Abella, Marc Gabriel A.

May 10, 2018

4PHL2 Philosophy of Science
An Analysis of the Progression of Method in History

Throughout history, there were different evolutions and revolution which change the
perception of the majority. Oddly enough, these changes were pioneered by the minority.
This was evident in all the time periods particularly: (1) ancient Greek, (2) renaissance (3)
modern, and (4) contemporary. In line with this division, the discussion of this paper will be
divided into four parts. Furthermore, it would analyze one prominent thinker’s method per
period namely: (1) Aristotle, (2) Francis Bacon, (3) David Hume, and (4) Karl Popper.
Additionally, it would draw comparisons to these methods to show the progression in
history. Through these division, answering the question “How did method change modern
science?”

The first period, the ancient Greek period, was dominated by mythology because of
the lack in explanation of natural phenomenon.1 This lead the people to cling on to Gods and
Goddesses such as Zeus, Poseidon, and Hera. During this time, polytheism was the dominant
belief. However, the minorities particularly the: pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
changed this belief. Through their philosophies, the dominant belief on polytheism was
weaken. Among the major thinkers, Aristotle’s contributions on logic, physics, and
astronomy were one of the major influences which resulted to the shift. One of the major
contribution of Aristotle was his founding of logic.2 Aristotle states:

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable
opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an
argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it. First, then, we must say what deduction is, and what
its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical deduction; for this is the object of our search in the
treatise before us.

Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these
necessarily comes about through them. It is a demonstration, when the premises from which the

1 Michelle M. Houle, Gods and Goddesses in Greek Mythology (New Jersey: Enslow Publisher Inc, 2006), 12.
2 Marko Malink, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013),1.
 deduction starts are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come
through premises which are primitive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction 3

Through the excerpt, Aristotle’s method of logical deduction was manifested. His method
implies causality, and applicability which was important during those times. His logical
deductive method supported his other contributions in other fields such as astronomy, and
physics. This was reflected in his work entitled Physics.4

The second period, the renaissance period, was dominated by Aristotelian logic and
medieval religiosity. However, Francis Bacon problematizes that (1) Aristotelian deductive
logic does not lead to new knowledge, and (2) Aristotelian logic is flawed because of the
four idols.5 This problem manifest in the deduction’s use of universal premises to arrive at
a particular truth which ultimately prevents discovery of new knowledge. To support these
claims, Bacon states:

The illusions and false notions which have got a hold on men’s intellects in the past and are now
profoundly rooted in them, not only block their minds so that it is difficult for truth to gain access, but
even when access has been granted and allowed, they will once again, in the very renewal of the
sciences, offer resistance and do mischief unless men are forewarned and arm themselves against
them as much as possible.

There are four kinds of illusions which block men’s minds. For instruction’s sake, we have given them
the following names: the first kind are called idols of the tribe; the second idols of the cave; the third
idols of the marketplace; the fourth idols of the theatre.

Formation of notions and axioms by means of true induction is certainly an appropriate way to banish
idols and get rid of them; but it is also very useful to identify the idols. Instruction about idols has the
same relation to the interpretation of nature as teaching the sophistic refutations has to ordinary
logic.6

3 Aristotle, Topics, trans., W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),2.

4 Aristotle states: In all disciplines in which there is systematic knowledge of things with principles, causes, or
elements, it arises from a grasp of those: we think we have knowledge of a thing when we have found its primary causes
and principles, and followed it back to its elements. Clearly, then, systematic knowledge of nature must start with an
attempt to settle questions about principles. The natural course is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to
us, to what is more knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the same. Hence, we must start thus with things
which are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, and move on to things which are by nature clearer and more knowable.
(Aristotle, Physics Books I and II, trans., William Charlaton [Newyork: Oxford University Press, 1970] , 1)
5 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, eds. Lisa Jardine and Silverthorne, Michael (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2000), 40-41.

6 Ibid.
Through these claims, he proposes the method of induction which start from particulars
truths to arrive at universal truths which mitigates the illusions done by the four idols
resulting a more credible truth.

The third period, modern, was dominated by the effects of induction, and cartesian
rationalism. However, Hume had problematized the validity of causation. He claims that
causation is psychological and habitual.7 This implies that certain outcomes expected
through the principle of causation were not necessarily true. From this refutation of
causality, he also refuted Bacon’s concept of induction because if particular events were not
necessarily the effect of other events. The goal of arriving at a universal truth becomes
impossible.

To answer the question posited at the beginning, “How did method change modern
science?”, the progression of method in the sciences addresses the concerning major
problem during a said time. For example, Aritotle’s method of deduction and the necessity
for clarity and causality in ancient Greek. Throughout the progression of method, modern
science benefited through amassing different perspective on the validity of method.
Furthermore, progression of method also refuted other systems which does not lead to
validity. To show these benefits, this work will discuss a thinker form the contemporary
period named: Karl Popper. He had theorized that “the criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”8 This statement was the solution to
his question “when should a theory be ranked as scientific?”9 Through his search, he
disregarded different theories of philosophy, and psychology because of its over verification,
and over clarification which leads to it being unable to be falsified.

7 Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in

order to find that impression, which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. At first sight I perceive, that I must
not search for it in any of the particular qualities of the objects; since, which-ever of these qualities I pitch on, I find some
object, that is not possest of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause or effect. And indeed there is nothing existent,
either externally or internally, which is not to be consider’d either as a cause or an effect; tho’ ’tis plain there is no one
quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a title to that denomination. The idea, then, of causation
must be deriv’d from some relation among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover
8 Timothy McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly & Fritz Allhoff, The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology

(Oxford: Blackwell, 2009),472.

9 Ibid.