Control of Executive Departments [Art. VII, Sec.

17]

Control

Is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or to set aside what a subordinate has done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute one's own judgment to that of a subordinate. (Mondano v.
Silvosa [1955])

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency(Alter Ego Principle)

All the different executive and administrative organizations are mere adjuncts of the Executive
Department. This is an adjunct of the Doctrine of Single Executive. The heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. [Villena v. Sec.
of Interior (1939)]

The exceptions are. —

(1) in cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to
act in person or

(2) the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive depts. In
the regular course of business, acts of exec. depts., unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively acts of the Chief Executive. [Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor and
Employment (1981)]

Power to Abolish Offices

Generally, power to abolish a public office is legislative.

BUT,

as far as bureaus, offices, or agencies of the executive dept. are concerned, power of control may
justify him to inactivate functions of a particular office. (See Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora
(2001), where the President effectively abolished the Economic Intelligence Bureau by
“deactivating” it, transferring its functions to other agencies.)

General Supervision over local government units and the autonomous regions

The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments.[Art. X, Sec. 4]
The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed. [Art. X, Sec. 16]

Supervision and Control, Distinguished

Supervision Control
Overseeing or the power or authority of the officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make
them perform these duties. This does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are
within their discretion.

Supervision Control
then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these
duties. This does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are within
their discretion.

MILITARY POWERS

Commander-in-chief powers [Art. VII, Sec. 18]

(1) He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

(2) He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,or

(3) He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof.

The President shall be the Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines

The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before
Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the
commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the
commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. Outside explicit constitutional
limitations, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes
the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities
which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
[Gudani v. Senga (2006)].

Graduated Powers – Art. VII, sec. 18 grants the President,

as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
power[s].”

From the most to the least benign, these are:

1. the calling out power,

2. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
3. the power to declare martial law.

In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of
two conditions, namely,

1. an actual invasion or rebellion, and

2. that public safety requires the exercise of such power.

However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,

“[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ [Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (2004)].

Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence

This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution does not regulate its
exercise radically.

State of Rebellion

While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. (Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary [2004])

Exercise of Emergency Powers

Background: Presidential Proclamation 1017 (Declaring a State of National Emergency) is different

from the law in Sanlakas as this proclamation was woven out of the “calling out” and “take care”
powers of the President joined with the “temporary takeover” provision under Art.
XII, section 17. PP1017 purports to grant the President, without authority or delegation from Congress,
to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.

While the President could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment, the exercise of the emergency powers, such as the taking over
of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest, requires a
delegation from Congress which is the repository of emergency powers. (David v. Arroyo [2006])

Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

"Writ of habeas corpus"

Is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court

(1) if he has the person in custody; and (2) his basis in detaining that person

"Privilege of the writ"

Is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should not be tested.
Note that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself.

The requisites for the suspension are:

(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
(2) The public safety requires the suspension.

Duration: Not to exceed 60 days unless extended by Congress.

Effects of the suspension of the privilege:

(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons "judicially charged" for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion (art. VII, sec. 18[5]).
 (a) Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be arrested and detained without a
warrant of arrest.

(b) The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without warrant legal. But the
military is, in effect,
enabled to make the arrest anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no
remedy available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention).

(c) The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency situation and the difficulty in
applying for a warrant considering the time and the number of persons to be arrested.

(d) The crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or invasion. As to
others, the suspension of the privilege does not apply.

(2) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be
released. (art. VII, sec. 18[6])

(a) The effect therefore is only to extend the periods during which he can be detained without
a warrant. When the privilege is suspended, the period is extended to 72 hours.

(b) What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released after 72 hours? The public officer
becomes liable under RPC Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery of detained persons."
(3) The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended. (art. III, sec. 13)

Proclaim Martial Law

The Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law are:

(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and

(2) Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof.

The following cannot be done [Art. VII, Sec. 18]:

(1) Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
(2) Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies.
(3) Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are
able to function.

"Open Court" doctrine. —Civilians cannot be tried by

military courts if the civil courts are open and
functioning.If the civil courts are not functioning, then
civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial law
usually contemplates a case where the courts are
already closed and the civil institutions have already
crumbled, i.e. a "theater of war." If the courts are still
open, the President can just suspend the privilege and
achieve the same effect.

(4) Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The President must suspend the privilege expressly.

The Role of Congress (See art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1,2)

(1) Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or proclamation.

(2) Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in
Session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours
following the proclamation or suspension.

(3) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a
report, in person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the action he has
taken).

(4) The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options:
(a) To revoke such proclamation or suspension. When it so revoked, the President
cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as he normally would do in the case of bills.
(b) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity. Congress can only so extend
the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President. The period need
not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress would determine, based on the
persistence of the emergency.

Note: If Congress fails to act before the measure expires, it can no longer extend it until the President
again redeclares the measure.

Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or suspension, because it is already valid. (see Carpio,
dissenting, in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, infra)
If Congress extends the measure, but before the period of extension lapses the requirements for the
proclamation or suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension,
since the power to confer implies the power to take back.

The Role of the Supreme Court(See Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3)

(1) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of:
(a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or
(b) the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.
(c) Note: Calling-out power is purely discretionary on the President; the Constitution does not
explicitly provide for a judicial review of its factual basis.[IBP v.
Zamora (2001)]

(2) The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case. Although the Constitution reserves to
the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congressdefaults
in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review shouldthe Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or
suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the President’s action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. [Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(2012)]

(3) Petition for habeas corpus

(a) When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he
or someone else in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or
suspension.
(b) Before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the
proclamation or suspension.
(4) Limit on Calling out Power. —Test of Arbitrariness: The question is not whether the President or
Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. [IBP v.
Zamora, (2000)]. Amounts to a determination of whether or not there
was grave abuse of discretion amounting to ack or excess of jurisdiction.

There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to

be lifted: (P-C-S-O)
(1) Lifting by the President himself
(2) Revocation by Congress
(3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
(4) Operation of law after 60 days

Cf. RA 7055 (1991) "An Act Strengthening Civilian

Supremacy over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts
the Jurisdiction over Certain Offenses involving Members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other Persons Subject to
Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National
Police, Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential
Decrees"

RA 7055 effectively placed upon the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving
members of the AFP and other members subject to military law.

RA 7055 provides that when these individuals commit crimes or offenses penalized under the RPC,
other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether civilians are co-
accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, they
shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service-connected in which case it shall be tried by court-martial.

The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in
Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open
and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a
violation of the right to due process. [Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 (1987)]

PARDONING POWER

Nature of Pardoning Power

Power to reprieve, commute, pardon, remit fines and forfeitures after final judgment [Art. VII, Sec.
19(1)]

Forms of executive clemencies

(1) Reprieves - a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal penalty or sentence or
a stay of execution. (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY). It is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of
time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of
execution. [People vs. Vera (1937)]

(2) Commutations - Reduction of sentence. [Black’s Law Dictionary]. It is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. (Vera, supra)

(3) Amnesty - a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of
persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses and who are subject to trial but have not yet
been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed
time. (BLACK’S; Brown v. Walker, 161 US 602). Requires concurrence of majority of all members of
Congress (art. VII, sec. 19)

(4) Pardons - Permanent cancellation of sentence. [BLACK’S] It is an act of grace proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a
forgiveness of the offense. [Vera, supra]

Plenary or partial. —

(1) Plenary - extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities.
(2) Partial – does not extinguish all penalties imposed

Absolute or conditional. —

(1) Conditional - the offender has the right to reject the same since he may feel that the condition
imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted.
(2) Absolute pardon - pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he likes it or
not. In this sense, an absolute pardon is similar to commutation, w/c is also not subject to acceptance
by the offender.

Limitations on PARDON.—

(1) Cannot be granted on impeachment cases.(art. VII, sec. 19).

(2) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC. (art. IX-C, sec. 5).
(3) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment
(People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581)
(4) Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.
(5) Cannot be granted to cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt.
(6) Cannot restore public offices forfeited, even if pardon restores the
eligibility for said offices. [Monsanto v. Factoran (1989)]
Pardon Amnesty
Infractions of peace of the state Addressed to Political Offenses Granted to individuals To classes of
persons Exercised solely by the executive Requires concurrence of Congress Private act which must be
pleaded and proved Public act which the courts could take judicial notice Looks forward and relieves
the pardonee of the consequences of the offense Looks backward and puts into oblivion the offense
itself Extended after final judgment
May be extended at any stage

(5) Remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment

Exceptions:
(a) In cases of impeachment, and
(b) As otherwise provided in this Constitution

For election offenses- No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation
by the Commission on Elections. [Art. IX, sec. 5]

Probation - disposition where a defendant after conviction and sentence is released subject to (1)
conditions imposed by the court and
(2) supervision of a probation officer.(PD No. 968, sec. 3[a])

Parole- suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon
which the sentence shall be suspended. (REYES)

Application of Pardoning Powers to Admin. Cases

(1) If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
(2) However, the power of the President to grant executive clemency in administrative cases refers
only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of
the govt. [Llamas v. Executive Secretary (1991)]

Removal of administrative penalties Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities – In meritorious

cases and upon recommendation of the (Civil Service) Commission, the President may commute or
remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or employees in disciplinary
cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the
interest of the service. [Sec. 53, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 ]

Who may avail of amnesty?

(Asked 5 times in the Bar; answers from case law)

Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 applies even to Hukbalahaps already undergoing sentence upon the date
of its promulgation. The majority of the Court believes that by its context and pervading spirit the
proclamation extends to all members of the Hukbalahap. [Tolentino v. Catoy (1948)]
The SC agreed with the Sandiganbayan that in fact the petitioners were expressly disqualified from
amnesty. The acts for which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion
and consisting only of diversion of public funds to private profit. The amnesty proclamation covered
only acts in the furtherance of resistance to duly constituted authorities of the Republic and applies
only to members of the MNLF, or other antigovernment
groups. [Macagaan v. People (1987)]

DIPLOMATIC POWER

Scope of Diplomatic Power-The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs.

The President is vested with the authority:

(1) to deal with foreign states and governments;

(2) extend or withhold recognition;
(3) maintain diplomatic relations;
(4) enter into treaties; and
(5) transact the business of foreign relations. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary (2005)]

Treaty-making power

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate. [Art. VII, sec. 21]

Treaty - as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “an international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its
particular designation.” [Bayan v. Executive Secretary (2000)] Other terms for a treaty: act, protocol,
agreement, compromis d’ arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration,
exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi.

Note:It is the President who RATIFIES a treaty (not the Senate), the Senate merely CONCURES. [Bayan
v. Executive Secretary, supra]

The President cannot be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence; she has the sole
power to submit it to the Senate and/or to ratify it. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo (2011)]

Executive Agreements

(1) Entered into by the President

(2) Need no concurrence
(3) Distinguished from treaties- International agreements involving political issues or changes in
national policy and those involving international agreements of permanent character usually take the
form of TREATIES. But the international agreements involving adjustments in detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving a more or less temporary character
usually take the form of EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. [Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading
(1961)]
(4) Executive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without the
concurrence of the Senate. From the point of view of international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between an executive
agreement and a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international
legal significance. [USAFFE Veterans Assn. v. Treasurer (1959)]

Two Classes of Executive Agreements. —

(1) Agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or
without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements; and
(2)Agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or Congressional-Executive Agreements.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. [Gonzales v
Hechanova (1963)]

Once the Senate performs the power to concur with treaties or exercise its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed as an abuse of power,
much less a grave abuse of discretion. [Bayan v. Executive Secretary, supra, on the
constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement] Deportation of undesirable aliens . The President
may deport only according to grounds enumerated by law, otherwise it would be unreasonable and
undemocratic. [Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (1963)]

2 ways of deporting an undesirable alien. —

(1) by order of the President after due investigation, pursuant to sec. 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code;
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration under section 37 of the immigration Law [Qua
Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, supra]

Scope of the power

(1) The Deportation Board can entertain deportation based on grounds not specified in sec. 37 of the
Immigration Law. The Board has jurisdiction to investigate the alien even if he had not been convicted
yet.
(2) The President’s power to deport aliens and to investigate them subject to deportation are provided
in the Revised Administrative Code.
(3) The State has inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. This power is exercised by the
President.
(4) There is no legal orconstitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the
intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive the full discretion to determine whether an alien’s
residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect the security, welfare or
interest of the state.
(5) The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which would warrant
the deportation of aliens. [Go Tek v. Deportation Board
(1977)]

POWERS RELATIVE TO APPROPRIATION MEASURES

Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

Requisites for contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans:

(1) With the concurrence of the monetary board [Art. VII, Sec. 20]
(2) subject to limitations as may be provided by law [Art. XII, Sec. 2]
(3) information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed shall be made available to the public [Art. XII,
Sec. 2] Cf. Republic Act 4860

An Act Authorizing The President Of The Philippines To Obtain Such Foreign Loans And Credits, Or To
Incur Such
Foreign Indebtedness, As May Be Necessary To Finance Approved Economic Development Purposes Or
Projects,
And To Guarantee, In Behalf Of The Republic Of The Philippines, Foreign Loans Obtained Or Bonds
Issued By
Corporations Owned Or Controlled By The Government Of The Philippines For Economic Development
Purposes
Including Those Incurred For Purposes Of Re-Lending To The Private Sector, Appropriating The
Necessary Funds
Therefore, And For Other Purposes (Approved, September 8, 1966.)

Role of Congress: The President does not need prior approval by the Congress

(1) Because the Constitution places the power to check the President’s power on the Monetary Board;
(2) BUT Congress may provide guidelines and have them enforced through the Monetary Board

Prepare and Submit the Budget

The President shall submit to Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. [Art. VII, Sec. 22]

The budget is the plan indicating:

(1) expenditures of the government,
(2) sources of financing, and
(3) receipts from revenue-raising measures.
The budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be passed by Congress. Through the budget,
therefore, the President reveals the priorities of the government. Fixing of tariff rates [Sec 28, Art VI]

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix—

(1) within specified limits, and
(2) subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose:
(a) tariff rates,
(b) import and export quotas,
(c) tonnage and wharfage dues;
(d) other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government. Rationale for delegation: highly technical nature of international
commerce, and the need to constantly and with relative ease adapt the rates to
prevailing commercial standards.

DELEGATED POWERS

Principle: The President, under martial rule or in a revolutionary government, may exercise delegated
legislative powers. (See CONST., art. VI, sec. 23[2]) Congress
may delegate legislative powers to the president in times of war or in other national emergency.
(BERNAS)

Emergency powers

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. [Art. VI, Sec. 23]

Different from the Commander-in-Chief clause:

(1) When the President acts under the Commander-in- Chief clause, he acts under a Constitutional
grant of military power, which may include the law-making power.

(2) When the President acts under the emergency power, he acts under a Congressional delegation of
lawmaking power. Meaning of “power necessary and proper” - Power to issue
rules and regulations

This power is:

(1) for a limited period, and
(2) subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide.

When Emergency Powers cease

(1) According to the text of the Constitution - The power

ceases:
(a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress; or
(b) if Congress fails to adopt such resolution, upon the next (voluntary) adjournment of
Congress.

(2) According to Cases

(a) The fact that Congress is able to meet in session uninterruptedly and adjourn of its own will
proves that the emergency no longer exists to justify the delegation. (See Araneta v Dinglasan
(1949), on Congress’ grant of emergency powers under C.A.
671; Court held that C.A. 671, being temporary, need not be expressly repealed by a law)
(b) This rule or the termination of the grant of emergency powers is based on decided cases,
which in turn became art. VII, sec. 15 of the 1973 Constitution.
(c) The specific power to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative is a limitation on the general power to exercise such other powers as
the executive may deem necessary to enable the government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
maintain and enforce its authority. [Rodriguez v Gella (1953)]

Inconsistency between the Constitution and the cases:

(BARLONGAY)

(1) The Constitution (See art. VI, sec. 23[2]) states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment of Congress unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress

(2) Cases tell us that the emergency powers shall cease upon resumption of session.

(3) Reconciling the two: it would not be enough for Congress to just resume session in order that the
emergency powers shall cease. It has to pass a resolution withdrawing such emergency powers,
otherwise such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress.

VETO POWER

General rule: all bills must be approved by the President before they become law

Exceptions:
(1) The veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the Members of the House where it
originated;
(2) The bill lapsed into law because the inaction of the President; and
(3) The bill passed is the special law to elect the President and Vice-President. This gives the President
an actual hand in legislation. However, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it as a whole.
(see Legislative Power of Congress) It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding
a veto [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is
claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line
where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
[PHILCONSA v Enriquez (1994)]

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
See discussion under Presidential Privilege.

RESIDUAL POWERS

General doctrine:The President has unstated residual powers, which are implied from the grant of
executive power necessary for her to comply with her Constitutional duties, such as to Safeguard and
protect the general welfare.

It includes powers unrelated to the execution of any provision of law. [See Marcos v. Manglapus (1988)]
In Marcos v. Manglapus, supra, the Court held that then- President Corazon Aquino had the power to
prevent the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines on account of the volatile national security
situation.

This was limitedonly by two standards:

(1) there must be a factual basis for the impairment of the Marcoses’ right to return (as distinguished
from their right to travel, which is a constitutional right); and
(2) the impairment must not be arbitrary. N.B. The decision was pro hac vice.