NOBLEJAS VS.
TEEHANKEE
G.R. No. L-28790
Facts:
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151,
he isentitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges
as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering
certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The
Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring
himto explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that
of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that
he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he
was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this
case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank
equivalent to a judge).
Ruling: No.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and
privileges equivalent to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be
suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court
with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privilege of a Judge of First
Instance” includes by implication the right to be investigated only by
the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the
legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This
include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant
Solicitors General; (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal
of Manila and (e) SEC Commissioner.
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a
judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and
binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves.
Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean
that they are judicial in character.Still, the resolution of the consultas
are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.
Petition is Dismissed.
PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
LEYTE G.R. NO. 31346 DECEMBER 28, 1929
FACTS:
On November 29, 1921, Gabino Po Ejap was the owner of a
certain parcel of land situated in the Tacloban, Leyte. On the same
date, he sold the land to Po Tecsi for the sum of P8,000 and the latter
gave general power of attorney to the former including the right to sell.
Gabino and Po Tecsi are brothers, while Gabino and Po Sun Tun are
father and son.
On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price in the amount
of P17,000. The mortgage was duly noted in the office of the RD on
August 18th of the same year.
Acting under this power, Gabino sold the land on November 22, 1923,
for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak. On this document there appears on
the upper right-hand margin the following: "Register of Deeds,
Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte."
On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to
Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the RD
on January 22, 1925.
On February 16, 1927, Price with the consent of his wife, sold the land
to the Province of Leyte for P20,570. On March 17, 1927, the OCT
was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the proper transfer
certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. On October
12, 1927, Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun for P8,000.
Presently, the possession of the property has been under the control
of Price and the Provincial Government and has not been under the
material control of Po Sun Tun. The latter filed an action to gain the
possession of the property before the CFI and decided in favor of
Price.
On the appeal, it was found out that the deed in favor of
Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry of
property.
ISSUE:
Whether the deed in favor of Katigbak with the note “ Register
of Deeds, Received December 23, 1923, Province of Leyte” can it be
said to be recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
HELD:
No. the term "To register" it has been said that it means to "enter in a
register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list"
The mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a
document on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not
equivalent to recording or registering the real property. Escriche says
that registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry
made in a book or public registry of deeds.
If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning
to Act No. 2837 amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code,
and recalling that it is therein provided that "No instrument or deed
establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing
rights with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of
Act No. 496, entitled 'The Land Registration' and its amendments,
shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such
instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city
where the real estate lies."
Hence, since the deed made by Gabino in favor of Katigbak was not
only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so
recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price,
who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province
of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal
rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of
indefeasible titles. Further, it could beruled that within the meaning of
section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of
Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property.
Teodoro Almirol v Registry of Deeds
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
FACTS
In June 1961, Petitioner Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio
Abalo a parcel of land situated in Esperanza, Agusan, and covered by
OCT P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo." Sometime in May 1962, Almirol will cause the registration of
the deed of sale and to secure in his name a TCT. Registration was
refused by the Register of Deeds since the property was a conjugal
one and that Agusan cannot dispose such property even if his wife has
already died.
Almirol the filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan to compel the Register of Deeds to register the
deed of sale, to issue the TCT and damages. It is Almirol's assertion
that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts
required of him, and that Almirol has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE
W/N a petition for mandamus is the remedy to compel the respondent
to register the deed of sale in question.
RULING
Yes. It is the ministerial duty of respondent Registry of Deeds to
register the deed of sale in question. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs
properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection
to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-
existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on
registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered.
The registry of deeds is precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151
from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted
with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the
ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt
as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other
instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to
do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
Baranda vs. Gustilo GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no.
6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and
possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found
that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to
be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the
RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued
new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason
of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted
the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting
Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but
the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of
title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting
Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529
states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in writing, stating the
ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other
hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is
in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to
be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does
not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to
the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by
the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”
GALLARDO VS. IAC (G.R. NO. L-67742, OCTOBER 29, 1987)
APRIL 23, 2015
FACTS:
1. This case is about an 81,300 sq. m. lot in Laguna owned by
the late Pedro Villanueva. Such land was claimed to be sold
to Meliton Gallardo and Teresa Villanueva through a private
document, an unnotarized Deed of Sale in Tagalog.
2. Based on that Deed of Sale, the original certificate of title was
cancelled and a new one was issued under the name of
petitioners.
3. The main issue was that the private respondents countered
the Deed of Sale and wanted the titles be declared void ab
initio. The RTC of Laguna ruled in their favor.
4. Appeal to the CA was made (then IAC) which affirmed the
trial court. Hence, present action.
ISSUE: Was there a valid reconstitution of transfer certificate of title?
Was the sale valid?
RULING: No.
1. As a general rule, Art. 1356 of the Civil Code provides that
contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may had been
entered, provided all the essential requisites are present.
2. But there is an exception: requiring a contract to be in some
form when the law so requires for its validity or enforceability.
3. Sec. 127 of Act 496 – the conveyance be executed “before
the judge of a court of record or a clerk of a court of record
or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify
such acknowledgement substantially in form next hereinafter
stated.”
4. Also, the document was signed by somebody else and not
by Pedro Villanueva.
5. The right to recover possession of registered land is
imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence
of ownership where the land has been registered under the
Torrens system because its efficacy and integrity must be
protected.
G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992
SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES
BERMUDEZ, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO GONZALES, respondents.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the then
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which upheld the validity of
the deed of sale of a parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo
Sales in favor of respondent Leonilo Gonzales.
Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861, the property had
an area of 5,733 square meters more or less. 1 On July 4, 1955, Sales
mortgaged said property, together with two other parcels of land, to
Faustina P. Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of P2,240.00 payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On
October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No. 5861 was canceled and in lieu
hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued to Sales but the area
of the property was stated therein as 5,229 square meters more or
less. 3
More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the
consent of his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900)
square meters of the same property in favor of their daughter,
petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. 4 The duly notarized deed of
donation was presented to the Assessor's Office on the day of its
execution. Hence, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was replaced by two tax
declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 5 in the name of Esperanza
Sales Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot donated to her and Tax
Declaration No. 13874 6 in the name of Sales covering the remaining
portion or 4,339 square meters.
As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, sometime in January
1959, the mortgaged property of Sales was set for foreclosure. To
prevent such foreclosure, Sales requested his friend, Ernesto
Gonzales, to pay his total indebtedness of P2,700 to the Agpoon
spouses. 7Ernesto Gonzales acceded to the request and asked Sales
and his wife to sign a document transferring the mortgage to him.
According to the Sales spouses, they were not given a copy of said
document. 8 Around a month later, Sales had the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5861 surveyed by a private surveyor. 9
On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between
Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales was registered with the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan. 10
In October 1968, Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale
appearing to have been signed by him and his wife on January 29,
1959 before ex-officio Notary Public Arturo Malazo in San Manuel,
Tarlac. The document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land
described under Tax Declaration No. 5861 in consideration of the
amount of P4,000 to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.
In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, (SP 42692)
in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, the land in question was
claimed by respondent Leonilo Gonzales. Subsequently, upon
submission of the Deed of Sale between Severo Sales and Leonilo
Gonzales, the questioned land was excluded therefrom. 11 Said parcel
of land was declared by Leonilo Gonzales under Tax Declaration No.
12483. 12
On November 7, 1968, Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal
detainer against Sales before the Municipal Court of
Bugallon. 13 Before the case could be tried, Sales and his daughter,
Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, Branch III a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale
between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud. Consequently,
the municipal court suspended the illegal detainer proceedings before
it pending the outcome of the annulment case.
On October 27, 1969, the Court of First Instance 14 rendered a
decision finding that the allegation of fraud was not supported by
convincing evidence. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant,
and against the plaintiffs by:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;
2. Declaring that the defendant is the lawful owner of the land
described in Exhibits "2" and "2-A" (same as Exh. "H") and is,
therefore, entitled to the possession thereof;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendant the
sum of P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and
4. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The lower court noted that while plaintiffs counsel claimed that Sales
and his wife were illiterates, their signatures on each page of the two-
page deed of sale revealed "striking features" of intelligence. The court
added:
Defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is valid,
it having been properly executed and notarized, and is therefore a
public document, and carries weigh as provided for in Section 31, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. Defendant likewise proved that the money
paid by his father, Ernesto Gonzales was his. Arturo V. Malazo, the
Notary Public ex-officio and Justice of the Peace, before whom the
Deed of Sale was executed, testified personally in Court and
confirmed the genuineness and validity of the Deed of sale, together
with the signatures appearing therein, particularly those of the vendors
Severo Sales and Margarita Ferrer, and the witnesses thereto. The
bare and naked assertions of the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife,
could not offset the presumption of regularity as to the execution of the
Deed of Sale, especially so, that the ratifying officer was, and still is, a
municipal judge. The contention of plaintiff Severo Sales that he was
made to sign the document hurriedly by the deceased Ernesto
Gonzales does not deserve credence, considering that he has affixed
(sic) or signed the said Deed of Sale no less than three (3) times,
together with his wife and the other witnesses. Considering the
interest of the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife in this case, it could
not overthrow the testimony of the Notary Public ex-oficio Arturo V.
Malazo. 15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sales and his
daughter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that
the lower court erred in upholding the validity of the deed of sale and
in not considering the unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor
thereof. On December 19, 1974, the Court of Appeals 16 affirmed the
decision of the lower court but added that the petitioners shall pay,
jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000 as attorney's fees. Hence,
the instant petition.
Petitioners primarily invoke Art. 1332 of the Civil Code which provides
that when one of the parties to a contract is unable to read, "or if the
contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud
is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms
thereof have been fully, explained to the former." Petitioners contend
that respondent Gonzales failed to prove that the contents of the deed
of sale were ever explained to Sales, an illiterate. They also argue that
granting that the deed of sale was valid, the courts below failed to take
into consideration the fact that the deed of donation was executed
ahead of the deed of sale and must not, therefore, be disregarded
considering that with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier
instrument prevails over a later one.
With regard to the issue of whether or not there was compliance with
the provision of Art. 1332 of the Civil Code, before said article may be
invoked, it must be convincingly established that the disadvantaged
party is unable to read or that the contract involved in written in a
language not understood by him. 17 It is the party invoking the benefits
of Art. 1332 or Sales, who has the burden of proving that he really is
unable to read or that English, the language in which the deed of sale
was written, is incomprehensible to him. Only after sufficient proof of
such facts may the burden or proving that the terms of the contract
had been explained to the disadvantaged party be shifted to the party
enforcing the contract, who, in this instance, is Leonilo Gonzales.
The records of this case, however, show that although Sales did not
go to school and knew only how to sign his name, 18 he and his wife
had previously entered into contracts written in English: first, when
Sales mortgaged his property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second,
when he donated a portion of the property involved to his daughter,
petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. 19 The court below also noted
the fact that the signatures of the Sales spouses in the deed of sale
showed the "striking features of the signatures of intelligent"
individuals. Coupled with this is the fact that in court, the Sales
spouses themselves admitted that the signatures on the deed of sale
"looked like" their signatures. 20
But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically
the notarial acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its
executors were known to the notary public to be the persons who
executed the instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary
public) of the contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the
notary public that the instrument was freely and voluntarily
executed. 21 When he testified at the hearing, notary public Arturo
Malazo stated, "I know Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before me
when I notarized that document." Later, he added that "the document
speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were the
persons present" (sic). 22 Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners,
specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in the face of
Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys
greater credence than that of an ordinary witness. 23
The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that
while the property subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan
where the vendors also resided, the document was executed in San
Miguel, Tarlac. What is important under the Notarial Law is that the
notary public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction. 24 A notarial
acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document
concerned. 25 It also vests upon the document the presumption of
regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive
proof. 26 Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.
While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the property
described in Tax Declaration 5861 when in fact this had been
subsequently cancelled already by Tax Declaration 13875 in the name
of Esperanza Sales Bermudez and by Tax Declaration No. 13874 in
Severo Sales' name, one can hardly ascribe bad faith to respondent,
for unlike a title registered under the Torrens System, a tax declaration
does not constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The issue
of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject
of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an
unregistered land. 27
On the issue of whether or not the earlier deed of donation should
"prevail" over the deed of sale or be "recognized", petitioner
invokes Nisce v. Milo 28 and Estate of Mota v. Concepcion 29 which
purportedly ruled that "with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier
instrument, be it a sale or
mortgage, prevails over a later one, and the registration of any one of
them is immaterial." 30
The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has
not been registered neither under Act 496 nor under the Spanish
Mortgage Law. The parties hereto have agreed to register this
document under Act 3344." 31Such agreement had to be expressly
stipulated in the deed of donation 32 because under Act 3344, the
Register of Deeds is not authorized to effect any registration unless
the parties have expressly agreed to register their transaction
thereunder. A perusal of the records shows, however, that the deed of
donation was not registered at all. Besides, at the hearing, petitioners
failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners' counsel
even failed to secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan of its due registration as directed by the trial judge.
Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the
donee thereby effectively transmitting the rights to said property from
Sales to his daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo
Gonzales, a third party to the donation. This is because non-
registration of a deed of donation under Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does
not bind other parties ignorant of a previous transaction,
notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke that
"any registration made under this section shall be understood to be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right" Petitioner
Esperanza Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third
party 33 being the daughter of the vendor himself and the "better right"
possessed by a third party refers to other titles which a party might
have acquired independently of the unregistered deed such as title by
prescription. 34
We take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not
registered, the Deed of Sale was registered as evidenced by the
notation made by Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan 35 and the official receipt issued by the Registry of
Deeds. 36
Finally, we cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or
instruments affecting unregistered lands because the books of
registration provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code as Amended by Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this
day. In fact, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
instruments dealing with unregistered lands can still be registered. 37
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEFINO O. ALORA and
OSCAR O. ALORA, G.R. No. 210341, July 1, 2015
FACTS: On 6 June 2010, the respondents file a verified application for
registration of title before the RTC. Among other pieces of evidence,
the respondents presented the certification of CENRO that the land
applied for registration in an alienable and disposable land. The RTC
granted the application and further ruled that the applicable
jurisprudence is the case of Republic v. Serrano promulgated on 24
February 2010, wherein the SC allowed the approval of a land
registration even without the submission of certification from the
DENR Secretary, and not the case of Rep. v. T.A.N, promulgated on
26 June 2008, which categorically requires all applicants for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. The petioner appealed with the CA, however,
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this instant case.
ISSUE: Whether the certification by the CENRO is sufficient evidence
to show that the subject parcel of land falls within the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain.
HELD:
No.
Admittedly, we declared in Republic v. Vega that trial courts may grant
applications for registration despite the absence of a certification from
the DENR Secretary. It should be emphasized, however, that Republic
v. Vega applies on a pro hac vice basis only. After Republic v. Vega,
we pointed out in Republic v. San Mateo 27 that:
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered
its decision on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict
compliance was laid down in T.A.N Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus,
the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which
was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the
Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N Properties, the Court
allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was
no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in
T.A.N Properties, the trial court and the CA already having decided the
case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N Properties.
In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down
on November 23, 2010, when the rule on strict compliance was
already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the
respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC
evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South
CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.
SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP
G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008
Facts
The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the
petition for declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to
have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes for the land they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al
alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares
of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable).
Issue
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
Ruling
The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al.
Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island
remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801,
must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government
grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land
possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership
or possessory rights.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those
lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
AMUNATEGUI vs DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
I. Parties:
 Petitioners
o HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI G.R. No. L-27873
o ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION
DELFING.R. No. L-30035
 Respondents
o DIRECTOR OF FORESTRYG.R. No. L-27873
o ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES
BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF
JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCEG.R. No. L-30035
II. Prior Proceedings:
 Two petitions for review on certiorari before the
SC questions the decision of the Court of
Appeals which declared the disputed property
as forest land
 two petitions have their genesis in an
application for confirmation of imperfect title
and its registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz.
 RoqueBorre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035,
and MelquiadesBorre, filed the application for
registration.
 the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in
G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and MelquiadesBorre.
They prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No.
885 of PilarCadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in
the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
 Director of Forestry, through the Provincial
Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that
the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public
domain
 EmeterioBereber filed his opposition insofar
as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that
title to said portion be confirmed and registered
in his name
 During trial, applicant-petitioner RoqueBorre
sold whatever rights and interests he may have
on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. Alpasan also
filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled
to have said lot registered in his name.
 After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to
EmeterioBereber and the rest of the land
containing 527,747 square meters was
adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to
Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
MelquiadesBorre.
 Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the
Director of Forestry filed their respective
appeals with the Court of Appeals
 The Court of Appeals dismissed all oppositions
except the Director of Forestry
III. Theories of the Parties
 Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot
be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested
but is a "mangrove swamp."
 Director of Forestry claims that the land was mangrove
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the
public domain.
IV. Objectives
 Petitioners – To confirm and register the land to their name
 Respondents – To oppose such registration because such
land is part of the Public Domain
V. Key Facts
 The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot
No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an
area of 645,703 square meters
 The petitioners argue that no big trees classified in section
1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are
found on the land in question
 The petitioners furthermore contend that Lot 885 even if it is
a mangrove swap is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property has been in actual
possession of private persons for many years and therefore,
said land was already private land better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification
VI. Issue
WON Lot No. 885 is public forest land
VII. Ruling
The petition is without merit.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi
The disputed lot no. 885 is part of public domain, classified as public
forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must
have been a virgin forest as stated by EmeterioBereber’s witness
DeograciasGavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of
the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s
finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning
from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it
was classified as "public forest."
IX. Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No.L-30035 and G. R. No. L-
27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
Montano v. The Insular Government
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration
for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality
of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805
square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value
according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States
currency. This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf
of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObras Pias de la
Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question
belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that
it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern
boundary of the said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its
decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without
costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication
and registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of
Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the
Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo
Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation
pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine
Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not
synonymous items. The first includes not only the second, but also
other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public
use or subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns
real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate
which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds —
first, that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and
second, that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts.
339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public
character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore,
there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not
affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public
lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings
or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public
lands does not extend to tide lands. It provided that the scrip might be
located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said
inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is
inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not susceptible
to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case
inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was
not yet titled
Chavez vs PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002
Facts:Public EstatesAuthority (PEA) is a wholly government-owned
and –controlled corporation which is the primary implementing agency
of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain. By virtue of a Special Patent issued by
President Corazon Aquino, the Register of Deeds of the Paranaque,
in April 1988, issued certificates of title, in the name of PEA, covering
three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paranaque City.
The Freedom Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.
In April 1995, PEAentered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares
ofsubmerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation
Project. The JVA was later amended giving AMARI an option to
reclaim an additional 350 hectares of submerged area. Part of the
consideration for AMARI’s work is the conveyance of 70% of the total
net usable reclaimed area – equivalent to 367.5 hectares, title of which
will be in AMARI’s name.
Issue: Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore
and submerged areas in Manila Bay
Held:No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed
Freedom Islands, though alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease, as provided under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
The still submerged areas (i.e., the more or less additional 250 and
350 hectares of submerged areas) in Manila Bay are inalienable lands
of the public domain; as such, they are beyond the commerce of man,
as provided under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to PEA of the
ownership and administration of the reclaimed areas in Manila Bay,
coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. They also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands
are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.
The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of foreshore and
submerged areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open
to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot
be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them
for some public or quasi-public use.
PEA’s authority to sell:In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be
legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, in view of the
requirement under CA No.141. Without such legislative authority, PEA
could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA’s Charter grants it such
express legislative authority to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or
alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Registration of alienable lands of the public domain:Registration of
land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration. The registration of lands of the
public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert
public lands into private lands. Jurisprudence holding that upon the
grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot
apply to government units and entities like PEA.
Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively
private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be
registered pursuant to existing laws.Several laws authorize lands of
the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act
No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public
lands. For instance,
- Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, private
property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an
airport may be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for
use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the
name of the municipality. All these properties become properties of the
public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in
any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens
System.
- Private lands taken by the Government for public use under
its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public
domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the
Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government
new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands.
BALBIN V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are issued,
a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all
the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof would
contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered.
FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur
register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate
of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears
to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of
deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in
the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate
sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received
their co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s
copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of
deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred
the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the
action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is
proper
HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their
integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If
different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the
whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that
is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina,
“there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the
conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that
2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½
his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he
had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil
status, character of land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the
registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may
protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag. G.R. No. 164687. February 12,
2009
Facts: Madayag filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land situated in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM) filed an opposition to the application
alleging that Madayag’s survey plan encroached from their properties.
Meanwhile, SM filed with the DENR a petition for the cancellation of
Madayag’s survey plan. SM filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
alleging that the RTC should await the DENR resolution of the petition
for the cancellation of the survey plan. The RTC issued an Order
granting the Motion. Madayag filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the RTC Order. CA granted the petition ordering the RTC to
continue proceedings. Thus, SM filed this Petition for Review.
Issue: Whether the RTC should suspend the proceedings in the land
registration case pending the resolution of the petition for the
cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan filed with the DENR.
Ruling: There is no need to suspend the proceedings. When the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It
may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a
petition for registration. The RTC need not wait for the decision of the
DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine
whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already
titled property. Petition is denied. The RTC is directed to continue with
the proceedings.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057 January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which
seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land
in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government
until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a
decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of
Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition
to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the
Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim
of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that
the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants
and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and
exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government through a
statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as
alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is
presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not
ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.
To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction
of Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision
inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which
were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes
the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to
reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having
been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable,
hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the
right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by
Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these
lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo
two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during
the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970.
The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the
control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of
Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law
nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos,
however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice,
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen
de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from
the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land may be owned by private
persons.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots
here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by
petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the
registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to
plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013 Possession, Property Registration Decree,
Regalia Doctrine
NOVEMBER 13, 2018
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the
property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to
the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the
Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
What are the classifications of public lands?
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
RULING:
1.Classifications of land according to ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public
dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that
is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit
of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law
to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used
for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
2.Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession – possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier –
the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land
located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to
obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as
such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information
title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired
a good title from the Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of
land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the
petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in
the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire
tract of land?
HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for
his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the
law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public
land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the
claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if
the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a
forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing
proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for
which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
22.G.R. No. L-27088 July 31, 1975
HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN vs. HEIRS OF LARUAN
Facts:
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals. "... declaring the contract of sale between Lacamen and
Laruan null and void [for lack of approval of the Director of the Bureau
of Non-Christian Tribes] ..."Petitioners-appellants are the surviving
heirs of BatiogLacamen, while respondents-appellants are the heirs of
Laruan.
Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of BatiogLacamen.
Laruan delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen. Thereupon,
Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land without
first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his name.
He introduced various improvements and paid the proper taxes. His
possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse.
Later on, after the death of Laruan, his heirs discovered that Laruan’s
heirs were able to obtain a new owner’s certificate of title. Hence, they
sued Laruan’s heirs for reconveyance. The Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of the heirs of Laruan whose decision was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue:
WON estoppel by laches applies?
Ruling:
Laruan’s sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were
it not for the sole fact that it lacked the approval of the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes considering that there was impressed upon its face
full faith and credit after it was notarized. However, notwithstanding
the invalidity of the sale, the fact that when the Lacamens succeeded
to the estate of their father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that
the lot is their own. Even granting that no prescription lies against their
father’s record title, their inaction for almost 30 years commands the
imposition of laches. Hence, the Lacamens were declared as the
owners of the land.
SPOUSES PANG-ODEN vs. ISABEL LEONEN et. Al
G.R. No. 138939.||
Facts:
• Petitioners and respondents are the owners of two
(2) adjoining parcels of land located at Sudipen, La Union. Petitioners'
land is at the eastern portion while that of the respondents is at the
western side.
• The two properties have a common boundary: a
creek which ran from south to north, such that petitioners' property
was bounded by said creek on the west, while that of respondents was
bounded by the same creek on the east.
• Due to constant heavy rains and flood, water from
the creek overflowed and destroyed the irrigation canal located at the
north of the property in dispute. In order to minimize the damage to
the irrigation canal, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
diverted the course of the creek so rain water will not go directly to the
irrigation canal.
• As a result, the course of the creek which originally
ran from south to north and which used to separate the respective
properties of the parties was instead diverted to run from south to
northwest, passing through the middle portion of the respondents'
property and resulting to the formation of a new creek
• The portion segregated by the new creek,
consisting of 1,336.5 square meters, is the strip of land subject of this
controversy.
• In 1976, Manuel Leonen saw the carabao of
petitioner Alejandro Pang-oden devouring the Leonens' sugar cane
crops planted on the property in question. It was then that Manuel
Leonen discovered that petitioners had encroached on the 1,336.5-
square meter portion of their property and had in fact occupied the
same.
• Despite Repeated demands from respondents,
Alejandro Pang-oden refused to surrender possession of said land. So
the respondents filed a complaint for the Recovery of Possession
Based on Ownership.
 • Petitioners contend that no new creek was created
and that the present creek is the same creek which bounds their
property on the west, thus making them the owners of the property in
question.
• RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Leonens and
ordered the Pang-odens to vacate said lot. Thus this petition.
Issue: Who between the petitioners and the respondents, own the
strip of land subject of the suit.|||
Ruling:
The SC ruled that the owners of the subject strip of Land are the
respondents herein.
The CA and the trial court relied on the testimonies of two (2)
disinterested witnesses: Gregorio Libao, a retired employee of the
NIA, and Anacleto Dicta-an, a resident of Sudipen, La Union. Both
testified as to the existence of an old creek which served as the
common boundary of the respective properties of the parties, and of
the subsequent diversion of the creek to its present position which now
cuts through the middle portion of the respondents' property. The
witnesses' testimonies were amply supported by the report and sketch
plan prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which revealed
the existence of an old creek running from south to north, and the
creation of a new creek from south to northwest.
According to Article 434 of the Civil Code: "In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim."
Hence, in order that an action for the recovery of property may
prosper, it is indispensable that the party who prosecutes it must fully
prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity
of the same.
The evidence presented in this case showed that the property subject
of the dispute rightfully belongs to the respondents, as it was
established that the same is part of the parcel of land declared under
the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen.
Indeed, the verification survey of the contested property conducted by
Juvenal Quitoriano, a geodetic engineer, revealed that it was in the
name of Dionisio Leonen. Thus, petition is denied.
REPUBLIC vs.CA G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, AzucenaTancinco Reyes, Marina
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the
registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property. On April
5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in
representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the
application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal
of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-
131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the Court.On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered
withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect
to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.On June 26, 1976, the
lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding
that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals.On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: DAHIL DITO,
anghatolnainiakyat ay sinasangayunan at
pinagtitibaysakanyangkabuuannangwalangbayad.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under
Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is
that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any
accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result
of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of
Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect that:
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were
already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr.
Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2)
arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that
sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of
Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new
Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were
then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2)
meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence
establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention because
the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.
ISSUE:Whether or not the subject land is registrable as an accretion.
RULE:
We agree with the petitioner.Article 457 of the New Civil Code requires
the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this
particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.The requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers.
There is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and
man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came
into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but
as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching
upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast
imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond
adjoining it. It is under two meters of water.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any
land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are
ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river to which it
belongs.
Leonida Cureg, Romeo Carniyan, et al. v. IAC, Domingo Apostol,
et al.
GR No. 73465 | September 7, 1989 | Medialdea, J. (Gel)
Facts: In 1982 Apostol, et al filed a complaint for quieting of title and
damages with preliminary injunction against the Carniyans with the
RTC of Isabela. Apostol, et al. alleged that they are the legal heirs of
Domingo Geraro who has been in OCEN possession of a parcel of
land referred to as "motherland" since time immemorial or before July
26, 1894. During the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Voluntary Reconveyance, the motherland already showed/manifested
signs of accretion of about 3 has on the north caused by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River. Apostol declared the motherland and
its accretion for tax purposes under a tax declaration. Apostol, et al.
were about to cultivate their “motherland” together with its accretion,
they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans from continuing
to do so.
Carniyans’ answer: the “motherland” is non-existent; that Antonio
Carniyan, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a
piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the
land of Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the “subject
land” is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have
been in possession and cultivation of the “accretion” for many years
now.
RTC: Apostol is the absolute owner
IAC: affirmed RTC.
Issue: WoN can be considered riparian owners who are entitled to the
“subject land” which is an accretion
Held: Yes. OCT is better than tax declarations!
Apostol's claim of ownership is anchored on 4 tax declarations, while
Carniyans relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their
OCT No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968.The declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is
not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. As against tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership
nor proof of the area covered therein, an OCT indicates true and legal
ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Since OCT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by
the Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over their “motherland,” allegedly
existing between petitioners’ land and the Cagayan River, is deemed
barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT.
Thus the alleged “motherland” claimed by private respondents is
nonexistent. The “subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the
northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to NCC 457:
“To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.”
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No.
P-19093 is only 4,584 m2. The accretion attached to said land is
approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners’
land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward
movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens title. (Grande v. CA, 1962). As such, it must also
be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. Petition granted.
IAC reversed.
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITYv. MARIO D.
EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of
land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land
was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son,
Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also
paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land.On April 21, 1987, Pedro
transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance
from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an
access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The
proposed roadwill run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compoundtraversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Respondents immediately opposedand the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when
several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty
(30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.The request
remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of
Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:
No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from
the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-
cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over
the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which remains in effect,in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to
creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain.Even a city or municipality cannot acquire
them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion,the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.
G.R. No. L-12958 / May 30, 1960
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
TOPIC: Class 5 - Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete
Title under the Public Land Act
FACTS:
1. January 25, 1950 - Ignacio filed an application for the
registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio
Gasac, Navotas, Rizal (37,877sqm).
2. Later, Ignacio amended his application by alleging that he
 owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion.
3. The Director of Lands and a certain Velrianoopposed.
4. Director of Lands:
a)theland applied for as a portion of the public domain, for
the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-
interest possessed sufficient title,
b) not acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish
government or by possessory information title under the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
b) thathe had not possessed the same openly, continuously
and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July
26, 1894.
5. Valeriano: holds the land by virtue of a permit granted him
by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and
approved by the President.
6. It is not disputed that the subject land adjoins a parcel owned
by Ignacio which he had acquired from the Government by
virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been
established that the parcel in question was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest.
7. Ignacio: he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with
api-api trees, and that his possession had been continuous,
adverse and public for a period of 20 yrs. until the possession
was distributed by oppositorValeriano.
8. The Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and,
therefore, formed part of the public domain.
9. CFI of Rizal: In favor of the Director of Lands.
10. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON the subject land is owned by Ignacio? NO!
HELD:Ignacio contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of
accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the
Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366,
Old Civil Code). But, it is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion
in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Then, Ignacio contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of
Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by
the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.We find
said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea. In the case
ofKer & Co. vs. Cauden, thatsuch land formed by the action of the
sea is property of the State.
Again! Ignacio argues that granting that the land in question
formed part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea,
the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for
any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and
available for private ownership. But the Court said, until a formal
declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public
use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
Last! Ignacio said that he had acquired the parcel of land
through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over
ten years.BUT the land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. UP
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J
Luciano, Noel Christian O.
SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License
Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates
from the public domain parcels of land and reserved them for use
by UP. The land subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was
covered by said Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted
fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP.
UP sought to collect forestry charges from Hardwood and
demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and
supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the
thing without other limitations than those established by law. In
this case, that exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or
grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to
cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has
the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or
royalties to the new owner, UP
DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights
over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land,
subject only to existing concession. Since there is an express
proviso on existing concessions, this means that the right of
Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or
diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government
is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively
assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P
Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. BIR also lost
authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to
collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this
full transfer.
FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture,
processing, and exportation of plywood. It was granted by the
Government an exclusive license for 25 years expiring on Feb 1985
to cut, collect and remove timber from a timber land in the provinces
of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement,
the President issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this
proclamation, certain parcels of land of the public domain in Quezon
and Laguna were withdrawn from sale or settlement and were
reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment station for
the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990
was enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the
colleges of agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under
RA 3990 the land described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject
to any existing concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:
1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the
License Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within
the land described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to
UP’s demands.
International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory
relief seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and
other forest products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
Hardwood and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that
 portion of its concession covered by a License Agreement,
ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.
UP filed its Answer:
1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that
the petition states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the
forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP
under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:
1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal
the timber cut by International Hardwood within the tract of
land and collect the corresponding charges prescribed by
NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves
purely legal questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal
the timber cut by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.
I. Arguments of the Parties
A. UP asserts that:
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect
collection of forest charges through UP because the
License Agreement does not expressly provide that
they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over
and has ownership over the land in question. Thus,
it acquired full control and benefit of the timber and
other resources in the area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of
land ceded to it by RA 3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central
experiment station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of
Hardwood by UP was intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific
rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect
royalties and charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority
to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise
the operation of the timber concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to
any concession, if any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber
concession under the supervision and control of the
Bureau of Forestry
II. Discussion on the effect of the laws
A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public
domain was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as
experiment station, subject to private rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in
Proc. 791 was ceded fully to UP, subject to any
existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the
Philippines completely removed it from the public
domain and segregated the areas covered by the
timber license from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights
over the area to UP
a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land,
subject only to existing concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing
concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood
as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired,
or diminished; it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its
rights as grantor of the license were effectively
assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a
public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber
cut from the subject area and to collect forestry
charges and other fees thereon because of this
full transfer.
III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the
thing without other limitations than those established by
law. In this case, that exception is made for Hardwood
as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has
been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber
from the area ceded and transferred to UP until February
1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and
obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to the
new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government
but to UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial
court. Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber
cut pursuant to its License Agreement within the area ceded
and transferred to UP pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid
to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within
the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
REPUBLIC v CA & CHAVEZ
G.R. No. L-62680 November 9, 1988
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The case deals with the confirmation of an imperfect title over a tract
of land situated in Guimaras. In 1976, private respondent Chavez filed
an application for its registration which is solely opposed by the DoL.
The application was granted. Petitioner appealed to the CA which
affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that (1) the subject land was not sufficiently Identified
with indubitable evidence since what was submitted was not the
tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan; and
(2) the nature and length of possession required by law had not been
adequately established.
ISSUE:
1. WON there is ample evidence to establish the Identity of the subject
property.
2. WON the length of possession required is adequately established.
HELD:
1. YES. The Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the
blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go
with it. It contained all the details and information necessary for a
proper and definite Identification of the land sought to be registered,
thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is
required. –
 where the subject land is located,
 its area of in square meters,
 the land as plotted,
 its technical descriptions and
 its natural boundaries
2. NO. There is not enough evidence except his own unsupported
declarations. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. The
private respondent showed that he had been paying taxes on the land
only from 1972 and up to 1977.
Even assuming that he had really planted those trees, such an act will
hardly suffice to prove possession as this would constitute what this
Court has called "a mere casual cultivationwhich does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the state.
The Court finds that although the subject property was sufficiently
Identified with the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the applicant has
failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous, and open
possession necessary to support his claim of ownership. For this
reason, the registration sought should have been, as it is now, denied.
REPUBLIC v CA & CENIZA
G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for registration of
their respective titles over the property they inherited from
ApolinarCeniza (the declared owner in 1948), with the RTC of
Mandaue City. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the application. RTC
granted the application. This was affirmed by the CA by ruling that
mere possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title.
ISSUE:
WON there is a need for private respondents to establish that the land
subject of their application was alienable and disposable despite
proofs showing their possession thereof for more than 30 years; and
HELD:
YES. Before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of the
public domain, the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. Only when these conditions are met
may the possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action;investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by CENRO, Cebu City stating that the lots
involved were found to be within the alienable and disposable land
classification. This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of
the land subject of private respondents’ application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also
was that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry
to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property
still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the
lots in question are forestal land.
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession
of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of
private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. SitioSto. Nino Residents
Association, Inc.
GR No. 158455. June 28, 2005
FACTS:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari dismissing civil action
on the ground of litispendenia and forum shopping.
 Petitioner is the register owner of 2 parcels of land in
Muntinlupa, Rizal. In 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint for
quieting of title against respondents and Land Management
Bureau, alleging among others, respondents unlawfully
entered and occupied the lots in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Among
said unauthorized persons are members and officers of
respondents.
o From all indications, LMB is set to recommend to
the Philippine Government, [through] the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), the “nullification” of
TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919 and/or the reversion
thereof to the Philippine Government, despite the
fact that the latter, sometime in 1927 or thereabout,
sold and/or disposed of subject lots, then covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684,
pursuant to Act No. 1120 and other pertinent laws.
Petitioner is the third or fourth transferee and buyer
in good faith of the lots in question.
 Petitioner prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued, ordering the LMB to cease and desist from
proceeding with the hearings in LMB Case No. 7-98, a case
pending before it where petitioner’s titles to the subject lots
were being questioned by the respondents SSNRAI and
NildaDevilleres.
 Respondents filed an MTD contending forum shopping and
litispendentia. Such contention was opposed by petitioner.
 The petitioner pointed out that in LMB Case No. 7-98, the
private respondents (as the petitioners therein) sought the
declaration of the nullity of the said titles issued in its favor,
on their claim that their issuance was “highly irregular and
erroneous,” and that the subject properties were not
disposed of in accordance with Act No. 1120, otherwise
known as the Friar Lands Act. On the other hand, in SP Civil
Action No. 02-237, the petitioner’s right of action was based
on the private respondents’ act of disturbing and casting
clouds over TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919, considering that
such titles have long become indefeasible and conclusive.
 Trial Court: dismissed on the grounds of
litispendentia and forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was forum shopping and whether the court has
jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
Yes, there was forum shopping and Lands Management Bureau has
the proper jurisdiction in this case. The Supreme Court held that the
courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
And in such cases, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence, in this case, the
LMB.
REPUBLIC v NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes AbieraNillas (Nillas) filed a
Petition for Revival of Judgment with RTC of Dumaguete City. It was
alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then CFI of Negros Oriental,
acting as a cadastral court, rendered a Decisionadjudicating lots in
favor of, among others, Eugenia and EngraciaCalingacion. Nillas
further alleged that her parents acquired in its entirety the lot of the
Calingacions. In turn, Nillas, acquired this lot from her parents. Despite
these multiple transfers, no decree of registration has ever been
issued over the lot despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision.
Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance
of the corresponding decree of registration. RTC rendered a decision
ordering the revival of the 1941 decision as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the
1941 Decision.
OSG appealed to CA invoking that the principles of prescription and
laches apply to land registration cases citing Art 1144 of NCC and
Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The OSG
also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals
and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro. CA denied the appeal. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON Nillasright of action to revive judgment had already prescribed.
HELD:
NO. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations
applies to a decision in a land registration case”. Under Sec. 6, Rule
39 of the RoC, judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion,
and after five years but within 10 years, by an action. This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because
a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be
registered.
Upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further
step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists
alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of,
and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
Sec 39 of PD 1529 lays down the procedure that interposes between
the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title.
No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the
title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land
court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment
and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All
these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or
review.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration
Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is
complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another
perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DOCTRINES:
General Rule:
Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1961
neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a
land registration case
Exception:
1. Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 2001
Prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made
in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately
peripheral to that case.
Note, although Sta Ana case is 1961, this was not mentioned in
Shipside case.
2. Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro
The property involved therein was the subject of two separate
applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959,
the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first
able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as
1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final
judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had
already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus
obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The
issues of prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed
their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of
the competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year
prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court
did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing
the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus
denied the petition on that score.
There could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the
registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the
petitioners in Heirs of Lopez
KATIHAN v. JUDGE MACEREN
Facts:
1. This case involves an administrative complaint filed by
KATIHAN against Judge Maceren of MeTC of Manila and
Sheriff Ortega.
2. The complaint alleged that due to the writ of demolition
issued by J. Maceren, KATIHAN was ejected from the
property without due process of law.
a. They declare that they should not be affected by the
decision rendered by J. Maceren in the ejectment
and damages case filed by Limsui against the
unlawful settlers of his property because there
group were not impleaded as respondents thereto.
b. As for Sheriff Ortega, they averred that his issuance
of a notice of demolition was not proper as it was
made without order or authority from the MeTC.
3. The Court exonerated Judge Maceren from the
administrative liability on the ground that there was no
concrete evidence that he allowed or participated in the
Sherrif’s act but it ruled that Sheriff Ortega is administratively
liable.
4. In a motion for reconsideration filed by Sheriff Ortega, he
insisted that he committed no wrong in issuing the notice of
demolition without the order from the MeTC as it was the
party themselves who agreed to the demolition under the
compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
WON the order of demolition issued by the Sheriff was proper.
Ruling:
1. NO. The order of demolition was not proper as an outright
removal by the sheriff of the structures erected in the property
subject of execution is not allowed under Sec. 10 (c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
2. According to this provision, when the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor, or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvement except upon
special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment oblige after due hearing and after the former has
failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
the court.
3. Therefore, aside from the writ of execution implementing the
court’s decision, another writ or order must also be acquired
from the court before the removal of the improvements on the
property subject of execution can be made.
ISSUE # 2: WON the Sherrif properly furnished the court with
the required periodic reports.
Ruling: No.
1. The Rules of Court mandates the officer that if the judgment
cannot be satisfied within 30 days after his receipt of the writ
of execution, he shall report to the court and state the reason
therefor.
2. In this case, the records reveal that on Nov. 30, 2005, the
MeTC issued the writ of execution and on the same date,
Sheriff Ortega issued the notice to vacate.
3. Therefore, it was incumbent upon him to submit a report to
the MeTC on Dec. 30, 2005, and every 30 days thereafter
until the judgment is satisfied in full or until its effectivity
expires.
#1
G.R. No. 123346 March 31, 2009
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134385 March 31, 2009
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS
COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R.
DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO,
ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN,
LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON;
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents.
FACTS:
TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in
the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the "Memorandum of
the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate"
was the sale executed in favor ofFrancisco Gonzales dated 3 March
1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of
Francisco Gonzales.On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled
by TCT No. 35486.
The propertywas later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with
subdivision plan Psd-21154. Partitioning the lots among the co-
owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof
six (6) certificates of titles were individually issued to Francisco
Gonzales’s six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while
TCT No. 1374 was issued in favor of all the children.
However, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were
expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were eventually
subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were
obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot
covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC
acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-
B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT
No. 232568 was issuedon 9 May 1991.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al.
ISSUE: Whether the fact of expropriation of the property is significant
in determining the proper owners of the estate.
HELD: YES.
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles
acquired by the State by way of expropriation are deemed
cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these
titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals, and
then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v.
NHA: "In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the
property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public
under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide
a judicial process for securing better title against all the world
than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance." This doctrine
was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme
Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S., which in turn cited
the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack that
"[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against
all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged
defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However,
TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was
expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended
that particular title would have been purged when the property
covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through
eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much:
As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should be
upheld because they were derived from the Republic’s valid
certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’ titles can be
traced back to the Government’s titles as a result of the expropriation
in 1947.

Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of

the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition
resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain
that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the
alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the
exercise of the State of its inherent power did not affect or render
invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when
land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former
owner.