1.

Intervention

G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012

LORENZA C. ONGCO, vs. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY,
SERENO, J.
Facts: Dalisay applied for a registration of a parcel of land before the MTC. During the hearing,
there were no oppositor aside from the Republic. Later, an order of General Default was was
issued except for the Republic. MTC ordered a deed of registration in favor of Dalisay. Republic
appealed to CA, pending appeal Ongco filed a “Motion for Leave to Intervene” w/ an attached
Answer for intervention. CA denied the motion of Ongco. Ongco then filed an MR which was
later on denied.

Doctrine: Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect
or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy, however,
is not a right. The rules on intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding.

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied)

It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's sound
discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but
also take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that
the intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal
interest is not more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should
result. To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the
Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of judgment by
the trial court.

Application: Ogco’s petition is denied. Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature
that she "will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary,
her interest is indirect and contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject
land, as she in fact admits being only in the process of applying for one. Her interest is at best
inchoate. In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had
rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the motion.
To recall, the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment."

2. Modes of Discovery
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
SANTIAGO,
NARVASA, J.

Doctrine: Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the
Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties, and production and inspection of documents and
things. Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges),
there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them — which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of
other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and
speed up adjudication. Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose
is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in
the dark.

In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery

mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written
interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for
admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court
intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of
said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an
answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or
property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of
discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts
are not clear.

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or
inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a
showing of due cause.
 To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and
efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such
as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against
the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment
of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery;
taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.

Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken

without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations
inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And . . .
further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."

In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of the law.

It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in

relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be
resolved.

Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a
widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a complicated matter, unduly
expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For example, as will
already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate
or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25
of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth
a list of least questions with the request that they be answered individually. 55 That is
all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on
him the obligation of answering the questions "separately and fully in writing
underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories . . ." 56 The
sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been mentioned. 57 So, too,
discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party
of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts
therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended,
be admitted in writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by
the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party
requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters
of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters
of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking of
depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written
 interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as
complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.

G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK &
TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff, Province of Bulacan,
DEL CASTILLO, J.

Doctrine: As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand
is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice,
a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who
does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable
to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying
the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling
the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case.
Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility
of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the
witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being
bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental
to the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit
the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the
adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it
likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case.
Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need
not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence,
badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can
only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.
3. Consolidation

ROMEO TESTON vs. DBP et.al

G.R. No. 144374
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Doctrine: Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of

law or fact or pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any
or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise

from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or

substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be

consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the

substantial rights of any of the parties. The obvious purpose of the rule allowing consolidation is

to avoid multiplicity of suits to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear

congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with

the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. Consolidation of actions is addressed to

the sound discretion of the court and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the
absence of manifest abuse of discretion.

4. Demurrer
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. PHILBANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150731
VELASCO, JR., J.

Doctrine: Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
 Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence.
If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is

whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The
evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits
of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the
plaintiffs evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence.
These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made
during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being
the defendants evidence.

5. Judgment based on compromise

G.R. No. 194560 June 11, 2014
NESTOR T. GADRINAB, vs. NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ,
LEONEN, J.

Doctrine: A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res
judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent.
The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already
attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.

Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies
against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided
these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds exist, remedies may include the following: a)
motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from judgment; e)
petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment.

6. Interlocutory Order

[G.R. No. 110147. April 17, 2001]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO
ROXAS CHUA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.

Doctrine: If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Once determined to be final, the order may be
the subject of an appeal, as in the present case.

Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court (in effect at the time), which states:
Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders shall
be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order
is rendered for one party or the other.

It has been held that [a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose
of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. It refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some
point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. Conversely, a final order
is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether
an order is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.

7-10: Remedy against Judgment.