Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C.

Varzi

1 — INTRODUCTION

1. What is modal logic?

◆ Basic ideas:
— Modal logic is an extension of (not an alternative to) ordinary logic.

— It is concerned with logical facts (e.g., inferences) that involve modalities, i.e., qualifications of
propositions.

— Example: the following statement is true.

Neil is Canadian.
But we may want to qualify this truth: the statement is true, but could have been false (things
could have been otherwise).

— On the other hand, the following statement is not just true: it is necessarily true (could not have
been false)
Neil is Neil.
You might want to say that this is just a logical fact: self-identities are logically true (true under
every interpretation of the non-logical constants). Then consider
Neil is a person.
Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Nothing is in two places at the same time.
These are not true in every logically possible model (i.e., under every way of interpreting our
language). Yet, arguably, they are true in every possible world. (E.g., since ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ pick out one and the same object, that object could not be different from itself.)

⇒ Modal logic should not be confused with model theory.

◆ Of course, there is plenty of room for controversy:

• could I have been fatter?
• could I have been a woman?
• could I have been that chair?
• could I have been a mosquito?
• could I have been the French Revolution?
• could I have been the number 7?

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◆ The basic picture (mostly from ARISTOTLE, De Interpretatione, chapters 12-13)

true false
necessary
po impossible
ss
ib
e l
contingent

◆ Modal logic is interested in the interrelationships between these modalities.

— Not interested in their nature
• logical
• metaphysical
• physical
• sociological
etc.
— Not an explanation (on pain of circularity), but a help in understanding

2. Two questions

◆ Is this the business of logic?

— One could argue it is just a matter of semantics (explain the meaning of ‘necessary’ etc.)
But the same could be said of ordinary logic (explain the meaning of ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘all’, etc.)
— One could argue it is a matter of theorizing (e.g., axiomatic characterization of necessity, etc., or
axiomatic characterization of identity, parthood, and other notions)

(I would be happy to change the lable to Theory of modality, or something like that.)

◆ Couldn’t we deal with modalities without invoking anything else than standard logic?
Four possible strategies:

1) Modalities as truth-functional connectives

• However, there are only four possible truth functions
p ƒ1 ƒ2 ƒ3 ƒ4
T T F T F
F F T T F

and none is adequate to model e.g. necessity:

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 ƒ1 yields p⇔p (determinism)
ƒ2 yields p ⇔ ¬p
ƒ3 violates p⇒p and makes a trivial operator anyhow
ƒ4 validates p ⇒ ¬p " "
In general, from the T of p we don’t know anything about the T of p
In general, from the F of p we don’t know anything about the F of p

• Besides, there are many other cases of non-truth-functional connectives

It is well-known that p
According to Mary, p
It is surprisingly the case that p
p because q
p, and as a consequence q (non according to Davidson)

2) Move everything to the metalanguage

• Modalities as metalogical properties of sentences (necessity = validity, modulo a certain
selection of admissible models)
• But then we may want to formalize the metalanguage...

3) Modalities as metalinguistic predicates of sentences (cp. truth-predicate) (Carnap 1937)

It is necessary that ... ⇔ ‘....’ is necessarily true

• Quine 1963: the lowest “grade of modal involvement”:

Necessity resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about [p. 176]

• But Montague 1963 shows this is no good—cp. Tarski’s problems with truth predicate.
• Only recently this strategy has been reconsidered: see Schwartz 1992.

4) Translation using quantifiers

Necessarily p ⇔ ∀w p(w)
Possibly p ⇔ ∃w p(w)
But this involves a number of complications
• quantify over possible world
• propositions become predicates of worlds
• problems when one moves on to quantified modal logic (ariety)
(Come back to this later.)

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3. Need for a logic (Theory) of modality

◆ So: think of modal logic as involving non-truth-functional connectives.

— Notation: , or N, M.

◆ What is the logic of this extended language?

— We need not only laws such as p→ q
p
________
q

— but also specific principles such as (p → q)

p
________
q

◆ The choice of valid principles may be a controversial matter. It depends

— on one’s views on what is necessary etc.
— on the specific interpretation of and .

◆ Necessity and possibility are alethic modalities (modifications of truth = aletheia), but there are also
— Epistemic, deontic, temporal, spatial modalities.
— Indeterminacy
— Provability
• A ⇔ A is provable (relative to some one formal system, e.g., Peano Arithmetic)
• Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem would read: ¬ ⊥ → ¬ ¬ ⊥

◆ And there are other uses, too. For example:

— Intuitionism (¬¬A |–/ A)
MacKinsey-Tarski’s map I(p) ⇒ p
I(¬Α) ⇒ ¬I(A) (negation as impossibility)
I(Α →B) ⇒ (I(A) →I(B))
[Note: This means that intuitionism—a restriction of classical logic—may be interpreted as an
extension of it.]

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Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

2 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (1)

1. Syntactic Preliminaries: the Modal Language

◆ Vocabulary:

— atomic formulas: P 0, P 1, P 2, . . .
— connectives: ⊥, T, ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, , .
— metavariables: A, B, C, .....

◆ Grammar:
— Straightforward.
— Only be careful to distinguish necessity of the consequence vs necessity of the consequent.

1) (A→Β)
2) A→ Β

Obviously different:

(P→P) (P→P is a tautology)

P→ P
Often ambiguous in English
If I have no money, then I can't buy a new computer this probably corresponds to 1)
If I am a man, then I can't be a number this probably corresponds to 2)

2. Semantics

◆ Extensional models are (intuitively) possible worlds

— Each model α is a way of partitioning the atomic sentences into true and false:
α(P i)∈{T,F} for all i
or simply
α ⊆ {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , . . .}

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 — This induces an corresponding assignment of values to all sentences—a valuation:
Vα (A) → {T,F} for all sentences A
or equivalently
=α A iff A is true (holds, etc.) relative to α.

— This is done recursively:

=α P i iff P i ∈α
=α ¬A iff not =α Α
=α A ∧ B iff =α A and =α B
M M M

◆ How do we specify truth conditions for modal formulas (given that , are not truth-functional)?
1) Carnap in Meaning and Necessity:
=α A iff =β Α for every model β
=α A iff =β Α for some model β

— This is too strict: it equates worlds with models, hence necessity and logical validity.

2) Leibniz (on modern readings):

— A model is not just a possible world, but a collection of possible worlds.
— Hence a model is a collection of extensional models.
= {α, β, γ, ....}
— Then we could say e.g.
=α P i iff P i ∈α
=α ¬A iff not =α Α
=α A ∧ B iff =α A and =α B .
=α A iff =β A for every β∈
=α A iff =β A for some β∈

— This account still requires that we specify what possible worlds are (functions or sets of
sentences, etc.), but otherwise OK. It can be generalized as follows:

◆ First idea (Leibniz’s simplified models)

— Instead of a set of functions, a model becomes a set with a function
• take worlds as unanalyzed entities (points)
• ask the model to associate each sentence with the worlds in which it is true

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 — Formally: = 〈W,P〉, where
• W ≠ Ø (the possible worlds)
• P a sequence P0 , P1 , P2 , . . . ⊆ W associating with each i a set of worlds (those in
which P i holds)
• Intuitively: Pi = the proposition expressed by P i

— Truth conditions:
=α P i iff α∈Pi
M M M
=α A iff =β A for every β∈W
=α A iff =β A for some β∈W

— Notes:
• Pi may be empty
• i Pi may not add up to W

◆ Second idea (Kripke’s standard models): Generalize Leibnizian models by relativizing possibilities:
— Model = 〈W, R, P〉, where
• W and P as before
• R⊆W ×W
[Intuitively: R is a relation of “accessibility”: αRβ means that β is possible relative to α]
— Truth conditions:
=α P i iff α∈Pi
M M M
=α A iff =β A for all β∈W such that αRβ
=α A iff =β A for some β∈W such that αRβ

— NB: If R is an equivalence relation, this is equivalent to the first account.

◆ Third idea (Montague’s minimal models): Necessity and possibility should not be understood in
terms of truth in every/some world, but treated as primitive:
— Model = 〈W, N, P〉, where
• W and P as before
• N : W → ℘℘W associates each world with the propositions that are necessary at that world
℘W = sets of worlds = propositions
℘℘W= set of propositions
[Intuitively: Nα = the propositions that are necessary at α]

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 — Truth conditions:
=α P i iff α∈Pi
M M M
=α A iff {β∈W: =β A} ∈ Nα = iff A expresses a necessary proposition at α
=α A iff {β∈W: ≠β A} ∉ Nα = iff A does not express an impossible proposition at α

— Notation: || A || for {β∈W: =β A} (the proposition expressed by A in ) (p. 38)

3. Examples

◆ Definitions

— A is valid/true in =A iff =α A for every α∈W

— A is valid in C =C A iff = A for every ∈C
— A is valid =A iff =C A for very C

◆ Some principles that are valid in the semantics based on Leibnizian models:

D A→ A
T A→A
B A→ A
4 A→ A
5 A→ A
G A→ A

K (A → B) → ( A → B)
Df A ↔ ¬ ¬A
Df A ↔ ¬ ¬A

RN =C A
____
=C A
RE =C A ↔ B
__________
=C A ↔ B
RK =C (A1 ∧ ... ∧ An ) → A
_____________________
=C ( A1 ∧ ... ∧ An ) → A

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◆ Examples of invalid principles:

A→ A W={α,β}, Pn = {α} for all n P0 ¬P 0

(note difference from RN) Then =α A but ≠β A, hence ≠α A α β

(A ∨ B) → ( Α ∨ B) W={α,β}, P0 = {α} Pn = {β} for all n>0. P 0 ,¬P 1 ¬P 0 ,P 1

Also, consider B=¬Α α β

( Α ∧ B) → (A ∧ B) same countermodel

(A → B) → ( Α → B) W={α,β}, P0 = {α} Pn = ∅ for all n>0. P 0 ,¬P 1 ¬P 0 ,¬P 1

α β

( Α→ B) → (A → B) same countermodel

◆ Do some exercises (1.1 to 1.9)

4. Exercise 1.11: correspondence between and ∀

◆ Define predicate language with one variable, x

MAP: τ(P n ) = P n (x)
τ(T) = T
τ(⊥) = ⊥
τ(¬A) = ¬τ(A)
τ(A∗B) = τ(A)∗τ(B)
τ( A) = ∀xτ(A)
τ( A) = ∃xτ(A)

Example1 τ( P n → P n ) = τ( P n ) → τ(P n )
= ∀xτ(P n ) → τ(P n )
= ∀xP n (x) → P n (x)
Example2 τ( (P 1 → P 2 ) → ( P 1 → P 2 )) = τ( (P 1 → P 2 )) → τ( P 1 → P 2 )
= τ( (P 1 → P 2 )) → τ( P 1 ) → τ( P 2 )
= ∀xτ(P 1 → P 2 ) → ∀xτ(P 1 ) → ∀xτ(P 2 )
= ∀x(τ(P 1 ) → τ(P 2 )) → ∀xτ(P 1 ) → ∀xτ(P 2 )
= ∀x(P 1 (x) → P 2 (x)) → (∀xP 1 (x) → ∀xP 2 (x))

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◆ Remark: τ is a specification of the truth conditions

◆ THEOREM: = A iff τ(A) is valid in quantification theory

Proof. ⇐ If not = A, then there is a model =〈W,P〉 and a world α∈W such that not ≠α A
But =〈W,P〉 is also a model for quantificational logic.
By induction, show that for any α∈W, ≠α A iff ≠ τ(A) [sα], where sα (x) = α for all α∈W
– A atomic. Then τ(A) = P n (x) for some n. Then: ≠α A ⇔ ≠α P n
⇔ α∉Pn
⇔ sα(x)∉Pn
⇔ ≠ P n (x) [sα]
⇔ ≠ τ(P n ) [sα]
– A= B. Then τ(A) = ∀xτ(B). Then: ≠α A ⇔ ≠α B
⇔ ≠β B for some β∈W
⇔ ≠ τ(B) [sβ] (by IH)
⇔ ≠ τ(B) [sα(x|β)].
⇔ ≠ ∀ατ(B) [sα]
⇔ ≠ τ(A) [sα]
⇒ Similar Proof

6
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

3 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (2)

1. Standard versus Minimal models

◆ The general notion of a model (see § 2.2): = 〈W, ..., P〉, where
• W ≠ Ø (the possible worlds)
• P a sequence P0 , P1 , P2 , . . . ⊆ W associating each i with a set of worlds (those in which P i holds)

◆ Recall from lecture 2: Two main ways of filling in the dots

• Standard models: = 〈W, R, P〉, where R ⊆ W × W
αRβ = β is possible relative to α =α
=α
• Minimal models: = 〈W, N, P〉, where N : W → ℘℘W
Nα = propositions necessary at α =α
=α
A iff =β A for every β∈W s.t. αRβ
A iff =β A for some β∈W s.t. αRβ
A iff {β∈W: =β A}∈Nα i.e., iff ||A || ∈Nα
A iff {β∈W: ≠β A}∉Nα i.e., iff ||¬A || ∉Nα

◆ Comparisons (Theorem 3.4 + 3.5 and Exercise 7.22 + Theorem 7.11)

schema standard minimal

K (A → B) → ( A → B) valid valid iff

||B || ∈Nα whenever ||A → B|| , ||A|| ∈Nα

Df A ↔ ¬ ¬Α valid valid

Df A ↔ ¬ ¬Α valid valid

RN =C A valid valid iff W ∈Nα

_____
(for all α in all in C )
=C A

RE =C A ↔ B valid valid
__________
=C A ↔ B

RK =C (A1 ∧ ... ∧ An ) → A valid valid iff

_____________________
||A || ∈Nα whenever ||A1|| , ..., ||An|| ∈ Nα
=C ( A1 ∧ ... ∧ An ) → A

1
schema standard minimal

T A→A valid iff reflexive: αRα valid iff α ∈ ||A ||

whenever ||A|| ∈ Nα
¬P
P
■P

α β

D A→ A valid iff serial: ∀α∃β(αRβ) valid iff –||A|| ∉ Nα

¬P
whenever ||A|| ∈ Nα
■P
¬◆ P

B A→ A valid iff symmetric: αRβ ⇒ βRα (b) p. 224 Chellas

P ¬P
¬■ ◆ P ¬◆ P

α β

4 A→ A valid iff transitive: αRβ & βRγ ⇒ αRγ (iv) p. 224

P
P
■P ¬P
¬■ P
¬ ■■ P

α β γ

5 A→ A valid iff euclidean: αRβ & αRγ ⇒ βRγ (v) p. 224

P
¬◆ P

P
◆P
β
¬■ ◆ P

α P
¬◆ P

G A→ A valid iff incestual: αRβ & αRγ ⇒ ∃δ(βRδ & γRδ) (g) p. 225

■P

◆ ■ P β P
¬■ ◆ P

α ¬◆ P δ

The notation is important: the relevant conditions on R can be expressed by means of first-order
formulas, so we are essentially looking for ordinary first order models satisfying these formulas.

2
◆ Example of proof for the “if” part (from Theorem 3.5):
Scheme 5 is valid in the class of all euclidean standard models:
1. Assume =α A.
2. Then =β A for some β∈W such that αRβ.
3. Suppose αRγ.
4. Then, we have αRγ & αRβ and therefore, by euclideanness, γRβ (of course, we also have αRβ
& αRγ and therefore βRγ, but this is irrelevant).
5. So, for any γ such that αRγ there exists β such that γRβ and =β A.
6. So, for any γ such that αRγ, =γ A.
7. Thus =α A.
8. By 1–7, if =α A then =α A.
9. Hence =α A→ A.

2. General comparisons

◆ DEFINITION (p. 36)

Two structures = 〈W, ..., P〉 and ' = 〈W', ..., P'〉 are pointwise equivalent iff there is a one-one
map ƒ:W → W' such that, for every sentence A and every α ∈ W
'
=α A iff =ƒ(α) A

◆ FACT 1 (Problem 3.12 p. 73):

Every simplified model = 〈W, P〉 is pointwise equivalent to a standard model, namely to the
model ' = 〈W, R, P〉 where R =W × W.
Proof: A straightforward inductive argument, taking ƒ to be the identity function, i.e., setting ƒ(α) =
α for all α∈W:
1. Base: =α Ïi iff α∈Pi
'
iff =α Ïi
2. Truth-functional connectives: obvious
3. Modal connectives:
=α A iff =β A for all β∈W
'
iff =β A for all β∈W (by Inductive Hypotesis)
'
iff =β A for all β∈W such that αRβ
'
iff =α A

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◆ FACT 2 (using parts of Theorem 7.9 p. 221)
Every standard model s
= 〈W s, R, Ps〉 is pointwise equivalent to a minimal model
m
= 〈W , N, P 〉, where X∈Nα iff X contains all R-accessible worlds, i.e., iff {β∈W: αRβ} ⊆ X.
m m

(Intuitively: the propositions necessary at α are those that include the set of all worlds accessible
from α)
Proof: Again, we set ƒ(α) = α and prove by induction that, for every sentence A:
=α A iff =α A
s m
for every α∈W:
Again, the only interesting case is modal sentences:
=α =β A for all β∈W s.t. αRβ
s s
A iff
{β∈W: αRβ} ⊆ {β∈W: =β A}
s
iff
{β∈W: αRβ} ⊆ {β∈W: =β A}
m
iff by I.H.
{β∈W: =β A} ∈ Nα
m
m
iff by def. of
=α A
m
iff by recursive clause for

3. Comments

◆ Morals:
— The simplified models may be viewed as a special case of standard models
— Standard models may be viewed as a special case of minimal models

◆ Note: Fact 2 can be improved by saying under what conditions a minimal model is equivalent to a
standard model (Theorem 7.9).

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Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

4 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (3)

1. Generalizations of the G schema

◆ Recall the schema

G A→ A ■P

◆■P β
P
R must be incestual (offprints of a common parent ¬ ■◆P

have an offprint in common) or convergent: α δ

¬ ◆P

αRβ & αRγ ⇒ ∃δ(βRδ & γRδ) ψ

◆ DEFINITION (p. 29).

Let φ be any modality (¬, , or ). Then we define

if n=0 φn A = A
if n = k+1 φn A = φφk A

◆ FACT 1 (see p. 86).

Consider the schema
Gk , l , m , n = k l
A→ m n
A
Then:
G = A→ A is just G1 , 1 , 1 , 1
D = A→ A is just G0 , 1 , 0 , 1
T = A→A is just G0 , 1 , 0 , 0
B = A→ A is just G0 , 0 , 1 , 1
4 = A→ A is just G0 , 1 , 2 , 0
5 = A→ A is just G1 , 0 , 1 , 1

◆ DEFINITION 3.6 (p. 86)

if n=0 αRn β ⇔ α=β
if n = k+1 αRn β ⇔ αRγ for some γ∈W such that γRk β

1
◆ DEFINITION (p. 88)

A standard model = 〈W, R, P〉, is k,l,m,n-incestual iff αRk β & αRm γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRl δ & γRn δ)

R
k β R
l

α δ

m n
R R

γ
So in particular:

is incestual iff is 1111-incestual

is serial iff is 0101-incestual
is reflexive iff is 0100-incestual
is symmetric iff is 0011-incestual
is transitive iff is 0120-incestual
is euclidean iff is 1011-incestual

(The proofs of these equivalences se are just derivations in first order logic with identity.)

◆ EXAMPLE: is serial iff is 0101-incestual

Proof: ∀α∀β∀γ[α Rk β & αRm γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRlδ & γ Rn δ)]

is 0101-incestual ⇒ ∀α∀β∀γ[αR0 β & αR0 γ ⇒ ∃δ(βR1 δ & γR1 δ)] def.
⇒ ∀α∀β∀γ[α=β & α=γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRδ & γRδ)] def.
⇒ α=α & α=α ⇒ ∃δ(αRδ & αRδ) ∀ elim
⇒ α=α ⇒ ∃δ(αRδ) & idem
⇒ ∃δ(αRδ) since α=α
⇒ ∀α∃δ(αRδ) ∀ intro
⇒ is serial def.

is serial ⇒ ∀α∃δ(αRδ) def.

⇒ ∃δ(αRδ) ∀ elim
⇒ ∃δ(αRδ & αRδ) & idem
⇒ α=β & α=γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRδ & γRδ) = laws
⇒ ∀α∀β∀γ[α=β & α=γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRδ & γRδ)] ∀ intro
⇒ ∀α∀β∀γ[αR0 β & αR0 γ ⇒ ∃δ(βR1 δ & γR1 δ)] def.
⇒ is 0101-incestual def.

2
◆ FACT (Theorem 3.8):
The schema Gk , l , m , n is valid in the class of all k,l,m,n-incestual standard models

◆ COROLLARY (cp. Theorem 3.5)

The schema G is valid in the class of all incestual standard models
The schema D is valid in the class of all serial standard models
The schema T is valid in the class of all reflexive standard models
The schema B is valid in the class of all symmetric standard models
The schema 4 is valid in the class of all transitive standard models
The schema 5 is valid in the class of all euclidean standard models

2. Further generalizations

◆ Gk , l , m , n is not the most general schema.

For instance, the following are not instances of Gk , l , m , n :

Gc A→ A
Gr ( A → A) → A

◆ Indeed there are more general schemes with interesting properties—e.g.

Sahl n
(A → B) (with resrtictions on the form of A and B)

But Gr and Gc are still not covered by such a schema.

3. Characterizability (for Kripkean modal logics)

◆ QUESTION 1:
Does every modal formula correspond to some first-order definable R?
i.e., given a formula A, is there always a first-order sentence φ so that, for every = 〈W, R, P〉

= A (modally) iff = φ (quantificationally) ?

ANSWER IS NO

— Gk , l , m , n YES ∀α∀β∀γ[αRk β & αRm γ ⇒ ∃δ(βRl δ & γRn δ)]

— Sahl YES complicated condition
— Gr NO there is a condition on R (see test), but not first-order definable
— Gc NO not first-order definable (though Gc ∧ 4 is)

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◆ QUESTION 2:
What about the other way around? Does every R correspond to a modal formula?

ANSWER IS NO
— E.g. Reflexivity ∀α(αRα) ⇒ A→A
Irreflexivity ∀α(¬αRα) ⇒ no characteristic wff
i.e., if a wff is true in every irreflexive model, then it
is true in every model
— Ditto for
Asymmetry ∀α(αRβ→ ¬βRα)
Antisymmetry ∀α(αRβ & βRα → α=β)
Intransitivity ∀α(αRβ & βRγ → ¬αRγ)

⇒ Exercises 3.56–57

◆ More material on this in Hughes–Cresswell (Chapter 10)

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Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

5 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (4)

1. Systems of Modal Logic—basic definitions (§ 2.4)

◆ DEFINITION 2.11
A system of modal logic is any set of sentences (=theory) closed under the rule:

A 1 , …, An
__________
RPL (n ≥ 0) where A is a tautological consequence of A1 … An
A

Σ is closed under RPL means:

if A1 … An ∈Σ, then A∈Σ

◆ Equivalently: A system of modal logic is any set of sentences Σ closed under the rules:
__________
PL where A is a tautology
A

A, A→ B
__________
MP
B
◆ NOTE
— The set of all tautologies (PC) is the smallest system of modal logic
• every system closed under RPL contains all tautologies (by n=0)
— The set of all sentences valid in a class of models {Α: =
| C A}
M
— The set of all sentences valid in a model {Α: = | A}
— The set of all sentences true at a world {Α: =| Mα A}
— The set of all sentences is the largest system of modal logic

◆ DEFINITION 2.12
A theorem of a system modal logic Σ is any member of Σ:

Σ A ⇔ Α∈Σ

◆ DEFINITION 2.14
A is deducible from Γ in system Σ (Γ Σ A) iff there are A1 , …, An ∈Γ so that Σ (A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A

1
 This is equivalent to the usual definition: Γ Σ A iff there is finite sequence A1 , …, An such that
• A1 ∈ Σ∪Γ
• Ai ∈ Σ∪Γ or follows by RPC
• An = A

◆ DEFINITION 2.15
A set Γ is inconsistent in Σ (CønΣ Γ) iff Γ Σ

A set Γ is consistent in Σ (ConΣ Γ) otherwise

◆ THEOREM 2.16
These notions have all the expected properties

◆ EXERCISES

3.33
3.35 4.5–6 read only
3.37 (seriality done in class) 2.32 (b)–(e) 4.7 (some)
3.51 4.9
3.56–7 read only

2. Normal Systems of Modal Logic (§ 4.1)

◆ DEFINITION 4.1
A system of modal logic is normal iff it contains every instance of

Df A ↔ ¬ ¬A

and is closed under the rule:

(A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A
________________________
RK (n ≥ 0)
( A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A

◆ The idea now is:

complete
Normal Systems ←→ Standard Models
sound

Additional axioms ←→ Special conditions on R

2
◆ Eventually:
complete
Classical Systems ←→ Minimal Models
sound

◆ THEOREM 4.2:
Every normal system of modal logic has the following rules of inference:

A
____
RN n=0
A

A →B
________
RM n=1
A→ B

(A ∧ B) → C
___________________
RR n=2
( A ∧ B) → C

A↔ B
________
RE RM × 2
A↔ B

Every normal system of modal logic has the following theorems:

N T T PL (tautol)
T RN

C ( A ∧ B) → (A ∧ B) (A ∧ B) → (A ∧ B) PL
( A ∧ B) → (A ∧ B) RR

M (A ∧ B) → ( A ∧ B) (A ∧ B) → A PL
(A ∧ B) → B PL
(A ∧ B) → A RM
(A ∧ B) → B RM
(A ∧ B) → ( A ∧ B) PL

R (A ∧ B) ↔ ( A ∧ B) (by C and M)

K (A → B) → ( A → B) ((A → B) ∧ A) → B PL
( (A → B) ∧ A) → B RR
(A → B) → ( A → B) PL

3
◆ THEOREM 4.4: We also have the analogues for .

First the basic rules:

Df A ↔ ¬ ¬A ¬A ↔ ¬ ¬¬A Df
A ↔ ¬¬A PL
A ↔ ¬¬A RE
A ↔ ¬ ¬A PL (1,3)
A → (A1 ∨ … ∨ An )
________________________
RK
A → ( A1 ∨ … ∨ An ) A → (A1 ∨ … ∨ An ) hyp
(¬A1 ∧ … ∧ ¬An ) → ¬A RPL
( ¬A1 ∧ … ∧ ¬An ) → ¬A RK
¬ ¬A → (¬ ¬A1 ∨ … ∨ ¬ ¬An ) RPL
A → ( A1 ∨ … ∨ An ) RPL + Df
Then the derived rules and theorems:

¬A
______
RN n=0
¬ A

A →B
________
RM n=1
A→ B

A → (B ∨ C)
___________________
RR n=2
A → ( B ∨ C)

A ↔B
________
RE RM × 2
A↔ B

N ¬ ⊥

C (A ∨ B) → ( A ∨ B)

M ( A ∨ B) → (A ∨ B)

R (A ∨ B) ↔ ( A ∨ B)

K ¬( A ∧ B) → (¬A ∧ B) if we defined A ← B =df ¬A ∧ B

then it becomes A ← B) → (A ← B)

4
◆ THEOREM 4.6
We also have the following generalizations

(A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A
________________________
RKk
( k
A1 ∧ … ∧ k
An ) → k
A (A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A
( k –1
A1 ∧ … ∧ k –1
An ) → k –1
A I.H.
( k –1
A1 ∧ … ∧ k –1
An ) → k –1
A RK
( k
A1 ∧ … ∧ k
An ) → k
A Def

Df k k
A↔ ¬ k
¬A k –1
A ↔ ¬ k –1 ¬A I.H.
k –1
A ↔ ¬ k –1 ¬A RE
k –1
¬A ↔ ¬ ¬ k –1 ¬A Df
A↔ ¬
k –1 k –1
¬A PL
k
A ↔ ¬ k ¬A Def

k k
This can be extended to every other principle as well: The result of putting and for and
in a valid principle remains valid.

3. Alternative Characterizations

◆ THEOREM 4.3: The following are all equivalent

Df + RK ⇔ Df + K + RN
Df + N + RR
Df + N,C + RM
Df + N,C,M + RE

example, the first is proved by induction

n=0 RK = RN
n=1 RK = RM A→ B
(A → B) RN
A→ B K, PL
n=k+1 (A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A
(A1 ∧ … ∧ An–1 ) → (An → A) PL
( A1 ∧ … ∧ An–1 ) → (An → A) I. H.
( A1 ∧ … ∧ An–1 ) → ( An → A) K, PL
( A1 ∧ … ∧ An ) → A PL

5
◆ THEOREM 4.4:
Axiomatizations using

Df + RK ⇔ Df + RK
Df + N + RR
Df + N + RR
Df + N ,C + RM
Df + N ,C ,M + RE

◆ Many more in exercises 4.5/4.6

4. Replacement and duality (§ 4.2)

◆ THEOREM 4.7: Every normal system of modal logic has the following Rule of Replacement:

B ↔ B'
________
REP
A ↔ A' where A' is obtained from A by replacing ≥0 occurrences of B by B'

Proof is by induction on the complexity of A (see p. 125)

◆ EXAMPLE: using REP to prove (A → B) ↔ ( A → B)

1. (A → B) ↔ (¬A ∨ B) PL
2. (A → B) ↔ (¬A ∨ B) 1,PL, REP
3. (A → B) ↔ ( ¬A ∨ B) 2, R , REP
4. (A → B) ↔ (¬ ¬A → B) 3, PL, REP
5. (A → B) ↔ ( A → B) 4, Df , REP

◆ EXERCISE 4.19

Df + RK ⇔ Df + K,N + REP

◆ DEFINITION 2.4, P . 30
*
Ïn = ¬ Ïn
*
T =⊥
*
⊥ =T
* *
(¬Α) = ¬(A )
* * *
(Α ∧ Β) = A ∨ B
* * *
(Α ∨ Β) = A ∧ B

6
 * * *
(Α → Β) = ¬(A ) ∧ B
* * *
(Α ↔ Β) = A ↔ ¬(B )
* *
( Α) = (A )
* *
( Α) = (A )

◆ EXAMPLES
* * *
N ( T) = (T ) = ⊥
* *
C (( Α ∧ Β) → (Α ∧ Β))
* *
= ¬( Α ∧ Β) ∧ ( (Α ∧ Β))
* * *
= ¬(( Α) ∨ ( Β) ) ∧ (Α ∧ Β)
* * * *
= ¬( Α ∨ Β ) ∧ (Α ∨ Β )

◆ FACT (see THEOREM 4.8): The following equivalencies hold in any normal system Σ:
*
(1) |– Σ Α ⇔ |– Σ ¬Α proof by induction on the complexity of A
**
(2) |– Σ Α ⇔ |– Σ Α from (1)
* *
(3) |– Σ (Α → Β) ⇔ |– Σ Β → Α

Proof of (3):
* *
|– Σ Α → Β ⇒ |– Σ ¬Α → ¬Β from (1) by REP
* *
⇒ |– Σ Β → Α
* * * *
|– Σ Β → Α ⇒ |– Σ ¬Α → ¬Β from (1) by REP
* * * *
⇒ |– Σ ¬(¬Α ) → ¬ (¬Β ) from (1) by REP
** **
⇒ |– Σ Α → Β def
⇒ |– Σ Α → Β from (2) by REP

◆ DEFINITION (P . 29): the dual of a modality φ is the modality φ* obtained by interchanging and

◆ THEOREM 4.10

|– Σ φΑ → ψΑ ⇔ |– Σ ψ*Α → φ*Α

7
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

6 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (5)

1. 15 Main Normal Systems

— K = the smallest system

— The main extensions are obtained by adding one or more of the following:

D A→ A
T A→A
B A→ A
4 A→ A
5 A→ A

— Naming conventions:
KS1 ... Sn
is the (smallest) extension of K obtained by taking the schemas S1 ... Sn as axioms.
(The order of the Si does not matter.)
— E.g., KT5 is the smallest system of modal logic obtained by adding T and 5
Etc.

◆ Facts:
— There are 25 =32 possible combinations
— Only 15 of these are distinct (proved later)
— General picture: Figure 4.1 on p. 132.

◆ Example:
KTD = KT
Proof: Obviously
KT ⊆ KTD.
So we only show that
KTD ⊆ KT.

1
 To this end it is sufficient to show that every instance of D is a theorem of KT:
1. KT A→A T
2. KT A→ A duality principle
3. KT A→ A 1,4 PL

◆ Other examples:
KT5 = KTD5 = KTB5 = KT45 = KTDB5 = KTD45 = KTB45 = KTDB45 (This is S5)
— Every instance of D is a theorem of KT5: obvious from above
— Every instance of B is a theorem of KT5:
1. KT5 A→ A 5
2. KT5 A→ A dual of T
3. KT A→ A 1,2 PL
— Every instance of 4 is a theorem of KT5:
1. KT5 A→ A 5
2. KT5 A→ A 5 (duality principle — Theorem 4.10)
3. KT5 A→ A 2, RM
4. KT5 A→ A B (which is a theorem of KT5)
5. KT5 A→ A 3,4, PL

2. Some other important Normal Systems (and their positions in the diagram)

◆ We have encountered the following schemas:

G A→ A
Gc A→ A
Gr ( A → A) → A
◆ Facts about G:
KG ⊆ KB (EXERCISE 4.34)
1. KB A→ A B
2. KB A→A B (Theorem 4.10)
3. KB A→ A 1,2 PL

2
 KG ⊆ K5 (EXERCISE 4.38b)
1. K5 A→ A 5
2. K5 A→ A 5 (Theorem 4.10)
3. K5 ( A→ A) → ( A→ A) theorem of K (Exercise 4.7p, p. 123)
4. K5 A→ A 2,3, PL
5. K5 A→ A 1,4 PL

So: KT4 ⊆ KT4G ⊆ KT5

| | |
S4 S4.2 S5

◆ Facts about Gc:

KT4 ⊆ KT4G c ⊆/ KT5

| | |
S4 S4.1 S5

◆ Facts about Gr:

K4 ⊆ KGr
KT4 ⊆/ KGr
KGr ⊆/ KT5

◆ Much, much more in the exercises.

3. Reduction laws for modalities (§ 4.4)

◆ Definition: two modalities φ and ψ are equivalent (in system Σ) iff for all sentences

Σ φA ↔ ψA

◆ Example: in KT5 there are at most 6 distinct modalities: A, A, A, ¬A, ¬ A, ¬ A.

a) KT5 A↔ A 1. KT5 A→ A T
2. KT5 A→ A 4
3. KT5 A↔ A 1,2, PL
b) KT5 A↔ A 1. KT5 A→ A 4
2. KT5 A→ A T
3. KT5 A↔ A 1,2, PL

3
 c) KT5 A↔ A 1. KT5 A→ A T
2. KT5 A→ A 5
3. KT5 A↔ A 1,2, PL
d) KT5 A↔ A 1. KT5 A→ A T
2. KT5 A→ A 5
3. KT5 A↔ A 1,2, PL

◆ Example:
KT5 ¬ ¬ A ↔ KT5 ¬ ¬ ¬¬ A Df
↔ KT5 ¬ ¬ A PL + REP
↔ KT5 A Df
↔ KT5 A d) above
↔ KT5 A a) above
↔ KT5 A c) above
↔ KT5 A d) above
↔ KT5 A a) above
↔ KT5 A c) above
↔ KT5 A d) above

◆ In fact, you can just drop all modalities except for the last (plus negation, if necessary)

◆ Remarks:
1) These reduction laws fix an upper bound; a lower bound (to the effect that there are no further
reduction laws) follows from completeness (Chapter 5).

2) Only 7 of the 15 basic systems in the picture have finitely many distinct modalities:
KT4 K5 KD5 K45 KB4 KD45 KT5
(See THEOREMS 4.22–4.28 for proofs)

3) Two systems may have the same modalities, but differ with respect to the patterns of
implication among them
e.g. KT5 (Theorem 4.28) six modalities
KD45 (Theorem 4.27) same six modalities, but T not provable

4) Of course, two distinct systems may not have the same modalities and the same the patterns of
implication among them

4
4. Soundness (§ 5.1)

◆ THEOREM 5.1:
Let S1 ... Sn be schemas valid in classes of standard models C1 ...Cn (respectively). Then the
system KS1 ... Sn is sound with respect to the class C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn , i.e.,

KS 1 ... S n A ⇒ C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn A

Proof: KS 1 ... S n A only if A is either one of the Si, or an instance of Df , or follows by RK

1. Each Si is valid in C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn ⊆ Ci given
2. Df is also valid in C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn ⊆ C (all standard models) Theorem 3.3(1) p. 69
3. Validity in C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn is preserved under RK Theorem 3.3(1) p. 69
(proof by induction, p. 70)

◆ In general, systems are sound with rspect to models as per table 5.1 (p. 164)

◆ Corollary (THEOREM 5.2):

The 15 normal systems of Figure 4.1 are all distinct
Proof: give a model of one that is not a model of another
E.g., R=Ø ⇒ R symmetric and transitive, but D fails. So ....

5. Two more remarks about modalities (§ 5.2)

◆ Lower bounds (THEOREM 5.3):

The advertised distinct modalities cannot be further reduced

Proof: Find counterexamples of the sort considered in soundness, i.e. show that φA ↔ ψA fails in
a class of models with respect to which the system is sound.

E.g. and are distict in KT4:

R:reflexive + transitive (+ symmmetric),

so a model of KT4
¬P We have
◆P P
■ ◆P ◆P
not α P↔ P
¬■P ¬■P Thus, by soundness:
¬◆ ■P
not KT4 P↔ P
α β

5
◆ Infinitely many modalities (THEOREM 5.4):
The 8 systems
K KD KT KB K4 KDB KD4 KTB
have infinitely many modalities

Proof: Case 1: all of K, KD, KB, KT, KDB, KTB

The following is a reflexive symmetric model, hence a model of KTB by Theorems 3.5 + 5.1.

P0 P0 P0 ... P0 ¬P 0 ... ¬P 0

α0 α1 α2 αm αm + 1 αn

m n
We have α0 P but not α0 P
Therefore not C
m
P↔ n
P (where C is the class of reflexive, symmetric models)
Therefore not KTB
m
P↔ n
P (by soundness)
Since all of K, KD, KB, KT, KDB are included in KTB, this completes case 1.

Proof: Case 2: all of K, KD, K4, KD4

This is exercise 5.15

6
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

7 — SENTENTIAL MODAL LOGIC (6)

1. Structure of completeness proof for normal systems (§ 2.7 + 5.3): Overview

◆ Let Σ be a system of modal logic and C a class of models:

• Σ is sound with respect to C iff
Σ A ⇒ C A
• Σ is complete with respect to C iff
C A ⇒ Σ A

◆ We have seen how to prove soundness. Now we deal with completeness. Main strategy:
1) Define canonical standard model for Σ
2) Show: if is canonical, then for all A and all α∈W:
M
α A iff A ∈α
3) Using this, show in general: if is canonical, then
M
A iff Σ A
4) Thus, to show that Σ is complete with respect to a class C of models, it is sufficient to show
that C contains a canonical model for Σ. For then we have:
M
C A ⇒ A ⇔ Σ A

2. Preliminary definitions and facts

◆ DEFINITION 2.15 (p. 47)

A set of sentences Γ is Σ-consistent (written ConΣΓ) iff Γ / Σ ⊥

◆ THEOREM 2.16
Basic properties of Σ and Σ-consistency. Notably:
(6) Γ Σ A and Γ⊆∆, then ∆ Σ A
(14) Γ Σ A iff Γ∪{¬A} is not Σ-consistent
∴ Γ / Σ A iff Γ∪{¬A} is Σ-consistent

1
◆ DEFINITION 2.17 (p. 53)
A set of sentences Γ is Σ-maximal (written MaxΣΓ) iff
1) Γ is Σ-consistent
2) Γ has no Σ-consistent extensions, i.e., for every A, if Γ∪{A} is Σ-consistent, then A∈Γ

◆ THEOREM 2.18
Basic facts about Σ-maximal sets of sentences Γ. Notably:
1) A∈Γ iff Γ Σ A
2) Σ⊆Γ
M
5) ¬A∈Γ iff A∉Γ
6) A∧B∈Γ iff both A∈Γ and B∈Γ
M

◆ THEOREM 2.19 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) (p. 55)

Every Σ-consistent set Γ can be extended to a Σ-maximal set ∆ ⊇ Γ
Proof structure:
— List all sentences Α1 , A2, , ...
— Define ∆0 = Γ
∆n = ∆n–1 ∪{An } if this is Σ-consistent
= ∆n–1 otherwise
∆= n ≥0 ∆n

◆ Important COROLLARY 2.20 (p. 57)

(1) Γ ΣA iff A∈∆ for all Σ-maximal ∆⊇Γ
(2) Σ A iff A∈∆ for all Σ-maximal ∆ (=special case for Γ=Ø)

Proof:
(⇒) Let ∆⊇Γ be Σ-maximal:
Γ Σ A ⇒ ∆ ΣA by THEOREM 2.16 (6)
⇒ A∈∆ by maximality (=THEOREM 2.18 (1))
(⇐) by contraposition:
Γ /Σ A ⇒ Γ ∪ {¬A} is Σ-consistent by THEOREM 2.16 (14)
⇒ ∃ Σ-maximal ∆⊇Γ ∪ {¬A} by THEOREM 2.19 (Lindenbaum’s)
⇒ ∃ Σ-maximal ∆⊇Γ such that A∉∆ by THEOREM 2.18 (5)

2
3. Proving completeness

STEP 1: DEFINE CANONICAL MODELS

◆ Recall the idea of a Henkin model: put the language in the domain

◆ DEFINITION 5.5 (p. 171)

A standard model =〈W,R,P〉 is a canonical standard model for a normal system Σ iff:
1) W = set of all Σ-maximally consistent sets of sentences
2) Pn = {α: P n ∈α}
3) A∈α iff A∈β for every β∈W such that αRβ
equivalently (by THEOREM 5.6 p. 172):
3') A∈α iff A∈β for some β∈W such that αRβ

STEP 2: FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM ABOUT CANONICAL MODELS

◆ THEOREM 5.7 (p. 172)

If is canonical, then for all A and all α∈W:
M
α A iff A∈α

(This generalizes what is true by definition for atomic sentences)

Proof by induction:
M
α Ïn iff α∈Pn by def of Mα
iff Ïn ∈α by def of canonical model
M
α ¬A iff / Mα A by def
iff A∉α by I.H.
iff ¬A∈α by maximality (THEOREM 2.18 (5))
M
M
α A iff Mβ A for all β such that αRβ by def
iff A∈β for all β such that αRβ by I.H.
iff A∈α by def of canonical model

3
STEP 3: DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO CANONICAL MODELS

◆ THEOREM 5.8 (p. 173)

If is canonical, then
M
A iff Σ A

Proof:
M
A | Mα A
iff = for all α∈W by def.
iff A ∈α for all α∈W by step 2 above
iff α Σ A for all α∈W by maximality of α (THEOREM 2.18(1))
iff Σ A from COROLLARY 2.20 (2)

◆ NOTE: This means that if is a canonical standard model for Σ, then Σ is sound and complete
with respect to the class { }

STEP 4: CONCLUSION

◆ To show:
Σ is complete with respect to a class C of models,
it is sufficient to show:
C contains a canonical model for Σ.
For then we have:
M
C A ⇒ A ⇔ Σ A

◆ In general (though not always), one shows that C contains the proper canonical standard model:

◆ DEFINITION 5.9 (p. 173)

A standard model =〈W,R,P〉 is the proper canonical standard model for a normal system Σ iff:
1) W = as any canonical model
2) Pn = as any canonical model
3) αRβ ⇔ A∈β whenever A∈α, i.e.
⇔ {A: A∈α} ⊆ β
Equivalently (by THEOREM 5.10 p. 174):
3') αRβ ⇔ A∈α whenever A∈β
⇔ { A: A∉β} ⊆ α

4
◆ Must show: proper canonical standard models are indeed canonical standard models, i.e., 3)
implies the corresponding clause in the definition of canonical model

◆ THEOREM 5.11
If is the proper canonical standard model for Σ, then
A∈α ⇔ A∈β for every β∈W such that αRβ

Proof (using THEOREM 4.30, p. 158)

⇒ Suppose A∈α
Let β∈W such that αRβ
Then A∉β (clause 3 in def of proper canonical)

⇐ Suppose A∈β for every β∈W such that αRβ

i.e. A∈β for every β∈W such that B∈β whenever B∈α
i.e. A∈β for every β∈W such that {B: B∈α}⊆β
We have Γ Σ A iff A∈∆ for all Σ-maximal ∆ ⊇ Γ COROLLARY 2.20 of Lindenbaum
hence Γ Σ A iff A∈β for all β∈W such that Γ ⊆ β since W ={∆: ∆ is Σ-maximal}
Thus {B: ■ B∈α} Σ A taking Γ={B: ■ B∈α}
Hence Σ (B1 ∧...∧ Bn ) → A for B1 ... Bn ∈{B: ■ B∈α} by DEFINITION of Σ
So Σ (■ B1 ∧...∧ ■ Bn ) → ■ A RK
But ■ B1 , ..., ■ Bn ∈α
Thus α Σ ■A by DEFINITION of Σ
So ■ A∈α by maximality (THEOREM 2.18(1))

4. Specific determination results (Soundness and Completeness) (§ 5.4 + § 5.5)

◆ THEOREM 5.12
K is determined by (=sound and complete with respect to) the class C of all standard models
Soundness: trivial
1. Df is valid in C
2. validity in C is preserved by RK
Completeness: also trivial
Let = the proper canonical standard model for K
Then is a standard model
Hence ∈C

5
◆ LEMMA 5.13
If is the proper canonical standard model for Σ, then
(1) is serial if Σ contains (every instance of) D
(2) is reflexive ´´ T
(3) is symmetric ´´ B
(4) is transitive ´´ 4
(5) is euclidean ´´ 5
In general (THEOREM 5.17):
(6) is k,l,m,n-incestual ´´ Gk,l,m,n

Proof of (4)

Transitivity means: if αRβ and βRγ, then αRγ

i.e.: if {B: B∈α} ⊆ β and {B: B∈β} ⊆ γ, then {B: B∈α} ⊆ γ

Assume: 1. {B: B∈α} ⊆ β

2. {B: B∈β} ⊆ γ
3. B∈α

Show: B∈γ

We have 4. B → B∈α since α is Σ-maximal (THEOREM 2.18 (2))

Thus 5. B∈α THEOREM 2.18 (2) (plus MP 3, 4)
Hence 6. B∈β by 1
Hence 7. B∈γ by 2
Thus 8. {B: ■ B∈α} ⊆ γ by 3–7 and generalization

◆ THEOREM 5.14
KD is determined by the class C ={ : is serial}
KT C ={ : is reflexive}
KB C ={ : is symmetric}
M M
KDB C ={ : is serial & symmetric}
M M
In general:
KS1 ... Sn is determined by the class C1 ∩ ... ∩ Cn
where S1 ... Sn ∈ {G k,l,m,n : k,l,m,n ≥ 0} and C1 ...Cn are the corresponding classes of standard
models (as per LEMMA 5.13).

6
5. Remarks

◆ Different classes can determine the same logic.

For example, the system S5 (KT5) is determined by any of the following:
C1 = { }, where is the proper canonical standard model for S5
C2 = { : R is reflexive and euclidean}
C3 = { : R is universal}
C4 = { : ∈C2 and W is finite} (using the method of filtrations)

◆ In general, determination for the basic systems holds also if we take only finite models.
(This is good for decidability)

◆ Not every determination result can be established using proper canonical models.

There exist systems that are determined by a class C even if the canonical model ∉C.

E.g., the canonical model for KGr is not irreflexive, but Gr fails for any model in which R is not
irreflexive.

7
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

8 — NON-ALETHIC INTERPRETATIONS (1)

1. Introduction

◆ Three interpretations of É (and consequently of ®):

— Deontic
ÉA = It ought to be the case that A (often written °A)

— Epistemic
ÉA = The agent, x, believes that A (often written BA)
ÉA = The agent, x, knows that A (often written KA)

— Temporal
ÉA = It will always be the case that A (often written GA)
ÉA = It has always been the case that A (often written HA)

2. Deontic interpretation of modalities

◆ Basic normal system of deontic logic is KD (also known as D*)

D ÉA → ®A (‘Ought’ implies ‘can’)

◆ É is often written ° (for Obligatory) and ® (i.e., ¬É¬) is written P (for Permissible). So:
D °A → PA (‘Ought’ implies ‘can’)

Of course we don’t want

T °A → A (‘Ought’ implies ‘is’)
◆ FACT: the following are equivalent to D in any K-system:

OD ¬°(A ∧ ¬A) (No impossible obligation)

OD* ¬(°A ∧ °¬A) (No incompatible obligations)

— Intuitively, these principles express different thoughts, so their equivalence is a defect of any K-
system, hence of any modal logic which admits of a Kripke-style semantics.

1
 — In other words, to avoid this result we must go “below K”, hence work with a weaker
Montague-style semantics.

3. Deontic semantics à la Kripke

◆ Intuitive interpretation of the accessibility relation:

αRβ ⇔ β is deontically admissible from the point of view of α
Thus:
M M
  6=α °A ⇔  6 =β A for every β such that αRβ
⇔ A is true in every deontically admissible world
⇔ It ought to be the case that A

◆ Equivalently:
{β: αRβ} = the proposition that represents the standards of obligation for the world α.
Thus:
M M
  6=α °A ⇔  6 =β A for every β such that αRβ
M
⇔ {β: αRβ} ⊆ {β:   6=β A}
⇔ {β: αRβ} ⊆ || A ||M
⇔ the proposition expressed by A is entailed by the standard of obligation for α.

◆ Recall that D corresponds to the conditio0n that R be serial: ∀α∃β(αRβ).

M
— Obligations should be non-vacuous. [If R=Ø, then   6=α °A vacuously.]
— There may be more than one deontically accessible world, due to non-deontic facts.
— If αRβ, then β need not be perfect: there may be γ≠β such that βRγ (i.e., the standards of
obligation for β may be different from those of α):

β1

γ1

α β2 γ2

γ3

β3

2
4. Looking for extensions (KD systems)

T °A → A Every obligation is realized

✘ inacceptable

B A → °PA What is the case is obligatorily permissible

✘ inacceptable

4 °A → °°A Obligations remain such in every deontic alternative

= Standards of obligations do not decrease
α β ... γ
= No fewer obligations
better perfect ? acceptable?

5 PA → °PA Permissions remain such in every deontic alternative

P0 = standards of obligations do not increase
¬OP 0
= no more obligations
β
? acceptable?
¬P
OP α δ 0
0 ¬OP 0

P
0
¬OP
0

U °( °A → A) Obligations ought to be realized

(one of the few unconditional °-principles)
⇒ R must be secondarily reflexive: αRβ → βRβ
? acceptable? Note: this means that
M M
if   6=α °A and   6=α ¬A, then βRα for no β∈W
i.e., α is one of the worst possible worlds

4c °°A→ °A What is not obligatory is not obligatorily obligatory

¬°A→ ¬°°A R = density: αRβ → ∃γ(αRγ ∧ γRβ)
✔ sounds good

(D*1) (D*2)
KD4 KD44 c KD4U
(D*) (D*3)
KD KD45

KD4 c KDU KD5

3
5. Problems with these theories (all KD systems)

◆ There are two sorts of problems:

— Correctness
— Adequacy

◆ Correctness: two problems

1) Obligations always exist (however trivial they may be)

¢KD °(A ∨ ¬A)

Thus: There exists no world where we are absolutely free

2) Two important principles become indistinguishable

¢KD ¬ °(A ∧ ¬A) ↔ ¬(°A ∧ °¬A)

| |
No impossible obligation No incompatible obligations
= ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’

◆ Adequacy:
— Cannot express conditional obligations

If you cough, then you ought to apologize

 |        |
 A       B
= conditional obligation of B given A, written °(B/A).

Two only options:

(a) °(B/A) =df A → °B This is T whenever A is F
If the earth is flat, then you ought to apologize.
(b) °(B/A) =df °(A→ B) This is T whenever °¬A or °B is also T
If you steal books, then you ought to eat pizza.
If you cough, then you ought to pay taxes.
— Other problem: Chisholm’s paradox:
(i) John ought to go to help his neighbors
(ii) If John is going to help his neighbors, he ought to tell them he is going.
(iii) If John is not going to help his neighbors, he ought not to tell them he is going.
(iv) John does not go to help his neighbors.

4
 (i)–(iii) seem a reasonable and consistent set of requirements. Yet the fact that John does not go
to help his neighbors, i.e., (iv), is enough to yield a contradiction. Formally:

(1) °H given
(2) °(H → T) given
(3) ¬Η → ° ¬Τ given
(4) ¬Η given
(5) °(H → T) → (°H → °T) K
(6) °T (1), (2), (5), RPL
(7) ° ¬Τ (3), (4), RPL
(8) ° T ∧ ° ¬Τ (6), (7), RPL
(9) ¬(°T ∧ °¬T) Equivalent to D
(10) ⊥ (8), (9), RPL

— The alternative symbolization of (ii) following (a):

(2') H → °T
avoids the problem, but at the price of making (ii) a logical consequence of (iv) (by RPL).

— Similarly, the alternative symbolization of (iii) following (b)

(3') °(¬Η → ¬Τ)
avoids the problem, but at the price of making (iii) a logical consequence of (i) via the theorems
(5') H → (¬Η → ¬Τ) PL
(6') °H → °(¬Η → ¬Τ) (5'), RE
— So:
either °( / ) must be assumed as a primitive
or °( / ) is definable in terms of some other kind of conditional

6. A weaker system

◆ KD could also be axiomatized as:

A→B
________
RM
°A → °B
OD ¬ °(A ∧ ¬A)
N °(A ∨ ¬A)
C (°A ∧ °B) → °(A ∧ B)

5
◆ By correctness problem 1) (“obligations always exist”), we want to get rid of N
— But this is a K- theorem.
— This means we need a system weaker than K, hence not complete with respect to Kripke models.
— We need minimal models

◆ By correctness problem 2), we must also get rid of the equivalence

¬°(A ∧ ¬A) ↔ ¬(°A ∧ °¬A)

— But this is provable even without N

1. (°A ∧ °¬A) → °(A ∧ ¬A) C

2. ¬ °(A ∧ ¬A) ΟD
3. ¬(°A ∧ °¬A) 1,2 PL

— So we must also get rid of C or OD.

— But OD is OK, so it is C that must go.

◆ The resulting system D = RM + D is not normal (= not a K system).

◆ D is determined by the class of minimal models such that
1) if X∩Y∈Nα , then X∈Nα and Y∈Nα (supplemented)
2) Ø∉Nα

7. Even weaker?

◆ There are problems with D, too.

◆ Ross paradox (from Alf Ross, 1941).

— RM implies that

¢D PA → P(A∨B).

1. ¬(A∨B) → ¬A PL
2. °¬(A∨B) → °¬A 1, RM
3. ¬°¬A → ¬°¬(A∨B) 2, PL
4. PA → P(A∨B). DfP
But this is counterintuitive:

Peter may drink water →

/  Peter may drink either water or whiskey

6
 — In fact, it seems natural to suppose that

Peter may drink either water or whiskey → Peter may drink water and he may drink whiskey

This corresponds to the following, which is not a theorem of D:

P(A∨B) → (PA ∧ PB)

◆ Åkvist puzzle.

— Consider the epistemic operator Peter knows that, written K. Since knowledge implies truth,

¢ KA → Α

RM implies that

¢D °KA → °Α
— But this is counterintuitive:
Peter ought to know that there is a fire →
/  There ought to be a fire
◆ Conclusion: D is also too strong...

7
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

9 — NON-ALETHIC INTERPRETATIONS (2)

1. Epistemic interpretation of modalities

◆ Starting point:

— É as a belief operator, written B

BA  =df the agent, x, believes that A
— Alternative notation: B(A,x), convenient for first-order or multi-agent extensions

◆ A lot depends on what we mean by “believes”

• implicit vs explicit
• persuasion vs opinion
• etc.

◆ KD45 = the logic of full belief

D BA → ¬B¬A (coherence)
4 BA → BBA (positive introspection)
5 ¬BA → B¬BA (negative introspection)

◆ Semantics
— possible worlds = possible representations (consistent and complete) of reality
— αRβ iff β is epistemically possible (= conceivable) for the agent in α
M
—  6 =α BA ⇔ x thinks that Α is ungiveupable (=a constant element of all of representations)

◆ Determination
— R is serial, transitive, euclidean. So, standard situation looks like this:

α δ

1
 — Note:
M
not   6=α BA → A so T fails: beliefs need not be true
M
  6=α B(BA → A) so U holds: beliefs are believed to be true

◆ Problems
— RK implies closure of beliefs under logical implication ⇒ full (implicit?) belief
To avoid this, one must go for minimal models (non-normal systems)

— Then we have the following:

M
  6=α ¬B(Α ∨ ¬A) whenever α∉N α
M
  6=α B(Α ∧ ¬A) whenever Ø∈N α

2. Adding Knowledge

◆ Notation:
KA  =df the agent, x, knows that A

◆ This can be defined in terms of B if we accept the principle that knowledge is true belief:

DfK KA ↔ BA ∧ A.

◆ But one might prefer to have DfK as a theorem.

— This can be obtained in the mixed system Kmix defined by:

D BA → ¬B¬A (coherence)
TK KA → A
?1 KA → BA
4K KA → KKA (introspection)
?2 BA → KBA (introspection)
?3 ¬BA → K¬BA (introspection)
?4 (BA ∧ A) → KA

◆ Note: the rule RN for K is derivable in Kmix:

RN 6 ____
=Kmix  A

 6=Kmix KA

— This means omniscience

— Again, to avoid it one must go for minimal models (non-normal systems)

2
◆ Theorems:
¢ Kmix KA ↔ BA ∧ A (=DfK)
¢ Kmix BA ↔ BKA
¢ Kmix BA ↔ ¬K¬KA

◆ So, the belief operator B is also definable in terms of K.

— Axiomatization using only K?
— option 1 is simply to replace B by ¬K¬K in Kmix
— option 2 is to give a better axiomatization of K:

T KA → A
4 KA → KKA
5– (BA ∧ A) → KA
A → (BA → KA)
A → (¬K¬KA → KA)
A → (®ÉA → ÉA)

◆ Fact: KD45 is equivalent to KT45– upon the obvious translations:

BA ↔ ¬K¬KA or KA ↔ BA ∧ A

◆ Other theories

1. KT4G is the same as KT4 + D-for-belief

Proof:

1. ¬K¬KA → K¬K¬A axiom G

2. ¬K¬KA → ¬¬K¬K¬A DN
3. BA → ¬B¬A subst.

— Note: KT4G is the same system as Kmix, but with ?4 replaced by

BA ↔ BKA

Clearly, KT45– ⊆| KT4G

But also, KT4G ⊆| KT45–

|     |
S4.2    S4.4

3
2. KT5 is not good if BA ↔ ¬K¬KA
For otherwise

1. ¬K¬¬A ↔ K¬K¬¬A axiom 5

2. ¬KA ↔ K¬KA DN
3. ¬KA ↔ ¬¬K¬KA DN
4. ¬KA ↔ ¬BA DfB
5. BA ↔ KA PL ⇐ unacceptable

4
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

10 — NON-ALETHIC INTERPRETATIONS (3)

1. Temporal logic

◆ Modalities:
FA A
FA it will sometime be the case that A
GA it will always be the case that A
= ¬F¬A
A PA
PA it has sometime be the case that A
HA it has always be the case that A
= ¬P¬A

◆ Minimal tense logic Kt

— Axioms:

System K for G
    + System K for H
    + A → GPA
    + A → HFA

— Theorems:
    ¢ PGA → A
    ¢ FHA → A 1. ¬A → GP¬A ax
2. ¬GP¬A → A PL
3. F¬P¬A → A dfF
4. FHA → A dfH
— More generally:
    ¢kt A ⇔ ¢kt A*, where A* is the mirror image of A
(replace G / H and F / P)
— This means symmetry past/future

◆ Semantics:
— Note: a multimodal system
— in general: one R for each modality

1
◆ Determination: all standard models
— provided αRGβ ⇔ βRHα
— alternatively: same R in two directions (the direction of time)

◆ Natural extension:

Kt + 4 GA → GGA future transitivity

¢ HA → HHA past transitivity
or:

Kt + 4® FFA → FA future transitivity

¢ PPA → PA past transitivity

◆ Further extensions: Two main possibilities:

now
linear:

A A
FA ∧ FB PA ∧ PB
¬F(A ∧ B) ¬P(A ∧ B)
branching: ¬F(A ∧ FB) ¬P(A ∧ PB)
¬F(FA ∧ Β) ¬P(PA ∧ Β)
B B

2. Linear extensions

◆ Basic linear system CL (Cocchiarella):

RL (FA ∧ FB) → (F(A∧B) ∨ F(A ∧FB) ∨ F(FA∧Β)) right linearity

LL (PA ∧ PB) → (P(A∧B) ∨ P(A ∧PB) ∨ P(PA∧Β)) left linearity

◆ Semantics: R must be:

— transitive
— right linear: αRβ & αRγ  ⇒  β=γ or βRγ or γRβ
— left linear: βRα & γRα  ⇒  β=γ or βRγ or γRβ

◆ System SL: non-ending time (Dana Scott)

CL + D GA → FA seriality
HA → PA "

2
◆ System PL: dense time (Prior)

SL + 4®c + FA → FFA αRβ ⇒ ∃γ(αRγ & γRβ)

¢ PA → PPA

◆ System PCk: circular time (Prior)

Kt + 4 ® + GA → A
GA → HA

(So: G and H are logically equivalent)

3. Branching extensions

◆ System CR (Cocchiarella)

Kt + 4® (= CL minus linearity)

◆ System Kb (Rescher + Urquhart)

CR + LL (= branching admitted only in the future)

symmetry P/F fails

3
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

11 — QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC (1)

1. Preliminaries

◆ Vocabulary:
— variables x0 , x1 , x2 , ...
— names a0 , a1 , a2 , ...
— predicates œ0 , œ1 , œ2 , ...
— connectives and quantifiers ∀, ∃,

◆ Grammar:
— Straightforward
— But notice that the interplay between quantifiers and modalities yields de dicto/de re readings:
de dicto: É ∀xA e.g., Necessarily, everything is spatio-temporally located.
de re: ∀x ÉA e.g., Everything is necessarily spatio-temporally located.
de dicto: ® ∀xA e.g., It is possible that everybody votes for Berlusconi.
de re: ∀x ®A e.g., Anybody could vote for Berlusconi.
de dicto: É ∃xA e.g., There must necessarily be right-winged politicians.
de re: ∃x ÉA e.g., Somebody is necessarily a right-winged politician.
de dicto: ® ∃xA e.g., Bush might have had a sister.
de re: ∃x ®A e.g., Somebody might have been Bush’s sister.

◆ Semantics:
— Two main approaches.
1. The possibilist (or fixed-domain) approach: each model comes with a single domain of
quantification containing all possible objects (i.e., all objects that are possible according to
the model).
2. The actualist (or world-relative) approach: each model comes with a domain of quantifica-
tion for each world in the model—a domain containing only those objects that actually exist
in the given world.
— We shall look at these options only from the perspective of Kripke-style semantics, but
Montague-style semantics admit of a similar distinction.

1
2. Semantics # 1: The fixed-domain approach

◆ MODELS
A model is a four-tuple M = 〈W, R, D, V〉 such that:
— W is a non-empty set (of worlds);
— R is a binary (accessibility) relation on W;
— D is another non-empty set (of individuals);
— V is a function assigning
• an element V(a) ∈ D to every name a.
• a relation V(œ) ⊆ W × Dn to every n-ary predicate œ. (If œ is 0-ary, V(œ) is just the
proposition P expressed by œ, as before; otherwise V(œ) is the intension of œ..)
In such a model, an assignment µ is a function that maps every variable x to a value µ(x)∈D, and
two assignments µ and µ' are said to be x-alternatives iff they agree on every variable except
possibly for x [i.e., iff µ(y)=µ'(y) for every variable y distinct from x].

◆ TRUTH AND VALIDITY

The truth conditions of a wff A at a world α under an assignment µ are defined as follows, where
µ*(t)=µ(t) if ‘t’ is a variable, and µ*(t)=V(t) if ‘t’ is a constant
M
1.   6=α œt1 ...tn [µ] iff 〈α, µ*(t1 ), ..., µ*(tn )〉∈V(œ)
M M
2.   6=α ¬A [µ] iff not   6=α A [µ]
M M M
3.   6=α A ∧ Β [µ] iff   6=α A [µ] and   6=α B [µ]
4.
M
 6 =
α ÉA [µ] iff   6=β A [µ] for every β∈W such that αRβ.
M

M M
5.   6=α ∀xA [µ] iff   6=α A [µ'] for every x-alternative of µ' of µ
M
— A wff A is true at α in M iff   6=α A [µ] for every assignment µ.
— The other semantic notions (validity in a model, validity in a class C of models, and logical
validity) are defined as before.

◆ REMARK 1
— The semantic condition on names corresponds to the idea that names are rigid designators.

◆ REMARK 2
— Concerning predicates, there is an expressiveness problem. Consider:
®∀xRx e.g., There is a world in which everybody is rich

— This formula refers to those existing at some world and says that they are all rich.
But do we mean to say that at some world everybody will be rich as they use the word
‘rich’, or as we use the word in the actual world?

2
 — It could be argued that the above semantics is constrained to interpret wffs involving ‘R’ at a
world according to that world’s meaning of ‘R’, so it only gives us the first option. But this
is not quite right.

— The same problem arises with de re modalities:

∀x®Rx e.g., Everybody could be rich.

We certainly don’t mean to say that everybody could be rich insofar as ‘rich’ could have a
different meaning...

◆ LOGIC
— Modal logics adequate to this semantics can be axiomatized by supplementing the principles of
whichever propositional modal logic one chooses with the classical quantifier rules together
with the so-called Barcan Formula (Barcan 1946):

BF ∀xÉA → É∀xA

— This is actually provable as a theorem in quantified KB as also in quantified KT5.

◆ REMARK 3
— BF captures one half of the “fixed domain” idea: it tells us that the domain of every possible
world is included in the domain of the given world. [Otherwise BF could be false, for even if
everything falling under the actual range of the quantifiers were A in every world, there might
be something else at some world that failed to be A at that world.]
— The other half of the “fixed domain” idea is captured by the converse of BF, which is valid
(and provable in quantified K even without BF).

BFc É∀xA → ∀xÉA

Proof: 1. ∀xA → A QL axiom
2. É(∀xA → A) 1, N
3. É(∀xA → A) → (É∀xA → ÉA) K
4. É∀xA → ÉA 2,3, PL
5. ∀x(É∀xA → ÉA) 4, QL
6. ∀x(É∀xA → ÉA) → ∀xÉ∀xA → ∀xÉA QL axiom
7. ∀xÉ∀xA → ∀xÉA 5, 6, PL
8. É∀xA → ∀xÉ∀xA QL axiom
9. É∀xA → ∀xÉA 7, 8, PL

This ensures that the domain of every possible world includes the domain of the given world.
[Otherewise BFc might be false, for even if everything in every world were A, there could be
something in the actual world that fails to exist (hence to be A) at some world.]

3
 — If we have equality, this half of the “fixed domain” idea is also captured by the following valid
wff:
NecEx ∀x É ∃y(y = x)

◆ REMARK 4
— Note that we can read BF as asserting that if a necessity holds de re, then it also holds de dicto.
But we may as well read it as asserting that if a possibility holds de dicto, then it also holds de
re—for BF is equivalent to:

BF® ®∃xA → ∃x®A

— In any case, BF and BF® are controversial. Consider the following instances:
• If everything is necessarily spatio-temporally located, then necessarily everything is
spatio-temporally located.
• If Berlusconi might have had a sister, then there is something that might have been
Berlusconi’s sister.

— Likewise, we can read BFc as asserting that if a necessity holds de dicto, then it holds de re.
But we may as well read it as asserting that if a possibility holds de re it holds de dicto:

BFc® ∃x®A → ®∃xA

— BFc and BFc® are more plausible. But they are also controversial. Consider:
• If necessarily everything exists, then everything necessarily exists.
• If there is something that might not have existed, then it is possible for there to be
something that doesn’t exist.

— In general, the problem with the “fixed domain” approach is that it seems a fundamental
feature of common ideas about modality (at least: alethic modality) that the existence of many
things is contingent, and that different objects exist in different possible worlds.

— However, one can avoid this objection by interpreting the quantifiers as ranging over all
possible objects and letting a designate predicate ‘E’ express existence.
For all existing x: A ⇒ ∀x(Ex → A)
For some existing x: A ⇒ ∃x(Ex ∧ A)

BF and BFc would then be non-problematic if interpreted unrestrictedly as holding of

possibilia, and their existentially restricted versions would not be theorems and, therefore,
would not give rise to the above objections
∀xÉA → É∀xA ⇒ ∀x(Ex → ÉA) → É∀x(Ex → A)
É∀xA → ∀xÉA ⇒ É∀x(Ex → A) → ∀x(Ex → ÉA)

4
Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

12 — QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC (2)

1. Semantics # 2: The world-relative approach

◆ MODELS
A model is a five-tuple M = 〈W, R, D, V, Q〉 such that:
— W, R, D, V are as in Semantics #1
— Q is a function assigning a non-empty set Q(α) ⊆ D to each world α∈W (the domain of
quantification for α), with the proviso Q(α) ⊆ Q(β) whenever αRβ.
(This proviso ensures that BFc comes out valid, for recall: BFc is derivable in quantified K).
Assignments are defined as in #1.

◆ TRUTH AND VALIDITY

The truth conditions of a wff A at a world α under an assignment µ are defined as follows:
1–4 as in #1.
M M
5.   6=α ∀xA [µ] iff   6=α A [µ'] for every x-alternative of µ' of µ such that µ'(x)∈Q(α)

Other semantic notions (truth, validity, etc.) are defined as before.

◆ REMARKS 1
— The expressiveness problem persists.
— A (non-equivalent) alternative to clause 1 is:
M
  6=α œt1 ...tn [µ] iff µ*(t1 ), ..., µ*(tn )〉∈Q(α) and 〈α, µ*(t1 ), ..., µ*(tn )〉∈V(œ)
— In this semantics, BF is not valid. For instance, the following instance of BF
∀xÉ œx → É∀x œx
is false in any world-relative model M  such that:
W = {α, β},
D = {a, b}
Q(α) = {a}, Q(β) = {a, b}
V(œ) = {〈α, a〉, 〈β, a〉}
— However, if R is symmetrical then BF holds, since the proviso on Q implies that
Q(α) = Q(β) whenever αRβ.

1
 Since symmetry corresponds to principle B, this means that BF is a theorem of KB. Proof:

1. ∀xÉA → ÉA QL axiom
2. ®∀xÉA → ®ÉA 1, RK®
3. ®ÉA → A B®
4. ®∀xÉA → A 2,3, PL
M M M
9. ®∀xÉA → ∀xA as in Lecture Notes 11
10. É®∀xÉA → É∀xA 9, RK
11. ∀xÉA → É®∀xÉA B
12. ∀xÉA → É∀xA 9,10, PL
This is disappointing, since symmetry is a plausible requrement on R (at least for alethic
modalities).
— Moreover, the validity of BFc, and more generally of the proviso that Q(α) ⊆ Q(β) whenever
αRβ, is still controversial. Can we give it up?
— We can give up BFc, but the resulting semantics does not validate classical logic. We need
supplement K with the axioms & rules of Free Logic. In particular, the QL axiom
∀xA → A [t/x]
[which was used in the proof of BFc.] must be weakened to:
∀y(∀xA → A [y/x])
or, if we have equality, to:
(∀xA ∧ ∃y(y = t)) → A [t/x]

— If we do so, then (as expected) BFc is valid in a model iff the inclusiveness condition
αRβ ⇒ Q(α) ⊆ Q(β)
is explicitly imposed upon R.
— If we also require R to be symmetric, then BF is valid too.

2. Identity and Counterparthood

◆ Axioms
— If the language includes the identity predicate =, the standard identity axioms hold:

ID1 t=t
ID2 t = t' → (A → A [t'/t])

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 — As a consequence, we immediately get the following logical truths (provable regardless of
whether we rely on a Classical or Free Logic for the quantifiers):
NecId t = t' → É t = t'
NecDiv t ≠ t' → É t ≠ t'

◆ Identity or counterparthood?
— Both types of semantics assume that objects may exist in more than one world, and imply that
names are rigid designators.
— But one could object to this view on philosophical grounds. One could say that when we
counterfactualize about someone, say John, we don’t look at the ways John could have been
but, rather, at the way John’s counterparts are—his counterparts being those individuals that
somehow correspond to John in other worlds.
This means that a statement such as ‘John could have been a singer’ would be true, not if there
is a possible world in which John is a singer, but if there is a counterpart of John’s, in some
possible world, who is a singer.
— We can account for this intuition as follows (though a fuller account will be seen next week,
devoted to David Lewis’s Counterpart theory):

◆ MODELS
A model is a six-tuple M = 〈W, R, D, V, Q, C〉 such that:
— W, R, D are as in #1 and #2
— Q is as in #2, but with the proviso that Q(α) ∩ Q(β) = ∅ for all distinct α,β∈ W.
— C is a binary relation (of counterpart) on D.
— V is a function assigning
• a function V(a): W → D to every name a, with the proviso that V(a)(α)∈Q(α). (Intuitively,
V(a)(α) is the individual denoted by ‘a’ in α.)
• a relation V(œ) ⊆ W × Dn to every n-ary predicate œ (as before.)

◆ TRUTH AND VALIDITY

The truth conditions of a wff A at a world α under an assignment µ are defined as follows:
1–3 as in #2.
  6=α ÉA [µ] iff   6=β ∀y1 …∀xn (Cx1 t1 ∧ … ∧ Cxn tn → A [x1 /t1 … xn /tn ]) [µ] for every β∈W such
M M
4.
that αRβ — where t1 …tn are all the names and variables occurring free in A.
5. as in #2.
Other semantic notions (truth, validity, etc.) are defined as before.

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Modal Logic (G4424) Achille C. Varzi

13 — QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC (3)

1. Modal Logic without modalities: Lewis’s Counterpart Theory

◆ Primitives:
Wx (x is a possible world)
Ixy (x is in possible world y)
Ax (x is actual)
Cxy (x is a counterpart of y)

◆ Axioms:
A1 Ixy → Wy
(Nothing is in anything except a world)
A2 Ixy ∧ Ixz → y=z
(Nothing is in two worlds)
A3 Cxy → ∃zIxz
(Whatever is a counterpart is in a world)
A4 Cxy → ∃zIyz
(Whatever has a counterpart is in a world)
A5 Ixy ∧ Izy ∧ Cxz → x=z
(Nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its world)
A6 Ixy → Cxx
(Anything in a world is a counterpart of itself)
A7 ∃x(Wx ∧ ∀y(Iyx ↔ Ay))
(Some world contains all and only actual things)
A8 ∃xAx
(Something is actual)

2. Remarks

◆ Comments on the axioms

— Ad A1: The relation I is best interpreted as a mereological relation of parthood, so that ‘Ixy’
really means “x is part of y”: possible worlds are large possible individuals with smaller pos-
sible individuals as parts. (As a special case, a world is an improper part of itself.)

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 — Ad A2: Worlds do not overlap; thus, possible individuals in different worlds are never identical
(cross-world identity is replaced by the counterpart relation). However, the possible individuals
are not all the individuals: cross-world mereological fusions of possible individuals are
individuals too, though not possible individuals: there is no way for the whole of it to be actual.
— Ad A3–A4: Only possible individuals are (and have) counterparts. My counterparts are
individuals I would have been, had the world been otherwise.
— Ad A5–A6: The counterpart relation is essentially a cross-world relation, with the only
exception that everything qualifies as a counterpart of itself.
— Ad A7–A8: There exists a unique actual world. Its description can safely be used:
@ = ιx∀y(Iyx ↔ Ay)

◆ The following principles do not generally hold:

R1 Cxy → Cyx
(Symmetry of the counterpart relation)
R2 Cxy ∧ Cyz → Cxz
(Transitivity of the counterpart relation)
R3 Cy1 x ∧ Cy2 x ∧ Iy1 w1 ∧ Iy2 w2 ∧ y1 ≠y2 → w1 ≠w2
(Nothing in any world has more than one counterpart in any other world)
R4 Cyx1 ∧ Cyx2 ∧ Ix1 w1 ∧ Ix2 w2 ∧ x1 ≠x2 → w1 ≠w2
(No two things in any world have a common counterpart in any other world)
R5 Ww1 ∧ Ww2 ∧ Ixw1 → ∃y(Iyw2 ∧ Cxy)
(For any two worlds, anything in one is a counterpart of something in the other)
R6 Ww1 ∧ Ww2 ∧ Ixw1 → ∃y(Iyw2 ∧ Cyx)
(For any two worlds, anything in one has some counterpart in the other)

3. Comparison with Standard QML

◆ Translation:
T1 Α ⇒ A@
where Aw (A holds in a world w) is defined recursively as follows:
T2a Aw = A , if A is atomic
T2b (¬A)w = ¬Aw
T2c (A ∧ B)w = Aw ∧ Bw
T2d (∀xA)w = ∀x(Ixw → Aw)
T2f0 ( A)w = ∀z(Wz → Az)
(A holds in every world z)

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 T2f1 ( A x)w = ∀z∀y(Wz ∧ Iyz ∧ Cyx → Azy)
(A holds of every counterpart y of x in every world z)
T2fn ( Ax1 …xn )w = ∀z∀y1 …∀yn (Wz ∧ Iy1 z ∧ Cy1 x1 ∧ … ∧ Iyn z ∧ Cyn xn → Azy1 …yn )

◆ Examples:
E1 ∀xFx
⇒ ∀x(Ix@ → Fx)
(Everything actual is an F)
E2 ∃xFx
⇒ ∃w(Ww ∧ ∃x(Ixw ∧ Fx))
(Some possible world contains an F)
E3 Fx
⇒ ∀z∀y(Wz ∧ Iyz ∧ Cyx → Fy)
(Every counterpart of x, in any world, is an F)
E4 ∀x(Fx → Fx)
⇒ ∀x(Ix@ →∀z∀y(Wz ∧ Iyz ∧ Cyx → Fx))
(If anything is a counterpart of an actual F, then it is an F)
E5 Fx
⇒ ∀z1 ∀y1 (Wz1 ∧ Iy1 z1 ∧ Cy1 x → ∃z2 ∃y2 (Wz2 ∧ Iy2 z2 ∧ Cy2 y1 ∧ Fy2 )
(Every counterpart of x has a counterpart that is an F)

◆ Critical principles:
B A→ A
Not a theorem (for A open) unless R1 (symmetry of C) is assumed
4 A→ A
Not a theorem (for A open) unless R2 (transitivity of C) is assumed
BF ∀x Ax → ∀xAx
Not a theorem unless R5 is assumed.
BF' ∃x Ax → ∃xAx
Not a theorem unless R6 is assumed.
BFc ∀xAx → ∀x Ax
A theorem.
BFc' ∃xAx → ∃x Ax
Not a theorem (obviously).
= x=y → (x=y)
Not a theorem unless R3 is assumed
≠ x≠y → (x≠y)
Not a theorem unless R4 is assumed.