1990, Cheryl together with her 3 children left her in-laws house after a violent confrontation with
Edward whom she caught with in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the court described as “a very
compromising” situation. She then sued Edward together with his parents and grandparents for support.

The court ordered Edward, his parents and grandparents to provide support in the amount of
P40,000.00. P6,000.00 from Edward while the balance of P34,000.00 shall be borne by his parents subject to
the subsidiary liability of the grandparent. The court held that Edward’s parents (petitioners in this case) and
his grandmother Chua Giak were jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to x x x to give
sufficient support x x x.”

The petitioners further argued before the CA that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself
sanctions its effects by providing that that legal support should be “in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family” under Article 194 of the Civil Code as amended by the FC. Further, their liability is activated only upon
default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority.

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At the time Cheryl sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children hence,
the obligation to support ends with them.

SC: While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its
termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.

There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her
children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give is
insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for
their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
and maternal line (Cheryl’s family had already been giving support to respondents) following the order
established in Article 199 of the FC. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of paternal inability to
give adequate support even if the ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives by blood of lower degree. Hence, only the children of Cheryl and
Edward are entitled to receive support from their grandparents. Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.

Petitioners’ wish to exercise the option under Article 204 is unavailable. It will force Cheryl to return to
the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal
obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence,
her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of
the exception clause of Article 204.

CHERRYL DOLINA v. GLENN VALLECERA G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

In the complaint for violation of RA 9262, Dolina added a prayer for financial support from Vallecera for their
supposed child. Vallecera opposed the petition as Dolina’s action was essentially one for financial support
rather than for protection against woman and child abuses.

SC: To be entitled to legal support one first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall
have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children
are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

While the Court is mindful of the best interest of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as
aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Espiritu vs. CA 242 SCRA 362

-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child’s interests.

-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations. If a child is under 7 years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling
reasons.”

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-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody but it is not so
much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.

Santos, Sr. vs. CA 242 SCRA 407

The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of parents’ death, absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.

The legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents despite the latter’s demonstrated love and
affection. Wealth, too, is not a deciding factor.

The father’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism. It cannot, however, be
construed as abandonment.

Eslao vs. CA 266 SCRA 317

-When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even
if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

LAXAMANA vs. LAXAMANA September 3, 2002

The results of the psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial court states that “ Reymond Laxamana is
not yet considered completely cured (of his drug dependency) even though his drug urine test for “shabu” was
negative.” Likewise the children aged 14 and 15 when asked whether they like to be with their father but they
said that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.
The trial court then awarded custody of the children to their mother. Is the court correct?

While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral,
financial and social well-being. The psychiatric evaluation that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him
unfit to take custody of the children but there is no evidence to show that he is unfit to provide the children with
adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. While the children
were asked as to whether they like to be with their father but there was no showing that the court ascertained
the categorical choice of the children.

In controversies involving the care, custody, and control of their minor children, the contending parties
stand on equal footing before the court who shall make a selection according to the best interest of the child.
The child if over 7 years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the
court is not bound by such choice if the parent chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration
is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned taking into account the respective
resources as well as the social and moral situations of the opposing parents.

JOYCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V 461 SCRA 451 (June 28, 2005)
[2006 Bar]

Is a mother allegedly a lesbian unfit to have custody over a child below seven years of age?

SC: The convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. The principle of “best interest of the
child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict
with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to
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whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are
mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-
being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent,
other factors may be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children.

As a general rule a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of 7. The
caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise. The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children
in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relationship as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct
may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.

But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising parental care.

SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA August 29, 2006

Loran and Marie Antonette are the parents of Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived with Marie’s parents. Due
to in-law problems, Loran suggested that they transfer to their own house but Marie refused so he, alone, left
the house and was, later on, prevented from seeing his son.

He then instituted a petition for habeas corpus and custody. Ordered to show cause why Lorenzo
Emmanuel should not be discharged from restraint Marie moved for the reconsideration of the order which the
court denied. She went to the CA which the affirmed the denial of the lo wer court. On certiorari, she contended
that there was no evidence at all that the 3-year Lorenzo was under restraint and no evidence of maternal
unfitness to deprive the mother Marie of her son of tender years. That the writ is unwarranted considering that
there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the
mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining her own son. She maintains that Loran
had the burden of showing a compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Accordingly, the proper remedy is an action for custody and not habeas corpus as the latter is unavailable
against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Loran, on the other hand, argued
that under the law, he and Marie have shared custody and parental authority over their son. That at times that
Marie is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should
have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

SC: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their minor
son and consequently, joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody
has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents
are entitled to the custody of their child. In this case, Loran’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his son, hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

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Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the
proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counterargument for Loran’s petition for
custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under 7 years of age.

GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (July 11, 2007)

Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone. Their problem started when
Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would like to stay in their conjugal home in Diniwid, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan. One day, Agnes went to Boracay, asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her
to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. He later however, discovered that neither Agnes nor
their daughter would be coming back to Boracay. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus for Agnes to
produce Simone. The CA granted joint custody of the minor child to both parents.

SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody of the minor child to
both parents.

The Convention of the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The so-called “tender age presumption” under Article 213 of the FC may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable diseases.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody.

HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON DACASIN G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of divorce from an Illinois court. The court
awarded to Sharon sole custody of their daughter Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. Subsequently, the parties executed in Manila an agreement for the joint custody of
their daughter and chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to
Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for alleged violation of the agreement as the latter exercised
sole custody over Stephanie.

SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2 facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie
was under 7 years old (having been born on September 21, 1995); and (2) Sharon and Herald were no longer
married under the laws of the US because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: “no child under 7 years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC)”. This award of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory,
grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. The
agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between them over their minor child under
7 years old contravenes Philippine law.

The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint
parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
sole custody under the law if the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. The
separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children
below 7 years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually
drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under 7 as
these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.

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The rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents
may wish to enter such as granting the visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent
with regime of sole maternal custody under the 2nd paragraph of A. 213 which merely grants to the mother final
authority on the care and custody of the minor under 7 years of age, in case of disagreements.

- Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime – 2nd paragraph of A. 213 of
the FC vesting on the mother sole custody of a child under 7 years of age.

- Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest of the child.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

ST.MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS 376 SCRA 474

-Under Art. 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or 2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. Such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by
the school or its teachers. Under Art. 219 those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.

-For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs. TAGUIAM 558 SCRA 223 July 14, 2008

Taguiam was an adviser of a Grade V class of the above said school. The grade school principal granted the
written request of the class president authorizing the class to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds
and to use the swimming pool. Taguiam distributed the parents/ guardian permit forms to the pupils. One of the
pupils’, Chiara Mae Federico, form was unsigned but Taguiam presumed that she was allowed to join the
activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Taguiam
warned the children not to go the deeper portion of the pool. Subsequently, 2 of the children sneaked out and
went after them. While she was away Chiara Mae drowned.

SC: As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Taguiam should have made sure that the
children were protected from all harm while in her company. She should have known that leaving the pupils in
the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder “not to go the deepest
part of the pool” was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the
children, especially Taguiam knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created an unsafe

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situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This a clear violation not only of
the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.

Article 231 – grounds for suspension of parental authority – (94)

RA 7610 – CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION

- CHILD ABUSE –refers to maltreatment of a person below 18 years of age or over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. It
includes:

- A. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

- B. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

- C. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;

- D. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious

impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

Articles 234 and 236 as amended by RA 6809 – emancipation and effects of termination of parental authority
and its exception – (93)

TITLE XI

The SC in Republic vs. CA (May 6, 2005) said that a petition for declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court.

In Republic vs. Lorino (January 19, 2005) the SC held that “in Summary Judicial Proceedings under
the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Article 247 thereof, are “immediately final and
executory”.” An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment, which by express provision of
law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is part of due process, for it
is merely a statutory privilege (Veloria vs. COMELEC).

In REPUBLIC vs. TANGO G.R. No. 161062 July 31, 2009 the SC held “Article 238 of the FC, under
Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code.”

In turn, Article 253 of the FC specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. It states: “The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51. 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: “The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.”

It follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the FC. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.

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Others – Constitutional provisions strengthening marriage as an institution (91).

SURNAMES

Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Republic vs. CA and Vicencio

300 SCRA 138

-A legitimate child generally bears the surname of the father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a
privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

-More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a legitimate child is allowed to use the surname
of the stepfather, who did not legally adopt her.

-While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective stepfather even
without the benefit of adoption such as in the cases of Calderon and Llaneta, wherein the Court allowed the
concerned child to adopt the surname of the stepfather, in those cases the children were not of legitimate
parentage.

RA 9255 – An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father

In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 454 SCRA 2155, March 30, 2005

May a person be allowed to drop his middle name?

Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or affiliation of a person and further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate
child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument
or a private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his
father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name,
a middle name and a surname.

Before the registered name of a person may be changed he must show proper or reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason that may justify such change. Among the grounds are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence
as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alien parentage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name is for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his middle name is convenience.
How such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA March 31, 2005 [2006,
2012 Bar]

May an illegitimate child be allowed to use her natural mother’s surname as his/her middle name when
the child has been subsequently adopted by his/her natural father?

SC: As correctly submitted by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the family Code, as amended by RA 9255, is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The
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middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375 (1) of the Civil Code, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s name shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father.

Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189 (3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.

To allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
the noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Article 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169902
March 5, 2010

Remo requested the DFA, upon application for the renewal of her passport, to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied her request.

SC: The word “may” in Article 370 indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory.

A married woman has an option, not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the NCC. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the 3 names provided in
Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
status. This interpretation is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.

The conflict between A. 370 of the NCC and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996),
is more imagined than real. RA 8239 including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a
married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name except (1) death of the husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity
of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. A married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of marriage.

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If we allow petitioner’s present request definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to
the use of her husband’s surname. Undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will
arise.

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PROPERTY

Article 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the
owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs
of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their
owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land,
and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running
or stagnant;

(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed
place on a river, lake, or coast;

(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. (334a)

TUMALAD vs VICENCIO (GR L-30173)

Held: The rule about the status of buildings as immovable has been stated in many cases to the effect that "it
is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what
may constitute real properties (Art. 415) could only mean one thing, that a building is by itself an immovable
property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner.

Certain exceptions have been recognized, however. In the case at bar, the house on rented land is not only
expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES,
SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage he property together with its leasehold rights over the lot
on which it is constructed and participation ..."lthough there is no specific statement referring to the subject
house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the
same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
oreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-appellants merely had a temporary right
as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when
combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended
to treat the house as personalty. Also, unlike in the Iya cases, it is the defendants themselves who are attackin
the validity of the mortgage. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to them.

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BENGUET CORP. vs. CBAA GR No. 106041. January 29, 1993. 218 SCRA 271

A dam is an immovable property by nature and by incorporation. Hence, it is subject to realty tax.

SERG’S PRODUCTS vs. PCI GR No. 137705. August 22, 2000. 338 SCRA 499

Immovable property, when deemed as personal property in an agreement cannot be assailed by the
contracting parties by virtue of the principle of estoppel. It can then be a valid subject of a replevin.

SORIANO vs. GALIT GR No. 156295. September 23, 2003. 411 SCRA 631

A building in itself is considered immovable. It may then be a subject of a real estate mortgage separate from
the land.

JG Summit vs CA January 2005

The prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real
property as defined under Art. 415

PRC vs. JARQUE GR No. L-41506. March 25, 1935

Ship Vessels are personal property but when it is a subject of a chattel mortgage, the absence of an Affidavit of
Good Faith as required under the Mortgage Law makes the mortgage void.

Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

Domalsin vs Valenciano

Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public. Public use is “use that is not confined to
privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.” As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon
Road which is for the use of the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public dominion. This
being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves.

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Morandarte & Febrera vs CA

Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked
against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.

It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight,
lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of
title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public
domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.

MIAA vs CA

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like "roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State," are owned by the State. The term "ports"
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the
State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Before MIAA can encumber the Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must first withdraw from public use
the Airport Lands and Buildings. Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which "remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,

Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use,
these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the Airport Lands and
Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of public dominion, they are not subject to levy on
execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the Airport Lands and Buildings are reserved for public use, their
ownership remains with the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Chavez vs PEA

Only an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that “all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.” The Civil
Codes of 1889 (Art. 339) and 1950(Art. 420) incorporated the Regalian doctrine.

Procedure to be followed in classifying reclaimed lands as alienable:

1. DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be classified as alienable

2. DENR Secretary recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.

3. The President issues a proclamation classifying such land as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and that they are no longer needed for public service.

4. Congress must enact a law approving the Proclamation of the President. Said re-classification needs
both executive and legislative concurrence.

Republic vs Barandiaran (2007)

As for the notation on the subdivision plan of the lot stating that “the survey is inside alienable and disposable
area,” the same does not constitute proof that the lot is alienable and disposable. So Republic v. Tri-Plus
Corporation instructs:
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In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is
the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure
a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR,
the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to
do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. (388)

SPOUSES CUSTODIO vs. CA GR No. 116100. February 9, 1996. 253 SCRA 483

The owners have the right to enclose and fence their property provided that it should be without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.

The act of PETITIONERS in constructing a fence within their lot was a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Under Art. 430 of the Civil
Code, it is within the right of PETITIONERS, as owners, to enclose and fence their property provided that it
should be without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement
of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that the HEIRS OF
MABASA had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court
granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation.

Hence, prior to said decision, PETITIONERS had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said
right. Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by the HEIRS OF MABASA by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by PETITIONERS is damnum absque injuria, which is damage caused by a person
by his lawful acts done upon his own property.

ARTICLE 437: The owner of the parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and
he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he my deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain
of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
NPC vs Ibrahim

Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in the event the
latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are characteristically indivisible. For the loss
sustained by such owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.

Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for
their practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would limit the right to the sub-soil
upon the economic utility which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners’ right
extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is
extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.

In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells
but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the
tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-
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terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact
that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents’
enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment

Article 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other products of
animals.

Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.

Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of
perpetual or life annuities or other similar income. (355a)

BACHRACH MOTOR vs. TALISAY-SILAY GR No. 352230. September 17, 1931

Bonus granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one’s land to a lien in favor of the bank is not a
civil fruit of the mortgaged property.

Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their
production, gathering, and preservation. (356)

TACAS vs. TOBON GR No. 30240. August 23, 1929

The possessor in good faith must return the fruits received from the time the answer to the complaint was filed,
that is, from the time he became aware that he was in undue possession. During that time, before the law,
good faith ceased.

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)

Parilla vs Pilar 2006

Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that Article 448 covers only cases in which
the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of title
thereto, but not when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A
tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.

PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T CORP. vs. IAC GR No. 79688. February 1, 1996

Good faith is presumed. It consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.

Republic vs Ballocanag 2008

To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land, even if he is legally
entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to the land. It would negate the policy consideration
underlying the AFFLA -- to protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any
damage to the land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of the Civil Code which
provides:

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ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal thing, the
possessor in good faith may remove them unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option
under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.

In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code have
been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the trees he planted. The only equitable
alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the
property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or
upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on the land
shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee.

Narvaez vs Alciso

Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase — it is inapplicable when
the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:

Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco v. Regalado:

Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his own
land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a
building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a
person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the
part of the builder.

Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of the works on his own land, the issue of good
faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built the commercial building on
the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would be absurd.

Tuatis vs Escol

Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after
indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in
Article 546 of the Civil Code.

It is worthy to mention that in Pecson v. Court of Appeals,52 the Court pronounced that the amount to be
refunded to the builder under Article 546 of the Civil Code should be the current market value of the
improvement, thus:

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this
regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)]
that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of
a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may
enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market
value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly
enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding
four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to
adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base
its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. (Emphasis ours.)

Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain
possession of the building and the subject property.

Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to
pay the present or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property, as stated in the
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Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging
Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code,
and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when
Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to
be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject
property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on
the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.

Fuentes vs Roca

Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already
in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid
the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City
issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses
entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code,
who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity. (362)

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to
pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. (363a)

Article 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower. (n)

De Vera vs CA

In theorizing that their possession of the land in litigation could not have been in bad faith, De Vera’s alleged
that their possession over Portions "B" and "C" was by virtue of a valid title, viz: the Miscellaneous Sales
Application, and in possessing the said Portions "B" and "C", they honestly believed that the same formed part
of the lot with an area of 70 square meters covered by their Miscellaneous Sales Application

Art. 526 of the New Civil Code, provides:

Art. 526 - He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exist in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

Records disclose that prior to the construction in 1983 of De Vera house on the land under controversy
(Portions "B" and "C'), a demand letter dated April 27, 1981 was sent by Ramos to the De Veras, informing
them that the land they were possessing and occupying is within his titled property.

In the same letter, Ramos gave petitioner Agueda de Vera the option to either pay him the value of the
property or lease the same on a yearly or monthly basis. However, the contending parties failed to reach a
compromise agreement.

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The facts and circumstances aforestated are "outward acts and proven conduct" indicating bad faith of
petitioners as possessor and builder.

Heirs of Durano vs Uy

Furthermore, a purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the purchase is in the possession of persons other
than the seller. A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. In the herein case, respondents were in open
possession and occupancy of the properties when Durano & Co. supposedly purchased the same from
Cepoc. Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the nature of respondents’ possession before they ordered
demolition in August 1970.

Pada-Kilario vs CA

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they
knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is
well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation
of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert
them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was
not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly,
even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not
the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the
improvements that they built on the said lot.

Geminiano vs CA

Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only
for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.

In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the
same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.

Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot occupied by the private respondents' house, the
same was not substantiated by convincing evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the house nor the contract
of lease contained an option in favor of the respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And even if the
petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or builders in good
faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere
expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its
existence even proven. The first thing that the private respondents should have done was to reduce the
alleged promise into writing, because under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Not
having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise to sell may be enforced, the private respondents
cannot bank on that promise and profess any claim nor color of title over the lot in question.

There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs.
Court of Appeals, because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that
provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created
between the petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rights
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of the private respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.

It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the
lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the private
respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to remove
the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

Article 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses
of preservation of the land. (n)

Alviola vs CA

As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the petitioners when they
constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed portions since they were fully aware that the parcels of
land belonged to Victoria Tinagan. And, there was likewise bad faith on the part of the private respondents,
having knowledge of the arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative to the construction of
the copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Article 448 of the New Civil Code should be
applied. 32 However, the copra dryer and the store, as determined by the trial court and respondent court, are
transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within the coverage of Article 448. As the noted civil law authority,
Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly explains: "To fall within the provision of this Article, the construction must be of
permanent character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is
transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove the construction. The proper remedy of the
landowner is an action to eject the builder from the land.

Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (336)

Vda de Nazareno vs CA

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v.
CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river
is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et
al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said
land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber
Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners'
submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping
of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his
land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.

Heirs of Navarro vs IAC

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in
this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of
Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long
as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make
the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility
or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of private respondents as owners of
the estates adjacent thereto.

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Littoral owners – owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea

Bagaipo vs CA

The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were the
combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner
cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’s
former location cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place
gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present.

Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)

Agustin vs IAC

Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present:

(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and

(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA
514).

In the present case, the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up
to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351, with an original area
of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in
1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot 3351, covered by a homestead patent
issued in June 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares
through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian
owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands
vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806).

Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a riparian owner

The reason for the principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage
due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various
kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in
some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).

Ownership of accretion not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river
The' ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of
the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or transferred
said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code
apply to this situation. Article 459 provides that “whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to
which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within
two years." Article 463 provides that “ whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion
of land is separated from the estate by the current.”

Office of the City Mayor vs Ebio

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form
part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it
may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must

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register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and
possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local
government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed
an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation
purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No.
8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of
Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made:
that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in
its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed
to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the
purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A
decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Article 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole or in part in order to make a thing
of a different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the
material for its value.

If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of more value, its owner may, at his option,
appropriate the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or demand indemnity
for the material.

If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the material shall have the right to appropriate
the work to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter that he indemnify him for
the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered. However, the owner of the material cannot
appropriate the work in case the value of the latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is considerably more than
that of the material. (383a)

Aguirre vs Pheng

No. It is clear that we have here a case of accession by specification: Leonora and Company, as purchaser
acting in good faith, spending P11,299.00 for the reconditioning of the tank which is later adjudged to belong to
petitioner Aguirre. There is no showing that without the works made by Leonora & Company, the tank in its
original condition when Aguirre paid P900.00 therefor, would command the price of P14,500 which Nassco
was willing to pay. Although ordinarily, therefore, Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be entitled to any
accession thereto, the rule is different where the works or improvements or the accession was made on the
property by one who acted in good faith.2 And, it is not contended that the making of the improvements and
incurring of expenses amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora & Company was done in bad faith.

Furthermore, to uphold petitioner’s contention that he is entitled to the sum of P14,500.00 the price of the tank
in its present condition, would be to allow him to enrich himself at the expense of another. The lower courts,
therefore, acted correctly in ordering the reimbursement to Leonora & Company of the expenses it made on
the tank.

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

Heirs of Olviga vs CA
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With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the
property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 198 disturbed their possession.

Metrobank vs Alejo

Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein. As defined, a cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which
is in fact unfounded. [16 In this case, the subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title
or interest over the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319, which does not even have a semblance of
being a title.

It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action for
quieting of title, because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the
judgment or order of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has
no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of
justice. [17 Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case.

Secuya vs Vda De Selma

Petitioners insist that they had been occupying the disputed property for forty-seven years before they filed
their Complaint for quieting of title. However, there is no proof that they had exercised their rights and duties as
owners of the same. They argue that they had been gathering the fruits of such property; yet, it would seem
that they had been remiss in their duty to pay the land taxes. If petitioners really believed that they owned the
property, they have should have been more vigilant in protecting their rights thereto. As noted earlier, they did
nothing to enforce whatever proprietary rights they had over the disputed parcel of land.

Moreover, the lot, including the disputed portion, had been the subject of several sales transactions. The title
thereto had been transferred several times, without any protestation or complaint from the petitioners. In any
case, private respondent's title is amply supported by clear evidence, while petitioners' claim is barren of proof.

Clearly, petitioners do not have the requisite title to pursue an action for quieting of title

Bank of Commerce v. Sps. Prudencio San Pablo

The case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC was an action for quieting of title, and nullification of
the SPA, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings. While the body of the complaint
consists mainly of allegations of forgery, however, the primary object of the spouses San Pablo in filing the
same was to effectively free the title from any unauthorized lien imposed upon it.

An action for quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger or hostile
claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, ” not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no
rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has
the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best.

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The Bank of Commerce is estopped from repudiating the authority of the court to try and decide the case after
having actively participated in the proceedings before it and invoking its jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative
relief therefrom.

Tandog vs Macapagal
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or parol
assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written
or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse
possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.3
While petitioners alleged that respondents’ claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners’)
interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon
by respondents to justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in
evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been marked as exhibits
during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can
they be given any evidentiary value.
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action.5 Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any
evidence to prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree may be proved by acts
or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor
or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related to the subject by
birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the
controversy.

Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.

In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title.
(392)

Mercado-Fehr vs Fehr

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and
respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband
and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983,
at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as
common property of petitioner and respondent.

Spouses Si vs CA

There was already extrajudicial partition. After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the
community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer
available.

Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people
are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.[24] This
situation makes inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as
follows:

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"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

Balus vs Balus (2010)

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property
was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in
1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28,
1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984,
after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's
name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present
case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership
of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a
right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of
partition is to put an end to co-ownershipz an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

Pacual vs Ballesteros (2012)

The first issue raised by the petitioners is a factual question as it entails a determination of whether the subject
property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Such
determination would inevitably necessitate a review of the probative value of the evidence adduced in the case
below.

In any case, it ought to be stressed that both the RTC and the CA found that the subject property was indeed
co-owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Thus, in the absence of any
exceptional circumstances to warrant the contrary, this Court must abide by the prevailing rule that findings of
fact of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon it.[15]

Anent the second issue asserted by the petitioners, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling
that the 30-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not
commenced in view of the absence of a written notice. Verily, despite the respondents’ actual knowledge of the
sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the
commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the right of redemption.

Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Wee vs De Castro 2008

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,[21] this Court declared that a co-owner is not
even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence,
thus:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article
487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action

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for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed
the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are
not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the
suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners.

Plasabas vs CA

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the
plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the
rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.

With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners complaint is one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions.

Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to
this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus,
entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (399)

Heirs of Balite vs Lim 2004

Article 493 of the Civil Code19 gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of such interest. The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part
of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion
does not per se render the sale void.20 The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling
co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

Metrobank vs Pascual 2008

two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage
was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half
(1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction
of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia.
The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question,
Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."18This disposition is in line
with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so––quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.

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Heirs of Co vs Servacio 2011

It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are
governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations
Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is
void.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.[16] The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was
governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an
ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.[18] Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence,
Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners.[19] Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.[20] This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando
res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest)

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this
result, viz:

xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving
spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more
conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus
alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to
the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is
not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal
made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties
cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the
deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the
benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or
by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)

Delima vs CA (1991)

Held:

As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to
benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for
himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of
the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a

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depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320,
September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of
the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership

However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44
Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied
when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to
vest ownership by prescription.

Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954,
Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his
co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership,
and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient
to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to
the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription.
Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968,
such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted
before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.c

Monteroso vs CA 2008

The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their
legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership.
While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating
Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting
his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the
instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary properties. By asserting his right as
a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were
holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal
share or legitime thereon.

Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy for compulsory
or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the properties involved.

Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the properties comprising the
intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the
inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his
death,[28] i.e., on October 26, 1948. Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian’s intestate estate,
a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being
a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s right over a share thereof is imprescriptible.[29] As a matter of law,
acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or
legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share.[30] Contrary to petitioners’ stance,
reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not
asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate
estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned.

Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, “where there exists a clear repudiation
of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.”[31] In
the instant case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other
compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had not timely been made
against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be clear and open as to
amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale
were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961
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when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the
intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang
spouses.

However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code[32] applies;
thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The
records show that Tirso’s cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or
only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie
against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang
spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period[33] of 30
years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period
is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession
of the subject properties.

Sunset View vs Campos

WON every purchaser of a condominium unit, regardless of whether or not he has fully paid the purchase
price, is a "holder of a separate interest" mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as
"The Condominium Act" and is automatically a shareholder of the condominium corporation.

Held:

The contention has no merit. Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the shareholding in the
Condominium Corporation will be conveyed only in a proper case.

It is clear then that not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder of the condominium
corporation. The Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the shareholding will
be transferred to the purchaser of a unit.

It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of the Master Deeds that the shareholding in the Condominium
Corporation is inseparable from the unit to which it is only an appurtenant and that only the owner of a unit is a
shareholder in the Condominium Corporation.

The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon
full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even
under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a
purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and
consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.

The private respondents, therefore, who have not fully paid the purchase price of their units and are
consequently not owners of their units are not members or shareholders of the petitioner condominium
corporation,

Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation, the
instant case for collection cannot be a "controversy arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively" which
controversies are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902- A. The subject matters of the instant cases according to the
allegations of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts: that of G.R. NO. 52361, which is
for the collection of P8,335.38 with interest plus attorney's fees equivalent to the principal or a total of more
than P10,000.00 is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that of G.R. NO. 52524, which is for
the collection of P6,168-06 is within the jurisdiction of the City Court.

Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. (430a)

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Equatorial Realty vs Mayfair 2001

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right,20 which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee."21 This right is transferred, not merely by contract, but
also by tradition or delivery.22 Non nudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum transferantur. And there is said to
be delivery if and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee." 23 Thus, it has
been held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold,24 such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

Article 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. (413a)

Daclag vs Macahilig 2009

Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character,
except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the
title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the
true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has
knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad
faith.[8] Such interruption takes place upon service of summons.[9]

Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that petitioners received a summons together with
respondents' complaint on August 5, 1991;[10] thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received the
summons. Consequently, petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum beginning August
5, 1991 instead of 1984.

Mangahas vs CA 1999

The factual milieu obtaining with respect to the petition under scrutiny has rendered petitioner's reliance on the
applicability of the aforestated principles misplaced. In disposing of the issue, the Court of Appeals opined:

. . . Even if we were to disregard the need for a proper application, Article 1138 of the Civil Code
provides,

In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules srules
shall be observed:

(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor in interest . . .

The defendant-appellant's grantor or predecessor in interest (Severo Rodil) possession of the

property, subject matter of the litigation, on April 1955 (Exhibit "F" for the plaintiff-appellees and
exhibit "5" for the defendant). Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed on February 25,
1985, 23 the requirement of at least thirty years continuous possession has not been complied
with even if We were to tack Rodil's period of possession. . . .

As found by the lower court below, petitioner had admitted, contrary to his disclaimer, that the possession of
the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his supposed title, commenced only in April 1955.
Petitioner can not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission which he has resolutely repudiated in his
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present petition. 26 Acquisition of ownership under the law on prescription cannot be pleaded in support of
petitioner's submission that subject land has ipso jure become his private property.

Pajuyo vs CA and Guevarra (2004)

Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege and prove prior
possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to possess under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical
possession is not required.

Pajuyo’s withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan. Guevarra’s transient right to
possess the property ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the property
because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyo’s permission to temporarily hold the property and Guevarra had to
follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in the Kasunduan. Control over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this
is evidence of actual possession.

Cequena vs Bolante 2000

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute
mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.

Florentino vs Supervalue 2007

1. The trial court shall determine:

a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses’ lot;

b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their house;

c. the increase in value (“plus value”) which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof; and

d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional Trial Court shall
render judgment, as follows:

a. The trial court shall grant the respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise
their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to
petitioners either the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house, or the increase
in value (“plus value”) which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige petitioners to pay
the price of said land. The amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses and petitioners, in
accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by
the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor
of the party entitled to receive it;

b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises the option to oblige petitioners
to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value
of the land is considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written notice of such rejection to
the respondent-spouses and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the respondent-spouses’ option
to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of
rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such
agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days
from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease,
payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more
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than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since
petitioners have occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for
the second year of the forced lease. Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or improvements on
the house. Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period, or upon default by petitioners in the payment of rentals
for two (2) consecutive months, the respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to
recover their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at the latter’s expense. The rentals herein
provided shall be tendered by petitioners to the Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such tender
shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court.

c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable compensation for the occupancy of
the respondent-spouses’ land for the period counted from the year petitioners occupied the subject area, up to
the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;

d. The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party
obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be
entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with
such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.

Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)

Del Rosario vs Lucena

Facts:

Pia del rosario is the owner of the jewels, which are subsequently specified together with their respective
valuation. Said jewels are now detained by the defendant Teresa Verches, to whom they were pawned by the
other defendants, the married couple Juan Lucena and Praxedes Flores, without the knowledge or consent of
the Pia, for which act the defendant Praxedes was convicted of estafa by this same court and sentenced to five
months ofpresidio correccional, both she and her husband being bound to return the jewels otherwise to pay
for them.

Issue: WON plaintiff del rosario can ask to recover the jewels

Held:

If Teresa Verches accepted the jewels as a pledge constitution by Praxedes Flores in the name of Pia del
Rosario without ascertaining whether the latter had given the former any order or authority for the pledging
given of her jewels, Teresa Verches must stand the risk if when relying from her acceptance of the pledge,
even if when relying upon her judgment she was improperly or falsely informed; and it would not just nor logical
that the consequences of her reception, due to her own mistake, or to deceit employed by a stranger, should
fall on the owner of the jewels who, without having taken any part in the transaction, became the victim of a
crime. The conflict between the right of the owner of movable property who has either lost it or been illegally
therefore and that of the creditor who has loaned money thereon and holds it in pledge can not be decided
against the owner, to whom the Civil Code grants ba right of action to recover the property from whoever may
be in possession. (Art. 464.)

The exceptions to article 464 are herein contained, namely: (1) If the possessors of personal property, lost or
stolen, has acquired it at a public sale; (2) in favor of Montes de Piedad established under authorization of the
Government; and (3) with regard to things acquired on exchange, or at this fairs or markets or from a merchant
lawfully engage in similar business. The defendant was not with any of the exception under which she could
refuse to make restitution of the property without reimbursement of the amount advanced upon the pledge.

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Therefore the decision which provides for such reimbursement before the return of the jewels is not based on
any law whatever. On the contrary, it is in violation of article 464 of the Civil Code.

It is true that a subsequent ratification by the owner, of the illegal act performed by an agent without, his
consent, is equivalent to an order, and confirms the otherwise unlawful act of the agent; but such subsequent
ratification must appear in like manner as the order itself. No such ratification of the illegal act committed by
Paraxedes Flores can arise out of the fact that a son of the plaintiff called at the house of the defendant in
order to inquire if the that he intended to redeem them. Nor is a real intent to redeem stolen property a
subsequent ratification of an illegal act whereby the owner was deprived of the same.

Varela vs Finnick

Facts:

Some time during the months of November and December, 1905, Nicolasa Pascual received from Josefa
Varela several jewels, some of the jewels were owned by Varela and other belonged to strangers; all, however,
came from Varela and were delivered to Pascual to be sold on commission, with the express obligation on the
part of the latter to pay to the former the proceeds of the sale of said jewels, or to return them if unsold.

Nicolasa Pascual, however, far from complying with her duty, pawned the said jewels at various dates during
said months, as appears from the pawn tickets issued by the owner of H.J. Finnick's pawnshop, where the
jewels had been pledged; that jewels were thus misappropriated, and the amount of the loan granted thereon
embezzled, to the prejudice of Josefa Varela.

Issue:

Won the owner can recover

Held:

In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of the jewels misappropriated been
unquestionably proven but also that the accused, acting fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of them and
pledged them contrary to agreement, with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of the injured party, who
was thereby illegally deprived of said jewels; therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 464, the
owner has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them, in
accordance with the judgment entered in the aforesaid cause for estafa, wherein, the accused having been
found guilty, the right of Josefa Varela to recover the jewels in question is expressly acknowledged.

Arenas vs Raymundo

Facts:

The plaintiffs alleged that the said jewelry, during the last part of April or the beginning of May, 1908, was
delivered to Elena de Vega to sell on commission, and that the latter, in turn, delivered it to Conception Perello,
likewise to sell on commission, but that Perello, instead of fulfilling her trust, pledged the jewelry in the
defendant's pawnshop, situated at No. 33 Calle de Ilaya, Tondo, and appropriated to her own use the money
thereby obtained; that on July 30, 1908, Conception Perello was prosecuted for estafa, convicted, and the
judgment became final; that the said jewelry was then under the control and in the possession of the
defendant, as a result of the pledge by Perello, and that the former refused to deliver it to the plaintiffs, the
owners thereof, wherefore counsel for the plaintiffs asked that judgment be rendered sentencing the defendant
to make restitution of the said jewelry and to pay the costs.

Issue:

Won the owner can recover

Held:

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Even supposing that the defendant Raymundo had acted in good faith in accepting the pledge of the jewelry in
litigation, even then he would not be entitled to retain it until the owner thereof reimburse him for the amount
loaned to the embezzler, since the said owner of the jewelry, the plaintiff, did not make any contract with the
pledgee, that would obligate him to pay the amount loaned to Perello, and the trial record does not disclose
any evidence, even circumstantial, that the plaintiff Arenas consented to or had knowledge of the pledging of
her jewelry in the pawnshop of the defendant.

Between the supposed good faith of the defendant Raymundo and the undisputed good faith of the plaintiff
Arenas, the owner of the jewelry, neither law nor justice permit that the latter, after being the victim of the
embezzlement, should have to choose one of the two extremes of a dilemma, both of which, without legal
ground or reason, are injurious and prejudicial to her interest and rights, that is, she must either lose her
jewelry or pay a large sum received by the embezzler as a loan from the defendant, when the plaintiff Arenas
is not related to the latter by any legal or contractual bond out of which legal obligations arise.

The business of pawnshops, in exchange for the high and onerous interest which constitutes its enormous
profits, is always exposed to the contingency of receiving in pledge or security for the loans, jewels and other
articles that have been robbed, stolen, or embezzled from their legitimate owners; and as the owner of the
pawnshop accepts the same and asks for money on it, without assuring himself whether such bearer is or is
not the owner thereof, he can not, by such procedure, expect from the law better and more preferential
protection than the owner of the jewels or other articles, who was deprived thereof by means of a crime and is
entitled to be excused by the courts.

Aznar vs Yapdiangco

Facts:

The records before this Court disclose that sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two
metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. Vicente Marella stole the car.

That very same day, or on the afternoon of May 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was able to sell the car in question to
the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. Insofar as the above incidents are concerned,
Jose B. Aznar acquired the said car from Vicente Marella in good faith, for a valuable consideration and
without notice of the defect appertaining to the vendor's title.

While the car in question was thus in the possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was attending to its
registration in his name, agents of the Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in
consequence of the report to them by Teodoro Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him.

Issue:

The issue at bar is one and simple, to wit: Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff-appellant, Jose B. Aznar,
who has a better right to the possession of the disputed automobile?

Held:

The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is
to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to
recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in
good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of
irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In
these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying
any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. (Del Rosario v. Lucena, 8 Phil. 535;
Varela v. Finnick, 9 Phil. 482; Varela v. Matute, 9 Phil. 479; Arenas v. Raymundo, 19 Phil. 46. Tolentino, id.,
Vol. II, p. 261.)

Finally, the plaintiff-appellant here contends that inasmuch as it was the intervenor-appellee who had caused
the fraud to be perpetrated by his misplaced confidence on Vicente Marella, he, the intervenor-appellee,
should be made to suffer the consequences arising therefrom, following the equitable principle to that effect.
Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by
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another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of
two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party
who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.

EDCA Publishing vs Santos

Facts:

This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an
order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering
the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent
Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00.6

Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his
first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed
that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or
deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. 7 EDCA then went
to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as
Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private
respondents. 8

On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue,
which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution
for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to
EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner.

Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents (santos) sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA.

Issue:

whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.

Held:

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.

One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in
the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from
him would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid
the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and
would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of
the amount he had paid for it.

It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged
to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books
had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing with
the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered
(by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it
was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the
sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby
vesting ownership in the buyer.

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Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being
offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article
559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless
demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.

BPI Family Bank vs Franco

WON Art. 559 is applicable.

Held:

Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

BPI-FB’s argument is unsound. To begin with, the movable property mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code
pertains to a specific or determinate thing.30 A determinate or specific thing is one that is individualized and can
be identified or distinguished from others of the same kind.31

In this case, the deposit in Franco’s accounts consists of money which, albeit characterized as a movable, is
generic and fungible.32 The quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of
its nature or the will of the parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct
individuality.33

Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to
recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent
amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s account and credited to
Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati
Case against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which passed from one account to another,
commencing with the forged Authority to Debit.

It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership,34 and this characteristic is all the
more manifest in the instant case which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary
function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.35 Money,
which had passed through various transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of traceable
origin, is no exception.

Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate personal property, BPI-FB’s illustrative
example, ostensibly based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the instant case.

Article 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (467)

Moralidad vs Pernes 2006

To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one
of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the improvements they
introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory
provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote
on the matter:

If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case like this, the terms of
the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs.
Bantug, 71 Phil. 449). (Emphasis ours.)

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By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the
improvements they may have introduced on the property.

Hemedes vs CA 1999

Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The owner of
the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the
same. This right is embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which
is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the property’s form or substance, or do anything
which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.

There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law
provides that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and
should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the
usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.

Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)

Borbajo vs Hidden View 2005

The dominant estate cannot be the servient estate at the same time. One of the characteristics of an easement
is that it can be imposed only on the property of another, never on one’s own property. An easement can exist
only when the servient and the dominant estates belong to different owners.

Article 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. (534)

SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG TRAD. GR No. 90596. April 8, 1991.

The sale of the property in favor of BIO HONG did include the alley because it cannot be separated from the
tenement and maintain an independent existence. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of
which they form part. Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they
cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.

Liwag vs Happy Glen (2012)

In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the
community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and
because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated,
we find that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision
owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the original developer of the
Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the residents’ sole source of
water.[31] The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a
title or by prescription of 10 years.[32] It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has already been
acquired through prescription.

Unisource vs Chung 2009

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Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the
same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to
a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a
highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at
bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.A voluntary easement
of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of
the owner of the dominant estate.

SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ vs. RAMISCAL GR No. 137882. February 04, 2005

Voluntary easements are established by the will of the owners. In the present case, it was not proven that
RAMISCAL, the owner, voluntarily granted a right of way in favor of the SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ.

Article 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of
ten years. (537a)

NPC vs Spouses Campos 2003

NPC’s claim that, under Article 620 of the Civil Code, it had already acquired by prescription the easement of
right-of-way over that portion of the subject property where its wooden electric posts and transmission lines
were erected is untenable.

Prescription as a mode of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1) capacity to acquire by
prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by prescription; (3) possession of the thing under certain
conditions; and (4) lapse of time provided by law.12 Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which
case the possession must be in good faith and with just title,13 or extraordinary, in which case there is neither
good faith nor just title. In either case, there has to be possession which must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted.

In this case, the records clearly reveal that the petitioner’s possession of that portion of the subject property
where it erected the wooden posts and transmission lines was merely upon the tolerance of the respondents.
Accordingly, this permissive use by the petitioner of that portion of the subject property, no matter how long
continued, will not create an easement of right-of-way by prescription.

Bogo-Medellin Milling vs CA 2003

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or
sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of
way ofrailroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act
or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an
easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes
such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent.

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In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the existence of an
apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession
or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because,
under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not
by prescription.

Article 622. Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)

. It appears on the face of the complaint that Bolton Street has been where it is from time immemorial. When
the mother title of Fe's Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 7000, which is O.C.T. No. 638, was issued in 1911, it
was issued subject to the provisions of Section 39 of Act 496 which reads:

Section 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree or registration,
and every subsequent purchasers of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in
good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances, except those noted on said certificate,
and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting namely:

xxx xxx xxx

Third. Any public highway, way, private way, ... or any government irrigation, canal, or lateral
thereof ...

From the foregoing provision, Bolton Street which is a public highway, already subsisting when O.C.T. No. 638
was issued, as this fact is apparent too from the face of the complaint itself, is deemed to have attached as a
legal encumbrance to the lot originally registered lot No. 77, notwithstanding the lack of an annotation thereof
on O.C.T. No. 638. petitioner, therefore, cannot rely, as she almost entirely does for the relief she seeks, on
the aforequoted provision, which she had repeatedly cited but without making mention, perhaps conveniently,
of the exception as expressly provided in the later part of the legal provision invoked (Sec. 39, Act 496).

Also, Bolton Street cannot be a discontinuous easement as she claims it to be, which may not be acquired by
prescription. Nonetheless, whether the mode of acquisition of the easement that Bolton Street is, would be only
by virtue of title, as Fe contends, this is not material or of any consequence, in the present proceedings, once it
indubitably appears as it does, from the allegations of the complaint itself, that Bolton Street constituted an
easement of public highway on Lot No. 77, from which Fe's lot was taken, when the said bigger lot was original
registered. It remained as such legal encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted on the certificate
of title, by virtue of the clear and express provision of Section 39 of Act 496, it being admitted that at the time of
the registration of Lot 77, the public highway was already in existence or subsisting. This fact erases whatever
cause of action petitioner may have to bring the complaint she filed in the court a quofor quieting of title on a
portion of the street which she claims to be part of her lot, free from encumbrance of any kind. The Order
complained of has only this legal postulate as its basis. Nothing has been mentioned therein on the acquisition
by the City of Davao of the lot in question by prescription, and a discussion of this matter as is found in
petitioner's brief 3 would be entirely irrelevant.

Bicol Agro vs Tobias 2009

Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. It is established either by law or by will of the parties.

Article 622 of the CC is the applicable law in this case. Article 622 states that "Continuous non-apparent
easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title".

So in order for BAPCI to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right of way, it was incumbent upon
BAPCI to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the land that said road traversed.
However, BAPCI failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an agreement between
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BISUDECO and Obias et,al. The testimonies of BAPCI's witnesses are mainly hearsay, as not one among
them had personal knowledge of the agreement by reason of direct participation in the agreement.

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained
by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided,
the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be
removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing
owned in common by two or more persons. (541a)

Aneco Realty vs Landex 2008

Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by means of
walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of
the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent
a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of
ownership.

Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when affirmed by the CA
are accorded great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings
and conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate court. We have meticulously reviewed the records and
agree that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its
own property.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the
sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale
between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI
to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for
injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.

Goldcrest vs Cypress Gardens 2009

The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the
servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use
the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the
easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is
not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more
burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the
servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.

Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions.
First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use
or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on
the condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s common limited area, making the easement more
burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of
the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the
approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.

Article 631. Easements are extinguished:

(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;

(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed from the
day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an
act contrary to the same took place;
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(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it shall
revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the
use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding number;

(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional;

(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;

(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates. (546a)

Salimbangon vs Tan 2010

Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way
on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.[8] The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is
incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.

Secondly, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from
each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were already small, the heirs
executed a “Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc.” that cancelled the easement of right of way they
earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely
on Lot B.

Although the “cancellation” document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of the easement
cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to
use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that
their right as dominant estate under the original partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on a
1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the
new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.

The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon
the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious
that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now
consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to
have been extinguished by operation of law

Villanueva vs Velasco 2000

At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by
agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an
easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public
use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right.[14] As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The
essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.[15] The trial court and the Court of
Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below
is conclusive on this Court,[16] hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The
small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents’
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-
settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.[17] Conformably then,
petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private
respondents’ estate.

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St Michael vs Masaito 2008

It will suffice under Art. 649 of the Civil Code that “any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way.” Clearly, the school is a real party-in-interest
since it has established a right to use the passageway for the benefit of its students. More importantly, the
records reveal that petitioners-spouses are the owners of the lot where the school is located and they are the
incorporators, trustees, and officers of St. Michael. They are also authorized to represent the corporation in
the complaint and subsequent actions. Thus, petitioners are real parties-in-interest and we rule that the
dismissal of the complaint is patently erroneous and bereft of any legal basis. Petitioners must be allowed to
pursue their case before the trial court.

Dichoso vs Marcos 2011

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To
be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an
existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said
outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

Article 684. No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.

Castro vs Monsod 2011

Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to
deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his
surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not
deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent
landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor,
and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to
cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one
so excavating is liable.

In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was
established that the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of
respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner’s property. The
embankment and the riprapped stones have been in existence even before petitioner became the owner of the
property. It was proven that petitioner has been making excavations and diggings on the subject embankment
and, unless restrained, the continued excavation of the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear
portion of the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.

We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from making
injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent. However, an annotation of the
existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or
registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the
owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to
court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and
respected.

Atty Rivera vs La vista

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Notwithstanding the existence of a city ordinance, the petitioners do not have an unquestioned right over the
one-half portion of the Mangyan Road. In the case of Ramos, Sr. V. Gatchalian Realty, Inc. (154 SCRA 703
[1987]), this Court had the occasion to explain:

... To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspire of a road
right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian
Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main
thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the
years regarding an easement of a right of way, that 'mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. (See Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 2nd Ed., 1972, p. 371)

Jesus L. Cabahug and Coronacion M. Cabahug vs. National Power Corporation; G.R. No. 186069. January 30,
2013

Contract; law between the parties; rules on interpretation; easement of right of way; just compensation;
attorney’s fees; exception rather than the general rule. Indeed, the rule is settled that a contract constitutes the
law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language,
should be applied according to their literal tenor. Courts cannot supply material stipulations, read into the
contract words it does not contain or, for that matter, read into it any other intention that would contradict its
plain import. Neither can they rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve
one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.

Where the right of way easement, as in this case, similarly involves transmission lines which not only
endangers life and limb but restricts as well the owner’s use of the land traversed thereby, the ruling in
Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied. It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for
the monetary equivalent of the land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive
the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the
exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature,
create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is
necessary. Measured not by the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss, just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function and no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended (An
Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), is not binding upon this Court.

For want of a statement of the rationale for the award in the body of the RTC’s 14 March 2000 Decision, we
are constrained, however, to disallow the grant of attorney’s fees in favor of the Spouses Cabahug in an
amount equivalent to 5% of the just compensation due as well as the legal interest thereon. Considered the
exception rather than the general rule, the award of attorney’s fees is not due every time a party prevails in a
suit because of the policy that no premium should be set on the right to litigate.

Nuisance

Lucena Grand vs JAC Liner 2005

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which,
by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

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But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at
most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.

Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.

Telmo vs Bustamante 2009

Petitioner contends that respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se, which may be
the subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again, we disagree.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by
petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated
immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by
blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

DONATION

Abello vs CIR 2005

Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a donation, petitioners
argue that it is important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a political contribution is a
gift. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It cannot be
perceived except by the material and tangible acts which manifest its presence. This being the case, donative
intent is presumed present when one gives a part of ones patrimony to another without consideration. Second,
donative intent is not negated when the person donating has other intentions, motives or purposes which do
not contradict donative intent. This Court is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to
help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent. Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material
consideration evinces animus donandi. The fact that their purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the
donee does not negate the presence of donative intent.

Ganuelas vs Cawed 2003

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

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In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or
interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.

The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but that
Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her
lifetime.[29]

More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation
shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem
disposition.

Del Rosario vs Ferrer 2010

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.[14]
This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a
requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.[15]

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,[16] in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason
is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.

Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he
had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.

The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be
a donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the
donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The Court has held before that the
rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute.[19] Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate and in putting
the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now
claim that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.

Villanueva vs Branoco 2011

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to
Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment
Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place
on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had
Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in
another case, that “the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here
donated x x x”14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her.

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In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it,
contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove.
The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present
controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of
testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will.
Neither the Deed’s text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from
Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.”17
Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that “the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,” taking into
account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the same
conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while “b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor]
and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb [the donee’s] right,” also stipulated that the donation
“does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner” of the
donated parcels of land.

Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial
usufructuary right over it.20

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and affection to
the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless “corroborates the
express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers.”21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to
Rodrigo’s statement of “love and affection” for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore
its finding.

It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g.
“the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise” and “devise”). Dispositions bearing
contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donor’s intent. In no less than seven
cases featuring deeds of donations styled as “mortis causa” dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds,
eventually considered the transfers inter vivos,22 consistent with the principle that “the designation of the
donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death
of the donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument,
in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor.”23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are
resolved to favor inter vivos transfers “to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.”24

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her
retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal
uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught
perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The
interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25

Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo “cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another.”26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-
donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no
better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the
latter’s title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.

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Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not
take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments. (633)

Arangote vs Maglunob 2009

In Sumipat v. Banga,[37] this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to
the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the Deed of Donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is
either not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the
donation is null and void.[

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of
Donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.[41] At the very least, this last legal requisite
of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the
Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the
donation by petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property cannot be
adjudicated to the petitioner.

Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.

In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the
mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by
the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.

This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to
the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)

Secretary vs Heirs of Dulay 2006

The right to seek the revocation of

donation had not yet prescribed
when respondents filed their complaint

Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that respondents’ cause of action is
already barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance
with the condition in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the
property for school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property for
the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive period did not commence on such date.
Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this
fact to its advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil
Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on
contract.[19] We fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court:

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xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive period for the revocation of donation
provided under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and instead apply the general rules on contracts since Article
733 of the same Code, specifically provided that onerous donations shall be governed by the rules on
contracts.

Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of
the New Civil Code, which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a written contract is
ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of
action is from the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations
of the donation. In the instant case, however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period within
which the donee can comply with the condition of donation. As such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil
Code is necessary. Said article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. Indeed,
from the nature and circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period was
contemplated by the donors. The donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a very long
period of time when, in fact, they specifically obliged the defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated for
school purposes and thus put it in good use. xxx[20]

Quilala vs Alcantara 2001

The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed,
which reads:

That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the DONOR
and she hereby expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the
DONOR.17

Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature.
However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.
Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public, the
same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.

In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render
the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that
should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the
notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

RP vs Silim 2001

Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated
was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the
establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of
the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

Dolar vs Lublub 2005

If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case
of breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated
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property reverts back automatically to the donor. Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an
agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court and
that upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the
donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award of the court
can, to borrow from University of the Philippines vs. de los Angeles,[21] “conclusively settle whether the
resolution is proper or not.”

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.

When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the
Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, .
. . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that
stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action
for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself
the revocatory act.

In all, petitioner’s right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether
the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated
in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which
petitioner anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and development
conditions of the donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangay’s boast of compliance
is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated area of telephone service, a water service,
a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay residents, substantially satisfies the
terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete paving of roads and the construction of
government offices, sports complex for public enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per respondent
barangay’s estimate, cost not less than P25 Million,[27] add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.

With the view we take of the case, the execution of the 1989 deed of donation is really of little moment in
terms of furthering petitioner’s cause. For, at that time, the property subject of this recourse was no longer his
to donate, having earlier relinquished his ownership thereon. Nemo dat qui non habet – No one can give what
he has not. Stated a bit differently, respondent barangay’s right over the donated area proceeds from the 1981
donation. The legal effects, therefore, of its action or inaction respecting the donated property should be
assayed on the basis of the 1981 donation.

SUCCESSION

MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002.*

ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa.

HELD: Yes, it is. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita‘s death.

Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills
and testaments. Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the
manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.

Donations; Donations Mortis Causa; Factors in Determining Whether a Donation is One of Mortis
Causa.—In a donation mortis causa, ―the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is
still alive.‖ In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
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taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖
admits of no other interpretation but that the donor did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to the donee during her lifetime.—In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis
causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan‘s death. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.

Same; Same.—That the donations were made ―in consideration of the love and affection of the donor‖ does
not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

Same; Same; One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should
be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.—We apply the above rulings to the present
case. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners
predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This
is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take
effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject
deeds.

Same; Same; Donations mortis causa partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and must be
executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments.—Considering that
the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions
and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. [Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, 383
SCRA 6(2002)]

GANUELAS vs. CAWED G.R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003.*

The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing
is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. The following ruling of this Court
in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating: If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning
that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s
death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or
independently of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed
of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or
interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase
―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina
intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.

To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is
erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services
rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer
inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may
also underlie transfers mortis causa.

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Article 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)

Liu vs. Loy, Jr. G.R. No. 145982. September 13, 2004.*

As we held in our Decision, a prior contract to sell made by the decedent during his lifetime prevails over a
subsequent contract of sale made by the administrator without probate court approval. It is immaterial if the
prior contract is a mere contract to sell and does not immediately convey ownership. Frank Liu‘s contract to sell
became valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey the property upon full payment
of the consideration.

SAN AGUSTIN vs. CA G.R. No. 121940. December 4, 2001.*

In this case, the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of Exhibit ―D‖, nor for the forfeiture of the lot
in question. In our view, the contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until annulled in the
proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of
Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.

RABADILLA vs. CA G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.*

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children
and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus,
the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded
the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted
to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir
to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or
be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation.—In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix‘s near descendants would substitute him.

What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix‘s near descendants.

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the
same later to the second heir; Without the obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution.—In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution
is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. ―Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution.‖ Also, the near descendants‘ right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

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A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.—Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from
the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by
first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as
an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the
institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir. A ―mode‖ imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of
his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.

In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.—Then too, since
testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, the testator’s intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.—
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of
its provisions, the testator‘s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration
the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its
parts must be adopted.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his
properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be
the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN

FACTS: Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he died.
But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and
Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not
inherit anything from Lorenzo.

ISSUE: Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?

RULING: No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to the
extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the
value of the debts. But there was no property left. So the value of the inheritance is zero. The debts cannot be
enforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing.

Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

RIOFERIO vs. CA G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004.*

FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties.

He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents. Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero
and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
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Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner
Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim
involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.

Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate.

Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the
Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator.

HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the
heirs in the rules on party representation.

HEIRS OF CALPATURA, SR vs. PRADO G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004.*

The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Patricio’s
rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow
Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children.

Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is
the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property.
Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her
children are deemed co-owners of the subject property.

While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could
not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to
be determined by the parties before the trial court.

EMNACE vs. CA G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001.

The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can
file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao.
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.

Seangio vs. Reyes G.R. Nos. 140371–72. November 27, 2006.*

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo‘s intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo
was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and
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that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed. Segundo‘s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated
and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter‘s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence
of Alfredo.

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005.*

FACTS: Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. It was asserted that the will of Abada does not
indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not
acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the laws
in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed
Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not
necessary in the execution of any will. Abada‘s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public.

Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made.

MALANG vs. MOSON G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000.*

FACTS: Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Adbula then married for a second time
with Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage. Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married Nayo and
they also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another marriage with Mabay and had a daughter with her.
Not long after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually divorced them. Abdula then married his
4th wife Neng, excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless. Abdula died without leaving a will.

HELD: Abdula died intestate on December 1993. It is the Muslim Code which should determine the
identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the effectivity of the Muslim Code,
the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code.

The status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and
every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the
marriage rite. If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code, he cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is
valid. But when the marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are
allowed and valid. The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they have been validly
married. If they are not validly married, then they do not have successional rights over their partner.

The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of
conception or birth of the child.

As to property relations, it is the Civil Code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil
Code was the only on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or
non-Muslim.

LLORENTE vs. CA G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.*

FACTS: Llorente, enlisted as a serviceman of the US navy, was married to a Filipina. He was later on admitted
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as a US citizen. When he went to back to the Philippines, he filed for divorce since he found out that his wife
was having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Thereafter, he married his 2nd wife. In 1981, Lorenzo
executed a will and bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children.

HELD: Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issued best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. The will was duly probated.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. The SC does not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.

NB: In this case, it must be noted that Llorente was already an American citizen ***

DOROTHEO vs. CA G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999.* 320 SCRA 12

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died in 1969
without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, claiming to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a petition for probate of Alejandro‘s will. In1981, the will was admitted to probate but
private respondents did not appeal from the said order. In 1983, upon motion of the private respondents, the
trial court ruled that the will was intrinsically void and declared private respondents as the only heirs of the late
spouses.

HELD: Probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated
particularly on these aspects:
  Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedent‘s last will and testament 
  Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills 
  The testamentary capacity of the testator 
 And the due execution of the last will and testament 

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testaments
is always intrinsically valid.

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. (n)

Summary of cases with regard to soundness of mind:

INDICATIONS OF AN UNSOUND
MIND NOT INDICATIVE OF AN UNSOUND MIND
 Albornoz VS. Albornoz (71 Phil 414) - Torres VS. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) -
Lack  Senility,
of memory and understanding and pre-
senile Senile Dementia when not complete
Sancho VS. Abella (58 Phil 728) -Senile
dementia  debility,
 Neyra VS. Neyra (76 Phil 333) -
Delirium deafness, poor memory.
when it beclouds the mind so as not Alsua-Betts VS. CA (July 30, 1979) -
to  Weakness of
understand the nature of act, extent mind or partial imbecility from disease of
of body or from
property, objects of bounty age

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 Torres VS. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil Avelino VS. Dela Cruz (21 Phil 521) –
772) -  Blindness
complete senile dementia will result Bagtas VS. Paguio, Jocson VS. Jocson
to  (46 Phil
701), Cuyugan vs. Baron - Failure of
testamentary incapacity memory
 Samson VS. Corrales Tan (44 Phil Caguioa VS. Calderon (20 Phil 400) –
573) - the  Insomnia
positive testimony of attesting Yap Tua VS. Yap Ca Kuan (27 Phil
witnesses  579) –
which does not in itself seem
unreasonable as Tuberculosis
to the mental condition of the testator
must  Samson VS. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil
prevail over the professional speculations 573) –
of a
Diabetes
non-attending physician
 Galvez VS. Galvez (26 Phil 243) – Cholera
Bagtas VS. Paguio - Paralysis and loss of
 speech
 Carilio VS. Jaojoco (46 Phil 957) -
Cerebral
Hemorrhage with hemiplegia
 Hernaez VS. Hernaez (1 Phil 683) - Old age
 Neyra VS. Neyra (76 Phil 333) - Delirium;
Sleeping
Sickness (Addison's disease)
 Bugnao VS. Ubag (14 Phil 163) - Asthma

Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA January 31, 2005

FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that nowhere in the will can one discern that
Abada, the testator, knew the Spanish language.

HELD: There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.

ABANGAN CASE CAGRO CASE

Facts: A will consisted of 2 pages. The 1st Facts: The signatures instead at the
page is bottom, the
the disposition signed by the testator at the
bottom. signatures were on the margin.
Second page is the attestation signed
by the
witnesses.
Issue: There were no signatures on the left Issue: the signatures should be at the
margin. bottom so
According to the oppositors the signatures that there were signatures on the left and at
should the
also appear on the left margin. bottom.
Ruling: It is enough that the signatures Ruling: The main text of Cagro v. Cagro, it
appear on was
each and every page of the will. The considered a Fatal defect by the Supreme
purpose here Court.
is to identify that indeed the testator According to the SC, these signatures in
and the order to be
in compliance with requirement of the law,
witnesses signed the will. aside
from signatures on the left margin, you
should still
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No dissenting opinion sign at the bottom.

However, there were strong dissenting
opinions
to the effect that to require that the
signatures of the
witnesses aside from the left margin
should also
appear at the bottom is TOO TECHNICAL.
It will
not serve the purpose of the law because
what is
important is that the signature should
appear on
each and every page and this
purpose is
accomplished by affixing the signature on
the left.

Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.(n)

FELIX AZUELA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122880. April 12, 2006.*

A failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since
that fact can be checked by a visual examination, while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
witnesses signed in one another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only
textual guarantee of compliance.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal
flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which
the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the
absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the
execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is
substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised
of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of
the will, from the requisite that the will be ―attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]‖—
the respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other; Even if instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned clause, such signatures cannot

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demonstrate these witnesses‘ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page
were directed towards a wholly different avowal.—The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will,
from the requisite that the will be―attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses].‖ The respective
intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms
part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if
the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause,
such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses‘ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do
appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.

It is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves—it is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of
pages used upon which the will was written.—The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses
in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause.
Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses‘ signatures on each and every page, the fact must
be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary
witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every
page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts
would be their signatures on the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that ―every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses‖ has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the
fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate
provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited
flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import. In lieu of an
acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote ―Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.‖ By no manner of contemplation can those words be
construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to
the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

Even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid,
as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be ―acknowledged,‖ and not merely subscribed and
sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in
a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces
the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the
testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated
in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial
will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even
if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. [Azuela vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 119(2006)]

SAMANIEGO V. ABENA June 30, 2008

Anent the contestants‘ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause
states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages
only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered
opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to
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invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A,
B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error
must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3)
pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance
with the ―doctrine of liberal interpretation‖ enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: ―In the
absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.

Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In
such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's a death
shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of
wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (n)

SPS. PASCUAL vs. CA August 15, 2003

FACTS: Consolacion and Remedios are the niece and granddaughter of the late Canuto. Canuto and 11
others were co-owners of a parcel of land. The land was registered in the name of Catalina, Canuto and
Victoriano each owned 10/70 share. Canuto and Consolacion entered a Kasulatan where Canuto sold his
share in favor of Consolacion.

Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion for the cancellation of TCT. Remedios claimed that she is the
owner because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalina‘s will.

Consolacion sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Consolacion claimed that the basis
of the action is fraud, and Remedios should have filed the action within 4 years from the registration of

Consolacion‘s title on October 28, 1968 and not some 19 years later.

HELD: The action is barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is 10 years counted from registration of
adverse title. The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not
give rise to an implied trust. Remedios‘ does not seek to annul the Kasulatan. Remedios‘ action is based on an
implied trust.

Remedios is not a real party in interest who can file the complaint. Remedios anchored her claim over the lots
on the devise of these lots to her under Catalina‘s last will. However, the trial court found that the probate court
did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. Remedios does not contest this finding. Indeed,
during the trial, Remedios admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. Since the
probate court has not admitted Catalina’s last will, Remedios has not acquired any right under the last will.
REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance the lots or to enforce an implied
trust over these lots.

LIM vs. CA January 24, 2000

FACTS: In the inventory of the estate of Pastor, it included some properties belonging to some business
entities. The said corporations filed a motion for the exclusion of their property form the inventory. Rufina
argued that Pastor owned the said business entities. It follows that he also own the properties of the
corporations.
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HELD: The issue on the exclusion and inclusion of property from the inventory is within the competence of the
probate court. The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon
the gross value of the estate of the decedent.

However, the court‘s determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.

In this case, the real properties sought to be excluded from the inventory were duly registered under the
Torrens system in the name of the private corporations, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title. The probate court in denying the motion for exclusion acted in utter disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.

A corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it.
Consequently, the assets of the corporation are not the assets of the estate of Pastor Lim.

MALOLES vs. PHILIPS January 31, 200

FACTS: Dr. de Santos filed a petition for the probate of his will. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs.
The petition was granted. Shortly after, he died.

Octavio, his nephew, filed a ‗Motion for Intervention‘. He argued that as the nearest of kin and creditor of the
testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.

HELD: In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate
or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested party or one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor, and whose
interest is material and direct.

Octavio is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
decedent. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case
of intestacy. He can only inherit if the will is annulled. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition
to his motion to intervene and is not supported by evidence.

A probate proceeding is terminated upon the issuance of the order allowing the probate of a will.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator. However, Article 838 of the
Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself.

CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG February 23, 2004

FACTS: Rufina executed a notarized will where she devised a parcel of land to her grandson Anselmo. Later,
she executed a codicil which stated that her 4 children and Anselmo would inherit the above parcel of land.
Anselmo filed an action for partition against the Patulandongs. It was granted, subject to the result of the
probate of the codicil. Anselmo then sold the land to the Camayas.

The probate court then issued an order wherein the title issued to the Camayas were declared void and it
voided the sale as well. The Camayas contended that the probate court has no power to declare null and void
the sale and their title.

HELD: The probate court does not have the power to annul the title to lands subject of a testate proceeding
pending before it. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the
titles of the Camayas null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the
property.
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A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards such properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory.

Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it
specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was without prejudice to the probate of the
codicil. The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were subject to the outcome of the probate of the
codicil.

JLT AGRO vs. BALANSAG March 11, 2005

HELD: The appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved
prior to the death of Don Julian. At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering the lot in
question in favor of petitioner, Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot
would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.

Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. It is premature if not irrelevant to speak of
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides,
there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
death. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second marriage, a
requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Article 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted. (n)

RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000

FACTS: In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the following
provisions:

1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until
Belleza dies;

2. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have to obligation to still give yearly
the sugar as specified to Belleza;

3. In the event that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall
immediately seize the lot and turn it over to the testatrix‘ near descendants.

HELD: This is not a case of simple substitution. The codicil did not provide that should Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix‘ near descendants would substitute him.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also,
the near descendants‘ right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to
deliver is not fulfilled. Moreover, a fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second degree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla.

This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadilla‘s inheritance dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will
itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal
and not conditional.

The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the
efficacy of such institution. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the

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efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or
be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend.

Article 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)

FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO March 8, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Aida is the only daughter of Gregorio and Cirila, both deceased. Petitioners are
daughters of Gregorio with his common law wife Julia. Gregorio sold a parcel of land to his illegitimate children.

HELD: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Even if it was not
simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent‘s legitime.
The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code Obviously,
the sale was Gregorio‘s way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his
legitimate daughter.

If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive
respondent of her share in her father‘s estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his
only legitimate child.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the
right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect
to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal
and maternal lines. (912a)

BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD DECEMBER 8, 2000

FACTS: Augusto died without direct descendants or ascendants. Pastora (3rd degree) is his maternal aunt,
while Ofelia (5th degree) is the daughter of the 1st cousin of Augusto.

HELD: Ofelia cannot inherit alongside a Pastora.

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the nearest relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.

Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their
uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, is an absolute rule.

Thus, Pastora excludes Ofelia from succeeding ab intestate to the estate of Augusto. In fine, a maternal aunt
can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a 3rd degree relative,
excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the 4th degree in relationship, the latter in turn would have
priority in succession to a 5th degree relative.

HEIRS of SANDEJAS vs. LINA February 6, 2001

HELD: Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the decedent‘s entire estate – under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be
divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.
After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices.

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Article 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
(946a)

CALISTERIO vs. CALISTERIO APRIL 6, 2000

FACTS: Teodorico died intestate and was survived by his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the 2nd husband of
Marietta who had been previously married to James, who disappeared without a trace. Teodorico and Marietta
were married without having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Antonia,
surviving sister of Teodorico, claiming to be sole surviving heir of Teodorico, alleged that the marriage between
Teodorico and Marieta was bigamous and thus, null and void.

HELD: The 2nd marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, is valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon the dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should be divided into 2 equal portions: one portion to the surviving spouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse
over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with the legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces
(the latter by right of representation), is ½ of the inheritance, the brother and sisters or nephews and nieces,
being entitled to the other half. Brothers and sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation
by the latter of their parents who predeceased or are incapacitated to succeed.

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)

ZARAGOZA vs. CA SEPTEMEBER 29, 2000

FACTS: The father, during his lifetime, partitioned his properties to his children – Gloria, Zacariaz, and
Florentino, by way of Deeds of Absolute Sale except that in respect to daughter Alberta because of her
marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines, except by
hereditary succession. After the father died without a will, Alberta sued Florentino for the delivery of her
inheritance, consisting of Lots 871 and 943. Florentino claimed that Lot 871 is still registered in their father‘s
name while Lot 943 was sold to him for a valuable consideration.

HELD: The partition done during the lifetime of the father is valid as long as it is done without impairing the
legitime of compulsory heirs. Such legitime is determined after collation by compulsory heirs of what they
received during the lifetime of the deceased by way of donation or any other gratuitous title.

In this case, however, collation could not be done because the other compulsory heirs were not impleaded in
the case. The SC dismissed the case without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the
indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the partitioning
inter vivos prejudiced the legitimes.

Article 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)

HEIRS of SERASPI vs. CA April 28, 2000

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FACTS: Marcelino contracted 3 marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had 15 children from his 3
marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into 3 parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the
share of the heirs in each marriage.

In the same year, Patronicio, representing the heirs of the 1st marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate
to Dominador, an heir of the 2nd marriage. Dominador then sold said share to Quirico and Purficacion Seraspi.
They then obtained a loan but failed to pay it. As such, the lands were sold to Kalibo Rural Bank and then
subsequently sold to Manuel. Rata allowed Quirico to administer the property.

Simeon, Marcelino‘s child by his third wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico, ho had been paralyzed
due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.

The Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon for
recovery of possession of the lands.

HELD: Simeon cannot base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to
the heirs of the third marriage, to which he belongs. In the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino, the
properties were divided into 3 parts, each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the 3
marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first
and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the 3rd marriage, has no right over the
parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his
father‘s properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the
heirs of Marcelino.

Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. (n)

UNION BANK vs. SANTIBAÑEZ February 23, 2005

HELD: The probate proceeding already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including
the 3 tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court‘s approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the SC cannot allow. In executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature
of an extra-judicial partition, court approval is imperative and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity
of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement
were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate court has to determine yet who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and Florence to adjudicate unto themselves the 3 tractors was a
premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the
estate of the deceased.

Article 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should have
expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as
provided in article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for which
partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be
ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. (1051a)

SANTOS vs. SANTOS October 12, 2000

FACTS: Ladislao filed a complaint against his brother, Eliseo, and the latter‘s son Phillip. Ladislao averred that
when his and Eliseo‘s sister, Isidra, died, they inherited her parcel of land. A parcel of land left by Isidra was
conveyed by Eliseo to Virgilio, who from infancy had been under the care of Isidra. Virgilio executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Philip, his brother and a Tax Declaration was issued in favor of Philip.

Philip and the heirs of Eliseo aver that acquired Isidra‘s property by acquisitive prescription.

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HELD: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of repudiation is subject to certain conditions;

1. A co-owner repudiates the co-ownership

2. Such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners
3. The evidence is clear and conclusive
4. He has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
Property for the period required by law.

There was no showing that Eliseo had complied with these requisites. Acts of possessory character executed
in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the purposes of possession.

Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio was the ward of Isidra
ever since when Virgilio was still an infant, it was but natural that Ladislao did not interpose any objection to the
continued stay of Virgilio and his family on the property and even acquiesced thereto. Ladislao must have
assumed too, that his brother, Eliseo, allowed his son to occupy the property and use the same for the time
being. Hence, such possession by Virgilio and Philip of the property did not constitute a repudiation of the co-
ownership by Eliseo and of his privies for that matter. Penultimately, the action for partition is not barred by
laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.

Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
(1067a)

BAYLON vs. AMADOR February 9, 2004

HELD: The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. The SC has long established the rule that,
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-
owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as wells as its efficacy and
status.

Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has the right to redeem said 1/3 portion of
the subject property. On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the 30-day
period never commenced.

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA August 19, 2003

HELD: The 30-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to
exercise the right of redemption on March 31, 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the
City Treasurer of Butuan City or when the case was initiated on October 16, 1987, before the trial court.

The written notice is mandatory. The SC has long established the rule that notwithstanding the actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice form the selling co-owner in order to
remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. Even in
Alonzo vs. IAC, relied upon by the petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a
written notice of sale, the SC made it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence. The SC
simply adopted an exception to the general rule in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. In Alonzo,
the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days or months, after the consummation of the
contracts of sale but more than 13 years after the sales were concluded.

Article 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person. (1081a)

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. CA March 7, 2000

FACTS: Private respondents set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of Aznar to the subject
lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is
null and void for being fraudulently made.
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Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta participated in the extrajudicial partition and
that 2 person who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta.

HELD: Under Article 1104, partition made with preterition shall not be rescinded unless it be proved that there
was bad faith or fraud. In this case, there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud.

As to the 2 parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is applicable. The participation of
non-heirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding them.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or
in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and
as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (1090)

OSG vs Ayala September 2009

The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading
thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking
and loading spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor
area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents.
In fact, the term “parking fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR.

Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without any attempt at interpretation.[26] Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule
XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the
same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code

ABS-CBN, LOPEZ vs OMB 2011

The question posed by petitioners on this long-settled procedural issue does not constitute a novel question of
law. Nowhere in People v. Bayotas[7] does it state that a criminal complaint may continue and be prosecuted
as an independent civil action. In fact, Bayotas, once and for all, harmonized the rules on the extinguished and
on the subsisting liabilities of an accused who dies. We definitively ruled:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery thereof
may be pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

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4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right
by prescription.

Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises.
However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the same has been delivered to him. (1095)

Equatorial vs Mayfair 2001

The execution of a public instrument gives rise, therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such
presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies that delivery was not intended; or
when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a third person was actually in
possession of the thing. In the latter case, the sale cannot be considered consummated.

However, the point may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil Code, Equatorial as buyer acquired a
right to the fruits of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to petitioner arose.32 That
time arose upon the perfection of the Contract of Sale on July 30, 1978, from which moment the laws provide
that the parties to a sale may reciprocally demand performance.33 Does this mean that despite the judgment
rescinding the sale, the right to the fruits34 belonged to, and remained enforceable by, Equatorial?

Article 1385 of the Civil Code answers this question in the negative, because "[r]escission creates the
obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with
its interest; x x x" Not only the land and building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if any, had to be
returned by the buyer.
Another point. The Decision in the mother case stated that "Equatorial x x x has received rents" from Mayfair
"during all the years that this controversy has been litigated." The Separate Opinion of Justice Teodoro Padilla
in the mother case also said that Equatorial was "deriving rental income" from the disputed property. Even
hereinponente's Separate Concurring Opinion in the mother case recognized these rentals. The question now
is: Do all these statements concede actual delivery?

The answer is "No." The fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be
interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorial's title.

The CA Records of the mother case 35 show that Equatorial — as alleged buyer of the disputed properties and
as alleged successor-in-interest of Carmelo's rights as lessor — submitted two ejectment suits against Mayfair.
Filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, the first was docketed as Civil Case No. 121570 on July 9, 1987;
and thesecond, as Civil Case No. 131944 on May 28, 1990. Mayfair eventually won them both. However, to be
able to maintain physical possession of the premises while awaiting the outcome of the mother case, it had no
choice but to pay the rentals.

The rental payments made by Mayfair should not be construed as a recognition of Equatorial as the new
owner. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction. It is in this context that one should understand the
aforequoted factual statements in the ponencia in the mother case, as well as the Separate Opinion of Mr.
Justice Padilla and the Separate Concurring Opinion of the herein ponente.

At bottom, it may be conceded that, theoretically, a rescissible contract is valid until rescinded. However,
thisgeneral principle is not decisive to the issue of whether Equatorial ever acquired the right to collect rentals.
What is decisive is the civil law rule that ownership is acquired, not by mere agreement, but by tradition or
delivery. Under the factual environment of this controversy as found by this Court in the mother case,
Equatorial was never put in actual and effective control or possession of the property because of Mayfair's
timely objection.

As pointed out by Justice Holmes, general propositions do not decide specific cases. Rather, "laws are
interpreted in the context of the peculiar factual situation of each case. Each case has its own flesh and blood
and cannot be decided on the basis of isolated clinical classroom principles."36
In short, the sale to Equatorial may have been valid from inception, but it was judicially rescinded before it

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could be consummated. Petitioner never acquired ownership, not because the sale was void, as erroneously
claimed by the trial court, but because the sale was not consummated by a legally effective delivery of the
property sold.

Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time
when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment
of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation,
delay by the other begins. (1100a)

Vasquez vs Ayala

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation,
delay by the other begins.

In order that the debtor may be in default it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (1) that the
obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially.33

Under Article 1193 of the Civil Code, obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed shall be
demandable only when that day comes. However, no such day certain was fixed in the MOA. Petitioners,
therefore, cannot demand performance after the three (3) year period fixed by the MOA for the development of
the first phase of the property since this is not the same period contemplated for the development of the
subject lots. Since the MOA does not specify a period for the development of the subject lots, petitioners
should have petitioned the court to fix the period in accordance with Article 119734 of the Civil Code. As no
such action was filed by petitioners, their complaint for specific performance was premature, the obligation not
being demandable at that point. Accordingly, Ayala Corporation cannot likewise be said to have delayed
performance of the obligation.

Even assuming that the MOA imposes an obligation on Ayala Corporation to develop the subject lots within
three (3) years from date thereof, Ayala Corporation could still not be held to have been in delay since no
demand was made by petitioners for the performance of its obligation.

As found by the appellate court, petitioners' letters which dealt with the three (3)-year timetable were all dated
prior to April 23, 1984, the date when the period was supposed to expire. In other words, the letters were sent
before the obligation could become legally demandable. Moreover, the letters were mere reminders and not
categorical demands to perform. More importantly, petitioners waived the three (3)-year period as evidenced
by their agent, Engr. Eduardo Turla's letter to the effect that petitioners agreed that the three (3)-year period
should be counted from the termination of the case filed by Lancer

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

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The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. (1124)

Cordero vs FS Management

In the present case, the nature as well as the characteristics of a contract to sell is determinative of the
propriety of the remedy of rescission and the award of damages. As will be discussed shortly, the trial court
committed manifest error in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code to the present case, a fundamental error
which "lies at the base and foundation of the proceeding, affecting the judgment necessarily," or, as otherwise
expressed, "such manifest error as when removed destroys the foundation of the judgment." 24 Hence, the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled on these matters even if they were not raised in the appeal briefs.

Under a contract to sell, the seller retains title to the thing to be sold until the purchaser fully pays the agreed
purchase price. The full payment is a positive suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which is not a breach
of contract but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. The non-payment
of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. 25

Since the obligation of petitioners did not arise because of the failure of respondent to fully pay the purchase
price, Article 1191 of the Civil Code would have no application.

Castillo vs De Mistica GR 137909

Petitioner claims that she is entitled to rescind the Contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, because
respondents committed a substantial breach when they did not pay the balance of the purchase price within
the ten-year period. She further avers that the proviso on the payment of interest did not extend the period to
pay. To interpret it in that way would make the obligation purely potestative and, thus, void under Article 1182
of the Civil Code.

We disagree. The transaction between Eulalio Mistica and respondents, as evidenced by the Kasulatan, was
clearly a Contract of Sale. A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature when there is neither a stipulation in
the deed that title to the property sold is reserved to the seller until the full payment of the price; nor a
stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay
within a fixed period.[9]

In a contract of sale, the remedy of an unpaid seller is either specific performance or rescission.[10] Under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of the reciprocity
between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of them.[11] Rescission, however, is allowed only
where the breach is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.[12]

In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the purchase price within ten years from
the execution of the Deed did not amount to a substantial breach. In the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that
payment could be made even after ten years from the execution of the Contract, provided the vendee paid 12
percent interest. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law between the parties; thus, courts have no
alternative but to enforce them as agreed upon and written.[13]

Moreover, it is undisputed that during the ten-year period, petitioner and her deceased husband never made
any demand for the balance of the purchase price. Petitioner even refused the payment tendered by
respondents during her husband’s funeral, thus showing that she was not exactly blameless for the lapse of
the ten-year period. Had she accepted the tender, payment would have been made well within the agreed
period.

If petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the parties intended otherwise, she has to show
competent proof to support her contention. Instead, she argues that the period cannot be extended beyond
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ten years, because to do so would convert the buyer’s obligation to a purely potestative obligation that would
annul the contract under Article 1182 of the Civil Code.

This contention is likewise untenable. The Code prohibits purely potestative, suspensive, conditional
obligations that depend on the whims of the debtor, because such obligations are usually not meant to be
fulfilled.[14] Indeed, to allow the fulfillment of conditions to depend exclusively on the debtor’s will would be to
sanction illusory obligations.[15] The Kasulatan does not allow such thing. First, nowhere is it stated in the
Deed that payment of the purchase price is dependent upon whether respondents want to pay it or not.
Second, the fact that they already made partial payment thereof only shows that the parties intended to be
bound by the Kasulatan.

Both the trial and the appellate courts arrived at this finding. Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact by the
CA are generally binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal, especially when they are the
same as those of the trial court.[16] Petitioner has not given us sufficient reasons to depart from this rule.

Almira vs CA 2003

Addressing now the issue as to whether rescission of the Kasunduan by petitioners may prosper, we rule in the
negative. The power to rescind is only given to the injured party. The injured party is the party who has
faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is ready and willing to perform with his obligation. In the case at bar,
petitioners were not ready, willing and able to comply with their obligation to deliver a separate title in the name
of Julio Garcia to respondent. Therefore, they are not in a position to ask for rescission of
the Kasunduan. Moreover, respondent’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price was made subject
to delivery by petitioners of a separate title in the name of Julio Garcia within six (6) months from the time of
the execution of theKasunduan, a condition with which petitioners failed to comply. Failure to comply with a
condition imposed on the performance of an obligation gives the other party the option either to refuse to
proceed with the sale or to waive that condition under Article 1545 of the Civil Code.[20] Hence, it is the
respondent who has the option either to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the performance of the
condition imposed on his obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price.

Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary vs Orola 2008

At the outset, we must distinguish between an action for rescission as mapped out in Article 1191 of the Civil
Code and that provided by Article 1381 of the same Code. The articles read:

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is impled in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the
latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a
period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer
lesion by more than one fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion state in the
preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;

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(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.

Article 1191, as presently worded, speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the
context of Article 1124 of the Old Civil Code which uses the term “resolution.” The remedy of resolution applies
only to reciprocal obligations[8] such that a party’s breach thereof partakes of a tacit resolutory condition which
entitles the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the Old Civil Code, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either a rescission or
specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in each case. On the other hand, rescission
under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, taken from Article 1291 of the Old Civil Code, is a subsidiary action, and is
not based on a party’s breach of obligation.

As uniformly found by the lower courts, we likewise find that there was a perfected contract of sale between the
parties. A contract of sale carries the correlative duty of the seller to deliver the property and the obligation of
the buyer to pay the agreed price.[10] As there was already a binding contract of sale between the parties,
RVM had the corresponding obligation to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price upon the issuance
of the title in the name of respondents. The supposed 2-year period within which to pay the balance did not
affect the nature of the agreement as a perfected contract of sale.[11] In fact, we note that this 2-year period is
neither reflected in any of the drafts to the contract,[12] nor in the acknowledgment receipt of the downpayment
executed by respondents Josephine and Antonio with the conformity of Sr. Enhenco.[13] In any event, we
agree with the CA’s observation that the 2-year period to effect payment has been mooted by the lapse of time.

However, the CA mistakenly applied Articles 1383 and 1384 of the Civil Code to this case because
respondents’ cause of action against RVM is predicated on Article 1191 of the same code for breach of the
reciprocal obligation. It is evident from the allegations in respondents’ Complaint[14] that the instant case does
not fall within the enumerated instances in Article 1381 of the Civil Code. Certainly, the Complaint did not pray
for rescission of the contract based on economic prejudice.

Moreover, contrary to the CA’s finding that the evidence did not preponderate for either party, the records
reveal, as embodied in the trial court’s exhaustive disquisition, that RVM committed a breach of the obligation
when it suddenly refused to execute and sign the agreement and pay the balance of the purchase price.[15]
Thus, when RVM refused to pay the balance and thereby breached the contract, respondents rightfully availed
of the alternative remedies provided in Article 1191. Accordingly, respondents are entitled to damages
regardless of whichever relief, rescission or specific performance, would be granted by the lower courts
Yet, RVM stubbornly argues that given the CA’s factual finding on the absence of fraud or bad faith by either
party, its order to pay interest is inequitable.

The argument is untenable. The absence of fraud and bad faith by RVM notwithstanding, it is liable to
respondents for interest. In ruling out fraud and bad faith, the CA correspondingly ordered the fulfillment of the
obligation and deleted the RTC’s order of forfeiture of the downpayment along with payment of exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. But RVM’s contention disregards the common finding by the lower
courts of a perfected contract of sale. As previously adverted to, RVM breached this contract of sale by
refusing to pay the balance of the purchase price despite the transfer to respondents’ names of the title to the
property. The 2-year period RVM relies on had long passed and expired, yet, it still failed to pay. It did not even
attempt to pay respondents the balance of the purchase price after the case was filed, to amicably end this
litigation. In fine, despite a clear cut equitable decision by the CA, RVM refused to lay the matter to rest by
complying with its obligation and paying the balance of the agreed price for the property.

Lastly, to obviate confusion, the clear language of Article 1191 mandates that damages shall be awarded in
either case of fulfillment or rescission of the obligation.[17] In this regard, Article 2210 of the Civil Code is
explicit that “interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
contract.” The ineluctable conclusion is that the CA correctly imposed interest on the remaining balance of the
purchase price to cover the damages caused the respondents by RVM’s breach.

Reyes vs Tuparan 2011

Based on the above provisions, the title and ownership of the subject properties remains with the petitioner
until the respondent fully pays the balance of the purchase price and the assumed mortgage obligation.

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Thereafter, FSL Bank shall then issue the corresponding deed of cancellation of mortgage and the petitioner
shall execute the corresponding deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent.

Accordingly, the petitioner’s obligation to sell the subject properties becomes demandable only upon the
happening of the positive suspensive condition, which is the respondent’s full payment of the purchase price.
Without respondent’s full payment, there can be no breach of contract to speak of because petitioner has no
obligation yet to turn over the title. Respondent’s failure to pay in full the purchase price is not the breach of
contract contemplated under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code but rather just an eventthat prevents the
petitioner from being bound to convey title to the respondent.

LALICON vs NHA 2011

Invoking the RTC ruling, the Lalicons claim that under Article 1389 of the Civil Code the “action to claim
rescission must be commenced within four years” from the time of the commission of the cause for it.

But an action for rescission can proceed from either Article 1191 or Article 1381. It has been held that Article
1191 speaks of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the Old Civil Code
which uses the term “resolution.” Resolution applies only to reciprocal obligations such that a breach on the
part of one party constitutes an implied resolutory condition which entitles the other party to
rescission. Resolution grants the injured party the option to pursue, as principal actions, either a rescission or
specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.

Rescission under Article 1381, on the other hand, was taken from Article 1291 of the Old Civil Code, which is
a subsidiary action, not based on a party’s breach of obligation.[4] The four-year prescriptive period provided in
Article 1389 applies to rescissions under Article 1381.

Here, the NHA sought annulment of the Alfaros’ sale to Victor because they violated the five-year
restriction against such sale provided in their contract. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that such violation comes
under Article 1191 where the applicable prescriptive period is that provided in Article 1144 which is 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues. The NHA’s right of action accrued on February 18, 1992 when it
learned of the Alfaros’ forbidden sale of the property to Victor. Since the NHA filed its action for annulment of
sale on April 10, 1998, it did so well within the 10-year prescriptive period.

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)

Philippine Realty And Holding vs Ley Const 2011

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: “Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.” A
perusal of the construction agreements shows that the parties never agreed to make LCDC liable even in
cases of force majeure. Neither was the assumption of risk required. Thus, in the occurrence of events that
could not be foreseen, or though foreseen were inevitable, neither party should be held responsible.

Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation
due to an “act of God” or force majeure, the following must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must
be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

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The shortage in supplies and cement may be characterized as force majeure. In the present case,
hardware stores did not have enough cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of the
construction in the 1990s. Likewise, typhoons, power failures and interruptions of water supply all clearly fall
under force majeure. Since LCDC could not possibly continue constructing the building under the
circumstances prevailing, it cannot be held liable for any delay that resulted from the causes aforementioned.

Virginia Real vs Belo 2007

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion
of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.[31]

It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed
at petitioner’s fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the
other fastfood stalls, including respondent’s fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner’s
theory of fortuitous event.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo)
or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[34] To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.[35]

In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her
fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to
submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the
selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent

CONTRACT TO SELL FROM CONDITIONAL CONTRACT OF SALE

Carrascoso vs CA 2005

In a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to
sell, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price.[85]
In the former, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in the latter, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment
being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.[86]

PLDT argues that the July 11, 1975 Agreement to Buy and Sell is a conditional contract of sale, thus calling for
the application of Articles 1181[87] and 1187[88] of the Civil Code as held in Coronel v. Court of Appeals.[89]

The Court is not persuaded.

For in a conditional contract of sale, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby
perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer,
ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.[90] Whereas in a contract to sell, upon fulfillment of the suspensive condition,
ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may have been previously
delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a
contract of absolute sale.[91]

A perusal of the contract[92] adverted to in Coronel reveals marked differences from the Agreement to Buy and
Sell in the case at bar. In the Coronel contract, there was a clear intent on the part of the therein petitioners-
sellers to transfer title to the therein respondent-buyer. In the July 11, 1975 Agreement to Buy and Sell, PLDT
still had to “definitely inform Carrascoso of its decision on whether or not to finalize the deed of absolute sale
for the 1,000 hectare portion of the property,” such that in the April 6, 1977 Deed of Absolute Sale
subsequently executed, the parties declared that they “are now decided to execute” such deed, indicating that
the Agreement to Buy and Sell was, as the appellate court held, merely a preparatory contract in the nature of
a contract to sell. In fact, the parties even had to stipulate in the said Agreement to Buy and Sell that
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Carrascoso, “during the existence of the Agreement, shall not sell, cede, assign and/or transfer the parcel of
land,” which provision this Court has held to be a typical characteristic of a contract to sell.[93]

Being a contract to sell, what was vested by the July 11, 1975 Agreement to Buy and Sell to PLDT was merely
the beneficial title to the 1,000 hectare portion of the property.

Article 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages
shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.

The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
(1152a)

Filinvest Land Inc. vs CA 2005

There is no question that the penalty of P15,000.00 per day of delay was mutually agreed upon by the parties
and that the same is sanctioned by law. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability
in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to insure performance and has a double function: (1)
to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of
greater responsibility in the event of breach.

As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such terms and
conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.[13] Nevertheless, courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract in two instances: (1)
if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied; and (2) even if there has been no compliance
if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable.

We are hamstrung to reverse the Court of Appeals as it is rudimentary that the application of Article 1229 is
essentially addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[15] As it is settled that the project was
already 94.53% complete and that Filinvest did agree to extend the period for completion of the project, which
extensions Filinvest included in computing the amount of the penalty, the reduction thereof is clearly
warranted.

Filinvest, however, hammers on the case of Laureano v. Kilayco,[16] decided in 1915, which cautions courts to
distinguish between two kinds of penalty clauses in order to better apply their authority in reducing the amount
recoverable. We held therein that:

. . . [I]n any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular compliance with the provisions in a contract for
special indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine
of strict construction against the enforcement in its entirety of the indemnification, where it is clear
from the terms of the contract that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to the
probable damages which might be anticipated as a result of a breach of the terms of the contract; or, in other
words, where the indemnity provided for is essentially a mere penalty having for its principal object the
enforcement of compliance with the contract. But the courts will be slow in exercising the jurisdiction
conferred upon them in article 1154[17] so as to modify the terms of an agreed upon indemnification where it
appears that in fixing such indemnification the parties had in mind a fair and reasonable compensation for
actual damages anticipated as a result of a breach of the contract, or, in other words, where the principal
purpose of the indemnification agreed upon appears to have been to provide for the payment of actual
anticipated and liquidated damages rather than the penalization of a breach of the contract. (Emphases
supplied)

Filinvest contends that the subject penalty clause falls under the second type, i.e., the principal purpose for its
inclusion was to provide for payment of actual anticipated and liquidated damages rather than the penalization
of a breach of the contract. Thus, Filinvest argues that had Pecorp completed the project on time, it (Filinvest)
could have sold the lots sooner and earned its projected income that would have been used for its other
projects.

Unfortunately for Filinvest, the above-quoted doctrine is inapplicable to herein case. The Supreme Court
in Laureano instructed that a distinction between a penalty clause imposed essentially as penalty in case of
breach and a penalty clause imposed as indemnity for damages should be made in cases where there has
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been neither partial nor irregular compliance with the terms of the contract. In cases where there has been
partial or irregular compliance, as in this case, there will be no substantial difference between a penalty and
liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned.[18] The distinction is thus more apparent than real
especially in the light of certain provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides in Articles 2226
and Article 2227 thereof:

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of
breach thereof.

Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced
if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

Thus, we lamented in one case that “(t)here is no justification for the Civil Code to make an apparent
distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages because the settled rule is that there is no difference
between penalty and liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned and that either may be
recovered without the necessity of proving actual damages and both may be reduced when proper.

Article 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to
the debtor. (1158a)

DOMINION INSURANCE vs CA 2002

The instruction of petitioner as the principal could not be any clearer. Respondent Guevarra was authorized to
pay the claim of the insured, but the payment shall come from the revolving fund or collection in his
possession.

Having deviated from the instructions of the principal, the expenses that respondent Guevarra incurred in the
settlement of the claims of the insured may not be reimbursed from petitioner Dominion. This conclusion is in
accord with Article 1918, Civil Code, which states that:

“The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred by the agent in the following cases:

“(1) If the agent acted in contravention of the principal’s instructions, unless the latter should wish to avail
himself of the benefits derived from the contract;

“xxx xxx xxx”

However, while the law on agency prohibits respondent Guevarra from obtaining reimbursement, his right to
recover may still be justified under the general law on obligations and contracts.

Article 1236, second paragraph, Civil Code, provides:

“Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to
the debtor.”

In this case, when the risk insured against occurred, petitioner’s liability as insurer arose. This obligation was
extinguished when respondent Guevarra paid the claims and obtained Release of Claim Loss and Subrogation
Receipts from the insured who were paid.

Thus, to the extent that the obligation of the petitioner has been extinguished, respondent Guevarra may
demand for reimbursement from his principal. To rule otherwise would result in unjust enrichment of petitioner.

The extent to which petitioner was benefited by the settlement of the insurance claims could best be proven by
the Release of Claim Loss and Subrogation Receipts[27] which were attached to the original complaint as
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Annexes C-2, D-1, E-1, F-1, G-1, H-1, I-1 and J-l, in the total amount of P116,276.95.

However, the amount of the revolving fund/collection that was then in the possession of respondent Guevarra
as reflected in the statement of account dated July 11, 1990 would be deducted from the above amount.

The outstanding balance and the production/remittance for the period corresponding to the claims was
P3,604.84. Deducting this from P116,276.95, we get P112,672.11. This is the amount that may be reimbursed
to respondent Guevarra.

Article 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed
to be a donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor
who has accepted it. (n)

MORENO-LENTFER vs WOLFF 2004

Trying to apply Art. 1238 to the instant case is like forcing a square peg into a round hole. The absence of
intention to be reimbursed, the qualifying circumstance in Art. 1238, is negated by the facts of this case.
Respondent's acts contradict any intention to donate the properties to petitioner Moreño-Lentfer. When
respondent learned that the sale of the beach house and assignment of the lease right were in favor of Victoria
Moreño-Lentfer, he immediately filed a complaint for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the property
with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment. Respondent Moreño-Lentfer at that time claimed the beach
house, together with the lease right, was donated to her. Noteworthy, she had changed her theory, to say that
it was only the money used in the purchase that was donated to her. But in any event, respondent actually
stayed in the beach house in the concept of an owner and shouldered the expenses for its maintenance and
repair amounting to P200,000 for the entire period of his stay for ten weeks. Moreover, the appellate court
found that respondent is not related or even close to the Lentfer spouses. Obviously, respondent had trusted
the Lentfer spouses to keep a time deposit account for him with Solid Bank for the purpose of making the
purchase of the cited properties.

Petitioner Moreño-Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A donation is a simple act of
liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. 16 But when a large
amount of money is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800, based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are
constrained to take the petitioners' claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt.
Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements
set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation is the purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil
Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance
should have been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal
requisites prescribed by law.

Mandarin Villa vs CA 1996

Petitioner contends that it cannot be faulted for its cashier's refusal to accept private respondent's BANKARD
credit card, the same not being a legal tender. It argues that private respondent's offer to pay by means of
credit card partook of the nature of a proposal to novate an existing obligation for which petitioner, as creditor,
must first give its consent otherwise there will be no binding contract between them. Petitioner cannot seek
refuge behind this averment.

We note that Mandarin Villa Seafood Village is affiliated with BANKARD. In fact, an "Agreement" 6 entered into
by petitioner and BANKARD dated June 23, 1989, provides inter alia:

The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cards presented by their corresponding holders in the
purchase of goods and/or services supplied by it provided that the card expiration date has not elapsed and
the card number does not appear on the latest cancellation bulletin of lost, suspended and canceled PCCCI
credit cards and, no signs of tampering, alterations or irregularities appear on the face of the credit card. 7

While private respondent, may not be a party to the said agreement, the above-quoted stipulation conferred a
favor upon the private respondent, a holder of credit card validly issued by BANKARD. This stipulation is a
stipulation pour autri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code private respondent may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the petitioner before its revocation. 8 In this case, private
respondent's offer to pay by means of his BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said

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stipulation but also an explicit communication of his acceptance to the obligor.

In addition, the record shows that petitioner posted a logo inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village stating that
"Bankard is accepted here. 9 This representation is conclusive upon the petitioner which it cannot deny or
disprove as against the private respondent, the party relying thereon. Petitioner, therefore, cannot disclaim its
obligation to accept private respondent's BANKARD credit card without violating the equitable principle of
estoppel.

Article 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the
value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless
there is an agreement to the contrary. (n)

Equitable PCI Bank vs Ng Sheung Nor 2007

For extraordinary inflation (or deflation) to affect an obligation, the following requisites must be proven:

1. that there was an official declaration of extraordinary inflation or deflation from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP);

2. that the obligation was contractual in nature; and

3. that the parties expressly agreed to consider the effects of the extraordinary inflation or deflation.

Despite the devaluation of the peso, the BSP never declared a situation of extraordinary inflation.
Moreover, although the obligation in this instance arose out of a contract, the parties did not agree to recognize
the effects of extraordinary inflation (or deflation).[77] The RTC never mentioned that there was a such
stipulation either in the promissory note or loan agreement. Therefore, respondents should pay their dollar-
denominated loans at the exchange rate fixed by the BSP on the date of maturity.

Almeda vs Bathala 2008

Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and such
determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This intention,
once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.

While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of “extraordinary inflation or devaluation” as
compared to Article 1250’s “extraordinary inflation or deflation,” we find that when the parties used the term
“devaluation,” they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the
contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.

That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners’ letter[22] dated January 26, 1998,
where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference
to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not
warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article 1250 should be considered.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.

Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding
increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money and
credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level.[23] In
a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes extraordinary inflation, thus:

[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the
Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such
increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of

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the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.[24]

The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation
or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the
erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is
characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing
power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered
as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an
official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during
a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied.

Singson vs Caltex 2000

To further bolster her arguments, petitioner invokes by analogy the principle of rebus sic stantibus in public
international law, under which a vital change of circumstances justifies a state's unilateral withdrawal from a
treaty. In the herein case, petitioner posits that in pegging the monthly rental rates of P2.50 and P3.00 per
square meter, respectively, the parties were guided by the economic conditions prevalent in 1968, when the
Philippines faced robust economic prospects. Petitioner contends that between her and respondent, a
corporation engaged in high stakes business and employing economic and business experts, it is the latter
who had the unmistakable advantage to analyze the feasibility of entering into a 20-year lease contract at such
meager rates.

The only issue crucial to the present appeal is whether there existed an extraordinary inflation during the
period 1968 to 1983 that would call for the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code and justify an
adjustment or increase of the rentals between the parties.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.

Article 1250 was inserted in the Civil Code of 1950 to abate the uncertainty and confusion that affected
contracts entered into or payments made during World War II, and to help provide a just solution to future
cases. The Court has, in more than one occasion, been asked to interpret the provisions of Article 1250, and to
expound on the scope and limits of "extraordinary inflation".

We have held extraordinary inflation to exist when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of
the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and
such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.

An example of extraordinary inflation, as cited by the Court in Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation vs.
NAWASA, supra, is that which happened to the deutschmark in 1920. Thus:
"More recently, in the 1920s, Germany experienced a case of hyperinflation. In early 1921, the value of the
German mark was 4.2 to the U.S. dollar. By May of the same year, it had stumbled to 62 to the U.S. dollar. And
as prices went up rapidly, so that by October 1923, it had reached 4.2 trillion to the U.S. dollar!" (Bernardo M.
Villegas & Victor R. Abola, Economics, An Introduction [Third Edition]).

As reported, "prices were going up every week, then every day, then every hour. Women were paid several
times a day so that they could rush out and exchange their money for something of value before what little
purchasing power was left dissolved in their hands. Some workers tried to beat the constantly rising prices by
throwing their money out of the windows to their waiting wives, who would rush to unload the nearly worthless
paper. A postage stamp cost millions of marks and a loaf of bread, billions." (Sidney Rutberg, "The Money
Balloon", New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975, p. 19, cited in "Economics, An Introduction" by Villegas &
Abola, 3rd Ed.)

The supervening of extraordinary inflation is never assumed. The party alleging it must lay down the factual
basis for the application of Article 1250.

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Thus, in the Filipino Pipe case, the Court acknowledged that the voluminous records and statistics submitted
by plaintiff-appellant proved that there has been a decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, but
this downward fall cannot be considered "extraordinary" but was simply a universal trend that has not spared
our country. Similarly, in Huibonhoa vs. Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed plaintiff-appellant's
unsubstantiated allegation that the Aquino assassination in 1983 caused building and construction costs to
double during the period July 1983 to February 1984. In Serra vs. Court of Appeals, the Court again did not
consider the decline in the peso's purchasing power from 1983 to 1985 to be so great as to result in an
extraordinary inflation.

Like the Serra and Huibonhoa cases, the instant case also raises as basis for the application of Article 1250
the Philippine economic crisis in the early 1980s --- when, based on petitioner's evidence, the inflation rate
rose to 50.34% in 1984. We hold that there is no legal or factual basis to support petitioner's allegation of the
existence of extraordinary inflation during this period, or, for that matter, the entire time frame of 1968 to 1983,
to merit the adjustment of the rentals in the lease contract dated July 16, 1968. Although by petitioner's
evidence there was a decided decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso throughout this period,
we are hard put to treat this as an "extraordinary inflation" within the meaning and intent of Article
1250. Rather, we adopt with approval the following observations of the Court of Appeals on petitioner's
evidence, especially the NEDA certification of inflation rates based on consumer price index:

xxx (a) from the period 1966 to 1986, the official inflation rate never exceeded 100% in any single year; (b) the
highest official inflation rate recorded was in 1984 which reached only 50.34%; (c) over a twenty one (21) year
period, the Philippines experienced a single-digit inflation in ten (10) years (i.e., 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1975,
1976, 1977, 1978, 1983 and 1986); (d) in other years (i.e., 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1981,
1982, 1984 and 1989) when the Philippines experienced double-digit inflation rates, the average of those rates
was only 20.88%; (e) while there was a decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency from the
period 1966 to 1986, such cannot be considered as extraordinary; rather, it is a normal erosion of the value of
the Philippine peso which is a characteristic of most currencies.

"Erosion" is indeed an accurate description of the trend of decline in the value of the peso in the past three to
four decades. Unfortunate as this trend may be, it is certainly distinct from the phenomenon contemplated by
Article 1250.

Moreover, this Court has held that the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied without an official
declaration thereof by competent authorities.

Article 1252. He who has various debts of the same kind in favor of one and the same creditor, may declare at
the time of making the payment, to which of them the same must be applied. Unless the parties so stipulate, or
when the application of payment is made by the party for whose benefit the term has been constituted,
application shall not be made as to debts which are not yet due.

If the debtor accepts from the creditor a receipt in which an application of the payment is made, the former
cannot complain of the same, unless there is a cause for invalidating the contract. (1172a)

Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it,
the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.

Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:

(1) When the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment;

(2) When he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due;

(3) When, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt;

(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;

(5) When the title of the obligation has been lost. (1176a)

Swagman Hotels vs CA 2005

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It is worthy to note that the cash voucher dated January 1998 states that the payment of US$750 represents
“INVESTMENT PAYMENT.” All the succeeding cash vouchers describe the payments from February 1998 to
September 1999 as “CAPITAL REPAYMENT.” All these cash vouchers served as receipts evidencing private
respondent’s acknowledgment of the payments made by the petitioner: two of which were signed by the private
respondent himself and all the others were signed by his representatives. The private respondent even
identified and confirmed the existence of these receipts during the hearing. Significantly, cognizant of these
receipts, the private respondent applied these payments to the three consolidated principal loans in the
summary of payments he submitted to the court.

Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be
deemed to have been made until the interest has been covered. In this case, the private respondent would not
have signed the receipts describing the payments made by the petitioner as “capital repayment” if the
obligation to pay the interest was still subsisting. The receipts, as well as private respondent’s summary of
payments, lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the payments were for the principal loans and that the
interests on the three consolidated loans were waived by the private respondent during the undisputed
renegotiation of the loans on account of the business reverses suffered by the petitioner at the time.

There was therefore a novation of the terms of the three promissory notes in that the interest was waived and
the principal was payable in monthly installments of US$750. Alterations of the terms and conditions of the
obligation would generally result only in modificatory novation unless such terms and conditions are considered
to be the essence of the obligation itself. The resulting novation in this case was, therefore, of the modificatory
type, not the extinctive type, since the obligation to pay a sum of money remains in force.

Thus, since the petitioner did not renege on its obligation to pay the monthly installments conformably with their
new agreement and even continued paying during the pendency of the case, the private respondent had no
cause of action to file the complaint. It is only upon petitioner’s default in the payment of the monthly
amortizations that a cause of action would arise and give the private respondent a right to maintain an action
against the petitioner.

Ramos vs Sarao 2005

Tender of payment is the manifestation by debtors of their desire to comply with or to pay their obligation. If the
creditor refuses the tender of payment without just cause, the debtors are discharged from the obligation by the
consignation of the sum due. Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority,
before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested
parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with these requisites is mandatory

Article 1266. The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or
physically impossible without the fault of the obligor. (1184a)

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION VS PCIB 2006

Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable only to obligations
"to do," and not obligations "to give." An obligation "to do" includes all kinds of work or service; while an
obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable thing in order to
create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for its simple possession, or in order to return it to its
owner.

Article 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part. (n)

NAGA Telephone vs CA

Article 1267 speaks of "service" which has become so difficult. Taking into consideration the rationale behind
this provision, 9 the term "service" should be understood as referring to the "performance" of the obligation. In

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the present case, the obligation of private respondent consists in allowing petitioners to use its posts in Naga
City, which is the service contemplated in said article. Furthermore, a bare reading of this article reveals that it
is not a requirement thereunder that the contract be for future service with future unusual change. According to
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, 10 Article 1267 states in our law the doctrine of unforseen events. This is said to
be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic stantibus in public international law; under this theory, the
parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist the
contract also ceases to exist. Considering practical needs and the demands of equity and good faith, the
disappearance of the basis of a contract gives rise to a right to relief in favor of the party prejudiced.

In a nutshell, private respondent in the Occeña case filed a complaint against petitioner before the trial court
praying for modification of the terms and conditions of the contract that they entered into by fixing the proper
shares that should pertain to them out of the gross proceeds from the sales of subdivided lots. We ordered the
dismissal of the complaint therein for failure to state a sufficient cause of action.

he ruling in the Occeña case is not applicable because we agree with respondent court that the allegations in
private respondent's complaint and the evidence it has presented sufficiently made out a cause of action under
Article 1267. We, therefore, release the parties from their correlative obligations under the contract. However,
our disposition of the present controversy does not end here. We have to take into account the possible
consequences of merely releasing the parties therefrom: petitioners will remove the telephone wires/cables in
the posts of private respondent, resulting in disruption of their service to the public; while private respondent, in
consonance with the contract 12 will return all the telephone units to petitioners, causing prejudice to its
business. We shall not allow such eventuality. Rather, we require, as ordered by the trial court: 1) petitioners to
pay private respondent for the use of its posts in Naga City and in the towns of Milaor, Canaman, Magarao and
Pili, Camarines Sur and in other places where petitioners use private respondent's posts, the sum of ten
(P10.00) pesos per post, per month, beginning January, 1989; and 2) private respondent to pay petitioner the
monthly dues of all its telephones at the same rate being paid by the public beginning January, 1989. The
peculiar circumstances of the present case, as distinguished further from the Occeña case, necessitates
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.

Article 1291. Obligations may be modified by:

(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;

(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;

(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. (1203)

Bernabe vs CA 2008

The document that spells out the nature of the transaction of the parties is the Deed of Conditional Sale.
Stemming from the compromise agreement entered into by Titan and petitioners, the Deed of Conditional Sale
has superseded the Deed of Sale of Real Estate which is the original contract. The whole essence of a
compromise is that by making reciprocal concessions, the parties avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.[27] A compromise agreement can be entered into without novating or supplanting existing
contracts,[28] but in this case, the irreconcilable incompatibility between the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and
the Deed of Conditional Sale inevitably resulted in extinctive novation.[29]

The first contract or the Deed of Sale of Real Estate embodies a perfected contract of sale. There is no
stipulation in the said deed that title to the properties would remain with defendants until full payment of the
consideration, or that the right to unilaterally resolve the contract upon Titan’s failure to pay within a fixed
period is given to defendants. Patently, the contract executed by the parties is a contract of sale and not a
contract to sell.

When the parties entered into a compromise, they executed new contracts involving the shares of Patricio,
Cecilia and Antonio in the properties. These new contracts are the three deeds of conditional sale entered into
by Titan with Patricio, Cecilia and Antonio, the last represented by his attorneys-in-fact. These contracts, all
entitled Deed of Conditional Sale, are contracts to sell.

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The difference between contracts of sale and contracts to sell is relevant. In a contract of sale, the title to the
property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by
agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until
and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor
until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition,
failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective.[30]

A careful reading of the stipulations in the Deed of Conditional Sale conveys the intent of the parties to
enter into a contract to sell. The fourth paragraph of the contract explicitly states that only when full payment of
the purchase price is made shall Antonio execute the deed of absolute sale transferring and conveying his
shares in the subject properties. Clearly, the intent is to reserve ownership in the seller, Antonio, until the
buyer, Titan, pays in full the purchase price. The full payment of the purchase price does not automatically
vest ownership in Titan. A deed of absolute sale still has to be executed by Antonio.

As earlier noted, the Deed of Sale of Real Estate is substituted by the subsequent deeds of conditional
sale. The Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the deeds of conditional sale involve different parties and different
amounts, and impose different obligations. The original deed, on one hand, and the latter three, on the other,
are incompatible and cannot subsist all at the same time.

Reyes vs BPI Family Savings

The only issue for our consideration is whether there was a novation of the mortgage loan contract between
petitioners and BPI-FSB that would result in the extinguishment of petitioners’ liability to the bank.

We agree with the CA that there was none.

Novation is defined as the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation
by a subsequent one which terminates the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by
substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.

Article 1292 of the Civil Code on novation further provides:

Article 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other.

The cancellation of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation which may
be effected either expressly or impliedly. While there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might
constitute sufficient change resulting in novation, the touchstone, however, is irreconcilable incompatibility
between the old and the new obligations.

In Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we held that:

In every novation there are four essential requisites:(1) a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the
parties to the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There
must be consent of all the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the
creation of a valid new one. The acceptance of the promissory note by the plaintiff is not novation of the
contract. The legal doctrine is that an obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new instrument by
changing the term of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one. It is not proper to
consider an obligation novated as in the case at bar by the mere granting of extension of payment which did
not even alter its essence. To sustain novation necessitates that the same be declared in unequivocal terms or
that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between the two obligations. An obligation to pay a sum
of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified by changing only the terms of payment
and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one or wherein the old contract is merely
supplementing the old one.

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Thus, the well-settled rule is that, with respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, the obligation is
not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, adds
other obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or the new contract merely supplements the old one.

BPI-FSB and Transbuilders only extended the repayment term of the loan from one year to twenty
quarterly installments at 18% interest per annum. There was absolutely no intention by the parties to
supersede or abrogate the old loan contract secured by the real estate mortgage executed by petitioners in
favor of BPI-FSB. In fact, the intention of the new agreement was precisely to revive the old obligation after the
original period expired and the loan remained unpaid. The novation of a contract cannot be presumed. In the
absence of an express agreement, novation takes place only when the old and the new obligations are
incompatible on every point.

Moreover, under the real estate mortgage executed by them in favor of BPI-FSB, petitioners undertook to
secure the P15M loan ofTransbuilders to BPI-FSB “and other credit accommodations of whatever nature
obtained by the Borrower/Mortgagor.” While this stipulation proved to be onerous to petitioners, neither the law
nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of its consequences.[11] Petitioners voluntarily executed the real estate
mortgage on their property in favor of BPI-FSB to secure the P15M loan of Transbuilders. They cannot now be
allowed to repudiate their obligation to the bank after Transbuilders’ default. While petitioners’ liability was
written in fine print and in a contract prepared by BPI-FSB, it has been the consistent holding of this Court that
contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se. On numerous occasions, we have upheld the binding effects of
such contracts.

SUENO VS LANDBANK 2008

The elements of novation clearly do not exist in the instant case. While it is true that there is a previous valid
obligation (i.e., the obligation of LBP to honor Sueno’s right to redeem the subject property within a period of
one year), such obligation expired at the same time as the redemption period on 6 March 2001. There is,
however, no clear agreement between the parties to a new contract, again imposing upon LBP the obligation
of honoring Sueno’s right to redeem the subject properties within an extended period of six months. Without a
new contract, the old contract cannot be considered extinguished.

GARCIA vs LLAMAS 2003

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, we hold that no novation took place.

The parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had been extinguished by the issuance and
the acceptance of the check, or that the check would take the place of the note. There is no incompatibility
between the promissory note and the check. As the CA correctly observed, the check had been issued
precisely to answer for the obligation. On the one hand, the note evidences the loan obligation; and on the
other, the check answers for it. Verily, the two can stand together.

Neither could the payment of interests -- which, in petitioner’s view, also constitutes novation -- change the
terms and conditions of the obligation. Such payment was already provided for in the promissory note and, like
the check, was totally in accord with the terms thereof.

Also unmeritorious is petitioner’s argument that the obligation was novated by the substitution of debtors. In
order to change the person of the debtor, the old one must be expressly released from the obligation, and the
third person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the relation. Well-settled is the rule
that novation is never presumed. Consequently, that which arises from a purported change in the person of the
debtor must be clear and express. It is thus incumbent on petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally
that novation has indeed taken place.

In the present case, petitioner has not shown that he was expressly released from the obligation, that a third
person was substituted in his place, or that the joint and solidary obligation was cancelled and substituted by
the solitary undertaking of De Jesus. The CA aptly held:

“x x x. Plaintiff’s acceptance of the bum check did not result in substitution by de Jesus either, the nature of the
obligation being solidary due to the fact that the promissory note expressly declared that the liability of
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appellants thereunder is joint and [solidary.] Reason: under the law, a creditor may demand payment or
performance from one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously, and payment made by
one of them extinguishes the obligation. It therefore follows that in case the creditor fails to collect from one of
the solidary debtors, he may still proceed against the other or others. x x x ”

Moreover, it must be noted that for novation to be valid and legal, the law requires that the creditor expressly
consent to the substitution of a new debtor. Since novation implies a waiver of the right the creditor had before
the novation, such waiver must be express. It cannot be supposed, without clear proof, that the present
respondent has done away with his right to exact fulfillment from either of the solidary debtors.

More important, De Jesus was not a third person to the obligation. From the beginning, he was a joint
and solidary obligor of the P400,000 loan; thus, he can be released from it only upon its
extinguishment. Respondent’s acceptance of his check did not change the person of the debtor, because a
joint and solidary obligor is required to pay the entirety of the obligation.

It must be noted that in a solidary obligation, the creditor is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole
obligation from any or all of the debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to enforce
collection. Having made himself jointly and severally liable with De Jesus, petitioner is therefore liable for the
entire obligation

Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos,
unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of
such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction
and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it
is a sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;

( f ) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Municipality of Hagonoy vs Dumdum 2010

To begin with, the Statute of Frauds found in paragraph (2), Article 1403 of the Civil Code, requires for
enforceability certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or memorandum. The term
“Statute of Frauds” is descriptive of statutes that require certain classes of contracts to be in writing; and that
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do not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely
regulate the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.

In other words, the Statute of Frauds only lays down the method by which the enumerated contracts
may be proved. But it does not declare them invalid because they are not reduced to writing inasmuch as, by
law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. The object is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of
obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain
enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The
effect of noncompliance with this requirement is simply that no action can be enforced under the given
contracts. If an action is nevertheless filed in court, it shall warrant a dismissal under Section 1(i),[25] Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court,unless there has been, among others, total or partial performance of the obligation on the
part of either party.

Orduna vs Fuentebella 2010

Statute of Frauds Inapplicable

to Partially Executed Contracts

It is undisputed that Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the purchase price
payable on installment basis. Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of some partial payments. After
his death, his son duly recognized the sale by accepting payments and issuing what may be considered as
receipts therefor. Gabriel Jr., in a gesture virtually acknowledging the petitioners’ dominion of the property,
authorized them to construct a fence around it. And no less than his wife, Teresita, testified as to the fact of
sale and of payments received.

Pursuant to such sale, Antonita and her two sons established their residence on the lot, occupying the house
they earlier constructed thereon. They later declared the property for tax purposes, as evidenced by the
issuance of TD 96-04012-111087 in their or Antonita’s name, and paid the real estates due thereon, obviously
as sign that they are occupying the lot in the concept of owners.

Given the foregoing perspective, Eduardo’s assertion in his Answer that “persons appeared in the
property” only after “he initiated ejectment proceedings” is clearly baseless. If indeed petitioners entered and
took possession of the property after he (Eduardo) instituted the ejectment suit, how could they explain the fact
that he sent a demand letter to vacate sometime in May 2000?

With the foregoing factual antecedents, the question to be resolved is whether or not the Statute of Frauds
bars the enforcement of the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita.

The CA, just as the RTC, ruled that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with the Statute of
Frauds.

We disagree for several reasons. Foremost of these is that the Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403,
par. (2), of the Civil Code applies only to executory contracts, i.e., those where no performance has yet been
made. Stated a bit differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into
play where the contract in question is completed, executed, or partially consummated.

GF Equity vs Valenzona 2005

In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate the contract
— that “if the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to
coach the team, the corporation may terminate the contract.” The assailed condition clearly transgresses the
principle of mutuality of contracts. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient
skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed
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failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In
other words, GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the
soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.

To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for
void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article 1308 of the Civil Code, it is
null and void.

DKC vs CA 2000

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by
the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir,
Victor, even after her demise.

Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals held that the said contract was terminated upon the death of
Encarnacion Bartolome and did not bind Victor because he was not a party thereto.

Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows-

"ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. brnado

xxx xxx x x x."

The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation
or (3) provision of law.

In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations
under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by
their nature, transmissible.

LAGON VS CA 2005

The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed
existence of private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference
for which petitioner should be held liable for damages.

The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous interference with
contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse. In that
case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from
private respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented from
using the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.

As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, private
respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the contract appeared as
duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the
veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioner's counsel and after the
trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court
appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their
lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.

The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the
contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action
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for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is
unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts
which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and
rights of the parties in the contract.

In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own
personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a
cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the
entire property's title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of
property had no record of the same.

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to
make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in So
Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or
when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other
words, his act of interference cannot be justified.

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes
another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of
the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner
did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to
support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.

LEASE

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days
with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been
given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the
time established in articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived. (1566a)

Yuki vs Co 2009

In view of the above disquisition, petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his preemptive rights because he
was not notified of the intended sale, likewise crumbles. Besides, the right of first refusal, also referred to as
the preferential right to buy, is available to lessees only if there is a stipulation thereto in the contract of lease
or where there is a law granting such right to them (i.e., Presidential Decree No. 1517 (1978),[36] which vests
upon urban poor dwellers who merely lease the house where they have been residing for at least ten years,
preferential right to buy the property located within an area proclaimed as an urban land reform zone). Unlike
co-owners and adjacent lot owners, there is no provision in the Civil Code which grants to lessees preemptive
rights. Nonetheless, the parties to a contract of lease may provide in their contract that the lessee has the right
of first refusal.

In this case, there is nothing in the Contract of Lease which grants petitioner preferential right to buy the
subject premises. We are likewise unaware of any applicable law which vests upon him priority right to buy the
commercial building subject matter of this case. In fact, aside from the sweeping statement that his
preferential right to buy was violated, petitioner failed to cite in his Petition,[39] Reply,[40] or Memorandum[41]
any specific provision of a law granting him such right. In other words, petitioner failed to lay the basis for his
claim that he enjoys a preferential right to buy.
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Cheng vs Spouses Donini (2009)

The relationship between petitioner and respondents was explicitly governed by the Civil Code provisions on
lease, which clearly provide for the rule on reimbursement of useful improvements and ornamental expenses
after termination of a lease agreement.

Article 1678 modified the (old) Civil Code provision on reimbursement where the lessee had no right at all to be
reimbursed for the improvements introduced on the leased property, he being entitled merely to the rights of a
usufructuary – the right of removal and set-off but not to reimbursement.[21]

Contrary to respondents’ position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under these
provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents
must be considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is
unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. [22]

Under Article 1678 of the Civil Code, the lessor has the primary right (or the first move) to reimburse the lessee
for 50% of the value of the improvements at the end of the lease. If the lessor refuses to make the
reimbursement, the subsidiary right of the lessee to remove the improvements, even though the principal thing
suffers damage, arises. Consequently, on petitioner rests the primary option to pay for one-half of the value of
the useful improvements. It is only when petitioner as lessor refuses to make the reimbursement that
respondents, as lessees, may remove the improvements. Should petitioner refuse to exercise the option of
paying for one-half of the value of the improvements, he cannot be compelled to do so. It then lies on
respondents to insist on their subsidiary right to remove the improvements even though the principal thing
suffers damage but without causing any more impairment on the property leased than is necessary.

As regards the ornamental expenses, respondents are not entitled to reimbursement. Article 1678 gives
respondents the right to remove the ornaments without damage to the principal thing. But if petitioner
appropriates and retains said ornaments, he shall pay for their value upon the termination of the lease.

Accordingly, the 50% value of the useful improvements to be reimbursed by petitioner, if he chose to do so,
should be based on P513,301.90. Since petitioner did not exercise his option to retain these useful
improvements, then respondents could have removed the same. This was the legal consequence of the
application of Article 1678 under ordinary circumstances.

The reality on the ground ought to be recognized. For one, as disclosed by respondents’ counsel, he no longer
knows the exact whereabouts of his clients, only that they are now in Europe and he has no communication
with them at all. For another, it appears that as soon as respondents vacated the premises, petitioner
immediately reclaimed the property and barred respondents from entering it. Respondents also alleged, and
petitioner did not deny, that the property subject of this case had already been leased to another entity since
1991.[45] This is where considerations of equity should come into play. It is obviously no longer feasible for
respondents to remove the improvements from the property, if they still exist. The only equitable alternative
then, given the circumstances, is to order petitioner to pay respondents one-half of the value of the useful
improvements (50% of P513,301.90) introduced on the property, or P256,650.95. To be off-set against this
amount are respondents’ unpaid P17,000 monthly rentals for the period of December 1990 to April 1991,[46] or
P85,000. Petitioner should, therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is in accord with
the law’s intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now has to pay one-half of the value of the
useful improvements at the end of the lease because the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas the
lessor can enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.

Lopez vs Cosme (2009)

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It is well settled that where a contract of lease is verbal and on a monthly basis, the lease is one with a definite
period which expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period.7 In the recent case of Leo Wee v. De
Castro where the lease contract between the parties did not stipulate a fixed period,8 we ruled:

The rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month.
Thus, respondents have every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each month, the
contract having expired by operation of law. Without a lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to
the subject property and must vacate the same. Respondents, thus, should be allowed to resort to an action for
ejectment before the MTC to recover possession of the subject property from petitioner.

Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, et al.; G.R. No.
179382. January 14, 2013

Torts; proximate cause; vicarious liability is not applicable in the absence of employer-employee or principal-
agent relationship; contracts; requisites of stipulation pour autrui; Lease; act of parking a vehicle in a garage
upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease; obligations of lessor; contracts of adhesion; actual damages must
be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and
without which the result would not have occurred.

Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is
uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard
Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the security
guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter’s negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but
should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, the
Court enunciated thus:

It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the
pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no
more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency.

Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards Peña and
Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter’s complained act. Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that
“[b]y the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” The basis for agency
therefore is representation, which element is absent in the instant case. Records show that BSP merely hired
the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and
premises. Nowhere can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an agent of
BSP. Instead, what the parties intended was a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration,
AIB rendered its security services to BSP.

[I]n order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation
pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor
of a third person; (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting parties clearly
and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person – the favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is
unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor
before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized, by the third party.
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It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. Even
in a majority of American cases, it has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car in
any available space in the lot, locks the car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car,
necessary elements in bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual relationship
between the parties is one of lease.

Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver the thing which is the
object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended; (2) to make on the same during
the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the lease for the entire duration of the contract.” In relation thereto, Article 1664 of the same Code states that
“[t]he lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of
the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder.”

[C]ontracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a party who enters
into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms thereof are accepted without objection, as in
this case, where plaintiffs-appellants have been leasing BSP’s parking space for more or less 20 years, then
the contract serves as the law between them.

It is axiomatic that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty and a party is entitled
only to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that was duly proven. Thus, absent any competent proof of
the amount of damages sustained, the CA properly deleted the said awards.

TORTS

RAMOS VS COL REALTY 2009

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause
of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if
he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error
for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when
the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of
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damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the
petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of
the accident.

PACIS vs MORALES 2010

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled
the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing
and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer,
otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent
any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be
stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive
use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was
clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that
it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun
was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original
composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

-END-

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