September 9, 2015

G.R. NO. 160619

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA and
EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the Rules of Court require
that the Information allege the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the crime charged. Details
that do not go into the core of the crime need not be included in the Information, but may be
presented during trial. The rule that evidence must be presented to establish the ex.istence of the
elements of a crime to the point of moral certainty is only for purposes of conviction. It finds no
application in the determination of whether or not an Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an
accused.

The Case

Before us is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the People of the Philippines ("the
People") through the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. The
petition seeks the reversal of the Resolutions dated January 9, 20021 and November 3, 20032 issued
by public respondent Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent Jessie B. Castillo's Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss the Infonnation filed against him and denying the People's subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.

The Facts

Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998
elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal operation of
the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information,
Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted
benefits to his coaccused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the
Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and
permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).4

An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against Castillo also in
relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of
the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Castillo.5 The Court of Appeals held:

xxx [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was issued way back in 1998 yet, or before his
actual assumption of office. Quite the contrary, while already a mayor, [Castillo], upon being
informed of the notice, immediately took steps in resolving the municipality's aged-long garbage
problem. True, the solution was a longterm one, but the end results were just the same, i.e., what
was once a mountainous pile of trash covering a 2-hectare piece of property has been remarkably
reduced and what was left was a considerable area used as a segregation and transfer station of
garbage prior to their eventual dumping at the San Mateo landfill.

Doubtless, in finding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct and penalizing him therefor, the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion, ignored and did not take into
account the foregoing reports, including no less the letter of commendation of [DENR] Secretary
Cerilles.

It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken concrete steps to address a problem that was
not of his own doing or tolerance but merely inherited by him, he was instead rewarded by an
administrative penalty even as the very government agency (DENR) which issued the Notice of
Violation commended him for his efforts. If this is not a travesty of justice, then We know not what it
is.6

After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been decriminalized
by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 90038 and invoked the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving
him of administrative liability. His motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated September 6, 2001.9

On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the same does not charge an offense.10He claimed that a public officer may only be held
liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the government or any
private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the
Information, its extent must be specified. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,11 Castillo asserted that the claim of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and
proven to the point of moral certainty."

The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division failed to decide unanimously on the Supplemental Motion.
Thus, a special division (composed of five Justices of the Sandiganbayan) was constituted.12 Voting
3 to 2,13 this

Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's
Supplemental Motion:

Going over the elements of the crime vis-a-vis the allegations of the information, the court agrees
with the contention of movant that the allegations of the information fail to measure up to the
requirements of the law. While the information charges Castillo with violation of Section 3 [e] of R.A.
3019 for "giving unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga, by
allowing the operation of the dumpsite at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite" and "thereby
causing undue injury to the residents and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies,
rats and mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite" the court notes the failure of the information to
quantify the alleged unwarranted benefits supposedly given by movant to his co-accused as well as
the undue injury caused to the residents and students of the area affected by the dumpsite.

In the case of Alejandro vs. People, the Supreme Court had ruled that undue injury requires proof of
actual injury or damage. Thus, in Llorente, it was held that "undue injury in Sec. 3 [e] cannot be
presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be
proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that
the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

Anent the allegation of unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas, the court likewise notes the
failure of the information to specify and quantify the same. Whereas the Ombudsman's resolution
finding prima facie evidence against the herein accused made mention of the amount of P250.00 to
P300.00 allegedly collected from each garbage truck from companies and factories allowed to dump
garbage at the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, the same was not alleged in the information which
charged Castillo with having given unwarranted benefits to his co-accused.14

(Emphasis supplied.)

The Special Division15 also resolved, on November 3, 2003, to deny the motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by the People.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be stated in an
Information charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Specifically, we are
called to resolve whether an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of
undue injury must state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally informed of the facts
and the acts constituting the offense charged.16 Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can
file a motion to have the Information against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his
plea.17 A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an Information18 and compels the court to
determine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to endure the rigors of a trial.
Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid conviction, the court
must drop the case immediately and save an accused from the anxiety and convenience of a
useless trial.19

A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Information whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted.20The question that must be answered is whether such allegations are
sufficient to establish the elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.21 In
proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be alleged in a
valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and (3) whether these elements
are sufficiently stated in the Information.

Sufficiency of Complaint or
Information

Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state-
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

xxx

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

(Emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan,22 explained the two important purposes underlying the rule.
First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense.23 Second, it allows the accused, if found
guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.24 Thus, this Court
held that the true test in ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."25

Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, the elements of which are as
follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.26

The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:

That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jessie B.
Castillo, a public officer, being the incumbent Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, while in the performance of
his official and administrative function, acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring
and confederating with accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, caretakers of
Villa Esperanza, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to his
co-accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dump
site located at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, notwithstanding the fact that no
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or any permit has been issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources to any person or
entity for such purpose., and despite cease and desist orders issued by the DENR, thereby causing
undue injury to the residents and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and
mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite.27

(Emphasis supplied.)

Information filed against

Castillo and his co-accused is
Sufficient

We find that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and
conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the
latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury ·of the
residents and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.

The Sandiganbayan, however, allowed the quashal of the Information due to the prosecution's
failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits granted by Castillo to the Arciagas
and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the point of moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the
people of Molino. According to the Sandiganbayan:

to inform the accused of the quantity of injury caused by Castillo to the residents of Villa Esperanza
and the amount of unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas as a result of the operation of the
dumpsite. Such failure is fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that the public prosecutor is
barred from presenting evidence on a matter not alleged in the information. Otherwise, if the
prosecution would be allowed to present evidence to quantify the element of undue injury or
unwarranted benefits, the same would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.28 (Emphasis supplied.)

We disagree.

For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information charging
a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount
of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the
undue injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an
Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why
and how the crime was committed .29

As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo to the
Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws, rules, and
regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure the ill-effects of the
illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount
actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite
or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best
raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the
accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue
injury under the Information suffices.

Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one considers the
period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment and the parties'
presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso
amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury - to the point of moral
certainty, no less - at this stage of the criminal proceedings.

Application of Llorente ruling is misplaced

The Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.

Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, quantified and proven to
the point of moral certainty."30 The validity and sufficiency of the Information, however, was not an
issue in Llorente. The import of the ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by
the prosecution during the trial and not when the Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorente did we
require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to the point of moral certainty at the
time of the filing of the Information. Such an interpretation would effectively require the prosecution
to include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue injury
even prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan 's interpretation of Llorente, the
accused would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence as soon as the Information is filed
and even before he pleads. This runs counter to the function of a motion to quash as a remedy
afforded an accused before he proceeds to trial.

Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a tool for an
accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as it requires that the Information
already contain a long and detailed list of other matters not necessary in informing the accused of
the charge. It will also be prejudicial to the prosecution who will then be forced to present evidence
even before the trial proper. This interpretation cannot be countenanced.

Outright quashal of the Information not proper Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
Information was defective on the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense,
outright quashal of the Information is not the proper course of action.

Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It provides –

Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall
be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment. (Emphasis supplied.)
1âw phi 1

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the
defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information.31 Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment.32 In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information;
rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment.33This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be
cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to
prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade,34 the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court.

Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such
right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of
Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.

Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have first
ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the parties from resorting to
an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in the docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long
period.

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan's
Resolutions dated January 9, 2002 and November 3, 2003 are REVERSED and the Information
charging Castillo and the Arciagas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 is ordered
REINSTATED. As this case has been pending for almost fifteen years, the Sandiganbayan is
directed to resolve the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson's
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as additional Members per Raffle dated September 2, 2015 in view of the
recusal of Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. and Diosdado M. Peralta due to
relation to a party and prior action in the Sandiganbayan, respectively.

** Designated as Acting Member in view of the leave of a ence of Associate Justice

Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, with Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario,
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., rollo, pp.
68-75.

2
Penned by Associate Justices Rodolfo G. Palattao, with Associate Justices Gregory S.
Ong, Norberto Y. Geraldez, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr.,
rollo, pp. 101- 108.

3
Otherwise knowf ats f Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.

4
Rollo, pp. 119-121

5
Id at 248-273.

6
Id. at 270-271.

7
Resolution dated September 6, 2001, rollo, p. 122.

8
Otherwise known as the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000.

9
Rollo, pp. 122-124.

10
Id. at 125.

11
G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 382.

Administrative Order No. 278-2001 dated October 30, 2001. This Special Division of Five
12

was composed of the following Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan: Narciso S. Nario,
Rodolfo G. Palattao, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr. Resolution dated November 3, 2003, rollo, p. 68.

13
Associate Justices Palattao, Nario and Cortez-Estrada voted to grant Castillo's motion, with
dissents from Justices Ferrer and VHlaruz, Jr., rollo, p.

14
Rollo, pp. 72-73.
15
This Special Division of Five was now composed of the following Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan: Rodolfo G. Palattao, Gregory S. Ong, Norberto Y. Geraldez, Ma Cristina G.
Cortez Estrada and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. Associate Justices Palattao, Ong and Cortez-
Estrada voted to deny the People's motion. Associate justices Geraldez and Villaruz
dissented, rollo, 108.

16
People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252 (1952).

17
Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 1.

18
Los Banos v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, 586 SCRA 303.

19
Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145.

20
People v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-34112, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 190.

21
Gov. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2 09, 604 SCRA 322
citing People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 492.

22
G.R. No. 180122, March 13,2009,581 SCRA 431.

23
Id. at 446

24
Id.

25
Id.

Uriarte v. People, G.R. No. 169251, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 471, 486, citing
26

Santos v. People, G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 185, 194; Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCR 377, 386; and Jacinto v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84571, October 2, 1989, 178 SCRA 254, 259

27
Rollo, pp. 119-120.

28
Id. at 74

29
See Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431; People
v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 492; Gov. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 322.

30
Supra note 11 at 399.

People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014; People v. Talao Perez, 98 Phil.
31

764 (1956).

32
People v. Andrade, supra.

33
Id.

34
Id.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006

JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE
OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner Jocelyn E. Cabo seeking to nullify the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, dated May 4 and July 20, 2005 in Criminal Case
No. 27959.

The following are the antecedent facts:

On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. The
information alleged:

That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BONIFACIO C.
BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, a high ranking public official,
with the use of his influence as such public official, committing the offense in relation to his office,
together with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and
accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS
AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated
Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy group charged with conducting a feasibility
study for the Community-Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with
accused Cabo giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the said
accused having officially intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy
services with the Municipality of Barobo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary investigation as she never received any
notice to submit a counter-affidavit or countervailing evidence to prove her innocence, petitioner filed
a motion for reinvestigation2before the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, where the case was
raffled and docketed as Criminal Case No. 27959. The Sandiganbayan subsequently granted
petitioner’s motion on March 29, 2004 and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation insofar as petitioner is concerned.3

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to travel abroad for a family
vacation.4 The Sandiganbayan granted the same in an order dated May 14, 2004 that reads:

Acting on the Motion With Leave Of Court To Travel Abroad dated May 11, 2004 filed by accused
Jocelyn E. Cabo through counsel, Atty. Tomas N. Prado, and considering the well-taken reason
therein stated, the same is hereby GRANTED.
However, considering that this case is still pending reinvestigation/review before the Office of the
Special Prosecutor; considering further that the accused has not yet been arraigned by reason
thereof; and considering finally that there is a need for the Court to preserve its authority to conduct
trial in absentia should the accused fail to return to the Philippines, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, with
her express conformity, is hereby ordered arraigned conditionally. If upon such
reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no probable cause to proceed against said
accused, the conditional arraignment this morning shall be with no force and effect. However, if it
should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment or to pave the way for the filing
of some other indictment/s, then the accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule
110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy.

When arraigned, the Information having been read in a language known and familiar to her, accused
Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, Atty. Tomas N. Prado, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged in the Information.

Accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, shall affix her signature in the minutes of
the proceedings to signify her conformity to her acceptance of the conditional arraignment and the
legal consequences thereof as herein explained.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner returned from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded its
reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.7 Thus, the
Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of petitioner and her co-accused on October 12, 2004.8

On the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation With
Motion9 praying that "she be allowed to [re]iterate on her previous plea of ‘not guilty’ x x x entered
during her conditional arraignment held last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excused from
attending the scheduled arraignment for October 12, 2004." It does not appear, however, that the
Sandiganbayan acted upon the said motion.

The following day, petitioner’s co-accused Balahay failed to appear for arraignment. This prompted
the Sandiganbayan to order the arrest of Balahay as well the confiscation of his bail bond.10 Upon
motion for reconsideration of Balahay, however, the Sandiganbayan recalled the warrant for his
arrest and reinstated the bail bond.11 His arraignment was subsequently reset for November 30,
2004.12

On November 24, 2004, Balahay, through counsel, filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense.13 While Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes
the act of "(d)irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person, in connection with any transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law," the information alleged only in general terms that Balahay "intervened in the
undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo."
In other words, the information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract
under the law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor.

On January 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution14 sustaining Balahay’s contention that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019. Apart from the failure to allege that Balahay had to officially intervene in the transaction
pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted and received the money "for himself or
for another." The information was thus defective in that it failed to allege every single fact necessary
to constitute all the elements of the offense charged.

The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the information. It held that
under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, "if the motion to quash is based on the ground that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not quash
the information outright, but should instead direct the prosecution to correct the defect therein by
proper amendment. It is only when the prosecution fails or refuses to undertake such amendment, or
when despite such amendment the information still suffers from the same vice or defect,"15 that the
court would be finally justified in granting the motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan thus gave the
prosecution a period of 15 days from notice within which to file an amended information that is
sufficient as to both form and substance.

On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information which incorporated all the
essential elements of the crime charged, to wit:

That on or about 08 August 2000, in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY,
then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, a high ranking public official, in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of
authority, and committing the offense in relation to his office, conspiring and confederating with
JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100
(P104,162.31) for his own benefit or use from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient
Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy group charged with conducting a
feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of
Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of
the contract for said feasibility study, which contract accused Balahay in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended information. Petitioner
was likewise notified of her re-arraignment which was set on April 14, 2005.17 However, on April 11,
2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment18 on the ground that the amended
information pertained to Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned
on the amended information since substantial amendment of an information is not allowed after a
plea had already been made thereon.

On May 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s motion
for lack of merit, to wit:

[T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original information was only conditional in nature and
that the same was resorted to as a mere accommodation in her favor to enable her to travel abroad
without this Court losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in the event she decides to abscond.
However, as clearly stated in the Court’s Order of May 14, 2004, accused Cabo agreed with the
condition that should there be a need to amend the information, she would thereby waive, not only
her right to object to the amended information, but also her constitutional protection against double
jeopardy. Now that the original information has been superseded by an amended information, which
was specifically filed by the prosecution, and thereafter admitted by this Court, on the basis of
Section 4, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, accused Cabo is already estopped
from raising any objection thereto.19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration20 from the foregoing resolution on the additional ground
that double jeopardy had already set in. She asserted that her conditional arraignment under the
original information had been validated or confirmed by her formal manifestation dated October 7,
2004, wherein she reiterated her plea of "not guilty." Thus, her arraignment on the original
information was no longer conditional in nature such that double jeopardy would attach.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the second assailed resolution
dated July 20, 2005.21 Consequently, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
holding that her arraignment on the original information was conditional in nature and that a re-
arraignment on the amended information would not put her in double jeopardy.

The issue here boils down to whether double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the "not guilty"
plea entered by petitioner on the original information. She argues that it would, considering that her
arraignment, which was initially conditional in nature, was ratified when she confirmed her "not guilty"
plea by means of a written manifestation. In other words, the trial court could no longer assert that
she waived her right to the filing of an amended information under the terms of her conditional
arraignment because she has, in effect, unconditionally affirmed the same.

Petitioner’s assertions must fail.

Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of "conditionally" arraigning the
accused pending reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the
regular rules of procedure.22 In People v. Espinosa,23 however, the Court tangentially recognized the
practice of "conditionally" arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions attached
thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court ventured further by
requiring that said conditions be expressly stated in the order disposing of the arraignment.
Otherwise, it was held that the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.24

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set forth the
conditions for petitioner’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel
abroad. Among the conditions specified in said order is "if it should be found that there is a need to
amend the present indictment x x x, then the accused shall waive her right to object under Section
14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected
against double jeopardy." Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional arraignment
and was presumably apprised of the legal consequences of such conditions. In fact, she signed the
minutes of the proceedings which could only signify her informed acceptance of and conformity with
the terms of the conditional arraignment.

Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such conditions on the pretext that she
affirmed her conditional arraignment by means of a written manifestation. To begin with, there is no
showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled on her written manifestation and motion that she be allowed
to merely confirm her previous plea on the original information. It is likewise doubtful that petitioner
may legally confirm her conditional arraignment by means of a mere written motion or manifestation.
Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires that "(t)he accused must be present at
the arraignment and must personally enter his plea."

At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle of double
jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. It is elementary that for double jeopardy
to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form
and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge.25 In the instant case, the original information
to which petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" was neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a
conviction, and the criminal case was also neither dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could
not, therefore, attach even if petitioner is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the
original charge.

It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to allege all the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense
and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be sustained on
the basis of such information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted
when she entered her plea of "not guilty" to the insufficient indictment.

Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner. What the
Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the information pursuant to the express provision
of Section 4, Rule 117, which states:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall
be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when petitioner’s co-accused filed a
motion to quash the original information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense.
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the original information can be cured by amendment even after
she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters
of form and not of substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not violate the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

xxxx

In Poblete v. Sandoval,26 the Court explained that an amendment is only in form when it merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and does not introduce new and material
facts. Amendment of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is allowed, if the
amended information merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.

In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the indictment, the
amended information did not change the nature of the offense which is for violation of Section 3(b),
R.A. No. 3019. The amended information merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory
portion of the previous information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential elements of the
crime charged.

An examination of the two informations in this case would justify the preceding observation. While
the first information alleged that Balahay committed the offense "with the use of his influence as
such public official" "together with" petitioner, the amended information stated that he did so "in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of
authority" while "conspiring and confederating" with petitioner. Then too, while it was averred
previously that Balahay received and accepted the money from petitioner, with the latter "giving and
granting the said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having officially
intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services", the amended
information simply specified that Balahay received the money "for his own benefit or use" and that
the contract mentioned in the first information was one that Balahay, "in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law."

Consequently, even if we treat petitioner’s arraignment on the original information as "unconditional,"

the same would not bar the amendment of the original information under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-
arraignment on the amended information will not prejudice petitioner’s rights since the alterations
introduced therein did not change the nature of the crime. As held in People v. Casey:27

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said
to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable
to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows
that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto,
which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a
charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to
be one of form and not of substance – not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by
Section 13 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Likewise, it is not necessary, as petitioner suggests, to dismiss the original complaint under the last
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which states:

xxxx

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would
not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that there was no mistake
in charging the proper offense in the original information. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan:

[I]t is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal of the original information and then direct
the filing of a new one "charging the proper offense". The reason for this is obvious. The prosecution
did not commit a mistake in charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file an information
sufficient to charge the offense it intended to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently relied upon by
accused Cabo contemplates a situation where the accused will be charged with an offense different
from or is otherwise not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information to be
dismissed by the Court. In the case at bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a
different offense or with an offense that is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
original information, but with the very same offense that the prosecution intended to charge her in
the first place, that is, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.28

All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the re-
arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of
petitioner’s "conditional arraignment" on the first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of
double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the
charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his express consent.29 The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case
at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 34.

2 Records, Vol. I, pp. 71-74.

3 Id. at 139.

4 Id. at 169-170.

5Id. at 191. Penned by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Efren N.
De la Cruz.

6 Id. at 215-223.

7 Id. at 278-281.

8 Rollo, p. 36.

9 Records, Vol. I, pp. 293-294.

10 Id. at 296.

11 Id. at 312.

12 Id. at 314.

13 Rollo, pp. 41-45.

14Id. at 46-56. Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.

15 Id. at 55.

16 Id. at 57-58.
 17 Records, Vol. I, pp. 402-404.

18 Rollo, pp. 60-63.

19 Id. at 18-19

20 Records, Vol. I, pp. 439-444.

21 Rollo, pp. 20-31.

22 See People v. Espinosa, 456 Phil. 507, 515 (2003).

23 Id.

24 Id. at 519.

25 RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 7.

26 G.R. No. 150610, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 346, 356.

27 No. L-30146, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 21, 31-32.

28 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

29 Alonto v. People, G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 624, 641.

G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015

JOVITO CANCERAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 10, 2012
Decision1 and the March 7, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No.
00559, which affirmed and modified the September 20, 2007 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2003-141,
convicting petitioner Jovito Canceran (Canceran) for consummated Theft.

The records disclose that Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was
charged with "Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:

That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery
Department, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Jovito Canceran, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another with his co-accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz,
Jr., a Unilever Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at
₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they
were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further
carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, to the damage and prejudice of the
Ororama Mega Center.

Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Version of the Prosecution

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc),a security
guard; and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer of Ororama Mega
Center (Ororama),as its witnesses. Through their testimonies, the prosecution established that on or
about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Canceran approach one of the counters in Ororama; that
Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid
₱1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon
inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not
Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth ₱28,627.20; that
Canceran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate, Canceran
stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being questioned, he tried to settle with the
guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he tried to take; that Arcenio
refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.5

Version of the Defense

Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo
merchandiser of La Tondeña, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to buy
medicinefor his wife. On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person
ofaround 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he did not
know the name of this man who gavehim ₱1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic
Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because he was struck by his
conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at the
cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons ran after
him, and he was caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was mauled and
kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110 cellular phone and cash
amounting to ₱2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while a certain Amion took
his necklace.6

Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on October 9,2002
which was eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information was filed for the same
offense over the same incident and became the subject of the present case.7

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People8 that under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),there is no crime of "Frustrated Theft." Canceran was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years, eight (8) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.9

The RTC wrote that Canceran’s denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported
by sufficient and convincing evidence and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate his
claims. As such, his denial was considered self-serving and deserved no weight. The trial court was
also of the view that his defense, that the complaint for theft filed against him before the sala of
Judge Maximo Paderanga was already dismissed, was not persuasive. The dismissal was merely a
release order signed by the Clerk of Court because he had posted bail.10

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for the first time.
The CA held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea and so
the first jeopardy never attached.11

The CA also debunked Canceran’s contention that there was no taking because he merely pushed
the cart loaded with goods to the cashier’s booth for payment and stopped there. The appellate court
held that unlawful taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender gained possession of
the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the same.12

The CA affirmed with modification the September 20, 2007 judgment of the RTC, reducing the
penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Canceran moved for the reconsideration of the said decision, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its March 7, 2013 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

As can be synthesized from the petition and other pleadings, the following are the issues: 1] whether
Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information; and 2]
whether there was double jeopardy.

Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction. He insists that there was already
double jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and yet he was convicted
in the second case. Canceran also contends that there was no taking of the Ponds cream
considering that "the information in Criminal Case No. 2003-141 admits the act of the petitioner did
not produce the crime of theft."13 Thus, absent the element of taking, the felony of theft was never
proved.

In its Comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)contended that there was no double
jeopardy as the first jeopardy never attached. The trial court dismissed the case even before
Canceran could enter a plea during the scheduled arraignment for the first case. Further, the
prosecution proved that all the elements of theft were present in this case.

In his Reply,15 Canceran averred that when the arraignment of the first case was scheduled, he was
already bonded and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that the evidence was
insufficient or the evidence lacked the element to constitute the crime of theft. He also stressed that
there was no unlawful taking as the items were assessed and paid for.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

Constitutional Right of the

Accused to be Informed of
the Nature and Cause of
Accusation against Him.

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.16 It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.17

Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking
away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without
violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated
stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all."18

"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into
the concept of ‘taking’ itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree
of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the
crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution
have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished."19

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with
"Frustrated Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:

x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of
Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented
by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of accused’s will x x x.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge
Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never
produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged
with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser
crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the
complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing
the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it
is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He
has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put
on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information on
which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right."20 Indeed, an accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.21 An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.22

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage.
In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft,
he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict
him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft,
the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the allegations against him, as he so protests.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not
from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have
been violated – these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information."23 In the case of Domingo v. Rayala,24 it was written:

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts
or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.25

In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which was "Frustrated
Theft," may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by
the additional allegation, "but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent
of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who
prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x
x.26 This averment, which could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge
nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused,
Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him was
consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when

the first jeopardy never
attached

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. The rule of double
jeopardy has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.27
Canceran argues that double jeopardy exists as the first case was scheduled for arraignment and
he, already bonded, was ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that there was
insufficient evidence to constitute the crime of theft.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.28

Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy before the
RTC. Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same must
1âwphi1

still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself
admitted that he was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was
able to do so. Second, there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was not
terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he posted bail. Absent these two
elements, there can be no double jeopardy.

Penalty of Attempted Theft

The penalty for consummated theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.29 The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon principals in an attempt to commit a felony.30 The basis for reduction of penalty by two
degrees is the penalty prescribed by law for the consummated crime. Also, when the offenses
defined in the RPC are punished with a penalty composed of two periods, like in the crime of theft,
the penalty lower by one degree is formed by two periods to be taken from the same penalty
prescribed.31

Here, the products stolen were worth ₱28,627.20. Following Article 309 par. 1 of the RPC, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in. the same paragraph, because the
value of the things stolen exceeded ₱22,000.00. In other words, a special aggravating circumstance
shall affect the imposable penalty.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be within the range of
Arresto Mayor Minimum to Arresto Mayor Medium. In view of the special aggravating circumstance
under Article 309 (1), the maximum penalty should be Arresto Mayor Maximum to Prision
Correccional Minimum in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 10, 2012 Decision and the March
7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00559 are hereby MODIFIED, in that,
the Court finds accused Jovito Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted
Theft.

Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term ranging from
Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months of Prision
Correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer 'of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 2079, dated June 29, 2015.

1
Rollo pp. 20-34; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justice
Pedro B. Corales and Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, concurring.

2
Id. at 36-37.

3
Id. at 8-18.

4
Id. At 21.

5
Id. at 22.

6
Id. at 13-14.

7
Id. at 68.

8
552 Phil. 381 (2007).
9
Rollo, p. 18.

10
Id. at 17.

11
Id. at 28.

12
Id. at 30.

13
Id. at 4.

14
Id. at 65-71.

15
Id. at 73-74.

16
Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

17
Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, 201Phil. 311 (1982).

18
Valenzuela v. People, supra note 8.

19
Id.

20
United States v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368, 371 (1912).

21
People v. Manalili, 355 Phil. 652, 684 (1998).

22
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

23
People v. Resayaga, 242 Phil 869, 874 (1988)

24
569 Phil 423, 454 (2008), citing People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil 630, 649-650.

Domingo v. Rayala, 569 Phil 423, 454 (2008), citing People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil 630, 649-
25

650.

26
Rollo, p. 21.

27
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 767-768 (1950).

28
Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 129.

29
Article 309 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000.00, but does not exceed 22,000.00; but if the value of
the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of the code the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. 30Article 51, Revised Penal Code.
31
The Revised Penal Code. Luis. B. Reyes. Book One, 16th Edition (2006), p. 708.