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FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the
court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by
law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in
its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one
class against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according
to the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a
greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by
the crime.

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment;
to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to
those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval
of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.

PD 603 (THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE)

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the
proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him
the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by
the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one
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years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he
has been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as
it may prescribe.

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006

RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner, vs.HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas
City, and FRANK BANSALES, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent Frank
Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras.
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in President
Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After conducting
the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that
the victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different parts of the body. 2
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor with the Family Court. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High
School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter
multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne
Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength considering that the attack was made by the accused using a long knife which the
latter carried along with him from his house to the school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and
defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her
death. 3
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003
finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his
commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds CICL
Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of
minority, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil
indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages,
Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney’s fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and unearned income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National
High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was
established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school
hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the law
(CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz
Provincial Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his
counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public Prosecutor,
the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth,
considering that the accused would turn 18 on June 3, 2003. 5
Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial court’s decision suspending the sentence of the accused and
committing him to the rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
(otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not
apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
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In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering that the offense
charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of
his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic
suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did not
abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent’s sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended
sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty
for the crime charged as provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for
the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he
has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari. 8 This is in line with the underlying
spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the OSG has
filed its comment on the petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion
of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10 A direct invocation of the original
jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised
and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for
certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident
premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found
him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the
proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him,
the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds
that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further
proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
or to any training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have
reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the
reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training
institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the
Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over
the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such
conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one
who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law,
the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be suspended without
need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference
within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the
Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of
the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and
supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
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Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law
authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in
conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and
progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the
presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be
deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age
or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving
of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." 15 The word
"punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17
the Court defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to the possible, not
to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the
penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines
the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless,
ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any
civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose
the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension
of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of
Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having
their sentences suspended.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the
same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is
supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference
thereto. 19 Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national
policy. 20
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending the
sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130602 March 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA, ANTONINO FLORA
y SABADO, JR., LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR., accused, MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA, accused-
appellant.
Accused Michael Fronda (hereafter FRONDA); Antonino Flora, Jr.; and Lauro Millamina, Jr., were charged with and
tried for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, 1 as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R under an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of October, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 June Corpuz and PO2 Ceasary Harry Bedey,
members of the Philippine National Police, Baguio City, one (1) kilo marijuana leaves wrapped with newspaper, a
prohibited drug, well knowing that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do
so, in violation of the aforementioned provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Ceasary Harry Bedey and PO3 June Corpuz, who arrested
the accused, and Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villaseñor, the forensic chemist.
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After its Demurrer to Evidence was denied, the defense presented as witnesses the three accused and their
landlady, Mrs. Lolita Flora.
The prosecution's evidence was faithfully summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief as follows:
On October 8, 1998, around 12:00 high noon, Police Officer Cesary Harry Bedey, Desk Officer at the Baguio City
Police Office, was informed by a "concerned citizen" thru telephone that somebody was engaged in selling
marijuana at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 3). The caller mentioned the
names of Michael Fronda, Antonino Flora, Jr. and Lauro Millamina, Jr., as the marijuana dealers (TSN, ibid., p. 6).
After referring the matter to his superior, Officer Bedey was advised to look for Police Officer June Corpuz who was
also a resident of No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street (TSN, ibid., p. 4).
When Officer June Corpuz arrived at the police station around 8:30 in the evening, Bedey immediately relayed to
him the information about the drug dealing activities at the given address (TSN, ibid., pp. 4-5). Both of them then
agreed to verify "the information" and proceeded to 341 Bonifacio Street, which was also Corpuz' residence (TSN,
ibid., p. 5).
There were actually two (2) houses at 341 A. Bonifacio Street. The first house was the residence of the land lady,
Lolita Flora, while the second house was a two-storey building leased to bedspacers. There were 2 rooms at the
first floor and also two rooms at the second floor. One room at the first floor was occupied by Fronda, Flora and
Millamina and beside it was another room occupied by one Gilbert Mugot. At the second floor, Officer Corpuz
occupied the room directly above that of the accused (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 8-9).
To avoid detection, Corpuz then went ahead of Bedey and a woman companion. Upon reaching the place, he joined
the drinking session held at the room of Gilbert Mugot (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 4-5, 10).
Meanwhile, Bedey and his woman companion following Corpuz, proceeded to the house of the landlady and
inquired where the appellant and his co-accused resided (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 5-6; TSN, December 11,
1996, p. 5). After Lolita Flora had pointed to one of the rooms at the first floor, Bedey proceeded there and
knocked at the door (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 7). Somebody from inside then pulled the door open half-way
and asked, "What do you want?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 8-9,11,13).
As soon as the door was opened, Bedey stepped backwards, about 3 to 4 meters (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 9),
and then asked if he could buy marijuana (TSN, ibid., pp. 9,13).
Someone answered, "there is," and a square package wrapped in newspaper about 1 to 2 inches thick, 8 1/2
inches in width and 11 inches long was then handed to Bedey (TSN, ibid., pp. 9, 15, 16).
Bedey immediately opened the package a little, smelled it and determined that the contents were marijuana (TSN,
ibid., p. 20). At the same time, he asked, "How much?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 13-18).
When somebody answered "P1,000.00," Bedey immediately shouted "positive" (TSN, ibid., pp. 19-20).
Upon hearing Bedey, officer June Corpuz immediately rushed towards him from the next room (TSN, December 3,
1996, p. 11). He and Bedey then advised/invited the occupants of the room to come out (TSN, December 3, 1996,
ibid; December 11, 1996, p. 20) Michael Fronda, Lauro Millamina., Jr., and Antonino Flora, Jr. came out of the
room (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 22; December 3, 1996, pp. 11,14, 16-17).
The three were immediately brought to the police station and charged with selling marijuana (TSN, December 3,
1996, p. 18; December 11, 1996, p. 32). Meanwhile, the brick of marijuana was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where Alma Margarita Villaseñor, Forensic Chemist, subjected it to physical, chemical and confirmatory
tests (TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 38). The package, weighing 1.1 kilograms, was confirmed to be marijuana, a
prohibited drug (TSN, ibid., pp. 38-40, Exhibit "D").
The accused's defense is denial. Their version of the incident was also succinctly summarized by the OSG in its
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief, thus:
[The accused] claimed that they hailed from Talogtog, Nueva Ecija and were freshmen students at the University of
Baguio (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 13-14; February 6, 1997, p. 2). Since June 1996, they stayed as bedspacers at
the boarding house/apartment of Mrs. Lolita Flora at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City (TSN, February 4,
1997, p. 3; February 6, 1997, ibid).
From June 16 to September 30, 1996, only the three of them occupied a room located at the first floor of the
apartment. However, on October 1, 1996, one Ramil (Rommel) Oroy from Kapangan, Benguet, was taken in by
Mrs. Lolita Flora as another bedspacer and stayed with them in their room (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 3-4;
February 5, 1997, p. 2; February 6, 1997, p. 8).
Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 8, 1996, Fronda, Flora and Millamina came home one after the other
from their respective classes at the University of Baguio. At the time, Oroy was inside, talking with two (2)
unidentified visitors. They did not mind Oroy and his visitors and proceeded to eat their supper. Thereafter, the
three of them went to sleep (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 6-7, 19 24; February 5, 1997, pp. 9-10; February 6,
1997, pp. 4-6).
They were suddenly awakened when they heard someone calling their names and ordering them to go out of their
room (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 8-9; February 5, 1997, p. 4.). As soon as they went out, they were surprised
when they were handcuffed and brought to the police station for allegedly dealing in marijuana (TSN, February 4,
1997, pp. 9-12; February 5, 1997, pp. 6-8; February 6, 1997, pp. 6-7).
Mrs. Lolita Flora confirmed on the stand that, indeed, on October 8, 1996, appellant Fronda, Flora and Millamina
were sharing their room with a new boarder, Rommel/Ramil Oroy.
All the accused vigorously denied having anything to do with the brick of marijuana recovered on the night of 8
October 1996, which they allegedly saw for the first time only during the trial. 3 FRONDA claimed that he did not
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even know what a marijuana was. 4 Millamina denied that he was engaged in selling marijuana, and that any one
of them handed the marijuana to PO2 Bedey. 5
In its Decision of 6 March 1997, 6 the trial court found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to prove that the
accused conspired in delivering or dealing in marijuana. It reasoned that (1) the accused were literally caught
flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing a brick of marijuana to PO2 Bedey; (2) only the accused came out of the
room where the brick of marijuana was obtained; (3) the marijuana was sold and delivered by the three of them, if
not by one of them; (4) since the accused chose to cover up for each other, they must have acted together in
dealing in the marijuana; and (5) notwithstanding the fact that no money was exchanged, there was a transaction
of the delivery of the marijuana and the "twin elements of the selling transaction and the corpus delicti were
present to uphold a conviction under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended."
The trial court did not find credible accused's claim that they were mere students, since their classcards,
enrollment or registration papers, or even their teachers and classmates were not presented. It dismissed as
concocted and fabricated the defense's story that a fourth bedspacer named Rommel Oroy/Ramil Uroy was inside
the room of the accused with two unidentified visitors in the night of 8 October 1996 when the marijuana was
obtained by PO2 Bedey, considering that PO3 Corpuz testified categorically that only the three accused came out of
the room as occupants. If indeed Ramil Oroy and his two unidentified visitors were inside the room on that
occasion, they could not have escaped the attention of the policemen, there being only one door to the room and
the two policemen were outside that door when they asked the occupants to come out. Besides, when caught, the
accused did not tell the police that there were other occupants in the room. The Court disbelieved Lolita Flora's
corroborative testimony that a certain Ramil Oroy was also a bedspacer in that room and considered it as a last
minute attempt on her part to help out the three accused to create a doubt on who were inside the room at the
time.
The trial court thus convicted all the accused of violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, plus costs.
On 11 March 1997, all the three accused filed a Notice of Appeal. 7 However, two days later, Flora and Millamina
filed a Motion for Suspension of Sentence 8 under the provision of P.D. No. 603, as amended. 9 Pending its
resolution, the trial court issued an Order 10 holding in abeyance Flora and Millamina's Notice of Appeal until their
motion was resolved. It also stated that FRONDA's appeal would be forwarded to us only after the resolution of his
co-accused's motion for suspension of sentence.
During the hearing of the motion, the trial court informed Atty. Jaime Ulep, Flora and Millamina's new counsel, that
should the Supreme Court ultimately rule that the movants were not entitled to a suspended sentence, they might
lose their right to appeal because by their move to avail themselves of the benefit of the suspended sentence, they
could be deemed to have withdrawn their appeal and not to have disputed the trial court's finding of guilt. Thus,
Flora and Millamina were required to manifest to the court whether
(1) they are pursuing only the appeal of the decision in this case and therefore their appeal should be forwarded
immediately to the Supreme Court and that they are withdrawing their Motion for Suspension of Sentence which
shall no longer be resolved by the court; or
(2) they are pursuing only the motion to suspend sentence and therefore withdrawing their notice of appeal in
which case the court will resolve the Motion to Suspend Sentence immediately; or
(3) they are pursuing their motion for a suspension of sentence which should therefore be resolved by the court
and in the event the accused minors do not qualify, their appeal of the decision of the court convicting them should
nevertheless be forwarded to the Supreme Court as they are also pursuing the appeal. 11
In his Manifestation of 26 May 1997 Atty. Ulep stated that accused Flora and Millamina were "pursuing their motion
for a suspension of sentence and/or for the suspension of further proceedings under Article 192 of P.D. 603, as
amended"; and in the possibility that they would not qualify, they would file a petition to be admitted to bail and to
avail themselves of their right to appeal the decision. 12
On 4 June 1997, the trial court granted Flora and Millamina's motion for suspension of sentence 13 and amended
its decision by (1) reducing their penalty to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum on ground of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, both being below 18 years of age at the time the offense was
committed; (2) suspending their sentence for two years from 4 June 1997; (3) releasing Flora and Millamina and
committing them to the custody of their parents and grandparents, respectively, with the supervision of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Nueva Ecija; and (4) stating that should they behave
properly, they would be discharged and their case would be dismissed; otherwise, they would be returned to the
court for pronouncement of their penalty.
In its Order of 9 June 1997, the trial court forwarded to us the records of the case "for purposes of the appeal of
Michael Fronda only," 14 and ordered FRONDA's commitment to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for
preventive imprisonment pending appeal. 15
In our Resolution of 19 January 1998 we accepted not only the appeal of FRONDA, but also those of Flora and
Millamina. The acceptance of the appeals of Flora and Millamina was erroneous because they did not appeal from
the Amended Decision. Consequently, we shall deal only with FRONDA's appeal.
FRONDA alleges that (a) the trial court erred in convicting him solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and in
totally disregarding the evidence for the defense; (b) the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to warrant a
conviction; and (c) there being no factual or legal basis, the decision is a complete nullity.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief,
submitting that the prosecution's evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence required to overcome the
 7

constitutional presumption of innocence; and thus, regardless of the supposed weakness of their defense, all the
accused are entitled to acquittal. It therefore recommends the acquittal not only of appellant FRONDA, but also of
his co-accused, Flora and Millamina.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender or offenders, like the crime itself, must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Identification which does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot
be accorded any evidentiary force. 16 Thus, where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on the identity of the
malefactor, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. 17 In the absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused's constitutional right of presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal 18 even though his
innocence may be doubted. 19 The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of
primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution. 20
In the instant case, as correctly pointed out by both FRONDA and the OSG, the trial court's finding that FRONDA
and the other accused were "literally caught flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing in a brick of marijuana to Police
Officer Bedey" is not supported by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very
act of committing the crime." 21 To be caught flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification
by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, which is "that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption" 22 in contrast to circumstantial evidence which is "the
proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a
necessary or probable consequence." 23 Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker form of evidence vis-á-
vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. 24 No greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct; for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 25
In this case, as pointed out by the parties, neither PO2 Bedey, who transacted with and obtained the brick of
marijuana from "somebody" in the room at 341 A. Bonifacio St., Baguio City, nor PO3 Corpuz, who rushed to the
scene upon hearing Bedey shout "Positive," could identify the person or persons Bedey was talking to and dealing
with prior to and at the time the brick of marijuana was obtained. Thus, the trial court had to resort to inference
that since Bedey obtained the brick of marijuana from "somebody" from the same room occupied by FRONDA and
the other accused who, when their names were called, "volunteered" as occupants of the room, then one or some
of them must be responsible for selling and delivering to Bedey the marijuana.
From the testimony of PO2 Bedey on the circumstances resulting in the delivery of a brick of marijuana, it is clear
that none of the accused was caught flagrante delicto selling or delivering marijuana. Due to the darkness and lack
of illumination inside and outside the door where the transaction took place, Bedey could not identify the person he
was dealing with. He was not even sure how many person or persons he was talking to that night in question.
Significantly, he admitted that there were several persons who came out of the room other than the accused. Like
PO3 Corpuz, he did not even bother to enter the room to check whether there were persons other than the
accused. When Bedey was given the final chance to identify who among the three accused talked to him and
handed him the marijuana, he could not do so. 26
PO3 Corpuz, who was in another room when Bedey obtained the marijuana, neither witnessed the transaction
leading to the delivery of marijuana. His testimony that only the accused came out of the room was materially
contradicted by Bedey's testimony that besides the accused, there were other persons who came out of the room.
Moreover, Corpuz also admitted during cross examination that, like Bedey, he did not enter the room of the
accused and thus could not definitely rule out the possibility that there were other persons in the room aside from
the three. 27
In view of the admissions by the police officers who conducted the "operation" that they could not identify the
person or persons who transacted with Bedey and delivered the brick of marijuana, and that they did not bother to
enter the room where the marijuana was obtained, there is no moral certainty that FRONDA and the other accused
were responsible for the delivery of marijuana to Bedey.
Indeed, far from having been caught flagrante delicto, the evidence against FRONDA and his co-accused is, at
most, only circumstantial in nature. Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there should be an even greater
need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense
and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. 28 Under the Rules
of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated,
a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty. 29
The only circumstantial evidence clearly established by the prosecution against the accused are the following: (1)
the fact that a brick of marijuana was obtained by Bedey from "somebody" inside the room which the appellants
were also occupying; and (2) when called out, the accused "volunteered" to come out of the room. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of these circumstances do not satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court. They do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. They
do not exclude the possibility that other persons might have been the ones who transacted with Bedey and handed
 8

him the marijuana principally because the police officers failed to seal off the area from other curious boarders and
to enter the room to ensure that no other persons were still inside that room. Notably, Bedey testified that there
were other persons besides the accused who came out of the room.
The foregoing disquisitions render unnecessary a discussion on the trial court's finding of conspiracy.
A final word on the fate of Flora and Millamina is in order. We disagree with the view of the trial court that the
application and grant of Flora and Millamina's suspension of sentence presupposed their acceptance of the finding
of guilt against them and constituted a waiver of the right to appeal. It must be emphasized that an application for
suspension of sentence under the provisions of Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code is not the same as
an application for probation, which is deemed a waiver of their right to appeal. 30 There is nothing in the said Code
which prohibits a youthful offender from appealing his conviction after he proves to be incorrigible and the trial
court proceeds to pronounce its judgment of guilty and sentence against him. 31 In fact, as amended by P.D. No.
1179, Article 197 of the Code expressly provides that the convicted offender may still apply for probation under the
provisions of P. D. No. 968. Conversely, the accused may pursue his appeal if he chooses not to avail himself of the
benefits of probation. Although the right to appeal is a statutory right, it is an essential part of the judicial system.
Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right; they should, instead, afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. 32
At any rate, even if Flora and Millamina did not pursue their appeal, the acquittal of FRONDA and our finding that
the prosecution has not established the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt must, perforce, benefit
Flora and Millamina. 33 First, neither the charge of conspiracy nor their individual liability was proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Second, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an "[a]ppeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except in so far as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter." After all, the grant of suspended sentence to accused
Flora and Millamina does not mean that they are already exonerated from the crime charged; only that the
pronouncement of judgment and the service of sentence are suspended 34 until their return to court for final
disposition depending on their conduct and the progress of rehabilitation. 35 Should the criminal case against them
be dismissed based on their observance of good conduct, it would only mean that they would suffer no penalty. 36
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the RTC, Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R is hereby
REVERSED. A new judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA and his co-accused
ANTONINO FLORA y SABADO, JR., and LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to immediately release from confinement MICHAEL FRONDA unless his further detention is
warranted by virtue of any lawful cause, and to make a report of such release within five (5) days from notice
hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PD NO. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM)

Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than
one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.

G.R. Nos. L-69810-14 June 19, 1985

TEODULO RURA vs. HON. GERVACIO A. LEOPENA, ET AL.
This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended), more specifically Section 9
thereof which disqualifies from probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than
one month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case Nos. 523, 524,
525, 526 and 527.
The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983. Rura was sentenced to a
total prison term of seventeen (17) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was
three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the
case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application
was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground Chat Rura is disqualified for probation under Sec. 9 (c)
of the Probation law quoted above. The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
The question which is raised is whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation.
In denying the application for probation, the respondent judge said:
 9

Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided by the court convicting the accused thereof, yet the
dates of commission are different. Upon conviction he was guilty of said offenses as of the dates of commission of
the acts complained of. (Rollo, p, 58.)
Upon the other hand, the petitioner argues:
We beg to disagree. There is no previous conviction by final judgment to speak of. The five (5) cases of Estafa
were tried jointly and there is only one decision rendered on the same date—August 18. 1983. It could not be
presumed that accused-petitioner had been convicted one after the other for the five cases of Estafa because the
conviction in these cases took place within the same day, August 18, 1983 by means of a Joint Decision, and not in
a separate decision.
Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a prior sentence or that there was already a decision
rendered which convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however, there is only one decision rendered on the
five (5) counts of Estafa which was promulgated on the same date. In other words the effects of conviction does
not retract to the date of the commission of the offense as the trial court held. (Id., pp, 8-9.)
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When
he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application.
The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due course to the petitioner's
application for probation. No costs.

G.R. No. 127899 December 2, 1999

SANTOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision, 1 Resolution,
2 and Supplemental Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38522.
The facts that matter are as follows:
Petitioner issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10) Pesos, all of which checks were dishonored upon presentment
to the drawee bank.
On October 12, 1993, the petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 ("BP 22") in fifty-four (54) separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 102009 to 102062,
respectively, before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. To the said accusations, petitioner
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After trial, she was found guilty in a Decision promulgated on December 20,
1994, sentencing her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3,989,175.10 to the private
respondent.
Petitioner therefore, filed an application for probation, which was referred by Presiding Judge Umali to the
Probation Officer of Marikina, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Private respondent opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the petitioner is not eligible for
probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years, and she failed to pay
her judgment debt to the private respondent.
On January 6, 1995, private respondent presented a "Motion for a Writ of Execution", which motion was granted by
Judge Umali in an Order dated January 11, 1995. Thus, the corresponding writ of execution issued for the
implementation and satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the said Decision. Thereafter, the sheriff prepared and
signed a Notice of Levy on Execution over several properties belonging to the petitioner.
On February 13, 1995, petitioner and her husband executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" deeding out in favor of
Teodoro S. Dijamco ("Mr. Dijamco") for P264,570.00 a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet ("Benguet Property"),
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18721 ("TCT No. T-18721"). On the same day, the sheriff annotated
the Notice of Levy on Execution on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-18721.
On March 29, 1995, Mr. Dijamco filed an "Affidavit of Third-Party-Claim" over the same Benguet property on the
strength of the said previous sale but averring already a consideration of P3,000,000.00. Attached thereto are the
checks he allegedly paid for subject property.
On May 5, 1995, private respondent interposed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the application for probation;
contending that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Recent developments show that the accused had been disposing and/or mortgaging her properties in obvious
attempt to negate the satisfaction of her civil liability to herein private complainant, as evidenced by the Affidavit of
Third Party Claim filed by Teodoro S. Dijamco and the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the accused in favor of
the Rural Bank of Angono, Inc. (attached as Annexes "A" and "B" in the Comment/Opposition to the Post Sentence
Investigation Report).
3. It must be stressed that the real estate mortgage was executed by the accused in anticipation of an unfavorable
judgment and that the alleged sale the real property in favor of Teodoro Dijamco was made after this Honorable
Court had rendered judgment convicting the accused of the crime charged and after notice of levy on execution
had been annotated on the title. Clearly, the said mortgage and sale executed by the accused constitute indirect
contempt under Sec. 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and the accused may likewise be prosecuted criminally for
the said acts.
4. Moreover, the accused is disqualified from the benefits of the aforecited Decree as she has been sentenced to a
total of fifty four (54) years of imprisonment.
 10

5. From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the probation law and
that the acts enumerated constitute indirect contempt.
In the Order he issued on June 30, 1995, Judge Umali granted petitioner's application for probation for a period of
six (6) years, subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. Probationer shall report initially to the Chief parole and Probation Officer at Marikina Parole & Probation Off. Hall
of Justice, Marikina within seventy-two hours from receipt of the Order granting Probation.
2. She shall, thereafter, report to her supervising probation and parole officer 2 times a month, unless otherwise
modified by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer.
3. She shall reside in #8 Jazmin, Twinsville Subd. Concepcion, Marikina and shall not change her residence without
approval of the supervising probation and parole officer or of the Court, as the case may be.
4. She shall secure a written permit to travel outside the jurisdiction of the parole and probation office from the
chief probation officer, and from the Court if such travel exceeds thirty (30) days.
5. She shall allow the supervising probation officer, or an authorized Volunteer Aide to visit her place of work and
home.
6. She shall meet her family responsibilities.
7. She shall devote herself to a specific employment and shall not change said employment without prior notice to
the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.
8. She shall refrain from associating with persons of questionable character, and shall not commit any other
offense.
9. She shall cooperate with her program of supervision, and shall satisfy any other condition related to her
rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her freedom of conscience.
10. She shall plant at least five (5) fruit bearing trees in his backyard or any government lot as part of her
rehabilitation.
11. She shall participate in the Parole and Probationer's Project as clean and green project in Marikina and attend
the First Friday Mass at the Hall of Justice of Marikina.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but to no avail. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.
Dissatisfied, the private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, questioning the grant of probation. In its Decision 4 dated August 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals
ruled thus:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Respondent Judge, Annexes
"A" and "B" of the Petition are SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Court a quo. The
Respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Private Respondent.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 of the above Decision but the same was denied in the
Resolution 6 dated January 7, 1997, holding:
Anent Private Respondent's "Motion for Reconsideration", We find no valid justification for a reversal or
reconsideration of our Decision. Private Respondent's claim that the Petitioner is not the proper party-in-interest to
file the Petition is barren of merit. In the first place, the Private Respondent, in her Answer/Comment and the
Public Respondent, in his Comment, on the Petition, never claimed that the Petitioner was not the proper party-in-
interest to file the Petition. More, the Solicitor General appearing for the Public Respondent has not filed any
"Motion for Reconsideration" of our Decision. Evidently, the Solicitor General is in accord with our Decision.
Anent Petitioner's "Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order", We find the said motion meritorious and
hereby grants the same. Accordingly, the Commissioner & Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed not to
allow the departure from the Philippines of the Private Respondent Marilyn C. Santos, married, and a resident of
No. 8 Jasmin Street, Twinville Subdivision, Marikina City, until further orders of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
In a Supplemental Resolution 7 dated January 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals elucidated further its Resolution that
the herein petitioner is the real party-in-interest, and declared that there were no procedural lapses in the granting
of private respondent's petition.
Having lost the case before the Court of Appeals, petitioner has come to this Court for relief; contending that:
I
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON T. CASTRO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO QUESTION THE GRANT OF
PROBATION TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
II
NON-PAYMENT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY IMPOSED ON PETITIONER IN THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE REVOCATION OF PROBATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS MORE INTERESTED IN THE FULL SATISFACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON
T. CASTRO RELATIVE TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CASE THAN IN THE REHABILITATION OF PETITIONER AS A
PROBATIONER. THIS IS HIGHLY IMPROPER.
IV
THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO PETITIONER MARILYN C. SANTOS IS FAIT ACCOMPLI AND SHE HAS COMPLIED
WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBATION GRANTED HER.
V
THE GRANT OF PROBATION BY JUDGE UMALI TO PETITIONER UNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
VI
 11

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A "HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER"
TO PREVENT PETITIONER FROM LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the private respondent had the personality to bring a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Being the person aggrieved by petitioner's issuance of bouncing checks,
private respondent has an interest in the civil aspect of the case. It is not true that it is only the State or the People
that can prosecute the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent may bring such action in
her own name to protect her interest in the case.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional
grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties
are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. (People v. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143, 153)
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was therefore proper since it was
brought in his own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. That the said proceedings benefited the
People is not a reversible error. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion. . . . (De la Rosa v. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 501, 508)
Anent the second, third, and fifth issues, erroneous is petitioner's submission that the Court of Appeals unduly
stressed petitioner's non-satisfaction of her civil liability as the basis for reversing the grant of probation to her.
The proper approach to the problem, and the Court considers the same as the pivotal issue in this case, is whether
the petitioner is entitled to probation.
The point of conflict is whether the petitioner is qualified to be granted probation. Stated otherwise, has petitioner
shown her qualifications entitling her to the grant of probation? Is society better off with petitioner in jail or should
petitioner be allowed to co-mingle with the people, subject to some conditions, despite her criminal record?
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by
the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of
the penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted. 8 The primary objective in granting
probation is the reformation of the probationer. Courts must be meticulous enough to ensure that the ends of
justice and the best interest of the public as well as the accused be served by the grant of
probation. 9
Probation is a just privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before granting probation, the court
must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the demands of justice and public interest,
along with other relevant circumstances. 10 The courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or
recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive. 11
In granting petitioner's application for probation, Judge Umali ratiocinated:
Based on the report of the probation officer, accused may be granted probation (P.D. 968, as amended) The
findings of the Parole and Probation Office shows that accused is not considered as a rescidivist [sic]; accused
petitioner is not in need of correctional treatment, but more of an individualize treatment of rehabilitation; offenses
committed by accused/petitioner is not so grave a crime that she can pose a great threat in the peace and order of
the community where she resides; and accused/petitioner is not condemned by the community because of her
cases, it can be presumed that she is still welcome to mingle with the community and participate in any community
projects.
Her failure to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability is not a ground for the denial of the application for probation
of accused. Moreover, the court had earlier issued a writ of execution to satisfy the money judgment in an order
dated January 11, 1995 and the sheriff of this court had issued a notice of levy on execution on the properties of
accused.
Foregoing considered that petition of accused for probation is hereby Granted. (Order, June 30, 1995; Rollo, p. 99)
When the aforesaid order was assailed before it, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of probation, on the
grounds that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and petitioner was unworthy of probation; ruling
thus:
As it was, the Private Respondent had violated, with impunity, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 no less than fifty-four (54)
times to the damage and prejudice of the Petitioner in the aggregate amount of close to P4,000,000.00. One would
believe that the Private Respondent had learned her lesson, would strive, from then on, to reform, shy away from
doing and abetting injustices to her fellowmen, make amends for her criminal misdeeds, demonstrate remorse and
concomitant determination to reform and turn a new leaf in her life, and reassume her role as a responsible and
productive member of community. On the contrary, after escaping from the specter of imprisonment and averting
the tribulations and vicissitudes of a long prison term, by applying for and securing probation from the Respondent
Judge, Private Respondent resorted to devious chicanery and artifice to prevent Petitioner from recovering her
losses and perpetrate reprehensible if not criminal acts of falsification of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of
Dijamco over her Benguet property, thus flaunting, once again, her mockery and defiance of justice, foul play and
unabashedly making gross misrepresentations to the Probation Officer.
In fine, then, We find and so declare that the Respondent Judge abused his discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting probation to the Private Respondent. Accordingly, We find and so declare that the Orders
complained of, Annexes "A" and "B" of the Petition are null and void." (Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 51)
 12

The Court finds merit in the determination by the Court of Appeals that the herein petitioner is not entitled to
probation because she had displayed a devious and reprehensible character in trying to evade the implementation
of the execution against her thereby rendering the judgment against her ineffective; as indicated by the following
facts and circumstances, to wit:
1. On February 13, 1995, petitioner disposed of her Benguet property by means of a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in
favor of Mr. Dijamco and had the deed registered in Benguet to preempt the sheriff of the lower court from causing
the "Notice of Levy on Execution" annotated at the back of the title of the Benguet property.
2. The "Deed of Absolute Sale" executed in favor of Mr. Dijamco stated a consideration of P264,570.00 when in
truth and in fact, the consideration was P3,000,000.00, as stated in the uncontested "Affidavit of Third Party Claim"
of Mr. Dijamco and as evidenced by the checks issued to and encashed by petitioner. By understating the price,
petitioner committed acts of falsification causing damage to the government as the latter was deprived of taxes
that should have been paid from the sale.
3. There is evidence to prove that the "Deed of Absolute Sale" may just have been a simulated sale because
petitioner's husband, in his "Affidavit of Third Party Claim" dated February 21, 1995, still claimed the property to
be theirs. There is no mention whatsoever of any sale to Mr. Dijamco.
4. Petitioner never remitted a single centavo of the proceeds of the "Real Estate Mortgage" (in favor of Rural Bank
of Angono, Inc.) and "Deed of Absolute Sale" (in favor of Mr. Dijamco) to the private respondent. If she really had
the good intentions of settling and satisfying the judgment of the trial court, she should have at least offered a
portion of said proceeds to private respondent. Worse, she exhibited a design to compeletely evade her civil
obligation to private respondent.
5. Petitioner's claim that the Benguet property actually belongs to Corazon Leano is of no moment and could not be
given credence. The documentary evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly proves that such claim is puerile
and tenuous. Primarily, the "Deed of Absolute Sale" and "Affidavit of Third Party Claim" (filed by petitioner's
husband) prove their ownership of the Benguet property.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned unerringly that petitioner has shown no remorse for the criminal acts she
committed against the private respondent. Her issuing subject fifty-four (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense.
To allow petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the seriousness of her malefactions. Worse,
instead of complying with the orders of the trial court requiring her to pay her civil liability, she even resorted to
devious schemes to evade the execution of the judgment against her. Verily, petitioner is not the penitent offender
who is eligible for probation within legal contemplation. Her demeanor manifested that she is incapable to be
reformed and will only be a menace to society should she be permitted to co-mingle with the public.
With respect to the fourth issue, petitioner's contention that her probation is fait accompli is equally untenable. The
six (6) year period of probation which commenced on June 30, 1995, has not yet been completed. Furthermore,
even if the said period has expired, such lapse of the period of probation does not detract from the fact that the
order granting probation was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Probation having been improperly granted,
there is no probation to speak of.
Anent the last issue, the Court rules that the issuance of a "hold departure order" against the petitioner is
warranted under the premises. Having displayed a criminal tendency and propensity to evade or disobey the lawful
orders of the trial court, there is indeed the need to restrict the petitioner's movements and activities so as not to
render nugatory the multiple judgments rendered against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38522 AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

Sec. 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. – Upon
promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the
sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose
community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance
shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the
Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written
report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the
court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court
in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this
Act. The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the
Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of
compliance of said community service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service
or order a final discharge.chanrobles virtual law library
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act.chanrobles
virtual law library
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the accused
during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.

MICHAEL PADUA VS. PEOPLE (GR NO. 168546, JULY 23, 2008)
 13

This petition for review assails the Decision dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution dated June 14, 2005, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua’s petition for certiorari and
denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the
Orders dated May 11, 2004 and July 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had
denied his petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168,
Pasig City of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” for selling dangerous drugs. The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. “Allan”
and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. “Mike”, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to
sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was
willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time
offenders under Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, the RTC
on the same date issued an Order stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn.
Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua
guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art.
39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-
time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (P.D. No. 968),
otherwise known as “The Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-
Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The
City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the
order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation
Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the
Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared
by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed
on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender.
Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for
probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to
violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or
Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds
that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165,
cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
“Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.” (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is
hereby DENIED.
 14

SO ORDERED.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision
dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition
where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION
WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC]
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED
OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment as its
Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of
Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has no
application to the instant case.
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari assailing the
trial court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,” violated? and (3) Does Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as
the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board
or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction”
when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of
statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous
drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail
of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,
regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The
elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim
verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing
while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of
violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims
while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are
categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike,
are given the chance to mend their ways. The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention
of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.
 15

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug
users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5,
Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known
as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively
applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is
found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that
once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14,
2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

RA 9344 (JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WELFARE SYSTEM)

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose
the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the
child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or
to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.
BAR QUESTIONS ON INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, PROBATION LAW, MITIGATING AND
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Indeterminate Sentence Law (1994)

Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a special law. The penalty prescribed is not less than six years but
not more than twelve years. No modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime. If you were the
judge, will you apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law? If so, how will you apply it?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last sentence of Section 1
Act 4103, specifically provides the application thereof for violations of special laws.
Under the same provision, the minimum must not be less than the minimum provided therein (six years and one
day) and the maximum shall not be more than the maximum provided therein, i.e. twelve years. (People vs.
Rosalina Reyes, 186 SCRA 184)
Indeterminate Sentence Law (1999)
Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment
of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten [10) years. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. In
the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? If you were the Judge
trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied because the minimum imprisonment is more than one (1)
year.
If I were the Judge, I will impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum penalty prescribed by the same. I
have the discretion to impose the penalty within the said minimum and maximum.
Indeterminate Sentence Law (1999)
 16

A was convicted of illegal possession of grease guns and two Thompson sub-machine guns punishable under the
old law [RA No,4] with imprisonment of from five (5) to ten (10) years. The trial court sentenced the accused to
suffer imprisonment of five (5) years and one (1) day. Is the penalty thus imposed correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to: The penalty imposed, being only a straight penalty, is not correct
because it does not comply with the Indeterminate Sentence Law which applies to this case. Said law requires that
if the offense is punished by any law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum penalty fixed by the law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum penalty prescribed by the same.
Indeterminate Sentence Law (2002)
How are the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence for offenses punishable under the
Revised Penal Code determined? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the Indeterminate sentence shall be the
penalty properly imposable under the same Code after considering the attending mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstances according to Art, 64 of said Code. The minimum term of the same sentence shall be fixed within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime under the said Code.
Under the law, what is the purpose for fixing the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The purpose of the law in fixing the minimum term of the sentence is to set the grace period at which the convict
may be released on parole from imprisonment, unless by his conduct he is not deserving of parole and thus he
shall continue serving his prison term in Jail but in no case to go beyond the maximum term fixed in the sentence.
Indeterminate Sentence Law (2005)
Harold was convicted of a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law where the imposable penalty is from
6 months, as minimum, to 3 years, as maximum.
State with reasons whether the court may correctly impose the following penalties:
a) a straight penalty of 10 months;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because the penalty is less than one year, a straight penalty may be imposed. (People v. Arellano, G.R. No,
46501, October 5, 1939)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty shall be imposed but the maximum shall
not exceed the maximum imposable by law.
b) 6 months, as minimum, to 11 months, as maximum;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the penalty imposed is less than one year (Sec. 2,
Art. 4103, as amended).
c) a straight penalty of 2 years. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply when the minimum of the penalty exceeds one year.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER.
If the imposition of straight penalty which consists of the minimum period of the penalty prescribed by law, then it
may be allowed because it favors the accused.
Indeterminate Sentence Law; Exceptions (1999)
Under what circumstances is the Indeterminate Sentence Law not applicable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment; 2) Those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; 3) Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; 4) Those convicted of piracy; 5) Those who are habitual delinquents; 6) Those who shall
have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; 7) Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief Executive;
8) Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
9) Those who, upon the approval of the law (December 5, 1933). had been sentenced by final Judgment;
10) Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.
Indeterminate Sentence Law; Exceptions (2003)
When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law be inapplicable? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to:
1) those persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua;
2) those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; 3) those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; 4) those convicted of piracy; 5) those who are habitual delinquents; 6) those who shall have
escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence;
 17

7) those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof;
8) those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; 9) those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act; and 10) those whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve
imprisonment, like destierro.
Penalties; Homicide w/ Modifying Circumstance (1995)
Homer was convicted of homicide. The trial court appreciated the following modifying circumstances: the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, no intent to
commit so grave a wrong, illiteracy and voluntary surrender. The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Taking into account the
attendant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, determine the
proper penalty to be imposed on the accused.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It appears that there is one aggravating circumstance (nocturnity), and four mitigating circumstances (passion and
obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender). Par. 4, Art. 64
should be applied. Hence there will be off-setting of modifying circumstances, which will now result in the excess of
three mitigating circumstances. This will therefore justify in reducing the penalty to the minimum period.
The existence of an aggravating circumstance, albeit there are four aggravating, will not justify the lowering of the
penalty to the next lower degree under paragraph 5 of said Article, as this is applicable only if THERE IS NO
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE present. Since the crime committed is Homicide and the penalty therefor is
reclusion temporal, the MAXIMUM sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be the minimum of the
penalty, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The MINIMUM penalty will thus be the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its full extent (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Ergo, the proper penalty
would be 6 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day, as maximum. I believe that because of the
remaining mitigating circumstances after the off-setting it would be very logical to impose the minimum of the
MINIMUM sentence under the ISL and the minimum of the MAXIMUM sentence.
Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances w/out Aggravating Circumstance (1997)
Assume in the preceding problem that there were two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
Impose the proper prison penalty.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There being two (2) mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the proper prison penalty is
arresto mayor (in any of its periods, ie. ranging from one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months) as MINIMUM to prision correccional in its maximum period four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years as MAXIMUM. Under Art. 64, par. 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, when a penalty contains three periods, each one of which forms a period in accordance with Article 76 and
77 of the same Code, and there are
two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, the penalty next lower in degree should
be imposed. For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree should be
determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code should be applied
in its maximum or minimum period as circumstances modifying liability may require. The penalty next lower in
degree to prision correccional. Therefore, as previously stated, the minimum should be within the range of arresto
mayor and the maximum is within the range of prision correctional in its maximum period.
Penalties; Parricide w/ Mitigating Circumstance (1997)
A and B pleaded guilty to the crime of parricide. The court found three mitigating circumstances, namely, plea of
guilty, lack of Instruction and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The prescribed penalty
for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. Impose the proper principal penalty.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Even if there are two or more mitigating circumstances, a court cannot
lower the penalty by one degree (Art. 63. par. 3, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 685). In U.S.
vs. Relador 60 Phil. 593, where the crime committed was parricide with the two (2) mitigating circumstances of
illiteracy and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, and with no aggravating circumstance, the Supreme
Court held that the proper, penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Penalties; Preventive Imprisonment (1994)
1) When is there preventive imprisonment? 2) When is the accused credited with the full time of his preventive
imprisonment, and when is he credited with 4/5 thereof?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) There is preventive imprisonment when [a) an offender is detained while the criminal case against him is being
heard, either because the crime committed is a capital offense and not bailable, or even if the crime committed
was bailable, the offender could not post the required bail for his provisional liberty.
2) An accused is credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment if he voluntarily agreed in writing to
abide by the rules of the institution imposed upon its prisoners, provided that:
a) the penalty imposed on him for the crime committed consists of a deprivation of liberty;
b) he is not disqualified from such credit for being a recidivist, or for having been previously convicted for two or
more times of any crime, or for having failed to surrender voluntarily for the execution of the sentence upon being
so summoned (Art. 29, RPC).
 18

Where the accused however did not agree he would only be credited with 4/5 of the time he had undergone
preventive imprisonment.
Penalties; Reclusion Perpetua (RA) No. 7959 (2005)
Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7959, reclusion perpetua shall be
from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. Does this mean that reclusion perpetua is now a divisible penalty? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly called the attention of the Bench and the Bar to the fact that the
penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous and should be applied correctly and as
may be specified by the applicable law. Reclusion perpetua has a specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40
years (Art. 27) and accessory penalties (Art. 41), while life imprisonment has no definite term or accessory
penalties. Also, life imprisonment is imposable on crimes punished by special laws, and not on felonies in the Code
(People vs. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 51385-86, Jan. 22, 1993; People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 92506-07, April 28,
1993; People vs. Alvero,
G.R. No. 72319, June 30,1993; People vs. Lapiroso, G.R. No. 122507, Feb. 25, 1999).[see Criminal Law
Conspectus, page 156]
Penalties; Reclusion Perpetua vs. Life Imprisonment (1994)
Differentiate reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
RECLUSION PERPETUA is that penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code for crimes defined in and penalized
therein except for some crimes defined by special laws which impose reclusion perpetua, such as violations of
Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659 or of PD 1860; while LIFE IMPRISONMENT is a penalty
usually provided for in special laws. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty [40] years under Republic Act 7659, while life imprisonment has no duration; reclusion perpetua may be
reduced by one or two degrees; reclusion perpetuates accessory penalties while life imprisonment does not have
any accessory penalties (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, People vs. Panellos, 205 SCRA 546).
Penalties; Reclusion Perpetua vs. Life Imprisonment (2001)
After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder, the victim having sustained
several bullet wounds in his body so that he died despite medical assistance given in the Ospital ng Manila.
Because the weapon used by Benjamin was unlicensed and the qualifying circumstance of treachery was found to
be present. Judge Laya rendered his decision convicting Benjamin and sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment".
Are "reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment the same and can be imposed interchangeably as in the foregoing
sentence? Or are they totally different? State your reasons. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life Imprisonment are totally different from each other and
therefore, should not be used interchangeably.
Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, with a fixed duration of imprisonment from
20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries it with accessory penalties.
Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration of
imprisonment and without any accessory penalty.
Probation Law: Proper Period (2005)
Maganda was charged with violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) punishable by imprisonment of not less
than 30 days but not more than 1 year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check, which fine shall not exceed P200,000.00, or both. The court convicted her of the crime and sentenced her to
pay a fine of P50,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the private complainant
the amount of the check. Maganda was unable to pay the fine but filed a petition for probation. The court granted
the petition subject to the condition, among others, that she should not change her residence without the court’s
prior approval.
a) What is the proper period of probation?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The period shall not be less than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment. Under Act No. 1732,
subsidiary imprisonment for violations of special laws shall not exceed 6 months at the rate of one day of
imprisonment for every F2.50. Hence, the proper period of probation should not be less than (6 months nor more
than 12 months. Since P50,000.00 fine is more than the maximum subsidiary imprisonment of 6 months at P2.50 a
day.
b) Supposing before the Order of Discharge was issued by the court but after the lapse of the period of probation,
Maganda transferred residence without prior approval of the court. May the court revoke the Order of Probation
and order her to serve the subsidiary imprisonment? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The Court may revoke her probation. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued
by the court an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only
then can the case of the probationer be terminated.
(Bala v. Martinez, G.R. No. 67301, January 29, 1990, citing Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 968)
Probation Law; Barred by Appeal (1994)
 19

On February 3, 1986, Roberto was convicted of arson through reckless imprudence and sentenced to pay a fine of
P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On February 10, 1986, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several months later, he filed a motion to withdraw
the appeal on the ground that he is applying for probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the
motion and considered the appeal withdrawn.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case were remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a "Motion for Probation"
praying that execution of his sentence be suspended, and that a probation officer be ordered to conduct an
Investigation and to submit a report on his probation.
The judge denied the motion on the ground that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1990, which took effect on
July 16,1986, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction. Is the denial of Roberto's motion correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Even if at the time of his conviction Roberto was qualified for probation but that at the time of his application
for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be
determined as of the time the application is filed in Court (Bernardo vs. Judge, etal. GRNo. L86561,Nov, 10. 1992;
Edwin de la Cruz vs. Judge Callejo. et al, SP-19655, April 18, 1990, citing Llamado vs. CA, et al, GR No. 84859,
June 28, 1989; Bernardo us. Judge Balagot, etal, GR 86561, Nov. 10, 1992).
Probation Law; Barred by Appeal (2001)
A, a subdivision developer, was convicted by the RTC of Makati for failure to issue the subdivision title to a lot
buyer despite full payment of the lot, and sentenced to suffer one year Imprisonment. A appealed the decision of
the RTC to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed. May A still apply for probation? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, A is no longer qualified to apply for probation after he appealed from the judgment of conviction by the RTC.
The probation law (PD 968, as amended by PD1990) now provides that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Sec. 4, PD 968).
Probation Law; Maximum Term vs. Total Term (1997)
The accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation in sixteen (16) informations which were tried jointly and
was sentenced in one decision to suffer in each case a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional. Within the period to appeal, he filed an application for probation under
the Probation Law of 1976, as amended. Could he possibly qualify for probation?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. In Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384, the Supreme Court held that in case of one decision
imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the prison terms should not be taken into account for the purposes
of determining the eligibility of the accused for the
36 of 86
probation. The law uses the word "maximum term", and not total term. It is enough that each of the prison terms
does not exceed six years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties imposed, when taken
individually and separately, are within the probationable period.
Probation Law; Order Denying Probation; Not Appealable (2002)
A was charged with homicide. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day in
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Prior to his conviction, he had been found guilty of vagrancy and
imprisoned for ten (10) days of arresto manor and fined fifty pesos (P50.00). Is he eligible for probation? Why?
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law (PD 968, as amended) does not extend to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years (Sec. 9a).
It is of no moment that in his previous conviction A was given a penalty of only ten (10) days of arresto mayor and
a fine of P50.00.
B. May a probationer appeal from the decision revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and
conditions thereof? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, an order granting or denying probation is not appealable.
Probation Law; Period Covered (2004)
PX was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of thirty days and a fine of one hundred pesos. Previously, PX
was convicted of another crime for which the penalty imposed on him was thirty days only. Is PX entitled to
probation? Explain briefly. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, PX may apply for probation. His previous conviction for another crime with a penalty of thirty days
imprisonment or not exceeding one (1) month does not disqualify him from applying for probation; the penalty for
his present conviction does not disqualify him either from applying for probation, since the imprisonment does not
exceed six (6) years (Sec. 9, Pres. Decree No. 968).
Probation Law; Right; Barred by Appeal (1995)
In a case for violation of Sec. 8, RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, accused Vincent was
given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilt and drunkenness not otherwise habitual.
He was sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with the
 20

accessory penalties provided by law, plus costs. Vincent applied for probation. The probation officer favorably
recommended his application.
If you were the Judge, what action will you take on the application? Discuss fully.
Suppose that Vincent was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten (10)
years. Under the law, he is not eligible for probation. He seasonably appealed his conviction. While affirming the
judgment of conviction, the appellate court reduced the penalty to a maximum of four (4) years and four (4)
months taking into consideration certain modifying circumstances. Vincent now applies for probation. How will you
rule on his application? Discuss fully.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. If I were the judge, I will deny the application for probation. The accused is not entitled to probation as Sec. 9 of
the Probation Law, PD NO. 968, as amended, specifically mentions that those who "are sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years" are not entitled to the benefits of the law.
2. The law and jurisprudence are to the effect that appeal by the accused from a sentence of conviction forfeits his
right to probation.(Sec. 4, PD No. 968. as amended by PD 1990; Bernardo us. Balagot; Francisco vs. CA: Llamado
vs. CA; De la Cruz vs. Judge Callejo, CA case).
This is the second consecutive year that this question was asked. It is the sincere belief of the Committee that
there is a need to re-examine the doctrine. Firstly, much as the accused wanted to apply for probation he is
proscribed from doing so as the maximum penalty is NOT PROBATIONABLE. Secondly, when the maximum penalty
was reduced to one which allows probation it is but fair and just to grant him that right because it is apparent that
the trial judge committed an error and for which the accused should not be made to suffer. Judicial tribunals in this
jurisdiction are not only courts of law but also of equity. Thirdly, the judgment of the appellate court should be
considered a new decision as the trial court's decision was vacated; hence, he could take advantage of the law
when the decision is remanded to the trial court for execution (Please see Dissenting opinion in Francisco vs. CA).
It is suggested, therefore, that an examinee answering in this tenor should be credited with some points.
Probation Law; Right; Barred by Appeal (2003)
Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty imposed upon him to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court ultimately sustained Juan's conviction but reduced his sentence to a maximum of four
years and eight months imprisonment. Could Juan forthwith file an application for probation? Explain. 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Juan can no longer avail of the probation because he appealed from the judgment of conviction of the trial
court, and therefore, cannot apply for probation anymore. Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended,
mandates that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Suspension of Sentence; Adults/Minors (2006)
There are at least 7 instances or situations in criminal cases wherein the accused, either as an adult or as a minor,
can apply for and/or be granted a suspended sentence. Enumerate at least 5 of them. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Suspension of sentence of minor under P.D. 603 as amended by R.A. 9344.

2. Suspension of sentence of minor above 15 but below 18 years of age at the time of trial under R.A. 9344.

3. Suspension of sentence of minor above 15 but below 18 years of age at the commission of the offense,
while acting with discernment.

4. Suspension of sentence by reason of insanity (Art. 79, Revised Penal Code).

5. Suspension of sentence for first offense of a minor violating RJV. 9165. (Sec. 32)

6. Suspension of sentence under the probation law.

(P.D. 968)

7. Suspension of death sentence of a pregnant woman. (Art. 83, Revised Penal Code)

(NOTA BENE: R.A. 9344 is outside the coverage of the examination)

Suspension of Sentence; Minors (2003)
A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with the crime 3 months
later. He was 23 when he was finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to serve a jail term, he sought
a suspension of the sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile offender Should he be entitled to a suspension
of sentence? Reasons. 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, A is not entitled to a suspension of the sentence because he is no longer a minor at the time of promulgation of
the sentence. For purposes of suspension of sentence, the offender's age at the time of promulgation of the
 21

sentence is the one considered, not his age when he committed the crime. So although A was below 18 years old
when he committed the crime, but he was already 23 years old when sentenced, he is no longer eligible for
suspension of the sentence.
Can juvenile offenders, who are recidivists, validly ask for suspension of sentence? Explain. 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, so long as the offender is still a minor at the time of the promulgation of the sentence. The law establishing
Family Courts, Rep. Act 8369, provides to this effect: that if the minor is found guilty, the court should promulgate
the sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. However, the sentence shall
be suspended without the need of application pursuant to PD 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth
Welfare Code" (RA 8369, Sec. 5a), It is under PD 603 that an application for suspension of the
sentence is required and thereunder it is one of the conditions for suspension of sentence that the offender be a
first time convict: this has been displaced by RA 8369.
Suspension of Sentence; Youthful Offender (1995)
Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the store while Rod and
Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky complained that he was shortchanged although
Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and
stabbed Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy.
When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as Ricky
had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the
street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles looted from
the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of Victor and Ricky.
Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie.
Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to suspended sentence under The Child and Youth Welfare Code? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1 . All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide....
2. No, because the benefits of suspension of sentence is not available where the youthful offender has been
convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, pursuant to P.D. No. 603, Art. 192, The complex
crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 294 (1), RFC [People vs.
Galit. 230 SCRA 486).
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Amnesty vs. PD 1160 (2006)
Can former DSWD Secretary Dinky Soliman apply for amnesty? How about columnist Randy David? (You are
supposed to know the crimes or offenses ascribed to them as published in almost all newspapers for the past
several months.) (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Proclamation 1160, which amended Proclamation 724, applies only to offenses committed prior to 1999. Thus,
their applications shall be ineffectual and useless.
General Lim and General Querubin of the Scout Rangers and Philippine Marines, respectively, were changed with
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under the Articles of War. Can they apply for amnesty? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Proclamation 1160, which amended Proclamation 724, applies only to offenses committed prior to 1999. Thus,
their applications shall be ineffectual and useless.
Amnesty; Crimes Covered (2006)
Under Presidential Proclamation No. 724, amending Presidential Proclamation No. 347, certain crimes are covered
by the grant of amnesty. Name at least 5 of these crimes. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Crimes covered under Presidential Proclamation No.
724:

1. Coupd'etat,

2. Rebellion or insurrection;

3. Disloyalty of public officers or employees;

4. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection;

5. Conspiracy to commit rebellion or insurrection;

6. Proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection;

7. Sedition;

8. Conspiracy to commit sedition;

 22

9. Inciting to sedition;

10. Illegal Assembly;

11. Illegal Association;

12. Direct Assault;

13. Indirect Assault;

14. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority;

15. Tumults and other disturbances;

16. Unlawful use of means of publications and unlawful utterrances;

17. Alarm and scandal;

18. Illegal Possession of firearms.

Pardon vs. Amnesty (2006)

Enumerate the differences between pardon and amnesty. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) PARDON includes any crime and is exercised individually by the President, while AMNESTY applies to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses.
b) PARDON is exercised when the person is already convicted, while AMNESTY may be exercised even before
trial or investigation.
c) PARDON looks forward and relieves the offender of the penalty of the offense for which he has been
convicted; it does not work for the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights are expressly restored by means of pardon, while AMNESTY looks backward and abolishes the offense
and its effects, as if the person had committed no offense.
d) PARDON does not alter the fact that the accused is criminally liable as it produces only the extinction of
the penalty, while AMNESTY removes the criminal liability of the offender because it obliterates every vestige of the
crime.
e) PARDON being a private act by the President, must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, while
AMNESTY which is a Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
39 of 86
Pardon; Effect; Reinstatement (1994)
Linda was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa, through falsification of public document. She was sentenced
accordingly and ordered to pay, among others, P5,000.00 representing the balance of the amount defrauded.
The case reached the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of conviction. During the pendency of Linda's
motion for reconsideration in the said Court, the President extended to her an absolute pardon which she accepted.
By reason of such pardon, she wrote the Department of Finance requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant treasurer, which is still vacant. The Department ruled that Linda may be reinstated to her former
position without the necessity of a new appointment and directed the City Treasurer to see to it that the sum of
P5,000.00 be satisfied. Claiming that she should not be made to pay P5,000.00, Linda appealed to the Office of the
President.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and held that acquittal, not absolute pardon. Is the only ground
for reinstatement to one's former position and that the absolute pardon does not exempt the culprit from payment
of civil liability. Is Linda entitled to reinstatement?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Linda is not entitled to reinstatement to her former position inasmuch as her right thereto had been
relinquished or forfeited by reason of her conviction. The absolute pardon merely extinguished her criminal liability,
removed her disqualification, and restored her eligibility for appointment to that office. She has to re-apply for
such position and under the usual procedure required for a new appointment. Moreover, the pardon does not
extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime.
(Monsanto vs.Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191); see Art. 36, RPC)

Art. 267 Trespass to Dwelling (2009)/True or False

The use of an unlicensed firearm in homicide is considered a generic aggravating circumstance which can be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
 23

Amnesty and Art. 157 Evasion of Service of Sentence (2009)

Antero Makabayan was convicted of the crime of Rebellion. While serving sentence, he escaped from jail. Captured,
he was charged with, and convicted of, Evasion of Service of Sentence. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines
issued an amnesty proclamation for the offense of Rebellion. Antero applied for and was granted the benefit of the
amnesty proclamation.
Antero then filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release from confinement. He claims that
the amnesty extends to the offense of Evasion of Service of Sentence. As judge, will you grant the petition?
Discuss fully. (4%)

Indeterminate Sentence Law (2009)

1. In a conviction for homicide, the trial court appreciated two (2) mitigating circumstances and one (1)
aggravating circumstance. Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by
reclusion temporal, an imprisonment term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Explain.
(3%)

Indeterminate Sentence Law (2009)

Joe was 17 years old when he committed homicide in 2005. The crime is punishable by reclusion temporal. After
two years in hiding, he was arrested and appropriately charged in May 2007. Since Republic Act 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) was already in effect, Joe moved to avail of the process of intervention or
diversion.
What is intervention or diversion? Is Joe entitled to intervention or diversion? Explain. (3%)

Suppose Joe’s motion for intervention or diversion was denied, and he was convicted two (2) years later when Joe
was already 21 years old, should the judge apply the suspension of sentence? Explain. (2%)

Suppose Joe was convicted of attempted murder with a special aggravating circumstance and was denied
suspension of sentence, would he be eligible for probation under Presidential Decree (PD) 968, considering that the
death penalty is imposable for the consummated felony? Explain. (2%)
 24

TITLE ONE: CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the
Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a
fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or
on confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos. (As amended
by E.O. No. 44, May 31, 1945).

Elements of Treason
1. That the offender is a Filipino citizen or an alien residing in the Philippines.
2. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved.
3. That the offender either
a. Levies war against the Government, OR
b. Adheres to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort.

Treason, defined
- Treason is the breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it.

Nature of the crime

- Violation by the subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or to the supreme authority of the State

Treason cannot be committed in times of peace (It is a wartime offense).

- It is a war crime, not an all-time offense.
- Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
- It is punished by the state as an act of self-defense and self-preservation.

Treason is a CONTINUING CRIME.

Even after the war, offender can be prosecuted.
Treason is a continuing offense. It can be committed by a single act or by a series of acts. It can be committed in
one single time or at different times and only one criminal intent. In construing the provisions relating to the
commission of several acts, the same must be done in pursuance or furtherance of the act of treason.
No matter how many acts of treason are committed by the offender, he will be liable for only one crime of treason.

Treason distinguished from Rebellion

An act levying war to help the foreign enemy is treason; otherwise, it would be rebellion. In treason, the purpose is
to deliver the government to the enemy or to pave the way for the coming of the enemy, whereas in rebellion, the
purpose is to substitute the government with their own.

Treason distinguished from Sedition

Treason is the violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or the supreme authority of the state,
whereas sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.

In treason, the offender repudiates his allegiance to the government by means of force or intimidation. He does
not recognize the supreme authority of the State. He violates his allegiance by fighting the forces of the duly
constituted authorities.

In sedition, the offender disagrees with certain policies of the State and seeks to disturb public peace by raising a
commotion or public uprising.

Treason distinguished from Espionage

Espionage is a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender. This is also true as regards treason, in view
of the amendment to Art. 114.
 25

But treason is committed only in time of war while espionage may be committed both in time of peace and in time
of war. Treason is limited in two ways committing the crime: levying war, and adhering to the enemy giving them
aid or comfort, while espionage may be committed in many ways. (Com. Act. No. 616).

Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted
upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement
nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of
its complement or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas.

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 10. Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it
was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application,
the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.

Elements of piracy
1. That the vessel is on the high seas or in Philippine waters
2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the vessel
3. That the offenders
a. Attack or seize the vessel OR
b. Seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. LOL-LO, ET AL.

Facts: A boat, in which there were 11 men, women & children, arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated the 2 of the women by methods too horrible to be described . All of the persons on the boat with the
exception of the 2 young women, were again placed on it & holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, but after 11 days of hardship & privation they were succored. 2 of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo &
Saraw who later returned to their home in Sulu, Phils. There they were arrested & were charged in the CFI of Sulu
with the crime of piracy.
Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction?
Held: It cannot be contended with any degree of force that the CFI of Sulu was without jurisdiction of the case.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender maybe found or into which he maybe carried. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by 1) rape and 2) the abandonment of persons without means of saving themselves. Lol-lo who
raped one of the women was sentenced to death, there being the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, abuse of
superior strength and ignominy, without any mitigating circumstance.

Art. 123. Qualified piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to death shall be imposed upon those who
commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.

G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. JULAIDE SIYOH
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been
committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is.,
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without
lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation
 26

against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into
the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de
Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said
pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other
personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on
the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water,
whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman
was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said victim,
Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were
apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide
Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as
defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural
minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM
AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of
Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro
and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets
and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an
agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said
goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the
goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de
Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On
July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC
seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused
the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants
like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea.
The goods they brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at
2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-
kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their
goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram
and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-
42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However
that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him,
Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram.
They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but
Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48,
50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived
at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of
the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53,
tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not
recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh,
prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while
Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and
green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of
their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58,
tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them
to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close
to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island.
On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their
 27

goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said
'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro.
Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of
Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till
nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo
de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he
received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province
(pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and
Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was
wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get
back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings
showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime
M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and
issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp.
5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed
Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who
claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the
record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of
which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following
claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the
occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would
make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods would
be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was
both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For as
the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are
all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies
but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed
to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the
PC or Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in
locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence
was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why
the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with
triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken
by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the
accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently
with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro,
wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that
their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is
that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face
of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following
facts appear to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the
survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking
to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken,
the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom
the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from
the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and
companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained
unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable
for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of
the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of
any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen
because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or
that he died in a manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the
 28

trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked
wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage
due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of
Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan
and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with
the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and
(b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of
P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

PD 532 ANTI-PIRACY AND HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following terms shall mean and be understood, as follows:
a. Philippine Waters. - It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs,
bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of
its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or
legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. - Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place
to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in
fishing.
d. Piracy. - Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel,
in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage. - Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or
highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other
peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

RA 6235 ACTS INIMICAL TO CIVIL AVIATION

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course or destination of an
aircraft of Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control thereof, while it is in flight.
An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external doors are closed following embarkation
until any of such doors is opened for disembarkation.
It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry to land in
Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is within the said territory.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry in any
passenger aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines, and explosive, flammable,
corrosive or poisonous substance or material.

Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind, it may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state.

2008 Bar Question

The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I, while cruising off Batanes, was forced to seek shelter at the harbor of
Kaoshiung, Taiwan because of a strong typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, Max, Baldo and Bogart arrived in a
speedboat, fired a bazooka at the bow of the vessel, boarded it and divested the passengers of their money and
jewelry. A passenger of M/V Viva Lines I, Dodong advantage of the confusion to settle an old grudge with another
 29

passenger, and killed him. After their apprehension, all four were charged with qualified piracy before a Philippine
court.
1. Was the charge of qualified piracy against the three person ( Max, Badong and Bogart ) who boarded the
inter-island vessel correct? Explain.

Yes, they boarded and fired upon the ship and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry (Art.
122, 123, RPC). As long as murder or homicide is committed as a result of or on occasion of piracy, the
special complex crime of qualified piracy is committed.

2. Was Dodong correctly charged before the Philippine court for qualified piracy? Explain.

Dodong was correctly charged before the Philippine court, though it should be for murder or homicide
because he did not act in conspiracy or concert within the pirates. Under the territorial principle of
jurisdiction in International Law, the Philippine court will have jurisdiction over the offense of murder or
homicide because it was committed by Dodong on a vessel of Philippine registry, and the crime is also
cognizable by the courts of Kaoshiung, Taiwan.

2006 Bar Question

1. While the 5.5. Nagoya Maru was negotiating the sea route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while still
300 miles from Aparri, Cagayan, its engines malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop for
emergency repairs lasting for almost 15 hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep. While
the ship was anchored, a motorboat manned by renegade Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and
took advantage of the situation. They cut the ship's engines and took away several heavy crates of
electrical equipment and loaded them in their motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards Aparri. At
daybreak, the crew found that a robbery took place. They radioed the Aparri Port Authorities resulting in
the apprehension of the culprits.
What crime was committed? Explain.

The crime committed was piracy under Art. 122, RPC, the essence of which is robbery directed against a
vessel and/or its cargoes. The taking of the several heavy crates of electrical equipment from a vessel at
sea, was effected by force and undoubtedly with intent to gain. It is of no moment that the vessel was
anchored when depredated so long as it was at sea.

2. Supposing that while the robbery was taking place, the culprits stabbed a member of the crew while
sleeping.
What crime was committed? Explain.

The crime was qualified piracy under Art. 123 of the RPC because it was attended by a killing committed
by the same culprits against a member of the crew of the vessel.

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE 1

Piracy in the High Seas & Qualified Piracy (2006)

While the S.S. Nagoya Maru was negotiating the sea route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while still 300 miles
from Aparri, Cagayan, its engines malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop for emergency repairs
lasting for almost 15 hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep. While the ship was anchored, a
motorboat manned by renegade Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and took advantage of the situation.
They cut the ship's engines and took away several heavy crates of electrical equipment and loaded them in their
motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards Aparri. At daybreak, the crew found that a robbery took place. They
radioed the Aparri Port Authorities resulting in the apprehension of the culprits.
What crime was committed? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Piracy in the high seas was committed by the renegade Ybanags. The culprits, who are neither members of the
complement nor passengers of the ship, seized part of the equipment of the vessel while it was three hundred
miles away from Aparri, Cagayan (Art. 122, Revised Penal Code).
Supposing that while the robbery was taking place, the culprits stabbed a member of the crew while sleeping. What
crime was committed? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The crime committed is qualified piracy, because it was accompanied by physical injuries/homicide. The culprits
stabbed a member of the crew while sleeping (Art. 123, Revised Penal Code).
Vessel (2000)
After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino seaman,
stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an overseas vessel which
was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich
 30

Filipino businessman. When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the
vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An information for homicide was filed against
Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. If you
were the Judge, will you grant the motion? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime
committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs. Fowler, 1 Phil 614)
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner,
which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in
the high seas.

TITLE TWO: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

A. CLASSES OF ARBITRARY DETENTION:

Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person,
shall suffer;
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has
continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not
more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.
5. The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory
confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of
any person.

Illegal detention distinguished from arbitrary detention:

Illegal detention
Committed by a private individual
By unlawfully kidnapping, detaining or otherwise depriving a
person of liberty
It is a crime against personal liberty
Arbitrary Detention
Committed by a public officer or employee
By detaining a person without legal ground
It is a crime against the fundamental laws of the
State

Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he detains a person
3. That the detention is without legal grounds

A. Definition of Arbitrary Detention

Deprivation by a public officer of the liberty of person without legal ground. If the offender is a private individual
the offense illegal detention. But when a private individual connives with a public officer, the crime is arbitrary
detention due to conspiracy and the higher penalty is imposed. The crime of illegal detention is absorbed in
arbitrary detention.

Legal grounds for the detention of a person

1. The commission of a crime;
2. Violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital.

Arrest without a warrant – when lawful

- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
- NOTE: (a) and (b) pertains to suspect caught in flagrante delicto, while (c) pertains to escaping prisoners
 31

2006 Bar Question

What are the 3 ways of committing arbitrary detention? Explain each.

a. by detaining or locking up a person without any legal cause or ground therefore purposely to restrain his
liberty (Art. 124)
b. by delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority of a person lawfully arrested without a warrant (Art.
125).
c. By delaying release of a prisoner whose release has been ordered by competent authority (Art. 126)
In all the above-stated ways, the principal offender should be a public officer acting under color of his
authority.

What are the legal grounds for detention?

The legal grounds for detention are:
a. commission of a crime;
b. violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in an institution established for such
purpose.

When is an arrest by a peace officer or by a private person considered lawful? Explain.

Arrest by a peace officer or by a private person is lawful---
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where
he is serving sentence or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes,
or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and
272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).

Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he has detained a person for some legal ground
3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:
a. 12 hours for crimes punishable by light felonies
b. 18 hours for crimes punishable by correctional penalties
c. 36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties

G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999

Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dated 19
January 1998 1 which recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner against herein
private respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the delivery of detained
persons, and the Order of April 13, 1998 2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the
Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." 3 The following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for
violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Metro Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle 4. The complaint, insofar as pertinent,
reads as follows:
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu, Philippines and
within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while accused JASPER AGBAY
manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the
 32

Private Complainant, Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle going their destinations. Upon initial
investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman, accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was released and accused
JASPER AGBAY is presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail. Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release
of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial
authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997." 5 Private respondents did not act on this letter and
continued to detain petitioner. 6
On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued an order, denominated
as "Detention During the Pendency of the Case", committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City. 7 Five (5)
days later, or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond.
8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein
private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers
stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. 9
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on November 10, 1997, the 7th
MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610, it is hereby recommended that
an INFORMATION be filed against the two aforenamed accused.
Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscal's Office for appropriate action. 10
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
11 the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein private respondents before the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition.
Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which
issued the questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal against herein private
respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but this motion was denied in an Order dated
April 13, 1998.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The grounds relied upon in the present petition 12 are as follows:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RELYING ON MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 14,
SERIES OF 1995, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995, OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS
COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT, THE SAID CIRCULAR BEING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS
COMPENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA
HAS IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MCTC, WHILE HAVING
AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE "PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY "
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND, HENCE, THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT
BEFORE IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID NOT INTERRUPT THE
PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125.
IV.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE ORDER OF DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS.
V.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL
COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the Philippine National Police, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, by virtue of the description of the Office, has no competence or
jurisdiction to act on his complaint against private respondents who are members of the PNP. Petitioner also
questions the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the Philippine
National Police.1âwphi1.nêt
There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XVI,
has mandated the establishment of "one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian character
(emphasis supplied)." Likewise, R.A. 6975 13 is categorical in describing the civilian character of the police force.
14 The only question now is whether Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of the PNP, violates the
latter's civilian character.
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December 1998 15, the issue as to whether
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate civilian personnel of the government was
 33

resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. 16 In that case, the petitioners, who
were members of the Philippine National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to
investigate the alleged shootout of certain suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court
held that:
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is
prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of
the relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise.
As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties"
as Congress may prescribe through legisiation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the
Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military
establishment. In this light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of
the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall
have supervision and control of the said Office.
While Section 31 thereof declares:
Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein shall be under his supervision and control.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for
Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman
of the Kurutong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators. 17
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply to Comment dated February 1, 1999,
argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on all fours with the case at bar 18. Petitioner states that the doctrine
laid down in the said case is simply that "the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or
individual cases involving non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military Affairs" and
does not apply when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction.
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases involving non-military personnel to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases. The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing
Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of
his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or the or lawyer in the government service to
act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases." This Court,
absent any grave abuse of discretion, may not enterfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of
supervision and control over the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent and policy of the Constitution
and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian character of the police force and "would render nugatory and meaningless
the distinction between cases involving civilian and military personnel and the creation of separate divisions of the
Ombudsman." 19
Said contentions are misplaced.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is by no means a member of the military
establishment. The said Office was established "to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military
establishment just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference". The Office was intended
to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain redress for their grievances against higher authorities and the drafters
of the Constitution were aware that the creation of the Office, which is seemingly independent of the President, to
perform functions which constitutionally should be performed by the President, might be in derogation of the
powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces 20.
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of the 1987
Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people" 21 and "a champion of the citizen. 22" Sec. 12, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as "protectors of the people." Thus, first and
foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance
to the people and ordinary citizens, it is clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the assumption of
jurisdiction by the said office over the investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract from or violate the
civilian character of the police force when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in
the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person for the proper judicial authorities within the period of:
twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six hours (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
 34

In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7 September 1997 for an
alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically section 5 (b) thereof 23. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty. Under these circumstances, a criminal
complaint or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a complaint on 8
September 1997 against petitioner for violation of R.A. 7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Metro Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for purposes of
preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the offense. This act of private complainant
petitioner argues, was unnecessary, a surplusage which did not interrupt the period prescribed by Art. 125 24
considering that under the Rules it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. As
such, upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the proper
Regional Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125. Thus, petitioner argues, when
the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he was acting contrary
to law since by then there was no basis for the continued detention of petitioner. 25
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998 Order, stated that
the duty of filing the corresponding complaint in court was "fulfille by respondent when the formal complaint was
filed on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours after the arrest of herein
complainant of September 7, 1997." 26 The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that while a municipal court
judge may conduct preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties, he still retains the
authority to issue an order of release or commitment. As such, upon the filing of the complaint with the MCTC,
there was already compliance with the very purpose and intent of Art. 125 27.
The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes to a "proper judicial
authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail 28. More specifically, it punishes public
officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes
illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to
the corresponding judicial authorities 29.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by
law. 30"
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, as in the instant case, conducts a
preliminary investigation, he is not acting as a judge but as a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the cases of
Sangguniang Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39,
where it was held that "when a preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge, he performs a non-judicial
function as an exception to his usual duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila,
80 Phil. 862, that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in Art. 125 is applicable.
Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The cited cases of Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt with
the issue of whether or not the findings of the Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject to
review by provincial and city fiscals. There was no pronoucement in these cases as to whether or not a municipal
trial court, in the exercise of its power to conduct preliminary investigations, is a proper judicial authority as
contemplated by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra, since the facts of this case
are different. In Sayo, the complainant was filed with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of
release or commitment while in the instant case, the complaint was filed with a judge who had the power to issue
such an order. Furthermore, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case 31, this
Court even made a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person "is a legal one and consists in making a
charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First
Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an
investigation if the evidence against said person warrants."
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. In contrast with a city
fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment 32. Furthermore, upon the filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be
released on bail 33. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail 34. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly
served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the postion of the Ombudsman that such
filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Finally, we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the complaint against petitioner with the
7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If tere was any error in this procedure, private respondents should not be held
liable. In the same manner, petitioner's argument that the controversial orders issued by the MCTC are contrary' to
law does not give rise to criminal liability on the part of the respondents. Respondent police officers may have
 35

rendered themselves open to sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order of the court, knowing
fully well that a complainant was a already filed with it.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed January 19, 1998 Resolution and
the April 13, 1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves to DISMISS
the petition. No pronouncement as to costs.

EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE 125:

1. When the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
2. Presence of the circumstances considered in determining liability of officer detaining a person beyond
legal period and these are:
a. The means of communication as well as
b. The hour of arrest and
c. Other circumstances such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to
make the investigation and file in time the necessary information must be taken into
consideration.
3. SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel,
who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to
the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial
authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or
suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by
the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under
Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act. (2007 Human Security Act)

Art. 126. Delaying release. — The penalties provided for in Article 124 shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who delays for the period of time specified therein the performance of any judicial or executive order
for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the notice of such order to said
prisoner or the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.

Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That there is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or that there is a
proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person
3. That the offender without good reason delays:
a. The service of the notice of such order to the prisoner;
b. The performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner; OR
c. The proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person

Three acts are punishable under Article 126

1. By delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner
2. By unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner
3. By unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person

Art. 128. Violation of domicile. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against
the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such
owner, or having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do
so.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be
not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.

Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or make a search therein for papers or other
effects

Acts punishable under Article 128

1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner; OR
2. By searching paper or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner; OR
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having required to
leave the same
 36

“Against the will of the owner”

To constitute a violation, the entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the will of the owner of
the dwelling, which presupposes opposition or prohibition by said owner, express or implied. If the entrance by the
public officer or employee is only without the consent of the owner of the dwelling, the crime is not committed.
Neither is the crime committed if the owner of the dwelling consented to such entrance. (People vs. Luis Sane)

The offender must be a public officer or employee

If the offender is a private individual, the crime committed is trespass to dwelling (Article 280).

2002 Bar Question

What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling?

The differences between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling are; 1) The offender in violation of domicile
is a public officer acting under color of authority; in trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person or public
officer acting in a private capacity.

2) Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different ways: (1) by entering the dwelling of another against the
will of the latter; (2) searching papers and other effects inside the dwelling without the previous consent of the
owner; or (3) refusing to leave the premises which he entered surreptitiously, after being required to leave the
premises.
Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by entering the dwelling of another against the
express or implied will of the latter.

RA NO. 9372 (HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007) WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 15, 2007
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property from acts
of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the
welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the
law of nations.
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and fundamental liberties
of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising political,
economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of terrorism without
acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include conflict
management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and
promoting equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized
powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the exercise of the
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect for
human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the
Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall
suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer
the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime of
terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions,
or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
 37

terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written
application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-
Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential
to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will
be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any organization,
association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not
organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional
Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons
concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said
Regional Trial Court.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal
liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said
charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said
police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits
under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of
terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest
took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented
before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning
and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the
subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought
to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the
place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or
after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police
or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the event of an
actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the
arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law
enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above
that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall
be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of
the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose
connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon
application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where
he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with
Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the
court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided
under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other
means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the
case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.
 38

SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of
Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of
probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members
of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination
of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or
cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow
such examination or to provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written order of
the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication
equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any person
suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) to a member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered,
and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and
security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the monthly
needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's medical needs upon approval
of the court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of
his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals to allow the
person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums
from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the
regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen
for legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall give the highest
priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in relation to the
implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil and political rights of
persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of which the
Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application, the provisions of this
Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act within the
terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the
crimes defined and punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board
Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy,
consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5)
to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes
against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the
commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by the President, the Act shall
be published in three newspapers of national circulation; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in llocos
Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo and Tacloban; and
three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro, Davao and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished shall be aired everyday at
primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over three national television and radio networks; three radio
and television networks, one each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio and television networks, one each
in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and Zamboanga City. The publication in the
newspapers of local circulation and the announcements over local radio and television networks shall be done in
the dominant language of the community. After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall
take effect two months after the elections are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be
automatically suspended one month before and two months as after the holding of any election.

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE TWO

Violation of Domicile vs. Trespass to Dwelling (2002)
What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling? (2%)
 39

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The differences between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling are; 1) The offender in violation of domicile
is a public
officer acting under color of authority; in trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person or public officer
acting in a private capacity.
2) Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different ways: (1) by entering the dwelling of another against the
will of the latter; (2) searching papers and other effects inside the dwelling without the previous consent of the
owner; or (3) refusing to leave the premises which he entered surreptitiously, after being required to leave the
premises.
3) Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by entering the dwelling of another against the
express or implied will of the latter.
Homicide; Fraustrated; Physical Injuries (1994)
At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto's son, saw Dante
and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went
out of his room. Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were it not for
the timely medical attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him for
25 days. What crime or crimes did Dante commit?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less serious
physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide ...
Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay because he had already performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the intended felony of homicide were it not for causes independent of the act
of Dante. Dante had the intent to kill judging from the weapon used, the manner of committing the crime and the
part of the body stabbed. Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto.
There appears to be no intent to kill because Dante merely assaulted Mamerto without using the knife.
Arbitrary Detention; Elements; Grounds (2006)
1. What are the 3 ways of committing arbitrary detention? Explain each. (2.5.%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The 3 ways of arbitrary detention are:
a) Arbitrary detention by detaining a person without legal ground committed by any public officer or
employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person (Art. 124, Revised Penal Code).
b) Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities which is committed by a public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offense punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen hours (18), for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional facilities, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent (Art. 125, Revised Penal Code).
c) Delaying release is committed by any public officer or employee who delays the release for the period of
time specified therein the performance of any judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner, or unduly
delays
the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner or the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of
such person (Art. 126, Revised Penal Code).
2. What are the legal grounds for detention? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the
patient in a hospital shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any person (Art. 124[2], Revised Penal
Code).
3. When is an arrest by a peace officer or by a private person considered lawful? Explain. (5%)

1. When the arrest by a peace officer is made pursuant to a valid warrant.

2. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

i. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense,
ii. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it, and
iii. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 5, Rule 113,1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
Kidnapping; Serious Illegal Detention (1997)
A and B conspiring with each other, kidnapped C and detained him. The duo then called up C's wife informing her
that they had her husband and would release him only if she paid a ransom in the amount of P10,000,000 and
that, if she were to fail, they would kill him. The next day, C, who had just recovered from an illness had a relapse.
 40

Fearing he might die if not treated at once by a doctor, A and B released C during the early morning of the third
day of detention.
Charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention provided in Article 267, RPC, A and B filed a petition for bail.
They contended that since they had voluntarily released C within three days from commencement of the detention,
without having been paid any amount of the ransom demanded and before the institution of criminal proceedings
against them, the crime committed was only slight illegal detention prescribed in Article 268, RPC.
After hearing, the trial court found the evidence of guilt to be strong and therefore denied the petition for bail. On
appeal, the only issue was: Was the crime committed kidnapping and serious detention or slight Illegal detention?
Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The crime committed by A and B is kidnapping and serious illegal detention because they made a demand for
ransom and threatened to kill C if the latter's wife did not pay the same. Without the demand for ransom, the
crime could have been slight illegal detention only.
The contention of A and B that they had voluntary released C within three days from the commencement of the
detention is immaterial as they are charged with a crime where the penalty prescribed is death (Asistio vs. San
Diego. 10SCRA673).
They were properly denied bail because the trial court found that the evidence of guilt in the information for
kidnapping and serious Illegal detention is strong.
Trespass to Dwelling; Private Persons (2006)
Under what situations may a private person enter any dwelling, residence, or other establishments without being
liable for trespass to dwelling? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Trespass to dwelling is not applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of: a)
Preventing some serious harm to himself, its occupants, or a third person; and b) Rendering service to humanity
or justice;
Any person who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns, and other public houses, while the same are open will likewise not
be liable (Art. 280, Revised Penal Code).
Tresspass to Dwelling; Rule of Absorption (1994)
At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay. Mamerto's son, saw Dante
and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went
out of his room. Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered Injuries which, were it not for
the timely medical attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him for
25 days. What crime or crimes did Dante commit?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less serious
physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide because when the
trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious offense, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the
greater crime, and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling (People vs. Abedoza, 53
Phil.788).
Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay.... Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for
the wounds sustained by Mamerto...
Unjust Vexation vs Acts of Lasciviousness (1994)
When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's breast considered only unjust vexation instead of acts of
lasciviousness?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising either out of passion or other motive and the touching of her
breast as a mere incident of the embrace without lewd design constitutes merely unjust vexation (People vs,
Ignacio. CA GRNo. 5119-R, September 30, 1950). However, where the kissing, embracing and the touching of the
breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the same constitute acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Percival Gilo,
10 SCRA 753).
Art. 124 Arbitrary Detention (2008)
After due hearing on a petition for a writ of amparo founded on the acts of enforced disappearance and extralegal
killing of the son of the complainant allegedly done by the respondent military officers, the court granted the
petition. May the military officers be criminally charged in court with enforced disappearance and extralegal killing?
Explain fully.
Yes, the respondent military officers maybe criminally charged in court since “enforced disappearance” constitutes
arbitrary detention under Art. 124 or Unlawful Arrest under Art. 269 of the RPC. Extralegal killing can also be
considered murder and/or homicide under Art. 248/249 RPC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The petition for the writ of amparo is not a criminal proceeding and will not determine the guilt of the respondents.
If the evidence so warrants, the amparo court may refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) of the military officers for the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder
or homicide under Art. 276 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659.

Art. 280 Trespass to Dwelling (2009)/True or False

 41

A policeman who, without a judicial order, enters a private house over the owner’s opposition is guilty of trespass
to dwelling.

Art. 267 Illegal Detention/Art. 270 Kidnapping of minors (2009)

Virgilio, armed with a gun, stopped a van along a major thoroughfare in Manila, pointed the gun at the driver and
shouted: "Tigil! Kidnap ito!"
Terrified, the driver, Juanito, stopped the van and allowed Virgilio to board. Inside the van were Jeremias, a 6-
year-old child, son of a multi-millionaire, and Daday, the child’s nanny. Virgilio told Juanito to drive to a deserted
place, and there, ordered the driver to alight. Before Juanito was allowed to go, Virgilio instructed him to tell
Jeremias’ parents that unless they give a ransom of P10-million within two (2) days, Jeremias would be beheaded.
Daday was told to remain in the van and take care of Jeremias until the ransom is paid. Virgilio then drove the van
to his safehouse.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Virgilio commit? Explain. (5%)

TITLE THREE: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by
rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).

People vs. Hernandez, et. al.

Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956

Facts: Accused Hernandez is alleged to be either a member or officer of Committee on Labor Organization (CLO),
an active agency of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP). The said agency has engaged in activities
involving rebellion that will ensure the permanent success of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the
Philippines. The purpose of the rebellion is to remove the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws thereof. Their activities consist of making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police constabulary, and army detachments as well as innocent civilians & as a necessary means to commit the
crime of rebellion, in connection therewith & in furtherance thereof have then & there committed acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder and arson & planned destruction of private & public property to create & spread chaos,
disorder, terror & fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose. The accused is alleged to
have committed murders, arsons and robberies pursuant to their purpose. In relation thereto, the accused was
charged with & convicted of rebellion, completed with murders, arsons & robberies. The penalty imposed on him is
life imprisonment. The defense, however, contended that he cannot be charged with rebellion complexed with
murder, arson or robbery.
Issue: WON the charge against him is correct?
Decision: The motion for bail is granted. The accused is provisionally released.
Ratio Decidendi:
a. For engaging in war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life & property are inherent in
rebellion but not in assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape.
b. Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as maybe
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
c. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof then said offense
becomes stripped of its “common” complexion, inasmuch as being part & parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
 42

d. Another definition of political offense: These are divested of their character as “common offenses” & assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.
e. Under the allegations of amended information, the murders, arsons, & robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants as means “necessary” for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion.
f. That the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, SIMPLE REBELLION, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons & robberies.
g. In the commission of rebellion, one must consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof. Such crime
constitutes only one crime, punishable with one single penalty.

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes
center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the
limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with
the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more
effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same
question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in
Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel
of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis
and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile
was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990,
he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5
On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R.
No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does
not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,
whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which
is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling,
and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and
to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon
their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00
(for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended
resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the
legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and
two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No.
92163.
 43

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor
General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common"
crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or
not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt
that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the
incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by
enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the
occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in
effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in
its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling
should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments
were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be
the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority
opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming
that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de
1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas
delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite
que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of
the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code
does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses
put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties
for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he
commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from
the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
 44

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez
remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less
adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for
the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the
propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado
V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;
that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the
policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of
Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised
Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation
conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.
14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during
the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his
witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not
the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the
case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the
voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might
consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez
as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should
be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent
crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or
justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion
to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition,
whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the
part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this
Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or
competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial
courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every
court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial
 45

processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the
reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a
warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation
regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in
the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash
the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through,
the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that
said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial
court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the
Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like
the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within
the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of
the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-
10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were
taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality
that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less
impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom
nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military,
but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital
City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it
cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court
has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is
needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in
this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read
as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-38538 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRES A. MANGLALLAN

On September 3, 1972 in Barrio Punti East, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Ka Daniel who appears to be the leader of the New
People's Army (NPA) in the area directed Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos, and Virgilio
Ballesteros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka
Daniel to be a Philippine Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual, Manglallan carrying a
Browning shotgun, Ramos a Thompson, Alvarez a carbine and Ballesteros, a homemade gun called Bulldog, They
arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at the river bank giving his carabao a bath. Ramos went to him
and after a while shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him with his Browning followed with another shot by
Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed on the dead body of Ragual a
writing and drawing made by their association warning the people and the PC of their activities. 1 Thereafter, the
group returned and reported to Ka Daniel that Ragual was already dead. Dr. Leonides Flores, the Municipal Health
Officer of Sta. Ana, Cagayan conducted a post-mortem examination on the remains of Apolonio Ragual at about
 46

4:00 P.M. of the same day, after which he issued an autopsy report 2 showing multiple gunshot wounds suffered
by the deceased and finding the cause of death to be severe hemorrhage, shock secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds.
An information was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan charging Andres
Manglallan, Virgilio Ballesteros, and Cesar Alvarez of the crime of murder. However, upon arraignment on accused
Manglallan and Ballesteros were present as Alvares was at large. Upon motion of the fiscal, Ballesteros was
discharged from the information as a government witness. The trial on the merits proceeded as against Manglallan
after which a decision was rendered on March 19, 1974, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Andres Manglallan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance offsetting each other, and hereby sentences him to suffer
reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00)
without, however, serving subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The accused being a detention prisoner and having signed the agreement required of detention prisoners by Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, As amended by Republic Act No. 6127, is credited with the whole period of his
preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
Not satisfied therewith, said accused interposed this appeal alleging that the lower court committed the following
assigned errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS NOT MURDER BUT A POLITICAL
OFFENSE WHICH GIVES RISE TO THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT FALLS UNDER THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT
OR UNDER ARTICLES 134 AND 135 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Second Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR ONLY
MERE MEMBERSHIP IN THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) WHICH IS PENALIZED BY ARRESTO MAYOR AND NOT FOR
A GRAVER CRIME PENALIZED BY PRISION MAYOR TO DEATH. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAVING BEEN DENIED OF
HIS STATUTORY RIGHT AND THE TWO-WITNESS REQUIREMENT OF THE ANTI- SUBVERSION ACT NOT HAVING
BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
Third Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF BALLESTEROS AND IN NOT
HOLDING, ASSUMMING REBELLION AS THE APPLICABLE OF TENSE. THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT COULD, IF AT
ALL, BE HELD LIABLE MERELY AS AN ACCOMPLICE IN THE CRIME OF REBELLION.
Fourth Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
After the briefs of the parties were filed, the defendant-appellant filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on October
25, 1977 as he had lost interest in the same and is convinced that the decision appealed from is in accordance with
law and the evidence.
The Solicitor General was required to comment on this motion and he recommended the denial of the motion to
withdraw the appeal in view of the recommendation in the People's brief that accused-appellant should be
convicted of the lesser offense of simple rebellion which is more favorable to the appellant. The counsel de oficio
for the appellant, in reply to the said comment stated that he agrees with the Id comment of the Solicitor General
and asked that the appeal be decided at the earliest possible time. Appellant filed a separate manifestation and
motion stating his interest to pursue the appeal. The motion was granted by the Court on January 25, 1982.
Under the first assigned error, the appellant contends that the crime he committed is not murder but a political
offense which gives rise to the question as to whether the same falls under the Anti-Subversion Act or under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant admits that he was a member of the NPA then
operating in the Cagayan area with Ka Daniel as their leader. He asserts that the NPA is the military arm of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. 3 There is no question likewise that the killing of Apolonio Ragual by the
appellant and his companions who were also members of the NPA upon orders of Ka Daniel was politically
motivated. They suspected Ragual as an informer for the PC. In fact, after he was killed, they left a letter and a
drawing on the body of Ragual as a warning to others not to follow his example. 4
In the case of People vs. Agarin, 5 which was a prosecution for murder, like the present case, where the accused
Huk member with his companions killed the victim because he was a PC informer, this Court held that the crime
committed is simple rebellion and not murder, as follows:
The offense perpetrated by appellant is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. Considering, however, the
fact that the killing was committed as a means to or in the furtherance of the subversive ends of the Huk balahaps
(HUKS) because the Id appellant and his companions, Commander Manaing and Commander Vida suspected the
deceased to have acted as a spy and had informed the BOT and Government agencies regarding the presence of
the Huks in that region, we find the Id Federico Agarin alias Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple
rebellion only (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz. [12] 5506; Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People
vs. Melecio Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. Gaz [51] 91 80)'" [People vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]"
The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he committed is not murder but the
crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court does not agree, however, with the allegation of the appellant that he could be held liable only for being a
member in the NPA punishable under the Anti-Subversion Act. More than being a member of the NPA, which is a
 47

subversive organization, the appellant took up arms against the government by committing murder, as in this
case, which thus holds him liable for the graver offense of rebellion.
Nor can the argument of the appellant that he should be held liable as an accomplice be sustained. The records
show without doubt that together with his companions, they killed the victim, the appellant being among those who
shot him and thereafter they placed the letter and drawing on top of the body of the deceased as a warning against
others. His participation in the commission of the offense is obviously that of a principal and not that of a mere
accomplice.
Under the fourth assigned error, the appellant claims that he should be credited the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender,. Evidence has been adduced by the appellant that after several months of hiding after the
killing, he voluntarily surrendered to Lt. Lee Barnes. 6
The elements of this mitigating circumstance.
(a) The offender had not actually been arrested;
(b) That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
(c) The surrendered was voluntary. 7
All the above elements are present in the case. The appellant should thus be credited this mitigating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
rebellion punishable under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and not of murder. Considering that the
commission of the offense was attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrendered, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is hereby imposed an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Two (2)
Years and Four (4) Months of prision correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as
maximum to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Apolonio Ragual in the amount of
P30,000.00. As the accused-appellant is a detention prisoner in the New Bilibid Prisons and he appears to have
been under detention for a period beyond the period of the penalty herein-above imposed on him, he is hereby
ordered Released immediately from detention unless he is being held for some other charges. This Decision is
immediately executory.

Elements
1. That there be a
a. Public uprising AND
b. Taking arms against the Government
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
a. To remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws
(1) The territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; OR
(2) Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; OR
b. To deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Rebellion and insurrection are NOT synonymous

• Rebellion is more frequently used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede
the existing government.
• Insurrection is more commonly used in reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of
minor importance or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters or
subjects.

Nature of the crime of rebellion

• A crime of masses, of a multitude.
• A vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
• It evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but also civil war on a bigger or lesser scale.
• The RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking of arms.

Rebellion distinguished from treason

a. The levying of war against the Government would constitute treason when performed to aid the enemy. It
would also constitute an adherence to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort.
The levying of war against the Government during peace time for any of the purposes mentioned in Art.
134 is rebellion.
b. Rebellion always involves taking up arms against the Government; treason maybe committed by mere
adherence to the enemy giving him aid or comfort.

Political crimes and common crimes, distinguished

• Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose.
• The decisive factor is the intent or motive.

CONTINUING OFFENSE; EFFECT.

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

 48

Umil vs. Ramos

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the
petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule —
as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member
is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the
factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary,
in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the
elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in
relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that
such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those
confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners
under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering
decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance
with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such
arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing
arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a
valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which
read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified
it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when
arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile,
8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have
shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-
called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
 49

subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership
in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown
hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest
of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for
a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second,
that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of
Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit")
was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was
based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was
truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January
1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including
Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie
Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality
Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action
and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the
confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes
Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the
directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who
make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the
same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is
therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R.
Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were
searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives
and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here
that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby
placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention
in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the
CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of
this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
 50

search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other
communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August
1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other
members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents
found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988,
when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents
frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a
permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the
premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house
was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of
the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military
authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were
being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of
Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received
was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search
warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a
person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership
thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the
corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the
case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in
the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better
for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and
judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law
and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule
113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the
crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be
innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he
said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on
22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November
1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the
above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on
the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words
 51

were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of
the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had
before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on
28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the
killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted)
and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno
noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga,
was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve
the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by
said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against
them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by
factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary
or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is
pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an
extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in
the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents
found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA,
as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again,
these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which
the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already
guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or
innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial
of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court
finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where
national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels.
What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding.
This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of
the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this
Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then
the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be
either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
 52

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the
validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for
stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the
records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.

G.R. No. 125796, Promulgated: December 27, 2000

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR vs. CA, ET. AL.

The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of trial, the prosecution can be ordered to change the
information which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation shows
that the crime committed is not murder with multiple frustrated murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that the
power to determine what crime to charge on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public
prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, while agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the prosecutor
to have gravely abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidence
adduced at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed was rebellion. Accordingly, it ordered the
prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him. Hence, this petition brought by the provincial prosecutor of
Zamboanga del Norte for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte1 filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information (docketed as Criminal Case No, 6427) charging private
respondents and 10 other individuals with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The Information reads:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ATICO OBODO alias "Dondoy," NACENCIANO PACA-LIUGA, JR.,
ELEAZAR FLORENDO, NESTOR BASES alias ‘Beses/Belly,’ FLORENCIO CANDIA alias "Bimbo," JUDY CATUBIG alias
‘Elboy/Al," PETER MOLATO alias, Joker,’ ALBERTO CATUBIG alias "Blacky", ALMARIO CATUBIG alias ‘Nixon,’ JIMMY
BENGAL alias "Macoboy," ENRICO SIMBULAN alias ‘Monstop,’ JIMMY GARIG alias "Gino" and BERNIDO QUENCAS
alias "Digoy’ of the crime of MURDER WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows:
That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May, 1988, in the Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with the high caliber
firearms, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ PA, which accused his instantaneous death and
causing injuries to the following victims namely: SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT. RODRIGO BARADI, SGT.
LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT. BELLIZAR PA, which injuries would ordinarily cause their death; thus performing all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence, but which nevertheless
did not produce it for reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to the said victims which prevented their death; that as a result of the commission of
the said crime the heirs of Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz and the herein victims suffered the following damages, vis:
On victim CPL ALFREDO DELA CRUZ:
 53

Indemnity for
Victim’s death ….. P50, 000.00
Loss of earning
Capacity ………… 30,000.00
P80, 000.00
SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR:
a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00
Loss of earning
Capacity ………….. 10,000.00
P20, 000.00
SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS:
a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00
Loss of earning
Capacity ………….. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
SGT. RODRIGO BARADI;
a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00
Loss of earning
Capacity ………….. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
SGT. BELLIZAR:
a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00
Loss of earning
Capacity ………….. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
CONTR ARY TO LAW (Viol. Of Art. 248, in relation or Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.2
The foregoing information is based on a joint affidavit executed on June 1, 1993 by five individuals, who claim to
be former members of the New People’s Army (NPA), before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. The affiants stated that on May 1, 1988, their group, which included private respondents, figured in an
armed encounter with elements of the Philippine Army in Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte,
as a result of which one solider, Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz, was killed while four others, Sgts. Rodrigo Alviar,
Linomagan Piatos, Rodrigo Baradi, and a certain Bellizar, were seriously wounded. Although private respondents
did not appear nor submit affidavits in the preliminary investigation, they appealed the resolution of the provincial
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice on the ground that, in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, the provincial prosecutor disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed rebellion.
When the case was filed in court, private respondents reiterated their contention and prayed that the provincial
prosecutor be ordered to change the charge from murder with multiple frustrated murder to rebellion.
On September 29, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying private respondents’ motion for the correction or
amendment of the information. The trial court said.3
Be it recalled, that as pointed out by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, the same moving counsel sometime on July
22, 1993 filed a notice of appeal assailing the resolution of the provincial prosecutor dated July 16, 1993 finding
probable cause against all the above-named accused for the crime of Murder and Multiple frustrated Murder, to the
Honorable Secretary of Justice, by raising the same issue that "instead of recommending the filing of a political
crime such as subversion or rebellion, the investigating prosecutor is recommending the filing of the common crime
of murder to cover-up the apparent political color of the alleged crime committed.’ Until the Secretary of Justice
therefore resolves the appeal by the movant, this court will have no basis to order the public prosecutor to amend
or change the crime charged in the information. Besides, this Court recognizes and respects the prerogative of the
fiscal to determine whether or not a prima facie case exists in a given case against the accused. This power vested
in the fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the courts.
But since the case has already been filed with this Court, jurisdiction therefor now lies with the court. It may not
even be bound by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice…
Private respondents twice moved for reconsideration and twice were rebuffed. They then filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court to set aside the orders dated September 29, October 24, and November 3, 1995 of the
trial court. They impleaded the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte as co-respondent of Judge Pacifico
Garcia of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City.
Without ruling on the petition, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in decision4 dated July
24, 1996, the subject of this review, found the provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion in charging
private respondents with murder with multiple frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals held:
The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed component of the Communist Party in this country called the national
Democratic Front (NDF). The ultimate objective of the NPA/NDF is to overthrow the constitutional democratic plant
it with a government anchored on the communist ideology.
It is common practice of the military and police to charge captured or arrested members f the NPA with capital
offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, illegal possession of firearms used in the commission of homicide or
murder, arson resulting in death rather than on simple rebellion.
 54

If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military lexicon) commits homicide, murder, arson, robbery, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance or on the occasion of his revolutionary pursuit, the only
crime he has committed is rebellion because all those common crimes are absorbed in the latter one pursuant to
the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and several subsequent cases.
The reason why instead of charging the NPA fighter with capital offenses mentioned supra and not the proper
offense of rebellion is obvious. Rebellion is a bailable offense and given the resources of the NPA, it is the easiest
thing for it to bail out its members facing rebellion charges in court. Once out, the NPA fighter goes back to his
mountain lair and continues the fight against the government. If he is accused of a capital offense where the
granting of bail is a matter of discretion, his chances of securing provisional liberty during the pendency of the trial
are very much lessened.
Since, the military and the police carry the brunt of fighting the NPAs and in so doing they put their limbs and lives
on the line, it is easy for Us to understand why they usually charge the captured or arrested NPAs with capital
offenses instead of the proper offense which is rebellion. The police or military practice is of course wrong, but it is
not much of a problem because it is at most recommendatory in nature. It is the prosecutory service that
ultimately decides the offense to be charged.
No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the public prosecutor has the discretion to
determine the crime to be charged in a criminal action. But like all discretion’s, his must be exercised soundly,
meaning, reasonably, responsibly, and fairly. As stated by the Supreme Court in Misola v. Panga cited in
respondents’ Comment (p. 61, Rollo); "The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information must be supported by the facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him." (Underscoring supplied).
If then, a public prosecutor deliberately ignores or suppresses an evidence in his hands which palpably indicates
the chargeable offense and files an information charging a more serious one, he departs from the precinct of
discretion and treads on the forbidden field or arbitrary action.
This was what happened in the case at bench. The evidentiary bases of the criminal action against petitioners are
the Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony earlier adverted to. It is not at all disputed that based upon these
two documents, the proper offense to charge petitioners with is rebellion. No amount of legalistic sophistry can
make those documents support murder for these offenses in the factual milieu in this case were all absorbed by
rebellion.
We vehemently reject respondents’ contention that the petitioners do not suffer any prejudice because they can
use their theory that the chargeable offense is only rebellion as a defense in the trial on the merits and if the trial
court finds that the evidence establishes only rebellion, then, it can convict them under the Information for just
that lesser crime. This argument is not only wrong but betrays insensitivity to violation of human rights. If
prosecutory discretion is twisted to charge a person of an unbailable offense and, therefore, keeps him under
detention when the truly chargeable offense is a bailable one, the prosecutor transgresses upon the human rights
of the accused.5
The appeals court was more kindly disposed toward the trial court. It said:
Respecting the respondent court, the situation is different…
The Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony mentioned earlier are not part of the records. The trial has not yet
been started and, therefore, no evidence has yet been adduced. There is no basis then for the trial court even to
call the attention of the prosecutor to a mistake in the crime charged.
We hold that respondent court did not commit an error in issuing the assailed orders, much less gravely abused its
discretion in issuing them.6
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered:
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing premises, We a) dismiss the petition as against respondent court for lack of merit;
and b) order the respondent office of Provincial Prosecutor to file a substitute Information in Criminal Case No.
6472 charging the petitioners with rebellion only.7
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
IN MAKING DISPARATE AND IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS CONCERNING THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ACTION OF
PETITIONER AND THE LOWER COURT.
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CHARGING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH
MURDER AND MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER.8
We find the contentions to be well taken.
First. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider the record of the preliminary investigation as basis for
finding petitioner provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when such record was not presented
before the trial court and, therefore, was not part of the record of the case. Rule 112, 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal procedure provide;
SEC. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. – The record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted by a
judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court,
on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record of any part thereof whenever the
same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by
the party requesting for its production.
The certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals was limited to the record of the trial court and indeed the Court
of Appeals recognized this by absolving the trial court of any liability for abuse of its discretion. It is petitioner
provincial prosecutor, which it found guilty of grave abuse of discretion in filing a case for murder with multiple
frustrated murder against private respondents because, in its view, the crime committed is rebellion. The Court of
 55

Appeals based its ruling on the joint affidavit of five prosecution witnesses and their testimonies relating to such
affidavit before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, which had conducted the preliminary
investigation. But this could not be done because the petition before it was a petition for certiorari to set aside
orders of the Regional Trial Court denying private respondents’ motion to compel petitioner to change the charge
against them from murder with frustrated murder to rebellion.
To sustain the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals of considering evidence dehors the record of the trial
court would be to set a bad precedent whereby the accused in any case can demand, upon the filing of the
information, a review of the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation for the purpose of compelling
the trial court to change the charge to a lesser offense. Such a ruling would undermine the authority of the
prosecutor and impose and intolerable burden on the trial court. As held in Depamaylo v. Brotario.9
The Court in a number of cases has declared that a municipal judge has no legal authority to determine the
character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima facie the
allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime
and his declaration upon that point can only be regarded as an expression of opinion in no wise binding on the
court (People vs. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960; de Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619). This power belongs to the fiscal
Bais vs. Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101).
It is to be noted that private respondents did not even attend the preliminary investigation during which they could
have shown that the crime committed was rebellion because the killing and wounding of the government troopers
was made in furtherance of rebellion and not for some private motive.
Second. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the crime as made out by the facts alleged in the Joint Affidavit of
witnesses is rebellion and not murder with multiple murder. The affidavit reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) S.S
Municipality of Jose Dalman)
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
JOINT AFFIDAVIT

I..Teofilo D. Sarigan, 31 years old, Manuel A. Cuenca, 28 yrs. Old, Romulo A. Pacaldo, 25 years
old, Carmelito Carpe, 36 yrs. Old, all married and Pablo D. Maladia, 20 yrs. old and with postal
address of Brgy. Lopero, Brgy. Lumaping, of Jose Dalman, Brgy. Villahermosa, Roxas, all of ZDN,
Brgy. Sigamok, Dumingag, ZDS and Brgy. Lipay. Jose Dalman, ZDN after having been duly sworn
to an oath in accordance to law do hereby depose and answer questions propounded:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q – Why are you here now in this office?
A – To render statement regarding the alleged incident wherein we were previously involved when we were still
with the underground movement of CPP/NPA that transpired on or about 011000H May 1988 at vicinity Campo
Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, ZDN against the government troops of 321B.
Q – Since when the five (5) of you entered the underground movement of CPP.NPA?
A – Since May 16, 1980, August 12, 1980, March 12, 1981, May 7, 1983 and August 27, 2987, sir.
Q – What is your previous position?
A – CO, FCOM (Front Command) and second deputy secretary of FC-1 "BBC, the Vice CO, FCOM, the CO, FCOM
after @ Bebeth surrender, a Unit Militia (YM) member, GYP element under squad Lion all of FC-1 "BBC" in which we
are operating within the Province of ZDN.
Q – Will you narrate to me what and how the incident you are referring to all about?
A – Actually sir, last 30 April 1988 our main force of FGU, FC-1 "BBC" had a meeting at vicinity basketball court of
vicinity Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan ZDN. While on that status our security group left at the high ground
portion of the place and engaged the advancing government troops of 321B after which we then decided to
postpone the meeting hence, the government troops presence. However, on the following day of 01 May 1988 at
about 10:00 o’clock in the morning when we assembled again at the aforesaid place, firefight occurred between us
and the government troops of 321B which resulted to inflict casualties to the 321B troopers, KIA one (1) Cpl.
Alfredo Dela Cruz and wounding four (4) others, Sgt. Rodrigo Alviar, Sgt. Linogaman Piatos, Sgt. Rodrigo Baradi
and Sgt. Bellizar while on our side with one wounded @ TOY.
Q – Can you still recall the names of those other NPA’s that participated in that encounter against the government
troops?
A – Yes, sir. ATICO OBORDO @ DONDOY, NACENCIANO PACALIUGA JR., @ ALFIE/IGI, ELEAZAT FLOREDO,
NESTOR BASES @ BELOY/BELLY. FLORENCIO CANDIA @ BIMBO, JUDY CATUBIG @ ELBOY/AL, PETER MOLATO @
JOKER, BIENVENIDO CATUBIG @ RASTY, ALBERTO CATUBIG @ BLACKY/RENATO, ALMARIO CATUBIG @ NOEL,
ROGER CATUBIG @ JAMSE, JOEL CATUBIG @ NIXON, JIMMY DINGAL @ MACBOY, ENRICO SIMBULAN @ NONSTOP,
@ DANDY, @ WAWAY, @ ALBA/JONAS, JIMMY GARIG @ NONOY, NILO CATUNGAN @ GINO, BERNIDO QUENECAS
@ DIGOY, @ CRISTINE/LFA @ MARILOU @ ELNA, @ BENIGNO PAULINO CORPUZ @ JR/PAWA, BENJAMIN
SANTANDER @ JAKE, @NESTOR, @ JAY, @ ISAGANI, @ RONIE, ESMAEL OBORDO @ ANICIO, @ FREDO, @ RUEL,
@ DODONG, JULITA ADJANAN @ GENIE, @ TONY, @ RJ, @ LANNIE @ DEMET, @ RENDON, @JESS, @ SAMSON
AND many others, sir.
Q – Then what transpired next?
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A – Right after the encounter, we withdraw our troops towards vicinity SVR, complex, Sergio Osmeña, Sr., ZDN.
Q – Do you have something more to say?
A – Nothing more, sir.
Q – Are you willing to sign you statement without being forced, coerced or intimidated?
A – Yes, sir.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE hereunto affix our signature this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN Philippines.
(SGD.) TEOFILO D. SARIGAN
Affiant
(SGD,) MANUEL A. CUENCA
Affiant
(SGD,) ROMULO A. PACALDO
Affiant
(SGD.) CARMELITO L. CARPE
Affiant
(SGD.) PABLO G. MALADIA
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN, Philippines.
(SGD.) ADELA S. GANDOLA
Municipal Trial Judge
Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated in foregoing affidavit. Merely because
it is alleged that private respondents were members of the CCP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight
resulting in the death of a government trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the
killing and wounding of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad,10
although it was shown that the accused was an NPA commander, he was nonetheless convicted of murder for the
killing of a person suspected of being a government informer. At all events, as this Court said in Balosis v.
Chanvez:11
Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the
basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than one offense does not
rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatory require him to charge the lesser offense although
the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one.12
In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA members, assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866 under
which they were charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that it gave prosecutors
the discretion to charge an accused either with rebellion or with other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. In
rejecting their contention, this Court said:
The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code trets rebellion or insurrection as a crime
distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of
rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the
latter’s whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either
murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the former has been committed in
furtherance of or in connection with the latter.13
The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not private is on the defense. This is the
teaching of another case.14 in which it was held;

In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind
which the accused better than any individual knows.
Its not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the pre-arraignment stage. The parties have yet to present their
respective evidence. If during the trial, private respondents are able to show proof which would support their
present contention, then they can avail of the remedy provided under the second paragraph of Rule 110, 1415
which provides:
If it appears at any time before judgement that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy…
Until then, however, petitioner provincial prosecutor is under no obligation to change against private respondents.
Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice of the military and the police to charge captured members
of the NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, or illegal possession of firearms rather than
rebellion. The alleged purpose is to deny them bail only if it can be shown that the evidence against them is not
strong, whereas if the charge is rebellion, private respondents would have an absolute right to bail.
As already stated, however, given the Joint affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone, it is not possible to
determine at this stage of the criminal proceeding that in engaging the government troops in a "firefight," private
respondents were acting in pursuance of rebellion. It could be that the "firefight" was more of an ambush staged
 57

by the NPA, as shown by the fact that while the government troop suffered one dead and four wounded, the
CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.
The charge that it is "common practice’ for the military and the police to charge suspected rebels with murder in
order to prevent them from going on bail can be laid equally at the door of the accused. As noted in Enrile v.
Salazar:16
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality
that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less
impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom
nothing, not even the sancity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so c this
aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in
the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large
attributable to, or even claimed by so called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.17
What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the application for
bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show proof that the crime with which they were charged is really
rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED insofar as it orders petitioner
to file a substitute information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is AFFIRMED.

Article 134-A. Coup d'etat; How committed. — The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of
the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications network, public utilities or other facilities
needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the
Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office of employment
with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As amended
by R.A. 6968).

Elements
1. That the offender is a person/s belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment
2. That it is committed by means of a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth
3. That the attack is directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines or any military
camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power
4. That the purpose of the attack is to seize or diminish state power

2004 BAR QUESTION

Distinguish clearly but briefly;
1. Between rebellion and coup d’ etat based on their constitutive elements as criminal offenses

REBELLION is committed when a multitude of persons rise publicly in arms for the purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted government, to be replaced by a government of the rebels. It is carried
out by force and violence, but need not be participated in by any member of the military, national police
or any public officer.

COUP D'ETAT is committed when members of the military, Philippine National Police, or public officer,
acting as principal offenders, launched a swift attack thru strategy, stealth, threat, violence or intimidation
against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, military camp or installation,
communication networks, public facilities or utilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of
governmental powers, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state powers.

Unlike rebellion which requires a public uprising, coup d'etat may be carried out singly or simultaneously
and the principal offenders must be members of the military, national police or public officer, with or
without civilian support. The criminal objective need not be to overthrow the existing government but only
to destabilize or paralyze the existing government.

Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal.
Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup d'etat shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in
undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period.
Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or aids in
undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
 58

When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who
in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as
performed similar acts, on behalf or the rebels shall be deemed a leader of such a rebellion, insurrection, or coup
d'etat. (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990).

Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and
proposal to commit coup d'etat shall be punished by prision mayor in minimum period and a fine which shall not
exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by
prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos (P2,000.00). (As amended
by R.A. 6968, approved October 24, 1990).

Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in
their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept
appointment to office under them. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Art. 138. Inciting a rebellion or insurrection. — The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite
others to the execution of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).

Elements
1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the Government
2. That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, banners or other representations
tending to the same end

Art. 139. Sedition; How committed. — The crime of sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods, any of the
following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public officer thereof
from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class;
and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National Government (or
the Government of the United States), of all its property or any part thereof.

Elements
1. That the offender rise 1) publicly and 2) tumultuously;
2. That they employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods;
3. That the offenders employ any of those means to attain any of the following objects:
a. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or holding of any popular election;
b. To prevent the National Government or any provincial or municipal government, or any public officer thereof
from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
c. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee
d. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class;
and
e. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National Government of all
its property or any part thereof.

Nature of the crime

• Raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
• The ultimate object is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently
engenders it.

What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is the object or purpose of the uprising
1. In both rebellion and sedition, there must be a public uprising.
2. In rebellion there must be the taking up of arms against the Government; In sedition, it is sufficient that the
public uprising is tumultuous.
 59

3. If the purpose of the uprising is not exactly against the Government and not for the purpose of doing the things
defined in Article 134, but merely to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods, one
object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, it is sedition.

Sedition distinguished from treason

• Treason is the violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or liege, lord, or to the supreme authority
of the State.
• Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.

Common crimes are not absorbed in sedition

Note the clause in the opening sentence of Art. 189, which says: “The crime of sedition is committed by persons
who rise publicly and tumultuously.” In Art. 163, the word “tumultuous” is given a definite meaning. It says that
”the disturbance shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more than three persons who are armed or
provided with means of violence.

PEOPLE VS. UMALI

96 PHIL 185

Facts: On the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal’s father, then beng used as his electoral headquarters,
Congressman Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan would
be killed. Pasumbal, complying with the order of his Chief (Umali), went to the mountains which were quite near
the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that
Punzalan was going to win in the election the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him
from the electoral fight.

In the evening of the same day, Pasumbal reported to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying
that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and even outlined the manner of attack.

After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived.
Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 30 armed
men. Then shots were heard. Afterwards, they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by
way of the railroad tracks.

Held: We are convinced that the principal and main, though not necessarily the most serious, crime committed
here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising
publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing things defined in
Article 134 of the RPC. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of the local Government. Rather,
the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc., one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan who was then mayor of Tiaong.

Inciting an act of hate or revenge upon public officers

PEOPLE vs. CABRERA

53 PHIL. 64

Facts: A policeman posted on Calle Real had an encounter with some constabulary soldiers, resulting in the death
of a constabulary private. This encounter engendered on the part of the constabulary soldiers a desire for revenge
against the police force in Mainila. They escaped from the barracks with their guns and made an attack upon the
police force. They fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo, killing a policeman and a
civilian. They also fired upon a passing street car, slaying one and wounding other innocent passengers. They
attacked the Luneta Police Station and the office of the secret service.

Held: The crime committed is sedition. The object of the uprising was to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
persons of the policemen who were public officers or employees.

The object of the uprising in this case is that one stated in par. 3 of Art. 139. Note also that in sedition, the
offenders need not be private individuals.

G.R. No. L-12686 October 24, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KAMLON HADJI, ET AL.

Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu for
different crimes in various cases, to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal Cases Nos. 1162-A to
 60

1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple injuries; and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh
Kaddam, et al., for kidnapping with murder and attempted murder.
The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon, leader of the sedition, to
an indeterminate imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
minimum to SIX (6) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of P10,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the proportionate costs.
Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment of
THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to FIVE (5) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00, each,
and in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.
Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukari Abdulialim Adin, Ulloh Urong Angkang Adiad, Angkang Illama,
Sahidula Ajad, lbbing Janah, Kakari Damboa, Akbara Abduhasman, Hatib Hala Amsajen, Hatib Jaron alias Baito
Haron, Awah Kamsa; Waliul Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili Jamli; Sinihag Salihan; Sarahan Ibba; is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTH IMPRISONMENT and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum; to pay a fine of P3,000.00 and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate
costs.
Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan, Taraman Adil, Kahiral Dastan, Boyongan Sabiban,
Sakkam Hussin, Baybayan Asao, Abdurahman Sahol, Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan Ladialawan is hereby acquitted
of the charges against him with the portionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from custody is hereby
ordered.
Crim. Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered dismissed with costs de oficio. The release from
custody of all the accused in those cases, except those who are charged or convicted in another case, is hereby
ordered.
In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon to the death penalty for the kidnapping of
Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon complexed with the murder of Jamalul Alling; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P3,000.00, without imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which the accused, Kamlon, was found guilty and
sentenced to the death penalty. A co-accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still at large at the time the lower court
rendered its judgment.
In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated that the trial judge recommended the
commutation of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment, The trial judge based his recommendation upon his
finding that the defendant agreed to surrender principally because he was made to believe by the authorities "that
he would be paroled." In the words of the decision of the lower court, "If the Constabulary officers concerned did
not promise any condition to Kamlon for his surrender, said officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas
Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that Kamlon's parole would be respected or be enforced after all outlaws had
surrendered. In one word, the officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon in double talk. They were
not frank.
The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following factual findings:
One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with two other armed
companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected were responsible for the
disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The search ended when the defendant and his companions
chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines.
Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair
and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas,
Kamlon made known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any
knowledge or responsibility for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their
protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, they were brought to the market place and, in a store, they were made to sit on chairs, one beside the
other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to the roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their
hands tied to the roof, Kamlon leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing him instantly.
Kamlon then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man whereupon Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as
he was bidden.
Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta by the shore and paddled out far into the
sea. When he returned, he no longer had with him his gruesome load.
Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he imposed on Jamalul Alling. Instead, Ajibun was
conducted back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged participation in the
disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must have caused Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its
end, he was merely told to raise the sum of P105.00 as fine and thereafter he was set free.
The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court was denied, disavowed and disputed by the
defendant. He offered an entirely different version of the killing. According to Kamlon, the deceased was shot to
 61

death, not by him, but by some relatives of a woman who, on that occasion, Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were
attempting to abduct.
The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be established by the sisters, Bariha Imam
Habilul and Muhayla Iman Habilul, who testified that one day they went to take a bath at a watering place some
100 brazas from where they were living. While washing their clothes at the same place and gathering water in
bamboo tubes, Bariha suddenly heard Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run away. I am being embraced and held
by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry because Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the nearby
bushes suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla and pulled her towards the eastern part of the place, a sitio
called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing the scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran away but was able to see Ajibun and
Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.
Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor were her uncle, Adu, and some other
men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji and Uttung, who forthwith armed themselves with guns and went after Ajibun
and Jamalul.
Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun went inside the
vinta and pulled the hands of Muhayla as Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an effort to place her on board.
Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by pushing the vinta, and while being engaged in this
struggle, she heard her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla, duck;" Muhayla ducked by dropping herself on the sea, face
downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water, she heard bursts of gunfire coming from the place where Adu
had given out his order.
After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit Jamalul who fell on the water almost falling on
Muhayla. Ajibun was fired upon, but he was able to paddle himself away out to the sea.
We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted by the trial court. While the defendant had
indeed insisted that the prosecution version was false and untrue, he has failed to demonstrate to this Tribunal
exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such fallacy and untruth obtain. This case has resolved itself
into a question of who among the witness at the trial were telling the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves in a
better position to answer that than the trial judge who had his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair,
correct and just conclusion. While we have merely the records to guide Us by, the trial judge saw the witnesses,
heard them speak, watched them move. He was, therefore, in the far advantageous position of being able to
discriminate more competently than Us the prevaricators among the witnesses from those who testified the truth.
Consequently, as the evidence on record sufficiently attest to the findings of the lower court, We shall not disturb
the same.
The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between the actual commission of the crime
charged and the filing of the same in the trial court — a period of 21 months — attests to the unreliability of the
prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified for the government did actually witness the
defendant commit the murder, they would have forthwith reported the incident to the authorities and this case
would have been filed sooner. It is vigorously impressed on Us that the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case
for the prosecution.
We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised. Although it is true that undue delay in the
prosecution of criminal actions speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's claim, the same observation cannot
be made where the delay or inaction, long though it may be, was imposed on the government by causes over
which it has no control. In the premises and as explained by the Solicitor General's Office, "the incident took place
15 days before the last military operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected were in the grip of fear and
felt no other than for their personal safety. The witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of what they
knew against Kamlon in the hope, however, that with the military operations about to be set afoot, retributive
justice would catch up with Kamlon and his henchmen that they might perish in the battle."
The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the defendant that, by the doctrine enunciated
in the cases of People v. Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v. Geronimo, 53 O.G. No. 1, p. 68, "the trial
court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping with murder in spite of the fact that said acts of violence
were committed in furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in this latter crime."
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the defendant's claim that acts of
violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez and Geronimo,
supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime
of rebellion and not sedition.
Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule of stare decisis, We deem ourselves
unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, and People v. Umali,
G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this Court held:
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against
public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of
individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills
any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law however
nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses com nomine different, but the allegations
in the body of the information are different. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous
uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of
 62

hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the
city of Manila; that gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally
and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical
injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could not have been
convicted of these crimes under the first information. (Emphasis supplied)
And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the government's theory that the crime committed was
rebellion complexed with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, but rather sedition and the said
common crimes, We proceeded to convict the defendants therein of the said crime of sedition and the common
crimes of murder, frustrated murder, etc. The dispositive portion of this last cited case read: "In conclusion, we
find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. . . ."
Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc.
as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.
In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the herein defendant missed a very
significant point. When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed by
"rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the rebellion were specifically
charged in the information and, for that reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for
political ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes
no allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary,
the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by personal
vengeance."
There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of record before this Tribunal hands down Its
judgment on appeal. The defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had been convicted for
rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance
of Sulu. Soon after his conviction, however, he was extended a conditional pardon by the late President Elpidio
Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the pardon, namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the
nearest constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the authorities in the surrender of
firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow himself to be visited by any authority of the Government and allow him
to question him freely; and (4) that he would cooperate with the Government in the surrender and apprehension of
wanted persons in Luuk.
Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon brazenly violated the same. He did not only
fail to report regularly to the authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate government agents
from visiting and questioning him. It was these lawlessness and defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted
into the various criminal prosecutions enumerated at the start of this decision, including this one on appeal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the findings and judgment of the lower court. The crime
committed is kidnapping complexed with murder. We find the death penalty as well as the indemnity in the amount
of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law and affirm the same with costs against the defendant.

Art. 140. Penalty for sedition. — The leader of a sedition shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos.
Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine
not exceeding 5,000 pesos. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).

Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not
exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of
sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end,
or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines,
or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or
who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Elements
1. That the offender does not take direct part in the crime of sedition
2. That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners or other
representations tending to the same end.

Different acts of inciting to sedition

 63

1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace.

Uttering seditious words

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. ISAAC PEREZ

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a
discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of
times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing
for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is,
What crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully
and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-
General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following phrases:
"Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can
saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself,
must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the
defense. According to the first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what
Perez said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has
recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary,
he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained independence
and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a
written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the
first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off
the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which
the accused participated. But they endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo
Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the
Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that
what he wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. On the
witness stand, he stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in
power but do not take into account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls
everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the
Filipinos will install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the
information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused
should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having been
infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is
addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in
force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was charged with having uttered
the following language: "To hell with the President of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was
prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial,
the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having published an article
reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr.
Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was abrogated
completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members
holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation,
abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of
 64

article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found
this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must bow with as
good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal
Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and must be
enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels,
constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and
the Libel Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code, it is our
opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition
Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to defame,
abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather
against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses
created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of
sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it
does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the
freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the
intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed
to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence
of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs.
Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like
the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of
affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the
attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The
Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The
Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed
on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall
print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order
of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an
act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb
the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be
ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect,
responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by
the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that described by the facts stated
in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver
offense than that designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the
information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
 65

The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law, and will,
we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is justified when it is
recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an
outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles removes the slightest
doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression of this
court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous
in their character that they suggest the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and
become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our own sense of humor is
not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the
embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with
firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a
violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it
being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer
2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.

Uttering seditious speech

PEOPLE VS. NABONG
G.R. No. L-36426 November 3, 1932
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija,
finding the appellant, Ignacio Nabong, guilty of the offense of sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended
by Act No. 1692, and sentencing him to pay a fine of two hundred pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and requiring him to pay the costs.
The appellant is an attorney engaged in the practice of law at Cabanatuan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija;
and shortly before the incident with which we are here concerned, he had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo
against a charge of sedition that had been preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of
the communists in Nueva Ecija, and was related by marriage to the appellant. In the latter part of January, 1931,
one Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in the Philippine Islands, died in the municipality of Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija, and a necrological service in his memory was appointed by his followers to be held at Santa Rosa on
the evening of January 30. The fact that said meeting was to be held came to the attention of Major Silvino
Gallardo, in charge of the Philippine Constabulary in Cabanatuan, and he was informed that the red flag would be
displayed in this meeting as an emblem of the communists. Major Gallardo accordingly had an interview with the
provincial fiscal over the question whether the display of the flag should be prevented. The fiscal gave an opinion to
the effect that the display of the red flag would be unlawful, and a copy of his opinion to this effect was placed in
the hands of Major Gallardo. As Major Gallardo left the court-house, he met the appellant Nabong, and knowing the
relation between the latter and Feleo, the leader of the communists in that province, Major Gallardo requested
Nabong to interfere and prevent the display of the red flag at the meeting referred to. At this interview a copy of
the fiscal's opinion was exhibited to Nabong and was read by him in the presence of various persons. After
perusing the opinion Nabong said that he did not agree with the conclusion of the fiscal; and he, therefore, refused
to accompany the Constabulary officers and the deputy provincial fiscal to Santa Rosa, stating that, if he were to
go there, he would tell the communists that no law prohibited the display of the red flag and that he would induce
them to display the same. He added that, if the communist were forbidden to use the flag, a disturbance would
probably result.
The Constabulary officers, accompanied by the deputy fiscal Villamor, then departed for Santa Rosa. On
their way they met Juan Feleo. In the interview that followed, Feleo was shown the opinion of the fiscal and he was
requested to refrain from displaying the red flag at the meeting in Santa Rosa. Feleo promised to comply with this
request, at least until he should have discussed the matter with the communist leaders in Manila.
Although Nabong, as above stated, had refused to accompany Major Gallardo and his companions on their
trip to Santa Rosa, he waited a while at Cabanatuan and afterwards left for Santa Rosa, arriving in time to
participate in the meeting. At this meeting the red flag was displayed, contrary to the promise that Feleo had made
to Major Gallardo; and upon learning of this fact, Major Gallardo, accompanied by several Constabulary officers and
soldiers, repaired to the place in Santa Rosa where the meeting was being held. Upon arrival they found Feleo
making a speech, and inasmuch as some of his utterances appeared to be of a seditious nature, Major Gallardo
caused him to be arrested and removed from the place. At the same time the red flag which was being displayed
on the platform was removed. Words spoken by Feleo on this occasion became the subject of prosecution in People
vs. Feleo, G. R. No. 36428. 1
The arrest and removal of Feleo resulted in disorder among the people present at the meeting, and Major
Gallardo found it advisable to make a short speech explaining why Feleo had been arrested. Then, seeing Nabong
present, Major Gallardo told him that the disturbance would have been avoided if he (Nabong) had followed the
suggestion made to him at Cabanatuan by Major Gallardo. Nabong replied that the communists had consulted him
and that he had advised them to display the flag inasmuch as the act was not prohibited by any law.
After Feleo had been arrested and taken away, the proceedings at the meeting were continued, and Jacinto
Manahan spoke to the crowd. He was followed by Ignacio Nabong who delivered a speech in Tagalog, occupying
some twenty minutes of time. In the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary,
using words substantially to the following effect:
 66

They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because they
shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. — In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that
abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use
your whip so that there may be marks on their sides.
While Nabong was talking his words were attentively listened to by deputy fiscal Villamor, as well as Captain
Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo, all of whom understood the Tagalog language. At the same time Captain Cacdac
and Lieutenant Arambulo took notes of the substance of this part of the speech. Major Gallardo himself was also
attentive to what was said, and from time to time, in the course of the speech, the major asked fiscal Villamor
whether the language then being used was seditious. An affirmative answer to these questions was not given by
the fiscal until that part of the speech was reached which contained the words above quoted, and after those words
had been spoken Nabong was arrested.
The proof in our opinion shows beyond reasonable doubt that the language imputed to the appellant was
used by him; and this is corroborated by the circumstance that the appellant, upon the occasion of a meeting of
the Nueva Ecija Bar Association in connection with this charge against Nabong, admitted having advocated in Santa
Rosa the overthrow of the Government. Such advocacy by the defendant is confirmed by the testimony of Amado
Estonilo, a witness for the defense.
The testimony for the defense tends to show that Nabong went to Santa Rosa for the purpose of preventing
a disturbance, and that upon arrival in Santa Rosa he attempted to prevail upon Feleo not to display the red flag.
The proof for the defense further suggests that Nabong is well affected to the Government and that the language
used by him was not intended to advocate the overthrow of the Government by force. The trial court seems to
have attached little weight to this line of proof, and we are of the opinion that in this no error was committed.
The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it
should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word
"overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective
franchise. The use of the whip, an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent
with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us impute to the language. It was the purpose of the
speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The
words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of
the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested
and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the order of the Government, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, as amended. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact
result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order. As was said by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652, 669), "Such utterances, by their very
nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace
and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a
given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen."
The question of the seditious character of the language imputed in the information to the appellant was
raised by demurrer to the information, but the demurrer was overruled and the defendant was required to plead.
There was no error in the action thus taken by the trial court.
It is suggested in the appellant's brief that the provisions of our law relating to sedition are incompatible
with that portion of section 3 of the Jones Law which declares that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press, but the appellant's brief does not contain any argument tending to support this suggestion.
At any rate the point is not well taken. The acts contemplated in the provisions of law relating to sedition are not
protected by the constitutional provision, being abuses rather than the exercise of the right of speech and of the
use of the press. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which
is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U. S., 652,
666.) lawphil.net
With respect to the penalty appropriate to this case, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in not
imposing upon the appellant imprisonment for a period of six months in addition to the fine of P200. In reaching
this conclusion we bear in mind the fact that the appellant is a lawyer by profession, and by reason of his
intelligence and education, as well as by the obligation of his office as a lawyer, it was his duty to exercise his
influence in support of the State. Instead of this he appears to have made the cause of Feleo and other
communistic agitators his own. In particular, it is proved that the display of the red flag upon the occasion referred
to was due to his advice. In taking this position and uttering the seditious words which he is proved to have used,
the appellant violated not only the written law but his oath of office as an attorney.
The act which is the subject of this prosecution was committed prior to the coming into effect of the Revised
Penal Code; but the penalty provided for this offense in article 142 in relation with article 139 of said Code is
greater than that imposed by the trial court, and by this court, under section 8 of Act No. 292. It results that
nothing beneficial to the appellant is revealed in the new Code.
It being understood, therefore, that the penalty of imprisonment for six months is imposed upon the
appellant in addition to the fine, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
 67

Scurrilous Libel
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951
OSCAR M. ESPUELAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against
the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a
violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the
end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers
and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which
letter or note in hereunder reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I
don't need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I
still have the right to burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the
administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the
Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the
world with this dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So,
I sacrificed my own self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the Free
Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one
Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto
Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition
to remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the
people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a
breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am.
Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in
England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the
ministers of state, the courts of justice, must be recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and
to be defended and treated with an established and well-nigh unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions
has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness
predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each
fiery invective, each burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository,
for the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is sedition.
And yet within there is ample room and verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures
in the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild
criticism of the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments grew to be more representative, the
laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression strife continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our
own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the seditious libel
amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of intolerance constraining the free
expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring
intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action-such legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism
presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must be applied.
 68

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the
freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without
responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition have
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes. 5
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit his criticism to
the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such
criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of
the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the
government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the
government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or
commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities.
It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant
would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it
seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with
the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use
irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free
speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and
his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against
any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to
the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were
naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. 6
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people
against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. 7
Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8
"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a
person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of
disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted
authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and
the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted
authorities cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the
Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless
depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on lawlessness, rebellion and
anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put
under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to
the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended
by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government
from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of
appeals conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least
members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion
clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with several persons in a public place uttered
theses words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to the them Governor-General,
Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of
the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice
Malcolm probably of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is
the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States and other
high office, under form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to
invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech
and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used,
which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the
penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Art. 143. Act tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies. — The penalty of prision
correccional or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or
fraud, prevents the meeting of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its committees or
 69

subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or
municipal council or board. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Elements
1. That there be a projected or actual meeting of the National Assembly or any of its committees or
subcommittees, constitutional committees or divisions thereof, or any provincial board or city or municipal council
or board.
2. That the offender who may be any person prevents such meeting by force or fraud.
Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who disturbs the meetings of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of
any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any
provincial board or city or municipal council or board, or in the presence of any such bodies should behave in such
manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Elements
1. That there must be a meeting of the National Assembly or any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional committees or divisions thereof, or any provincial board or city or municipal council or board.
2. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He disturbs any of such meetings
b. He behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to
impair the respect due it.

Art. 146. Illegal assemblies. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period shall be imposed upon the organizers or leaders of any meeting attended by armed persons for the
purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under this Code, or of any meeting in which the audience is
incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in
authority or his agents. Persons merely present at such meeting shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, unless
they are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision correccional.
If any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm, it shall be presumed that the purpose of said
meeting, insofar as he is concerned, is to commit acts punishable under this Code, and he shall be considered a
leader or organizer of the meeting within the purview of the preceding paragraph.
As used in this article, the word "meeting" shall be understood to include a gathering or group, whether in a fixed
place or moving. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

What are illegal assemblies?

1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the
Code

Requisites
(1) That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving;
(2) That the meeting is attended by armed persons;
(3) That the purpose of the meeting is to commit any of the crimes punishable under the Code.

2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason,
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or assault upon a person in authority or his agents.

Requisites
(1) That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving;
(2) That the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition or direct assault.
Art. 147. Illegal associations. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon the founders, directors, and presidents of associations totally or
partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under this Code or for some
purpose contrary to public morals. Mere members of said associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Illegal association distinguished from illegal assembly

Illegal Assembly Illegal Association
Necessary that there is an actual meeting or assembly or armed Not necessary that there be an actual meeting
persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes
punishable under this Code; or of individuals who, although not
armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion,
sedition, or assault upon a person in authority or his agent
It is the meeting an attendance at such meeting that are It is the act of forming or organizing and
punished. membership in the association that are
 70

punished.

Persons liable: Persons liable

1) organizers or leaders of the meeting 1) founders, directors and president
2) persons present at the meeting 2) members

Other illegal means for the purpose of placing such government or political subdivision under the control and
domination of any alien power; AND
3. Taking up arms against the Government, the offender being a member of the Communist Party or of any
subversive association.

Art. 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition,
or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos, when the assault
is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed.

Two ways of committing the crime of direct assault

1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition

Elements
1. That the offender employs force or intimidation
2. That the aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the
crime of sedition
3. that there is no public uprising

2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force or by seriously intimidating or by seriously

resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on occasion of such performance

Elements of 2nd form of direct assault

1. That the offender a) makes an attack, b) employs force, c) makes a serious intimidation, or d)makes a serious
resistance
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agents
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent a) is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or that he is assaulted b) by reason of the past performance of official duties
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties
5. That there is no public uprising

Who is a person in authority?

• Any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman are included.
• “directly vested with jurisdiction” – the power or authority to govern and execute the laws

Who is an agent of a person in authority?

• An agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as a barrio vice-lieutenant, barrio councilman and barrio policeman and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority.

2 kinds of direct assault

1. simple assault
2. qualified assault

Direct assault is qualified

1. when the assault is committed with a weapon
2. when the offender is a public officer or employee
3. when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority
 71

COMPLEX CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WITH MURDER

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996
PEOPLE VS. TIBURCIO ABALOS
In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct
assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of
unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the criminal incident narrated by the
sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant's guilt of
the offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.
An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to
herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations —
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a
person in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood,
which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly
appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the
occasion of such performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of
said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both
ears and nose" which wound directly caused his death.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was present. 1
At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 2 The
trial conducted thereafter culminated in the decision 3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding appellant guilty
as charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages
in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. 4
As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar,
appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then the
day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near
the house of appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty
of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the residence of appellant.
According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his
employees in his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day. While
Major Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just
let them take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument
between father and son. 5
While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-aringasa." meaning,
"Police officer, help us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the
scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face
him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two
inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle.
He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired
from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant
struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray bullets 6 should a gunfight ensue.
Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece of
wood during the incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being
attacked by a member of the New People's Army (NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated inside their
family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay
Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant's father
had just arrived from a trip from Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.
The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were grappling for
possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from
Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to
the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had
companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his victim the following morning, he
forthwith surrendered to the authorities. 7
As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by appellant was roundly
rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the
trial court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the defense; (b) in believing the evidence
presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on the prosecution's evidence which falls short of the required
quantum of evidence that would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the commission of the
 72

crime and failing to credit in appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness
for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility,
particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution
should have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to
corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite
a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these,
unfortunately, are flawed arguments.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive
testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any
showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against
appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. 9 There was thus no need, as appellant would want the
prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be
corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons
to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up to the
People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the
necessity for such testimony. 11 Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering
that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to
testify regarding her husband's slaying. 12
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather
preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police
officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only
to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and
unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a long-time
resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which,
by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a
couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses
provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants.
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony
which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant
considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under
the same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that
worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt
while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the lights in the area
at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's
pretense. Appellant's testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given
not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.
Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that
he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and
that it was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and
there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police
(INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of
retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed
with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with
no weight in law.
On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for
the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad
o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to
rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more
common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the
offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the
said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. 16
Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a
person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that he
was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and
order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a
policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred
 73

appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to
assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the
complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of
murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind
while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant
deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that
purpose.
Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a
policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's
voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court would have been inconsequential.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that
context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At
all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua due
to the then existing proscription against the imposition of the death penalty. 20
However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is erroneous, as the
same should properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of
the victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should
be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the judgment of the court
a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.

The crime of slight physical injuries absorbed in direct assault

PEOPLE VS. ACIERTO
G.R. No. L-36595 November 28, 1932
This is an appeal taken by the accused Leon Acierto from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, convicting him of the crime of assault upon a public officer, defined and punished in article 251, in
connection with the last paragraph of article 250 of the old Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, and sentencing him two years, eleven months, and
eleven days of prision correccional, a fine of 1,000 pesetas, the accessory penalties of the law, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50, and the costs of the prosecution.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo
in its decision, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the accused-appellant Leon Acierto acted in self-defense in preventing
or repelling with his fists, the unlawful attack begun by the alleged offended party, Hipolito Velasco.
2. The lower court also erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of assault upon a public officer,
defined and punished in article 251 of the Penal code in connection with the last paragraph of article 250 hereof.
3. Lastly, the lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant, Leon Acierto, of all criminal liability for the
crime with which he was charged.
The prosecution attempted to prove the following facts:
At about 10 o'clock on the morning of March 2, 1931, while the offended party, Hipolito Velasco, duly
appointed postmaster for the municipality of Bacarra, Province of Ilocos Norte, was in his office situated in the
municipal building, counting two rolls of twenty-peso bills amounting in all to P4,000, the accused, Leon Acierto,
entered the office without the postmaster's noticing it, and stood behind him. Without saying a word, the accused
took one of the rolls, but the postmaster caught hold of his hand and took away the money, saying: "Get out of
here, Lawyer, because we have plenty of work". The defendant moved away towards the north, and the
postmaster, believing he had gone, began to count the money again; but the accused came back to his side, and
as he did not want to be disturbed, he put the money in the safe, took the key to the office, and as he was going
towards the door, said to the accused: "Be so good as to leave now, Lawyer". The other answered: "I don't want
to. You may close it". He said this with his hands in his trouser's pockets, and was walking about the room. When
he came to the door of the office, the postmaster again told the accused: "Be so good as to leave now, Lawyer".
The accused gave the same answer. For the third time the offended party said to the defendant: "Go away now,"
and the latter answered: "I don't want to leave." Displeased with this answer, the offended party approached the
defendant quietly, and took hold of his left hand to conduct him outside. Whereupon the lawyer hit him in the right
eye with his fist, leaving him stunned, and making him lose his balance. When he recovered, the accused again hit
him, first in the right frontal region, and then below the left eye. The offended party shouted for help, and a
member of the municipal police, as well as his office companions, came up. As a result of the blows he had
sustained, the offended party suffered an ecchymosis in the orbit of the left eye, and another in the frontal region,
which took seven days to heal completely.
Testifying in his own behalf, the accused said that on the morning of March 2, 1931, he had gone to the
post office of Bacarra to collect his correspondence, and approached the postmaster, the offended party herein,
Hipolito Velasco, who was counting bank bills on his table, and being close friend, he gave him one or two little
slaps on the back; that as the man paid no attention, he slapped the table; that the postmaster then got up angrily
 74

and said: "Don't you come around with your jokes; I may stick a knife into you." The accused was hurt by this
taunt, and began to walk away. The postmaster then got up, put the papers in the safe, and when the accused was
already within two meters of the door, passed by him and blocked his way, and said with a gesture of threat: "Get
out, you, I say." That as the accused would not budge, he rushed at him, caught his right arm, and pushed him
forward, giving him a blow on the right temple; that the accused then returned the blow, giving rise to a fist fight
between the two until a policeman came and separated them, and took them outside the hall; that the offended
party had not told him to leave his office or was he answered in the manner attributed to him.
The trial court, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, gave more credit to the testimony for the
prosecution than that for the defense. There is no doubt that in spite of his intimacy with the offended party, the
accused had no right to enter the latter's office and disturb him while in the performance of his duty, counting
money he had received from Manila. But taking into account the circumstances of the case and the friendship
between the two, it may be supposed that the defendant was joking, and the offended party happened to be in
irritable mood, on account of the work he had, and it degenerated into a real fight, having been provoked by the
herein accused.
The court a quo found the accused guilty of the crime of assault upon a public officer, defined and punished
in article 251, in connection with the last paragraph of article 250, of the old Penal Code. The Attorney-General
considers the act to constitute two crimes: assault upon an agent of authority, defined in article 249, paragraph 2,
and punished in the last paragraph of article 250 of the Penal Code; and slight physical injuries, defined and
punished in article 587 of the same code.
The first question to decide in the present appeal is whether one offended party, Hipolito Velasco, as
postmaster of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, who was discharging his duties at the time of the assault, is merely a public
officer, or is an agent of authority besides.
In People vs. Ramos (p. 462, ante), by Justice Imperial, it was held:lawphil.net
From the above-quoted provisions of law we believe it may be deduced that the provincial treasurer is a
person in authority within the province where he exercises his jurisdiction, and that the municipal treasurer, being
his deputy ex officio, is an agent of authority, and not a person in authority, as this word is employed in the Penal
Code under which the information against the appellant was filed.
The postmaster of a municipality is an agent of the Director of Posts, and as such is in charge of the custody
of the Government funds that come into his hands by virtue of the transactions with the public in postal matters,
telegrams, savings bank, and so forth, and like a municipal treasurer is an agent of a person in authority in
addition to being a public officer, inasmuch as the Director of Posts is a person in authority who by law exercises
jurisdiction of his own in postal and telegraphic matters.
Since the offended party, Hipolito Velasco was an agent of a person in authority when he was attacked, the
defendant herein having laid hands upon him, the crime of which the latter is guilty is assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, defined and punished in the last paragraph of article 250, in connection with paragraph 2 of
article 249 of the Penal Code, the penalty fixed by law being prision correccional in the minimum and medium
degrees, and a fine not less than 375 pesetas or more than 3,750 pesetas, and this penalty must be imposed in
the medium degree because there is no modifying circumstance present.
The same offense is punished in article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty fixed being that of
prision correccional in the minimum degree, and a fine not exceeding P500 which is less severe than the penalty
prescribed by the old Penal Code for the same crime, and in accordance with article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the accused not being an habitual criminal, the penalty provided by article 148 above-mentioned must be
imposed.
With regard to the physical injuries sustained by the offended party from the attack, they, being light in
character are to be considered as inherent in the, assault, for it cannot be supposed that in laying hands upon a
person, no harm or injury will be caused.lawphi1.net
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a postmaster is an agent of
a person in authority; and (2) that the slight physical injuries sustained by such an agent as a result of the
defendant's laying hands upon him, are inherent in the offense of assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused-appellant is held to be guilty of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, and sentenced to suffer one year, one month, and eleven days of
prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus costs. So
ordered.

Art. 149. Indirect assaults. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any
person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of any of the crimes
defined in the next preceding article.

Elements
1. That a person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault
2. That a person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent
3. That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person coming to the aid of the authority or his
agent
 75

Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being
included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the
agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor
or a fine ranging from 10 to P100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.

Elements of resistance and serious disobedience

1. That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to
the offender
2. That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent
3. That the act of the offender is not included in the provisions of Article 148-150

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as such. — In
applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall
be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in
authority. (As amended by PD No. 299, Sept. 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).

G.R. No. 109617 August 11, 1997

PEOPLE VS. FELIPE SION, ET. AL.
In its decision 1 in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but promulgated on 8 February 1993,
Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Murder pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in
view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the two accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify
jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu are ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the
victim the sum of P11,910.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Felipe Sion alias "Junior," whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. 2 (hereafter appellant Sion), and Federico
Disu alias "Miguel" (hereafter appellant Disu), seasonably appealed therefrom to this Court 3 in view of the penalty
imposed. 4
The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint for Murder 5 on 19 November 1991
in Criminal Case No. 2141 (SP-91) before the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto in the
Province of Pangasinan. Charged with appellants therein were Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet,"
and "four (4) other John Does." After appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of said court issued
a warrant for the arrest of the accused with no bail fixed for their temporary liberty. 6 However, the warrant was
served only on appellant Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu's motion for bail, to
which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr., recommended that bail be fixed at P40,000.00 for said
accused only, the court fixed said accused's bail at such amount; and upon filing and approval of the bail bond,
appellant Disu was ordered released. 7 Subsequently, one Atty. Fernando Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused,
a motion to reduce the bail from P40,000.00 to
P20,000.00. 8 As Provincial Prosecutor Dumlao agreed to a reduction of P10,000.00, the court granted the motion
and fixed bail at P30,000.00. None of them, however, filed a bail bond.
For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, finding
probable cause against all the accused for the crime of murder on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution,
ordered the transmittal of the record of the case, including the bail bond of accused Federico Disu, to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan for appropriate action. 9
On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias
"Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the
crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
stones and a bladed weapon conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with
 76

treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack
and stab Fernando Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries:
— stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid axillary area slanting upwards
hitting the left lobe of the lung
— stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2, inch in depth
— stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left
— contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow
which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned to Branch 44 thereof.
On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the RTC annulled and voided the bail
earlier granted to appellant Disu by the MCTC Judge Sergio Garcia for luck of proper hearing, denied the motion for
bail filed by appellant Sion, and ordered their detention in jail. 12
Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded against them only. Upon arraignment, both
pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial. 13
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the wife of the victim, respectively;
Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health Officer; Rosendo Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay Binday;
and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witness appellant Disu; appellant Sion;
Corazon Sion, wife of appellant Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its witnesses is partly summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee, as follows:
On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of
his house situated in Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo
Manuel (p. 6, TSN, August 20, 1992) when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon (p. 7, TSN, id.). On that same occasion,
Fernando Abaoag also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are making trouble again." The
latter answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe
Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me. (p. 8, TSN, id.). Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon
appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing stones but before they
desisted and left, one of them uttered "even you Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of
your mother, you Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag
whose nickname is Andong.
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside his house lying
down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his brother Fernando. He went out to
see who were throwing stones (14, TSN, id.). When already near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw
his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of
stone throwers, hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back
towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his direction. On the other
hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando,
first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below
the jaw (pp. 18-19, TSN, id.).
Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which landed on his right side
below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions saying, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar
desisted in helping brother (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.). Instead, he ran to his brother's house and informed Felicitas, the
wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.). Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied
by Carlos Abaoag, went to the place of the incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only saw her
husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened,
Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992). Fernando told his
wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.)
The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN,
August 20, 1992).
Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian, Pangasinan conducted post mortem examination
(Exh. A) on the body of the victim. The result of his findings showed that Fernando Abaoag sustained the following
injuries, to wit:
1) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11, ICS, mid axillary area slanting upwards
hitting the left lobe of the lung
2) stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 inch in depth
3) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left
4) contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow. 14
Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-pointed instrument, possibly a dagger,
with the first wound hitting the lower lobe of the left lung causing severe bleeding and its eventual collapse. He
determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds. 15
Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando Gatchalian, on the night of the incident, found a
small bolo and a bloodied double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene of the crime. 16 Cesar Abaoag
recognized this weapon as the one used by appellant Sion in stabbing the
 77

victim. 17 On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she spent more than P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of
her husband whose death saddened her, she being left alone to take care of their children. 18
In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong 19 Sion and Felix Sion alias "Ellet,"
respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in a stone-throwing incident and "free-for-all
rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one hand, and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the
other. However, he professed his innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who
stabbed the victim. 20 His version of the incident was summarized by the trial court, thus:
On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny Juguilon went to the house of Eling Alcantara as
he wanted to talk with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel was already there when they arrived. While at the place,
Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel came out and started fighting with each other. Ronnie and Manuel ran and
proceeded to the place of his cousin. He was pacifying Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Johnny Juguilon
threw stones at Ronnie Manuel. At this point, Fernando Abaoag intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your
mother Johnny, you are too much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon answered "vulva of your mother
Andoy, do not interfere because you are not our enemy." After the verbal exchange, he took Johnny Juguilon to
their (Sion's) house . . . . At about 9:00 p.m., that same evening, they stoned their house, its sides and the stairs.
He and Idong and Johnny Juguilon looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two
(2) other companions. They were at the place of Marta Soriano. After that, they still threw stones towards them.
There was a free for all rumble between Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, the Abaoags and Idong Sion, and Johnny
Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front of the house of Loly Galdones. He denied the testimony of Cesar Abaoag
that he stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times and before he was stabbed Johnny Juguilon stoned him (Fernando
Abaoag). It was Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. After Fernando Abaoag was
stabbed, they ran away. His group also ran away. He went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon because he
was stabbed. He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and Hospital. He did not report the incident to Barangay
Captain Rosendo Imuslan. On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he presented himself to Kagawad Lagman who brought him
to the Police Station . . . . 21
In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no participation in the killing of
Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16 October 1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing
incidents in question were taking place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his employer, Felicidad
Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the entire day. However, before proceeding home from work that
afternoon, he went to the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of appellant Sion
where he stayed for about five minutes. He only learned about the killing the following morning when he was told
that he was one of the suspects. He was arrested about a month after the incident. 22
On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar asserted that neither his brothers, the
Manuels nor himself threw stones at Sion's house; there was no free-for-all fight between the Sions and the
Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion merely threw stones at, but did not stab, Fernando Abaoag; and it was
only appellant Sion who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. 23
After the conclusion of trial, the court granted appellants' motion to file a memorandum within fifteen days. Despite
the extension given, appellants' counsel did not file the memorandum. Thus, in its order of 11 December 1992, the
trial court declared the case submitted for decision. 24
On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision, 25 the dispositive portion quoted in the introductory
paragraph of this ponencia.
As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:
The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve scant consideration.
Cesar Abaoag narrated in detail how his brother Fernando Abaoag was stoned by accused Johnny Juguilon,
Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how accused Felipe Sion stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar Abaoag
saw Johnny Juguilon throw stone hitting the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother (Fernando
Abaoag) turned left, accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion and Felix Sion simultaneously threw
stones toward him (Fernando Abaoag). Then, at a distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw accused Felipe
Sion stab Fernando Abaoag three times, hitting the left side below the armpit, then on the left waistline and the
right side of the neck below the jaw of the deceased with the use of a sharp double bladed dagger.
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away when he saw the
accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the place of the incident coming
from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, the doctor who conducted
the postmortem examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag. Dr. Manalo stated that "stab wound 1 1/2 inches
in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid-axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung"
is located below the left armpit. The second stab wound, "stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in
width, 1 1/2 in depth," is located at the right side of the nec[k] at the back. The doctor stated that the wounds
were caused possibly by a dagger.
Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag in the presence of Felicitas Abaoag, to wit:
"naalaak, which means, I was hit, take note of this because I cannot survive these injuries of mine". Fernando
Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-
12 tsn July 27, 1992). This is a dying declaration because it was made under a consciousness of impending death
(Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court). 26
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the prosecution, thus:
 78

As stated in the decision, accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone, hitting the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and
Edong Sion, Felix Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu simultaneously threw stones upon the deceased, while accused
Felipe Sion alias "Junior" stabbed him (victim) three times, resulting in the latter's death. 27
It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the "attack was so
sudden that the victim had no time to defend himself" and (b) the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty
because "there were three stab wounds" and the first wound — which "caused severe bleeding and collapse of the
lung" and the death of Fernando Abaoag — "was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other wounds which are
unnecessary for its commission." 28 It did not, however, appreciate evident premeditation for lack of "substantial"
evidence; 29 nor give the benefit of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion since his surrender was merely
"forced by circumstances," as he "presented himself to Kagawad Lagman because he was suspected as one of the
persons who stabbed the victim." 30
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. 31
In their eight-page Appellant's Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, 32 appellants plead for their
acquittal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in convicting them of murder; (2) in taking into account the
aggravating circumstance of cruelty; (3) in ruling that conspiracy was established; (4) in not appreciating the
presence of voluntary surrender; and (5) in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and
Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag.
In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification made of them by prosecution witnesses.
They claim that if witness Cesar Abaoag actually saw appellant Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have
immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of this fact. Cesar's failure was then unusual and
unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's testimony on her husband's alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as
far as the assailant's identities were concerned because the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without
identifying appellant Sion as the one who stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five (5)
accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility." Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were limited
to relatives of the victims; "other vital witnesses" — such as Marta Soriano, Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara —
should have been presented to corroborate the "biased" testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.
Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the stabbing of the victim was not "sudden"; (2)
cruelty was not proven because "there is no clear testimony" that the first stab wound was fatal and the second
and third wounds were "unnecessary"; (3) conspiracy cannot be deduced from the mere fact that all the accused
threw stones at the victim before the stabbing; (4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered even before the police
started investigating the case when he was not yet a suspect; and (5) appellant Sion could not have testified that it
was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim if such were not true, considering that the former is
his brother and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant Sion bore no grudge against the victim and did not
escape.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the Appellee, supports the trial court's findings
and conclusions, except as to the appreciation of cruelty, which it concedes to be erroneous.
Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties convinces us that prosecution witness
Cesar Abaoag positively identified appellants as being present during the incident in question and saw appellant
Sion stab the victim thrice. As correctly found by the trial court:
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away when he saw the
accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the place of the incident coming
from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing stones at the victim. He was
definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit the victim at the left eyebrow. The
three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at the left eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by
Juguilon jibed with the post mortem findings of Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow as
"contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow." 33 If Cesar had any ulterior motive to testify against appellant
Disu, he could have declared that it was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then
honestly narrated what he observed.
That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion who stabbed her husband, was not
proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar was absent from the crime when it was committed. Cesar's presence was
admitted by appellant Sion himself on direct examination, thus:
Q Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when you said he was stabbed by
Johnny Juguilon and Idong Sion?
A Yes, sir. 34
Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform Felicitas of this fact. At that time, Cesar
himself was running away from the accused who had hit him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get
someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was scared of accused Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who
was a "notorious" character in their neighborhood. 35 It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the
perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness nor destroy its
probative value. 36 In any event, in his sworn statement 37 which was submitted on 22 October 1991 before
Judge Sergio Garcia, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion and Disu as among the
perpetrators of the crime.
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the declaration made by the victim
to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly characterized this as a "dying declaration," 38 having been
made under the consciousness of impending death. The victim was already weak his wife saw him and he knew
 79

that he would not survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the
hospital. 39 When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries and
that he did not expect to live, thus:
Q What happened next after that when you met your husband?
A Immediately asked him what happened to him.
Q And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag?
A He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit.
COURT:
Q Did you ask him why he said "naalaak"?
A He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
Q What do you mean by word "naalaak"?
A I was hit.
COURT:
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:
Q Do you know the reason why he was hit?
A What I understand is that in the course of his pacifying the trouble between his nephew and the rest, he was
stabbed, sir.
Q Aside from the statement of your husband Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else did he say, if you know?
A He said, take note of this because I know I cannot survive with these injuries of mine.
COURT:
Q What else did he tell you aside from that?
A He said, remember that in case I cannot survive with the injuries that I sustained, the men who stabbed me are
Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion, sir. 40 (emphasis supplied)
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying declaration under
Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that
fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the
declaration relates to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would
have been competent to testify had he survived. 41 Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death renders
impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the
crime; and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of
this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth. 42 We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations
of her husband.
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution witnesses were biased due to their
relation to the victim's family. Plainly, witnesses Imuslan (the barangay captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related
to the victim, while the relationship of witnesses Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas Abaoag to the victim, as brother and
wife, respectively, neither disqualified them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not
to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of
a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A witness' relationship to a
victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the same more credible as it would be
unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
44
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as those mentioned by the appellants,
fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that the decision as whom to present as witnesses for the
prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case and the non-presentation of
certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense. 45 The prosecution is not obliged to present all
possible witnesses, especially if their testimony will only serve to corroborate that of another eyewitness'
testimony, in which case the former may every well be dispensed with considering that the testimony of a single
witness, if credible and positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, would suffice. 46
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion's defense that it was not he who stabbed the victim, but his brother
Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, both of whom fled after the incident. Constituting a mere denial of Cesar
Abaoag's positive testimony that it was appellant Sion who stabbed the victim, such must fail in light of the settled
rule of evidence that positive testimony is stronger that negative testimony. 47 Moreover, the claim was made
rather late in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity. From the time that appellant Sion presented himself
to Kagawad Lagman and the police authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent incarceration, he
never told anyone nor made any statement that he was not one who stabbed the victim; he did not even so inform
his close relatives, not even his wife who visited him in jail. 48 Also, during the preliminary investigation, when he
had the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and other evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to
dispute the statements of Felicitas and Cesar Abaoag identifying him and detailing his participation in the crime. 49
He raised this claim for the first time only during his testimony in court almost one (1) year after the stabbing
incident and his initial surrender, and notably, only after the hope of apprehending Idong Sion and Johnny
Juguilon, together with the other accused, already seemed remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the
information as soon as he was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a vital matter hardly inspire
belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of men and common experience.
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That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny Juguilon, neither proved his innocence. Non-
flight — unlike flight of an accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt — is simply inaction which may be due
to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an indication of innocence. 50
Appellant Sion's claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando Abaoag was belied and contradicted by his
admission in court that just before the stabbing of the victim, he and his co-accused hurled stones at and fought
with the Abaoags, including Fernando, whom he blamed for allegedly stoning his house. 51 It is also belied by his
actuation and utterance made earlier in the evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando Abaoag interfered in the
quarrel between appellant Sion and Fernando's nephew, Ronnie Manuel, which prompted appellant Sion and
Johnny Juguilon to curse and warn Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you are interfering, you
are siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have also your day . . . . you Abaoags." 52 Appellant Sion also
admitted that he "had an ill-feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel, the victim's nephew, because "he was making
trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the incident." 53
In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must fail.
It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot prevail over and is
worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that an accused perpetrated the crime. 54
We are unable to discern any plausible reason, and appellant Disu does not offer any, why he should be falsely
implicated by Cesar Abaoag and mentioned in the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim' assailants, if
appellant Disu was not actually present during the incident and had no participation in the commission of the
crime. As to his motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu claims that he had no misunderstanding with Fernando
Abaoag or his family. 55 However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu was close to the Sion clan, which
explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and joined the Sions and Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico
Disu was Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for five (5) months, the latter teaching the former how to drive for three (3)
months; and when Disu became a driver himself, they had the same route and saw each other every day at the
poblacion. 56 Disu even admitted that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he "dropped by" the house of Felipe
Sion, which he often did before. 57
We now rule on the presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 58 Direct proof of a previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose design, concerted
action and community of interest. 59 Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. 60
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay road of Binday, near the houses of
Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when Fernando Abaoag, who was looking for the persons who just stoned his
house several times, and Cesar Abaoag, arrived. Immediately, Johnny Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting
him on the left eyebrow; then, Edong, and Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones, also at
Fernando. As Fernando turned away from his assailants, appellant Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3)
times, even as the latter raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag tried to help his
brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone. Appellant Sion then commanded his
companions to also kill Cesar, prompting the latter to run away. Then the assailants fled, leaving behind a small
bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably manifested a community of interest and unity of
purpose and design to take Fernando Abaoag's life.
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellant's claim, through the testimony of appellant Sion, that the
fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was a result of a "free-for-all rumble," thereby possibly tempering their liability
to that of causing death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, which carries a penalty
lower than that for homicide. 61 In this case, it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal
stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected.
Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now rule on the circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime.
In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which was likewise alleged in the information.
We agree as to the latter as the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of evident premeditation, viz:
(a) the time when appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to
their determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to
reflect upon the consequences of their act. 62
We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Under the
law, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically to ensure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 63 We find no clear and convincing
evidence of treachery. Cesar Abaoag's testimony as to how his brother was attacked lacks sufficient detail showing
conclusively that the mode and manner of the assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless. He merely testified
that when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay road of Binday, he saw Johnny Juguilon stone his
brother and hit him on the left eyebrow. Fernando Abaoag then turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion,
Edong Sion, Miguel Disu and the four (4) other unidentified companions, who then "simultaneously" threw stones
at Fernando. "Seconds later," Cesar saw appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed dagger and stab his
brother three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just standing and said 'I will not fight.'" 64 They
were six (6) meters away from Johnny Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at Fernando which signaled the
other accused to the same. 65
 81

Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim when the attack commenced, and the fact
the three were two (2) waves of stoning which preceded the stabbing of the victim, these should have sufficiently
forewarned him of the greater danger which loomed and prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence
of clear details showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim was entirely helpless
when stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that the attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the
victim entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim was forewarned of the
attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the
deceased completely unaware. 66 Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.
Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty, 67
based solely on the fact that the victim was stabbed thrice, with the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung
causing severe bleeding and its collapse. In fact, appellee concedes this error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be
appreciated in absence of any showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to
suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain; and, the mere fact that
wounds in excess of what was indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body of the victim does
not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and with the intention of deliberately intensifying
the victim's suffering. 68 In the instant case, the evidence only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were
delivered in succession, nothing more.
We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority." 69 Its
requisites are: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. 70 For a surrender to be voluntary, it must
be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1)
because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to
his search and capture. 71
As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion "presented" himself to Kagawad
Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered" him to the police in the poblacion. 72 His admission that
he surrendered because he was already suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his
surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor
inevitable. At the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been issued, the same having
been issued only on 19 November 1991. 73 In fact, he was released from custody after a few days, and was
ordered committed to jail only sometime in June 1992, after his motion for bail was denied by the trial court on 10
June 1992 and was thus taken into custody. 74 This subsequent fact should not diminish nor erase the favorable
effect of Felipe Sion Jr.'s voluntary surrender on 17 October 1991. As has been held, whatever the accused's
reason for surrendering — either the fear of reprisal from victim's relatives or, in this case, his knowledge that he
was already a suspect — "does not gainsay the spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving
himself up, he saved the State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested." 75
We disagree with Appellee's submission that there was no voluntary surrender because appellant Sion surrender to
a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the police authorities, implying that
the former is not a person in authority. 76 This ignores Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
expressly provides, in part, that "[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions . . . ." 77 This law expands the definition of a person in authority under the Revised
Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong
Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the
Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong
Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority. 78
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial
Region in Criminal Case No. D-10796 is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants FELIFE SION, alias "JUNIOR" or FELIFE
RODRIGUEZ, JR., and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
former entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prison
mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum,
and an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum,
with all the accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged judgment stands.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

Section 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the
 82

maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbance of public orders; Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable
to cause disturbance. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause any serious
disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public performances, functions or
gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any disturbance or interruption of a
tumultuous character.
The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more than three persons who are
armed or provided with means of violence.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting, association, or public place,
shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display placards or emblems
which provoke a disturbance of the public order.
The penalty of arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos shall be imposed upon these persons who in
violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body of a person who
has been legally executed.
Inciting to sedition or rebellion distinguished from public disorder
Inciting to Sedition or Rebellion Public Disorder
It is necessary that the offender should have done the act with the If the outcry is more or less unconscious outburst
idea afterthought of inducing his hearers or readers to commit the which, although rebellious or seditious in nature,
crime of rebellion or sedition. is not intentionally calculated to induce others to
commit rebellion or sedition.

G.R. No. L-2578 July 31, 1951

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. LADISLAO BACOLOD
This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double jeopardy.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948. Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an informations
charging him the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed on February 21, 1948 in
Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was arraigned in another case for having caused a public disturbance on
the same date, the second information alleging.
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with deliberate intent, and on the occasion
of a dance held in the municipal tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, did then and there wilfully,
criminally and feloniously cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded
one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the said dance who ran and
scampered in all directions.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of the first
information which for convenience is quoted:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, then a member of the PC patrol, by reckless
imprudence and without taking due care and precautions to avoid damage and injury to the life and property of
other persons, did then and there fire a shoot of the sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back
of right side of her body which physical injury required or will require medical attendance for more than 30 days
but less than 90, and incapacitated or will incapacitate her from performing her customary labor for the same
period of time.
The motion to quash was granted, and the people appealed in due time.
Did the lower court err?
It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant's having fired a sub-machine gun.
The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio thru reckless imprudence. On
the other hand the second information accuses him of having deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a
disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby producing panic among the people present therein. The two
informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other is an offense against
public peace and order.1
The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153 referring to
individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof establishing the first would not establish
the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of firearm, that there was a dance in the
tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the people in attendance became panicky and terrified.
The offenses are not the same although they arose from same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently conviction for
the first does not bar trial for the second.2
A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot is distinct from the
offense of assault and battery.3
 83

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an offense against two
different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which, the other does not an
acquittal or conviction under one does not a bar prosecution under the other.4
It is true that section 9 of Rule 113 prohibits prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, in the former, informations. But it may not be held that the second
offense in this case necessarily included the first, physical injuries is included in a charge of murder. Neither may it
be maintained that every crime of physical injuries necessarily produces such public disorder as is contemplated by
section 153 of the Revised Penal Code. Note especially that the first information did not describe the festal
celebration in which the injuries were inflicted.
It has been suggested that the new Rules of Court modified the above principles, and the precedent of People vs.
Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488 is invoked. Enough to state, that this last decision and its doctrinal innovation has been
expressly repudiated in Melo vs. People, 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, with which our present, views substantially conform.
From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing the second
information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for further proceedings. So
ordered.

Art. 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other
explosives calculated to cause alarm or danger;
2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive to
another or prejudicial to public tranquility;
3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal amusements, shall
disturb the public peace; or
4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any disturbance or scandal in public places, provided
that the circumstances of the case shall not make the provisions of Article 153 applicable.

Disturbance of serious nature falls under Article 153

• If the disturbance is of serious nature, the case will fall under Article 153 not under Paragraph 4 of this article.
Article 155 does not make any distinction as to particular place in the town or public place where the discharge of
firearm, rocket, etc. is effected; as long as it produced alarm or danger.
Is the discharge of firecrackers or rockets during fiestas or festive occasions covered by Paragraph 1 of Article 155?
• Viada opined that it is not.

Art. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means
of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution,
the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment
2. That he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty
3. That he evades the service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence

G.R. No. L-1255 July 30, 1947

CARLOS TOLEDANO vs. FELIX SEVERINO
This is an appeal from the decision of the court of First Instance of Occidental Negros which denied the appellant's
petition for habeas corpus.
The appellant appealed from the order denying his petition, and now submits to this Court the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not finding that it lacks jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and over the crime
he has committed.
2. The trial court erred in sentencing him to serve the unexpired portion of a sentence for a crime committed prior
to the Japanese Invasion.
3. The trial court erred in not giving him his liberty.
(I) The first and third assignments of error do not deserve a serious consideration.
Appellant's contention that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the person of the appellant is untenable, for it
is plain that the appellant, having filed a petition for habeas corpus with the court, the latter had acquired
jurisdiction of the person of the appellant.
 84

And as to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the lower court over the crime committed by the appellant, suffice it to
say that said appellant was not tried and convicted by the said court. In this habeas corpus proceeding the lower
court denied only the release of the appellant, because there was no showing that the trial court which convicted
him had no jurisdiction over the crime and the person of the appellant, and to impose the penalty imposed upon
him.
(II) The second assignment of error is not meritorious also, for the lower court did not sentence the appellant to
serve the unexpired portion of the sentence he was serving for a crime committed prior to the Japanese invasion.
What the lower court did was only to deny the petition for habeas corpus, for the reason that the appellant was
being legally detained since he was serving the unexpired portion of his sentence. The lower court did not try the
appellant for evasion or violation of sentence under article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires a new
prosecution, previous trial and the imposition of another penalty if convicted of said offense.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence under
the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which
he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final
judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits
made against him and commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that
decision with the following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which
does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally
liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that
said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their
liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part
reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the English
language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in
case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y
maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad
por sentencia firme; . . . .
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted
in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro
as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view
has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court
held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is
suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited
area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro
when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped
from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment
wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Art. 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorder, conflagrations, earthquakes, or
other calamities. — A convict who shall evade the service of his sentence, by leaving the penal institution where
he shall have been confined, on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or
similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which he has not participated, shall suffer an increase of one-fifth of the
 85

time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall exceed six months, if he shall
fail to give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the
Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity.
Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall give themselves up to the
authorities within the above mentioned period of 48 hours, shall be entitled to the deduction provided in Article 98.
Elements
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution;
2. That there is disorder resulting from:
a. Conflagration
b. Earthquake
c. Explosion
d. Similar catastrophe, OR
e. Mutiny in which he has not participated.
3. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the
occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny.
4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity.

The offender must be a convict by final judgment because only a convict by final judgment can “evade the service
of his sentence.”

G.R. No. L-810 March 31, 1947

MANUEL ARTIGAS LOSADA vs. JUAN ACENAS
This is an appeal from an order, dated July 20, 1946, of the justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, who,
in the absence of the judge of first instance (Act No. 2131), directed the release on habeas corpus, of Manuel
Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada, Santiago Aguda, and Francisco Danao, inmates of the Davao Penal Colony at
Inagawan, Palawan.
The first is undergoing a maximum sentence of 15 years, 2 months and 2 days for estafa, and estafa through
falsification. Such term is due to expire, with good conduct allowance, on July 16, 1947.
The second, Getulio Geocada, doing time for illegal possession of counterfeit money is due for release April 25,
1947.
The third, Santiago Aguda, serving a sentence of 12 years and 1 day for homicide, would be entitled to his liberty
about January 7, 1948, should he observe good conduct in the meantime.
The last, Francisco Danao, jailed for abduction with rape, will complete the service of his sentence, with good
conduct allowance, about June 19, 1948.
As above stated, the court decreed in July, 1946, that these four penal colonists should forthwith be freed from
restraint. Reason for the decree was their allegation, and the court's opinion, that they had earned a special time
allowance in the form of a deduction of one-fifth of their respective sentences under articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code, which for convenience are quoted below:
A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the
service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity
or catastrophe referred to in said article. (Article 98, Revised Penal Code.)
A convict who shall evade the services of his sentence, by leaving the penal institution where he shall have been
confined, on the occasion, or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which he has not participated, shall suffer
an increase of one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall
exceed six months, if he shall fail to give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight hours following the
issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity.
Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned period of 48 hours, shall be entitled to the deduction provided in
article 98. (Article 158, Revised Penal Code.)
The judge a quo made those observations in support of his action.
. . . in the opinion of this Court, those prisoners who, having all the chances to escape and did not escape but
remained in their prison cell during the disorder caused by war have shown more convincingly their loyalty than
those who escaped under the circumstances specifically enumerated in article 158 and give themselves up within
48 hours. After the executive proclamation for the latter, that is, the prisoner who escaped might have been
persuaded to give themselves up merely because they could see but a slim chance to avoid capture inasmuch as
the government then was functioning with all its normal efficiency. And if those who are loyal merely in times of
conflagration, earthquake, explosion and other similar catastrophe are considered loyal and are for that reason
given in their favor one-fifth reduction of their sentences, with more reason that those who stayed in their places of
confinement during the war . . ..
These are considerations that more properly belong to the legislative department, should an amendment to the law
be proposed. They are likewise equitable pleas, which the executive department could properly entertain in
connection with petitions for parole or pardon of the prisoners. But they may not authorize the courts to read into
the statute additional conditions or situations. The special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158 of
the Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service of their sentences by leaving the
 86

penal institution, give themselves up within two days. As these petitioners are not in that class, because they have
not escaped, they have no claim to that allowance. For one thing there is no showing that they ever had the
opportunity to escape, or that having such opportunity they had the mettle to take advantage of it or to brave the
perils in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had they successfully run away and regained
their precious liberty they would have, nevertheless, voluntarily exchanged it later with privations of prison life
impelled by that sense of right and loyalty to the Government, which is sought to be rewarded with the special
allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their case comes within the spirit of the law they have invoked. It must be
observed in this connection that the only circumstance favorable to petitioners is the admission of the respondent
that they "remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war."
The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for habeas corpus denied. No costs. So ordered.
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty.
— Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted
by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of
seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching
the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

Article 160 provides for the so-called quasi-recidivism

• Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance where a person, after having been convicted by final
judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same. He
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Elements
1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same

G.R. No. L-38624 July 25, 1975

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. CONRADO BAUTISTA, ET AL.
Mandatory review of the death penalty imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in its decision in case
"CC-VII-847-Rizal" for Murder, entitled "People vs. Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin", the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of Murder, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the
amount of P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages; and another P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Prisoners George Daeng, No, 56088-P; Rolando Castillo, No. 31087-C (these two already sentenced previously);
Conrado Bautista, No. 71055-P; Gerardo Abuhin, No. 61409-P who are serving sentence by virtue of final
judgment, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, were accused of Murder, committed as follows: .
That on or about December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while then confined at the said institution, conspiring,
confederating and acting together and each armed with improvised deadly weapons, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and would therewith one Basilio Beltran, No. 71495-P, another convicted prisoner
serving final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of serving the accused breakfast, inflicting upon
him multiple stab wounds while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the
accused, as a result of which the said Basilio Beltran died instantly.
That the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin were arraigned on March 10, 1973, and they pleaded not
guilty, after which the case went to trial on the merits. The evidence for the prosecution established the following
facts:
That on or about 6:15 in the morning of December 13, 1970, a stabbing incident took place near the door of 8-C
(cell house) at building 8; that the victim in said stabbing incident was Basilio Beltran who was also a prisoner in
the New Bilibid Prison with the rank of IC (Inmate Cadet); that on said date and time, while prison guard Armando
Miranda, assigned keeper at Building 8 was then opening the door of 8-C, where members of the Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang were confined, with him were IC Basilio Beltran and Domingo Mallari, both confined at dormitory 8-
A-2, who were then carrying bread ration for breakfast of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang at 8-C, when all of a
sudden, the four accused, two of whom were already sentenced, and two of whom were Conrado Bautista and
Gerardo Abuhin, rushed out from their cell and attacked and stabbed to death prisoner Basilio Beltran, while
Domingo Mallari sneaked away from the attackers; that the victim, Basilio Beltran, was facing the accused,
standing, carrying the breakfast ration for the occupants of 8-C when he was almost simultaneously stabbed by his
attackers as a result of which he sustained multiple stab wounds, numbering 12 in all, on the different parts of his
body; that the weapons used in stabbing the victim were matalas or improvised deadly instruments; and an icepick
which is improvised also; that the accused were investigated by the investigators and they admitted having killed
 87

the victim because of an alleged threat by the inmates cadets that they would kill any member of the Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang everytime that the IC delivered their ration, so that they moved ahead of the IC by taking that
opportunity.
Their defenses of denial and alibi based on testimonial evidence of the accused, and their claim that their written
statements admitting the crime were extracted from them by force and intimidation, consisted of:
The accused Conrado Bautista was placed on the witness stand and he testified that he was 28 years old, married
and a woodcarver by Occupation and formerly residing at 2504 Cagayan St., Sta. Ana, Manila, but now an inmate
of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal, after having been convicted by final judgment for the crane of
Robbery. In the course of the direct examination by counsel de oficio, Atty. Leonora M. Cabasal, accused Bautista
intimated to his counsel that he be allowed to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and that he be allowed to
substitute it with a plea of guilty. He was asked by his counsel, if he realized the gravity of the offense that he has
committed and he manifested that he realized the same; that he realized the fact and he is aware that he would be
penalized in accordance with law; that he is determined to change his life because he wanted to be free, after
serving his sentence. However, during the cross examination of the prosecution when he was asked if he helped
the other accused, namely: Gerardo Abuhin, Rolando Castillo and George Daeng, in stabbing the victim, Basilio
Beltran, he answered in the negative, alleging that he was inside the bartolina in that morning of December 13,
1970, when the victim was stabbed to death, and he only admitted as a participant in the killing of the victim
because Boy Coro (a Alfredo Mariano poked him with an improvised weapon; that this Boy Coro according to him
was the leader of the Sputnik Gang and he was very powerful because Boy Coro was the one giving orders and
they were mere followers; that the statement he allegedly signed was not really his own statement but that of the
investigator who forced him to sign the same through force and intimidation and maltreatment, but he did not file
any charge against said investigator according because according him he does not know anything about filing
charges. With this manifestation of the accused Conrado Bautista, the counsel de oficio moved that the former plea
of not guilty of said accused be allowed to remain on record, which was granted by the Court, there being no
objection on the part of the prosecution. So also, the defense of the accused Gerardo Abuhin that he was lying
down on his cell when he suddenly heard a commotion and he stook up and took his weapon, when he saw many
people coming out and he heard someone shouting, "everybody must come out"; that what was stated in his
statement was not the real happening, because it was only his gawa-gawa, knowing that Sarmiento and Coro were
very powerful in their cell and if he would not follow, something might be done against him; that it was not true
that his co-accused Bautista was involved in the stabbing and his conscience would not forgive him to implicate a
man who was not really a participant in that riot; that he was not able to add in his statement that Bautista was
not guilty because he was not asked about it and it did not occur to his mind to exculpate him in the course of his
giving a statement to the investigator; and that it would be against his conscience if he would let Bautista suffer for
anything that he did not commit; that he was intimidated by investigator de las Alas into giving an extrajudicial
confession and out of fear he signed the same.
We have gone to great lengths in closely scrutinizing the evidence presented in this case, and no amount of deeper
probing can convince Us that the trial court committed any reversible error in basing its judgment of conviction "on
the testimonies of the prosecution eye witnesses corroborating the statements in the extrajudicial confessions of
the accused" (Exh. "C-4"; Exh. "C-5").
An examination of the corroborated sworn statements of accused Rolando Castillo (already sentenced on a plea of
guilty, September 15, 1973) Exh. "C-1"; of Prison guard Armando Miranda, Exhibit "C-2"; of accused George
Daeng (already sentenced on a plea of guilty, September 1, 1973), Exh. "C-3"; of accused Conrado Bautista, Exh.
"C-4" of accused Gerardo Abuhin, Exh. "C-5"; and of prisoner (inmate cadet) Domingo Mallari, Exh. "D", shows
that on the morning of December 13, 1970, at around 6:15 A.M., while prison guard Armando Miranda
accompanied by Inmate Cadets Basilio Beltran (victim) and Domingo Mallari who carried bread and coffee, were
about to give food to the prisoners in "Brigada 8-C" under the stairs of "Brigada 8-A-2", located at New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, four prisoners, accused Rolando Castillo, George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, and Gerardo
Abuhin, all armed with "matalas" (improvised deadly weapons) suddenly pushed the cell door and rushed out.
While one of the four (Rolando Castillo) suddenly pointed his weapon at prison guard Miranda, the other three
simultaneously attacked and stabbed inmate cadet Basilio Beltran; that accused Rolando Castillo joined the three
others in stabbing the already prostrate victim; and the attack happened so suddenly that it did not take half a
minute for the four accused to kill the victim. The other inmate cadet, Domingo Mallari, was able to get away and
give the alarm. Witness Domingo Mallari in his sworn statement Exh. "D" was able to identify by their appearance,
not by name, the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin, Bautista and Daeng) out of ten prisoners in a line-up, as the
prisoners who stabbed the victim. This same witness stated that it was accused Conrado Bautista who first stabbed
the victim.
We noticed from the sworn statements that they were all taken during the investigation immediately conducted on
the very day of the crime, December 13, 1970, except that of prison guard Armando Miranda which was taken on
December 15, 1970. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-1") of accused Castillo given before PG Investigator, IS Ignacio
J. Ferrer, was taken in the presence of prison guard-investigator Jesus B. Tomagan, Chief Investigator Benedicto R.
Planta and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-3") of accused George Daeng
given before P.F. Jesus B. Tomagan was taken in the presence of Security Officer B.R. Planta, P.G. Ignacio Ferrer
and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-4") of accused Conrado Bautista
given before P.G. Jesus B. Tomagan was taken in the presence of Chief Investigator Benedicto R. Planta,
Investigator Ignacio Ferrer and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-5") of
 88

accused Gerardo Abuhin given before P. G. Abraham de las Alas was taken in the presence of P. G. Ignacio J.
Ferrer, P. G. Jesus B. Tomagan and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos.
The alleged threat and intimidation used in assailing the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions of the four
accused, being general in nature, becomes hardly credible in the face of the overwhelming established facts and
circumstances, as for instance (1) the judicial plea of guilty of accused Castillo and Daeng (both of whom were
already sentenced); (2) the very apparently disinterested and truthful narrations of prison guard Miranda and
inmate cadet Mallari who were eye-witnesses to the crime and who positively identified the four accused as the
persons who stabbed the victim, there being no other prisoners who at that moment of the crime could have
participated in it; (3) the manifestly spontaneous narrations of the circumstances that happened during the crime
appearing in the sworn statements that were executed on the very day the crime was committed, when those who
participated and who witnessed the crime did not have sufficient time to fabricate evidence and distort the truth;
(4) the fact that it would be difficult to presume that those disinterested investigators who were present when the
accused gave their sworn statements would subvert the ends of justice and falsify the truth by utilizing force and
intimidation on the accused, there being no indication nor evidence that they have a motive or grudge against the
accused; (5) and the fact that those officials of the Bureau of Prisons were merely doing their duties in the regular
course of official business when they conducted the investigation to shed light on the crime committed.
The narration of the crime contained in the sworn statement of prisoner Domingo Mallari (Exh. "D") who was an
eyewitness to the crime substantially coincides with his testimony in court in all material aspects and he was able
to identify the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin, Daeng, Bautista) when asked to do so during the trial (pp. 7-25 t.s.n.
Hearing on August 25, 1973). The four improvised deadly weapons used by the accused in killing the victim were
all recovered and identified (pp. 3-8; 14-15, t.s.n. Hearing of September 1, 1973.).1äwphï1.ñët Prison guard
Armando Miranda's testimony in court clearly corroborated all his narrations contained in his sworn statement Exh.
"C-2", pointing out without doubt that the accused Bautista, Abuhin, Castillo and Daeng were the prisoners who
rushed out of their cell and stabbed the victim, Beltran, in the early morning of December 13, 1970 (t.s.n. pp. 2-
11, Hearing of April 28, 1973).
Accused Abuhin in his testimony in open court admitted that he participated in the killing and stabbed twice,
although he said he did so because he was hit and wounded by a knife thrown from above (p. 5 t.s.n. Hearing of
November 29, 1973). He declared that he gave his sworn statement, Exh. "C-5", voluntarily Cpp. 6-7 t.s.n. Hearing
of November 29, 1973). Accused Bautista admitted in open court that the signature appearing on Exhibit "C-4" (his
sworn statement) is his (p. 7 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). He claimed that he was maltreated by
investigator Ferrer to extract from him the confession contained in his sworn statement. Yet he could not explain
why notwithstanding the supposed injuries inflicted on him, he could sign the sworn statement calmly without signs
of nervousness or trembling; he was not treated for his supposed injuries, was never hospitalized for them, and
never reported the supposed maltreatment to Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos whom he treated like a
father (pp. 7-9 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973).
Accused Bautista's very weak alibi was that on the morning of December 13, 1970, when the crime was committed
he was sleeping in his cell (pp. 9-10 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). Witness Antonio Juaningco, another
prisoner, tried to substantiate Bautista's alibi by testifying that on the morning of December 13, 1970, accused
Bautista was with him sleeping in cell no. 9 and went out because they were awakened by a commotion and then
saw the victim Beltran already dead (p. 21 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973).1äwphï1.ñët Accused Abuhin
when recalled to the witness stand did a complete somersault on his previous testimony implicating Bautista when
he stated that on that occasion he did not see Bautista (p. 28 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). The trial court
did not commit any mistake in not giving credit to the alibi of accused Bautista, for aside from its inherent
weakness as a defense, unsupported as it is by credible evidence, his alibi cannot stand against the positive
identification made by prison guard Miranda, witness Mallari, and the very damaging sworn statements of his co-
accused Castillo and Daeng both of whom, by their plea of guilty, had been previously sentenced for the same
crime with which Bautista is charged. We consider of little significance the belated testimony of Castillo, after he
was convicted and sentenced, that Bautista was not a participant in the crime (pp. 2-6 t.s.n. Hearing of January
21, 1974). We are more inclined to give more credence to his sworn statement (Exh. "C-1") given on the very date
of the crime, considering that Castillo had pleaded guilty to the crime of murder and he has nothing more to lose in
subsequently repudiating his previous narration of the crime implicating his co-accused Bautista. It is likewise
considered of no moment that another witness, prisoner Benito Balagtas, testified that when the crime was
committed in the early morning of December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 (p. 4 t.s.n.
Hearing of March 8, 1974).1äwphï1.ñët It is very significant that while defense witness Antonio Juaningco testified
that on the morning of December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him sleeping in cell no. 9, this defense
witness Balagtas in turn testified that accused Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 on the very same occasion. What
a tragedy for the accused and a significant victory for truth that even the very witnesses presented to establish an
alibi for accused Bautista contradicted themselves on a very material point. Neither do We give credence to the
testimony of witness Ricardo Felix, another prisoner, that on the morning of December 13, 1970, immediately after
the killing of victim Beltran, he saw prisoner Daeng, Boy Coro and Rolando Castillo "poking a knife to Bautista" and
threatening said Bautista to admit the crime.
We consider it an exercise in futility to discuss further the alleged errors committed by the trial court in considering
as generic aggravating circumstances the presence of obvious ungratefulness and evident premeditation so as to
impose the maximum penalty of death, because Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code succintly provides that "any
person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, ..., or while serving the same,
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony". In passing,
 89

however, it may be stated that the consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances is for the purpose of
fixing the proper penalty within the minimum, medium or maximum as provided by law, but We have no choice
here other than to impose the maximum because by mandate of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code a person
convicted of a crime while serving sentence for a previous crime shall get the maximum of the penalty prescribed
by law for the new felony (murder), which is death, without further regard of the effect of mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, or the complete absence thereof.
The trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crime of
murder. It was conclusively proven that the accused in a sudden, concerted and unprovoked act, all of them being
armed with improvised deadly weapons, stabbed the victim to death after pushing their cell door open, threatening
and throwing off-guard Miranda when the victim who was holding in both hands the bread and coffee intended for
the breakfast of the assailants was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected assault.
As to the existence of evident premeditation, it was established by the following circumstances: (1) the sudden
concerted attack, perpetrated and calculated to throw off guard the intended victim as he was in the act of giving
food to the assailants, which attack necessarily must have been planned; (2) that all of the accused were armed
with improvised deadly weapons which they were not supposed to possess and which they must have secretly
prepared for a long time for committing the crime; and (3) the admission on the part of the accused in their sworn
statements that they killed the victim by "attacking first" because they had heard that the members of the rival
gang would liquidate them, leading to the conclusion that the accused must have planned how to counteract the
supposed attack of the rival gang by literally beating the latter to the draw.
The aggravating circumstance of obvious ungratefulness was present as the victim was suddenly attacked while in
the act of giving the assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast. Instead of being grateful to the victim, at least
by doing him no harm, they took advantage of his helplessness when his two arms were used for carrying their
food, thus preventing him from defending himself from the sudden attack.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the requirements of moral certainty in the evaluation of
evidence have been more than adequately met. We have no other alternative than to affirm the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court, and all other parts of the judgment.
Costs against the accused.

G.R. No. L-38756 November 13, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. ROMUALDO CAPILLAS, ET AL.
This is an automatic review of the decision rendered by the defunct Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, in CCC-
VII-1335 Rizal, for murder.
ROMUALDO CAPILLAS and AQUILINO PACALA were accused of the crime of murder alleged to have been
committed as follows:
That on or about September 9, 1971, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then, confined at the said institution,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another with treachery and evident premeditation, and each armed with
improvised deadly weapons did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and wound therewith one
Patricio Gallardo, No. 39072-P a sentenced prisoner in the same institution, inflicting upon him the multiple stab
wounds, while then unarmed and unable to defend himself/themselves from the attack launched by the accused,
as a result of which the said Patricio Gallardo died instantly;
That the offense when committed by the above accused was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism in the case of both accused. (Expediente, p. 1.)
When the accused were arraigned on July 5, 1973, with the assistance of counsel, both pleaded GUILTY.
Thereafter, according to the trial court:
The accused were apprised by the Court of the consequence of their plea of guilty that there is no other penalty to
be meted upon them except death and the said accused manifested that although they are aware that they might
be punished with death, still they are pleading guilty to the crime they have committed.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Daeng, et al., G.R. No. L-34091,
January 30, 1973, the Court ordered the presentation of evidence to determine the degree of culpability of the
accused. (Id, p. 113.)
The trial court rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, in view of the spontaneous and voluntary confession of guilt made by the accused Romualdo Capillas
and Aquilino Pacala, the Court finds them GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder in accordance
with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P12,000.00; to pay the amount of
P5,000.00 as moral damages; another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. (Id., p. 118.)
The appellants do not dispute the factual findings of the trial court. The errors which they impute to said court
relate to the propriety of imposing the death penalty on them and ordering the payment of moral and exemplary
damages.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Romualdo Capillas and Aquilino Pacala are both inmates of the death row of the National Prisons at Muntinlupa (p.
2, tsn, November 28, 1973; p. 2, tsn, November 27, 1973). Romualdo Capillas has been confined in the national
penitentiary since 1964. He was sentenced to death for the crime of robbery in band with homicide by the Court of
First Instance of Samar (pp. 4-6, tsn, November 27, 1973; pp. 24 and 28, Records). Aquiline Pacala was sentenced
to death together with his brother by the Court of First Instance of Samar (pp. 8-9, tsn, November 28, 1973) for
 90

robbery with homicide (p. 24, Records). As of September 9, 1971, the date of the slaying of the victim in the
instant case, the decisions convicting both accused were still under automatic review by this Honorable Court (p. 6,
tsn, November 27, 1973; pp. 24, 28 & 30, Records).
Sometime before September 9, 1971, the victim Patricio Gallardo, also an inmate of Muntinlupa, was transferred
from his original cell to the so-called death row dormitory. His leg was chained when he was transferred there (p.
9, tsn, November 27, 1973). Accused Capillas was the squad leader of dormitory 1-D, the dormitory to which the
victim was transferred (p. 3, tsn, November 27, 1973).
On September 9, 1971 at about 1 1:00 A.M., the victim was in cell 32, dormitory 1-D (p. 3, tsn, November 27,
1973).
While the victim was seated near the door of his cell (Cell No. 32), accused Capillas stabbed him without any
warning, first in the stomach, then successively in different parts of the body (pp. 8-9, tsn, November 27, 1973;
Exhibit G).
Accused Pacala is one of the followers of accused Capillas (p. 7, tsn, November 28, 1973). Before and up to
September 9, 1971, Capillas' Batang Samar Leyte gang was fighting the Genuine Ilocano gang of Gallardo. (p. 12,
tsn, November 28, 1973). Capillas had previously told Pacala that he entertained ill feelings against the victim (p.
8, tsn, November 28, 1973). When he saw Capillas stabbing the victim, and with his previous knowledge of the ill
feeling entertained by Capillas against the victim, Pacala got out of his cell, took his weapon and also stabbed the
victim (p. 8, tsn, November 28, 1973) on the chest. At the time that the victim was being stabbed by the accused,
he was pleading for his life saying, 'Maawa na kayo sa akin' (p. 5, tsn, November 28, 1973), 'Huwag mo na akong
patayin' (p. 11, tsn, November 11, 1973). The accused, nevertheless, disregarded his plea for mercy and
proceeded to stab him. Because of the multiple wounds, death was immediate (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 27, 1973).
An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola of the NBI who found the following wounds:
Exhibit "A" (p. 96, Records)
Aside from abrasives
Inside wound, left hand, dorso-medial aspect, 6.5 cm, long running almost vertically, involving deeply the muscles.
Stab wounds, elliptical in shape, with cleancut edges, one of the extremities of which is blunt and the other sharp.
1. Left mammary region, medial aspect, level of the third intercostal space along the parasternal line, 4.8 cm. from
the anterior midline, 1.8 cm. long, running downwards medially, superior extremity, of which is sharp, directed
slightly upwards, medially and backwards, involving among others the soft tissues ... 12.0 cm. depth.
2. Left inframary region ...
3. Left infraxillary region — 15.0 cm. depth.
4. Left infra-axillary line — 9.0 cm. depth.
5. Left hypochondriac region — 11 cm. depth.
6. Umbilican region — 9.0 cm. depth.
7. Right arm — 2.3 cm. depth.
8. Left forearm — 3.5 cm. depth.
9. Left thigh — 7.0 cm. depth.
10. Left thigh — 9.0 cm. depth.
11. Left thigh — 6.0 cm. depth.
12. Left thigh — 10.0 cm.depth.
(Brief, pp. 3-6.)
The trial court appreciated in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty. Nonetheless the death penalty was imposed on them because, according to the court, "this being a case of
quasi-recidivism, as special aggravating circumstance, the same cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating
circumstance because of the mandatory provision of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code which specifically
provides that the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony. (Pp. vs. Perete, 58 O.G. 8628)." (Expediente, p. 118.)
The appellants claim, and the Solicitor General agrees, that Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to
them. The codal provision reads as follows:
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense — Penalty.
— Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted
by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
In the case at bar the appellants committed the crime of murder while they were confined at the New Bilibid Prison.
But such fact does not justify the application of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code to them because the record is
bereft of any evidence introduced by the prosecution showing that they were serving sentence by virtue of final
judgments.
Romualdo Capillas had been sentenced to death for robbery in band with homicide by the Court of First Instance of
Samar but when he committed the murder on September 9, 1971, his sentence had not yet become final because
it was still under review by this Court.
As to Aquilino Pacala he admitted that he had been sentenced to death for a crime committed in Laya, Samar, and
that he had been previously convicted of trespass. But there is no evidence to the effect that when he took part in
killing Patricio Gallardo he was serving final sentence for the crime committed in Samar.
(The death sentence imposed on Romualdo Capillas was reduced to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes
in a decision promulgated on October 21, 1981. See People vs. Capillas, L-27177, 108 SCRA 173. As to Aquiline
 91

Pacala the death sentence imposed on him was likewise reduced to reclusion perpetua in a decision promulgated
on August 15, 1974. See People vs. Pacala, L-26647, 58 SCRA 370).
It is true that the information alleges recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the two accused. True it is also
that a plea of guilty is deemed as an admission of all the material allegations in the information including the
attendant circumstances. But in the instant case the trial court proceeded to receive evidence despite the plea of
guilty because of the serious nature of the offense and the evidence shows that the appellants are not recidivists.
The evidence, under the circumstances, must prevail over the admission.
The Solicitor General concedes that Capillas is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty.
The Solicitor General concedes that Pacala is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty but denies
that he can invoke voluntary surrender because it is not supported by the evidence. The latter point is well-taken
because Pacala himself stated during the hearing that he did not surrender; he merely waited in his cell until prison
employees took him out.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Capillas has two mitigating
circumstances in his favor so that the penalty is reduced by one degree to prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. As to Pacala who has one mitigating circumstance in his favor, the minimum period of the
penalty for murder is applicable.
The appellants claim that the trial court erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages. This claim appears to be
academic and would require no discussion in the light of their economic condition. Nonetheless, it is useful to state
that the relevant provisions of the Civil Code do authorize the award not only of compensatory or actual damages
in delicts and quasi-delicts but also of moral and exemplary damages. (See People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11,
1968, 25 SCRA 468.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is modified; Romualdo Capillas is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; Aquilino Pacala is sentenced to an indeterminate of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; both shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.
G.R. No. L-38176 January 22, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. ARTURO ALICIA
Before the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, the accused, Arturo Alicia and Victor Bangayan, were
charged with the crimes of Murder and of Multiple Frustrated Murder (Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1391-Rizal)
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1972, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, while then confined at the said institution, each
armed with improvised deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and acting together and mutually helping one
another, with treachery, evident premeditation and deliberate intent to kill – did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab:
1. Pedro Madjos, No. 76970-P
2. Felipe Macerin, No. 53421-P
3. Victorio Sansanan, No. 58203-P
4. Sulficio Sulina, No. 79723-P
all prisoners serving final sentences in the same institution while then unarmed and unable to defend themselves
from the attack launched by the accused thereby inflicting upon Pedro Madjos a stab wound which directly cause
his death and simultaneously inflicting upon Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina stab wounds in
the different parts of their bodies, the accused having performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
offense of murder, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is
by the timely arrival of prison guards which deterred the accused from inflicting further injuries on their victims and
the timely and able assistance of the NBP Hospital Staff in treating the injured.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court ordered a
mandatory presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Trial followed and on January 28, 1974, the lower court
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of
P10,000.00 jointly and severally; to pay moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Likewise, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
Multiple Frustrated Murder, as defined under Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information,
the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS AND FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision mayor as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the offended parties in the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00,
as exemplary damages, jointly and severally: and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
The case is now before Us on automatic review pursuant to Rule 122, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.
 92

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Dr. Argente Alejandro, Tolentino Avelina, Francisco Cometa, Jr., Sulficio
Sulina, Loneida Panopio and Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr..
Dr. Argente Alejandro, a physician employed in the Bureau of Prisons Hospital, testified that he treated Felipe
Macerin who sustained two lacerated wounds (two inches right midaxillary line and one-third inch around the right
elbow just above the distal portion all over the bone), both of which could have been caused by an improvised
weapon usually used by prisoners in Muntinlupa; that he sutured the wounds and gave the victim an IPS anti-
tetanus syrup and antibiotic five per cent dextrose and water; that Felipe Macerin had already been admitted to the
hospital for treatment of siptomiasis when these injuries were inflicted upon him; and that the injuries of Macerin
had been cured and he recovered, but sixteen days after the stabbing incident he died of Maxonia (the doctor's
certificate of the NBP Hospital shows that the cause of his death is "Carcinoma-Liver").
He further testified that aside from Felipe Macerin, he also treated Sulficio Sulina and Victorio Sansanan for injuries
resulting from the stabbing incident at Ward 3 of the NBP Hospital; that Sulficio Sulina sustained four (4) lacerated
wounds (one inch subcostal left parasternal line; one inch supra clavicular region right; two inches right elbow; and
two inches hyposgastrion); that he conducted an exploratory operation, suturing his urinary bladder which was
penetrated in the distal part of the elum and part of the dentary column; that the injuries of the internal organs of
Sulina would have been fatal without surgical intervention and that they could have been caused by an improvised
weapon used by prisoners; that Sulficio Sulina recovered from his injuries and was discharged on June 24, 1972;
and that Victorio Sansanan was treated by him for a superficial lacerated wound (one-half of an inch at the back
lever of the dentary parasipital area) which was not fatal.
Furthermore, he testified that another prisoner, Pedro Madjos died in the hospital and his cadaver was forwarded
to the Muntinlupa Board of Investigation for autopsy; that he examined the cadaver and saw one wound which is
1.5 cms., one foot long from the axillary line, which caused his death as it penetrated the heart.
Tolentino Avelina, an investigator in the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons, declared that he
investigated a stabbing incident which transpired on May 2, 1972 inside Ward 3 of the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital
wherein Pedro Madjos Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina were attacked and stabbed by other
prison inmates, and that said investigation was reduced in writing (Exhibit "B"). He declared that when he arrived
at the office before 8:00 o'clock in the morning on said date, he was informed of the stabbing incident so he
immediately proceeded to Ward 3 of the NBP Hospital to investigate and determine who the victims were and their
assailants. In the court of his investigation he took written statements from appellant Arturo Alicia on May 2, 1972
(E exhibit "C") wherein the latter admitted before him that he (Alicia) was the one who stabbed Pedro Madjos,
Victorio Sansanan and Felipe Macerin (Exhibit "C-2") with an improvised weapon (Exhibit "D"), and from Victorio
Sansanan on July 1, 1972 (Exhibit "E"), one of the victims in that incident, wherein Sansanan Identified his
assailant as Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina executed a written statement on June 19, 1972 (Exhibit "F"), pointing to
Victor Bangayan (Exhibit "F-2") as his assailant.
Francisco Cometa, Jr., a prison guard in the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Prisons, testified that he
investigated prisoner Victor Bangayan on May 2, 1972, in connection with the stabbing incident at the NBP Hospital
and reduced the investigation in writing (Exhibit "I"); that in that statement, Bangayan admitted that he was one
of those who attacked the victims (Exhibit "I-2") and that he used an improvised deadly weapon (Exhibit "I-3");
that appellants explained that they attacked and stabbed their victims because the latter were members of the
rival Batang City Jail Gang, and were planning to attack them and other members of the Commando Gang.
Sulficio Sulina, one of the victims and an inmate in the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that on May 2, 1972, at about
5:00 o'clock in the morning, while confined in the hospital, he was stabbed five times by appellant Victor
Bangayan.
Leonida Panopio, a resident physician, testified that on May 2, 1972, she learned about a stabbing incident where
the victims were Madjos, Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina, and about the death of Madjos, and that she accordingly
prepared a death report (Exhibit "A-4").
Mariano Cueva, Jr., a physician and medicolegal officer of the NBI, testified that he personally conducted an
autopsy on the cadaver of Pedro Madjos and his post-mortem findings are embodied in his Necropsy Report No. N-
72-845 (Exhibit "L"); that according to his findings, the stab would found on the left side of the abdomen of the
late Pedro Madjos was 14 cms. from the center line and 17 cms. above the hipbone, 1-½ inches in width,
penetrating the body of the left, about 15 cms., involving vital structures and causing serious or severe
hemorrhage which caused his death; that the external characteristic of the wound indicates that the stabbing
instrument was sharp, pointed with double edges, like a dagger, a double edged balisong, a knife or any similar
stabbing instrument; that from the direction of the wounds, it appears that the assailant was in front of the victim
when he attacked him; that the death could have occurred several minutes or an hour after the injury was
inflicted; and that it is possible that the attack was sudden and unexpected in view of the absence of any sign that
the victim attempted to parry the blow.
During the trial, the appellants testified in their behalves.
Appellant Victor Bangayan, an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, testified that he is presently
confined at the New Bilibid Prisons, serving sentence for the crime of robbery holdup and at the same time
awaiting the outcome of his appeal from a judgment of conviction in a murder case wherein he was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death (G.R. No. L-36234, submitted for decision with this tribunal). He declared that when the
incident took place, he was confined at the NBP Hospital due to swollen jaw and recuperating from fever. He
claimed that he stabbed Madjos because they quarreled in a gambling game wherein the latter cheated him After
he stabbed the victim he surrendered voluntarily to the prison authorities and voluntarily gave his statement to the
investigators.
 93

Arturo Alicia, also an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that he is serving sentence for the crime of
robbery he committed in Manila; that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking spree with his companions, using alcohol
which they bought from a hospital attendant; that after drinking he went to his "tarima"; that all he knew was that
he stabbed Pedro Madjos but he had no intention of killing him; that on the date of the incident he was confined in
the hospital because he was vomiting blood; that he also stabbed Victorio Sansanan and Felipe Macerin; and that
after the incident he surrendered to the authorities and voluntarily gave his statement to them.
It has been sufficiently established by the evidence that in the early morning of May 2, 1972, Pedro Madjos, Felipe
Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina, all persons serving sentences for one reason or another and
confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital, were attacked and stabbed by appellants who were armed with
improvised pointed instruments. This resulted in the death of Pedro Madjos and the infliction of numerous stab
wounds on the persons of Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina injuries which could have caused their death were it not
for the timely arrival of prison guards and for the medical assistance rendered to them by the prison hospital
personnel. Macerin was about to plug in an electric iron when he was stabbed by prisoner Arturo Alicia. Pedro
Madjos was massaging the body of Victorio Sansanan, who was then suffering from asthma, when he and Victorio
were stabbed by Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina was stabbed by Victor Bangayan while he was asleep on a mat laid on
the cement floor of Ward 3, adjacent to the attendant's table. Appellants admitted to the investigators that they
stabbed the victims because of the reported plan of the latter to attack them the following day. Hence, in the
evening of May 1, 1972, appellants Alicia and Bangayan decided to attack the members of the Batang City Jail
Gang early the following morning.
In her brief, counsel de oficio for the appellants, Atty. Eugenia Banzon Jose contends that appellants acted in
selfdefense in view of the imminent attack upon them by the rival gang that none of the elements which would
qualify the crime as murder had been proven; that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should not have
been applied, and on the contrary, appellants should have been given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
To begin with, a plea of guilty admits all the material allegations of the Information, including the attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Prescinding from the foregoing, self-defense is an
affirmative allegation which the accused must prove with sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence. 1 Here,
no such evidence has been presented. To support the claim that the offense was not qualified by treachery, the
counsel de oficio makes capital of the testimony of Dr. Cueva to the effect that when Pedro Madjos was stabbed,
his assailant was in front of him, hence the attack on the victim was face to face. But the same witness, Dr. Cueva,
also testified that it was possible that the attack was sudden and unexpected because of the absence of any sign
that the victim attempted to parry the stabbing thrust, and appellants admitted that to insure the success of their
ploy they suddenly attacked their victims during the early dawn of May 2, 1972. As a matter of fact, Sulficio Sulina
was still sleeping on the floor when he was stabbed five times by appellant Victor Bangayan.
The existence of the qualifying circumstance of premeditation is shown by the fact that as early as the evening of
May 1, 1972, appellants agreed to attack their victims, which plan they executed in the early morning of the
following day. From the time they agreed on their plan until dawn of the next day when the plan was implemented,
sufficient time had elapsed to allow appellants to meditate and reflect upon their plan and the possible
consequences of their act. This decision on the. part of appellants to attack their victims, was, therefore, the result
of meditation, calculation or reflection. 2
Appellants' counsel de oficio makes much ado about the fact that the trial court questioned appellants as to the fact
of their previous conviction. This, she contends, violated the constitutional rights of the appellants against self-
incrimination.
The trial court's question as to the nature of the offense for the commission of which appellants were serving
sentence did not call for incriminating answers. The fact that appellants, at the time of the commission of the
crime, were prisoners in the New Bilibid Prisons serving sentence by final judgment is not disputed. The status of
appellants as such appears in their extrajudicial confessions (Exhibits "C" and "1") which were submitted in
evidence. Since the Information alleges that appellants committed the afore-mentioned crime "while then confined"
in the New Bilibid Prisons, and the evidence of the prosecution shows that they were inmates of the New Bilibid
Prisons serving sentence by virtue of final judgment, it was proper for the trial court to inquire as to the nature of
the offense for which they were serving sentence.
The lower court correctly found the existence of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, defined
under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense. — Penalty.
— Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted
by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, sham be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which imposes the maximum of the penalty for the new
offense. It makes no difference, for the purpose of the effect of quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised
Penal Code, whether the crime for which an accused is serving sentence at the time of the commission of the
offense charged, falls under the said Code or under special law. 3 Quasi-recidivism is punished with more severity
than recidivism proper because the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as any other aggravating
circumstance, may be offset by a mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, whereas, in a
case of quasi-recidivism the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed should
always be imposed irrespective of the presence of any mitigating circumstance.
 94

In the case at bar, both appellants Arturo Alicia and Victor Bangayan were serving sentence for robbery by virtue
of final judgment when they committed the new felony. The existence of quasi-recidivism renders moot the
argument Of appellants' counsel that the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances which should
have entitled the appellants to a lower penalty. Although the counsel de oficio of appellants is correct in her
statement that after the commission of the crime appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and
executed statements admitting their participation, and that both pleaded guilty to the Offense, those circumstances
notwithstanding, the imposition of the supreme penalty is in order. 4 However, for lack of votes, the penalty to be
meted the appellants must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P1,000.00 in the
murder case is hereby raised to P12,000.00.
G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS LAYSON, ET AL.
This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in
criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces.
On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao
Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the following crimes:
Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;

Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;

Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

Joventino Garces — robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited house.

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with bladed weapons,
entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the room.
Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded
themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender
only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of
their safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered
themselves.
Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal and external
hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.
Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a
number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week before. The four
plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.
On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:
The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces of the crime of Murder,
under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, while then being convicts
serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment
imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed
instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-
inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries which caused his death; with the aggravating
circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them
with two or more prior convictions.
Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and spontaneously pleaded guilty.
Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo proceeded to receive testimony because of the gravity of the
offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and having been previously punished
for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and
Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or more offenses to which the law
attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating
circumstances consisting of any two of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the crime to murder and the
special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged while serving the penalty imposed upon
them for previous offenses as regards all the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences all of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino Gasang
 95

in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason
of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately.
For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
be considered in favor of all the accused. For this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise
to the obfuscation be not removed from the commission of the offense by a considerable length of time, during
which period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.1
Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces
a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964.
In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained
their equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their
fellow inmates whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and
obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.
Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh. J), plus the
testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed in a manner insuring utter
suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to offer
resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this
circumstance must be considered as absorbed in treachery.2
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation becomes a mere generic aggravating
circumstance4 which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A qualifying circumstance not only
gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve
no other penalty than that specially prescribed for said crime.5
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered
against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving their
respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused
with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.6
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and
circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court
is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of having been
previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties because the said
aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is considered shall have
served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at
the time of the commission of the murder.
Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr., counsel de
officio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the judgment a quo.
It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the
inexorable mandate of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and
Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino Gasang, is hereby increased to
P12,000,7 to be paid jointly and severally by the four accused. Costs de officio.
BAR QUESTION TITLE THREE

Art 134; Rebellion; Politically Motivated; Committed by NPA Members (1998)

On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his car traveling along the
National Highway of Laguna, Joselito and Vicente shot him on the head resulting in his instant death. At that time,
Joselito and Vicente were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army and they killed the governor
upon orders of their senior officer. Commander Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente,
they were ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of his corrupt practices. If you were the prosecutor, what crime
will you charge Joselito and Vicente? [5%J
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering that the killers
were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army and the killing was upon orders of their
commander; hence, politically-motivated. This was the ruling in People vs. Avila, 207 SCRA 1568 involving identical
facts which is a movement taken judicial notice of as engaged in rebellion against the Government.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente for the crime of murder as the purpose of the killing
was because of his "corrupt practices ", which does not appear to be politically motivated. There is no indication as
to how the killing would promote or further the objective of the New Peoples Army. The killing is murder because it
was committed with treachery.
 96

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime should be rebellion with murder considering that Art. 135 of the Revised Penal Code has already been
amended by Rep. Act No. 6968, deleting from said Article, common crimes which used to be punished as part and
parcel of the crime of rebellion. The ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1994), that rebellion may not be
completed with common crimes committed in furtherance thereof, was because the common crimes were then
penalized in Art. 135 together with the rebellion, with one penalty and Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code cannot be
applied. Art. 135 of said Code remained exactly the same when the case of Enrile vs, Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
(1990) was resolved. Precisely for the reason that Art. 48 cannot apply because the common crimes were punished
as part of rebellion in Art. 135, that this Article was amended, deleting the common crimes therefrom. That the
common crimes were deleted from said Article, demonstrates a clear legislative intention to treat the common
crimes as distinct from rebellion and remove the legal impediment to the application of Art.
48. It is noteworthy that in Enrile vs. Salazar (supra) the Supreme Court said these:
"There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that if it cannot be conveniently
utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect
such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
purely with in its province,"
And significantly the said amendment to Art. 135 of the Rev. Penal Code was made at around the time the ruling in
Salazar was handled down, obviously to
neutralize the Hernandez and the Salazar rulings. The amendment was sort of a rider to the coup d'etat law, Rep.
Act No 6968.
Art 134-A: Coup d’ etat & Rape; Frustrated (2005)
Taking into account the nature and elements of the felonies of coup d’ etat and rape, may one be criminally liable
for frustrated coup d’ etat or frustrated rape? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, one cannot be criminally liable for frustrated coup d’ etat or frustrated rape because in coup d’ etat the mere
attack directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation, communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power would consummate the crime. The objective may not be to overthrow the government but
only to destabilize or paralyze the government through the seizure of facilities and utilities essential to the
continued possession and exercise of governmental powers.
On the other hand, in the crime of rape there is no frustrated rape it is either attempted or consummated rape. If
the accused who placed himself on top of a woman, raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor to
have sex with her very apparent, is guilty of Attempted rape. On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the
female organ by the penis, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, consummates the crime
of rape. More so, it has long abandoned its “stray” decision in People vs. Erina 50 Phil 998 where the accused was
found guilty of Frustrated rape.
Art 134-A; Coup d’etat (2002)
If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation
and threat against a vital military installation for the purpose of seizing power and taking over such installation,
what crime or crimes are they guilty of? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup d'etat, under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, because their attack was against vital military installations
which are essential to the continued possession and exercise of governmental powers, and their purpose is to seize
power by taking over such installations.
B. If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the leader thereof? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other
documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be deemed the leader of
said coup d'etat (Art 135, R.P.C.)
Art 134-A; Coup d’etat; New Firearms Law (1998)
1. How is the crime of coup d'etat committed? [3%]
2. Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime or
crimes did he commit? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The crime of coup d'etat is committed by a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, military camps and
installations, communication networks, public utilities and facilities needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power, carried out singly or simultaneously anywhere in the Philippines by persons belonging to the
military or police or holding public office, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing
or diminishing state power. (Art 134-A, RPC).
2. The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed
firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294).
Art 136; Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (1994)
 97

VC, JG. GG and JG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the titular head of the
conspiracy. Several meetings were held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his conscience, confessed to
Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the government. Father Abraham did not
report this information to the proper authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion, not a
conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person criminally liable under Art 116, RFC. And even assuming that
it will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7, as his
failure to report can be considered as due to "insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and inviolability of a
confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in criminal liability to the co-conspirators, but not to a person who learned of
such and did not report to the proper authorities (US vs. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People vs. Atienza. 56 Phil. 353).
Art 148; Direct Assault vs. Resistance & Disobedience (2001)
A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad at X, one of his pupils, because of the latter's throwing paper
clips at his classmates, twisted his right ear. X went out of the classroom crying and proceeded home located at
the back of the school. He reported to his parents Y and Z what A had done to him. Y and Z immediately proceeded
to the school building and because they were running and talking in loud voices, they were seen by the barangay
chairman, B, who followed them as he suspected that an untoward incident might happen. Upon seeing A inside
the classroom, X pointed him out to his father, Y, who administered a fist blow on A, causing him to fall down.
When Y was about to kick A, B rushed towards Y and pinned both of the latter's arms. Seeing his father being held
by B, X went near and punched B on the face, which caused him to lose his grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z
shouted words of encouragement at Y, her husband, and also threatened to slap A. Some security guards of the
school arrived, intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so that they could be investigated in the principal's office.
Before leaving, Z passed near A and threw a small flower pot at him but it was deflected by B. a) What, if any, are
the respective criminal liability of X Y and Z? (6%) b) Would your answer be the same if B were a barangay tanod
only? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the physical injuries inflicted on B, the Barangay Chairman, to be
only slight and hence, would be absorbed in the direct assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in authority
(Art. 152, RPC) and in this case, was performing his duty of maintaining peace and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault With Less Serious Physical Injuries for the fist blow on A, the
teacher, which caused the latter to fall down. For purposes of the crimes in Arts. 148 and 151 of the Revised Penal
Code, a teacher is considered a person in authority, and having been attacked by Y by reason of his performance of
official duty, direct assault is committed with the resulting less serious physical injuries completed. Z, the mother
of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an accomplice to the complex crimes of direct assault with less serious
physical injuries committed by Y. Her participation should not be considered as that of a coprincipal, since her
reactions were only incited by her relationship to X and Y. as the mother of X and the wife of Y.
b) If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying hand on him, being an agent of a person in authority
only, would constitute the crime of Resistance and Disobedience under Article 151, since X, a high school pupil,
could not be considered as having acted out of contempt for authority but more of helping his father get free from
the grip of B. Laying hand on an agent of a person in authority is not ipso facto direct assault, while it would always
be direct assault if done to a person in authority in defiance to the latter is exercise of authority.
Art 148; Direct Assault; Teachers & Professors (2002)
A, a lady professor, was giving an examination. She noticed B, one of the students, cheating. She called the
student's attention and confiscated his examination booklet, causing embarrassment to him. The following
day, while the class was going on, the student, B, approached A and, without any warning, slapped her. B would
have inflicted further injuries on A had not C, another student, come to A's rescue and prevented B from continuing
his attack. B turned his ire on C and punched the latter. What crime or crimes, if any, did B commit? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for slapping the professor, A, who was then conducting classes
and thus exercising authority; and another one for the violence on the student C, who came to the aid of the said
professor.
By express provision of Article 152, in relation to Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, teachers and professors of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities in the actual performance of their professional
duties or on the occasion of such performance are deemed persons in authority for purposes of the crimes of direct
assault and of resistance and disobedience in Articles 148 and 151 of said Code. And any person who comes to the
aid of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. Accordingly, the attack on C is, in the
eyes of the law, an attack on an agent of a person in authority, not just an attack on a student.
Art 148; Persons in Authority/Agents of Persons in Authority (2000)
Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in authority? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Persons in authority are persons directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or government corporation, board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed
persons in authority. (Article 152, RPC)
 98

Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, are charged with maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority (Art. 152, RPC),
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the Rev. Penal Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in
the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority. (P.D. No. 299, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873).
Art 156; Delivery of Prisoners from Jail (2002)
A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital for emergency medical treatment. His followers, all of whom were
armed, went to the hospital to take him away or help him escape. The prison guards, seeing that they were
outnumbered and that resistance would endanger the lives of other patients, deckled to allow the prisoner to be
taken by his followers. What crime, if any, was committed by A's followers? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A's followers shall be liable as principals in the crime of delivery of prisoner from Jail (Art. 156, Revised Penal
Code).
The felony is committed not only by removing from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein but
also by helping in the escape of such person outside of said establishments by means of violence, intimidation,
bribery, or any other means.
Art 157; Evasion of Service of Sentence (1998)
Manny killed his wife under exceptional circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City to suffer the penalty of destierro during which he was not to enter the city.
While serving sentence, Manny went to Dagupan City to visit his mother. Later, he was arrested in Manila.
1. Did Manny commit any crime? [3%]
2. If so, where should he be prosecuted? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Yes. Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he was
prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro.
A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded when the convict enters any of the place/places he is
prohibited from entering under the sentence or come within the prohibited radius. Although destierro does not
involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty. (People vs. Abilong. 82 Phil. 172).
2. Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in Manila where he was arrested. This is so because evasion of
service of sentence is a continuing offense, as the convict is a fugitive from justice in such case. (Parulan vs. Dir. of
Prisons, L-28519, 17 Feb. 1968)
Art. 134; Rebellion vs. Coup d'etat (2004)
Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between rebellion and coup d'etat, based on their constitutive elements as criminal
offenses.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
REBELLION is committed when a multitude of persons rise publicly in arms for the purpose of overthrowing the
duly constituted government, to be replaced by a government of the rebels. It is carried out by force and violence,
but need not be participated in by any member of the military, national police or any public officer.
COUP D'ETAT is committed when members of the military, Philippine National Police, or public officer,
46 of 86
acting as principal offenders, launched a swift attack thru strategy, stealth, threat, violence or intimidation against
duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, military camp or installation, communication
networks, public facilities or utilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of governmental powers, for
the purpose of seizing or diminishing state powers.
Unlike rebellion which requires a public uprising, coup d'etat may be carried out singly or simultaneously and the
principal offenders must be members of the military, national police or public officer, with or without civilian
support. The criminal objective need not be to overthrow the existing government but only to destabilize or
paralyze the existing government.
Complex Crime; Direct Assault with murder (2000)
Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay Camias. A, the
Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was delivering his speech. B, one of
the guests, went to the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance movements, brandishing a knife and
challenging everyone present to a fight. A approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the
dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his back twice when A
turned his back to proceed to the microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of
the incident A was not armed. What crime was committed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. A, as a Barangay Captain, is a person in authority
and was acting in an official capacity when he tried to maintain peace and order during the public dance in the
Barangay, by admonishing B to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. When B,
instead of heeding A's advice, attacked the latter, B acted in contempt and lawless defiance of authority
constituting the crime of direct assault, which characterized the stabbing of A. And since A was stabbed at the back
when he was not in a position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing. Hence, the
 99

death caused by such stabbing was murder and having been committed with direct assault, a complex crime of
direct assault with murder was committed by B.
Art 148; Direct Assault with murder (1995)
Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud where he resided. Renato, a resident of the neighboring
Barangay Guihaman, also operated a mobile rice thresher which he often brought to Barangay Napnud to thresh
the palay of the farmers there. This was bitterly resented by Pascual, one afternoon Pascual, and his two sons
confronted Renato and his men who were operating their mobile rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A
heated argument ensued. A barangay captain who was
Criminal Law Bar Examination Q & A (1994-2006)
fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to appease Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent confrontation. However,
Pascual resented the intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him to death. What crime was committed by
Pascual? Discuss fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 148 and 249 in
relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a person in authority and if he is attacked
while in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof the felony of direct assault is committed.
Art. 48, RPC, on the other hand, provides that if a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. Here, the single act of the offender in hacking the victim to death resulted in two
felonies, homicide which is grave and direct assault which is less grave.
Criminal Liability; Tumultous Affray (1997)
During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in the public plaza. As a result of the tumultuous affray, A
sustained one fatal and three superficial stab wounds. He died a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the "rumble", each using a knife against A, but it could not be ascertained who among them inflicted
the mortal injury. Who shall be held criminally liable for the death of A and for what?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having been proven to have inflicted serious physical
injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A, are criminally liable for the latter's death. And because it cannot be
ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or tumultuous affray.
B, C, D, and E are all liable for the crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Criminal Liability; Tumultuous Affray (2003)
In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some customers inside a night club became unruly, guns were fired by a
group, among them A and B, that finally put the customers back to their senses. Unfortunately, one customer died.
Subsequent investigation revealed that A's gunshot had inflicted on the victim a slight wound that did not cause
the deceased's death nor materially contribute to it. It was B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the
deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to slight physical injury. Would you agree? Why?
6%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I beg to disagree with A's contention that his liability should be limited to slight physical injury only. He should
be held liable for attempted homicide because he inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is a lethal
weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 123 [1990])
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, I would agree to A's contention that his criminal liability should be for slight physical injury only, because he
fired his gun only to pacify the unruly customers of the night club and therefore, without intent to kill. B's gunshot
that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased may not be imputed to A because conspiracy cannot exist when there
is a free-for-all brawl or tumultuous affray. A and B are liable only for their respective act
Death under Exceptional Circumstances (2005)
Pete, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see Flor, his wife,
and Benjie, his best friend, completely naked having sexual intercourse. Pete pulled out his service gun and shot
and killed Benjie. Pete was charged with murder for the death of Benjie. Pete contended that he acted in defense of
his honor and that, therefore, he should be acquitted of the crime.
The court found that Benjie died under exceptional circumstances and exonerated Pete of the crime, but sentenced
him to destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Pete to pay
indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00. (5%)
Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, is destierro a penalty? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the case of People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987, the Court ruled that Article 247 does not
define a felony. However, it went on to state that the penalty is merely banishment of the accused, intended for his
protection. Punishment, therefore, is not inflicted on the accused.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of Serious Physical Injuries. Destierro is a
punishment whereby a convict is banished to a certain place and is prohibited from entering or coming near that
place designated in the sentence, not less than 25 kms. (People v. Araquel, G.R. No. L-12629, December 9, 1959)
Did the court correctly order Pete to pay indemnity despite his exoneration under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code? Explain.
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because the privilege defined under this Article exempts the offender from criminal liability but not from civil
liability. (People v. Abarca, G.R, No. L-74483, September 14, 1987; Art. 12, Revised Penal Code)
Illegal Possession of Firearms – RA 8294 (1998)
Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes
did he commit? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed firearm
is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294). A prosecution for illegal possession
of firearm under the new law is allowed only if the unlicensed firearm was not used in the commission of another
crime.

Art. 139 Sedition (2007)

What are the different acts of inciting to sedition?
The different acts which constitute the crime of inciting to sedition are:
1. Inciting others through speeches, writings, banners and other media of representation to commit acts which
constitute sedition;
2. Uttering seditious words, speeches or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or
any of its duly constituted authorities, which tend to disturb or obstruct the performance of official functions,
or which tend to incite others to cabal and meet for unlawful purposes;
3. Inciting through the same media of representation rebellious conspiracies or riots;
4. Stirring people to go against lawful authorities, or disturb the peace and public order of the community or of
the Government; or
5. Knowingly concealing any of the aforestated evil practices (Art. 142, RPC)

Amnesty and Art. 157 Evasion of Service of Sentence (2009)

Antero Makabayan was convicted of the crime of Rebellion. While serving sentence, he escaped from jail. Captured,
he was charged with, and convicted of, Evasion of Service of Sentence. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines
issued an amnesty proclamation for the offense of Rebellion. Antero applied for and was granted the benefit of the
amnesty proclamation.
Antero then filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release from confinement. He claims that
the amnesty extends to the offense of Evasion of Service of Sentence. As judge, will you grant the petition?
Discuss fully. (4%)

Art. 148 Direct Assault (2009)

Rigoberto gate-crashed the 71st birthday party of Judge Lorenzo. Armed with a piece of wood commonly known as
dos por dos, Rigoberto hit Judge Lorenzo on the back, causing the latter’s hospitalization for 30 days. Upon
investigation, it appeared that Rigoberto had a grudge against Judge Lorenzo who, two years earlier, had cited
Rigoberto in contempt and ordered his imprisonment for three (3) days.
1. Is Rigoberto guilty of Direct Assault? Why or why not? (3%)

2. Would your answer be the same if the reason for the attack was that when Judge Lorenzo was still a
practicing lawyer ten years ago, he prosecuted Rigoberto and succeeded in sending him to jail for one
year? Explain your answer. (3%)
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Art. 148 Direct Assault (2009)

While Alfredo, Braulio, Ciriaco, and Domingo were robbing a bank, policemen arrived. A firefight ensued between
the bank robbers and the responding policemen, and one of the policemen was killed.
1. What crime or crimes, if any, had been committed? Explain. (3%)

2. Suppose it was Alfredo who was killed by the responding policemen, what charges can be filed against Braulio,
Ciriaco and Domingo? Explain. (2%)

3. Suppose in the course of the robbery, before the policemen arrived, Braulio shot and killed Alfredo following a
heated disagreement on who should carry the money bags, what would be the criminal liability of Braulio,
Ciriaco and Domingo? Explain. (2%)

TITLE FOUR: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

Art. 166. Forging treasury or bank notes on other documents payable to bearer; importing, and uttering
such false or forged notes and documents. — The forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations and securities payable to bearer and the importation and uttering in connivance
with forgers or importers of such false or forged obligations or notes, shall be punished as follows:
1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000 pesos, if the document which has
been falsified, counterfeited, or altered, is an obligations or security of the United States or of the Philippines
Islands.
The word "obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands" shall be held to mean all bonds,
certificates of indebtedness, national bank notes, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for
money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States or of the Philippine Islands, and other
representatives of value, of whatever denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of the
Congress of the United States or of the Philippine Legislature.
2. By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the falsified or altered
document is a circulating note issued by any banking association duly authorized by law to issue the same.
3. By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the falsified or counterfeited
document was issued by a foreign government.
4. By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P2,000 pesos, when the forged or altered
document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign bank duly authorized therefor.
How are “forging” and “falsification” committed
• Forging is committed by giving to treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or order the
appearance of a true and genuine document.
• Falsification is committed by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means, the figures, letters,
words, or signs contained therein.
• To forge an instrument is to make false instrument intended to be passed for the genuine one.
Art. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the
following means:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or order mentioned therein, the
appearance of a true genuine document.
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2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
therein.
Forgery includes acts of falsification and acts of counterfeiting or forging said instruments.
Art. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. —
Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall
knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in
this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Elements
1. That any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another
person.
2. That the offender knows that any of those instruments is forged or falsified.
3. That he performs any of these acts –
4. Using any of such forged or falsified instruments; OR
5. Possessing with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original;
or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character
that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric
b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate
c. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them
d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
e. Altering true dates
f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning
g. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from that of the original.
h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
In case the offender is an ecclesiastical minister, the act of falsification is committed with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
A. Meaning of document and kinds of documents
[GRN 93942 September 7, 1992]
HERNANDO C. LAYNO, petitioner, vs, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12955, dated
15 June 1990, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document
defined in Article Penned by Justice Jose S. Balajadia and concurred in by Justices Romeo M. Escareal and
Cipriano.A Del Rosario.
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Briefly, the facts as found by the Sandiganbayan are as follows:
The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, on 16 March 1980, having been
elected to that position in the elections held in that year. As chief executive of the municipality, he had the
authority to appoint employees in the municipal government of Lianga.
On 16 March 1980, the petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layne, his legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of
the municipal treasurer of Lianga. He signed the appointment document-Civil Service Form No.35--twice, first as
 103

the appointing authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying "(t)hat all the required supporting papers
pursuant to MC 5, s. 1974, as amended, have been complied with, reviewed and found to be in order."
Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the Certification (Exh. "B") signed by the petitioner,
reading as follows:
"In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. LAYNO, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Lianga, Surigao del Sur at the rate of FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO PESOS
ONLY per annum (P4,632.00), effective March 16,1980. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT:
"I. He is not related to me to (sic) any person exercising immediate supervision over him within the third degree of
either consanguinity or affinity."
On the same day, i.e., 16 March 1980, Fernando Y. Layno took his oath of office with the petitioner as the
administering officer.
Thereafter, the appointment paper, together with the required supporting documents, was forwarded to the Davao
Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission and was received by the said office on 17 May 1980. On 20 May
1980, the OIC, Jorge Mindanao, acting by authority of the Commission, approved the appointment of Fernando Y.
Layne. Three (3) days later, the approved appointment was returned to the office of the petitioner.
The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he was appointed nor collected the sa lary
corresponding to it.1
On 28 September 1988, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of falsification of public
document defined in Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information reading as follows:
"That on or about March 16,1980, in the Municipality of Lianga, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the incumbent
Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in
relation to his duties, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and falsify a document or
certification, wherein said accused is legally bound to disclose the truth, by stating that a certain Fernando Y.
Layne of Lianga, Surigao del Sur is not related to him within the third degree of either consanguinity or affinity,
when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, said Fernando Y. Layno is his son, thus, making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, to the damage of the public interests.
"Contrary to law.2"
When arraigned, petitioner assisted by counsel de parte pleaded not guilty.3
At the pre-trial held on 9 February 1989, the petitioner admitted that: (1) he was the duly elected mayor of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, on the date alleged in the information; (2) that, as mayor, he had the authority to appoint
employees in the municipal government of Lianga; (3) that on 16 March 1980, he appointed Fernando Y. Layno
meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga, Surigao del Sur; and (4) that the appointee is his
legitimate son. Upon motion of the petitioner, his admission that he appointed Fernando Y. Layno was made
subject to the qualification that he later on revoked the appointment upon being advised that it was against the law
on nepotism.4
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution as well as the defense adduced their respective
evidence.
After the trial, on 15 June 1990, the Sandiganbayan as aforestated promulgated its decision5 finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document defined and penalized in Article 171,
para. graph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the dispositive portion of which reads:
'WHEREFORE, We find the amused, HERNANDO LAYNO y DE CASTRO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsifi. cation of public document defined in Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and applying in his favor the Indeterminate Sentence Law, We
impose upon him the indeterminate imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum,
and a fine of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,500.00), Philippine currency, without subsidi. ary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. No costs."6
The petitioner has interposed the present appeal, contending that;
"I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN UTTERLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL DEFENSES OF PETITIONER.
"II. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IS GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN; A VERDICT OF CONVICTION.
"III. THE SANDIGANBAYAN FAILED TO YIELD OBEDIENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."7
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight nor credence to his defense that he did not sign nor issue
the certification (Exh. B) in question. He claims that the lone witness for the prosecution, Armando R. Pandi, Jr.,
who identi fied his signature on the said certification is incompetent to testify on the matter because he admitted
during the trial that he never saw him (petitioner) actually signing (affixing) his signature on the questioned
certification. Petitioner further claims that the said witness is biased and prejudiced and that his testimony is
incredible, unreliable and undeserving of belief. He argues that Pandi did not testify voluntarily but was actually
instructed by the incumbent mayor who was his (petitioner's) political opponent for the mayorship of the
Municipality of Lianga in the laist local election and that he (Pandi) is a relative of the incumbent vice-mayor
against whom he (petitioner) has a longstanding political feud.
The petitioner's aforesaid contentions are without merit. Under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
the handwriting of a person maybe proved by any witness who "has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person." Otherwise
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stated, any witness may be called who has, by sufficient means, acquired knowledge of the general character of
the handwriting of the party whose signature is in question.8

Prosecution witness Amando R. Pandit Jr. was competent to testify on the signature of petitioner on the
certification, Exhibit "B" because in the course of his employment as municipal secretary and designated personnel
officer in the municipal government of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, he had seen records under his charge bearing the
long and short signatures of the petitioner, and, as such, he had acquired knowledge of the general character of
the handwritingof the petitioner. As aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan.
"x x x. Pandi has seen in the course of his employment in the Municipal Government of Lianga aft Municipal
Secretary since July 15,1988, and aft; designated personnel Officer from February 1, 1989, appointment records of
municipal employees and old resolutions of the Municipal Council bearing the full and abbreviated signatures of the
accused as Municipal Mayor. For this reason, he became familiar with those signatures. He could therefore identify
and did identify the full signature on the Certification, Exhibit "B", to be that of the accused.9
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the signature on the certification in question is the signature of the
petitioner was not only based on the testimony of Amando R. Pandi, Jr, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence further provides that "(e)vidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan
compared the signature on the certification with the signatures of the petitioner on documents filed with the court,
and which were proved to be genuine. Thus, the Sandiganbayan held:
"The record of this case contains documents bearing signatures of the accused which have been proved to be
genuine or treated by him to be so. We refer, among many others, to two full signatures undisputably affixed by
the accused on the appointment paper, Exhibit A, on March 16,1980, the day when the questioned signature was
made. There is no doubt that these two signatures strikingly resemble that on Exhibit B not only in general
appearance but also in the manner the illegible letters were formed. Even the accused himself reluctantly admitted
that the challenged signature 'really looks like my signature and is almost the same ......10
After making the comparison, the Sandiganbayan was satisfied and convinced that the signature on the
certification Exhibit B is truly the signature of the petitioner. The Court finds no ground or reason for disturbing
such finding or conclusion.
On the question of credibility of the witness for the prosecution Amando R. Pandi, Jr., it would suffice to state that
"the rule consistently adhered to by this Court is to give due respect to the finding of the trial court on the matter,
the latter tribunal having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesscs while testifying
and, therefore, is in a better position to properly gauge their credibility. Thus, appellate tribunals will not disturb
the findings of fact of the trial court unless there is proof that said court, in making the findings, had failed to
appreciate some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have altered the results of the case."11
Upon review of the records, the Court finds no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner also assails the Sandiganbayan in disregarding his defense that he had no obligation to disclose the truth
about his relationship with the appointee-his son Fernando Y. Layno. He argues that there is nothing in Section 49
(a) of P.D. No. 80712 which makes it a legal obligation of the appointing public official to disclose his true
relationship with the appointee in the form of a certification. He further argues that the law contemplated under
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not a prohibitory but a mandatory law, that is, a law which
requires the revelation of any relationship, either by blood or affinity, between the appointing public official and the
appointee.
Again, the petitioners aforesaid contention is devoid of merit.
In one case,13 the defendant-appellee therein was charged with falsification of a public document by
misrepresenting to the representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name was Antonio Perez, that his place
of birth was Jere, Leyte and that his citizenship was FiIipino, and by means of such misrepresentation, said
represents e of the City Treasurer (if Cebu was made to issue and write, and in fact did issue and write on the
corresponding lines of residence certificate NoA-1618529 the name of Antonio Perez, es the name of the taxpayer,
Jaro, Leyte, as his place of birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus causing it to appear that said residence
certificate No. A- 1618529 dated 7 January 1952, was issued to one Antonio Perez with place of birth at Jaro,
Leyte, and his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, his true name was Po
Giok To, his place of birth was Amoy, China, and his citizenship was Chinese. The accused moved to quash the
information on the ground that it did not allege that he (the accused) had the obligation to disclose the truth in the
document allegedly falsified. 'The trial court quashed the information. The prosecution appealed to this Court. In
resolving the appeal and reversing the trial court's judgment, this Court hold:
11x x x, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a
residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 of Commonwealth Act
465 (otherwise known as the Residence Tax Law) provides 'that the residence certificate for persons shall contain
the full name, place and date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the Philippines, length of
residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued, occupation or calling', all of which facts are
required to appear therein for the purpose of establishing the true and correct identity of the person to whom the
certificate is issued' Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued must
state to the officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely the
ministerial function of recording thereon the facts supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts given
correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3, Supra, to sign the document
 105

and affix his right hand thumbmark thereon. There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the duty to
disclose the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who issued his
residence certificate No. A-1618529; and such duty being inherent in the transaction, there was no need for the
criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty."
In another case,14 the defendant-appellant who was born a citizen of the Philippines married one Kho Cheng, a
Chinese citizen, on 6 January 1936. As a consequence of said marriage, she acquired the citizenship of her
husband, for which reason, she was registered as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration. Sometime in 1951, she
purchased a parcel of residential land from the San Francisco del Monte, Inc., as evidenced by a deed of sale which
appeared to have been acknowledged by appellant and Cipriano B. Castro, VicePresident of the San Francisco del
Monte, Inc. in the City of Manila before a notary public. The deed of sale stated inter alia that appellant was a
widow and a Filipino citizen, she having represented to the clerk who typed the deed that she was a widow. The
truth however was that her husband was then alive and that, at the time the deed of sale was executed, she was a
registered alien. The deed of sale was subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, after
which appellant was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15975 covering the lot subject of the sale.
After an investigation conducted by an agent of the AntiDummy Board, an information was filled with the court a
quo charging the appellant with the offense of falsification of public document. The trial court found the appellant
guilty as charged. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In sustaining her conviction, the appellate court
held:
x x x. In this connection, it is to be noted that alienage modifies or limits a person's capacity to act (Art. 39, new
Civil Code). For instance, Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring agricultural land.
There is, therefore, no merit in the argument that appellant did not have a legal obligation to disclose her true
citizenship, for, had she revealed the truth in the deed of sale, the same would have been a patent nullity, being in
violation of the constitutional mandate referred to above, and it would have never have been registered with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That the integrity of the document Exhibit C was thus affected by appellant's
false statement regarding, her citizenship cannot be doubted."
Furthermore, Section 54 of Act No. 496 explicitly requires that 'Every deed or voluntary instrument presented for
registration shall contain or have indorsed upon it the full name, nationality, place of residence, and the post-office
address of the grantee or other persons acquiring or claiming such interest under such instrument, and every such
instrument shall also state whether the grantee is married or unmarried, and, if married, give the name in full of
the husband or wife.' Now, it being undeniable that deed of sale, Exhibit C, was intended to beas it was a fact-
registered with the corresponding Register of Deeds, and considering that in transactions affecting registered land,
such as the one in question, the registration of the deed of conveyance is the operative act by which title is fully
conveyed to the grantee as against all parties, which was paramount in her mind to precisely achieve her ultimate
purpose, appellant could not validly claim that she was not legally obliged to reveal her civil status and citizenship
in the deed Exhibit C. Otherwise, the deed could not have been registered and a new title would not have been
issued in her favor."
The law on nepotism, as provided in Section 49(a) of PD No. 807, prohibits the appointing or recommending
authority from making any appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or in any branch
or instrumentality thereof, including government-t-owned or controlled corporations, in favor of his (appointing or
recommending authority's) relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity.15 Thus, in order to
guarantee that the law is duly observed, it is required, among others, that the appointment paper should be
accompanied by a certification of the appointing or recommending authority stating therein that he is not related to
the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although Section 49(a) of PD No. 807 does not
explicitly provide that the appointing or recommending authority shall disclose his true relationship with the
appointee in the form of a certification, nonetheless, in the light of the rulings in the aforecited cases, the legal
obligation of the appointing _r recommending authority to state the true facts required to be stated in the
certification is inherent in the law on prohibition against nepotism and the nature and purpose of such certification.
In the case at bar, since the petitioner was the appointing authority when he made the appointment in favor of his
son, Fernando T. Layno, as meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, he
had the legal obligation to disclose in the certification his true relationship with the appointee. As aptly observed by
the Solicitor General in his Memorandum "The general purpose of PD No. 807 is to'insure and promote the
constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to
provide within the public service a progressive system of personnel administration, and to adopt measures to
promote moral and the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efriciency, and professionalism in the
Civil Service.' (Section 2, PD No. 807)
"The civil service laws are designed to eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on political
considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making
appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of the
appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better government. (Meran vs. Edralin,
154 SCRA 238 [19871).
'Indeed, there are many cases wherein local elective officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found
power by appointing their own proteges, and even relatives, in violation of civil service laws and regulations.
Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts. (Mendoza vs.
Quisumbing, G.R. No. 78053, June 4, 1990, citing Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 25 SCRA 1 [19681)
"Clearly, the provision on nepotism under Section 49 of PD No. 807 was incorporated to prevent the nefarious
practice of appointing or recommending relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. And to
 106

insure that the provision on nepotism is duly observed, the appointing authority issues a certification that the
appointee is not related to him within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Otherwise, the very
purpose of the prohibition would be put to naught.
"Prosecution witness Pandi testified that the certification is one of the documents required by the Civil Service
Commission to be Aft attached to the appointment paper and without said certification, the appointment will not be
acted upon. He also testified that he knows of no appointment which has been approved by the Civil Service
Commission without the certification. (TSN, April 26, 1989, pp. 7-8)
"Even the petitioner admitted, on cross examination by the public prosecutor, that in all the years he was the
Mayor of Lianga and during which time he had been issuing appointments, he signed certifications similar to the
certification (Exhibit 'B") he issued to his son. (TSN, August 21, 1988, pp. 22-23)
"Plainly, petitioner, as the officer authorized to issue the certification, has the legal obligation be disclose the truth
as to the facts that should appear in the certification, it being inherent in the purpose of the document and in the
very nature of the prohibition.
XXXXXXxxx ,
"Had petitioner, therefore, truthfully declared that the appointee was his son, the appointment would have been
disapproved by the Civil Service Commission and he would have been prosecuted, as in fact he was in another
case, for violation of the law on nepotism."16
Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not taking into consideration his defense of lack of criminal intent to
commit the crime, as evidenced by his withdrawal of the appointment followed by his order to the municipal
treasurer not to honor the appointment of his son and not to allow him to report for work, and that he made the
appointment through oversight and ignorance of the lamp on nepotism. In other words, he contends that he acted
in good faith when he made the appointment in favor of his son,
This Court had indeed ruled that good faith is a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.17 In the present case, however, the petitioner's claim of good
faith is unavailing as it is inconsistent with his very defense that he did not sign nor issue the certification in
question. As held by the Sandiganbayan "The plea cannot be accepted. He expressly admitted that Fernando Y
Layno was his legitimate son. Nevertheless, he deliberately disregarded that fact, brazenly certifying that he was
not related to him within the third degree of consanguinity. The perversion was designed to conceal his father-son
relationship from the Civil Service Commission and thereby deceived it, as it was in fact deceived, in approving the
appointment he extended to him. The criminal intent is not only obvious, but is also presumed, from the untruthful
narration of fact. The crime of falsification having already been committed, no acts showing subsequent repentance
and abandonment of purpose, even if true, can relieve the accused of his penal liability. "18 (emphasis supplied)
Finally, the petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan failed to yield obedience to the constitutional mandate that
guilt must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt, claiming that the evidence for the prosecution is grossly
insufficient to sustain his conviction.
In Syquian vs. The People of the Philippines,19 this Court held that:
"The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by 'any
public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts: x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; x x x.'It is
settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must coricur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false (Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 162 SCRA 18.)"
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that all the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document under Article 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code are present in the case at bar.
The petitioner was a public officer20 being then the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del
Sur, when he issued on 16 March 1980 the appointment in favor of Fernando Y. Layno as a meet inspector in the
office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga. In connection with the said appointment, the petitioner taking
advantage of his official position,21 issued the certification (Exh. B)22-a public document--stating therein that he is
not related to the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity; but, as previously discussed, he
had the legal obligation to disclose his true relationship with the appointee. The facts narrated by the petitioner in
the said certification are absolutely false because the bare fact and naked truth is that the appointee Fernando Y.
Layno is his legitimate son.
Contrary, therefore, to the petitioner's pretense, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification by a public officer under Article 171, par.
4, of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.
[GRN 82197 March 13, 1989.*]
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the
crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant
Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the
preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully,
 107

unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official
communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support
the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary
which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there was such a position
existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there
was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for
1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds
therefor.
x x x [Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts
as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of
Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of
Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall
of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see
the accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary,
Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work
the following day and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then acompanied her to the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung. The Treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went
to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the
accused.
xxx
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds (C.S. Form No. 203)
dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").
x x x Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-1") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same
day. Her monthly salary was P120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October,
November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-5") She was not, however, paid. As early as October
1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In
November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the
Treasurer who told her that there was no money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at
the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed
by Atty. Efren Ambrosio, Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
papers. Thereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is
addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual
budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD
No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H-1"). Thus,
the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the
Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was
no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan,
Isabela. Ile new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for
Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 19741975, was filled-up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he
appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to
the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss
Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same
position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and
"K-1").
x x x [Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to
SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore
affirmed. Costs against the accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian.
Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and
 108

jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the
following:
A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the
absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municip[a] Mayor when he made the
allegedly falsified certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his
absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p.13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any
public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . ." It is settled
that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false [Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987,
152 SCRA 18.]
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the
municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the
certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification,
having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v.
Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the
certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by
petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service
Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v.
Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 [1908]) falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds
were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position
itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of
law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as
follows:
"Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or
combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v.
Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362).
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that "funds for the position
are available" does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the
position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year
and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor
referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that
"funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41].
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-
enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget
for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the
Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed.
Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position,
thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the
statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in
the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that
the first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the
Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the
availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the bead of office or any officer who
has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is
designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the
position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the
falsified document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People
v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on
the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been
stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or
 109

private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for
the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People
v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the
public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to
cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pecana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal
intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of
public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)],
such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown
to exist in the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings
of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions
passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for
failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan,
Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted
and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the
position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed
his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a
certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on
July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975-1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to
which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely
false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it
amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal
Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes
an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In
this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his
commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the
document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer
requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him,
in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present
when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or
preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People
v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the
certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the
case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is
totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due
process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to
present its evidence although the prosecution bad rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original
Records, p. 253, et seq.)
It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA
438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been
properly accorded due process of law:
"x x x (I)f an accused has been beard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly
process" of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. x
x x" [People v. Muit, G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73
(1946); Italics supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf
but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be
deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be
deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the
hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the
petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p.
428). In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he
was withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went
abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the
basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
 110

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
[GRN L-67472 July 3, 1987.]
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PETITION to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas
y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2) counts, with the crime of Falsification of Official Documents
allegedly committed in the following manner:
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529
"That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers being then
employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of their
official position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify x x x Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 x x x evidencing, among
others, receipt by them in their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A000064 up to A000082 of the
795th series, by then and there making alterations and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury
bills bearing SN-A000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or
concealing the loss while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077 to A-000082 of the 795th
series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities Delivery Receipt."
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938
"That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers, being then
employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, and taking advantage of
their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30,
1992, which is an official document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the Makati Branch
of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and submit to their superiors, by then and
there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or disappearance while in their custody of six
(6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with face value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities
under their custody as to volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's
report was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's report was
P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to
'Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated 3/09182' the truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills
with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the Securities Delivery Receipt
or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to
have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful
statement in a narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code."
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with
costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.
"2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
"a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio; an ordering his bail bond cancelled.
"SO ORDERED."
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the foregoing decision
in Criminal Case No. 6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities
Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work
is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department (FMD) of the Land Bank of
the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading transactions. The securities which are in the
form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Makati Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to the Securities Section, Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00
and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund Management Dept.
while the original of the same was retained by the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March
9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of
 111

P500,000.00 each, or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare
the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions and
operations of the Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure being
adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a Security Custodian,
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and
Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon
verification that Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of the
missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the
said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-
000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then
at the bottom of the SDR, Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then
upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram. When the DR
SDUC for March 29,1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with
a total face value of P610,095,000.00.
The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by carrying forward the ending balance of
the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982. However, instead of following
the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G") dated March 30, 1982 wherein
he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00 which the
latter claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series in his possession at the time of the preparation of
said report. At the bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas placed the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
(incoming) dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure "1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a
treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI
agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram, was the
one who negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the
five (5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to A000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home
Savings Bank to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the
case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, Cabigas and
Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR)
dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G
dated March 30, 1982 and for which the corresponding informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both
accused were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed Decision that "In the
case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the
alleged falsification consists of the following entries (figures) pertaining to treasury bills: '1,533', P607,095,000.00
'1,533 and 607,095,000.00' marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the
bottom portion reading, 'Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3109/82' marked as Exhibit G-2. The
numbers '1,533' and '607,095,000.00' represent the volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the
treasury bills supposedly in the custody of the Securities Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were
falsifications, the prosecution maintains, because the correct number of treasury bills deposited with the Securities
Section as of that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures were altered to '1,533 and
P607,095,000.00 respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and
that the footnote at the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written to attribute the reduction in the
number of treasury bills from '1,539' to '1,533' to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt
of March 9,1982 (Exh. C).
"The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29,1982 (Exh. F), the ending balance
on the number of treasury bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity
value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1), Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of the same treasury bills
on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be 1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value of
P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC for March 30,1982 (Exhs. "G") and G-1), the
beginning and ending balances on the number and value of treasury bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and
P607,095,000.00 maturity value.
"The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was the purpose behind them, "
"x x xx x x x x x
"By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from '1,539' and '610' to '1,533' and '607'
respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the corrected draft Cabigas
caused the document to show that the treasury bills in their custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a
total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00 By placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure '1,533' and
writing the words 'Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82' as legend of the asterisk (*) sign,
Cabigas caused to make it appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error
in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982
(Exh. C). Considering that the said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not contain any error but reflected the
number of securities received by them on that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit G and
the misleading footnote (Exh. 0-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact that the 6 treasury bills comprising
the discrepancy were lost while in their custody.
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"The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or official document, under paragraph No. 4, Article
171, of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As Securities Custodian,
Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said document the correct number and total maturity value of the
securities under his official custody as of March 30, 1982."
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-"by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
(e) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The correction of the
figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under custody is not falsification
because it was made to speak the truth (US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after the
figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the
asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the
missing 6 treasury bills were lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no
asterisk or footnote in the DR SDUC, Exh. G. In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the
loss on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor, Estela. L. Espiritu and Branch
Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive on the part of
petitioner to conceal the said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely
devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land
Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number
and total maturity value of the securities under their official custody as of a given date. It is purely optional on the
part of petitioner to use the said forms.
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because "There is nothing to show the
DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged falsification of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal
Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or is required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner
points out that as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank. The form was his own
initiative adopted 'for our own convenience and also for reference purposes.' Petitioner therefore, was not under
legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by mid DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the
alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of falsification of public document with
which he is charged. (People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333)."
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6938 is
hereby REVERSED and another one rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.
Cost de oficio.
G.R. No. L-7236 April 30, 1955
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. PO GIOK TO
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of falsification
under the following information:
That on or about the 7th day of January, 1952, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to falsify or forge a public document, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or forge a public document consisting of residence certificate No. A-1618529
issued to him in the City of Cebu, on January 7, 1952, by e representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu, to wit: by
misrepresenting to the said representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his
place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino, and by means of such misrepresentation, said
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu was made to issue and write, and in fact did issue and write, on the
corresponding lines on said residence certificate No. A-1618529 the name of Antonio Perez, as the name of the
taxpayer, Jaro, Leyte as his place of birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus causing it to appear that the said
residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated January 7, 1952, was issued to one Antonio Perez with his place of birth
as Jaro, Leyte, and with his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, his true
name is Po Giok To, his place of birth is Amoy, China, and his citizenship is Chinese.
Contrary to law.
(Appellants Brief, pp. 2-3).
The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information does not allege (1) that the accused had
the obligation to disclose the truth in the document allegedly falsified, nor (2) that the accused had the wrongful
intent to injure a third person. The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash claiming that the information alleges all
the integral elements of the offense charged as defined by the statute. The lower Court, however, found the motion
to quash meritorious and ordered the amendment of the information. Upon insistence of the City Fiscal that the
information was sufficient and that he was not in possession of any evidence that the accused made use of the
residence certificate containing the alleged false entries, the Court a quo dismissed the case without prejudice.
Hence, this appeal by the Government.
The sole issue is whether or not the information in question alleges sufficient facts to constitute the crime of
falsification of public document. The defense contends that the information is insufficient for failure to recite two
 113

alleged essential elements of the crime charged; namely, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the
truth, and wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure third persons.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the information, viz., the obligation
on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is
inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 (otherwise known as
the Residence Tax Act) provides "that the residence certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place and
date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued,
occupation or calling", all of which facts are required to appear therein for the purpose of establishing the true and
correct identity of the person to whom the certificate is issued. Needless to say, this provision implies that the
person to whom the certificate is issued must state to the officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to
appear therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts as supplied by this
person. And to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also
required by Sec. 3, supra, to sign the document and affix his right hand thumb mark thereon. There is, therefore,
no question that the accused had the duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship
to the officer or employee who issued his residence certificate No. A-1618529; and such duty being inherent in the
transaction, there was no need for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty.
Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is clear that wrongful intent on
the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document.
Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, under which provision the
accused is charged, provides as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
other kind of commercial document.
On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the crime falsification of private document, provides:
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceeding article.
The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons, first, of public documents, and secondly
of private documents, is clear; the first is committed by the mere performance of any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171; while the second is committed not only by the performance of any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Art. 171; but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was committed to
the damage of a third party or with intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated December 23, 1885, cited
by this Court in the case of People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48; i.e., that in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal
thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Our own commentators on the Revised Penal Code are also agreed on this distinction. (Francisco, Revised Penal
Code.) Sec. ed., Vol. II, Part 1, p. 301; Guevara, Comm. on the Revised Penal Code, IV Ed., P. 172; Albert,
Revised Penal Code, 1948 Ed., p. 398).
Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint of
the accused would not correspond to that of the person whose personal circumstances are recited in the certificate.
Such confusion in its records evidently operates to the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and direct result
of the criminal act charged, the accused must be presumed to have intended it.
Defendant-appellee also advances the theory that a private person can not commit the crime of falsification
charged, i. e., by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, referring to the opinion of the late Justice
Albert that "only of the eight ways of committing falsifications enumerated in Article 171, to wit, the first, the fifth,
and the sixth, are open to a private individual" (Albert, supra, p. 405); and stresses that if there had been any
falsification at all in this case, it was committed by the employee who, though innocently, wrote the allegedly
untrue facts on defendant's residence certificate. The opinion quoted plainly refers to direct falsification by a
private person, and does not contemplate situations where the accused, though a private person, becomes a
principal to the act of falsification committed by a public official or employee, by induction, cooperation, or planned
conspiracy (cf. Sent. of Tribunal Supremo of Spain of 23 Mar. 1885; 28 Apr. 1905; 28 Mar. 1893). In the present
case, although it is true that it was the employee of the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu who performed the
overt act of writing the allegedly false facts on the defendant's residence certificate, it was however, the
defendants who induced him to do so by supplying him with those facts. Consequently, the employee was
defendant's mere innocent agent in the performance of the crime charged, while defendant was a principal by
inducement.
 114

Finally, it is argued for the defendant-appellee that there being a special law with respect to residence certificates
expressly punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465), this special law, and not the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case; and since Commonwealth Act No. 465, sec. 11 punishes the
falsification of a residence certificate only when it is done "for the purpose of using the same in the payment of
revenue or in securing any exemption or privilege conferred by law", which element is not alleged in the
information, the same was properly dismissed by the lower Court. Again this contention is without merit. The fact
that Commonwealth Act No. 465 punishes the falsification of residence certificates in the cases mentioned therein
does not prevent the application of the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code on other acts of falsification
not covered by the special law, since under Art. 10 of the Rev. Penal Code, it has supplementary application to all
special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary, and Commonwealth Act No. 465 makes no
provision that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates. Then, again, section 12 of
Commonwealth Act. No. 465 penalize all other violations of the residence certificate law not covered by the
preceeding sections thereof. Which law is applicable should be determined when the case is decided on its merits.
At the present stage of the proceedings, however, it can be stated that whether the crime charged be punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, or sec. 12 Comm. Act No. 465, the information was sufficient, and its dismissal for
insufficiency by the Court below was improper and erroneous.
The order of the trial court dismissing the information filed in this case is, therefore, reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Court below for further proceedings, with costs against the defendant-appellee.
a. Introduction in evidence or use of falsified documents---last par.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Three acts punished under Article 172
1. Falsification of public, official or commercial document by a private individual
2. Falsification of private documents by any person
3. Use of falsified document
Falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position
2. That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171
3. That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document
Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172.
Elements of falsification of private document
1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraphs 7, enumerated in Article
171
2. That the falsification was committed in any private document
3. That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to
cause such damage
e. There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document. Cash vouchers are
private documents not commercial documents.
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006
LEONILA BATULANON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming
with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in
Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from
May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the
member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered.4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to
wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
 115

feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda
Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that
she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the
amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the same,
and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the
loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite
demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.5
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the
name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was
granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan,
received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the
amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo
with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn
Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus
making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by
the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after
the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check
Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it
appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said
Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and
thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal
use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that
the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the
signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same
and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused
 116

and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers9 testified that on
certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different
individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A 10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao;
on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A 11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00
thru Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982,
P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they
were not bona fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the
cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her
membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who
must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash
vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein.18
As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting
of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated
Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that
Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He
averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until
1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the
cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's
signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans
taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled.22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and
Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI
General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of
the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in
question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to
identify the other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the
entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of
Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office
after she personally released the money to them; 24 that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by
their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing
her to certify to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the
cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; 25 that she
signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that
she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity; 26 that contrary to the
testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children of regular
members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for another loan
as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative
refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court. 27 She also declared that one automatically
becomes a member when he deposits money with the cooperative. 28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from
1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been
registered since 1967.30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the
above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2
months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from
the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM,
 117

to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one
hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly
forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead
of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of
falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not
been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant
could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the
information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the
information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and
important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a
crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name
of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which
those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that
the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third
party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article
171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A,
and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it
appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive
the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao
and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case
of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the
cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers
and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of
Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was
indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-
bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was
sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was
prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is
untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are
reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide
members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible
for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed
to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the
money is collected from Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial
documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. 42
Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private
person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition
or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43
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In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in
this case was able to discharge its burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to ascertain
whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the
estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a
laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days,
and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of
private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and
made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another
pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of
falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the accused presented a document of guaranty
purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by
means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a
private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period,
which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty
the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal
Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the
range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the
aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount
of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid
by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former
once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the
complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature
in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The
records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of
Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf
of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing
untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the
proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements,
which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to
PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for
the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to
Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code
are:
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(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary
when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a
treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it
for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila
Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was
discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that
he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with
the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form
of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the
place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is,
comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x
x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or
administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as
such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the
custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter
the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted
on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for
safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by
the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks
did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control
they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his
subordinate with instructions to retain them.
xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the
funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have
seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to
hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed
to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own
use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes
no distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present
case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel
argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period
the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the
disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36
Phil., 821.)53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and
in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her
son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from
the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount
received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the
latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in
other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph
(3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed
P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification
of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify
 120

complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate
of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.
[GRN 81541 October 4, 1989.*]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, et. al.
PETITION to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 22. Togonon, J.
Pedro Caragao, complainant in Criminal Case No. 87-53321 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 22, presided over by the respondent judge, for falsification of public document, invoking
the name of the "People of the Philippines," petitions the Court for the review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, of two orders of the respondent trial court, dated July 17, 1987 and August 26, 1987. The
first order granted the defense motion to quash the information while the second denied the motion for
reconsideration of the first order.
The controversy arose from the following facts:
On September 20, 1980, the private respondents sold several parcels of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite, in
favor of Ricardo Silverio. These parcels were at that time registered in the names of the private respondents. One
of the parcels, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110942 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of
Cavite, is the subject matter of a litigation between the private respondents and Pedro Caragao and his coowners
for reconveyance and cancellation of title and damages docketed as Civil Case No. TG-493 before Branch XVIll of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Tagaytay City.
Pedro Caragao then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original of the Transfer
Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) of the parcel of land under litigation, on file in the Register of Deeds for the province of
Cavite, without the knowledge of the private respondents. Hence, the owners' (private respondents') copy of the
title in question did not bear any annotation of such notice of lis pendens.
When the private respondents sold the two parcels of land to Silverio, including the one under litigation for
reconveyance between Caragao and the private respondents, they warranted that the properties are "free from all
liens and encumbrances whatsoever." Thus the Deed of Sale states:
2. That for and in consideration of the sum of TWELVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND AND NINE
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P12,716,910.00), Philippine Currency, to be paid by the VENDEEMORTGAGOR to the
VENDOR-MORTGAGEE as specified hereunder, the latter, by these presents. do hereby SELL, TRANSFER and
CONVEY unto the VENDEE-MORTGAGOR, its heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests the above-described two (2)
parcels of land, together with all the improvements thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever.1
(italics supplied.)
On the basis of this express warranty vis-a-vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at the back of the original
of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.-110942) on file in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,
Assistant Fiscal Napoleon V. Dilao of the City of Manila filed an information for "Falsification of Public Document"
against the private respondents. The information reads in part:
That on or about the 20th day of September 1980 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, being then private persons and with intent to cause damage
to public interest,did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification on a public
document, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there making it appear that a parcel of agricultural land
situated at Malinta, Dasmariñas, Cavite identified as Lot No. 3877-A-1 and now by TCT No. T-110942 is free from
all liens and encumbrances, which is subject of a Deed of Sale With Mortgage signed and executed in favor of one
Ricardo Silverio which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Carolina L. De Guzman and entered in his
(sic) Notarial Registry As Doc. No. 89, Page 11, Book No. 111, Series of 1980, and therefore a public document, by
making it appear that the said parcel of agricultural land is "FREE FROM ALL LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES", when in
truth and in fact, it is not, as the accused fully well knew that the subject parcel of land is subject of litigation in
Civil Case No. TG493 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII of Tagaytay City for reconveyance and/or
cancellation of title and damages, as evidenced by the "Notice of Lis Pendens" at the back of said TCT No. T-
110942 under Entry No. 71086 dated August 9,1980 and acts (sic) of inscription is (on) August 11, 1980, to the
damage and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.2
Before arraignment, the private respondents, accused in the respondent trial court, filed, under date of June 17,
1987, a 'Motion To Quash" the information, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Par.
(a), See. 3, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court]. They contended "that a notice of lis pendens is not a lien or an
encumbrance within the contemplation of the law much less of the parties."3 Moreover, the "(a)ccused were not
summoned by the Register of Deeds concerning the alleged notice of lis pendens"4 despite the fact that all the
parcels of land were, at the time of the sale to Silverio, registered in the names of the private respondents,
accused in the court below.5
The respondents aver that, without their knowledge, Pedro Caragao had caused the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens at the back of the original copy of the T.C.T, of the land under litigation6 in the Register of Deeds for the
province of Cavite. They stress that their (owner's) copy of the T.C.T. in question is "clean"- did not bear any
 121

annotation of notice of lis pendens. They assure that prior to the sale, the accused did not mortgage or otherwise
encumber the said property as security for the payment of any obligation. They claim that at the time of the sale
on September 20, 1980, the accused believed that the properties being sold, including the one under litigation,
were indeed free from all liens and encumbrances as they really were.7
The court a quo, in an order dated July 17, 1987, sustained the private respondents' Motion to Quash and
dismissed the case ruling that a notice of lis pendens is not a lien or encumbrance. The court said:
The motion to quash is well-taken. A notice of lis pendens is not a lien or encumbrance under our civil law. It is a
mere cautionary notice to prospective buyers of certain property that said property is tinder litigation, and that any
sale made thereof shall be subject to the result of such litigation. It imposes no obligation on the owner, but on the
prospective buyer.
It is to be noted, also, that the clause is merely a formal statement in sales contained in notarized documents
inserted by the drafter of the deed even without any actual statement by the vendor.8
Only on August 7, 1987,9 after the issuance of the order granting the Motion to Quash, did Pedro Caragao file his
opposition. In a nutshell, he contended that the notice of lis pendens is the evidence of the lien or encumbrance on
the subject property, and not the lien or encumbrance itself charged in the information.
On August 12, 1987, Pedro Caragao moved for reconsideration of the July 17, 1987 order of quashal arguing that:
a) The Notice Of Lis Pendens Is Not The Lien Or Encumbrance Charged In The INFORMATION, But Merely An
Evidence of Such Lien Or Encumbrance.
b) The Information is clear and clear cut that The Lien Or Encumbrance Being Charged Is The Fact That "The
Subject Parcel of Land is Subject of LITIGATION in Civil Case No. TG-493 x x x as EVIDENCED by the Notice of Lis
Pendens'x x x"
c) Litigation is both an encumbrance and hen on the property being litigated. d) Ignorance of the law excuses no
one. c) Damage to a third person is NOT an element in falsification of a public document."10
The lower court in an order dated August 26,1987, denied the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration,
hence, this petition,
Before us now, the petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF TCT NO. T-
110942 IS THE VERY LIEN OR INCUMBRANCE (sic) CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, WHEN IN FACT, SAID
ANNOTATION IS MERELY AN EVIDENCE OF PENDING LITIGATION AND IT IS THE PROPERTY'S STATUS OF BEING A
LITIGATED PROPERTY THAT IS THE LIEN OR ENCUMBRANCE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
II
RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT
ON THE GROUND THAT "FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE." BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE
SUBSTITUTED THE PLAIN RECITALS OF THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING SUCH
RECITALS WITH HIS ERRONEOUS OPINION AND INAPPLICABLE AND IRRELEVANT DOCTRINES.11
Even, if we disregard the semantics of the private prosecutor's first submission, it has no merit nonetheless.
Central to the controversy in this case is the issue as to whether or not a notice of lis pendens is a lien or
encumbrance within the contemplation of criminal law, in particular, the crime of falsification of public document. If
so, then the private respondents would have committed falsification because they stated in paragraph 2 of the
deed of sale they executed in favor of Ricardo Silverio, that the real properties they sold were "free from all liens
and encumbrances" although a notice of lis pendens is annotated at the back of the T.C.T. of one parcel.
The meaning, nature, recording, and effects of a notice of lis pendens are clearly stated in the Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 14, Section 24, thus:
SEC. 24. Notice of lis pendens.-In an action affecting the title or the right of possession ofreal property, the
plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative
relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterwards, may record in the office of the registrar of deeds of the
province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby.
From the time only of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or incumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper
showing that notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit12 or a pending litigation while a notice of lis
pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning
that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over the said property.13 It is but a signal to the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or
beware and to investigate the prospect or nonprospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his money.
Notice of Lis pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed of, to protect the real rights of the
registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly
recorded, and remains uncancelled, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it
during the litigation.
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"[T]he doctrine of Lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to
keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or the decree shall have
been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered
abortive and impossible of execution."14
The lower court is therefore correct in ruling that a notice of Lis pendens being a mere cautionary notice to a
prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation, then it imposes no obligation on the owner, but
on the prospective buyer. It cannot conceivably be the "lien or encumbrance" contemplated by law.
On the other hand, a "lien" is a charge on property usually for the payment of some debt or obligation.15 A "lien"
is a qualified right or a proprietary interest, which may be exercised over the property of another. It is a right
which the law gives to have a debt satisfied out of a particular thing.16 It signifies a legal claim or charge on
property, either real or personal, as a collateral or security for the payment of some debt or obligation.
Similarly, an "encumbrance is a burden upon land, depreciative of its value, such as a lien, easement, or servitude,
which, though adverse to (the) interest of (the) landowner, does not conflict with his conveyance of (the) land in
fee."17
The following are considered encumbrances: A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and binding real property;
e.g., a mortgage, judgment lien, lease, security interest, easement or right of way, accrued and unpaid taxes.18 A
lien is already an existing burden or charge on the property while a notice of lis pendens, as the very term
connotes, is only a notice or warning that a claim or possible charge on the property is pending determination by
the court.
Consequently, the effect of a notice of lis pendens is not to establish an actual lien on the property affected. All
that it does is to give notice to third persons and to the whole world that any interest they may acquire in the
property pending litigation will be subject to the eventuality or result of the suit. It follows to reason, therefore,
that the mere failure to state in a public document, as a notarized deed of sale, the existence of a notice of lis
pendens does not constitute falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
specially true in the case at bar because the notice of lis pendens is annotated only at the back of the original of
the T.C.T. in the Registry of Deeds; it does not appear at the back of the owner's copy of the same T.C.T.
The petitioner has taken the semantic stance that the notice of lis pendens is not the lien or encumbrance charged
in the information but that it is merely an evidence of such litigation. In sum, the petitioner claims that the status
of being a litigated property is the very lien or encumbrance that is charged in the information.
The petitioner's sophistry stretches the legal meaning of lien and encumbrance too far to be tenable. Be that as it
may, not all claims against a property can be considered a lien within the contemplation of law. First, such claims
must be in satisfaction of some debt or performance of an act under a contract. Second, the legal right to enforce
such payment or performance of an act be anchored on an existing or demandable obligation and not merely
dependent upon the result of a pending litigation where the claims of the parties are not yet finally determined.
Such claims in a pending litigation only ripen to a "lien" within the contemplation of law when there is already a
valid judgment rendered because then it becomes a judgment or judicial lien.
The fact that the property is contested or under litigation does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that the
complainant or petitioner has a better legal right than the respondents so as to enable the former to enforce a lien
thereon. That is exactly the reason for a notice of lis pendensto warn those who may subsequently deal with the
property to take cognizance of the conflicting rights between the parties.
In fine, a notice of lis pendens, or a pending litigation, or the fact that the property is under litigation is not within
the purview of what is legally considered a lien or encumbrance. The term notice of lis pendens is a distinct
concept, as differentiated from the term lien or encumbrance. The trial court, therefore, committed no reversible
error in granting the private respondents' Motion to Quash, and thereby dismissing the information against them.
The issue raised by the Solicitor General and the private respondents that there is a patent lack of authority on the
private prosecution to file this petition or even to move for reconsideration of the lower court's order granting the
Motion to Quash is well-taken. But there is no need to dwell on that point further considering that the foregoing
disquisition, without more, sufficiently disposes of the petition.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by respondent court, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and
the two challenged orders, dated July 17,1987 and August 26,1987, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
a. Presumption as to material author of falsification
G.R.No.62634. June26,1992.
ADOLFO CAUBANG, petitioner, us. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
This is a petition filed by the accused Adolfo Caubang to review the Court of Appeals decision which affirmed in toto
his conviction of the crime of falsification of a public document punished under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2. At the time Caubang was charged with committing the
crime, he was the incumbent mayor of Baganga, Davao Oriental.
The information charging him with the offense alleged:
"That on or about the 15th day of January, 1975, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of falsification on a
Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the Bagangs Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedcring Services, Inc., which is a
public and/or official document identified as Document No. 95, Page No. 15, Book No. 27, Series of 1975 of the
Notary Public Justo Agtarap of the City of Manila, by then and there forging, falsifying and simulating, or causing to
be forged, falsified and simulated the signature of the treasurer thereof, Baltazar Pagaduan, appearing on the
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lower, right hand portion of the said document, thus making it appear, as it did appear, that the said document
was made, prepared and signed by the said Baltazar Pagaduan, thereby attributing to the latter particiPation and
intervention in the making and preparation of said document by signing his name and affixing his signature thereon
when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said Baltazar Pagaduan did not so participate, neither
did he authorize the herein accused or anybody else to prepare and sign tKe same.' (See RTC decision, pp. i and ii
in Rollo, p. 51)
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
"That in 1954, the accused and hi, brother, Melquiades Caubang, Florencio Teves and Teodoro Diaz organized a
stevedoring service in Davao Oriental called the Biinganga Mutual Association. This was operating without permit
from the Bureau of Customs since its establishment.
"In 1966, Solomon Baja also organized the East Coast Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc., also in Davao Oriental.
Baltazar Pagaduan was one of the members thereof who was its manager since 1967.
"In 1974, the Collector of Customs at Mati, Davao, suggested that the two arrastre companies merge into one.
Following the suggestion, the respective officials of both organizations entered into a merger agreement with the
signing of a document to that effect (See Exh. A-1). Thereafter, they drew up and signed the Articles of
Incorporation (Exh. H) of a new merged organization which they called the Banganga Consolidated Arrastre
Stevedoring Services, Inc. Baltazar Pagaduen was elected Treasurer of the merged corporation and he executed
and signed his Treasurer's Affidavit (Exh. H-1).
After the execution of the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. H) and the Treasnirer's Affidavit (Exh. H-1), the accused
brought to Manila these papers, as well as the sum of P2,500.00 on the paid-up capital and P500.00 for filing fees,
for the registration of the new corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for short). During
the process of its registration in Manila, the accused accomplished and signed an information sheet (Exh. Q and an
undertaking to change the corporate name in the event that another person, firm or entity has acquired a prior
right to use the same or one similar to it (Exh. D). He also wrote at the bottom of Exhibit D a promise to submit
the TAN (Tax Account Number) of his brother, Melquiades (should be Clemente) Caubang now marked Exhibit D-1.
On the 15th day of January, 1975, the corporation was registered with the SEC which issued a Certificate of
Registration (Exh. B-1). The Certificate of Registration (Exh. B-1), together with the letter of transmittal (Exh. F-1),
was received by the accused who brought and hand-ca"ied the same to Davao Oriental.
Disputed is the authorship of the forgery of the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan, marked Exhibit B-2-a, found in the
Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the Banganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc., marked
Exhibit B-2, which was submitted to the SEC as required by SEC as a pre-requisite to the registration of the new
corporation." (RTC decision, p. iii in Rollo, p. 51)
The plaintiff-appellee, People of the Philippines, admits that the officials of the two arrastre companies originally
agreed to a the East Coast Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc. (ECASSI). It notes that the BMA which was partly
owned by petitioner had been operating without a business permit since 1957, a fact explicitly admitted by
petitioner in a letter to the Social Security System for exemption from coverage by the system in the years prior to
1967. (Exhibit "0," Table of Exhibits, p. 37)
Thereafter, or on December 18, 1974, the officials of both arrastre companies executed the Articles of
Incorporation for the newly-formed Banganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Incorporated (BCASSI)
and elected Baltazar Pagaduan, as Treasurer, who then accomplished a Treasurer's Affidavit. For failure to receive
P500.00 as initial payment of sub. scription from each of the incorporators except Solomon Baia and himself,
Pagaduan claimed to have announced to the rest of them namely, Melquiades Caubang, Clemente Caubang and
Federico Teves, that the merger will not push through (See Rollo, p. 44; TSN, August 16,1976, p. 23) Pagaduan
said that he left the Treasurer's Affidavit, which he signed, with the accused. He was surprised to learn more than a
month after he signed the affidavit, or in February 1975, that the proposed merger was already registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He also learned that he had supposedly executed and signed a
Statement of Assets and Liabilities on February 15, 1975 before a notary public who was not known to him.
The bulk of the evidence for the prosecution consists of testimonies of Pagaduan, Solomon Baja, and the persons
who received for processing the incorporation papers in the SEC, namely, Juana Jularbal and Atty. Bernardo
Espejo. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused-petitioner was the person who had possession and
use of the papers for incorporation including the questioned Statement of Assets and Liabilities.
For his part, the accused-appellant denies having been the one who personally went to and handed over the
documents before the SEC. This, notwithstanding his statement that since he frequently travelled to Manila on
official business, the incorporators requested and authorized him to file the Articles of Incorporation and the
Treaqurer's Affidavit, and to present the P2,600.00 paid-up capital for registration of the newly-formed company
with the SEC. The following is his own narration of events:
"5. Because petitioner frequently travelled to Manila on official business, the incorporators requested him to
register the articles of incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner agreed and brought
the papers to Manila on January 14, 1975. His associate Luis Granados, who had been previously notified by his
son of his coming, met him at Avenue Hotel at (sic) Manila. Because he had to attend to official matters of his
municipality in the Department of Local Governments, petitioner entrusted the filing of the articles of incorporation
to Granados to whom he gave P2,500.00 representing the paid-up capital of the corporation, plus expense money.
6. In the afternoon of January 14, 1975, Tuesday, Granados went to the SEC to register the articles. While there
he negotiated with a fixer named 'Pete' who agreed to rile the articles for a fee of P300, but who, after consultation
with an SEC clerk, found that certain papers were lacking. Pete thereupon typed the general information sheet and
ar, undertaking to change the name of the corporation should there be any already registered with that name
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placing thereat the name of petitioner as 'authorized representative' after Granados told him that the president,
Clemente Caubang, was not available but that his brother, the petitioner, was in town. Pete asked for the TAN of
Clemente Caubang but since Granados did not have it with him, he returned to Avenue Hotel with the papers
prepared by Pete. Late in the afternoon, he met the petitioner and after showing him the additional papers
prepared by Pete, petitioner signed them. Petitioner did not have with him the TAN of Clemente Caubang but
nevertheless wrote on the undertaking to change the corporate name that the TAN will be submitted upon the filing
of the by-laws of the corporation.
7. On January 15,1976, Wednesday, Granados returned to the SEC and gave the papers to Pete. The articles were
riled by Pete who thereupon got the agreed fee of P300 from Granados. Pete then followed-up the papers in the
SEC while Granados waited outside upon the advice of Pete. Later, Pete fetched him to appear before a lady
employee at the SEC to whom he presented the P2,500 paid-up capital of the corporation. After counting the
money, the lady returned it to Granados. Then Pete told him to return on the following Friday, January 17, 1975.
8. On the agreed day, Pete gave Granados an envelope full of papers and told him that the articles were already
registered. Granados left and returned to the hotel where he found the petitioner. He gave him the papers saying
they were already approved.
9. As it now appears, the SEC approved the articles of incorporation of the merged companies on January 16,
1975. Among the papers filed with the SEC was the statement of assets and liabilities of BCASS that the company
had total assets in the form of cash in the amount of P2,600 and liabilities to shareholders in the same amount.
The statement was signed by Balta;iar Pagaduan as Treasurer and sworn to before Notary Public Justo Agtarap of
Manila on January 15, 1975.
10. Claiming that the signature on the statement of assets and liabilities was not his, Pagaduan then filed with the
Department of Justice a complaint for forgery of his signature against the petitioner. Solomon Baja also
commenced against petitioner the following complaints:
a. With the SEC for cancellation ofthe registration ofBaganga Consolidated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.;
b. With the Department of Local Governments;
c. With the Office of the Secretary of National Defense; and
d. With the Office of the President; in his efforts to unseat petitioner as; mayor of Baganga, Davao Oriental and to
put out of business the arrastre company of his (Adolfo's) brother, Melquiades Caubang. During this period, all
local elective officials were undergoing performance audit and the President had declared that officials with pending
charges will be removed from office. The charges were given wide publicity in the radio and newspapers circulating
in Mindanao. Significantly, after Baja signed the articles of incorporation of BCASS, Inc., he nevertheless continued
to operate his former stevedoring company." (Rollo, pp. 16-20)
On July 31, 1978, the trial court found the accused petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a
public document and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay: (1) a fine of P3,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
at the rate of P8.00 a day but not exceeding one-third of the Principal penalty, and (2) the costs. The court also
allowed him a credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence to the extent of four-fifths.
On August 7, 1978, petitioner filed a notice to appeal the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision finding no grounds for its reversal.
Hence, this petition where the following issues are raised:
"1. Whether or not the exception to the general rule and not the general rule itself on the findings of the trial court
on credibility of witnesses being binding on the appellate court, is to be applied in this case where the guilt of the
accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as laid down in People v. Peruelo, 78 OG No. 16, pp.
2024,2031;
2. Whether or not the exception to the general rule, and not the general rule itself on the finality of findings of fact
by the Court of Appeals, is applicable and must govern in this case where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are:
a) Contrary to the established fact, as decided in Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 642, 650-651, and, therefore, should be
reversed by this Court;
b) Overlooked matters of substance in the evaluation of the evidence, as held in Lim Yhi Luya v. Court of Appeals
and Hind Sugar Company, 78 OG No. 25, pp. 3208, 3229 or misinter. preted the significance of some fact or
circumstance, as held in People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 472, and, therefore, should be reversed by this Court.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction for halsification of the official
document in question where the entries therein are not absolutely false and no damage was caused to the
government or third parties, and in the absence of criminal intent, contrary to the ruling in Beradio v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 77 O.G. No. 48, pp. 6315, 6327." (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
After an in depth examination of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that there is strong evidence that
leaves no doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
The first two questions raised by petitioner pertain to one and the same issue of the correctness or propriety of the
factual findings of the court, including the finding on credibility of witnesses. The Court restates that the credibility
of witnesses who testified in court becomes a matter of great significance in order to determine whether or not the
degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met. (People v. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587 [1991])
It is a well-settled rule, however, that appellate courts generally will not disturb, but instead uphold and respect
the factual findings of the trial court which had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their
deportment as well as the manner of testifying during the trial, and which was in a better position to decide the
 125

case. (People v. De Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 (1990); People v. Arbolante, G.R. No. 96713, October 17, 1991; People v.
Caraig, G.R. No. 91162, October 3, 1991; People v. Aguiling, G.R. No. 91662, March 11, 1992) Moreover, the juris.
diction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law and
not errors of fact. (Bernardo de los Santos v. Faustino B. Reyes, at al., L45027, January 27, 1992) This doctrine
will not apply only where, as alleged in the case at bar, the judge has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (People v. Javier, 183 SCRA 702 (19901; People
v. Belibet, supra) As will be seen later, the court did not overlook rhaterial points as to avoid application of the
general rule.
Contrary to the submission of petitioner, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court and the
respondent appellate court are sufficient to establish the fact that the accused-petitioner was responsible for the
falsification of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. (Exhibit "B-2," Table of Exhibits, p. 5)
The Court found that the following papers were submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
the registration of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. (BCASSI): (1) the Articles of
Incorporation (Exhibit "H," Table of Exhibits, p. 15); (2) Treasurer's Affidavit (Exhibit "A," ibid, p. 1); and (3) the
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (Exhibit "B-2," ibid., p. 6).
Additionally, the following were also submitted and made part of the records; (1) a General Information Sheet
(Exhibit "C," ibid., p. 9) on which appears the signature of petitioner as the one who certified the truthfulness of
the data placed therein; and (2) a typewritten letter also signed by the accused expressing willingness to change
the corporate name in case of a prior registrant bearing the same or a similar name (Exhibit "D," ibid., p. 10) on
which there was a handwritten promise to submit the Tax Account N umber (TAN) of one of the incorporators,
Clemente Caubang. At the trial, the petitioner admitted having affixed his signature on Exhibits "C" and "D."
The records also reveal the report of SEC Examiner Juana Jularbal dated January 15, 1975 on which she declared
that:
"I have made a physical count of the paid-up capital of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedoring Services,
Inc. in the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS, P2,500.00 presented by Mr. Adolfo Caubang as
representative of the corporation x x x." (See Exhibit "E,"Table of Exhibits, p. 11)
Petitioner himself states that he came to Manila from Baganga, Davao on January 14, 1975 bringing with him only
the Articles of Incorporation, the Treasurer's Affidavit, and the cash amount of P2,500 paid-up capital. He did not
mention the Statement of Assets and Liabilities to be among those carried by him for purposes of registration.
Despite this, the records show that there was on file a copy of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities executed on
January 16, 1975 and notarized on the same date by a notary public in Manila, Atty. Justo Agtarap, and bearing a
signature purporting to be that of Baltazar Pagaduan. The signature appears to be written in crooked strokes. A
comparison of that signature to those sample signatures of Pagaduan appearing in Exhibit "L" on page 32 of the
Table of Exhibits, on the Treasurer's Affidavit and on the Articles of Incorporation proves that it is not genuine nor
authentic. Considering that the accused-petitioner acted as the representative of the new corporation to file the
documents and that the named-officers were in Davao in January 1975, it was physically impossible for Pagaduan
to have signed the statement and subscribed it before Atty. Agtarap in Manila.
The fact that accused-petitioner did not carry with him the statement throws open the question of how that
document came into being and who caused its execution.
Having represented himself to be the authorized person to register the company, it logically follows that petitioner
had knowledge about the existence of the document, which along with Exhibits "C" and "D," was an equally
important requirement for the registration of a corporation. Thus, it behooved upon the accused-petitioner to shad
light or, the sudden appearance of the spurious document.
Instead, the petitioner insists on his own version that it was some other person, i.e., a fixer named Pete who
personally appeared before the SEC in all stages of the process for a fee until the claiming of the certificate of
registration. He alleges that Pete finished the registration upon agreement with Luis Granados, from whom the
petitioner asked for assistance.
The arguments of the petitioner are mere denials which, if weighed against documentary evidence as well as the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Ms. Jularbal and Atty. Espejo of the SEC, do not lay down a convincing
ground to reverse the respondent court's decision.
The main thrust of the petitioner's arguments refers to the inapplicability to this case of the presumption of law
that a person who is found in possession of a forged document and who used the same is the forger thereof. He
attempts to englighten the Court by relating some intervening circumstances to disprove his possible knowledge or
interference in the making of the Statement of Asseta and Liabilities prior to the submission of the latter to the
SEC.
The petitioner states that the trial court admitted in its decision the failure of prosecution witness, Juana Jularbal,
to identify the accused as the one who presented the P2,500.00 cash. Non-identification of the accused as the
presenter allegedly defeats the evicience or a report naming him to be the one.
A careful reading of the decision, however, reveals that the trial court did not actually make such an admission.
After comparing the testimony of defense witness Luis Granados and that of Jularbal, the trial court gave credence
to the latter's testimony. Granados testified that he was the one who gave the money to Jularbal. The court
distinctly noted, however, that Granados' testimony "lacks detail as to keep the court wondering on how Juama
Jularbal could have known the name of Adolfo Caubang as the representative of the registrant corporation to
enable her to put this fact in Exhibit'E.'" (RTC decision, P. xiii in Rollo, p. 51) The defense theory, therefore, is not
in accord with human experience.
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Thus, the absence of contradictory evidence the trial court correctly based its judgment on the factual statement
appearing in Exhibit "E," i.e., that the P2,500.00 was presented by Adolfo Caubang as the authorized
representative.
The petitioner denies having signed Exhibit "D" (or the typewritten undertaking to change the corporate name with
a written promise to give Clemente Caubang's TAN) in the presence of Atty. Espejo.
He alleges that he accomplished it in his hotel room on January 14, 1975 upon being asked by Granados to do so.
He also states that there was no written evidence in Exhibit "D" to indicate that he signed in the office of Atty.
Espejo.
The vacillations of Atty. Espejo did not make him an unreliable witness. The Court has held several times that
inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not dispel the credibility of the witness (People v.
Sabellano, 198 SCRA 196 (19911; People v. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538 [19911).
The Court has earlier ruled that:
"The most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic
credibility. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the veracity and testimony on material points." (People v. Belibet,
supm, at page 592)
The material facts pointing to the accused-petitioner as the one who accomplished and signed Exhibit "D,"
wherever he may have done so, remains undisputed. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to prove his active
participation in the completion of the registration requirements.
The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court erred in fmcling that it was he who followed up the
registration of the Articles of Incorporation with the SEC. The respondent court, he alleges, overlooked the fact that
he gave the Articles of Incorporation, the Treasurer's Affidavit and the cash of P2,500.00 to Granados on January
14,1975. From that time on, he never saw the papers again, except for Exhibits C. and "D," until the completion of
the process. It was allegedly the fixer who took charge of the registration in order to expedite it. He denies having
received and signed the letter transmitting the certificate of incorporation (Exhibit "F," Table of Exhibits, p. 13) and
the Certificate of Incorporation dated January 15, 1975.
The Court finds that the accused-petitioner has consistently made use of the fixer as a necessary character to block
the possibility of his having gone to the SEC. The petitioner not only had to use the person of Luis Granados but
also a third person whose shadowy character and shady occupation do not help at all to convince us of the veracity
of the defense theory.
There was no way of verifying the existence of the fixer in the defense version. It is quite likely that no fixer in his
right mind would audaciously volunteer to disclose his true identity in court and testify that he acted as such.
Whatever the reason for the non-production of this key participant, utilizing a fixer as part of the scenario becomes
a convenient ploy to divert the mind of the court from the more plausible inference that the accused-petitioner
engineered the spurious statement of assets and liabilities.
Even assuming that the defense story was true and such that the accused-petitioner could not have been the one
who personally received the letter of transmittal and the certificate of incorporation, the circumstances point to the
vital fact that being the real authorized representative, any representations made at his own instance by another
before the SEC and for the newly-formed corporation, were absolutely made on behalf of the accused Adolfo
Caubang.
The principle of estoppel in pais is made applicable to the situation wherein the accused, either by himself or
through another person made a representation by submitting a supposedly validly executed statement of assets
and liabilities to form part of the registration requirements, and thereafter, by receiving the certificate of
incorporation and the letter transmitting the certificate of incorporation. The accused acted in a manner as to make
the SEC believe that the person transacting was duly authorized to do so and was faithfully complying with the
lawful requirements of the agency.
The presumptionjuris et dejure: that whenever a party has by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot in a
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it-more appropriately solves the
disparity between the factual narrations of the defense as well as those of the prosecution.
Even if the allegation that some other person filed and followed up the registration papers was true, the
accusedpetitioner would still be subjected to the same conclusion.
It is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution "would not always have the means for obtaining
such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely." (Koh Tieck Heng v. People, 192 SCRA 533 at 546
[1990]) This is the reason why the court a quo and the respondent appellate court had to rely on circumstantial
evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Esparcia, 187 SCRA 282 [19901)
The version of facts as presented and proven by the People deserves more credence for being in consonance with
human experience and normal conduct and for being based on documentary evidence admitted by the accused-
petitioner. (People v. Aguiling, supra)
Having been the one responsible for the filing of the registration papers, including the means he felt necessary to
accomplish the registradon, the accused must likewise be accountable therefor. As the authorized representative
he is deemed to have been the one in custody or possession, or at least the one who has gotten hold even for a
short while, of the papers which included the statement of assets and liabilities. That he knew of the execution of
the statement is a possibility not too difficult to imagine under the circumstances.
We are satisfied that the court a quo and the respondent court did not err in relying upon the presumption that the
possessor and user of a falsified document is presumed to be the forger thereof (People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA
 127

120 [19781; People v. Caragao, 30 SCRA 993 [19691; Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 688 (19671; Dava v.
People, G.R. No. 73905, September 30, 1991).
The evidence conclusively shows that the statement of assets and liabilities was not among those brought by the
petitioner from Davao to Manila. The statement was not an authentic representation of the assets and liabilities of
the BCASSI. It was surreptitiously signed by someone who imitated the signaure of Balta, ar Pagaduan. Indeed, no
forger could ever do this in the open.
Forgery could easily be consummated only by the forger alone or in the confidence of persons in connivance with
him.
The filing of the previously inexistent document subjects the accused-petitioner to the inference that he used it as
part of the registration papers. In the absence of a credible and satisfactory explanation of how the document
came into being and then filed with the SEC, the accused is presumed to be the forger of the signature of
Pagaduan, and the one who prepared doubtful information on the financial status of the proposed corporation
(People v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906 (1935]).
The Court has similarly ruled in United States v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453 [19061 regarding the utterance of a check:
"The utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the
utterer either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken together with
the further evidence set out xxx and brought out on the trial of the case establishes the guilt of the accused with
which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (At p. 455; italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the filing of the statement of assets and liabilities remained unexplained. This fact, together
with other proofs presented by the prosecution, is strong evidence tending to show that the accused Adolfo
Caubang either himself forged the statement or caused it to be forged by someone else. Worthy of note is the
willingness of the accused to accomplish all that were necessary to acquire a certificate of incorporation.
Contrary to the denials of the accused, the Court upholds the finding that "he was the one, or through someone
else as he claimed, who received the Certificate of Registration (Exhibit "6") from the SEC and who brought it home
to Davao" (RTC decision, page x in Rollo, p. 51). We find no reason to believe the assertion that the respondent
appellate court erred in relying on the factual determination by the trial court.
The petitioner contends that there were absolutely no false entries in the statement of assets and liabilities as to
make its execution injurious or damaging to the government or third parties. The claim is without merit.
In the falsification of a public document such as Exhibit "B2," it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth
therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited.
The ruling in Beradio v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 567 [19811, alleged by petitioner to be applicable is not
binding in the instant case. In that case, the official document involved was a time record, the accomplishment of
which was for the purpose of proving rendition of service in the interest of the public. The reason why the Court
ruled that there was no damage to the government was because under the facts proven, the time record had
already served its purpose. The time record could thereafter be set aside for being worthless. Moreover, the
submission of a time record was not strictly required of election registrars as a matter of legal obligation, but only
for administrative procedural convenience.
The Court, however, did not fail to distinguish a time record from other public documents "with continuing interest
affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified." (Beradio v. Court of Appeals,
supra, p. 584)
This is not to say that Exhibit "B-2" is a public document the falsification of which must have the effect of damage
that must first be proven.
The Court is of the view that mere falsification by forging the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan as to cause it to
appear that Pagaduan has participated in the execution of Exhibit 'T-2," when he did not in fact so participate,
makes the accusedpetitioner criminally liable. In a crime of falsification of a public or official document, the
principal thing punished is the "violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed." (People v. Pecans, 47 Phil. 48 [19241; People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 (1955]; Sarep v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440 [19891) Thus, intent to gain or to injure is immaterial. Even more so, the gain or
damage is not necessary.
The petitioner states that the respondent appellate court erred in finding that the merger, through which the new
corporation was formed, did not materialize. It is unfortunate that petitioner gravely misunderstood not only the
manner by which the respondent court presented the facts, but also their simple meaning. In quoting the narration
prepared by the prosecution, the appellate court did not additionaIly indicate nor give the impression that the
merger did not push through.
The quotation, as again quoted by petitioner, related that:
. x x x [Me (referring to Pagaduan) told the subscribers that the merger will not push through." (Rollo, p. 30)
In his last attempt to dwell on prevarications, the petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses, Baltazar Pagaduan
and Solomon Baj a had an ulterior motive to destroy his integrity by instituting the charge of falsification against
him. He stated that Baja, his political rival for mayoralty at that time, was inclined to unseat him as mayor.
The Court finds this an effort to befuddle what has been established by the evidence on record. The respondent
court correctly ignored the infusion of political or partisan matters where the evidence was found to be wrong to
convict the accused-petitioner of falsification beyond reasonable doubt. The questions raised we fattual. We see no
reason to deviate from the usual respect accorded to factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for absence of reversible error on the part of the respondent court.
The appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 128

[GRN 68203 September 13, 1989.*]

METUROGAN L. SAREP, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
APPEAL from the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Escareal, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, appeals from the decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, dated 3 April 1984, in Criminal
Case No. 4273, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Meturogan Sarep y Lucman," convicting him of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph
4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. The information, originally filed before the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, charged petitioner with the crime of Falsification of Official Document,
committed as follows:
"That on or about December 30, 1977, or sometime prior thereto, in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then employed as Soil Technologist II under the
Bureau of Soils, Region XII, Cotabato City, with a Temporary Appointment, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take without permission from the records of said Office the appointment paper proposed in his
name dated January 19, 1976, which appointment paper was replaced due to an incorrect entry, by another one
bearing the same date; and the accused once in possession of said appointment paper, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously change, alter and falsify the date, figures and words written thereon, thus changing its
meaning and attributing to the person who caused the preparation of the same, statements other than those in
fact made by him; that the falsification and alteration were committed for the purpose of converting the Temporary
Status of his appointment to a Permanent Status, and which accused succeeded by having said falsified
appointment paper attested by the Civil Service Commission in Manila without the knowledge of the Civil Service
Commission, Region XII, who has the jurisdiction and authority to attest appointments under Regional XII."2
From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, petitioner appealed to this Court, after his motion for reconsideration
was denied by respondent court on 9 May 1984.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 19 January 1976, Director Kundo Pahm. of the Bureau of Soils, Region XII, extended an appointment in favor of
Meturogen L. Sarep (herein petitioner) to the position of Soil Technologist II (Exh. "C"). After signing the
appointment paper, Pahm noticed an error in the item on civil service eligibility. The entry therein read "First Grade
Unassembled" instead of "Unassembled Examination" which was the appropriate eligibility for the position of Soil
Technologist; whereupon, Director Pahm called the attention of the acting personnel officer, Usman Salic, to the
error and directed him to prepare another appointment paper (Exh. "B") which Pahm signed after noting the
correction made by the personnel officer. The appointment was approved by the Assistant Regional Director of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) as "temporary."
Sarep's appointment was renewed on 23 May 1977 (Exh. "A") to expire on 1 April 1978 and, just like his 1976
appointment, the same was approved as "temporary" by the CSC Regional Office.
In March 1978, Director Pahm decided not to renew petitioner's appointment since the latter was not performing
the duties of his position. Petitioner was accordingly informed of the director's decision. Three (3) days later, Pahm
was surprised to receive a xerox copy of Sarep's appointment paper dated 30 December 1976 (Exh. "C") with
erasures and superim-positions thereon, which was approved by the CSC Central Office in Manila as "permanent."
When asked by Pahm to produce the original copy of the appointment paper, petitioner refused to do so.
Consequently, Pahm went to the regional office of the Civil Service Commission to verify and he was advised to file
a petition to recall or cancel Sarep's appointment (Exh, "C") which he did, by forwarding to the CSC Central Office
in Manila a "Petition for Recall and/or Withdrawal and Cancel Supposed Permanent Appointment of Mr. Meturogan
L. Sarep, Soil Technologist II, Lanao del Sur Soil District Office."
On 21 December 1978, an Information for Falsification of Official Document was filed against Sarep before the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, which was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 596. The case was later
transferred to respondent Sandiganbayan pursuant to the lower court's Order dated 25 September 1981.
After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the now assailed decision, the dispositive part of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Meturogan Sarep y Lucman GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal in the offense of Falsification of Public Documents through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and
penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being present the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, hereby sentences him to suffer the straight
penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) MONTHS, to pay a fine of P500.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of this action."3
As earlier mentioned, petitioner appealed the said decision on the sole assignment of error.
"THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED OF [sic] CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR FALSIFICATION THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE."4
It is petitioner's submission that, based on the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, there is no
evidence which proves that he caused the erasures, alterations and intercalations on Exh. "C" for which he was
found guilty of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence. He points to the personnel officer,
Usman Salic, or the latter's subordinates, as responsible for the erasures and alterations in said appointment
paper. He likewise asserts that Director Kundo Pahm should also be held responsible. In support of this assertion,
he quotes a portion of the cross examination of witness Pahm, to wit:
"ATTY. ORENCIA:
 129

QNow it appears in Exhibit I that there is an erasure above the typewritten words December 30, 1976 which
erasure can be read as February ... which the month could be read as February; Do you still insist that this Exhibit
C was dated January 19, 1976?
AYes air, of course when I first signed it.
ATTY. ORENCIA:
May we respectfully request that the erasure above the words December 30 which reads February be encircled and
be marked as Exhibit I -a.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Mark it.
JUSTICE MOLINA:
QThe word that was originally printed was February and another superimposed to it?
AYes sir, below December 30 which is also the date appearing in Exhibit C, Your Honor.
XXX
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
QWhy did you not cancel the document when you found out that there was something wrong with it?
AI trusted the personnel officer and that he will be the one, Your Honor.
QSine [sic) the document bears your signature, you should have crossed your signature out?
AMay be that was my fault, Your Honor."5
Petitioner thus claims that the appointment paper (Exhibit "C") already bore the erasures, alterations and
intercalations even before Pahm signed it.
Petitioner also contends that the following elements of the crime charged under paragraph 4, Article 171, of the.
Revised Penal Code, are absent in the case:
1. The offender makes in a document false statement in a narration of facts;
2. He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
3. The person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts narrated by him.
Petitioner submits that he is not a public officer who is in charge of preparing appointments of the employees in the
agency; that he had no participation or intervention in the preparation of his appointment paper nor held it in
custody in an official capacity. Moreover, petitioner argues that granting, for the sake of argument, but not
admitting, that he did falsify the questioned document, no third person had been damaged thereby. He also points
out that the alleged falsified document bears the correct item number and appropriate civil service eligibility.
Hence, there is no falsification. He cites the case of U.S. vs. Lino Reyes, in which:
"It was ruled that there can be no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the
defendant maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injuring third person."6
Finally, petitioner invokes good faith in his defense. He claims that after the personnel officer handed him the
questioned document, which bore the erasures and alterations as well as the Director's signature, he brought it to
the Civil Service Commission in Manila upon suggestion and with the permission of the personnel officer.
The petition is without merit.
The core of petitioner's arguments is based on the testimony of witness Kundo Pahm, earlier quoted. Petitioner
makes capital of the testimony of Director Pahm that the latter signed Exhibit "C" even if he already noticed the
mistake in the stated eligibility. However, an analysis and examination of the same testimony and that of witness
Usman Salic, the personnel officer, would show that Exhibit "C" was precisely discarded or cancelled after Director
Pahm had inadvertently signed it before noticing the mistake in the entry on civil service eligibility only. On the
other hand, petitioner's citation of the testimonies of both Kundo Pahm and Usman Salic disproves his contention
that both officers are to be blamed for the falsification. Both officers categorically stated that Exhibit "C" was
replaced by another appointment paper (Exh. "B") which was duly approved by the CSC Regional Office in Cotabato
City. It is clear that Exhibit "C" was the cancelled appointment paper that was missing but later found in the
possession of petitioner already bearing erasures, alterations and superimpositions. Consider the following
testimonies:
1. Kundo Pahm:
'FISCAL FERRER:
What did you do then with this Exhibit C after the preparation of Exhibit B which was approved by the Civil Service
Commission?
AWhen I noticed after going over for the second time, I called my personnel officer to prepare another one because
of that term which I requested him to make another one because it is not appropriate term.
FISCAL FERRER:
QDid you ever ask the cancellation of this Exhibit C by your personnel officer?
ATTY ORENCIA:
Objection, leading.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL: Reform.
FISCAL FERRER:
QWhat was your instruction if any for your personnel officer for him to do with respect to this Exhibit C because
Exhibit B was prepared with the proper correction?
AI just gave that back to him and being a personnel officer I presume he knows his functions."7
xxx
2. Usman Salic:
 130

QMeantime with the approval of this Exhibit B what did you do with Exhibit C which you were asked by the director
to cancel?
AThis is the appointment which I was looking for because it was lost.
QWhere did you keep this Exhibit C after you were advised by the director to prepare another appointment for Mr.
Sarep?
AI kept it in my drawer.
QAfter you kept this Exhibit C inside. I withdraw that question.
QWhat is your purpose any way in keeping this Exhibit C inside your drawer when there was already another
appointment for Mr. Sarep?
AMy purpose there is to cancel that. The only mistake I committed there was, I was not able to cancel it right
away.
QThereafter or in the following days months did you try to cancel this Exhibit C?
AI was not able to cancel it because it was already lost.
QWhen for the first time did you notice that this was already missing, Exhibit C?
AI noticed after I prepared the second appointment."8
The Court does not accept petitioner's defense of good faith. He admitted that he knew that Director Pahm. was
not only uninclined to extend him a permanent appointment due to his lack of civil service eligibility but he also did
not authorize him (Sarep) to follow up his appointment with the Civil Service Commission in Manila. More
importantly, he knew that if the falsified document had been presented before the CSC Regional Office, it would
have surely been attested as temporary only. Hence, he purposely avoided filing the appointment paper with the
CSC Regional Office, which is the practice and standard procedure in the regional office of the Bureau of Soils and,
instead, personally brought it to Manila where somehow he was able to have it stamped approved as permanent.
The Court also rejects Sarep's argument that there is no falsification, as the alleged falsified document bears the
correct item number and appropriate eligibility. We agree with the respondent court that "(I)t is falsification, and
not a correction, which the law punishes (People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324; Arriola vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 730)."
Likewise, "(I)n the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 23,
1886, cited in People vs. Pecana, 47 Phil. 56)."9
Since petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document that was found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. Petitioner has failed to convince the
Court that a person other than himself made the erasures, alterations and superimpositions on the questioned
appointment paper (Exh. "C',).
The Sandiganbayan in qualifying the offense and arriving at the penalty imposed on the petitioner held:
"We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since
he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer
(Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position,
then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G.
2937, People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
"Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle
way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act
committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone
to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered
by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although
such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L-19660, May 24,
1966).
"Consequently, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused herein should be that as provided for in the first
paragraph of Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the penalty prescribed for any person who by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional would constitute a grave felony, to wit: arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Accused is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender (Page 38, Record). No other modifying circumstance appears proven on the
record."10
The Court finds no reversible error in the Sandiganbayan's decision finding petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, guilty of
the crime of falsification of public document through reckless im. prudence. However, the penalty imposed should
be imprisonment of THREE MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO ONE YEAR, SEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS, instead of
imprisonment of THREE MONTHS under the appealed decision, since the period of the penalty imposed, i.e., arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period is four months and one day to four years
and two months reduced by appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, except as modified with respect to the penalty, the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
KOH TIECK HENG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.1990 December 212nd DivisionG.R. Nos. 48535-36D E C I S I O N
 131

This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16246-47-CR 1
which affirmed the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 15006 and
15007 convicting herein accused-petitioner of estafa and attempted estafa, respectively.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by respondent court are as follows:
"From the evidence extant on the record, the following facts appear undisputed: That accused Koh Tieck Heng,
alias Tomas P. Flores opened Savings Account No. 26580, with the Security Bank and Trust Company, Escolta St.,
Manila, hereinafter called SBTC in short, with an initial deposit of P500.00, made on 21 Feb. 1973, for which he
was given a pass book in his name of Tomas P. Flores (see Exh. C). He made a second deposit of P400.00 then a
withdrawal of P500.00 then a deposit of P775.00, and then a withdrawal of P1,000.00 (Entries on Exh. C).

"On 13 March (sic, August) accused went to SBTC and filled up or accomplished and signed a deposit slip (Exh. B)
for a deposit of P18,060.00 in check. With the deposit slip, he submitted to Urbana Ramos de Ferrer, Teller No. 2 of
SBTC, his pass book (Exh. C) and a Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973
(Exh. A) for P18,060.00, appearing to have been signed and issued by `F. Dycaico', who was then maintaining with
the Philippine Bank of Communications, hereinafter referred also as PBC, a checking account No. 13360. This check
was signed and indorsed by the accused. Upon deposit of this check for P18,060.00, the said sum was posted in
the pass book (Exh. C), as shown in Exhibit C-1. (T.s.n., pp. 5-15, Oct. 10, 1973, hearing).
"On 16 August 1973, the accused withdrew from this Savings Account No. 26580, the sum of P10,000.00 upon
submission to Margarita Tiongson, Teller No. 3, of a withdrawal slip (Exh. E) accomplished and signed by him. Such
withdrawal was posted in the pass book (Exh. C), shown by Exhibit C-2. Upon receipt of the amount withdrawn,
the teller caused the accused to sign at the back of the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit E-1.
On the next day, 17 August 1973, the accused withdrew another amount of P5,500.00 upon defendant's
submission to Teller No. 3 of a withdrawal slip (Exh. F) and the pass book. The withdrawal was posted in the pass
book as shown by Exhibit C-3. Upon receipt of the sum withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the
back of the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit F-1. (T.s.n., pp. 21-30; 32-39, id.).
"On 18 August 1973, the accused went again to the SBTC to deposit another Philippine Bank of Communications
Check No. U-186414 (Exh. H), dated 11 August 1973 for P18,060.00 which appears to be signed by 'F. Dycaico'
against Checking Account No. 13360. Accused, therefore, filled up and accomplished a deposit slip (Exh. I) for
P18,060.00. After accomplishing Exhibit I, accused submitted the check (Exh. H), the pass book (Exh. C) and the
deposit slip (Exh. I) to Candida Abella Villanueva, Teller No. 5. The deposit of P18,060.00 was thus posted at the
pass book (Exh. C), as shown by Exh. C-4 (T.s.n., pp. 60-70, Id.).
"Sometime in that month of August 1973, Florencio Dycaico, who maintains the Checking Account No. 13360 with
the Philippine Bank of Communications saw his Statement of Account and came upon an amount of P18,060.00
debited against his account. He complained to the PBC that he never issued a check for that much. With this
information PBC informed SBTC that the check, Exh. A, was a spurious check. So, SBTC officials instructed their
bank tellers to watch for Tomas P. Flores. NBI agent Mamerto Espartero was also assigned to crack down on check
forgers or passers in company with an informer, at the premises of SBTC, in coordination with SBTC officials
(T.s.n., pp. 3-7, 12, 16-17, Nov. 12, 1973, hearing).
"Then, came the pay off. The accused appeared in the SBTC premises on 22 August 1973. He filled up,
accomplished and signed a withdrawal slip (Exh. K) for P15,500.00, and after that he submitted his passbook (Exh.
C) with the withdrawal slip to Maria Victoria Soriano, SBTC Teller No. 7. Forewarned to watch for the accused
Tomas P. Flores, she asked the accused to sign his name in Exh. K, and he did sign it as requested. He signed his
name of Koh Tieck Heng (See Exh. K-3). After that, Teller No. 7 brought the slip and the pass book of Tomas P.
Flores. Teller No. 7 returned to her cage and then called up for Tomas P. Flores. The accused went to Teller No. 7.
Teller No. 7 asked the accused to sign his name at the back, and which signature is marked Exh. K-2. After he
signed Exh. K-2, the NBI agent Espartero swooped down on the accused and apprehended him. The accused was
brought inside the Cashier's Office. He was interviewed and then later brought to the NBI office where he was
investigated. In the course of his investigation, he executed a written statement now marked Exh. M. (T.s.n., pp.
3-20, Oct. 22, 1973, hearing)." 2
Based on the facts narrated, appellant Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores, was charged in
Criminal Case No. 15006 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII, with the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document in an information which reads:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between August 13, 1973 and August 17, 1973, inclusive, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, identity
and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to defraud, commit acts of falsification on a commercial document in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, after opening a savings account with the Security Bank and Trust Company,
under Savings Account No. 26580 in the name of Tomas P. Flores, and having somehow illegally obtained
possession of Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated July 14, 1973, pay to cash, in the
amount of P225.00, issued by F. DYCAICO, and therefore a commercial document, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify and/or cause to be forged and falsified the aforesaid check by then and
there erasing and altering and/or causing to be erased and altered the date and amount of said check and
superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original date and amount of said check the following: 'Aug.
9' after the printed word 'MANILA', the figures '73' after the figures '19', the figures 'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P'
and the words 'Eighteen Thousand Sixty Only' after the printed word 'PESOS', thus causing it to appear as it did
appear that said check was issued on August 9, 1973, for the amount of P18,060.00, when in truth and in fact as
 132

the said accused well knew, the correct date of said check is July 14, 1973, and the real amount of the check so
drawn and issued by said F. DYCAICO is only for P225.00, thereby making or causing to be made alterations and
changes in a genuine document which altered or changed its meaning: that once the aforesaid check had been
forged and falsified, altered or otherwise changed in the manner above set forth, said accused affixed the signature
Tomas P. Flores at the back thereof and deposited said check in his account with the Security Bank and Trust
Company, Escolta Branch, this City, which check was cleared by the Philippine Bank of Communications upon
presentation thereof believing that said check is genuine; and thereafter, said accused, with intent to defraud,
withdrew from said account the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,500.00 on August 16, 1973 and August 17, 1973
respectively, or a total of P15,500.00, which amount, once in his possession, said accused misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Security Bank
and Trust Company and/or the Philippine Bank of Communications in the aforesaid amount of P15,500.00,
Philippine currency." 3
On the same date, appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 15007 with attempted estafa thru falsification
of a commercial document before the same court under the following information:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between August 18, 1973 and `August 22, 1973, inclusive, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a depositor of the Security Bank and Trust Company,
Escolta Branch, this City, under Savings Account No. 26580, conspiring and confederating together with one whose
true name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, with intent to
defraud, commenced the commission of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document directly by
overt acts, to wit: the said accused having somehow obtained possession of Philippine Bank of Communications
Check No. U-186414, dated August 11, 1973, pay to cash, in the amount of P2,030.00 issued by F. DYCAICO, and
therefore a commercial document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify and or
cause to be forged and falsified the aforesaid check by then and there erasing and altering and/or causing to be
erased and altered the amount of said check and superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original
amount of said check the figures 'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P' and the words 'Eighteen Thousand Sixty Only' after
the printed word 'Pesos', thus causing it to appear, as in fact it did appear, that said check was issued for the
amount of P18,060.00, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew, the correct and real amount of the
check so drawn and issued by said F. DYCAICO is only for P2,030.00 thereby making or causing to be made
alterations and changes in a genuine document which altered or changed its meaning; that once the aforesaid
check had been forged and falsified, altered or otherwise changed in the manner above set forth, said accused
affixed the signature Tomas P. Flores at the back of said check and deposited the same in his account with the
Security Bank and Trust Company, the latter believing that said check is genuine, accepted the same for deposit,
and thereafter, the said accused with intent to defraud, accomplished a withdrawal slip for the sum of P15,500.00
and presented the same to the teller of the Security Bank and Trust Company for the purpose of withdrawing the
said amount, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime
of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, by the timely discovery made by the officials and/or employees of said bank of the forgery and
falsification made on the aforesaid check before payment could be made which led then and there to the
apprehension of said accused." 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in both cases, which were subsequently ordered consolidated. In his
defense at the trial, and later adopted for the same purpose in his brief, appellant claims:
"That on August 9, 1973, he went to the Supersonic Auto Supply, situated at the corner of España and P. Leoncio
Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. He went there to buy auto spare parts as he is engaged in the buying and selling of auto
spare parts. When he was at this store, a person whom accused claimed to know later as Jimmy Go, was also
buying tires. The store did not have tires for sale, and so the tire salesman pointed to the accused as one who is
selling such stuff. So, this man went to the accused and asked him if he had tires for sale. Accused asked the man
who introduced himself to the accused as Jimmy Go, how many tires he needed. This man told the accused he
needed twenty-four (24) pieces of tires. Accused told this `Jimmy Go' that he had the 24 tires but that he needed
cash. Accused told `Jimmy Go' that he does not accept checks for payment, especially he did not know him.
Accused claims that was the first time he had met this man 'Jimmy Go'. 'Jimmy Go', however, told the accused that
he can issue the check and he can deliver the tires only after having encashed the same. To this proposition, the
accused agreed.
'Jimmy Go', therefore, brought out a check, now Exh. A, and then signed it in his presence. He signed the name 'F.
Dycaico'. He then crossed the check at the upper left hand corner of the check. Accused claims that except the
signature and the lines used to cross the check as aforementioned all the other handwritten portions of the check
were already there when 'Jimmy Go' signed it.
"After signing Exh. A, 'Jimmy Go' handed it to the accused. Seeing the amount to be big, as the cost price of the 24
pieces of tires was only about P3,000.00, more or less, the accused told, 'Jimmy Go' that he has no cash to return
for the difference. 'Jimmy Go' told him to just deliver the difference after he has encashed it. So the accused got
the check and they parted.
"He claimed he went to the SBTC on 13 August 1973 as he deposited the check (Exh. A) in his bank account
(passbook, Exh. C), filling up therefor a deposit slip (Exh. B.). The accused claimed that on 13 August 1973, he
went to withdraw P10,000.00, accomplishing Exh. E. After withdrawing P10,000.00, the accused went to España
St. and delivered to 'Jimmy Go' the P10,000.00.
He delivered the tires in the afternoon. On that same day, 'Jimmy Go' told the accused that he needed the balance
of the money and so he said that he delivered the balance of P5,500.00 on 16 August 1973. On this date, 16 Aug.
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1973, as per his claim, 'Jimmy Go' again delivered to him another check (Exh. H) as 'Jimmy Go' was buying
another fifty (50) pieces of tires. So, he took the check and deposited it with SBTC on his account (passbook, Exh.
C). He claims he could not get the proceeds of the checks because at the time he was withdrawing from his
deposit, two men approached him and immediately handcuffed him" 5
On November 26, 1973 the trial court rendered judgment 6 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felonies charged in both cases, the decretal portion of its decision reading as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finding the guilt of the accused for the crime charged
in both cases (No. 15006 and 15007) to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and there being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances to affect his penal liability, hereby imposes upon the accused and
sentences him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case. No. 15006
an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and
to indemnify the Security Bank and Trust Company the sum of P18,060.00, sans subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 15007
an indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional as maximum, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 and to suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, but in no case
shall it exceed one-third (1/3) of the term of the sentence nor shall it continue for more than one year, and to pay
the costs.
"The accused shall first serve the sentence imposed in Crim. Case No. 15006, to which shall be credited four-fifths
(4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED." 7
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner interposed an appeal with respondent Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-
G.R. No. 16246-47-Cr. Respondent court, in a decision promulgated on September 26, 1977, affirmed the
judgment of conviction but modified the penalties in both cases as follows:
"In Criminal Case No. 15006
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
of the law; to indemnify the Security Bank and Trust Company in the sum of P18,060.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs; and
In Criminal Case No. 15007
to suffer the penalty of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
"The Accused shall first serve the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 15006 and shall be credited with the term
of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6127.
SO ORDERED." 8
Culled from the submissions of both parties in the present appeal and the established facts of these cases, the
issues raised and submitted for determination by us may be synthesized into whether or not respondent court
erred
(1) In supposedly changing the tenor and or nature of the accusation and convicting appellant on the basis of this
new accusation without having informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation;
(2) In holding that there is a crime of attempted estafa and convicting appellant of such crime in the absence of
the essential elements of deceit and damage; and
(3) In arriving at a conclusion of guilt of the crimes of attempted estafa and estafa, both thru falsification of
commercial documents, on the basis merely of a presumption of law, despite the absence of evidence showing that
appellant committed, or had knowledge of, the crimes charged, in violation of the constitutional presumption of
innocence and doctrinal jurisprudence on proof beyond reasonable doubt in favor of appellant.
Parenthetically, this petition for review on certiorari was formerly denied in a Resolution of this Court, dated August
18, 1978, 9 but was later on given due course on a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial, 10 based
inter alia, on an alleged letter of one Jimmy Go dated August 14, 1978, which appellant supposedly received on
August 21, 1978 and which he claims he could not have discovered and produced during the trial of the cases
despite diligent efforts to produce the same. Mere zerox copies of the supposed letter and the mailing envelope
were appended to said motion.
We do not, however, deem it proper to include the aforesaid matter in the issues above enumerated considering
that the requirement in the 1964 Rules of Court 11 , which was then in force, to the effect that a motion for new
trial must be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, has not
been complied with; and (b) the judgment of conviction will not in any way be affected by such evidence the
authenticity and credibility whereof have not been established, aside from the obvious fact that the tenor thereof is
inherently improbable and such a letter could easily be concocted.
Coming now to the first issue, appellant alleges that there is a variance between the allegations in the information
and the evidence adduced, thereby depriving him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
The rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information is based
upon the right to be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him. 12 However, respondent
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court exhaustively discussed this issue and lucidly explained the facts upon which its judgment of conviction was
predicated, thus:
"It is a fact that under the two informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the Accused is that of having
erased and altered the dates and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing or causing to be
superimposed over the original dates and amount of said checks other dates and amounts, thereby making
alterations and changes in genuine documents which changed their meaning. Clearly, therefore, the offense
charged is that penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code.
"It is to be noted, however, that presented in evidence by the prosecution for the First Case were two checks,
Exhs. 'A' and `O', which both bear the identical Check No. U-186378 but the former bears the amount of P225.00,
while the latter that of P18,060.00, both drawn and issued by 'F. Dycaico'. For the Second Case, two checks were
likewise presented, Exhs. 'H' and 'P' which bear the identical Check No. U-186414, but the former bears the
amount of P2,030.00 while the latter that of P18,060.00, both drawn and issued by 'F. Dycaico'.
"Prosecution witness, Florencio Dycaico, admitted that he issued the checks, Exhs. 'O' and 'P', in the amounts of
P225.00 and P2,030.00 respectively, but denied having issued at all the checks, Exhibits 'A' and 'H', both in the
respective amounts of P18,060.00.
"It has to be conceded, therefore, as alleged by the defense, and likewise admitted by the People, that considering
the evidence adduced, there were no erasures nor alterations nor superimpositions as alleged in both Informations,
but that Exhibits 'A' and 'H' were forgeries in toto. In other words, while the Accused has been charged of Estafa
and Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 in relation to Article 171,
paragraph 6 the Revised Penal Code, reading
'Art. 171. . . . shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
'6. Making any alterations or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning,'
based on the evidence, the accusation would fall under either paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 171 of the same Code
which reads:
'1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
'2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.'
"Be that as it may, as pointed out by the State, the aforementioned variance affects solely the charge of
Falsification, of which the Accused should not have been convicted under the time-honored rule that an Accused
should be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, with respect to the charges of Estafa and Attempted Estafa, respectively, (complexed under the two
Informations with Falsification of a Commercial Document) conviction would still be proper, the two essential
requisites of Estafa, namely fraud or deceit and damage to another, having been charged and proven." 13
On the second issue, appellant contends that respondent court erred in convicting him of attempted estafa in
Criminal Case No. 15007 when it admitted in its decision that appellant was not able to withdraw the value of the
second check as he was apprehended in the act of withdrawing the same.
From this, he argues that having failed to withdraw the sum as part value of the second check, no amount
whatsoever was taken by him, hence no damage or prejudice was suffered by the bank. Absent such damage, he
concludes, he can not be convicted of attempted estafa.
This is specious argumentation.
Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and
competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established. 14 Deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury. 15 The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question (Exhibits "A" and
"H") and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying to
withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified said Exhibits "A"
and "H". Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, 16 in the absence
of proof thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of
the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason
of his own spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the
amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court
correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
Lastly, appellant insists that there is no evidence whatsoever pointing to him as the person who falsified the two
checks in question (Exhs. "A" and "H"), as the prosecution failed to refute his version regarding the circumstances
under which he allegedly took possession of the said checks. He further posits the view that while the courts may
apply the presumptions of law in some cases, the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is
presumed to be the forger does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt and can not be applied in his case,
allegedly because the provisions not only of the Constitution but also of the Rules of Court must be the basis of the
judgment.
We disagree.
While it may appear that the prosecution failed to directly contradict the claim of appellant as to how he came into
possession of the two checks, it is understandable that the prosecution would not always have the means for
obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely.
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Undoubtedly, too, as a general rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted by anyone, should
control the decision of the court. Where, however, there is such an inherent improbability in the testimony or
theory of the witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting
testimony. We agree with respondent court that the People's version of the facts deserves more credence and it is
more in consonance with human experience.
As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible
source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and
probable as to make it easy to believe. 17 No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the
testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 18 As bewailed
by the court below, the theory espoused by appellant "is taxing too much the credulity of this Court, an insult to
the humble intelligence and the common sense of this Court." 19
The checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") were undeniably spurious, or were forgeries in toto. Prosecution
witness Florencio Dycaico categorically testified that he did not issue said checks but only those checks in the
amount of P225.00 and P2,030.00 (Exhibits "O" and "P"). The disclaimer by Dycaico of his alleged signatures on
the aforesaid checks is prima facie evidence of falsification and consequently shifts the burden of evidence to
appellant to prove otherwise, but which burden appellant has not discharged.
The court a quo, as well as respondent court, posed the question as to the identity of the forger, and we are
satisfied that both courts did not err in relying upon the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is
presumed to be the author thereof. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such
person is the forger.
20 The petitioner has been shown to have been the possessor and utterer of the two checks (Exhibits "A" and "H")
when he made use of and benefited therefrom by his withdrawals of and attempt to withdraw funds through said
checks. The circumstance, therefore, that appellant made use of and benefited from the falsified document is a
strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified, 21 he being criminally
responsible in either case. 22 Since appellant is the only person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of
the document that was found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification.
23
It is thus apparent that the refusal of respondent Court of Appeals to give credence to the theory of the defense is
substantially supported by the ambient circumstances and the evidence on record. Besides, this being a petition for
review on certiorari of a decision of respondent court rendered in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over the decision of the trial court, said decision of respondent court is "final", subject only to our power of review
on questions of law. 24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
b. Bank Checks are commercial documents
G.R. Nos. L-30012-30015 March 9, 1929
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. JOSEPH L. WILSON, ET AL.
The defendant Alfredo Dolores was accused with Joseph L. Wilson in criminal cases Nos. 35408 (G. R. No. 30012),
35426 (G. R. No. 30013), and 35447 (G. R. No. 30014) of the crimes of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch,
estafa through falsification of mercantile document, and falsification of a mercantile document, respectively. In the
information filed in the criminal case No. 35408, it is alleged that "on or about the 26th day of September, 1927, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused being then employees of the San Carlos Milling Company, a
business from doing business in this city, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, falsify a cable or telegraphic
dispatch, to wit: a cablegram in the following manner: the said accused, taking advantage of their positions as
employees of the aforesaid San Carlos Milling Company of which Alfred D. Cooper was then the manager, prepared
and caused to be prepared on the front page of a cablegram form used by the Commercial Pacific Cable Co., of said
city, the following code cablegram:
SCARLOSCO HONOLULU
WYSUXMOOJL.
which, deciphered, reads as follows:
SCARLOSCO — San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.
HONOLULU — Honolulu
WYSUX — Deposit Irving Bank — Columbia Trust Co., New York for account China Banking Corporation, Manila, account San Carlos Milling
Co., Ltd., $———; instruct Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co., advise Manila of deposit by cable.
MOOJL — 100,000
and wrote on the back thereof in typewriter at the space provided for the name and address of the sender the following:
ALFRED D. COOPER
By (Sgd.) ALFREDO DOLORES
227 David, Manila
thereby causing it to appear that the above-mentioned cablegraphic message was prepared and sent by and under
the authority and with the knowledge and consent of Alfred D. Cooper, then manager of the San Carlos Milling
Company wherein the said accused were then employed, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused very well
knew, the said Alfred D. Cooper never authorized, nor had any knowledge of, nor gave his permission to the
preparation and sending of the said cablegraphic message; that the said accused, once having forged and falsified
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the above- mentioned cablegraphic message in the manner above described, presented the same to the office of
the Commercial Pacific Cable Company for the due transmission.
The information filed in criminal case No. 35426 charges that "on or about September 29, 1927, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the above named defendants, who were then employees or clerks of a mercantile
concern known as "San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.," duly organized in this locality, with grave abuse of confidence and
with the intention to defraud and prejudice said institution and the local banking institution known as "Bank of the
Philippine Islands," acting upon a common agreement, and cooperating with each other and conspiring together,
falsified a mercantile document, to wit, a check against the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the sum of two
hundred thousand pesos by forging and simulating at the bottom and in the indorsement of said check the
signatures of Newland Baldwin, Manager of the San Carlos Milling Co., Inc., and falsely causing it to appear that
said Newland Baldwin intervened in said check, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such intervention, so
that the aforesaid check, once falsified, reads as follows:
No. A-352046
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
OFFICIAL DEPOSITORY OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
MANILA, P. I., September 29, 1927
Pay to San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., or order Pesos Two Hundred Thousand & 00/100 only (P200,000), Philippine
currency.
SAN CARLOS MILLING CO., LTD.
By NEWLAND BALDWIN
For Agent
that once said check was falsified, prepared, and drawn as above stated, the said accused, containing the collusion
and conspiracy plotted by them, presented it for payment to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, falsely and
fraudulently stating and representing to said bank and its officers that the check was authentic and duly signed by
Newland Baldwin, manager of said company, San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., in the ordinary course of its business, the
accused herein having succeeded, through said falsification and deceitful representations, in collecting the amount
of the check aforesaid in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, to wit, two hundred pesos (P200,000), which said
defendants misappropriated and converted to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
institutions, to wit, the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, in the aforesaid sum of
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), Philippine currency, equivalent to 1,000,000 pesetas.
The information filed in the criminal case No. 35477 reads as follows:
That on or about September 28, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above named defendants, who
were then employees or clerks of a mercantile concern known as San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., of this locality, with
grave abuse of confidence and with the intention to prejudice said institution, acting upon a common agreement
and cooperating with each other and conspiring together, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify, in a
mercantile document, to wit, the "Manager's Check" No. 17444 of the China Banking Corporation, of September
28, 1927, is issued in favor of the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., for the sum of two hundred thousand and one pesos
(P200,001), the signature of one Newland Baldwin, Manager of said San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., by forging,
simulating, and imitating it in the indorsement on the back of said document, and falsely causing it to appear in
said indorsement that Newland Baldwin intervened therein, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such
intervention, so that, once falsified, said indorsement reads as follows:
For deposit only with Bank of the Philippine Islands, to credit of account of San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.,
By NEWLAND BALDWIN
For Agent
Upon being arraigned on the above-quoted informations, the defendant Alfredo Dolores pleaded not guilty and,
upon motion by the prosecution, and with the conformity of the attorneys for the defense, a joint trial of the
above-mentioned cases with respect to the defendant Alfredo Dolores was had.
The trial court found the defendant Alfredo A, Dolores guilty as principal, by direct participation and in conspiracy
with Joseph L. Wilson, of the crimes alleged in the informations filed in criminal cases Nos. 35408, 35426 and
35447, and sentenced him in a criminal case No. 35408, for the crime of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch with
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine months, and eleven days
of prision correccional, to the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the
proceedings; in criminal case No. 35426, for the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document, to
eight years of presidio mayor, to the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the
proceedings; and in criminal case No. 35447, for the crime of falsification of a mercantile document, with the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine months, and eleven days of
prision correccional, to pay a fine of 12,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the
corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings. From these judgment the
defendant Dolores appealed.
The evidence fully sustains the findings of the court below and leaves no doubt whatever as to the appellant's guilt,
but his counsel insists that the court erred (1) in holding that "in preparing and in sending the false cablegram,
Exhibit A (case No. 35408), as well as in preparing and in negotiating the check no less false, Exhibit C (case No.
35426) and in later collecting its value, and in likewise preparing the false commercial documents, Exhibits A and
B, of the criminal case No. 35447, it was the idea of the said accused to benefit himself and damage another," and
(2) in holding that the defendant Alfredo Dolores wanted to defraud and damage or, more correctly, defrauded and
damaged the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
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Under the first assignment of error, counsel argues that the defendant Dolores did nothing but carry out the orders
of his superior, Joseph L. Wilson, and that he, consequently, is exempt from criminal responsibility. This argument
is entirely groundless. In order to work exemption from criminal responsibility for obeying the orders of a superior,
it must be shown that the person who gives the order and the person who executes it acting within the limitations
prescribed by law. That is not the case here. In his brief, the Attorney-General well and truly says:
The evidence of record clearly shows that the defendant Alfredo Dolores took direct part in, and cooperated with
his codefendant Joseph L. Wilson by means of acts prior to, and simultaneous with, the perpetration of the crimes
in question. He cooperated in the drafting of the checks and other documents for the falsification of which he is
now prosecuted, and he was the one who cashed said check and withdrew the money from the bank. He
furthermore received from Joseph L. Wilson the sum of P10,000 as his share in the embezzled amount. It cannot
be maintained, therefore, that Alfredo Dolores merely obeyed his superiors, and that he was not informed of the
fact that his codefendant, Joseph L. Wilson intended to embezzle said money.
Moreover, the behavior of the defendant Alfredo Dolores subsequent to the commission of the crimes in question
clearly shows his guilt. It is proven that after the withdrawal of the amount of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, he was seen in secret conversation with Joseph L. Wilson in Calle Herran, Paco; that from that
day he had been hiding from the authorities; that he had registered at the Plaza Hotel under the name of Jose Gil;
that he went to Sorsogon and Albay, where he represented himself as Patricio Lopez; that in Albay he attempted to
Board a foreign vessel, but did not succeed in his attempt. The flight of a person after the commission of an
offense, while it does not constitute a presumption of guilt, is nevertheless a circumstance indicative of his guilt (U.
S. vs Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486; U. S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil., 618).
The second assignment of error evidently relates to case G. R. No. 30013 (estafa through falsification of a
mercantile document) and requires no refutation. The conspirators carried away P200,001, and, of course,
someone suffered the loss. Whether the loss fell on the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., or on the Bank of the Philippine
Islands is immaterial; it is sufficient that it was sustained by a person or persons, other than the perpetrators of
the crime. It is to be observed that the trial court, at the request of the interested parties, made no
pronouncement as to the indemnity and that, therefore, the civil responsibility is not involved in the cases before
us.
The judgment appealed from are affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Malversation through falsification of public document
G.R. Nos. L-41265 and L-41266 July 27, 1934
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. JOSE BARBAS
In these two cases the defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros with the crime of
malversation of public funds through the falsification of public documents. In case No. 8857 (G. R. No. 41265) it
was alleged:
Que en o hacia el mes de abril de 1932, en el Municipio de Sagay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, Islas Filipinas, el
acusado arriba nombrado siendo un delegado especial del tesorero provincial de esta Provincia para la venta de
cedula personal y por razon de su cargo era responsable de los fondos publicos que tuviere en su poder recibio de
Marciano Salazar la cantidad de P2 como pago de la cedula personal de dicho Marciano Salazar correspondiente al
año 1932 y el acusado con abuso de su cargo entrego a dicho Marciano Salazar el duplicado de la Cedula F No.
1061367 falsificado antes, en al singuiente forma: Que el original de dicha cedula fue expedido a Patricio
Fernandez y en dicho original asi como en el duplicado aparecia el nombre de Patricio Fernandez despues de las
palabras impresas. "This certifies that"; que el acusado con el objeto de poder recibir la cantidad de P2 de Marciano
Salazar, con abuso de au cargo borro en el duplicado de la cedula No. 1061367, el nombre de Patricio Fernandez
que aparece despues de las palabras "This certifies that", y en su lugar escribio y puso el nombre de Marciano
Salazar, y una vez conseguida de dicho Marciano Salazar la cantidad de P2, voluntaria e ilegalmente se apropio
para su uso y beneficio de dicha suma en dafio y perjuicio de la Provincia de Negros Occidental y del Municipio de
Sagay.
The information in case No. 8859 (G. R. No. 41266), except as to the names, reads the same as the one quoted
above.
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found the defendant guilty of estafa through the falsification of public
documents, and sentenced him in each case to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than six months and
one day of prision correccional and not more than ten years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify Marciano
Salazar and Policarpo Palmares, respectively, in the sum of P2, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney now alleges that the trial court erred in considering the acts committed by Jose Barbas as
estafa by means of the falsification of public documents, and in not acquitting him, with the costs de oficio.
In our opinion there is no doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. The evidence clearly shows that after selling the
cedulas marked D and F to Angel Baflor and Patricio Fernandez, respectively, the defendant sold and delivered
Exhibits A and C, the duplicates of these two cedulas, to Policarpo Palmares and Marciano Salazar respectively, and
collected from each of them P2. The, defendant did not account for the money which he collected from each
Palmares and Salazar.
Cedula certificates are prepared in triplicate. The original is delivered to the purchaser, and the duplicate and
triplicate, which are carbon copies of the original, are retained by the internal revenue officer. Because the
defendant accounted to the municipal treasurer of Sagay for the cedulas received, the lower court found that the
defendant was not guilty of malversation but of estafa through the falsification of public documents. It is clear,
however, that the defendant, acting as special deputy of the provincial treasurer, collected from Policarpo Palmares
and Marciano Salazar P2 each in payment of their cedula tax and delivered to them what he represented to be the
 138

corresponding cedulas. This money was clearly received by the defendant in his capacity of a public officer, and in
our opinion constituted a valid payment of the cedula tax of Palmares and Salazar, and the defendant who
misappropriated it is guilty of the malversation of public funds.
The evidence shows that the defendant altered the duplicates of the cedulas in question as alleged in the
informations. These duplicates are public documents, and the alterations made by the defendant constituted the
falsification of public documents. The evidence shows that the duplicates of the cedulas in question were falsified
by the defendant in order that he might sell them to Palmares and Salazar. The falsification was therefore the
means which the defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation. As the acts of the
defendant constitute a complex crime, the penalty applicable thereto is that to the more serious offense, or the
falsification of a public document. The corresponding penalty therefore is the maximum degree of prision mayor, or
from ten years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor, and a fine of not more than P5,000. The medium
degree of prision mayor in its maximum period is from ten years, eight months, and one day to eleven years and
four months.
In case No. 8857 (G. R. No. 41265) the defendant is sentenced suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than
one year prision correccional and not more than ten years, eight months, and one day of prision mayor, to pay a
fine of P5, and to indemnify the Government of the Philippine Islands in the sum of P2, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant is further sentenced to suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification.
In case No. 8859 (G. R. No. 41266) the defendant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less
than one year of prision correccional and not more than ten years, eight months, and one day of prision mayor, to
pay a fine of P5 and to indemnify the Government of the Philippine Islands in the sum of P2, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus modified, the decisions appealed from are affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-31255 August 7, 1929

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. ISAIAS GEYROSAGA
From the sentence of ten years and one day of prision mayor, a fine of 8,666 pesetas, and costs, which the Court
of First Instance of Cebu imposed upon the defendant for the crime of estafa committed through the falsification of
a false document, this appeal is taken and the defendant's counsel assigns as error to the trial court the conviction,
rather than the acquittal of the accussed.
Counsel contends that the appellant, in performing the duties of the postmaster, made an involuntary mistake in
considering a certain woman to be the real Demetria Sualibio and the payee of the money order Exhibit C,
delivering to said fictitious person amount of the said money order. Such allegations made by the defendant,
uncorroborated as they are, cannot be deemed sufficiently established.
It is a proven fact that the amount of money ordered referred to, paid by the post office by which the defendant
was in charge, did not reach the hands of the real payee of the money. It is also a proven fact admitted by the
defendant himself, that he wrote the name "Demeteria Sualibyo" on the money order Exhibit C, in the space
provided for the signature acknowledging the payment of the money order. It is another proven fact that the
fictitious nor the real Demeteria Sualibio authorized with any mark the appearance of said name in
acknowledgment of the payment of the money order. The defendant tried to explain this vital efficiency by saying:
I wrote the name of Demeteria Sualibio because when that woman presented herself, Francisco K. Ruiz told me
that she did not know how to write, and whenever one who does not know how to write calls for a registered letter
or a money order, if that person does not know how to write, I sign his name and then require him to stamp his
fingerprint, but on that occasion I forgot to demand the fingerprint, because I was called away to the telegraph
apparatus, as there was much business.
This explanation of the incredible forgetfulness on the part of the defendant to follow the good practice of requiring
the illiterates to stamp their fingerprints instead of signing their names, is not acceptable to us.
The same may be said in what appears to be the lieu of the payee's signature in the card Exhibit A, where the lack
of the fingerprint in the interested party was due to the alleged call to the telegraph apparatus.
There is a force and weight in the observation of the Attorney-General in his brief, and in his writing the name of
Demetria Sulibio in these Exhibits C and A, the defendant did not do so in his ordinary writing, as may readily be
seen by comparing it with his handwriting in Exhibit D.
The fact proven in the case, and the indicia arising therefrom, establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant, through the falsification of the public documents Exhibit A and C, consisting in making it appear that
Demetria Sualibio had taken part in the signing thereof, she having had no intervention whatever in said act,
abstracted and appropriated the sum of $62, equivalent to 620 pesetas, Philippine currency, with fraud against and
prejudice to the aforesaid payee and owner of the said sum of money.
We find the following recommendation of the Attorney-General made in his brief, to be correct:
The fact proved constitute the complex crime of estafa through the falsification of public documents, defined in the
article 535, case 5, in connection with article 300, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, as said article was amended by
Act no. 2712. Following the rule set forth in article 39 of the said code, the penalty which must be imposed upon
the defendant is that corresponding to the more serious crime, which, in this case, is falsification of public
documents, (prision mayor, and a fine of not less that 250 nor more than 12,500 pesetas, and perpetual
disqualification for holding pubic office), which must be applied in its maximum degree. There being no
circumstance in modifying the criminal liability said penalty must be imposed in its minimum degree, that is ten
years, eight months, and one day of prision mayor, and a fine within the limits fixed above.
 139

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby specified, and the defendant is sentenced to ten years, eight
months and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 61 of the Penal Code, said
judgement being affirmed in all other respects, with costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.

Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely
represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or
any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
Two offenses are contemplated in Article 177
1. Usurpation of Authority (first portion)
2. Usurpation of Official Functions (second portion)
2 ways of committing the crime under Article 177
• By knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or any foreign government
• NOTE: In usurpation of authority, the mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer,
etc. is sufficient. It is not necessary that he performs an act pertaining to a public officer.
• By performing any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of a
foreign government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, and without being lawfully
entitled to do so.
• NOTE: In usurpation of official functions, it is essential that the offender should have performed an act pertaining
to a person in authority or public officer, in addition to other requirements
Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to
exceed 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall publicly use a fictitious name for the purpose of
concealing a crime, evading the execution of a judgment or causing damage.
Any person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances shall be punished by arresto menor or a
fine not to exceed 200 pesos.
Elements
1. That the offender uses a name other than his real name
2. That he uses the fictitious name publicly
3. That the purpose of the offender is
a. To conceal a crime;
b. To evade the execution of a judgment; OR
c. To cause damage to public interest.

Elements
1. That the offender conceals
a. His true name AND
b. All other personal circumstances.
2. That the purpose is only to conceal his identity.

CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.1984 August 282nd DivisionG.R. No. L-63817D E C I S I O N
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information against her reads:
"That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or alias name CORAZON
L. REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by which she has
been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary purpose and without having been previously
authorized by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or about November 4th, 1974." (Rollo,
pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year, as
minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine of 5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the
costs. The trial court recommended, however, that she be extended executive clemency. On appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition.
The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years - from November 8, 1965 to September 26, 1974, when
Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L.
Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes;
she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager, Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October
29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter claim in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
 140

Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of
Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed
a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of
that which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by
Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
"Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes
and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he
was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons,
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name
shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames." (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?
The resolution:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man
she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not
encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men
prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses
his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged
of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the
light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his
wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She
applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her
guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially
because some of them probably had their own Corazons.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.
a. Use of Alias/Anti-Alias Law
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan,
Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to
conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint
was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report
the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in
the area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez,
had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to
Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the
respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez)
name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to
register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after
which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed
the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a
copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in
the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline
station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without
leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed
alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that
 141

no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to
him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional
minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not
violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his
alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is
also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one
occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement
for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the
prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births.
He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under
the wrong law. 5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner,
and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias,
and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial
authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted.
Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he
was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name
shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name
and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he
has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless
the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use
in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes,
which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The
pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax
or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence
of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true
name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is
engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such
other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name
and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business
transaction, or business . . . .
 142

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use
of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu
Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to
his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government
offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because
if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions.
And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to
write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau
Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and
reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to
warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends
to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was
the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead
of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There
is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his
real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not
even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is
a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest
easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Art. 179. Illegal use of uniforms or insignia. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall publicly and improperly make use of insignia, uniforms or dress pertaining to an office not held by
such person or to a class of persons of which he is not a member.
Elements
1. That the offender makes use of insignia, uniform or dress
2. That the insignia or dress pertains to an office not held by the offender or to a class of persons of which he is not
a member
3. That said insignia, uniform or dress is used publicly and improperly
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Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who
knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods
mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided
therein.
2 ways of committing perjury
1. Falsely testifying under oath AND
2. Making a false affidavit
NOTE: Falsely testifying under oath should NOT be in a judicial proceeding.
Elements of perjury
1. That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter
2. That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath
3. That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and
4. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERY CODE
(R.A. No. 8293, effective January 1, 1998)
Who is liable for infringement?
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. - Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered
mark:
• 155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the
same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising
of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
• 155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts
stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or
services using the infringing material. (Sec. 22, R.A. No 166a)

G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000

K.R. Savage et. al. vs. Taypin et. al.
Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-
SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of
petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by respondent
Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general
manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), 1 Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 2
The application sought the authorization to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the
object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was issued by respondent Judge on 16 October 1997
and executed in the afternoon of the following day by NBI agents. 3 Seized from the factory were several pieces of
furniture, indicated in the Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have
remained in NBI custody up to the present. 4
On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused
of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the
witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. 5
On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally alleged that the
assailed warrant was applied for without a certification against forum shopping. 6 On 30 January 1998 respondent
Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental Motion to Quash. 7 On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to
reconsider the denial of their motion to quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original
Motion to Quash but adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order sought to be reconsidered. 8 The
denial of their last motion 9 prompted petitioners to come to this Court.
 144

The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving jurisdiction over the
offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the crime.
Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not designated as a
special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations
of IPR including Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The
sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated Special Court for IPR for the 7th
Judicial Region. 10 Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 was issued providing that
jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the Regional Trial Courts. 11
The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the Court
has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 12 The authority to
issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. 1 In the
instant case, the premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of
the respondent court. 14
Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR. Administrative Order
No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and
could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other
judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP
Blg.129, and not by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order. 15 The power to issue search
warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in Supreme Court
Administrative Order No.113-95.
Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed outright since it was
not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals. 16 In that case, we sustained the quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had been
guilty of forum shopping as private respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only
after he was denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no allegation
of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended
requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of "applications." 17 In contrast,
Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification even from "applications." Our
ruling in Washington Distillers required no such certification from applications for search warrants. Hence, the
absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.
The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents punishable under Art. 189
of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree as he filed the corresponding
Information against petitioners on 17 March 1998. 18 However, since the IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998
any discussion contrary to the view herein expressed would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code provides
—
All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act
No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed (emphasis ours). 19
The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art.
189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article.
The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts
specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by
MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco
and the buying public. 20 The Code defines "unfair competition" thus —
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off
the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair
competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer
or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance which would be likely to influence purchasers
to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such
goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief
that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act
contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of another. 21
There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling
provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA
 145

8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we
must strictly construe the statute against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, 22 for penal statutes
cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable consideration. 2 Respondents invoke
jurisprudence to support their contention that "unfair competition" exists in this case. 24 However, we are
prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in the IPR
Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined by the same
Code —
Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. — 76.1. The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented
product or a product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a patented process
without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent infringement. 25
Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, we are constrained
to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied
retrospectively, if such application would be beneficial to the
accused. 26 Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts
alleged, then that Code must be applied here.
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 27 Hence, since
there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is
therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in
petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all
property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence. 28
In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information they allege that the trial court denied their motion to transfer their
case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail to find any trace of such motion or
even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in the records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion
filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12. 29 This attachment being
immaterial we shall give it no further attention.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998, denying the Motion
to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and the Supplemental Motion to Quash
dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the Order dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998, is SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October
1997 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by
virtue of the illegal search warrant.

Unfair Competition
Who has the right to be protected against unfair competition
• A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or
services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the
goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as
other property rights.
Who is liable for unfair competition
• 168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his
business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right
in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same
manner as other property rights.
• 168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass
off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one
having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be
guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
• 168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be
deemed guilty of unfair competition:
Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or
dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and
defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief
that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary
to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.
FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN
Who is liable for false designation of origin or false description or representation
Section 169. False Designations of Origin; False Description or Representation. –
 146

169.1. Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which:
(a) Is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person; or
(b) In commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable to a civil action for
damages and injunction provided in Sections 156 and 157 of this Act by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Section 170. Penalties. –
Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two
(2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand
pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in
Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code)
Section 225. Jurisdiction. –
Without prejudice to the provisions of Subsection 7.1(c), actions under this Act shall be cognizable by the courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing law. (Sec. 57, P.D. No. 49a)

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE FOUR

Prescription of Crimes; False Testimony (1994)

Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a prosecution witness, testified
that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument. While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila
burned down and the entire records of the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was
again called to the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he was
abroad when the crime took place. The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false
testimony favorable to the defendant in a criminal case.
Will the case against Andrew prosper?
Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final on January 10, 1987. On June 18, 1994 a case of giving false
testimony was filed against Andrew. As his lawyer, what legal step will you take?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes. ...
2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of prescription. The crime of
false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the accused in the principal case, was acquitted on
January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art. 180, par. 4, RPC.
Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the case against Andrew
was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was decided with finality on January 10, 1987
and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is
more than five (5) years.
False Notes; Illegal Possession (1999)
Is mere possession of false money bills punishable under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (3%)
The accused was caught in possession of 100 counterfeit P20 bills. He could not explain how and why he possessed
the said bills. Neither could he explain what he intended to do with the fake bills. Can he be held criminally liable
for such possession? Decide. (3%}
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone without an intent to use it, is not punishable. But the
circumstances of such possession may indicate intent to utter, sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal
possession of false notes.
Yes. Knowledge that the note is counterfeit and intent to use it may be shown by the conduct of the accused. So,
possession of 100 false bills reveal: (a) knowledge that the bills are fake; and (b) intent to utter the same.
False Testimony (1994)
Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a prosecution witness, testified
that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument. While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila
burned down and the entire records of the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was
again called to the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he was
abroad when the crime took place.
47 of 86 The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony favorable to the
defendant in a criminal case. 1.] Will the case against Andrew prosper? 2.] Paolo was acquitted. The decision
became final on
January 10, 1987. On June 18, 1994 a case of giving
false testimony was filed against Andrew. As his
lawyer, what legal step will you take?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes. For one to be criminally liable under Art. 181, RFC, it is not necessary that the criminal case where Andrew
testified is terminated first. It is not even required of the prosecution to prove which of the two statements of the
 147

witness is false and to prove the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statements (People
vs. Arazola, 13 Court of Appeals Report, 2nd series, p. 808).
2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of prescription. The crime of
false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the accused in the principal case, was acquitted on
January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art. 180, par. 4, RPC.
Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the case against Andrew
was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was decided with finality on January 10, 1987
and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is
more than five (5) years.
Falsification; Presumption of Falsification (1999)
A falsified official or public document was found in the possession of the accused. No evidence was introduced to
show that the accused was the author of the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court convicted the accused
of falsification of official or public document mainly on the proposition that "the only person who could have made
the erasures and the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be benefited by the alterations thus made" and
that "he alone could have the motive for making such alterations".
Was the conviction of the accused proper although the conviction was premised merely on the aforesaid
ratiocination? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the conviction is proper because there is a presumption in law that the possessor and user of a falsified
document is the one who falsified the same.
Forgery & Falsification (1999)
How are "forging" and "falsification" committed? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FORGING or forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to
order the appearance of a true and genuine
Criminal Law Bar Examination Q & A (1994-2006)
document; or by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
FALSIFICATION, on the other hand, is committed by:
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them;
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
Altering true dates;
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
Perjury (1996)
Sisenando purchased the share of the stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two installments, making him the
majority stockholder thereof and eventually, its president. Because the stockholders who sold their stocks failed to
comply with their warranties attendant to the sale, Sisenando withheld payment of the second installment due on
the shares and deposited the money in escrow instead, subject to release once said stockholders comply with their
warranties. The stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded the sale in question and removed Sisenando from the
Presidency of the Estrella Corporation, Sisenando then filed a verified complaint for damages against said
stockholders in his capacity as president and principal stockholder of Estrella Corporation. In retaliation, the
stockholders concerned, after petitioning the Securities and Exchange Commission to declare the rescission valid,
further filed a criminal case for perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the latter perjured himself when he stated
under oath in the verification of his complaint for damages that he is the President of the Estrella Corporation when
in fact he had already been removed as such. Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando be held liable for
perjury? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury because It cannot be reasonably maintained that he willfully and
deliberately made an assertion of a falsehood when he alleged in the complaint that he is the President of the
Corporation, obviously, he made the allegation on the premise that his removal from the presidency is not valid
and that is precisely the issue brought about by his complaint to the SEC. It is a fact that Sisenando has been the
President of the corporation and it is from that position that the stockholders concerned purportedly removed him,
whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his removal. There is no willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood which is a requisite of perjury.
Perjury (1997)
A, a government employee, was administratively charged with immorality for having an affair with B, a coemployee
in the same office who believed him to be single. To exculpate himself, A testified that he was single and was
willing to marry B, He induced C to testify and C did testify that B was single. The truth, however, was that A had
earlier married D, now a neighbor of C. Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty of subordination of perjury?
 148

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful falsehood asserted by him is not material to the charge of
immorality. Whether A is single or married, the charge of immorality against him as a government employee could
proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a defense to the charge of immorality, hence, not a
material matter that could influence the charge.
There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The crime is now treated as plain perjury with the one inducing
another as the principal inducement, and the latter, as principal by direct participation (People vs. Podol 66 Phil.
365). Since in this case A cannot be held liable for perjury, the matter that he testified to being immaterial, he
cannot therefore be held responsible as a principal by inducement when he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C is not liable as principal by direct participation in perjury, having testified on matters not material
to an administrative case.
Perjury (2005)
Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a petition under oath for naturalization, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In
his petition, he stated that he is married to Leni Chua; that he is living with her in Sampaloc, Manila; that he is of
good moral character; and that he has conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines. However, at the time of the filing of the petition, Leni Chua was already living in Cebu, while Al was
living with Babes Toh in Manila, with whom he has an amorous relationship. After his direct testimony, Al Chua
withdrew his petition for naturalization. What crime or crimes, if any, did Al Chua commit? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Al Chua committed perjury. His declaration under oath for naturalization that he is of good moral character and
residing at Sampaloc, Manila are false. This information is material to his petition for naturalization. He committed
perjury for this willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood which is contained in a verified petition made for a legal
purpose. (Choa v. People, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003)
Use of Aliases; When Allowed (2006)
When can a Filipino citizen residing in this country use an alias legally? Give 3 instances. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pseudonym for literary purposes.
Use of aliases in cinema and television entertainment.
In athletics and sports activities (RA. 6085).
Under the witness protection program a person may adopt a different identity (RA. 6981).
When he has been baptized or customarily known by such alias.
When authorized by a competent court (CA. No. 142, as amended by RA. 6085).
When properly indicated in a Certificate of Candidacy (Omnibus Election Code).
Estafa; Falsification of Commercial Documents (1997)
The accused opened a saving account with Bank A with an initial deposit of P2,000.00. A few days later, he
deposited in the savings account a Bank B check for P 10,000.00 drawn and endorsed purportedly by C. Ten days
later, he withdrew P 10,000.00 from his savings account. C complained to Bank B when the check was deducted
from his account. Two days thereafter, the accused deposited another Bank B check of P 10,000.00 signed and
endorsed allegedly by C. A week later, the accused went to Bank A to withdraw P10,000.00. While withdrawing the
amount, he was arrested.
Convicted under two informations of estafa and attempted estafa both through falsification of commercial
documents, he set up the defenses that, except for the showing that the signature of C had been forged, no further
evidence was presented to establish (a) that he was the forger of the signature of C nor (b), that as to the second
charge C suffered any damage. Rule on the defense.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The defense is not tenable; (a) the possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the author of the
falsification (People vs. Sendaydtego, 81 SCRA 120; Koh Tiek vs. People, et al, Dec. 21, 1990); (b) In estafa, a
mere disturbance of property rights, even if temporary, would be sufficient to, cause damage. Moreover, in a crime
of falsification of a commercial document, damage or intent to cause damage is not necessary because the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.
Estafa; Defense of Ownership (2002) A sold a washing machine to B on credit, with the understanding that B could
return the appliance within two weeks if, after testing the same, B decided not to buy it. Two weeks lapsed without
B returning the appliance. A found out that B had sold the washing machine to a third party- Is B liable for estafa?
Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an entrustee of the washing
machine which he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the washing machine to him. The sale being
on credit, B as buyer is only liable for the unpaid price of the washing machine; his obligation is only a civil
obligation. There is no felonious misappropriation that could constitute estafa.
Art. 172 Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents (2007)
Fe is the manager of a rice mill in Bulacan. In order to support a gambling debt, Fe made it appear that the rice
mill was earning less than it actually was by writing in a "talaan" or ledger a figure lower than what was collected
and paid by their customers. Fe then pocketed the difference. What crime/s did Fe commit, If any? Explain your
answer.
If the “talaan” or ledger which Fe made to show a falsehood was a private document, the only crime that Fe
committed was estafa thru abuse of confidence or unfaithfulness. Criminal liability for falsification of a private
document does not arise without damage or at least proof of intent to cause damage. It cannot co-exist with the
 149

crime of estafa which also essentially requires damage or at least proof of intent to cause damage. Since the
“talaan” was falsified to cover-up or conceal the misappropriation of the amount involved, whatever damage or
intent to cause damage attends the falsification, it will be the same damage or intent to cause damage that will
attend the estafa.
If such “talaan” or ledger was a commercial document, damage or proof intent to cause damage is not necessary.
The falsification alone if done with intent to pervert the truth, would bring about criminal liability for falsification of
a commercial document. Damage or intent to cause damage, would sustain the estafa independently of the
falsification of the commercial document. In this case, 2 separate crimes are committed; namely, estafa and
falsification of the commercial document. The falsification should not be complexed with the estafa since it was not
committed as a necessary means to commit the estafa but rather resorted to, to conceal or hide the
misappropriation of the amount she pocketed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crimes committed by Fe are theft and falsification of private document because Fe’s possession of the proceeds
of the rice mill was only physical, not juridical, possession, and having committed the crimes with grave abuse of
confidence, it is qualified theft.
The falsification is a separate crime from theft because it was not committed as a necessary means to commit the
theft but resorted to only to hide or conceal the unlawful taking.
Art. 171 Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister (2008)
Upon opening a letter containing 17 money orders, the mail carrier forged the signatures of the payees on the
money order and encashed them. What crime or crimes did the mail carrier commit? Explain briefly. ( 6% )
In Peo vs. Villanueva, the SC held that the mail carrier is guilty of malversation and falsification.
In US v. Gorospe, 31 Phil, the SC ruled the crime is infidelity in the custody of documents.
He can be charged with qualified theft since the property stolen is mail matter.
He may also be charged with forgery under Art. 169 (2) RPC, because there was material alteration on a genuine
document.
He may be charged with falsification under Art. 171 (1), (2) RPC, because he counterfeited signatures to make it
appear that the payees signed the money order and received payment.
Art. 171 Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister (2008)
Raissa and Martin are married to each other but had been separated for the last five years. Raissa decided to wed
Juan, her suitor. Who had no inkling that she was married. Raissa and Juan accomplished an application for
marriage license which they subscribed and swore to before the Local Civil Registrar. Raissa declared, in the
application, that she is single. The marriage licensed was issued. In due time, the couple were married by the
mayor. Raissa and Juan had their first sexual intercourse later in the evening.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Raissa commit? Explain briefly. ( 7% )
Raissa committed bigamy for contracting a second marriage while her first marriage is still subsisting (Art. 349,
RPC). She is also guilty of perjury for making untruthful statements under oath or executing an affidavit upon a
material matter, when she declared she was not married in the application for marriage license a public document
(Art. 171, RPC). Lastly, she is also guilty of adultery (Art. 333, RPC) for having sexual intercourse with Juan,
although she is a married woman.
Art. 211 Qualified Bribery/Art. 216 Possession of Prohibited Interest by a Public Officer/Art. 171
Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister (2009)
To secure the release of his brother Willy, a detention prisoner, and his cousin Vincent, who is serving sentence for
homicide, Chito asked the RTC Branch Clerk of Court to issue an Order which would allow the two prisoners to be
brought out of jail. At first, the Clerk refused, but when Chito gave her P50,000.00, she consented.
She then prepared an Order requiring the appearance in court of Willy and Vincent, ostensibly as witnesses in a
pending case. She forged the judge’s signature, and delivered the Order to the jail warden who, in turn, allowed
Willy and Vincent to go out of jail in the company of an armed escort, Edwin. Chito also gave Edwin P50,000.00 to
leave the two inmates unguarded for three minutes and provide them with an opportunity to escape. Thus, Willy
and Vincent were able to escape.
What crime or crimes, if any, had been committed by Chito, Willy, Vincent, the Branch Clerk of Court, Edwin, and
the jail warden? Explain your answer. (5%)

Art. 171 Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister/RA No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)/Art. 217 Malversation (2009)
Roger and Jessie, Municipal Mayor and Treasurer, respectively, of San Rafael, Leyte, caused the disbursement of
public funds allocated for their local development programs for 2008. Records show that the amount of P2-million
was purportedly used as financial assistance for a rice production livelihood project. Upon investigation, however, it
was found that Roger and Jessie falsified the disbursement vouchers and supporting documents in order to make it
appear that qualified recipients who, in fact, are non-existent individuals, received the money.
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Roger and Jessie are charged with malversation through falsification and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 for
causing undue injury to the government. Discuss the propriety of the charges filed against Roger and Jessie.
Explain. (4%)

TITLE FIVE: COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
• Its effectivity is on July 4, 2002
Sec. 3) Definitions:
(ee) Protector/Coddler. – Any person who knowingly and willfully consents to the unlawful acts provided for in
this Act and uses his/her influence, power or position in shielding, harboring, screening or facilitating the escape of
any person he/she knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe on or suspects, has violated the provisions of this
Act in order to prevent the arrest, prosecution and conviction of the violator.
Section 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- .
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. –
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. -
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The penalty twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort. –
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon:
(a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort, who is aware of the nature of the place as such; and
(b) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of the next preceding, paragraph, is aware of the nature
of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the same
Section 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably
should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain or conceal any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical in violation of this Act.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed if it will be used to
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a dangerous drug in violation of this Act.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who uses a minor or a
mentally incapacitated individual to deliver such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs.
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
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(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine
(LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or
more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five
(hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such
as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

G.R. No. 148547 September 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MARCIAL G. EMPLEO, ET AL.
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Decision2 promulgated on 19 June 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59269. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution and Order of Judge Marcial G.
Empleo ("Judge Empleo") of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9 ("trial court"), directing the
prosecutor to amend the two Informations filed by filing only a single Information.
The Facts
On 6 October 1999, a search warrant3 was issued for the search and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia at the
room rented by private respondent Dante Mah ("private respondent") at the LS Lodge located at the corner of
Quezon Avenue and Mabini Street in Dipolog City.
During the search, the police officers seized the following from private respondent's room:
1. Thirty-two small plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules believed to be shabu, weighing 2 grams;
2. Six big plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules believed to be shabu, weighing 4.4 grams;
3. One roll/stick of dried Indian hemp ("marijuana") leaves weighing 0.2 gram; and
4. One small plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules believed to be shabu, weighing 0.05 grams.4
Police Superintendent Virgilio T. Ranes, Dipolog City Chief of Police, filed two criminal complaints for violation of
Section 8, Article II and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 64255 (RA 6425), as amended, against private
respondent. After preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Rodrigo T. Eguia filed two Informations before the
Regional Trial Court in Dipolog City:
Criminal Case No. 9272
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor of Region 9 accuses DANTE MAH y Cabilin of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 16,
ARTICLE III of R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That on October 6, 1999 at 10:30, more or less at corner Quezon Avenue and Mabini Streets, Barra, Dipolog City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that
unauthorized possession and control of regulated drug is punishable by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and control Thirty Two (32) pieces small plastic sachets and six (6) pieces
big plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, more popularly known as "shabu," weighing a total
of 6.4 grams, without any legal authority to possess the same, in gross Violation of Section 16, Article III, of R.A.
6425, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 9279
INFORMATION
The undersigned State Prosecutor of Region 9 accuses DANTE MAH y Cabilin alias "Dodoy Mah" of the crime of
"Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended", committed as follows:
That on October 6, 1999 at 10:30 in the morning, more or less, at corner Quezon Avenue and Mabini Streets,
Barra, Dipolog City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowing fully well that possession and use of prohibited drugs is punishable by law, did then and there willfully,
 152

unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control One (1) roll/stick dried marijuana leaves, without
legal authority to possess the same, in gross Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon his arraignment on 28 October 1999, private respondent pleaded not guilty to the two charges.
On 17 February 2000, private respondent filed a motion8 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 9279. Private respondent
alleged that the single act of possession of drugs committed at the same time and at the same place cannot be the
subject of two separate Informations. Since the prosecution already filed Criminal Case No. 9272, then the filing of
Criminal Case No. 9279 is tantamount to splitting a single cause of action into two separate cases.
The prosecution opposed the motion, claiming that unauthorized possession of marijuana and shabu are punishable
under Section 8, Article II and Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. Hence, these acts constitute two separate and
distinct offenses with separate penalties.9
In a Resolution10 dated 3 April 2000, Judge Empleo directed the prosecutor to file only a single Information. The
Resolution reads in part:
It is to be noted that the stuffs, "SHABU" and Marijuana Leaves are all prohibited and regulated drugs. But what is
important is that the search and seizure was done at one time, the same place and at one occasion. Hence, there
could be no two crimes committed, regardless of the two kinds of prohibited/regulated drugs that were confiscated
from the accused. There is in this case a clear case of splitting one single criminal act into two separate crimes.
Considering, however, that the penalty of this kind of offenses are based on the number of grams of the
regulated/prohibited drugs, instead of having these cases dismissed, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dipolog
City is hereby directed to amend its information by filing one single information.11
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,12 arguing that violation of any of the provisions of RA 6425
constitutes a separate and distinct offense. The prosecution maintained that private respondent cannot be charged
with violating Articles II and III of RA 6425 in one Information because that would be tantamount to charging him
with more than one offense in a single Information. The trial court denied the motion in an Order13 dated 2 May
2000.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. Hence this petition.
Meanwhile, in an Order14 dated 12 May 2000, the trial court suspended further proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
9272 and 9279 pending resolution of the petition. However, in a Resolution 15 dated 27 April 2004, the trial court,
upon private respondent's motion, dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 9272 and 9279 for unreasonable delay in the
prosecution of the cases which is violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial. 16 Upon the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued an Order17
dated 17 June 2004, setting aside its Resolution dated 27 April 2004 and reinstating Criminal Case Nos. 9272 and
9279, with the proceedings still suspended pending outcome of the appeal in the Supreme Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision promulgated on 19 June 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order and Resolution of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals held that the filing of only one Information is proper because only one violation was
committed – possession of dangerous drugs as penalized by RA 6425. The Court of Appeals ruled that:
In the case at bar, such intent to possess is the possession of a dangerous drug, however, without regard to the
kind of substance involve[d], since both pertain to dangerous drugs, provided it will be duly established during
trial, it shall make the accused liable for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As the possession of the
dangerous drugs happened at the same time, same occasion, same place, it cannot be denied that only one
violation [was] committed under the Dangerous Drugs Act, which is the possession of dangerous drugs. It is not
controverted that at the time of the apprehension, what was found in his possession were [a] "marijuana" and
"shabu." We shall not discount the fact that the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure point to none
other but a single intent to possess a dangerous drug; not to mention that there is only one occasion, as compared
to other cases wherein the alleged offense happened on different occasions, that with respect to the latter situation
clearly it may not be said [that] there is only one intent. It can be inferred from the action of the accused and the
surrounding circumstances that there was clearly one act intended by the former to perpetrate; it is apparent, that
the accused seems to have a single intention, which is his intention to possess the said dangerous drugs. Thus, not
just because it involves two different kinds of dangerous drugs make the said act to constitute two offenses. As has
been repeatedly said by this Court, dangerous drugs refer to both prohibited and regulated drug.
xxxx
Petitioner contends that since there are two acts of possession, one is possession of a prohibited drug and the
other is possession of a regulated drug, for that reason, there are two separate offenses that the accused may be
held liable for. Petitioner puts forward the argument that it is immaterial that the "marijuana" and "shabu" were
seized in the same place and on the same occasion. Petitioner further asserts that since two separate provisions of
the Dangerous Drugs Act were violated, concomitantly, herein private respondent may be held liable for two
distinct crimes under the said law. We hold otherwise. A careful look into the Dangerous Drugs Act would show that
it specified the manner of commission of the particular acts that would amount to a violation of the said law, and
one of which is the possession or use of a prohibited or regulated drug. Although the law has provided for
two separate articles covering the possession or use of a prohibited and a regulated drug, it does not mean that
there are two separate offenses that it speaks of. What the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes is the specific act of
possession or use of dangerous drugs, among others, regardless of the fact that it is a prohibited or a regulated
drug.18 (Emphasis in the original)
The Issue
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The main issue in this case is whether the prosecution should file only one Information for illegal possession of
shabu and marijuana.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order and Resolution of the trial court that the prosecution should file only one
Information. The Court of Appeals held that where possession of both prohibited and regulated drugs occurs at the
same time, on the same occasion, and in the same place, only one offense is committed under RA 6425, which is
possession of dangerous drugs.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling. Such interpretation dilutes the severity of the crimes
committed. RA 6425 does not prescribe a single punishment for the various offenses enumerated in the law. On
the contrary, RA 6425 enumerates the punishable acts and its corresponding penalty. RA 6425 also specifies the
particular drugs and the corresponding quantity in the imposition of penalty. For instance, under Section 20 of RA
6425, as amended, the minimum quantity of marijuana and shabu for purposes of imposing the maximum
penalties are not the same. For marijuana, the quantity must be 750 grams or more while for shabu, it is 200
grams or more.
The prosecution was correct in filing two separate Informations for the crimes of illegal possession of shabu and
illegal possession of marijuana. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend to lump these two separate crimes into just
one crime of "possession of dangerous drugs." Otherwise, there would be no need to specify the different kinds of
drugs and the corresponding quantity in the application of the appropriate penalty. Multiple offenses can be
committed under RA 6425 even if the crimes are committed in the same place, at the same time, and by the same
person. Thus, this Court has upheld rulings of the lower courts convicting an accused charged with two separate
crimes of illegal possession of shabu and illegal possession of marijuana, even if the crimes were committed at the
same time and in the same place.19
Besides, in People v. Tira, we have already ruled that illegal possession of shabu and marijuana constitutes two
separate crimes and therefore, two Informations should be filed. We held:
The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the appellants should be convicted of violating
Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG. We find and so
hold that the appellants are guilty of two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under
Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. Although only one Information
was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged therein and
proved by the prosecution. In this case, the appellants were charged for violation of possession of marijuana and
shabu in one Information which reads:
"That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody the following:
- Three (3) pieces (sic) sachets of shabu
- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue
- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams
- Twenty-four (24) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves weighing 86.3 grams
- Six [6] disposable lighter
- One (1) roll Aluminum foil
- Several empty plastics (tea bag)
- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations believed to be proceeds of the contraband.
without first securing the necessary permit/license to posses[s] the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. 6425, as amended."
The Information is defective because it charges two crimes. The appellants should have filed a motion to
quash the Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They
failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes
charged.20
Just like Tira, this case involves illegal possession of both shabu and marijuana. Hence, it was only proper for the
prosecution to file two separate Informations since there were two distinct and separate crimes involved. This is in
accordance with the rule that a complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.21
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 19 June 2001 of the Court of Appeals. We ANNUL the
Resolution and the Order, dated 3 April 2000 and 2 May 2000, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City, Branch 9. We ORDER Judge Marcial G. Empleo to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 9272
and 9279.

Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. - The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
 154

dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who
are required to carry such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their
profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the
purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked,
consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to
have violated Section 15 of this Act.
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. – Any person found
possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of
at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of
the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs.
Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be
imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
any dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons.
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of
any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided
for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties
or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. –
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory
equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby,
and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of
a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately
schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and
properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be
found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property
is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may
be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and
no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to
pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the
above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.
No plea bargaining provision
RULE 118 of Criminal Procedure
PRE-TRIAL
Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
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Sec. 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. – If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not
appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court
may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Sec. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken,
the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed
of, and control the course f the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender Under
the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive
finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime
by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or
Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed.
– The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties
obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.
Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous
drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or
juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office
and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions,
subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or –controlled corporations.
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. – Any person who is found guilty of "planting" any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer
the penalty of death.
Frame-up, like alibi
[G.R. No. 148668. June 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TONY PEDRONAN y LIMMAYOG, appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No.
17145-R, finding appellant, Tony Pedronan @ “Totoy”, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act 7659, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Appellant Pedronan was charged on October 25, 1999 in an information that reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver
to SPO2 FREDERICK LAOANG, a member of the Philippine National Police who acted as poseur-buyer, five (5)
bricks of dried flowering tops of marijuana each wrapped in a newsprint paper contained in a plastic bag with
markings, all placed in a green backpack with markings weighing 4.026 kilograms, a prohibited drug, well knowing
that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the
aforementioned provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial proceeded forthwith.
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows:
At 4:00 p.m. of October 21, 1999, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Cordillera Administrative Region
(CIDG-CAR) stationed at DPS Compound, Baguio City, headed by P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, received a tip from a
female civilian informant (CI) that a certain “Totoy” was engaged in the illegal sale of dried marijuana bricks at the
Bahay Kawayan restaurant on Abanao, Baguio City.
A police team, headed by P/Insp. Rodolfo Castil, Jr., was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. On that same
afternoon, some members of the team proceeded to Bahay Kawayan to see if the place was suitable for a drug
entrapment operation. The following day, October 22, 1999, at 3:00 p.m., the 6-member police team proceeded
to Bahay Kawayan Restaurant. SPO2 Frederick Laoang was designated as the poseur-buyer, while the others were
ordered to secure the area. Laoang had with him the buy-bust money amounting to P4,000.00, which had been
previously dusted with fluorescent powder at the National Bureau of Investigation office in Baguio.
The actual operation started when Laoang and the female CI known only as “Mamang” went inside the restaurant,
sat on a table and ordered drinks while waiting for appellant. At 4:00 p.m., a man who later turned out to be the
appellant, Tony Pedronan, arrived. Mamang stood up to greet him and introduced SPO2 Laoang as “Jerry.” When
Mamang told him that Jerry wanted to buy dried marijuana bricks, appellant immediately offered two kilos of
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marijuana at P1,750.00 per kilo. After reaching an agreement, appellant told Jerry and Mamang to wait inside the
restaurant while he left to get the merchandise.
As soon as appellant left, SPO2 Laoang went outside to inform the team about the agreement and to tell them to
wait for the return of the appellant. Later, at around 7:30 p.m., appellant arrived with a green backpack slung on
his right shoulder. He told Laoang that the bag contained four kilos of dried marijuana bricks instead of two as
agreed upon, and asked for additional payment.
SPO2 Laoang opened the backpack and saw five plastic bags of marijuana bricks. He immediately removed his
bullcap, which was the pre-arranged signal to alert the team. Thereafter, the members of the team rushed to the
scene and arrested appellant. Police Officers Modesto Carrera, Fernando Fernandez and Arturo Lavarias identified
themselves as members of the CIDG Narcotics and read the appellant his rights. Pedronan was subsequently
booked and arrested for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended, for the sale of marijuana.
The five bricks contained in the green backpack were subsequently forwarded to NBI Forensic Chemist Ma. Carina
Madrigal for laboratory examination. The forensic examination confirmed that the bricks, which weighed 4.026
kilograms, consisted of marijuana. The green backpack was also found positive for marijuana leaves. Appellant
was brought to the City Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio for inquest, and thereafter detained at the Baguio City Jail.
In his defense, appellant claimed that at 4:00 p.m. on October 22, 1999, he was in his house at No. 3932 Purok 3,
Kias, Baguio City, doing repairs. At 7:00 p.m., he went to Bahay Kawayan at Abanao Street to have dinner before
taking the 11:00 p.m. bus trip to Manila, where he intended to follow-up his application for overseas employment
in Palau, New Guinea.
As he was about to order food, police officers Laoang and Carrera approached him and invited him to their office.
Appellant knew Carrera and Laoang to be policemen since he was in high school, so he acceded to their invitation.
Upon boarding the van that would take them to the CIDG office in DPS Compound in Baguio City, Officer Carrera
frisked appellant and took his wallet containing P8,000.00 in cash. When they reached the CIDG office, Carrera
began to undress him and look for shabu. When Carrera did not find any shabu, appellant asked him to return the
money and have it receipted. Carrera refused, so appellant tried to punch him and pushed Laoang and another
officer which prompted the three police officers to subdue him. They put a black bag on his head and mauled him.
The police officers only prepared their report of his alleged arrest thirty minutes after he was beaten up.
At the time of appellant’s arrest, he was carrying a blue traveling bag containing two pairs of maong pants, two t-
shirts and two pairs of underwear. He denied that he had a green backpack, which the police allegedly confiscated
during his arrest. According to him, the police officers brought out a green bag when they were preparing their
report. He also denied knowing Mamang, the female confidential informant.
The defense also presented Pacita Farinias, the sister of appellant, who testified that on October 22, 1999 her
brother was at home from 8:00 a.m. and did not leave until around 6:30 to 7:00 p.m.
After trial, the lower court rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Tony Pedronan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of sale or
delivery of 4.026 kilograms of marijuana in violation of Section 4, Article 2 of R.A. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
7659 as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost.
The accused, Tony Pedronan, being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited with 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. The 4.026
kilograms of dried marijuana bricks contained in 5 plastic bags in the green and black backpack are declared
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State being the subject of the offense and instruments thereof to be
destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant interposed the instant appeal on the lone assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE ON THE
PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the evidence of the prosecution is full of contradictions and irregularity which to an
unbiased mind, leads only to one conclusion, that the police fabricated the case against him. He cited the fact that
the prosecution had three different versions with respect to the buy-bust money. According to him, since SPO2
Laoang allegedly went through a lot of trouble in preparing the buy-bust money by having it dusted with
fluorescent powder, it is unusual that he did not make use of it. He also points to the fact that the members of the
buy-bust team cannot seem to agree on the denominations of the money they allegedly prepared and whether or
not the team actually conducted surveillance on the appellant the day before the alleged buy-bust operation.
We agree with the appellant.
Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight and
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. In the case at bar, several
circumstances warrant the appellant’s acquittal.
A thorough examination of the record of the case exposes flaws in the testimonies of Police Officers Laoang and
Carrera. For one, they cannot agree on the amount and denomination of money used in the buy-bust operation.
Officer Laoang claimed that they used four P1,000.00 bills but SPO2 Fernandez, the team leader, claims that the
buy-bust money only amounted to P3,500.00 in denominations of P500.00. Another team member, Officer Castil,
claimed that the money consisted of three P500.00, or a total of P1,500.00 only. Furthermore, the NBI Forensic
Chemist, Ma. Carina Madrigal, testified that no letter request for ultraviolet dusting was received by her from the
CIDG-CAR with respect to the buy-bust operation, contrary to the claims of the police officers. The trial court itself
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remarked that it was unusual that the police officers went through a lot of trouble to have the money dusted only
to keep it and not use it to pay the accused during the operation. Thus:
Q. You likewise testified, Mr. Witness that at the time you arrested the accused you were in possession of the
P4,000.00 buy-bust money, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your prior arrangement, according to you, was for you to pay the accused once he delivers the marijuana to
you is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But the buy-bust money remained in your possession up to the time that the accused was arrested and in fact,
you never gave the money to him, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That money was called buy-bust money purposely for you to entrap the accused, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Of selling marijuana?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is the buy-bust money now, Mr. Witness?
A. It was used in some other operation, sir.
Q. You turned it over to your superior, is that what you are saying?
A. To my team leader, sir.
Q. Who was team leader?
A. At that time it was SPO2 Fernando Fernandez.
Q. So you don’t know now where is the buy-bust money?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT: (To witness)
Q: You are telling this court that you went to a lot of trouble of having the buy-bust money marked with
fluorescent powder by the NBI and yet when it came to the actual transaction you did not use it?
A. Because the suspect, sir, brought with him not the exact weight of the marijuana. (Emphasis ours.)
More importantly, the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in drug-related cases. In People v. Mapa, appellant was
acquitted after the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly taken from him. In People v. Dismuke, we ruled that the failure to prove
that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the appellant was fatal to
the prosecution’s case.
In the case at bar, the five dried marijuana bricks presented in evidence cannot be relied upon because of the
irregularity in its handling, a fact observed by the trial court itself when it admonished Officer Laoang for changing
the wrappings of the marijuana bricks allegedly seized from appellant, thus:
COURT:
Did it occur to your mind that what could distinguish one brick of marijuana from another brick of marijuana that
may have been previously confiscated; because they are almost always the same is their wrapper, precisely?
A. Not actually, sir.
Q. It did not occur to your mind? Are you telling us that you would be able to distinguish immediately what
particular brick of marijuana was confiscated on what occasion from another occasion without their wrappers?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Are you sure you did not change the marijuana?
A. No, sir.
Q. Because this is the first time that the court has come across the placing of a name on the crust of the
marijuana, not on the wrapper but on the brick itself. Is that your standard operating procedure?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come it is not done by others?
A. I don’t know, sir.
COURT:
You know, for the record, the court will call the attention of your superiors on this matter that you did not use the
money that was dusted with fluorescent powder when you took pains and effort to have it dusted and that you
changed the wrappers of the marijuana, thereby tampering and affecting the integrity of the evidence you
submitted here. (Emphasis ours.)
Apparently, not only was Officer Laoang remiss in his duties as arresting officer, he was also careless in handling
the evidence. He admitted changing the original wrappings of the marijuana bricks, yet he failed to report such
fact when it was his duty to do so in order to preserve the integrity of the chain of custody.
Q. When you changed the wrappers, did you write that in your report?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not deem it necessary that the wrappers you changed would be needed in court?
A. No, sir.
It is worthy to note that Officer Laoang began his law enforcement career in 1987 and had been a member of the
Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Cordillera Administrative Region (RIDG-CAR) since 1996. The
main function of the RIDG-CAR is to investigate dangerous drugs cases and effect arrests in connection with the
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same. Therefore, officer Laoang is not a green recruit unschooled in dangerous drugs cases and all matters related
to it, hence, his errors with respect to the handling of the marijuana are inexcusable. As an officer of the law,
SPO2 Laoang is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities in apprehending criminals, securing the
evidence related to arrests and protecting the chain of custody, just as it is presumed that in dispensing said
duties, he acts with regularity.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. There is a serious cloud of
doubt as to whether the marijuana bricks allegedly seized from the appellant were the same bricks marked and
forwarded by the police officers to the crime laboratory for examination and later presented in court for
identification. In People v. Casimiro, this Court held:
x x x. The government’s drive against illegal drugs deserves everybody’s support. But it is precisely when the
government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice
Brandeis warned long ago, “the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well
meaning but without understanding.” Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of
constitutional rights. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Tony Pedronan is ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered RELEASED from custody, unless he is being
lawfully held for another lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Section 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. –
A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, apply to the Board or its
duly recognized representative, for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application,
the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug
dependency. If the examination by a DOH-accredited physician results in the issuance of a certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board for a period of not less than six (6) months: Provided, That a drug dependent may
be placed under the care of a DOH-accredited physician where there is no Center near or accessible to the
residence of the drug dependent or where said drug dependent is below eighteen (18) years of age and is a first-
time offender and non-confinement in a Center will not pose a serious danger to his/her family or the community.
Confinement in a Center for treatment and rehabilitation shall not exceed one (1) year, after which time the Court,
as well as the Board, shall be apprised by the head of the treatment and rehabilitation center of the status of said
drug dependent and determine whether further confinement will be for the welfare of the drug dependent and
his/her family or the community.
Section 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt
from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this act subject to the following conditions:
(1) He/she has complied with the rules and regulations of the center, the applicable rules and regulations of the
Board, including the after-care and follow-up program for at least eighteen (18) months following temporary
discharge from confinement in the Center or, in the case of a dependent placed under the care of the DOH-
accredited physician, the after-care program and follow-up schedule formulated by the DSWD and approved by the
Board: Provided, That capability-building of local government social workers shall be undertaken by the DSWD;
(2) He/she has never been charged or convicted of any offense punishable under this Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; the Revised Penal Code, as amended; or any special penal laws;
(3) He/she has no record of escape from a Center: Provided, That had he/she escaped, he/she surrendered by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, within one (1) week from the date of the said escape; and
(4) He/she poses no serious danger to himself/herself, his/her family or the community by his/her exemption from
criminal liability.
Section 57. Probation and Community Service Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – A drug
dependent who is discharged as rehabilitated by the DOH-accredited Center through the voluntary submission
program, but does not qualify for exemption from criminal liability under Section 55 of this Act, may be charged
under the provisions of this Act, but shall be placed on probation and undergo a community service in lieu of
imprisonment and/or fine in the discretion of the court, without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed
in court.
Such drug dependent shall undergo community service as part of his/her after-care and follow-up program, which
may be done in coordination with nongovernmental civil organizations accredited by the DSWD, with the
recommendation of the Board.
COMMENT: Community Service, a new penalty, but for violators of this Act only.
Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the Voluntary
Submission Program. – Notwithstanding any law, rule and regulation to the contrary, any person determined
and found to be dependent on dangerous drugs shall, upon petition by the Board or any of its authorized
representative, be confined for treatment and rehabilitation in any Center duly designated or accredited for the
purpose.
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A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a Center may be filed by
any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such person is
found.
After the petition is filed, the court, by an order, shall immediately fix a date for the hearing, and a copy of such
order shall be served on the person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs, and to the one having charge of
him.
If after such hearing and the facts so warrant, the court shall order the drug dependent to be examined by two (2)
physicians accredited by the Board. If both physicians conclude that the respondent is not a drug dependent, the
court shall order his/her discharge. If either physician finds him to be a dependent, the court shall conduct a
hearing and consider all relevant evidence which may be offered. If the court finds him a drug dependent, it shall
issue an order for his/her commitment to a treatment and rehabilitation center under the supervision of the DOH.
In any event, the order of discharge or order of confinement or commitment shall be issued not later than fifteen
(15) days from the filing of the appropriate petition.
Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment and
Rehabilitation. – If a person charged with an offense where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than
six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to
be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and
transmit copies of the record of the case to the Board.
In the event he Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that such drug
dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment
with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being investigated or tried: Provided, That
where a criminal case is pending in court, such petition shall be filed in the said court. The court shall take judicial
notice of the prior proceedings in the case and shall proceed to hear the petition. If the court finds him to be a drug
dependent, it shall order his/her commitment to a Center for treatment and rehabilitation. The head of said Center
shall submit to the court every four (4) months, or as often as the court may require, a written report on the
progress of the treatment. If the dependent is rehabilitated, as certified by the center and the Board, he/she shall
be returned to the court, which committed him, for his/her discharge therefrom.
Thereafter, his/her prosecution for any offense punishable by law shall be instituted or shall continue, as the case
may be. In case of conviction, the judgment shall, if the accused is certified by the treatment and rehabilitation
center to have maintained good behavior, indicate that he/she shall be given full credit for the period he/she was
confined in the Center: Provided, however, That when the offense is for violation of Section 15 of this Act and the
accused is not a recidivist, the penalty thereof shall be deemed to have been served in the Center upon his/her
release therefrom after certification by the Center and the Board that he/she is rehabilitated.
Compare and Analyze Sec. 66 (R.A. 9165) and Art. 192 (P.D. No. 1179)
Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than
eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found
guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the
Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18)
months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under suspended sentence to a Center, or
to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not
more than eighteen (18) months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any offense penalized under
this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this
Section.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1179 (THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE)
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in
the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender if it finds that
the best interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further
proceedings and commit such minor to the custody of care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one
years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the government training institution or responsible person
under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the
Department of Social Welfare to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and
his family.
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The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social
Welfare or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment.
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time Minor
Offender. – If the accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence complies with the applicable rules
and regulations of the Board, including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of
the Board for the final discharge of the accused, shall discharge the accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an order to expunge all official
records, other than the confidential record to be retained by the DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which
shall be kept confidential, shall restore the accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held
thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor Offender.
– The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an accused drug dependent who is a first-
time offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act
but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated.
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time minor
offender violates any of the conditions of his/her suspended sentence, the applicable rules and regulations of the
Board exercising supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and regulations of the
Center should confinement be required, the court shall pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she shall serve
sentence as any other convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. –
Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the
sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose
community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance
shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the
Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written
report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the
court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court
in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this
Act. The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the
Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of
compliance of said community service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service
or order a final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the accused
during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.
PROBATION LAW
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than
one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
JURISPRUDENCE
Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs
G.R. No. 146805 January 16, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUEL EUGENIO Y ANGELES, ET AL.
The presentation in court of "buy-bust" money is not indispensable to the prosecution of illegal drug cases. Neither
is prior surveillance by the police. It is enough that the elements of the crime are proven by credible witnesses and
other pieces of evidence.
The Case
Ruel Eugenio and Jimmy Tan appeal the November 29, 2000 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City (Branch 6) in Criminal Case No. 16839-R. Finding them guilty of selling and delivering dried marijuana leaves,
the RTC ruled as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused RUEL EUGENIO y ANGELES and JIMMY TAN y ABUCAY, as confederates,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Sections 13
and 17 of Republic Act 7659 x x x as charged in the Information and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
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"The marijuana brick weighing 1,034.5 grams x x x being the subject of the crime and a prohibited drug, is
declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with the law."2
The Information dated July 12, 1999, charged appellants in these words:
"That on or about the 9th day of July, 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 JUAN A. PIGGANGAY, a member of the
Philippine National Police, who acted as poseur-buyer[,] one (1) brick of marijuana dried leaves x x x wrapped in
gift wrapper put inside a blue plastic bag with approximately more or less 1,000 grams, a prohibited drug, well
knowing that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law."3
Upon their arraignment on September 9, 1999,4 appellants, assisted by their counsel de parte,5 pleaded not guilty.
After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as follows:
"On July 9, 1999 at about 12:00 noon a civilian informer (CI) reported to the 14th Regional Narcotics Office,
Cordillera Administrative Region, based at FPS Compound, Baguio City, that a certain Ruel and Jimmy are engaged
in selling or delivering marijuana to buyers, and that the two could be contacted at the Hilltop Road, City Market,
Baguio City.
"After evaluating the information, Police Chief Inspector Benson Leleng, Regional Chief of the 14th Narcom, formed
a buy-bust team composed of Police Inspector Edgar Apalla as team leader, PO2 Juan Piggangay as poseur-buyer,
and PO2 Adel Punongbayan and PO2 Jun Calimlim as back-up team. Chief Inspector Leleng briefed the buy-bust
team. They were told to prepare the pre-operation coordination sheet so that they will coordinate with the Baguio
City Police Office on the matter.
"At about 1:00 [p.m.] of the same day of July 9, 1999, the buy-bust team proceeded to the Baguio City Police
Office Tactical Operation Center for proper coordination.
"Thereafter, PO3 Juan Piggangay, the poseur-buyer, and the CI proceeded to the Hilltop Road at the City Market
while Police Inspector Edgar Apalla, PO2 Adel Punongbayan and PO2 Jun Calimlim followed secretly and posted
themselves in strategic places in the area so that they could observe what the poseur-buyer and the CI will do. The
CI talked to two male persons later identified as Ruel Eugenio and Jimmy Tan in front of the Benguet Lunch
Restaurant at Hilltop Road. The CI introduced Piggangay as a marijuana and shabu user. They had a friendly
conversation outside the Benguet Lunch. Ruel Eugenio then asked Piggangay how much he will buy and the latter
asked the price of marijuana per kilo. And Jimmy Tan said P1,000.00 a kilo. Right then and there Piggangay
ordered one kilo of marijuana to be paid cash on delivery. Ruel thereafter instructed Piggangay and the CI to wait
beside the Reliance Appliance Center located at Magsaysay Avenue as they will get the marijuana in La Trinidad,
Benguet. Ruel and Jimmy thereafter left for La Trinidad, Benguet leaving Piggangay and the CI beside the Reliance
Center. It was then that Piggangay went to his back-up team who were in the vicinity and informed them that the
two, Ruel and Jimmy, proceeded to La Trinidad to get the marijuana ordered and told them to just wait.
"At about 3:30 p.m. Ruel and Jimmy came back on board a passenger jeepney and after they alighted therefrom,
Jimmy Tan was seen holding a blue plastic bag with something inside. Jimmy handed the blue plastic bag to
Piggangay and the latter asked in Ilocano dialect, ‘Is this my order.’ And Ruel answered in the affirmative that it
was and at the same time demanded the payment of P1,000.00. Piggangay opened first the blue plastic bag and
checked its contents. And upon seeing that it contained a dried marijuana brick, he immediately executed the pre-
arranged signal by pulling out his handkerchief. Upon seeing the signal, the back-up team composed of Police
Officers Adel Punongbayan, Jun Calimlim and Edgar Appalla rushed to the scene introducing themselves as
Narcotics Agents and effected the arrest of both accused Ruel Eugenio and Jimmy Tan. They apprised them of their
constitutional rights to remain silent, to have counsel, and that anything they will say may be used against them.
"The team thereafter brought appellants, and the x x x confiscated evidence to their office at DPS Compound for
investigation and proper disposition.
"At the Narcom office the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of both accused were prepared, the receipt of the
property seized from the accused consisting of one brick of marijuana dried leaves wrapped in a newspaper
contained in a gift wrapper and put x x x in three blue plastic bags was issued. A preliminary narcotics field test
was made by Police Officer Romeo Abordo and the same was found to be positive for marijuana.
"And when referred for laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet,
the item was found to have a weight of 1,034.5 grams and was found positive for marijuana after physical or
microscopic test, chemical test, and confirmatory or chromatographic test conducted by Forensic Chemist Alma
Villasenor as shown by her Chemistry Report No. 8-08-99. After a medical examination to determine if they were
maltreated, both accused were found to be normal as shown by their respective Medical Certificates."6 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Both accused are vegetable vendors at the Hangar Building, City Market, Baguio City. The accused Jimmy Tan is a
sidewalk vendor while the accused Ruel Eugenio manages the stall of his mother.
"The accused were arrested [o]n the afternoon of July 9, 1999 after just having alighted from a passenger jeepney
and were walking upwards the Hangar Road, Baguio City. The arrest was the result of an alleged buy[-]bust
 162

operation wherein a poseur buyer had earlier that same afternoon allegedly offered to purchase marijuana from
the accused. Curiously enough, no money was involved in this buy[-]bust operation."7 (Citations omitted)
Appellants testified that they were mere vegetable vendors who were tending their respective stalls beside the
Hangar Market.8 On July 9, 1999, around 1:30 p.m., they both went to the La Trinidad Trading Post in Benguet to
buy some vegetables, which they intended to sell.9 Upon their return, they alighted from a jeepney near the
Reliance furniture store at the corner of Magsaysay Avenue and Hilltop Road.10 While they were walking along
Hilltop Road on their way to their stalls, four unidentified men allegedly blocked their way and pointed guns at
them.11 The four men apprehended and took them to the police station in a taxi.12 It was at the police station
where appellants allegedly saw for the first time the subject marijuana brick, when it was presented to them by the
policemen.13
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that both appellants had been caught in flagrante delicto selling and delivering a marijuana
brick weighing 1,034.5 grams to the poseur-buyer, PO3 Piggangay, during a legitimate buy-bust operation. After
their failure to present clear and convincing evidence that would overcome the testimonies of the police team that
had conducted the operation, the RTC rejected their assertion that they had merely been framed up. The
policemen positively identified them as the sellers of marijuana. Since no ill motive on the part of the former was
shown by the defense, their testimonies could not be disregarded by the court a quo. The presumption of regularity
in their performance of official duties remained. Moreover, the trial court opined that the allegation of frame up was
a desperate attempt, an afterthought on the part of appellants, to extricate themselves from the drug charge
against them.
Hence, this appeal.14
Issue
In their Brief, appellants assign this lone error for our consideration:
"It is therefore respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and totally disregarding the evidence for the defense."15
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Main Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were implausible and unreliable. They further
assert that what actually transpired was a mere frameup, not a buy-bust operation.
Frameup, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. In the case at bar, the allegation of appellants that they had been framed up cannot prevail over the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who, not having any reason to testify falsely against them, positively
identified them as drug dealers.16 We find these testimonies consistent, unequivocal and worthy of credence.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the policemen as public officers were presumed to have performed their official
duties with regularity and in accordance with law.17 This presumption remained steadfast after the defense had
failed to present clear and convincing proof to the contrary.18
The defense also presented Carlito Valdez and Freddie Bautista. They were hairdressers at Carla’s Magic Touch
Beauty Parlor along Hilltop Road, not far from the scene of the buy-bust operation. In their Brief, appellants assert
that these eyewitnesses had no reason to perjure themselves in court and therefore gave credible testimonies.
Supposedly, on July 9, 2000, while they were in front of the parlor calling out to customers, the two witnesses saw
appellants being apprehended by armed men who later turned out to be policemen.19 The law enforcers allegedly
frisked appellants, but failed to recover anything from them.20 No bag was ever handed by the latter to the
former, according to the testimonies of Valdez and Bautista. Appellants were then handcuffed and whisked away.
The eyewitnesses purportedly saw all of this from the beauty parlor, which was only about five meters away from
the site of the arrest.21
However, in view of the conflicting statements Valdez made in court, we find his testimony dubious. We quote the
relevant portion in which he explicitly denied knowing appellants:
"Q: These two persons who were to be apprehended, do you know them?
A: No, sir.
Q: What about the two persons who were going to apprehend, do you know them?
A: No, sir.
Q: So you know none of the four persons?
A: Yes, sir."22
Later, however, he contradicted himself when he acknowledged that he had known appellants as past customers.
On the date of the arrest, he even visited Eugenio’s mother to tell her that her son had been arrested. He testified
thus:
"Q: Now, you said that after Tan and Eugenio were boarded into a Tamaraw FX taxi, you went inside your
shop because you had a customer. After that what did you do? After attending to the customer what did you do?
A: I went to inform their mother of what I saw.
Q: Whose mother?
A: Of the persons arrested.
Q: Both their mothers?
A: Only the mother of Eugenio, sir.
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Q: Why? Before July 9, 1999 did you already know the mother of Eugenio?
A: Yes, sir. I know the mother because I usually buy vegetables from her whenever I go to the province.
Q: Does she own any stall in that vicinity?
A: Yes, sir. I think they are renting.
Q: Where?
A: At Hilltop, sir.
Q: Do you know the name of the mother of Eugenio?
A: No, sir.
Q: All right. When you went to her store what did you tell her?
A: I informed her of what I saw, sir.
Q: If you can still remember, please tell the Honorable Court exactly what were your words in telling her
about what you saw?
A: I said, ‘Your son was apprehended.’"23
To our mind, this unexplained vacillation in the testimony of Valdez casts serious doubt on his credibility as an
eyewitness and, ultimately, undermines the defense of appellants. He could not have been an impartial bystander
as he would have liked the trial court to believe, for he was already familiar with them even before July 9, 2000, or
the day of the arrest. Bautista likewise testified to having known them even prior to the date of the arrest, for they
used to be customers of the beauty parlor.24In the face of the policemen’s positive testimony, appellants’ denial is
self-serving and has little weight in law.25 We have held that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are
not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of
guilt."26
Thus, there exists no cogent reason to abandon the findings of the trial court, which gave credence to the
prosecution evidence. Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will not disturb on appeal the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, absent any arbitrariness or oversight in the appreciation of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance.27
Appellants also contend that the policemen could not have planned a buy-bust operation in so short a time. The
team was formed right after the policemen had received a report from a civilian informer around 12 noon of July 9,
1999. Without first conducting a surveillance of appellants, they were already holding negotiations for the sale of
marijuana at 1:00 p.m. They arrested appellants a few hours later, after the latter had supposedly returned from
La Trinidad, Benguet. The operation seemed too simple and easy.
Further, appellants seemed so dumb as to openly deal drugs to a person they had just met for the first time. No
money even changed hands; PO2 Piggangay merely offered to pay after delivery.
We cannot sustain appellants’ contention that the buy-bust operation was a sham, simply because no prior
surveillance was conducted, and the entire operation lasted only for several hours. After a careful consideration of
all the events that transpired before, during and after the arrest, we agree with the lower court that the accounts
of the prosecution witnesses were plausible. There is nothing in their testimonies that would engender any
suspicion that the operation was a deception.
Furthermore, the officers were not ordinary policemen. They were operatives of the 14th Narcom group, which
specifically operated to curtail illegal drug activities. Since they were more experienced and familiar with drug
cases than ordinary police officers, we find nothing improbable or peculiar about their planned buy-bust operation
that was to be conducted in a span of several hours and even without prior surveillance.
There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken
especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant.28 Prior
surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation,29 there being no fixed
or textbook method for conducting one.30 We have held that when time is of essence, the police may dispense
with the need for prior surveillance.31
Moreover, it was not improbable for appellants to deal drugs openly in a public place to persons they hardly knew,
for drug dealers are known to sell their goods even to strangers. They ply their wares wherever prospective
customers may be found. They have indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the law.32
It is of no moment that no money changed hands. Considering that appellants were charged with the sale or
delivery of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime may be sufficiently established even in the absence of
an exchange of money.33 There is no rule that requires a simultaneous exchange of money and prohibited drug
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.34 Accordingly, the presentation of buy-bust money is not indispensable
to the prosecution of a drug case.35
Finally, appellants attribute ill motive to the civilian informant who, they allege, was denied a share in the reward
for identifying drug traffickers. However, this accusation was based merely on suspicion and was unsubstantiated
by any evidence. Appellants failed to show proof that the policemen were motivated by ill will in arresting them.
None having been shown, the logical conclusion is that none actually existed.36 We stress that Appellant Jimmy
Tan even testified that he and his co-accused did not have any previous quarrel or misunderstanding with the
arresting policemen. We quote from his testimony:
"Q: Now you don’t have any previous quarrels or misunderstanding with Police Officer Juan Pi[gy]gangay or
any of the members of the PNP Narcom who apprehended you and Ruel Eugenio at Reliance Store vicinity, is it
not?
A: None, sir.
Q: You don’t know of any reason why any of them would tell a lie against you and your co-accused, Ruel
Eugenio?
 164

A: None also, sir."37

In sum, the prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
Possession or use of Prohibited Drugs and Distinction between Illegal sale and illegal possession of
drugs
[GRN 97111 September 4, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, us. MONICA PADILLA y SAN PEDRO, AURORA SAN
PEDRO y CESAR, defendants-appellants.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of mila. Br. 28.
Th. facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal of the accused from the decision dated July 26, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
28, which convicted them of illegal sale (drug-pushing) and possession of marijuana punishable under Sections 4
and 8, respectively, of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced each of them to suffer: "(1) imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) and a fine of P20,000.00 for the first offense; and (2) imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and a fine of P15,000.00 for the other offense, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, (and) with costs de oficio " (p. 34, Rollo).
By the evidence of the prosecution, it was established that from September 4, 1988 to November 2, 1988, the
members of Police Station No. 4 of Manila conducted a surveillance of reported drug-pushing activities of the three
sisters residing in Sampaloc, Manila. In the process, the police arrested two persons involved in the drug
commerce, who pointed to the sisters Victoria Venus Reyes, Monica Padilla and Aurora San Pedro, as their source
of the prohibited drugs.
On November 2, 1988, the members of Police Station No. 4 applied for a search warrant from the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 33, and formed three (3) groups to launch a buy-bust operation against the suspects on
November 3, 1988, at 11:00 A.M. P/Cpl. Martin Orolfo of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
acted as the poseur-buyer.
Upon reaching the house of Victoria Reyes, the informer intraduced Cpl. Orolfo as a buyer and user of marijuana to
Victoria and Monica who happened to be in the same place. Monica asked Cpl. Orolfo how many tea bags of
marijuana he would like to buy. He replied that he wanted to buy rive (5) of them and handed to her one (1)
twenty-peso bill (1120 00) and one five-peso bill (P5.00). Monica went inside Victoria's house and after a while her
sister, Aurora San Pedro, came out and handed Orolfo five (5) tea bags of marijuana. At this juncture, Cpl. Orolfo,
gave the pre-arranged signal for his companions to swoop down on the houses of the accused within the
compound. They presented their search warrant and in the presence of Barangay Captain Francisco Eugenio, the
team conducted their search for prohibited drugs.
Their search yielded seventy-five (75) tea bags containing marijuana, one-half (1/2) kilo of dried marijuana leaves,
plus one hundred twenty pesos (P120.00) cash which they found inside a cabinet of Monica. One kilo of marijuana
was recovered from the houses of Victoria Reyes and Aurora San Pedro. Sgt. Amado Inabangan, P/Cpl. Martin
Orolfo and Sgt. Enrique David issued and signed a receipt for the properties they seized from Aurora, Monica, and
Victoria, who also signed the receipt. They were thereafter brought to the police station.
An examination of the confiscated drugs was conducted by the NBI forensic chemists upon the request of Police
Station No. 4. The report of the NBI forensic chemists showed that the specimens submitted for examination were
positive for marijuana.
Three (3) informations were filed on November 8, 1988, by the Assistant City Prosecutor charging Monica Padilla y
San Pedro and Aurora SanPedro y Cesar separately for the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in
violation of See. 8, R.A. 6425, and a third Information charging them jointly with illegal sale of prohibited drugs in
violation of Section 4 of the same law. The three (3) informations read as follows:
I "I'he undersigned accuses MONICA PADILLA Y SAN PEDRO Alias MONIC of a violation of Section 8, Article 11, in
relation to Section 2(e) (i), Article I of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, and further
amended by Batas Pambansa Big. 179, committed as follows:
"That on or about November 3, 1988, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in her
possession and under her custody and control the following, to wit:
"Seventy-five (75) pcs. of plastic tea bags containing dried flowering tops of marijuana: and One (1) plastic bag
containing one (1) block of dried flowering tops of marijuana which is a prohibited drug." (Italics ours; p.1,
Records, Vol. 1-a.)
Il "The undersigned accuses AURORA SAN PEDRO Y CESAR Alias AURING of a violation of Section 8, Article II, in
relation to Section 2(e) (i) of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, and as further
amended by Bates Pambansa Blg. 179, committed as follows;
"That on or about November 3, 1988, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in her
possession and under her custody and control the following, to wit:
"Forty-rive (45) small transparent plastic bags containing dried flowering tops of marijuana which is a prohibited
drug." (Emphasis supplied; p.1, Records, Vol. 1-b.)
III "The undersigned accuses MONICA PADILLA Y SAN PEDRO Alias MONIC and AURORA SAN PEDRO Y CESAR alias
AURING of a violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21(b) of Article IV, Republic Act 6425, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, committed as follows:
 165

"That on or about November 3, 1988, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to
another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell, deliver or give away to
another Five (5) plastic tea bags containing dried flowering tops of marijuana, which is a prohibited drug." (Italics
supplied; p. 1, Records, VOL 1.)
The appellants were arraigned separately on January 6, 1989, January 9, 1989, and April 12, 1989 assisted by
their respective counsels and entered pleas of "not guilty" to the offenses charged in the informations.
The prosecution presented during the trial NBI Forensic Chemist Marietta Bien, P/Sgt. Enrique David, Cpl. Martin
Orolfo, both of the Drug Enforcement Unit WPD, Maria Carina Madrigal-Javier, another forensic chemist of the NBI,
and Barangay Chairman Francisco Eugenio of Zone 55, Bgy. 563, Sampaloc, Manila.
The defense, on the other hand. presented the two accused and Jaime Ng of 828 Leyte Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
and David Padilla, the 12-year-old son of Monica Padilla. Monica testified that the marijuana and cash money were
found in her sister Victoria's house. She denied having anything to do with the same. She admitted that she knew
that her sister Victoria was engaged in the marijuana trade, hut she did not mind it. She alleged that at the police
station and city jail, P/Sgt. Enrique David and Cpl. Orolfo asked for P30,000.00 each from her and her two sisters,
but they had no money to give.
Aurora San Pedro corroborated the testimony of Monica Padilla. She alleged that the two policemen really asked for
P30,000.00 from each of them for their release but she had no money to give. On cross-examination, she denied
having met or seen the barangay officials during the search of her house. She alleged that she was made to sign a
blank piece of paper at that time.
David Padilla, the 12-year-old son of Monica, testified that on November 3, 1988, at about 11:30 A.M., he was
preparing to go to school when he saw policemen in a Ford Fiera and an owner-type jeep alight at the street
corner, and proceeded to the house of Victoria Reyes where his mother, Monica Padilla, was visiting at the time.
The policemen searched the house of Victoria Reyes and arrested her, including his mother, and took them to
Police Station No. 4.
Another witness, Jaime Ng, a resident of 828 Leyte Street, Sampaloc, Manila, testified that on the same date and
time, he was at the street corner buying rice when he saw some policemen get off a Ford Fiera. They asked a
woman to come down from her house, and they brought out of the house of Victoria a blue and red plastic bag and
arrested her and Monica.
Cpl. Martin Orolfo refuted the allegation of the accused, Monica Padilla, that there was no buy-bust operation, no
search in her house and that he and Sgt. Enrique David demanded money from each of the accused. Barangay
Councilman Francisco Feliciano was also presented by the prosecution. He cor. roborated the testimony of
Barangay Chairman Francisco Eugenio that they were present when the search was made by the police who found
tea bags of marijuana in the houses of the accused.
A separate information was filed against Victoria Reyes for illegal possession of two blocks of dried marijuana tops
and 55 pieces of small plastic bags containing flowering tops of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Republic Act
6425, as amended. By plea-bargaining with the prosecution, she pleaded guilty to, and was convicted by the trial
court, of illegal possession of a volatile substance punishable under Sec. 2, P.D. 619. She was sentenced to suffer a
straight penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years.
After the trial of Monica and Aurora, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-67924-
26 on July 26, 1990, finding both of them guilty of the crime charged.
Appellants appealed alleging that the trial court erred:
1. In believing the prosecution's version that there was a buybust operation conducted by the police operatives on
November 3, 1988;
2. In giving weight to the inconsistent and conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding
the evidence for the defense;
3. In convicting the accused of the crimes charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and 4. In convicting the accused of having violated Sections 4 and 8, Art. II, Republic Act 6,125,
as amended, despite the fact that possession of prohibited drug under Section 8 is inherent in the offense of selling
them under Section 4, and, therefore, deemed absorbed in the latter.
The above contentions of the appellants are belied by the evidence in the, record. Appellant Monica Padilla was
positively identified by the prosecution witness, P-/Cpl. Orolfo, as the person to whom he gave the marked money,
and appellant Aurora San Pedro as the one who gave him the five (5) tea hags of marijuana. Hence:
"QWhen you and your confidential information (sic) were there, what happened?
"AWe were approached by Victoria Venus Reyes who was at the veranda of the house and Monica Padilla and we
proceeded to the veranda. Then I was introduced as buyer by my informant and that I am user of marijuana.
Monica asked me how much will I buy from them and after I told her that I want to buy five teabags of marijuana.
Then I handed to her P25.00 pesos, consisting of one twenty peso bill and one five peso bill.
"Q What did she do after receiving the money from you?
"A She went inside the house.
"Q Whose house?
"A The house of Victoria Venus Reyes.
"Q After that what happened next?
"A One alias Auring appeared and handed to me rive bags. This Aurora San Pedro handed to me five pieces of
teabags.
"Q After receiving that rive teabags what did you do?
 166

"A After receiving the five teabags, I prepared to take out my eyeglasses.
"Q Why did you prepare to remove your eyeglasses?
"A That was our pre-arranged signal.
"Q After you took off your eyeglasses as your pre-arranged signal, what happened next?
"A I identified myself as police officer and placed Aurora San Pedro under arrest. And then immediately Sgt. David
and Pat. Inabangan assisted me and we arrested Monica Padilla and then we immediately went inside the house."
(pp. 9-10, tan, July 13, 1989.)
The prosecution witnesses testified that marijuana tea bags were recovered from each of the houses of the three
(3) appellants and were duly receipted for. Hence:
"Q What did you do in the house of Victoria Reyes?
"A We just passed-by in that house then I immediately brought Monica Padilla to her house sir.
"Q Now when you brought Monica Padilla from the house of Victoria Reyes, what did you do?
A I presented her the sear, Ii warrant wherein she acknowledged the search warrant after showing her the same
sir.
"Q Now after this Monica Padilla signed this search warrant, what did you do?
"AWe immediately conducted the search in the presence of barangay officials. We confiscated blocks of prohibited
drugs air and we issued the receipt with the corresponding evidence sir.
"Q To be more specific, will you please tell the Honorable Court from what house were you able to recover
marijuana?
"A Actually air, from the three houses, we recovered different prohibited drugs.
"COURT: Namely?
"A The houses of Monica Padilla, Aurora San Pedro and Victoria Reyes Your Honor.
"PROSECUTOR "QWhat is the number of those three houses?
"A It has only one number, that is No. 2161 Visayan Avenue, corner Leyte St., Sampaloc, Manila air.
"Q They are side by side each other'
"A Yes sir.
NAll the three houses were searched by your team subject of the search warrant?
"A Yes air.
"Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court what is the stuff you recovered from the house of Monica Padilla?
"A I confiscated about seventy five (75) pieces of teabags containing marijuana dried leaves and then one (1) kilo
of prohibited dried marijuana leaves plus P120.00 cash money as fruit of the sale of prohibited drugs sir.
"Q In what part of the house where you found the seventy five (75) teabags of marijuana tops and leaves?
"A We found the prohibited drugs inside the small 'aparador' of Monica Padilla sir.
"Q How about the blocks of flower tops of marijuana?
"A In the same place, they were together sir." (pp. 25-29, tsn, July 7, 1989.)
It was not altogether improbable that the police officers would find the three (3) accused sisters together in the
house of Victoria at eleven o'clock in the morning for they all lived in adjoining houses within the same compound.
Appellants assail the testimony of Sgt. Inabangan on the buy-bust operation because he admitted that he did not
actually see to whom Cpl. Orolfo and the informant gave P25.00 as payment for five (5) tea bags of marijuana. The
handing of payment and the delivery of the marijuana tea bags, were proven by competent evidence. "Credence
should be accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary." (People vs. Sariol, 174
SCRA 239; People vs. Segwaben, 194 SCRA 239, 240.)
With regard to some minor inconsistencies between the affidavits and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
we have previously pointed out that because affidavits are usually taken ex parte, they are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate but they do not really detract from the credibility of the witnesses.
Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting them of possession of prohibited drugs because
possession of the drugs is inherent in the offense of selling them under Section 4 of the same law, is not well
taken. While this Court ruled in People vs. Andiza, 164 SCRA 643, "that the possession of marijuana is inherent in
the crime of selling them," that ruling referred to the possession of the same batch of marijuana that the accused
was vending and which she surrendered voluntarily upon her arrest and apprehension.
In the case at bar, however, the bags of marijuana, for the possession of which Monica and Aurora were
prosecuted, were not the same marijuana which they sold to Orolfo during the buy-bust operation, hut unsold
stocks of marijuana which they kept in their houses and which the police discovered during the search with proper
warrant. The sale of prohibited drugs in the streets and the possession of more drugs in the houses of the accused
constitute distinct crimes of illegal vending and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. There is no reason to treat
with leniency the illegal possession of unsold stocks of marijuana in the houses of the accused, by considering it
"absorbed" in the crime of selling the prohibited plant, for they have an enormous potential for wreaking havoc on
the minds and character of those who fall pre- to the destructive lure of prohibited drugs.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, we AFFIRM it in toto, but with the clarification
that the term of imprisonment for the crime of vending prohibited drugs is properly life imprisonment, which is not
to be confounded, or interchanged, with. reclusion perpetua which is a distinct penalty provided in the Revised
Penal Code that carries certain accessory penalties not inherent in life imprisonment. Only in this respect, is the
appealed decision modified.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 92850. June 15, 1992.]
 167

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, accused-

appellant.
Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City, Metro Manila, 1
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 197Z, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the
costs. 2
In an information dated July 18, 1988, appellant Angeles was charged with the aforestated violation for having
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold and delivered 0.13 grams of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, "shabu" in
common parlance, which is a regulated drug. 3 At the arraignment, Angeles pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him and trial on the merits thereafter proceeded.
The findings of the trial court reveal that on July 16, 1988, Lt. Reuben Theodore Sindac of the Narcotics
Intelligence Operation Group based in Camp Crame, Quezon City received an intelligence report from a confidential
informant that a certain Rolando Angeles was engaged in drug pushing in Pasay City. A brief surveillance was
conducted to confirm the report, after which a team was formed to conduct the buy-bust operation. The team was
composed of said Lt. Sindac, team leader; Sgt. Flordeliz Nocom, as the poseur-buyer; Sgt. Cesar Dalonos and Sgt.
Jaime Sapon, the last two as support team members. 4
At 2:00 P.M. of the same day, the team proceeded to San Juan Street in Pasay City, the place where the alleged
drug pushing was taking place. The confidential informant introduced Sgt. Nocom to appellant Angeles. After a
brief conversation, Sgt. Nocom asked Angeles if she can buy "shabu" worth P200.00. Angeles then left for a while
and entered a compound. After ten minutes, he returned and showed Sgt. Nocom something wrapped in an
aluminum foil. 5
Angeles handed the foil to Sgt. Nocom who examined it. When she found that the foil contained crystalline
granules, which she reasonably suspected to be "shabu," Sgt. Nocom gave the agreed signal by scratching her
head: whereupon her companions, who were deployed in an area not far from where the transaction was taking
place, immediately rushed forward. They took hold of Angeles, placed him under arrest, and subsequently brought
him to their office at Camp Crame for investigation.
On July 19, 1988, the arresting officers, Lt. Sindac and Sgts. Dalonos and Sapon, executed a "Joint Affidavit of
Arrest" which was formally offered in evidence as Exhibit "F" 7 while Sgt. Nocom executed an "Affidavit of Poseur-
Buyer" on the same date, which document was marked and presented as Exhibit "A". 8
The suspected "shabu" was taken to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory Service for examination and was found positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. 9 The prosecution submitted Chemistry Report No. D-665-
88, dated July 18, 1985, 10 confirming said laboratory findings.
The evidence for the defense, on the other hand, avers that Angeles was 41 years old, married, an employee, and
residing at 124 San Juan Street, Pasay City. His version is that on July 16, 1988, at around 10:00 A.M., he was at
home with his child and was washing the dishes when four NARCOM agents barged into their house and handcuffed
him. These NARCOM agents, who were then in civilian clothes, were looking for a certain person and they tried to
force Angeles to tell them where they can find that person. When the NARCOM agents failed to extract information
from him, Angeles was forced into a car, driven around the place, and was later brought to Camp Crame. 11
During the investigation in Camp Crame, Angeles was allegedly mauled by the arresting officers. The investigation
conducted there was reduced to writing and he signed the same the document being thereafter marked and
admitted as Exhibit "2" for the defense. 12 Appellant's version on the matter of his arrest at their residence was
corroborated by the testimony of his sister who was supposedly there when he was arrested by the NARCOM
agents. 13
After trial, the court a quo rendered a judgment of conviction as aforestated. In this appeal, appellant contends
that the trial court erred in finding that methyl amphetamine hydrochloride is a regulated drug, and in considering
him guilty of a violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, on the basis of the evidence
submitted in the instant case. 14
Appellant maintains that the trial court was without jurisdiction because he was "not charged of a valid offense,"
since methyl amphetamine hydrochloride is allegedly not listed as a regulated drug under Board Regulation No. 6,
Series of 1972, issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board on December 11, 1972.
We reject appellants submission and hereby rule that methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu" or `poor man's cocaine," is a regulated drug. This is evident from the definition thereof in Section 2,
paragraph (e)(2), Article I of the law, to wit:
"(2) 'Regulated drug,' which includes self-inducing sedatives, such as secobarbital, phenobarbital, pentobarbital,
barbital, amobarbital and any other drug which contains a salt or a derivative of a salt of barbituric acids and salt,
isomer or salt of an isomer, of amphetamine, such as benzedrine or dexedrine, or any drug which produces a
physiological action similar to amphetamine; and hypnotic drugs, such as methaqualone, netrazepam or any other
compound producing similar physiological effects." 15 (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant is only partly correct in stating that the term methyl amphetamine hydrochloride has not been specifically
mentioned in the law. It is, however, not only deemed included in the aforequoted provision because the same is a
derivative of the generic drug known as amphetamines, but is in fact listed in the implementing regulation as a
regulated drug, as hereinbelow explained. Actually. only the word "hydrochloride" is not mentioned since it merely
denotes that the drug contains a compound of hydrochloric acid used with the names of organic bases for
convenience in naming salts, and to distinguish it from chloride which is a compound of chlorine with another
element or radical. 16
 168

The term amphetamine is not to be understood in its limited ordinary sense. Obviously, of course, only those who
are fortunate enough to have been exposed to the study of the preparation, composition, and nature of this drug in
the wider fields of medicine, pharmacology and forensic chemistry have a clear grasp of its effects and what it
consists of. For this reason, we feel it worthwhile to briefly expound on the matter, for the satisfaction of appellant
and those who would question the expertise of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Amphetamines are synthetic amines which act with a pronounced stimulant effect on the central nervous system.
17 They are the first and last drugs which cause a subjective feeling of improved mood - true euphoria, in fact -
and it is for this reason that they cause states of psychic dependence. 18
There are about fifty amphetamines or amphetamine-like preparations available. They include, among others,
methyl amphetamine (methedrine), 19 under which preparation the drug involved in this case is classified.
Furthermore, it is not true that methyl amphetamine hydrochloride is not contemplated by the Dangerous Drugs
Board in its aforesaid Drugs Board Regulation No. 6. Said regulation, which lists down the regulated drugs under
the law, specifically contains this item: "Methyl-amphetamine (e) - Methamphetamine, A," the classification "A"
meaning that it is an amphetamine, as distinguished from other classifications, such as barbiturates, hypnotics,
tranquilizers, and so forth.
On the issue of jurisdiction, we agree with appellant that where the information does not charge an offense, such
objection may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 20
This argument invoked by appellant is, however, of no consequence in the case at bar since, from the foregoing
disquisition, the information validly charges an offense within the jurisdiction of the court below.
As regards the alleged non-consummation of the transaction between appellant and the poseur-buyer for lack of
payment to the former, we reiterate our ruling in People vs. De la Cruz, 21 that the crime is consummated by the
mere delivery of the prohibited drug. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not
limited to, the act of delivering. In the aforecited case, the act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another,
personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. This is
precisely the reason why the non-presentation of the marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not fatal to
the case and is not indispensable for the conviction of the accused.
Furthermore, appellant Angeles is charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, which provides:
"SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The
Penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. If the victim is a minor or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein shall be imposed."
Therefore, since the information under which appellant was charged included the acts of sale or delivery, proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of said acts is sufficient for conviction under this provision of
law. 22
On the matter of credibility, we are inclined to give more credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
as against those of the defense witnesses. The prosecution witnesses are law enforcers who performed the buy-
bust operation in the performance of their official duty and pursuant to lawful orders of their superiors. As a rule
and in the absence of proof to the contrary, these law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty. 23 It is on this premise that once again we accord more belief and credit to the narration of the incident by
these witnesses, as the trial court itself has done, especially considering its vantage position in gauging the
credibility of the witnesses by personal observation during the trial.
Further bolstering the cause of the prosecution, appellant merely anchored his defense on alibi. It is trite hut
necessary to again stress that, in accordance with existing jurisprudence, such defense is inherently weak because
it can easily be manufactured and fabricated. 24 For alibi to be given credence, we have interminably reiterated
that it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 25
Applying such doctrinal rules in the instant case, it is clear than appellant failed to meet these requirements of
place and time. He was precisely at the place where the alleged buy-bust operation took place and at almost the
same time as alleged by the prosecution witnesses. The testimony of another defense witness corroborating that of
the accused cannot be given weight as the same is tainted with demonstrable bias and prejudice. Moreover, in
People vs. Cabanit, 26 we ruled that the defense of alibi is necessarily weak where it is established mainly by the
accused himself and his immediate relatives, and not by impartial and credible persons.
Well entrenched is the rule that the conviction of an accused person must rest not on the weakness of the defense
but on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution. 27 That rule has been clearly satisfied and duly
complied with in the present cage, the prosecution having amply proved the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. The documentary and testimonial evidence which it has presented engenders moral certainty and
constitutes that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 28
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, with costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Distinction between illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs
[GRN L-71986 August 19, 1988.*]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGIE ANDIZA y ORIA, defendant-appellant.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Br. 59. Garcia, J.
 169

There are two clashing versions of what transpired in the evening of January 25, 1984 at No. 333, Mindoro Street,
Mountain View Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City.
The version put forward by the prosecution, and upheld by the trial court,1 is as follows:
Together with a civilian informer, the group of Sgt. Edgardo Raquidan, Pat. Celestino de la Cruz, and Pat. Pedro
Hernandez set off at about nine in the evening of January 25, 1984 for the abovestated residence where the
appellant, already the subject of a week's surveillance,2 lived. Upon reaching the place, Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de
la Cruz positioned themselves just outside the steel gate while Pat. Hernandez and the civilian informer proceeded
to the entrance door. The appellant came out of the house, talked with Pat. Hernandez and the civilian informer for
about a minute, went back inside the house and, after a while, came out again, this time with a "Hope" cigarette
pack. She gave the "Hope" pack to the civilian informer, who passed it on to Pat. Hernandez. Pat. Hernandez
examined the contents of the pack, and pretending to be satisfied, he then pulled out from his pocket two marked
P20.00-bills which he handed over to the civilian informer who, in turn, gave the money to the appellant.
Thereupon, Pat. Hernandez gave the pre-arranged signal by touching his hair, signifying that the deal was
completed.3 Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de la Cruz, who were some ten meters away from the spot where the
exchange took place,4 immediately approached the appellant, introduced themselves to her as NARCOM agents,
and placed her under arrest, Sgt. Raquidan took the marked bills from the accused.5 Convinced by Sgt. Raquidan
to surrender to his group other stuffs of marijuana which may still be in her possession, the appellant voluntarily
turned over to them a brown paper bag containing 23 sticks of hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes, three small plastic
bags with dried marijuana fruiting tops inside, and several pieces of empty plastic bag. At about this time, the
NARCOM agents noticed a man standing near them looking like a drug addict. Upon questioning, the man identified
himself as Antonio Manuel, and admitted that he was there to buy more marijuana from the appellant.6 Searched,
the man's wallet yielded two sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Thereafter, the appellant and Antonio Manuel were
brought to the NARCOM office at Angeles.
Vehemently denying that she was guilty of the charges brought against her, the appellant gave a different account
of the incident. She testified that on the night in question, she was attending as a "tong" collector for four Mah-
Jongg players who were playing Mah-jongg at the garage of the house where she was staying. As she was
watching the game, while seated beside one of the players, a man suddenly barged in and pulled her for no reason
at all. The same man poked a gun at her, and forced her to go with him outside the gate where she was thrust into
a waiting car with two men inside and taken to the NARCOM office. The man who dragged her out of the premises
where she lived, whom she came to know as Pat. Celestino de la Cruz, accused her of being a drug pusher. Pat. de
la Cruz then pulled out from a drawer the marijuana items involved in this case, placed these in front of her, and
forced her to admit that these were hers, but she refused, whereupon he slapped her. She denied having known
Antonio Manuel before, and claimed that she saw him for the first time only at the NARCOM office on the very night
she was taken there. She like wise denied that the marked bills were found in her possession, alleging instead that
while she was at the NARCOM office, Sgt. Raquidan, whom she met for the first time there, made her stand up,
shoved a P100.00-bill into her pocket, after which Sgt. Raquidan pulled it out and said: "What is this?" to which
she replied that it was not hers.7
Subsequently, three separate informations were filed: two separate informations against the appellant for selling as
well as possessing marijuana, in violation of Sections 4 and 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; and another information against Antonio Manuel for violation of the
same law.8
The trial court accorded greater weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. It pronounced the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged thereby sentencing her as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No- 6499, to THIRTY (30) YEARS of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
2. In Crim. Case No. 6500, to SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P6,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.9
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, the appellant came to this Court.
The appellant contends that the testimonies of Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de Is Cruz are pure hearsay because these
witnesses were not the ones who actually transacted with the appellant for the alleged purchase of marijuana; and
that, in fact, the two key persons supposedly involved in the "buybust" operation, namely Pat. Hernandez and the
civilian informer, were never presented as witnesses during the trial.
This contention is untenable. The testimonies of both Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de la Cruz were based on their actual
and personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, being eyewitnesses to the incident in question. They may not have
been within hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed tones, but they
were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the poseurs-buyers. It is not disputed
that the area just outside the door of the house, where the exchange took place, was welllighted,10 but that
beyond the steel gate it was dark, such that a person positioned outside the gate could easily see the people inside
by peeping between the steel bars and remain undetected.11
In this case, there are no compelling reasons to depart from the general rule that factual findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed because courts have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses while they are testifying on the witness stand.
Moreover, the principal prosecution witnesses were all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have
regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.12
Furthermore, we find the testimonies of the above eyewitnesses, given during the direct as well as in the cross
examinations, to be consistent and compatible on the material points. Both Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de Is Cruz
 170

categorically stated that they saw the appellant come out of the house, converse with the civilian informer and Pat.
Hernandez, go back inside the house only to re-emerge after a few minutes with what appeared to be a pack of
"Hope" cigarettes. They watched as the appellant handed the cigarette pack over to the civilian informer who, in
turn, gave the same to Pat. Hernandez. They witnessed the transfer of the marked bills from the hand of Pat,
Hernandez to the civilian informer, and finally to the appellant.
The appellant underscores the fact that Pat. Hernandez and the civilian informer were not made to take the witness
stand, and maintains that their non-presentation rendered a fatal blow to the prosecution's case. We do not agree.
Admittedly, Pat. Hernandez and the civilian informer would be highly competent witnesses, being, themselves, the
poseurs-buyers;
however, their testimonies are not indispensable in view of the declarations of not only one, but two other
eyewitnesses. If presented, their testimonies would merely constitute cumulative evidence, thus, their non-
presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression of testimony that is adverse to the prosecution.13 At any
rate, the matter of presenting witnesses for the People is a prerogative of the prosecuting fiscal. In the instant
case, there was no need to present Pat. Hernandez because the testimonies of Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de la Cruz,
together with those of Cpl. Romeo Consengco, and the forensic chemist, Daisy Panganiban, were already clear,
sufficient, and convincing. Besides, the defense could have requested the court below to issue subpoenas requiring
the said eyewitnesses to testify, but as the defense apparently failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said
eyewitnesses' testimonies would have been adverse to the prosecution.
Additionally, the appellant contends that there were no marked bills in her possession at the time of her arrest as,
in fact, the statements of Sgt. Raquidan to the effect that he made the subject markings, were inconsistent with
his earlier statements. The alleged inconsistency was, however, explained by Sgt. Raquidan himself in the course
of his testimony, thus:
Q. So you do not know if you are the one who placed the marking?.
A. I'm not sure that I placed the marking because if I can see the money I can pinpoint it.14
Indeed, after having been shown the two P20.00-bills, Sgt. Raquidan acknowledged that it was he who placed the
markings on those bills, and this fact was confirmed by the other prosecution witnesses. But even if the purported
contradictory statements were to be excluded, there still remains sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for
"drug-pushing." In any case, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the matter of who actually placed
the markings is a minor detail which cannot substantially affect the finding of guilt by the trial court.
Besides the foregoing seeming inconsistency, no other discrepancy in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
was raised in the brief of the appellant.
Significantly, nowhere in the appellant's brief is there any mention of Antonio Manuel who was arrested on the
same occasion with the appellant. In fact, the sworn statement of Manuel,15 in which he categorically stated that
he bought from the appellant the marijuana found in his wallet, was never controverted.
Interestingly, Pat. de la Cruz testified that one or two days before they undertook the "buy-bust" operation, he
himself witnessed the sale of marijuana by the appellant to a person whom the police asked to pose as buyer; that
purposely, the appellant was not arrested then because the police were expecting the "Igorot supplier" of
marijuana to the appellant to arrive on the Keith of January, and were planning to entrap the two.16
On the other hand, the testimonies of the appellant and of his single witness, Ricardo Policarpio, only served to
weaken their credibility. For instance, it is very odd, considering that it was her aunt. Lucy Oria, who requested her
to go to Angeles City, that the appellant did not bother, at all, not even out of curiosity, to ask Lucy Oria for what
reason and for how long had she been detained.17 The explanation given by the appellant that she was too
shocked to ask, is unbelievable. Her surprise in seeing her aunt behind bars, if true, should have all the more
provoked her to ask a barrage of questions. Moreover, while the appellant repeatedly stated that when she arrived
in Angeles City at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, on January 22, 1985, Lucy Oria was already detained at the
city jail,18 Ricardo Policarpio confidently declared that on January 22, 1985, he saw Lucy Oria at her residence in
Mountain View Subdivision.19
Another inconsistency is Policarpio's statement during crossexamination, that he did not see if the appellant was
dragged into a jeep, car, or truck as he only heard the sound of a vehicle,20 as against his sworn statement, to
wit: "That the man succeeded in pushing Virgie and bring her outside. I noticed that there was a jeep parked near
the gate and forcibly brought Virgie on (sic) the said jeep."21 Also, according to the appellant, there were two men
and two women playing Mah-Jongg;22 but, according to Policarpio, aside from him there were two men and one
woman.23
In sum, the defense evidence which is replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities, as extensively discussed in
the trial court's decision, does not inspire belief The version of the prosecution, backed by the positive identification
by eyewitnesses, pointing to the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, is decidedly more credible than the tale
related by the appellant, which was correctly rejected by the trial court.
All considered, we hold that the guilt of the appellant Andiza has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. However,
the trial court erred, in not considering that the possession of marijuana is inherent in the crime of selling them,24
and in not applying the rule that when the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.25
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 6499 for the sale of marijuana is AFFIRMED except that there
shall be no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 6500 for possession
of prohibited drugs is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 171

[GRN 392928 January 21,1992*.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO CATAN, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the judgment af the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 152.
The Appellant herein was, in the same criminal prosecution, charged with and convicted of two (2) separate
offenses of sale of a prohibited drug punished by Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended), and of possession of a prohibited drug punished under Section 8 of the same law. The dispositive
portion of the Court a quo's verdict reads:
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Eugenio Caton y Gerona guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of selling dried marijuana, a prohibited drug, defined and punished under Section 4, Article II,
RA 6425, as amended, without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant thereto and sentences him
to suffer life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua), and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
"The Court further finds the same accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the same inforniation of the crime of
possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, defined and punished under the second paragraph of Section 8, Article
II, RA 6425, as amended, without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant thereto and sentences
him to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
"In both cases the dried marijuana and one stick of marijuana cigarette subject of the offense are confiscated in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law."
Challenging the above adjudication, Appellant is before us on appeal.
The facts follow: On 8 April 1989, the Special Action Team, NARCOM, headed by Lt. Maximo Valiente, decided to
conduct a "buy-bust" operation at No. 49-A Madrigal Compound, Bgy Corazon de Tesiiq, San 1,ian, Metro Vanila. A
of operation was _____ tot he polic at around 10:30 am on said date. Two (2) members of the team, C2C
Crisostorno and C2C Bascuna, acting as poseur-buyers, sought out Appellant at the said address, Inside the latter's
house, they negotiated for the purchase of 300 grams of marijuana worth P450.00. In the meantime, the other
members of the team positioned themselves outside. Crisostomo and Bascuria gave the amount of P500.00 to
Appellant consisting of five (5) marked P100.00 bills with serial numbers DG 664874, CN 548451, GS 003354, DR
757996 aria HH 793977 (TSN, 7 Nov. 1989, p. 8), which numbers had been earlier recorded in the logbook of the
NARCOM. Appellant then gave them the change of P50.00 and the 300 grams of marijuana (TSN, 7 Nov. 1989, pp.
3-5).
Soon after receiving the marijuana from Appellant, Crisostomo and Bascuna went out of the house and gave a
prearranged signal to their companions who were waiting outside. The other team members rushed inside the
house and arrested Appellant. Appellant, however, was able to pass the marked bills to a companion inside the
house who was able to escape during the commotion that ensued. The marked bills were never recovered.
Immediately thereafter, the NARCOM team conducted a search of the premises (TSN, 7 Nov. 1989, pp, 7-10) in
the presence of barangay official, Jess Abundo, a certain Mrs. Catan, the house owner, and Appellant. The search
yielded the following: a) 3,6287 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops in four separate bundles wrapped in
newspaper and transparent plastic all placed in a carton box marked "Windmill Wrappers;" b) 0.9407 kilos of dried
marijuana flowering tops inside a plastic bag marked "5 & Up Textile Mart," c) one (1) stick of marijuana cigarette;
d) 23.49 grams of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in newspaper with markings and placed in a transparent
plastic bag, and 3) 189.71 grams of marijuana seeds wrapped in a pink plastic bag and placed inside another
plastic bag marked "Bakers Fair." All the above were confirmed as marijuana after a laboratory examination.
For his part, Appellant denied both charges although he admits that he was inside the house on 8 April 1989. He
claims, though, that he was sick at the time. He testified that Crisestomo and Bascuma arrested him without a
warrant and conducted a search without any search warrant . He denied that a buy bust operation took place,
much less having received P450.00 as payment for marijuana. He further alleged that the search yielded nothing
and that he saw the marijuana, which was presented in Court, for the first time inside a box in a van in which he
rode when he was taken by the operatives to Camp Karingal.
The Trial Court, finding no reason to doubt the veracity of the, buy-bust operation conducted by the NARCOM
operatives, found Appellant guilty as charged. His present appeal hinges on the following allegations:
"That the lower court erred in convicting accused appellant for or alleged violation of Sec. 4 and 8, Art. It, Rep. Act
6425 as amended beyond reasonable doubt.
"That the lower court erred in giving too much emphasis on th( testimonies of prosecution witness rather than the
testimonies of the defense.
"Mat the lower court erred in admitting as evidence the marijuana fruiting top and the like which were illegally
searched by the Capeom allegedly taken from the residence of accused-appellant.
IV
"That the lower court erred in not acquitting accused-appellan. beyond reasonable doubt."
The foregoing assignments of error are far from impressivc Basically, the appeal revolves around the issue of
credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis Appellant's own testimony,
Pertinent to this point, it is well-settled that Appellate Court~ will generally not disturb the factual findings of the
Trial Court, as the latter is in a better position to decide the same, having heard the witnesses themselves and
having observed their department and manner identifying the trial less it has plainly overlooked certain foad- of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case (People v. Sabado, L-76952, 22
December 1988, 168 SCRA 681). A thorough review of the records of this case does Dot reveal any flaw in the
assessment by the Trial Court of the evidence before it. We, therefore, apply the time-honored rule that the
 172

findings of the Trial Court are to be given great weight and the highest degree of respect by Appellate Courts
(People v, Alpetche, L76149-50, 22 December 1988).
Appellant was correctly convicted of selling marijuana in violation of Section 4, Rep, Act No. 6425. The element of
sale was unequivocally established. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited
to, the act of delivering. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction (People v. Dekingeo, L-8768B, 13 September 1990, 189 SCRA 512). In a
"buy-bust" operation, such as in the case at bar, what is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the
marijuana from the Appellant and that the same was presented as evidence in Court. Proof of the transaction
suffices (People v. Mariano, L-86656, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 136). Tested by the foregoing criteria,
Appellant's culpability has been sufficiently established. He had sold, delivered and given away to two (2)
undercover agents approximately 300 grams of marijuana in exchange for P450.00.
Prosecution witness C2C Jesus Bascuna positively identified Appellant as the person who sold th~ prohibited drug
during the "buy-bust" operation (TSN, 6 November 1989, pp. 16-18). His testimony was corroborated by another
poseur-buyer, C2C Francisco Crisostorno, who likewise narrated to the Trial Court the circumstances relating to the
"buy-bust" operation involving Appellant as the seller of marijuana (TSN, 7 November 1989, pp. 27-30). The other
members of the team testified on the manner Appellant was arrested and the accompanying search conducted in
his premises (TSN, 6 November 1989, pp. 2-5, 7 November 1989, pp. 32-34). All these testimonies point to
ApPellant as the seller of marijuana during the "buy-bust" operation. Whatever discrepancies there may have been
in their teStimonies, such as the number of bills and their denominatious will not detract from their credibility since
their clarations dovetailed on all material points.
The mere fact that Appellant denied that a "buy-bust" operation ever took place does not render the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses less credible- As between the positive declaration of prosecution witnesses and the
negative statements of Appellant, the former deserves more credence and weight (Peoplev. Adap, L-66237,12
September 1990,189 SCRA 413). The prosecution witnesses are law enforcers, hence, presumed to have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Mariano, supra). Even Appellant himself
testistifed that he knew of no reason why he would be charged falsely by the members of the team that arrested
him (TSN, 22 December 1989, p. 68).
Appellant's assertion that he was illegally arrested and that the search of his premises was likewise illegal is not
well taken. Appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to the poseur-
buyers. His case therefore falls under the category of a valid warrantless arrest (Sec. 5, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure). The subsequent search of his house which immediately followed yielding other incriminating
evidence, and which became the basis of his conviction for possession of a prohibited drug, was a search
contemporaneously made and as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the
arrest was made (Nolasco v. Pano, G.R. 69803,30 January 1987,147 SCRA 509). That is a recognized exception to
the general rule that any search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant (Mampon v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 58889,31 July 1986,143 SCRA 267). The inclusion of the seized items, therefore, as evidence for the
prosecution, was in conformity with the provision on lawful searches (People vs. Castiller, G.R. No, 87783, 6
August 1990,188 SCRA 376).
Appellant also faults the Trial Court for having convicted him of selling marijuana under Setion 4, Rep. Act No.
6425, as amended' and of possession of marijuana under Section 8 of the SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from twenty thousand to thirty thousand same law.' He postulates that the possession of marijuana is absorbed in
the act of selling thereof, hence, he cannot be charged with two separate offenses, one for selling, and the other
for possession of marijuana. Indeed, this, Court has held that possession of marijuana is generally inherent in the
crime of selling them and that conviction for both offenses is not feasible (People v. Dekingco, L-87685, 13
September 1990, 189 SCRA 512). However, as held also in People v. Manalansan, L76369-70, 14 September 1990,
189 SCRA 619), the rule that the possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof is true only with respect
to the marijuana delivered to the poseurbuyer and not to the marijuana found in the seller's possession, not
covered by the sale and probably intended for a different purpose like another sale, or its direct use by the
possessor. Consequently, Appellant can be convicted separately of the offense of selling a prohibited drug in
connection with the manjuana sold by him to the poseur-buyers under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, and of the crime of possession of marijuana under Section 8 of the same law, with respect to the
marijuana found in his premises after this arrest, pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed, (As amended by PD No. 1675, February
17,1980).
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.-The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve yews and one
day to twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand Pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug, except Indian bemp in regard to
which the next following paragraph shall apply.
The penalty of imprisonment from six years and one day to twelve Years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or
use ],than hernp. (As amended by BP BIg. 179, March 2, l982)
 173

The fact that Appellant was charged with the two offenses in one Information does not alter the conclusion arrived
at. Firstly, Appellant was not denied his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
and to fully defend himself. The Information filed against him clearly and distinctly charged two separate offenses,
thus:
"That on or about the 8th day of April, 1989, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been duly authorized by law,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 221.57 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops which is a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law; that on the same occasion,
the accused had in his possession, and under his control the following to wit:
1) 3.6287 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops into four (4) separate bundles wrapped with newspaper,
transparent plastics and placed in a carton box marked "WINDMILL WRAPPERS' with markings respectively;
2) 0.9407 kilos of dried marijuana flowering tops with markings placed in a plastic bag marked '5 & UP TEXTILE
MART';
3) One (1) stick of marijuana cigarette;
4) 23.49 grams of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped with newspaper with markings and placed in a
transparent plastic bag; which are prohibited drugs, and
5) Eight (8) bundles of rolling paper wrapped with pink papers and placed into two (2) separate wrappers
marked'CAPITOL."
Secondly, the general rule is that an Information must charge only one offense. However, "when two (2) or more
offenses are charged in a single Information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the Court may convict
him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of
them setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case" (Rule 120, Section 3,1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure). In the proceedings at bar, the records do not show that Appellant seisonably objected to the two
offenses charged in a single Information. On the contrary, he merely pleaded not guilty thereto during
arraignment. Under the circumstances, possession of marijuana, Wier than that which was the object of the sale,
having been also charged and proved, his additional conviction therefor can withstand any challenge from the
defense. It should also be noted that the Trial Court had set out separately the findings of fact and the law in each
case, as required (ibid.).
In sum, the Court finds that Appellant's guilt of selling and possessing marijuana has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The penalty for selling marijuana, however, of "life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua)" imposed
by the trial Court is erroneous and is hereby changed to "life imprisonment" only plus the fine. The penalty for
possession of marijuana is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Rules regarding consummation of sale of drugs
[GRN 91159 September 11, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, us. LARRY FRANCISCO Y AQUINO, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 171.
Appellant Larry Francisco y Aquino was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
on 20 September 1987 with the violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in an information1 which reads:
'That on or about the 20th day of September, 1987, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Larry Francisco y Aquino, without authority of law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispatch in transit and transport five (6) sticks
of rolled marijuana cigarettes, which is (sic) prohibited drug (sic).
Contrary to Law."
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8280-V-87.
Upon his arraignment on 7 October 1987, appellant, assisted by Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) lawyer
Atty. Restituto Viernes, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.2
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented NBI Forensic Chemist Resurreccion Ramos Bajado and the
arresting officer/poseur-buyer Pat. Eduardo Fajardo. Appellant, testifying on his own behalf, merely denied the
accusation and claimed that the marijuana recovered from him was planted by Pat. Fajardo.
On 4 November 1988, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Larry Francisco y Aquino, Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling
and delivering prohibited stuffs consisting of five (5) marijuana cigarette sticks weigh ing 1.6091 grams, defined
and punished under Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the costs of
suit. x x x.3
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 4 December 1988.4 Subsequently, the trial court forwarded albeit erroneously,
the records of the case to the Court of Appeals; the latter then transmitted the same to this Court on 24 November
1989.5 On 19 March 1990, this Court resolved. to accept the appeal.6
The facts of the case as summarized by the trial court are as follows:,
"EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION:
The circumstances of his apprehension, as testified to by the arresting officer Valenzuela Patrolman Eduardo
Fajardo is (sic) sub. stantially m follows: In the morning of September 20, 1987, Cpl. Martin of the Valenzuela
Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered him and Pat. Allies to conduct buy[bust operations with the help of a civilian
 174

informer (CI) at Gen- T. de Leon Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The operation's target was a certain pusher, Boy
Hapon. Arriving the (sic) place, he was introduced by the CI to Boy Hapon, the herein accused. Posing as buyer
(sic), he handed a marked P10.00 bill to the accused and the latter put it inside his pocket. The accused told him to
wait and went (sic) to a house besides (sic) the mad about ten meters away to get the merchandise, Minutes later,
the accused returned and handed to him the merchandise consisting of five (5) marijuana cigarette sticks wrapped
in a (sic) plastic (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-4), He identified himself to the accused as a police officer. He placed the
accused under arrest and retrieved from the latter the P10.00 bill he paid (Exhibit E) with his initials on it (Exh. E-
1). That (sic) they brought the accused to their headquarters for investigation; that he gave a written statement in
connection with the incident (Exh, F, F-1).
On cross-examinations (sic), he testified that they rode the private vehicle owned by Pat. Albao in going to Gen. T.
de Leon St.;
that he has been in the place twice; that the residents of Gen. T. de Leon do not know him as a policeman; that he
was in civilian clothes; that he placed his initials on the P10.00 bill before leaving their office.
NBI forensic chemist Resurreecion Ramos affirmed that the seized five (5) cigarette sticks (Exh. A, A-1 to A-4)
submitted for examinations were positive for marijuana (Exh. B, B-1). Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic
tests were conducted yielding (sic) the same result (Exhs. C, C-1 to C-4).
On cross-examination, (sic) she testified that P/Aide Ludwig Lee brought the specimens to their office with the
written request for examination from the Valenzuela Police Station (Exh. D).
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE Accused denied selling marijuana cigarettes to Pat. Fajardo. He knows Fajardo to be
a policeman for more than five years. He knows Fajardo because he used to see him in the house of a policeman
living in their place at Gen. T. (Is Leon; that he is (sic) a truck helper of gravel and sand for about ten years; that
on September 20, 1987 at around 11:30 in the morning, he was in front of the house of his aunt at Gen. T. de
Leon washing the truck when Pat. Fajardo arrived and (sic) holding something wrapped in a (sic) plastic; that Pat.
Fajardo sud. denly pulled him at the waistline at the back of his pants and asked him if he has marijuana. He
replied that he is not selling marijuana. Fajardo pushed him and asked him to go with them. Pat. Fajardo had two
other companions; that the marijuana came from them (Pat. Fajardo and companions); that he replied that he
cannot go with them because he has not done anything wrong, He was hit by a gun in the head. He was brought t3
the Polo Emergency Hospital on the same day.
On cross-examinations (sic), he said that he do (sic) not have any misunderstanding/ill feeling with Pat. Fajardo
before the incident; that Pat. Fajardo failed to locate the person whom they were intending to arrest and turned his
ire on him; 'that Pat. Fajardo asked him to point to the person that was selling marijuana; that he do (sic) not
know the person and he has no relation with him; that three (3) days before he was arrested, Pat. Fajardo had
already asked him to point the (sic) person selling marijuana in the place."
Appellant assigns the following errors committed by the trial court:8
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF
PAT. EDUARDO FAJARDO.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED. APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."
Discussing these jointly for the sake of brevity, appellant states that the uncorroborated testimony of Pat. Fajardo
should be examined and scrutinized carefully considering that it is the only basis for his conviction; he claims that
it is doubtful whether the buy-bust operation itself was actually conducted because Pat. Fajardo's testimony reveals
that there was virtually a one man show wherein he acted as poseur-buyer and arresting officer at the same time.
Appellant rinds it odd that Fajardo's alleged companion during the buy-bust operation, Pat. Aldan, had no
participation at all therein. Accordingly, it is suggested that the entire operation was highly suspect.
Appellant further contends that the testimony of Pat. Fajardo is full of inconsistencies, to wit: a) Initially, during
direct examination, Fajardo testified that when the appellant asked for payment, he waited first for the latter to
bring back the marijuana before giving the money; on further examination, Fajardo stated that he paid at once; b)
During direct examination, he testified that he met the accused "on the road where there was (sic) a bridge;"
during cross examination, he said that he met the accused beside a house under construction which is located
beyond the bridge; c) On direct examination he stated that he waited for the appellant for sometime before the
latter came back, while on cross examination, he claimed that he only waited for two (2) minutes before the latter
returned; and d) During direct examination, he failed to mention that he had marked the buy-bust money before
leaving the office, while on cross examination, he testified that he made a marking on the bill before leaving the
office.9 While admitting that these inconsistencies refer to minor details, he asserts, however, that since the
prosecution's case is anchored solely on Pat. Fajardo's testimony, said inconsistencies affect the latter's credibility.
Finally, appellant declares that the amount of P10.00 is inadequate for the five (5) sticks of marijuana he allegedly
sold and it is improbable that he would risk his life and liberty for the measly sum of P10.00; besides, he knew that
at that time, Pat. Fajardo had been a policeman in their place for five (5) years. Thus, it is inconceivable that he
would sell marijuana to the latter.
The primal issue then is the credibility of Pat. Fajardo's testimony.
The factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great respect by appellate courts particularly on
matters of credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge is given the opportunity to observe the attitude and
deportment of the witnesses while listening to them speak.10 An exception to this rule obtains when certain facts
of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, would affect the result of the case.11 In the
case at bar, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence before it, found the testimony of Pat. Fajardo credible and
convincing. It said:
 175

'The Court he a very closely examined the evidence of the contending sides, including the deportment and
demeanor of those who took the witness stand and it is convinced that herein amused is guilty of transgressing the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The testimony of the arresting officer, Valenzuela Patrolman Eduardo Fajardo was clear,
positive and credible. He testified that after being introduced to the accused as buyer, he handed the marked
P10.00 bill to the accused. That the accused asked him to wait and upon his (amused) return from a house located
near the road about 10 meters away, the accused handed to him the prohibited stuffs, consisting of five (5)
marijuana cigarette sticks wrapped in a (sic) plastic (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-4). That he recovered from the accused
the P10.00 bill he paid (Exh. E) with his initials on it (Exh. E-1); that the prohibited stuffs were found positive for
martuana (Exhs. C, C- I to C-4). 12
We find no compelling reason to overturn such findings. A meticulous review and a careful evaluation of the
records of this case show that the same are firmly supported by the evidence.
That Pat. Fajardo's testimony is uncorroborated is of no moment for settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone
prosecution eyewitness, as long as credible and positive, can prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused.13
The alleged inconsistencies in Pat. Fajardo's testimony either do not exist or are merely exaggerated. The first
alleged inconsistency is based on the following exchange:
"FISCAL VICENTE:
xxx
After you told the accused that you want to 'Iiskor kami', what happened next?
A He told me 'May I have your money then'.
Q And what did you do after he asked for your money?
A I just waited because he left for some time and he circled around a house that was for rent."14
Upon further examination, he stated that:
"Q When you were asked a while ago what did you do when the accused asked for the money and you said he left
you, you mentioned about the payment?
A After I have (sic) remarked 'Iiskor kami', he replied, 'Akina ang pera'
Q And what did you do when the accused asked for the money?
A At that time, I handed him P10.00 (sic) hill.
And what did the accused to (sic) with the money which you gave to him?
A He placed it in his pocket and after that, he left us15
We find no in consistency in the abovequoted testimony. It seems that when Pat. Fajardo was initially asked what
he did when the appellant asked for the payment, he failed to answer the question directly; instead, Pat. Fajardo
said that the appellant left to get the marijuana. He, however, never mentioned that he gave the money, to the
appellant only upon the latter's return. When further examined, it becomes apparent that Pat. Fajardo actually
gave the P10.00 bill at once, before the appellant left to get the marijuana.
Another inconsistency, as claimed by the appellant, may be observed from Pat. Fajardo's account of how he met
the appellant. Upon direct examination, Pat. Fajardo declared:
"FISCAL VICENTE:
Q By the way, in what exact place in T. de Leon did you have contact with the accused?
A On the road where there was (sic) a bridge."16
On cross examination, he testified thus:
VIERNES:
Now, when you went to T. de Leon on September 20,1987, you said you have (sic) met this Boy Hapon, where did
you meet him?
A If this is the road, ahead is the bridge and after that, there was a house that is under construction. And this
house which is under construction is also near a four-door apart- ment and that is where I met or saw this Boy
Hapon.
Q You mean in front of the house under construction?
A At the side." 17
Pat. Fajardo's initial statement does not establish that he met the appellant on the bridge itself but rather on the
road leading to the bridge. Hence, there is no real inconsistency when Fajardo later declared that he actually met
the appellant at the side of a house under construction because said house stands beside that same road.
The claim-that Pat. Fajardo's failure to state during the direct examination that he marked the buy-bust money
with his initials before leaving the office is inconsistent with his later statement during cross examination that he in
fact marked the buy-bust money before leaving the office-is preposterous and absurd. Such failure was due to the
fact that the prosecuting fiscal did not ask the proper question. It was only during cross examination that such a
question was posed, thereby eliciting the said response. Appellant's counsel clarified the matter and merely
provided the witness an opportunity to furnish the details.
The last inconsistency adverted to by the appellant involves the statements during (a) direct examination of Pat.
Fajardo that he waited for sometime for the appellant to return after leaving to get the marijuana and (b) cross
examination where he stated that he only waited for about two (2) minutes before the appellant returned with the
marijuana. What needs to be determined here, in order to establish an inconsistency, is the import of the word
"sometime". Concededly, "sometime" is a relative term. Nevertheless, whether it could mean thirty (30) minutes,
one (1) hour or even two (2) minutes, the inconsistency, if any, is very minor and not substantial. In any event,
the cross examination merely allowed the witness to elucidate and explain what he meant when he used such a
term.
 176

Even assuming arguendo that discrepancies existed in Pat. Fajardo's testimony, they were discrepancies
concerning minor details which do not impair his credibility.18 The most candid of witnesses oftentimes makes
mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his testimony's intrinsic credibility.19 In People vs.
Reception,20 We held:
"In the course of a prolonged direct examination, more so, during cross-examination, the witness is usually
subjected to unfriendly questioning. As a result, it is usually the case that the witness, uncomfortable and fidgety in
a courtroom scene, may often fall into lapses. It is not infrequent for a witness to make minor mistakes in his
narration of facts; the intimidating presence of the opposing counsel coupled: by the verbose and misleading
manner of questioning are factors determinant of these inconsistencies"
The failure of Pat. Fajardo to mention the role of Pat. Aldao in the buy-bust operation is inconsequential;
moreover, Pat. Fajardo's acting as the poseur-buyer and arresting officer at the same time is -not at all odd. As a
matter of fact, in buy-bust operations where the poseur-buyer is also a member of the buybust team, it would be
even more convenient and effective for said poseur-buyer to arrest the drug pusher after the latter gives him the
prohibited drug.
Neither is there merit in the appellant's claim that it is improbable that he would risk his life and liberty for the
measly sum of P10.00. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the
consummation of the transaction where the poseur-buyer receives the marijuana from the seller.21 The monetary
consideration agreed upon by the parties is immaterial in establishing the fact of sale of prohibited drugs. The
question as to whether appellant would risk his life and liberty for the measly sum of P 10.00 is obviously to be
answered in the positive. Drug pushers, especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to
anyone who can pay for the same, be they strangers or not.22
Equally untenable is the appellant's claim that it was impossible for him to have sold marijuana to Pat. Fajardo
since he knew the latter to be a policeman. Even assuming arguendo the said statement is true, what matters in
drug pushing cases is not the existing familiarity between the seller and the buyer, but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.23
The defense of frame up claimed by the appellant was correctly dismissed by the trial court as follows:24
"The Court finds the accused' (sic) story that he was brought in on trump-up (sic) charge is without merit. There
was definite information/report that he was engaged. in the sale and distribution of prohibited stuffs. A plan of a
buy/bust operation was set up for his apprehension. lie handed the prohibited stuffs to the witness, Pat. Fajardo
and the money used in the operation was recovered from him (accused) bears (sic) the initials of the arresting
officer. He, therefore, could not just have been framed up as claimed by him. His claim that he was charged
because he did not point to the arresting officer the person who was selling the prohibited stuffs in the place is not
convincing. He testified that he has no misunderstanding with the arresting officer Pat. Fajardo prior to the
incident. He said that he has not associated nor have (sic) any relation with the person sought by the police
officers for selling prohibited stuffs in the place and he did not even know the person, why was he singled out to
point to the person? Of significance was his unexplained failure or omission to give his statement de. nouncing the
alleged actuations of the apprehending officer and to show that he was indicted for a crime he did not commit,
which is the natural reaction of one who is being falsely charged of an offense as an act of self-preservation. The
version of the arresting officer was more convincing. There appears no compelling reason why his testimony should
not be believed or discarded. The accused has not shown any convincing facts or circumstances from which it could
be reasonably inferred that this witness falsely testified or was actuated by improper motives.25
Furthermore, the defense of frame up requires stronger proof because of the presumption that public officers acted
in the regular performance of their official duties26 Since no ill motive on the part of Pat. Fajardo was proven by
the appellant, this presumption was not overthrown27
Thus, the affirmance of the trial court's decision is in order. However, the penalty imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, is incorrect because the penalty provided in Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging: from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. Reclusion Perpetua, a penalty
provided for in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code and which carries accessory penalties, is
completely different from life imprisonment.28
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification above
indicated changing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[GRN 100754 October 13,1992.*]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRENE SIMBULAN y DOLOR and ELVIRA SUGUI y
SUNGA, accused-appellants.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Br. 136.
The criminal prosecution in this case was initiated by an information, dated September 17, 1988, charging herein
accusedappellants Irene D. Simbulan, alias "Nene," and Elvira S. Sugui, alias "Elvie," as conspirators in the sale
and delivery of .17 gram of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, "shabu" in common parlance, which is a regulated
drug,1 in violation of Section 21(b), Article IV, in relation to Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.
At the arraignment, both appellants, duly assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, viz.: S/Sgt.
Rosalinda F. Directo, 1st Lt. Reuben Sindac, Sgts. Jaime Sapon and Capt. Lina Sarmiento.
A painstaking scrutiny of the transcripts of the testimonial evidence and documentary exhibits of the prosecution
confirms the findings in the decision of the court a quo,2 correctly summarized therein as follows:
 177

"In the morning of September 14, 1988, at around 9:00 a.m., a male informant came to the office of the 13th
Narcotics Regional Unit of the NARCOM and relayed to Lt. Reuben Sindac the information that @ NENE and @
ELVIE were engaged in the selling of shalm or methamphetamine hydrochloride at Masangkay St., Makati, Metro
Manila. Finding this information to be viable (to use his own word), Lt. Sindac submitted to Lt. Col. Raval of the
NARCOM a pre-operation report. Lt. Col. Raval approved the said pre-operation report and directed Lt. Sindac to
constitute a team and conduct a buy-bust operation. For the purpose, he gave Lt. Sindac money for gasoline and
P500.00 in five P100 bills as buy-money.
"The five P100 bills bear the serial numbers WF 210212 (Exh. D), UM 242970 (Exh. G), WP 787691 (Exh. E), SZ
832140 (Exh. C), and UXZ 65475 (Exh. F). Lt. Sindac marked each of them by shading the letter 0 in Bangko
Sentral, and had them xeroxed.
"The team constituted by Lt. Sindac was made up of himself, as the team leader, Sgt. Rosalinda Directo, Sgt.
Jaime Sapon, Sgt.. Cesar Dalonos and ClC Carlos Olina. Lt. Sindac designated Sgt. Directo as the poseur-buyer and
the rest as back-ups. Thus, he gave to Sgt. Directo the five P100 bills (Exhs. C to G).
"In the same morning the team of Lt. Sindac, together with the informant, left Camp Crams for Masangkay St.,
Makati, Metro Manila. They reached this target area at around 10:30 a.m. After a short briefing, Sgt. Directo and
the informant proceeded to the house of @ NENE, which is one of two houses located inside a compound. At the
same instance, Lt. Sindac and the other members of the team posted themselves at strategic points from where
they could watch Sgt. Directo and the informant carry out their assigned task.
"Upon reaching the house of @ NENE the informant knocked on the door and when @ NENE opened the door and
came out, he introduced Sgt. Directo as a person wanting to buy shabu. Thereupon, @ NENE asked Sgt. Directo
how much shabu she wanted to buy. When Sgt. Directo replied that she wanted to buy 1/2 gram of shabu, @
NENE said that the price would be P500.00, to which Sgt. Directo agreed. Forthwith, @ NENE went back inside the
house. After a while she emerged from the same door, this time with another woman. @ NENE introduced this
woman to Sgt. Directo as ELVIE. Having done this, @ NENE told Sgt. Directo to give the P500.00 to Elvie, which
Sgt. Directo did. Almost simultaneously @ NENE handed to Sgt. Directo a transparent plastic bag containing what
appeared to be shabu. Upon her receipt thereof, Sgt. Directo raised her right hand which was the pre-arranged
signal to her co-team members that she had already concluded the purchase of sbabui. Immediately, Lt. Sindae
and Sgt. Dalonos approached the four, (@) NENE, ELVIE, Sgt. Directo and the informant, and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents, Sgt. Sapon also moved in but he stopped just outside the fence and acted as
backup to Lt. Sindac, Sgts. Directo and Dalonas. Sgt. Directo then retrieved the 5 P100 bills she had earlier given
to ELVIE from the right front pocket of the latter's shorts where she saw ELVIE had placed the money.
"From the target area, Lt. Sindac and his team members brought @ NENE, who was later identified to be accused
Irene Simbulan, and ELVIE, who turned out to be accused Elvira Sugui, to their headquarters in Camp Crams. They
also brought there Erlinda Sugui, the sister of Elvira Sugui, whom they found in possession of shabu.
"Upon reaching their Headquarters, Sgt. Directo marked the transparent plastic bag earlier given to her by @
NENE, that contained what appeared to be shabu (Exh. K), with the letter W, prepared herAfridavit of Poseur-
Buyer' (Exh. A), and thereafter turned over the same to Lt. Sindac. She also prepared the 'Receipt for Property
Seized'(Exh. L). On the other hand, Lt. Sindac and his other team members executed their'Joint Affidavit of Arrest'
(Exh. B).
"By cover of a letter dated September 15, 1988 (Exh. J), the NARCOM sent the suspected shabu (Exh. K) that was
given by @ NENE to Sgt. Directo to the PC Crime Laboratory Service for appro. priate laboratory examinations. As
requested in the said letter (Exh. J), Capt. Lina C. Sarmiento, a forensic chemist, examined the said specimen and
found it positive for 'methamphetamine hydrochloride', a regulated drug. (Exhs. H and M)."
Expectedly, the defense presented a different version, which we have culled from the decision of the trial court.'
Appellant Irene Simbulan testified that in the morning of September 14, 1988, while she was cooking in the house
of appellant Sugui, a certain Angel, whom she had known for about two (2) years, came and told her "Kung
maaari, ikuha mo ako ng shabu."
Angel used to frequent her house but this was the first time that he asked for "shabu" from her. She allegedly
replied, "Alam mo ng wala rito bakit dito ka pa pumunta sa amin." Angel, however, insisted on his request saying
that he needed shabu as he was going to a birthday party, hence she relented and said "Mayroon dito pero hindi sa
akin. Kung gusto mo bayaran me na lang sa akin." Angel agreed, so she gave him the shabu and Angel gave her
P500.00. After he had left, she went to the other house of appellant Sugui, in the same compound and gave the
latter the P500.00 she received from Angel as her payment for a wrist watch. She then went back to her cooking.
'vs (5)
Later, without asking for permission, four (4) or five persons entered her house and said 'Walang tatakbo." They
asked her to bring out the marked money, and she replied that the money was with appellant Sugui. She and the
aforesaid persons then went to appellant Sugui's house and the latter asked said appellant to bring out the marked
money. Sugui replied, "Anong marked money, wala naman akong pera kundi ito lang nasa pitaka ko." Thereupon,
the intruders took the wallet of Sugui and, upon seeing the money in it, said, "Ito ang pera." The aforesaid persons
thereafter brought her and Sugui to Camp Creme where they were detained, investigated and made to sign a
"Receipt for Property Seized"' which listed the l/ 2 gram of "shabu" and the serial numbers of the five (5) P100.00
bills indicated as "marked money."
Elvira Sugui, for her part, testified that on September 14, 1988, at about 10:00 A.M., she was in her house talking
to her friend whom she only knows as "Baby." Baby came to invite her to go with her to Syvel's and while they
were talking, appellant Simbulan came in with the three (3) arresting officers. The latter were looking for the
P500.00 which Simbulan had earlier given her as payment for a wrist watch. The arresting officers took her wallet
 178

and then told her to go with them to Camp Creme. Out of fear, she, together with her sister, Erlinda, and
Simbulan, went along with them to Camp Creme. There, Lt. Sindac and Sgt. Dalonos told them that they could go
home if they could each produce P10,000.00. As they were unable to do so, Lt. Sindac and Sgt. Dalonos continued
to detain them.
Teresita Castillo, in corroboration of the testimony of appellant Sugui, testified that she was in the house of the
latter at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 14, 1988- She went there to deliver a Syvel's credit card
to Sugui. While she was there, appellant Simbulan came in, gave some money to Sugui as; payment for a wrist
watch and then left. About fifteen minutes later, Simbulan came back with three (3) persons, one of them a
female. They were looking for money and Simbulan pointed to Sugui. Sugui told them that the money that
SimbuIan had given her was in her wallet. The said persons got the wallet of Sugui and took out from it five (5)
P100.00 bills, after which they brought her to their jeep.
After evaluating the contradicting versions, the trial court rendered judgment finding both appellants guilty of the
crime charged, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Elvira Sugui y Songs and Irene Simbulan y Dolor,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, and each of them to pay a fine of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00).5
Appellants are now before us seeking the reversal of the said judgment, ascribing the following errors to the court
below: (1) That it erred in not acquitting both accused-appellants on reasonable doubt; and (2) That it committed
an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion in finding accused-appellant Elvira Sugui, in conspiracy with
accused-appellant Irene Simbulan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, in relation to Section 21, Article IV.6
Evidently, the errors assigned turn on the issue of credibility. Accordingly, we have perforce to once again reiterate
the entrenched rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who, anlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light
of the declaranes demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position
to discriminate between the true and the false.7 Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it,
accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had
overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.8 In the case at bar,
we find nothing which would warrant deviation from the general rule.
The narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses are worthy of credit. They are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, there being no evidence to the contrary,9 and more
so since there is nothing in the record which would indicate that they were actuated by improper motives.10
Furthermore, the testimonies of the apprehending officers were straightforward and consistent. As expressly
observed by the trial court in its decision
"x x x, in the course of their testimonies, the Court was intently observing the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Sgt. Directo and Lt. Sindac, and the Court was impressed by their candidness and straight-forward manner of
testifying, which in the mind of the Court indicated that they had testified truthfully. As a matter of fact, Lt. Sindac,
who is only 27 years (old) had impressed the Court that he is a professional whose only concern is to do his job
and to do it well. x x x ."11
It is argued by appellants that the failure of the prosecution to present the civilian informer was a fatal omission.
We do not agree. The poseur-buyer, S/Sgt. Directo, who dealt directly with appellants in the purchase of the
regulated drug was presented in the trial. Hence, the testimony of the informer, if it were given, would at best be
corroborative or cumulative. The rule is well settled that each party has the prerogative to determine which
witnesses to present and to dispense with the testimony of persons who will only give corroboration.12 The non-
presenta. tion of a mere corroborative witness does not amount to suppression of evidence.13
Moreover, if the defense believed that the testimony of the informer was important to their case, there was nothing
to prevent them from compelling the latter's presence and availing of his testimony in court by compulsory
process.14 The informer was known to the defense. It would have been simple enough to have him produced by a
subpoena for examination as a defense witness. This, appellants inexplicably failed or declined to do.
The allegation of appellants that the marked money used were not properly marked in accordance with accepted
standard procedures, that is, by application of fluorescent powder, does not deserve even a passing consideration.
How the buybust money should have been marked was of no significance in establishing the guilt of appellants.
What is material is the proof that the drug transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti15 In fact, even the absence of the marked money or its non-presentation in court would not create a
hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.16
Appellants further argue that even assuming that they were truly engaged in the illicit trade, they would not have
sold drugs right on their doorstep and to a total stranger. The said argument cannot be upheld, just as it has been
so often raised in other cases and just as often struck down by this Court.
Drug pushers have become increasingly casual about isolated transactions. They have come to consider the sale of
drugs as ordinary transactions and the buyers as ordinary users.17 Drug pushing when done on a small scale
belongs to that class of crimes which may be committed at any time and at any place. After the offer to buy is
accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties
are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their
illegal trade as such factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the court has sustained the conviction
of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front of a store, along a street, and in front of a
 179

house.18 Even the fact that the buyer is a total stranger is of no moment. In real life, pushers, especially small
quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to customers, be they strangers or not, who have the price of
the drug.19
The supposed irreconcilable inconsistency pointed out by appellants regarding the weight of the "shabu" purchased,
as testified to and as submitted in evidence, is too minor to militate against the credibility of the prosecution
witness. The "shabu" submitted in evidence was properly identified in court by the examining forensic chemist and
by the poseur-buyer to be the same "shabu" seized from appellants and submitted to the former for examination in
connection with this case. The discrepancy in weight is explained by the fact that what was expected and believed
to have been purchased by the poseurbuyer was one-half (1/2) gram of "shabu," The fact that what was delivered
is of lesser weight cannot be taken against her.
The poseur-buyer was not in a position to determine the actual weight of the drug delivered by appellants, as can
be gleaned from her testimony:
"Q Now you mentioned also earlier Madam witness that you were shabu (sic) and placed in plastic
transparent. Now also you stated you gave P500.00 to Elvis. Now why P500.00 Madam witness?
A Because that is the price that Aling Nene asked for 1/2 gram.
Q At that point do you know how much shabu you received from Aling Nene?
A I presumed it was half gram.
Q Though you are not sure whether you received also 1/2 grams (sic)?
A No. sir."20
Even appellants allegation that the apprehending officers asked them for money, being an imputation which can be
contrived with facility, is not entitled to credence. They utterly failed to substantiate the same. The Court has noted
that this is the usual defense in the prosecution of drug cases. Yet, if indeed there was any attempted or
consummated extortion, appellants could and should have come forward with the proper charges against the
culprits.21
Appellants further maintain that the trial court's finding of conspiracy is without basis. We disagree.
Appellants Irene Simbulan and Elvira. Sugui were obviously partners in the sale of "shabu." The prosecution was
able to establish that both of them were present at the place and time when the buy-bust operation took place. It
was Simbulan who handed the drug to the poseur-buyer while it was Sugui who accepted the payment. The
aforementioned acts show concerted action and unity of purpose towards the attainment of a common criminal
objective and which ineluctably signify and warrant a conclusion on the existence of a conspiracy.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the coordinated movements of the co-conspirators.22 There need not be direct
evidence of the existence and details of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individual offender, the existence of a
conspiracy and a conspirator's participation may be established through circumstantial evidence.23
The fact of sale of the regulated drug in the morning of September 14, 1988 was admitted by appellant Simbulan,
although she denied ownership of the same. As we have heretofore ruled, ownership and possession are not
indispensable elements of this crime. The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of marijuana and
other prohibited drugs consummates the crime.24
With regard to appellant Sugui, it was admitted that the marked money was found in her possession. However, she
denied that she was present at the time of the sale and claimed that the marked money was given to her by
Simbulan as payment for a wrist watch and that the same was delivered to her inside her house. We find her
protentations of innocence unworthy of belief.
Firstly, in her testimony, Simbulan unwittingly admitted that Elvira (or Elvis) Sugui was in the house where she
was staying at the time when the buy-bust operation took place, thus:
Do you remember where were you on Sept. 14, 1988 in the morning of that day?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A I was cooking.
Q Do your remember who were there in your house during that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who?
A My nieces and my nephews. Erlinda Sugui, Elvie Sugui and Rico Flores." (Emphasis supplied.)25
Secondly, the version of the defense that the poseur-buyer left after the sale, and then later returned together with
other NARCOM against to make an arrest, is illogical and absurd. Ina buy-bust operation drug dealers are
apprehended in flagrante delicto, not in a disjointed manner or sequence as appellants would portray.
Thirdly, appellants did not impute, much less prove, any ill motive on the part of the NARCOM agents that would
impel them to involve appellants in a serious criminal charge. There is nothing in the records of the case
suggesting that the testimonies of the NARCOM agents were motivated by any reason other than their mission to
curb drug abuse.26 Hence, the prosecution's narration of facts and identification of the accusedappellants should
be given weight.
On the foregoing disquisition and considerations, we find that the trial court acted correctly in finding both
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However, the dispositive portion of its decision
imposes the penalty of "life imprisonment or reclusio- perpetua." Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, provides for the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00. We are, therefore, constrained to call attention once again to the fact that life imprisonment and
 180

reclusion perpetua are not the same. Reclusion perpetua, as understood in the Revised Penal Code, has its own
legal connotation, effects and accessory penalties which are not applicable to life imprisonment provided for by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 which is a special law.27 For the imposition of the correct penalty, therefore, the
reference to reclusion perpetua in said judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby deleted.
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing modification, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Venue of sale
[GRN 91129 August 25, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO PABLO Y DOLLOSO, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Br. 17.
Accused Antonio Pablo y Dolloso was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City on 29 January
1986 for violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.1 The accusatory portion of the information reads:
"That on or about January 29, 1986, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without legal authority, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly deliver and sell to a poseur buyer one (1) slice of marijuana cake and one (1) aluminum foil of dried
marijuana leaves."
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 21-86.
Accused entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on 17 March 1986.2 At the trial, the prosecution established
its case through the testimonies of P/Sgt. Rodrigo Espiritu and T/Sgt Jacinto dela Cruz, both members of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Unit stationed at Noveleta, Cavite, and Constancia. Franco-Salonga, a forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The accused through his and his friend Rodymir Calalang's
testimony, set up the defense of denial.
On 4 May 1987, the trial court promulgated its judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged and
sentencing him:
"x x x to undergo imprisonment of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to
twenty (20) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs."3
Accused appealed from said decision through a notice of appeal which does not indicate the court to which he is
appealing.4 Considering the penalty imposed, the Branch Clerk of Court transmitted the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals 5 which then docketed the same as C.A.-G.R. No. 06265.
In the Appellants Brief filed with the Court of Appeals,6 the accused makes the following assignment of errors:
"1. . . The Trial Court erred in finding accused guilty of violation (sic) of Section 4, Article If of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended without the prosecution presenting the 'Informer' who was alleged to he the buyer of marijuana
cake from the accused.
xxx ... the Trial Court erred in finding accused guilty of the crime charged unsupported by positive facts and
contrary to law and evidence.
xxx * * * the Trial Court erred in giving full credit to the testimonies of Police Sgts. Rodrigo Espiritu and Jacinto de
Is Cruz who were not buyers of the marjuana cake nor heard (sic) the conversation that took place between
accused and informer.
xxx ... the Trial Court erred in disregarding and discrediting the testimony of accused and his corroborating witness
and without giving exculpatory weight to the evidence of the defense."7
After the Appellee filed its Brief through the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, of Appeals rendered a
decision on 23 November 1989 8 affirming the appealed decision with a modification of the penalty imposed for
being incorrect. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, promises considered, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that the accused-appellant
Antonio Pablo y Dolloso is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation (sic) of Section 4, Republic Act 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is sentenced to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00, and the cost.
However, the judgment herein shall not be entered and the case shall be, as it is hereby certified to the Supreme
Court and the entire records thereof elevated thereto for review (Section 12, of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court;
People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511; People vs. Ramos, 88 SCRA 486; People vs. Centeno, 108 SCRA 710).
SO ORDERED." 9
Pursuant to the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals forwarded to
this Court the entire records of this case, together with the transcript of the stenographic notes and exhibits, on 8
December 1989.10
This Court required the accused to file his Brief, which he did on 13 March 1990. He merely reiterated the errors
and arguments raised in the Brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General filed the Appellee's Brief
on 21 June 1990.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"At the trial the prosecution has established that at about 8:00 O'clock in the morning of January 28, 1986 an
informer by the name of Sobby' told Sgt. Jacinto data Cruz of the NARCOM Unit stationed at Noveleta, Cavite that
a certain 13oy Roberts' whose real name is Antonio Pablo y Dolloso (herein amused-appellant) of Cavite City was
selling marijuana. Immediately Lt. Jorge Corpuz, Officer-inCharge, designated Sgt. Jacinto data Cruz and Sgt.
Rodrigo Espiritu to form a team and conduct a 'buy-buat operation.'At 8:30 that same morning, the team together
with Bobby proceeded to Cavite City and arrived at around 9:00 O'clock at Dubai Street near San Sebastian
 181

College, Cavite City. From there, they went to Ejercito St., Sta. Cruz, Cavite, where Bobby pointed to the house of
the accused. After closely watching the amused's place for some time, the team and Bobby returned to the place of
the rendezvous near San Sebastian College. Sgt. dela Cruz instructed Bobby to buy from the accused one (1) slice
of marijuana cake and one (1) foil of marijuana leaves by using four (4) marked P6.00 bills. Sgt. data Cruz
supplied the amount of P20.00 in marked bills. They told Bobby to give a prearranged signal, by lifting his shirt,
after the marijuana cake and marijuana leaves had been handed to him. Sgts. dela Cruz and Espiritu saw Bobby
stop in front of the accused's house and called for 'Boy Roberts,' The latter appeared and after a short
conversation, the aforenamed officers saw Bobby hand the P20.00 marked bills to the accused who entered his
residence and after a while returned with something wrapped in a tin foil and gave it to Bobby. Upon seeing the
pre-arranged signal, the two (2) officers swooped down on the accused and arrested him. On the spot, the officers
recovered from the accused the marked bills and from Bobby one slice of marijuana cake and one (1) foil of
marijuana leaves. The accused did not resist arrest. Sgt. dele Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu went inside the house of the
accused. Upon further investigation the accused brought out three (3) cakes of marijuana which he kept inside the
refrigerator and rive (5) foils of marijuana leaves which he took from a yellow plastic can near the water tank
outside the house. The officers together the (sic) accused passed by the Cavite Police Station before returning to
their headquarters at Noveleta, Cavite. Thereafter, the accused without the assistance of counsel was investigated
by Sgt. Manolo.
On the same date, January 28, 1986, Lt. Jose Jorge E. Corpus, OMoor-InCharge of the Narcotic Command, Cavite
District Office, Noveleta, Cavite submitted to the Director, National Bureau of lnvestigation, Manila a written
request for laboratory examination to determine the presence of prohibited or regulated drugs of the following: one
(1) foil of marijuana dried leaves, three (3) bricks of brownies cake (marijuana cakes), and five (5) foils of
marijuana dried leaves (Exh. A). The aforementioned specimens were received by Research Chemist Constaricia
Franco Salongs (Exh. B). After conducting the microsoopic, chemical, and chromatographic examinations on (1)
one small brick of brownie cake allegedly containing marijuana and (2) one foil containing dried leaves suspected
to be marijuana, Research Chemist Me. Salonga found that said specimens gave positive results of marijuana (Exh.
C-2). Me. Salonga testified on the examinations she conducted and the findings she made on the aforementioned
specimens.
The defense of the aceused-appallant, 34, consists of denials. According to him, he does not know Bobby but knew
the informer as Anday. At about 10:00 in the morning of January 28, 1986, while he was fixing his bed on the lawn
inside the gate of his house, Sgt. dela Cruz, Sgt. Espiritu and Andoy arrived in a motor vehicle. Immediately after
having alighted, Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu pointed their guns at him and told him to run. Andoy who was
carrying a brown paper bag went up his house. With ihis (sic) gun, Sgt. dela Cruz hit him (accused) three times
while at standing (sic) position and two times while lying Prostrate on the drive way. Sgt. Espiritu was pointing a
gun at him. A little later, Andoy came down from the house carrying an orange colored bag which was the same
bag presented to the trial court by Fiscal Fred Aguilar, Andoy told the officers that the bag contained marijuana
cake (sic). Sgt. dela Cruz then told him to go up the house and show them the bedroom. $St. dela Cruz directed
Anday to search the room, but they did not find any mmijuana them. Fifteen (16) minutes thereafter, Sgt. Espiritu
came up, carrying a yellow plastic container which, according to the officer was found near the water tank, and
contained marijuana. Andoy also searched the bedroom of his mother, but he did not find anything. The accused
know Andoy as a NARCOM Informer. The gas stove presented by Fiscal Aguilar was taken from their house which
they utilized when. ever there is no electricity.
Accused-appellant also declared that Andoy nursed ill-feelings against him, because he bested Andoy In their
courtship of a certain Gram who was a waitress at Violy's refreshment parlor at San Anto. nio.
Aocused-appellant denied that Sgt. dela Cruz had taken from him four (4) P5.00 marked bills. He stated that while
he was being investigated at the NARCOM headquarters at Noveleta, Sgt. dela Cruz took out from his wallet a
P20.00 bill, which he asked to be changed into four P5.00 bills upon which Sgt, dela Cruz placed markings.
However, on cross-examination, accused-appellant declared that he does not know of any reason why Sgt. dela
Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu would falsely accuse him of selling prohibited drugs except what had happened between him
and Andoy, and that he would not know if the two (2) officers would connive with Andoy to falsely accuse him of
selling marijuana.
Corroborating the accused was Rodimar Calalang, 21, a friend of five (5) years and neighbor at Ejercito St."11
The first three (3) assigned errors raise the issue of whether or not the evidence for the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused sold marijuana in violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. It is the thesis of the accused that without having presented the informer who posed as buyer,
the fact of sale could not be establiahed.
In disposing of these assigned errors and issue, the Court of Appeals held:
"We do not agree. It has 'been established that Sgt. dela Cruz gave Bobby, their informer, four (4) P5.00 marked
bills with which to buy marijuana cake and one (1) foil of marijuaria dried leaves from accused-appellant. Sgt. dela
Cruz instructed Bobby that as soon as the accused should have given or delivered the marJjuana cake and
marijuana dried leaves to him, he would lift his shirt which was the signal for them to make the arrest. Sgt. data
Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu testified that they saw Bobby talk to the accused-appellant and thereafter hand the P20.00
bill to him. Thereafter, accused appellant went inside his house and immediately came back with the marijuana
cake and one marijuana leaves (sic) in a tin foil. When Bobby lifted his shirt, the two (2) officers swooped down on
accused-appellant and arrested him. The fact that the two (2) officers did not hear what conversation transpired
between Bobby and the accused-appellant is immaterial for the purpose of establishing the sale. Considering the
fact that money was handed by Bobby to the aecused-appellant and immediately thereafter the latter delivered to
 182

the former the subject marijuana cake and marijuana leaves, there can be no transaction established other than
that of a sale, The burden of proof that it was not a sale was shifted to the accuar)dappellant. In the case at bar,
the accused-appellant did not overcome that burden. He did not present any evidence to disprove that it was a sale
either by himself or by the informer whom he knew by the name of Andoy. Consequently, the fact of sale stood
unrebutted. Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act 6426, as amended par; (o) defines 'sale' to mean the act of giving a
dangerous drug whether for money or any other material consideration.""
As to the fourth assigned error, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly rejected the version of the
accused. Thus:
"The defense which accused-appellant set up at the trial is that the marijuana cake and the marijuana dried leaves
submitted by the prosecution to the lower court were planted evidence. The trial court who has obsersved the
demeanor of the witnesses presented by both the prosecution and the defense gave credence to the witnesses for
the prosecution and concluded that the crime charged in the information was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Aside from the settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial. court which depend upon the proper evaluation of
credibility of witnesses are given great weight on appeal and are not usually disturbed unless there is a showing of
strong and cogent reasons therefor,13 it is really incredible that Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu who have not been
shown to have any personal motive of falsely charging the accused with a capital offense would do so merely to
satisfy the alleged humiliation of Andoy, the informer, whom the accused-appellant had allegedly bested in the
courtship of a certain Grace assuming such courtship to be true. And to what extent of moral influence or
ascendancy (sic) has Andoy over the two officers who testified against him, the accused-appellant has not even
attempted to show. It has been repeatedly held that there is no test of the truth of human testimony except its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.14 To be believed the testimony must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself15 Measured by this criteria, We cannot
believe that Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu would have taken time and effort to drive from their hedquarter at
Noeleta. Cavite to Ejercito St., Sta. Cruz, Cavite City and planted as evidence the marijuana cake and mari juana
leaves that were submitted to the National Bureau of Investiga tion for examination and which were found to be
positive as to the presence of marijuana just to satisfy the whims of a certain Andoy, who was known to the
officers as Bobby, their informer. We hold that no reasonable prudent man would believe appellant's theory of
defense, which was easy to concoct, but hard to believe."16
After a painstaking examination of the records of this case, evaluation of the evidence adduced and review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals certified to Us, We find the latter to be My supported by the evidence; moreover,
We rule that the modification of the sentence is correct, except that the portion on subsidiary imprisonment should
have been likewise deleted.
Notwithstanding the sufficiecy of the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, however, We wish to amplify
certain points.
In support of his three (3) assigned errors, accused stresses that: (a) there was no reason to withhold the
testimony of the poseur-buyer because the latter was known to him, hence, the danger to the poseurbuyer's
person sought to be avoided by not revealing his identity does not exist; the non-presentation then of the poseur-
buyer gives rise to the presumption that his testimony would be adverse to the prosecution;17 (b) it was
improbable that he would commit the offense because it is contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell
marijuana in the open; and (c) there is no showing that the slice of marijuana cake and one foil of dried marijuana
leaves are the same items allegedly taken from him.
We find these contentions to be bereft of merit.
There was no suppression of evidence when the poseur-buyer was not presented. Firstly, his testimony would at
beat be corroborative because Sgt. Dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu were themselves eyewitnesses to the delivery of the
marked P5.00 bills by Bobby, the informer, to the accused and the subsequent delivery of the marijuana cake and
marijuana leaves by the latter to the former. His nonpresentation was not fatal to the prosecution's case. Secondly,
having admitted that Bobby is known to him, accused could have called him to the witness stand as a hostile
witness. Of course, if he chose this strategy he would be doing so at his own risk. As held by this Court in People
us. Raul Femandez.18
"There is as well no merit in the claim of the accused that the nonpresentation of the poseur-buyer as a witness is
a clear suppresaion of evidence. The testimony of the poseur-buyer, if it were given, would at best be corroborative
because Navarro end Feliciano sufficiently established how the crime was committed. Thus his non. presentation
was not fatal to the prosecutions case.19 Of course, it would be different if the police officers were unable to see
the actual sale of marijuana. In such a situation, an exception arises and the poseur-buyer should be presented as
a witness 20 Besides, there is no showing in this case that the poseur-buyer was not available for examination. If
the accused honestly believed that the testimony of such poseur-buyer would be adverse to the prosecution, the
former should have availed of the compulsory process to have such poseurbuyer produced as witness, or even as a
hostile witness."
The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"(a) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;"
does not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely Gonzales, 21 corroborative. As early as 1912, in United
States vs. Gonza this Court already held:
"When an act has been witnessed by several persons, the prosecution has no need, nor is it obliged, to present all
such witnesses, but only those it deems necessary; it is enough that it employ such witnesses as in its opinion may
be sufficient to prove the facts alleged in the complaint."
In United States vs. Dinola, 22 this Court pointedly ruled that:
 183

"The presumption that the evidence omitted by a party would, if presented, be adverse to him, is not applicable to
merely corroborative evidence,"
Neither does it apply in cases where the witness, as in this case, is available to the accused 23 because then, the
evidence would have the same weight against one party as against the other.24
In People vs. Andiza,25 We had the occasion to state that although Patrolman Hernandez and the civilian informer
could have been highly competent witnesses, being themselves the poseur-buyers, their testimonies were not,
however, indispensable in view of the declarations of not only one (1), but two (2) other eyewitnesses. Their non-
presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression of testimony that is adverse to the prosecution. Besides, the
matter of presenting witnesses is the prerogative of the Prosecutor.
And in the more recent case of People vs. Bati, 26 this Court held:
In the case at bar, there were other prosecution witnesses who testified and positively identified appellant as the
principal participant in the illegal transaction. Both Patrolmen Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and
their testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to
appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly
be carried on in hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and
the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have
regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary. (People vs. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, Oct.
12, 1987)."
As to the second point, 'We have held in a number of cases that drug pushing, when done on a small level, belongs
to that class of crimes which may be committed at any time and at any place. The fact that the parties are in a
public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade
as these facts may even serve to camouflage the same.27
As to the third point, the prosecution, via the testimony of Sgt. Espiritu, sufficiently established that the slice of
marijuana cake and the foil of dried marijuana leaves were the items taken from the accused. Thus, Sgt. Espiritu
testified:
Now, in a plastic evidence bag identified as Exh. E-6 the contents Is (sic) a brick of marijuana cake as testified by
the Forensic Chemist, what connection has that to the brick which was the subject matter of the buy-bust
operation?
AThis was the brick that he sold.
QWhy do you say so?
AWe asked him also to sign and his signature appears here.
Q Where?
A (witness pointing to a signature over the brick) xxx
Q Now, what about that foil of marijuana cigarettes that was the result of the buy-bust operation, where is it now?
A (witness pointing to a foil of marijuana which was previously marked as Exh. E-5)
Q Why are you sure that that is the foil of marijuana that was the result of that buy-bust operation'
A We also have him signed, (sic) sir.
xxx FISCAL AGUILAR:
Q I am showing to you a receipt dated January 8, 1986 certifying that the undersigned has seized and taken
possession of the property herein described from Antonio Pablo y Dolloso, what connection has that receipt with
the receipt you issued?
A This is the receipt of the property seized and that was prepared by Jacinto dela Cruz.
FISCAL AGUILAR: We request that the same be marked as Exh. G.
QWhose signature is this, reading Jacinto dela Cruz?
A To him (sic), air.
Q Are you (sic) present when it was signed by him?
A Yes, sir.
Below Sgt. dela Cruz's signature is the signature of one Antonio Pablo, whose signature is that?
A That is Antonio Pablo's signature, air.
Q Were you also present when he signed it?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
I request that these two signatures he marked as Exh. G-1.
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
Immediately after these items were confiscated or recovered from the accused, where did you take it (sic)?
A It was (sic) brought to the NBI for laboratory examination, sir.
Q Who brought it there?
A CIC Roberto Genido, sir."28
Moreover, Constancia Franco Salonga, the forensic chemist who examined the content$ of the foil and brick of
brownie cake obtained from the accused, testified that after conducting rnicroscopic, chemical and chromatographic
examinations thereon, she concluded that the same were positive for rnarijuana.29
Finally, We come to the penalty imposed by the trial court which is imprisonment 'of from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum," and a fine of P5,000.00.
 184

We are unable to trace the legal basis of this penalty. According to the Court of Appeals, the trial court applied the
provisions of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 before it was amended by P.D. No. 1675 which took effect on 17
February 1980. Before such amendment, the penalty provided for in said section was "imprisonment ranging from
twelve years and one day to twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos;"
however, should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under said section be the proximate cause of the death
of the victim thereof, the penalty imposable was life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos.
Thus, even under the pre-amendment provision, the penalty imposed is still incorrect for the trial court exceeded
the maximum by one (1) day and fixed the fine at an amount very much less than the minimum provided therein.
It likewise designated the penalty as reclusion temporal, nowhere in the law does such a designation appear.
Perhaps, it thought all along that since the range is that for reclusion temporal, it might be beat to so designate the
penalty as such. Furthermore, considering that the penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional, no
subsidiary imprisonment could be imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
As amended by P.D. No. 1675, the penalty provided for Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 is life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. However, the death penalty can no longer be imposed
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution."30
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed should be life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00, without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision appealed from finding the accused ANTONIO
PABLO y DOLLOSO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentencing him, as above modified, to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Presentation or non-presentation of poseur-buyer
[GRN 88515 April 7, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee, vs. WILLY BAGAWE y PAGALLA, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 5. Valdez, Jr., J.
The accused was only eighteen years old when he was charged with illegal sale of a prohibited narcotic under
Section 4, Article 11, of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Subsequently tried and convicted, he was sentenced to life
imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00.1 He is now before this Court and asks for a reversal of the
judgment against him, pleading error on the part of the lower court and his own innocence.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that on April 14, 1987, an informer reported to the First Narcotic Regional
Unit in Baguio City that a certain Willy (who was subsequently identified as the accused-appellant) was engaged in
selling marijuana at Poliwes in front of the Milton Hotel on Kennon Road. A buy-bust team was forthwith organized,
with A2C Serafin Artizona as poseur-buyer and Lt. Macusi, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro as back-
up members. Artizona was provided with three P20.00 marked bills to be used in the sham purchase.
At 11 o'clock in the morning of the same date, the informer led the team to the accused-appellant who was then
inside a billard hall. As the other team members deployed themselves covertly, the informer introduced Artizona to
Willy as an interested buyer of marijuana. Willy told them to see him that afternoon at 5 o'clock.
The team was back at the appointed hour but Willy arrived about a halfhour late. He invited Artizona and the
informer to a store about a hundred meters away where they could have some drinks. The other team members
discreetly followed and later watched the three as they drank rum and talked. While Willy smoked a stick of
marijuana cigarette, he quoted P20.00 as the price for a matchboxful of marijuana. Artizona ordered three boxes,
and Willy asked the two to come with him to the back of the market in front of the Milton Hotel. The other team
members went along from a distance without Willy noticing them.
When they reached the market, Willy drew three matchboxes from the right front pocket of his trousers and
handed them to Artizona, who in turn gave him the three marked P20.00 bills. After checking the contents of the
matchboxes and finding that they appeared to be marijuana, Artizona gave the pre-arranged signal to his
teammates by scratching his head. He then identified himself as a NARCOM agent and placed the accusedappellant
under arrest. Sgt. Fider, who had approached with the other two members of the team, searched Willy and took
from him the marked money, a suspected marijuana cigarette butt, and a parcel of brown paper containing what
looked like marijuana flowering tops.
The cigarette butt, dried leaves, and flowering tops were examined by Capt. Elias R. Canapi III of the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Bado, Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and found to be positive for marijuana. A second
examination was conducted by Carlos Figueroa, a forensic chemist in the same laboratory, who later testified that
the specimens he had subjected to the Daquenase-Levine test and thin layer chromatography test were positive
for marijuana.2 The examination reports3 and the specimens themselves were submitted in evidence.4
The other witnesses for the prosecution were Artizona and Fider, who described the buy-bust operation. The three
marked P20.00 bills were also offered as exhibits.5
In his defense, the accused-appellant flatly denied the charges against him. He said that in the morning of April 14,
1987, he was approached by Joseph Sumedca and Artizona and asked if he knew where they could buy marijuana.
He said no. Later that afternoon, he met the two again and they drank gin at the Bacoco store. He wanted to go
home afterwards, but the two asked him to accompany them to the parking lot nearby. On the way, Joseph gave
him P60.00. As he was urinating at the back of the market, Joseph handed him a small parcel, and it was at this
 185

precise time that a policeman arrived and arrested him. He was forced to admit ownership of the marijuana
wrapped in the parcel given to him by Joseph, and Sgt. Fider mauled him at the NARCOM station.
His mother, for her part, testified that she gave P5,000.00 to a certain Sgt. Domingo Pejoro in consideration of the
withdrawal of the case against her son.6
It is plain from a comparison of the evidence of the parties that the prosecution had a more plausible case than the
defense. The testimony of the accused-appellant is hardly believable and is obviously a tissue of lies. As for his
mother, all she did was give the impression that she herself believed her son to be guilty and was willing to pay
good money to prevent his imprisonment.
In the accused-appellant's brief, it is argued that the failure of the prosecution to present the informer was a fatal
omission. We do not think so. The rule is well settled that each party has the prerogative to determine which
witnesses to present and to dispense with, the testimony of persons who will only give corroboration.7 Artizona
and Fider had already described the details of the buy-bust operation; the testimony of the informer was not
really necessary, At any rate, if the defense felt that the prosecution did not call the informer to the stand for fear
that he would give adverse testimony, there was nothing to prevent him from testifying for the accused-appellant.
The informer was known to the defense as Joseph Sumedca. It would have been simple enough to have him
subpoenaed for examination as a defense witness.
The defense suggests that if Willy really lighted a marijuana cigarette at the Bacoco store, Artizona should have
immediately arrested him redhanded. It also asks why the team brought with it the exact amount of P60.00 when
it did not know beforehand about the quantity and quality of the marijuana Willy would be selling.
If the NARCOM agents did not arrest Willy while he was smoking the marijuana cigarette at the Bacoco store, it
was because they wanted to catch him for the more serious offense of drug-pushing. And if they brought with them
only P60.00 for the operation, the explanation is that they knew Willy to be a small-time operator who would be
selling only a limited quantity of the prohibited narcotic at the current price of P20.00 per matchboxful.
The defense also wonders why the agents and Willy first met at the billiard hall and says it was an unlikely place to
transact the illicit sale. It forgets that only the initial approach was made there and that the actual sale was made
at the back of the market, which was a less crowded place. In any event, we have already remarked on the
growing recklessness of drug-pushers, who have plied their trade in the most open -settings, regardless of
conscience and consequences. Thus:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at
anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is
completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may
not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the
same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billard hall
(People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January
12,1987,147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People v. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo,
G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People vs. Policarpio, G.R. No.
69844, February 23, 1988).8
The claim of the accused- appellant that he was "framed" taxes credibility; more bluntly, it is absurd. He has not
shown why the NARCOM agents, who did not know him before the operation and certainly had no grudge against
him, would single him out and arrest him for a crime that could mean his imprisonment for life. By contrast, the
agents enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their functions. This and the substantial evidence
adduced against the accusedappellant have overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor and
proved his guilt beyond the whisper of a doubt.
And so Willy Bagawe, now 23 years old, faces a life of punishment and, it is hoped, also remorse for his terrible
offense. It is a lamentable future for one so young, but let us not forget the victims of his trade who, trapped in the
clutches of drug addiction, suffer a fate more cruel than prison bars.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. It is so ordered.

[GRN 96548 May 28,1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL DAG-UMAN, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City, Br. 15.
In Criminal Case No. QC-903 of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court at Ozamiz City, the accused, Joel Dag-uman,
was convicted after due arraignment and trial, of a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The Trial Court's judgment, dated October 8, 1990, made the following
dispositions:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court finds the accused Joel Dag-uman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to the penalty of an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, to suffer the other accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
It appearing that accused Joel Dag-uman has been under deten. tion since his arrest on October 3, 1989, he partly
credited four-fifths (4/5) of his detention as he did not agree in writing to abide by the rules for convicted prisoners
in accordance with Republic Act 6127.
The sixteen (16) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes con. fiscated from the possession of the accused are
forfeited in favor of the government and should be burned to ashes by the Clerk of Court."
 186

The Court's verdict was reached after analysis and assessment of the contrasting proofs of the prosecution and the
defense. The Court deemed the following facts established by the evidence of the prosecution, viz.:
"x x x, Sgt. Emilio de Guzman and Sgt. Bernardino Mugot, members of the Narcotics Unit, stationed at Cotta,
Ozamiz City, together with their team leader Reynaldo Miguel, conducted a buy. bust operation along the national
highway at Bañadero, Ozamiz City, at about 11:15 o'clock in the morning of October 3, 1989, using as poseur
buyer their civilian informer from Cagayan de Oro City. This civilian informer previously conducted surveillance and
a test buy operation in the area, and the result was positive. On the said date, time and place in question, Sgt.
Miguel gave two (2) marked P5.00 bills to their poseur buyer, the serial numbers of which were PT319706 and
QC5099051 and duly registered in their logbook. When the said poseur buyer gave the marked P5.00 bills to
accused Joel Dag-uman, the latter gave the poseur buyer six (6) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes. Sgt. de
Guzman and Sgt. Mugot who (were) just nearby immediately placed the accused under arrest and when a search
was made on his person, his pants pocket yielded the two (2) marked P5.00 bills, and another ten (10) sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes. The six (6) sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes were duly submitted to the
NBI office, at Cagayan de Oro City, for laboratory examination, and the results proved that the specimens were
indeed marijuana (Exhs. D to D-5, E, E-1 to E-6)."
The Trial Court declared the People's evidence to be entitled to full faith and credit and that of the accused as
"unworthy of belief at all." It said:
"Weighing the facts and circumstances obtaining in this elm, there is positive evidence that the accused Joel Dag-
uman was caught in flagrante delictu selling marijuana cigarettes by the PC Narcotics Unit in an entrapment set up
by them using their civilian informer from Cagayan de Oro City as poseur buyer, with marked P5.00 bills. As public
officers duly designated in the enforcement of the AntiDangerous Drugs Law, there is that legal presumption that
these police officers were regularly performing their official functions as such. And there is that admission by the
accused that he came only to know Sgt. De Guzman when he arrested him, and therefore there was no motive or
reason for Sgt. De Guzman to falsely incriminate him. The version of the accused that he was only induced by the
two civilian informers of the PC Narcotics Unit to buy those marijuana cigarettes confiscated from him is too naive
to be believe(d) by the Court and is unworthy of belief at all. He knew very well that buying or selling marijuana
cigarettes is prohibited by law. Yet when he was requested by persons hardly known to him, he readily consented
to buy said marijuana cigarettes. There is no showing that other alleged inducements were offered him, except
that he was allegedly given that measly sum of P15.00, he consented to do an illegal act. The Court can only
conclude that the version of the prosecution that an entrapment was set up to apprehend the accused in the act of
selling of x x (peddling) or 'pushing' marijuana cigarettes is more in keeping with logic and in the natural course of
things. x x x."
Dag-uman has appealed his conviction and in this Court insists that his version of the material events-which
basically is that he was induced by Narcom agents to commit the crime, as above intimated-should have been duly
appreciated and consequently should have swung the balance in his favor. He also contends alternatively, that the
Trial Court should have credited him with "the full time during which he underwent preventive imprisonment."
After a thoroughgoing review of the record, the Court is sat. isfied that the Trial Court's judgment has been
correctly rendered and is not tainted by any reversible error in its essential conclusion of the appellant's guilt of the
crime.
Nothing in the record warrants disbelief in the evidence given by the Government witnesses. Said witnesses were
police officers who, acting on disclosures of undercover informants (their so-called "poseursbuyers," or "assets"),
had planned the entrapment of the appellant and carried it out successfully; they had personally seen the accused
hand over to their designated "poseur-buyer" six (6) sticks of hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes and accept payment
therefor in marked five-peso bills; that on apprehending the appellant, and searching him, they had taken from his
possession the marked money, as wen as ten (10) more sticks of handrolled marijuana; and the purchased
cigarettes were subsequently shown by expert scientific examination to be indeed marijuana cigarettes. There is
nothing in the record, too, on which to build and develop a theory of a "frame-up;" in fact, it is admitted on all
sides that there was no prior acquaintance between the appellant and the police officers who had carried out his
entrapment.
In contrast, the appellant's proofs attempt to substantiate an inherently improbable proposition, one that on its
face immediately engenders skepticism and incredulity. His story of how he came to be in possession of the
marijuana and the marked money is narrated by his counsel, as follows:1
On October 2, 1989, while he was drinking at a neighbor's store, three (3) friends of his came with two (2)
strangers. "They all joined him and they finished drinking at about 9:00 p.m. He then left to go home and slept.
That night was the eve of the barangay fiesta and there was a dance. On the following day, October 3, 1989 at
about 11:00 o'clock, he was at the store of his neighbor Henry Hagonos. He was just sitting there when two young
men approached him. They were the two (2) persons who were in company of his friends the night before. These
two (2) men told him that they passed their night in the house of his (accused) friends, Then, they asked him if he
has some marijuana cigarettes and he replied that he is not an addict. He was asked to buy marijuana cigarettes at
the back of the public market by giving him P15.00 and compelled him to go to the place. He was further told that
at the back of the public market, somebody will approach him, the person selling marijuana. He did obey the
instructions x x x x x. He rode on a motorcab and then he went to the back of the public market. Upon arriving at
the place, someone who was wearing a hat approached him and he told the former that he was requested to buy
marijuana and the person asked him, 'how much,' to which he replied, 'I have P15.00, sir.' The person went to a
path where there was a house and when he returned, he handed to him (accused) the mari juana already wrapped
and he does not know the number of cigarette sticks. He then took a motorcab and returned to their house. While
 187

there, the two (2) persons called him and inquired if he got the marijuana sticks and he answered, 'Yes, here it is-'
When he was handing the marijuana to the two (2) persons, the latter held his hands and (Sgt.) de Guzman pulled
out his firearm and handcuffed him and informed him that he is an RSAF and they brought him to Cotta PC
headquarters. This de Guzman suddenly appeared at the scene. Only the marijuana he bought at their request
which he was about to hand in was taken from his pocket since he has no money at the time. x x x x He did not
sell to a poseur-buyer on October 3, 1989 sticks of marijuana. The truth is that he was only requested to buy
marijuana cigarettes. He later came to know that these two (2) persons were assets of the PC.
"xxxx. Although he is aware that marijuana cigarettes are prohibited and he may be arrested for its possession, he
consented to buy because they (two persons) prevailed on him to buy it for them. He did not know the person from
whom he is going to buy the marijuana sticks. This man just called him. There am many drug pushers who will call
you at the place behind the market, according to the two (2) persons who requested him to buy. He did not know
Sgt. de Guzman and Sgt. Mugot on October 3, 1989. He has no misunderstanding with them. xx xx."
The appellant's story cannot be accepted. It is quite obviously a feebly contrived attempt to explain away his
possession of marijuana and his act of selling it. The story is so far contrary to human experience as to call for
immediate rejection; and the Trial Court was quite correct in so rejecting it.
Also meriting rejection is the appellant's contention that the fiscal's failure to present the so-called "poseurs-
buyers" is fatal to the prosecution. The relevant information acquired by said "poseurs-buyers" was equally known
to the police officers who gave evidence for the prosecution at the trial. They all took part in the planning and
implementation of the operation, and all were direct witnesses to the actual sale of the marijuana cigarettes, the
appellant's arrest immediately thereafter, and the recovery from him of the marked money and other marijuana
cigarettes. The testimony of the "poseurs-buyers" was not therefore indispensable or necessary; it would have
been cumulative merely, or corroborative at best. Besides, as the Solicitor General points out, "The reason the
civilian poseur-buyers were not presented as witnesses was because one was already dead, mercilessly gunned
down by the relative of an accused in another drug case, after testifying in that case also as poseur-buyer. The
other poseur-buyer's identity is naturally being protected as his life is also threatened (May 18, 1990 tan, p. 6.7;
June 21, 1991, tan, p. 7). xx."
As regards the appellant's other contention that he should have been credited with "the full time during which he
underwent preventive imprisonment," suffice it to point out that this is legally proper only if he had voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners (subject to certain
exceptions); otherwise, as also correctly held by the Trial Court, he may be credited only with four-fifths (4/5) of
the time of such preventive imprisonment.2
The Court notes that the appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The sentence should have been life
imprisonment, which is that provided by the law under which he was convicted, R.A. 6425.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the appellant's sentence should be life imprisonment instead of
reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial Court at Ozamiz City (Branch 15) in Criminal Case
No. OC-903, dated October 8, 1990, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No.82263. June26,1992.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. ERNESTO YABUT y TORRES, defendant.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172. Dizon-Capulong, J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Br. 172)** finding the
accused guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and payment of the prescribed fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
The information filed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Benjamin Aquino, Jr., against the accused reads as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of April 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Luis Alejandrino who is still at
large, without authority of law or any legal justification, and while in possession and control of one (1) tea bag of
marijuana dried leaves, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, dispose of and deliver the said
marijuana dried leaves to another person knowing fully well the same to constitute a prohibited and dangerous
drug."
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereupon commenced. To prove the merits of
this case, the prosecution presented the testimonial evidence of the arresting officer, S/Sgt. Pablito Reyno of the
Philippine Constabulary and Daisy Babor, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory based in Camp Olivas,
Pampanga.
The prosecution alleges that on 8 April 1985 at about 5:00 p.m., a civilian informant went to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga to report on the alleged drug trafficking activities of the accused-appellant Yabut and his co-accused
Alejandrino at Pulo, Palayan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Upon evaluating the information, recounts the prosecution
witness Reyno, he formed a team composed of S/Sgt. Ruben Bazar, Sgt. Venusto Homisulamin, two (2) FMIB
agents, and himself, and together with the informant, they proceeded to the reported site of the illegal activity to
conduct a buy-bust operation designed to entrap the accused-appellant and Alejandrino. Bazar was designated to
act as poseur-buyer.
Upon arrival at Pulo, Bazar and the civilian informant were allegedly met by the appellant and brought to the house
of Luis "Gigi" Alejandrino who met them there. From a distance of twenty (20) meters, witness Reyno, who had
positioned himself at the corner of the entrance of the alley leading to Alejandrino's house, saw Bazar talk to
Alejandrino after which the latter handed over one plastic bag of marijuana to Bazar who in turn gave a marked
 188

ten-peso bill to the appellant as payment for the drug. Thereupon, Bazar gave the pre-arranged hand signal and
Reyno proceeded to arrest the appellant and recovered from him the marked money. The team thereafter brought
accused-appellant to Camp Olivas.
The tea bag, also recovered from the scene, was subsequently submitted for examination to the witness Daisy
Babor whose tests confirmed the same to be the prohibited substance of marijuana.
In his defense, the accused-appellant alleged that during the night and hour in question, he was standing by the
house of his co-accused Alejandrino, chatting with the latter who was looking out from his window. During their
conversation, a group of four (4) men arrived, looking for Alejandrino and expressing the desire to buy marijuana.
Alejandrino however said he had nothing to sell and thereafter went to the inner portion of his house. Accused-
appellant further alleged that since the group's efforts, insofar as Alejandrino was concerned, had been thwarted,
he (appellant) then became the focus of their attention and was subjected to a search of his person; and thereafter
he was brought blindfolded to Camp Olivas. There, he was confronted with a tea bag of marijuana, but he denied
any knowledge as to the same, as well as having received P10.00 from Sgt. Bazar.
As earlier stated, the trial court found the accused's guilt to have been established beyond reasonable doubt, and
accordingly imposed sentence on him.
In support of the present appeal, the accused-appellant raises the following errors of the court a quo:
I
The trial court erred in not considering the non-presentation of Sgt. Ruben Bazar, the alleged poseur-buyer to the
witness stand as a fatal flaw to the cause of the prosecution.
II
The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of S/Sgt. Pablito Reyno.
III
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information.
This Court finds for the accused-appellant.
Well-established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty; and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 1 In the
present case, accused-appellant's version of the circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a total
denial of the prosecution's allegations. In this regard, this Court has ruled that when there is such a divergence of
accounts -
"it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant's allegations by presenting . . . the alleged poseur-
buyer. This it failed to do, giving rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. (Rule 131, Sec. 5[e]). This failure constitutes a total flaw in the prosecution's evidence since the so-
called informant who was never presented as a witness and never identified, is the best witness for the prosecution
. . . " 2 (emphasis supplied)
Who would have been the best witness for the prosecution? According to the prosecution's own version, Sgt. Bazar,
being the alleged poseur-buyer, was the only person who could definitely and categorically attest to the
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused-appellant. He was the one who transacted with the later and
he was the one who allegedly exchanged a marked P10.00 bill for a tea bag of marijuana. In short, he could have
provided the most accurate account of the case. Yet, he was not presented as a witness by the prosecution, and his
failure to testify remains unexplained. In such a situation, People vs. De Guzman 3 is enlightening where this Court
said:
"The court can only wonder why the prosecution did not present Querubin, who allegedly bought the marijuana
from de Guzman and paid him the marked money . . . It is true that each party has the discretion to plot its own
strategy, as we have said often enough in many cases, but under the circumstances of this particular case the
choice by the prosecution of its witnesses was less than tactical. Querubin was the best witness to narrate the
transaction; Bazar could at best only corroborate . . .
The prosecution suggests that if the defense really felt that Querubin would advance its cause, there was nothing
to prevent it from calling him as its own witness, as it had a right to do under the Bill of Rights and the Rules of
Court. It forgets however, that it was the obligation of the prosecution to prove its allegations, not of the defense
to disprove them. Bazar's testimony against de Guzman being insufficient to convict, it was incumbent on the
prosecution to bolster its case by calling Querubin to the stand."
Anent the court a quo's imputed error of giving credence to the testimony of Sgt. Reyno, this Court's own
examination of the record shows that Reyno was positioned some twenty (20) meters away from where Bazar,
Alejandrino and the accused were supposed to be transacting the purchase of the prohibited substance. At that
distance, considering the lateness of the hour and with no indication that the surrounding area was illuminated in
any way, it becomes reasonable to doubt that Reyno actually saw what he testified to have seen. It is a truism that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of credible witnesses (which is itself already in
doubt in this instance) but must be credible in itself 4 No better test has yet been found to measure the value and
weight of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 5 The
Court, therefore cannot live such testimony of Reyno the same credence as the trial court gave to it, despite the
entrenched rule that acords great weight to trial court's findings of fact. In the situation at bar, the exception to the
rule is in order, in the same way that exceptions to such rule have been recognized by this Court (1) when the
conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible, (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
 189

of facts, and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and appellee. 6 It is significant to point out that even the Solicitor-
General, as counsel for the appellee, recommends the acquittal of the accused-appellant.
Considering the above discussion, the third assigned error requires no further elucidation. One final question,
however, remains which further clouds the veracity of the prosecution's version. This has to do with appellant's co-
accused who, according to the Information, remains at large. As alleged by the prosecution, said co-accused
(Alejandrino) was with the accused-appellant and Bazar during the alleged transaction, yet, when the police
operatives moved in to arrest the accused, co-accused Alejandrino appears to have been ignored. Was he arrested
but was able to escape, or did he escape immediately? On the other hand, was he even there in the first place?
This appears to be the more likely situation, given the version of the accused-appellant who had testified that after
Alejendrino's avowal that he had no marijuana to sell, he retreated to the inner portion of his house. This detail
appears to have been suppressed by the prosecution or overlooked by the court a quo, yet, it remains quite a
damaging indicaion that the case of the prosecution is tainted with misrepresentations, if not contrived incidents.
This is again an occasion to remind law enforcement authorities, particularly the rank and file thereof, to be more
circumspect in the undertaking of anti-narcotics operations, conducted mostly through the use of civilian
informants and buyer-poseurs, where abuse, harassment, and yes, mistake is more than possible. It is perhaps
time to take the hierarchy of our police officials to task, for this is not the first time that these entrapment
procedures have been revealed to be a little more than plain police misrepresentation to cover up incompetence or
corruption.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
[GRN 91001 September 18,1992.*]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SILFERIO SILLO Y FERRER, accused-appellant.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Br. 109.
In what would have been an otherwise perfect frame-up, the People's case falls flat on its face and the accused-
appellant has to be acquitted as the poseurbuyer in the alleged buy-bust operation was never or presented in court
by the prosecution.
According to the People:
"On or about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of March 18, 1987, Patrolmen Ricardo Ones and Elmer Mabolo and
Corporal Valentin Ilagan of the Vice Division of the Pasay City Police, while on duty at the Office of the
AntiNarcotics Unit, received information from an anonymous phone caller trial there were pushers Lakandula St.,
Pasay City. Immediately, they formed themselves into a group for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation.
They entered in the police blotter their mission and the one ten peso and two five peso bills they will use as
marked money. (TSN, p. 4.5, June 15,1987).
"About 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the policemen, along with a civilian informant', proceeded to
Dolores Street, a block away from Lakandula Street. The informer led Patrolman Ones to appellants house at 164
Int., Dolores Street, while the other officers positioned themselves a few meters away from the house. Thereafter,
the informer called someone by the name of Penpen. Later, a man, who turned out to be appellant Silferio Sillo y
Ferrer, went down and talked to the informer. The latter told appellant in the presence of Patrolman Ofies, who
posed as buyer/companion, that they wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant went upstairs, leaving the undercover
cop and the informer. When he returned, appellant received from the informer the marked money and thereafter
handed to the latter the two foils of marijuana. Immediately, Patrolman Ones identified himself as a police officer
and, with the help of other police officers, arrested appellant. Appellant was brought to the police station and
turned over to Police Investigator Eduardo Manfoste for further investigation. (TSN, p. 6 to 8, May 11, 1988). The
two foils of marijuana were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination (Exh. 'B'). After
examination, Forensic Chemist Alicia Juan certified that the evidence thus examined gave positive result for
marijuana (Exh.'C')."1
Accused-appellant was, therefore, charged with violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425 in Criminal Case No. 87-11639-P
filed with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court.
At the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty!" because according to him:
"[O]n March 18, 1987 between 8:00 PM and 8:20 PM, Silferio Sillo went out of the house to fetch the children of
his live-in wife. At about 8:30 PM, he and the children were already at home. His wife prepared their supper and at
about 9:00 PM, Pat. Ones and P/Cpl. Hagan with the civilian named Kulot suddenly entered their house. He knows
the two policemen because he was a barangay tanod from 1983-1986. Pat. Oñes was holding something like foils
of cigarettes when he was about to search the body of Silferio but the latter was ablt to move back. The policemen
then pointed their guns at Silferio and he was told not to make a scandal. Silferio, then showed off his pant's
pocket and wallet to the policemen who found nothing. The policemen conducted a search inside the house and
they likewise found nothing. Silferio's mother and wife who were then present were afraid. Silferio was then
brought to the police headquarters but he did not see anymore Kulot, a well known snatcher and with whom he
(accused) had encountered several times in their barangay selling stolen items. (TSN, pp. 2-8, July 13, 1988 and
pp. 2-6, August 10, 1988 Sillo).2
The trial court gave more credence to the People's version and on September 30, 1988 rendered a decision which
stated in its dispositive portion:
"In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Silferio Sillo y Ferrer guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
charged in the information and hereby sentences him to Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the cost.
 190

"Likewise, the two (2) sticks of marijuana and the dangerous drugs subject of this case is hereby confiscated in
favor of the government and ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board thru the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
"SO ORDERED."3
Hence, this appeal.
The accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in:
1. Convicting him despite material inconsistencies in the tesstimonies of prosecution witness; and 2. Finding that
his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
I It is to be noted, that in this particular buy-bust operation, it was the civilian informer who allegedly handed the
money to the accused-appellant and who subsequently received the marijuana from the latter. This is clear from
the joint affidavit submitted by Pats. Oftes and Mabolo, Pfc. Manlongat and P/ Cpl. Ilagan4 right after the buy-bust
operation which in its fractured syntax states:
"THAT, minutes later upon arrival at the subject place, WE, P/ CPL. Valentino Hagan, PFC. Samuel Manlongat and
Pat. Elmer Mabolo, positioned ourselves to obscure/dim portion in front of house nr.-164 Int., Dolores, St., Pasay,
while Pat. Ricardo Oñes together with a civilian informer proceeded directly at the footstair of said house and after
several called by his alias PENPEN, the suspected drug pusher came down and approached the informant and Pat.
R. Oñes;
"THAT, the suspected pusher went upstair after short conversation with the Informant and Pat. Oñes and minutes
after, went back to the informer and Pat. Oñes and handed two foils of suspected Marijuana leaves to the informer
and kept the Twenty pesos as payment to his pants front right pocket;
"THAT, immediately after the payment, Pat. R. Oñes held the suspected Marijuana pusher by the right hand,
subsequently identifiled himself as police member of Pasay, at this juncture, Cpl. V. Hagan, PFC. S. Manlongat and
Pat. E. Mabolo showed themselves and assisted Pat. Oñes in apprehending the suspect;"
The civilian informer was not presented as a prosecution witness' in spite of the fact that, as testified to by Pat.
Ofies, it was the civilian informer who while acting as the poseur-buyer, gave the accused P20.00 and received
from the latter the two marijuana sticks. Thus, Pat. Oñes testified;
"Fiscal Barrera: who handed the money, ten peso bill and five peso bill to the suspect?
A My civilian informant,
Q After handing him the money what happened?
A He go (sic) upstairs and then he went down and handed to my civilian informant the two foils of marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx Court: Who received the marijuana from the accused?
A My civilian informer."6
One of the rights of an accused is to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him at the trial.7 Only two
(2) persons allegedly were eyewitnesses to the alleged sale of marijuana by the accused-appellant-the civilian
informer who was also the poseur-buyer and Patrolman Ones.
Reviewing Patrolman Oñes' testimony, We find the same riddled with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus:
1. Regarding who allegedly gave the marked money to the suspected drug pusher, on direct examination,
Patrolman Oñes already contradicted himself, as follows:
"Fiscal Barrera: While there at the house of the accused a certain Penpen, what happened there?
A After handing the marked money and after giving us the two foils of marijuana I informed him I am a member
of the Pasay Police Force. After I gave him the marked money, he put it in his right front pocket and I informed
him I am a police officer and effect the arrest.
XXX XX X xxx Fiscal Barrera: Who handed the money, ten peso bill and five peso bill to the suspect?
A My civilian informant."'
(Italics supplied)
While on cross-examination, he again contradicted himself,
as follows:
"Q Your civilian informer received the marijuana foil and after receiving it you turned over to the accused the
alleged marked money?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx",
"Q By the way, who gave this money to the accused?
A The poseur buyer."10
(Italics supplied)
2. Regarding which came first, the exchange of the marijuana or the exchange of the marked money, on direct he
contradicted himself as follows:
"Court: Did the accused handed you already the marijuana? A He handed the marijuana already.
Court: Upon receiving the money?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q After handing him the money what happened?
A He go upstairs and then he went down and handed to my civilian informant the two foils of marijuana."11
(Italics supplied)
3. Regarding as to whether he checked if the foils did contain marijuana before arresting the accused-appellant,
Patrolman Oñes testified on direct, as follows:
"Q You got the cigarette aluminum foil from the hand of the accused and your informant did not open it?
 191

A He opened it.
Q While he was looking at the marijuana you effect the arrest?
A Yes, sir, after handing the money.
Q All the time that marijuana cigarette foil was in the pos session of your informant?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you did not even touch that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then you immediately effect the arrest?
A Yes, sir."12
(Italics supplied)
But on cross, when asked why he arrested the accused-appellant without knowing the contents of the foil, he said:
"Q Why did you arrest him when you are not sure that contained in the foil is marijuana?
A I looked at the contents of the foil."13(Italics supplied)
Regarding as to when the civilian informer surrendered the marbuana foils to the police, he said on direct:
"Fiscal Barrera: Upon receiving these two foils of marijuana, what did your informer Jo?
Court: In time the civilian informer handed the marijuana to your team leader?
AIn the office already."14
(Italics supplied) while on cross, he said:
"Q Where was the informant, he followed you?
A He was together with us proceed to the headquarters. (sic)
Q At all time he has possession of that cigarette foil confis cated from the accused?
A No. At the said vicinity after getting the marijuana from the accused he handed the said foils of marijuana to our
team leader Corporal Ilagan."15
(Italics supplied)
5. As to whether there was actual drug trafficking in Lakendula St., Pat. Oñes under cross stated:
"Atty. Barcelona: You stated on March 18, 1987 you were in your office and that while present there at 8:30 you re
ceived a telephone call there is a drug trafficking in the vicinity of Lakandula St., Cecilia St. and Tramo?
AYes, sir."16
xxx x3oc "Atty. Barcelona: How did you know there were marijuna sold in that area?
A The civilian informant.
Q But before that you did not conduct surveillance?
A After the telephone call, two weeks before we are already receiving information regarding drug pushing in the
said vicinity.
Q Who received that call?
A Member of our team.
Q You mean to say that was the second call you received on March 18?
AWe have received call about drug trafficking in that place. Before that call we have been conducting surveillance.
At that night we conducted buy bust operation in the said vicinity after receiving the telephone call from a certain
resident there informing us a certain alias Penpen is conducting sale of marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx."17
While on further cross, he stated that:
"Court: In short, the information you received by phone is there is an actual drug trafficking in Lakandula St.?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q When you arrived at Lakandula St., you did not see any drug trafficking around?
A No.
Q What prompted you in going to the house of the accused?
A To check if said accused is selling marijuana."18
(Italics supplied.)
Apparently, the alleged buy-bust group members cannot even get their act together. For example:
1. As above-quoted, Patrolman Oñes stated that the civilian informer surrendered the foils of marijuana to P/Cpl
Ilagan either at the scene of the crime or at the police headquarters. However, P/Cpl. Ilagan stated it differently,
as follows:
"Q Together with the marijuana foils then what happened after that?
A We brought the suspect to the Police Headquarters.
Q And Pat. Oñes never parted with that 2 foils of marijuana?
A It was given to me.
Q When did Pat. Oñes give it to you?
A After the apprehension.
Q In the Headquarters?
A No, in the house of the accused."19
(Italics supplied)
2. A very glaring discrepancy exists in the distance between the group of Pat. Oñes and the civilian informer and
the group of the alleged buy-bust operatives who hid themselves as uncovered by the testimony. Pat. Oñes
testified on direct that:
 192

Q At that time when the civilian informant handed the marked money to the person of the accused and when the
accused went down again and handed the two foils of marijuana to your civilian informer, where were your other
companions then, Cpl. Ilagan, Pat. Mabolo and Manlongat.
A They hid them selves near to me (sic).
Fiscal Barrera: How far were these police officers? A A meter away20 (Italics supplied) while Pat. Mabolo testified
on direct that:
Q What happened there at Dolores Street?
A Pat. Oñes together with the informant proceeded to the footstairs of the house #164 Int. Dolores Street.
Q And what about the rest of the team?
A We positioned ourselves at the dim portion fronting the house #164,
Q How far were you from Pat, Oñes and your informant?
A Around 10 meters away.21
(Italics supplied)
3. Patrolmen Oñes in answer to a question by the Honorable Court had testified, as above-quoted, that the civilian
informer received the marijuana from the accused. However, P/ Cpl. Ilagan, then alleged team leader, testified
differently as follows:
Q So when he went down and gave these alleged 2 foils of marijuana he was immediately apprehended to whom
did the accused handled these marijuana?
A To Pat. Ricardo Oñes.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.22(Italics supplied.)
The inconsistencies and contradictory statements of Patrolman Oñes himself and the inconsistencies of the
statements of Patrolman Oñes with respect to the statements of P/Cpl. Hagan and Pat. Mabolo engender serious
doubts as to their reliability and veraci ty.23The presentation of the poseur-buyer is there fore very material and
relevant in this case. The alleged buybust team member's statements can now be regarded as pure hearsay
without the presentation of the civilian-informer-poseur-buyer.24 He alone could definitely testify whether
accusedappellant sold to him two foils of marijuana for Twenty (P20.00) Pesos. Accused-appellant's constitutional
right to cross-examine the alleged poseur-buyer was thus violated.25
True it is that the Court has ruled in several cases that the civilianinformer-poseur-buyer's testimony would have
been merely corroborative, the most recent of which is People vs. Daguman,26 but in accused-appellant's case,
considering the material discrepancies in the prosecution witnesses' testimony, the prosecution's case must
necessarily rise or fall on the civilian-informerposeur-buyer's testimony.27
The alleged civilian-informer-poseur-buyer was the only person who could definitely and categorically attest to the
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused-appellant. He was the one who allegedly transacted with the
latter and he was the one who allegedly exchanged the P20.00 bills for the two foils of marijuana. A similar
situation confronted the Court in People vs. Yabut,28 and the Court stated therein that:
"[I]n short, he could have provided the most accurate amount of the case. Yet, he was not presented as a witness
by the prosecution, and his failure to testify remains unexplained. In such a situation, People vs. De Guzman, 194
SCRA 601 is enlightening where this Court was less than tactical. Querubin was the best witness to narrate the
transaction; Bazar could at best only corroborate. XXX XXX The identity of the civilian-informer-poseur-buyer is
vital when the accused, as in the case at bar, denies having sold 3 marijuana to anyone.30 The failure to present
the civilianinformerposeur-buyer engenders a well-grounded belief that either he does not exist, or that, if he does,
his evidence is being wilfully suppressed because it will be adverse if produced.31
The Court notes that a witness for the accused-appellant, Amelia Abalos, testified as follows:
"That she is residing at 164 Dolores St., Pasay City about fifteen (15) meters away from the house of the accused,
That at about 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. of March 18, 1987, she was at home with her husband and child when a certain
Kulot came. That Kulot handed two (2) P10.00 bill to her husband. That in return, her husband gave Kulot 2 foils of
marijuana. That after fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes when Kulot left their house, a commotion was heard.
That she came to know from the people living in that place that Pen-pen was apprehended. That she saw Kulot
with the Police Officers."32
If Amelia Abalos' husband had been one of the accused in this case, Amelia Abalos' statement would have been
considered as a declaration against her husband's penal interest.33 Definitely, her husband is not the accused, but
the trial court should have examined with more care the following portion of her testimany:
"Q Was that the first time that you saw your husband handed marijuana to a person to another person?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did you do upon learning that your husband handed marijuana to another person or to alias Kulot?
A I got angry, sir.
Q And what did you do?
A I quarrelled with him when I came to know that he is selling marijuana."34
(Italics supplied)
which could provide a plausible reason for her testifying in favor of accused-appellant even to the extent of
incriminating her husband.
And who is this shadowy character Kulot? The accused-appellant's common-law wife's testimony sheds some light,
to wit:
"Q Are all this police officers who went to your house were police officers?
A There is a civilian who went in our house.
 193

Q Who is that civilian?

A I came to know to certain Kulot.
Q Before that incident you do not know this fellow?
A I know him for his alias.
Q You have known him that particular date or before the incident?
A Before,
Q How did you come to know this "Kulot"?
A This Kulot have a misunderstanding between my husband.
Q What was that misunderstanding?
A Because a Kumpadre of my husband complained to him that Kulot snatched the necklace the Kumpadre of my
husband.
Q What did your husband do?
A What my husband did is to talk to Kulot.
Q What was that misunderstanding that erupted between them? AAly husband is asking for Kulot, where is
necklace which he snatched, Kulot is being pinpointed.
Q Did you notice this incident?
A Yes sir.
Q Where is this confrontation happened?
A Inside the interior of Dolores St., Pasay City.
Q When was that confrontation happen?
A Before the incident happened.
Q How many months before the incident happened?
A About two months.
Q And that as the misunderstanding between Kulot and your husband?
A Yes sir."35
(Note: SIC not used to avoid cluttering up the testimony; Italics supplied)
While it is the rule that the accuseds common-law wife's testimony should be taken with a grain of salt because of
their common-law marital relationship,36 considering, however, the proven material discrepancies in the alleged
buy-bust team operatives' testimonies, it becomes now credible that the civilian-informer's (Kulot) testimony was
suppressed as there is the distinct possibility, that Kulot might have revealed something adverse to the policemen's
interest under skillful crossexamination.
The evidence of the prosecution is sorely wanting to justify conviction. Settled is the rule that the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not in the weakness of the defense.37
The Court notes the trial judge did not maintain the appearance of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge in
rendering the questioned decision38 for her Honor's statement, before the trial started, during the hearing of the
motion to grant bail to the accused was that:
"Court: So this is a hearing of the motion to bail.
Atty. Barcelona: The accused is charged under Section 4, this is not a capital offense.
Court: That is why we are hearing this case. It is not among those subject to presidential order. As long as it is in
the law, it's the law. The law could be hard but we should respect the law. Unless they decide to amend it or make
it henceforth not punishable with that penalty. In fact if I can have my way I will be frank to you, i was sent as
scholar to UNAFE, we have extended studies about drug addiction. The pusher should be shot to the Luneta. I am
referring to the pushers. In our rule the dividing tine is not very clear. Only the voluntary submission of addicts are
there."39 (Italics supplied.)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accusedappellant Silferio Sillo y Ferrer is ACQUITTED of the crime charged with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PD No. 1619: PENALIZING THE USE OR POSSESSION OR THE UNAUTHORIZED SALE TO MINORS OF
VOLATILE SUBSTANCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING INTOXICATION OR IN ANY MANNER
CHANGING, DISTORTING OR DISTURBING THE AUDITORY, VISUAL OR MENTAL PROCESS
Section 1. Volatile substances as used in this Decree shall mean and include any liquid, solid or mixed substance
having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes containing one or more of the following chemical
compounds: methanol, ethanol, isopropanol, ethyl acetate, n-propyl acetate, n-butyl acetate, acetone, methyl
ethyl ketone, methyl butyl ketone, benzene, toluene, xylene, stryene, naphtalene, n-pentane, n-hexane, n-
heptane, methylene chloride, trichloroenthylene, tetrachloroenthylene, nitrous oxide, dichlorodifluoromethane,
chlorodifluoromethane, isoamyl nitrate, ether or chloroform or any other chemical substance which when sniffed,
smelled, inhaled, or introduced into the physiological system of the body produces or induces a condition of
intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction, dulling of the brain or nervous system, depression, giddiness,
paralysis, or irrational behaviour or in any manner changing, distorting or disturbing the auditory, visual or mental
processes.
Section 2. The use or possession of volatile substances for the purpose of inhalation to induce or produce
intoxication or any of the conditions described in the preceding section shall be punishable by imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand, pesos:
Provided, however, That the provisions of Article VI, entitled "Rehabilitative Confinement and Suspension of
Sentence", of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), shall,
whenever appropriate, apply to the cases arising hereunder.
 194

Section 3. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and one day to eight years and a fine ranging from
four thousand to eight thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who sells, administers, delivers, or gives
away to another, on any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports or who acts as a
broker in any of such transactions, any substance or mixture of substances containing one or more of the chemical
compounds mentioned in Section one hereof for the purpose of inhalation to induce or produce intoxication or any
of the conditions described therein.
Section 4. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and one month to eight years and a fine ranging
from four thousand to eight thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person, or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any substance or mixture of substances containing one or more of the
chemical compounds mentioned in Section one hereof is used for the purpose of inhalation to induce or produce
intoxication or any of the conditions described therein.
Section 5. The sale of, and offer to sell, volatile substances to minors without requiring the written consent of their
parents or guardians as a condition for such sale or offer to sell shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging from
six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos: Provided, That
when the minor is eighteen years or over and is duly licensed to drive a motor vehicle, such written consent shall
not be necessary when the volatile substance sold or offered for sale is gasoline or any other motive fuel for motor
vehicles.
Section 6. The sale of, and offer to sell, to minors of liquors or beverages containing an alcoholic content of thirty
per centum or above (60 proof or above) is hereby prohibited and shall be punishable by imprisonment ranging
from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos.

R.A. No. 9344: Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act

SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from
prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy
under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution
being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall
undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program.

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE FIVE AND RA 9165

Murder & Sec. 25, R.A. No. 9165 (2005)
Candido stabbed an innocent bystander who accidentally bumped him. The innocent bystander died as a result of
the stabbing. Candido was arrested and was tested to be positive for the use of “shabu” at the time he committed
the stabbing. What should be the proper charge against Candido? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The killing, however, constitutes murder because the commission of a crime under the influence of
prohibited drugs is a qualifying, aggravating circumstance. (Sec. 25, R.A. No. 9165)
Dangerous Drug Act: Plea-Bargaining (2005)
Obie Juan is suspected to have in his possession an unspecified amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu”. An entrapment operation was conducted by police officers, resulting in his arrest following the discovery
of 100 grams of the said dangerous drug in his possession. He was subjected to a drug test and was found positive
for the use of marijuana, another dangerous drug. He was subsequently charged with two crimes: Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of “shabu” and violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 for
the use of marijuana. (5%)
a) Are the charges proper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The use of dangerous drugs is not committed when Obie Juan was also found to have in his possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug. (See s. 11 and 16, RA. No. 9165)
b) So as not to be sentenced to death, Obie Juan offers to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Can he do so? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Obie Juan cannot plead guilty to a lower offense as it is prohibited under the law. (Section 23, RA. No. 9165)
Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
Dangerous Drugs Act (1998)
Superintendent Al Santiago, Chief of the Narcotics Division, Western Police District, received information that a
certain Lee Lay of-No. 8 Tindalo Street, Tondo,
Manila is a member of the 14K Gang selling shabu and marijuana. SPOl Lorenzo and SPO3 Peralta were instructed
to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations against Lay. Their informant contacted Lay and a meeting was
arranged at T. Pinpin Restaurant at
2:00 in the afternoon on February 14, 1993. SPO1 Lorenzo and SPO3 Peralta, acting as poseur-buyers, purchased
from Lay 10 sticks of marijuana and paid P500. Later, Lay agreed to sell to them one kilo of dried marijuana
fruiting tops which he gave them at his residence.
The policemen arrested Lay and a search was conducted. Found were 356 grams of marijuana seeds, 932 grams of
marijuana fruiting tops and 50 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. What offense or offenses did Lay commit? [5%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 195

Lay committed the offenses of illegal selling of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs which
should be made subject of separate informations.
The crime of illegal selling of dangerous drugs is committed as regards the 10 sticks of marijuana and as regards
the one (1) kilo of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which should be subject of two (2) separate informations because
the acts were committed at different times and in different places.
The crime of Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is committed as regards the marijuana seeds, marijuana fruiting
tops and marijuana cigarettes which are not the subject of the sale. Another information shall be filed for this.
Dangerous Drugs Act (2006)
After receiving reliable information that Dante Ong, a notorious drug smuggler, was arriving on PAL Flight NO. PR
181, PNP Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa formed a group of anti-drug agents. When Ong arrived at the airport,
the group arrested him and seized his attache case. Upon inspection inside the Immigration holding area, the
attache case yielded 5 plastic bags of heroin weighing 500 grams. Chief Inspector Gamboa took the attache case
and boarded him in an unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito Lorbes. On the way to Camp Crame and upon nearing
White Plains corner EDSA, Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered PO3 Lorbes to stop the car. They brought out the drugs
from the case in the trunk and got 3 plastic sacks of heroin. They then told Ong to alight from the car. Ong left
with the 2 remaining plastic sacks of heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa advised him to keep silent and go home
which the latter did. Unknown to them, an NBI team of agents had been following them and witnessed the
transaction. They arrested Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile, another NBI team followed Ong
and likewise arrested him. All of them were later charged. What are their respective criminal liabilities? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Pepito Lorbes who conspired in taking the attache case are liable for the following
crimes defined under RA. 9165: a) Sec. 27 for misappropriation or failure to account for the confiscated or seized
dangerous drugs. b) Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 3(ee) for their acts as protector/coddler of Dante Ong who imported
drugs
In addition, by allowing Ong to escape prosecution for illegal importation or illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs, where the penalty is life imprisonment to death, they are also liable for qualified bribery under Art. 211-A of
the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to Dante Ong, he is guilty of illegal importation of dangerous drugs under Sec. 4, R.A. 9165, if PR 181
is an international flight. If PR 181 is a domestic flight, he is liable for violation of Sec. 5, RA. 9165 for illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs.
Dangerous Drugs Act (6425); Marked Money (2000)
At about 9 o'clock in the morning, a Narcom Group laid a plan to entrap and apprehend A, a long suspected drug
dealer, through a "buy-bust" operation. At the appointed time, the poseur-buyer approached A who was then with
B. A marked P100 bill was handed over to A who in turn, gave the poseur-buyer one (1) tea bag of marijuana
leaves. The members of the team, who were then positioned behind thick leaves, closed in but evidently were not
swift enough since A and B were able to run away. Two days later, A was arrested in connection with another
incident. It appears that during the operations, the police officers were not able to seize the marked money but
were able to get possession of the marijuana tea bag. A was subsequently prosecuted for violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, During the trial, the marked
money was not presented. Can A be held liable? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. A can be held liable. The absence of the marked money will not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence
as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. There was a perfected contract of sale of the drug (People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733;
People vs. Zervoulakos, 241 SCRA 625).
Dangerous Drugs Act (6425); Plea Bargaining (1998)
Edgardo was charged with importation of prohibited drugs in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City on June 4, 1994. The offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Can Edgardo avail of
plea-bargaining? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Edgardo cannot avail of plea-bargaining because the imposable penalty for his violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425. as amended) is reclusion perpetua to death. Section 20-A expressly provides that plea-
bargaining shall not be allowed where the imposable penalty for the violation of said law is reclusion perpetua to
death. (Sec. 20-A, R.A. No. 6425, as amended).
Dangerous Drugs Act; Consummation of Sale (1996)
Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer, approached Ronnie, a suspected drug pusher, and offered to buy P300 worth
of shabu. Ronnie then left, came back five minutes later and handed Pat, Buensuceso an aluminum foil containing
the shabu. However, before Pat, Buensuceso was able to deliver the marked money to Ronnie, the latter spotted a
policeman at a distance, whom Ronnie knew to be connected with the Narcotics Command of the Police. Upon
seeing the latter, Ronnie ran away but was arrested thirty minutes later by other policemen who pursued him.
Under the circumstances, would you consider the crime of sale of a prohibited drug already consummated? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the sale of prohibited drug is already consummated although the marked money was not yet delivered. When
Ronnie handed the aluminum foil containing the shabu to Pat. Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed sale, the crime
was consummated. Payment of the consideration is not an element of requisite of the crime. If ever, the marked
money is only evidentiary to strengthen the case of the prosecution.
 196

Dangerous Drugs Act; Criminal Intent to Posses (2002)

A and his fiancee B were walking in the plaza when they met a group of policemen who had earlier been tipped off
that A was in possession of prohibited drugs. Upon seeing the policemen and sensing that they were after him, A
handed a sachet containing shabu to his fiancee B, telling her to hide it in her handbag. The policemen saw B
placing the sachet inside her handbag. If B was unaware that A was a drug user or pusher or that what was inside
the sachet given to her was shabu, is she nonetheless liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, B will not be criminally liable because she is unaware that A was a drug user or pusher or of the content of the
sachet handed to her by A, and therefore the criminal intent to possess the drug in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is absent. There would be no basis to impute criminal liability to her in the absence of animus
possidendi.
Dangerous Drugs Act; Plea-Bargaining (2004)
MNO, who is 30 years old, was charged as a drug pusher under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
During pre-trial, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense concerning use of dangerous drugs. Should the
Judge allow MNO's plea to the lesser offense? Explain briefly. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Judge should not allow MNO's plea to a lesser offense, because plea-bargaining in prosecutions of drug-
related cases is no longer allowed by Rep. Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
regardless of the imposable penalty.
R.A. 9165: Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 (2007)
Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a "session". Thinking that it was for a mahjong session, Anastacio
agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house, Anastacio discovered that it was actually a shabu session. At that precise
time, the place was raided by the police, and Anastacio was among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any? Explain your answer.
Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of Rep. Act of 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of
2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort where dangerous drugs are used in any form. But for
a visitor of such place to commit the crime it is a requisite that he “is aware of the nature of the place as such and
shall knowingly visit the same.” These requisites are absent in the facts given.

R.A. 9165: Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 (2007); Indeterminate Sentence Law
Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see Joy, his
wife, and Ken, his best friend, in the act of having sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his service gun and shot
and killed Ken.

The court found that Ken died under exceptional circumtances and exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him
to destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Macky to pay
indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.

a. While serving his sentenced, Macky entered the prohibited area and had a pot session with Ivy (Joy’s
sister). Is Macky entitled to an indeterminate sentence in case he is found guilty of the use of prohibited
substances? Explain your answer.

No, Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103) for having evaded the
sentence which banished or placed him on destierro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly provides that the law
shall not apply to those who shall have “evaded sentence”.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

No, because the penalty for use of any dangerous drug by a first offender is not imprisonment but
rehabilitation in a government center for a minimum period of 6 months (Sec. 15, R.A. 9165). The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the penalty is imprisonment not exceeding one year.

R.A. No. 9165 (Dangerous Drug Act of 2002); Penalties (2009)

1. Will your answer be the same if it is a conviction for illegal possession of drugs under R.A. 9165
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), the prescribed penalty of which is also imprisonment for a term of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years? Why or why not? (3%)
 197

R.A. No. 9165 (Dangerous Drug Act of 2002)(2009)

Following his arrest after a valid buy-bust operation, Tommy was convicted of violation of Section 5, Republic Act
9165. On appeal, Tommy questioned the admissibility of the evidence because the police officers who conducted
the buy-bust operation failed to observe the requisite "chain of custody" of the evidence confiscated and/or seized
from him.
What is the "chain of custody" requirement in drug offenses? What is its rationale? What is the effect of failure to
observe the requirement? (3%)

TITLE SIX: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS

R.A. No. 9287 (An Act Increasing The Penalties for Illegal Number Games
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Illegal Numbers Game: Any form illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or combinations thereof as
factors in giving out jackpots.
Sec. 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer the following
penalties:
a) The penalty of imprisonment from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as a bettor;
b) The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such person acts as a
personnel or staff of an illegal numbers game operation;
The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to any person who allows his vehicle, house, building or land to be
used in the operation of the illegal numbers games.
c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such person acts as a
collector or agent;
d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if such person acts as a
coordinator, controller or supervisor;
e) The penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen (14) years, if such
person acts as a maintainer, manager or operator; and
f) The penalty of imprisonment from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years, if such person acts
as a financier or capitalist;
g) The penalty of imprisonment from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, if such person acts
as protector or coddler.
Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia or Materials. - The possession of any gambling paraphernalia and
other materials used in the illegal numbers game operation shall be deemed prima facie evidence of any offense
covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Liability of Government Employees and/or Public Officials. - a) If the collector, agent, coordinator,
controller, supervisor, maintainer, manager, operator, financier or capitalist of any illegal numbers game is a
government employee and/or public official, whether elected or appointed shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) to Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute disqualification from public office.
In addition to the penalty provided in the immediately preceding section, the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any local government official who, having knowledge of
the existence of the operation of any illegal numbers game in his/her jurisdiction, fails to abate or to take action, or
tolerates the same in connection therewith.
b) In the case of failure to apprehend perpetrators of any illegal numbers game, any law enforcer shall suffer an
administrative penalty of suspension or dismissal, as the case may be, to be imposed by the appropriate authority.
Sec. 6. Liability of Parents/Guardians. - The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year or fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon any parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or ascendancy
over a minor, ward or incapacitated person, and not otherwise falling under any of the foregoing subsections, who
induces or causes such minor, ward or incapacitated person to commit any of the offenses punishable in this Act.
 198

Upon conviction, the parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or ascendancy over the minor, ward or
incapacitated person shall be deprived of his/her authority over such person in addition to the penalty imposed.
Sec. 7. Recidivism. - The penalty next higher in degree as provided for under Section 3 hereof shall be imposed
upon a recidivist who commits any of the offenses punishable in this Act.
Sec. 9. Prosecution, Judgment and Forfeiture of Property. - Any person may be charged with or convicted of the
offenses covered by this Act without prejudice to the prosecution of any act or acts penalized under the Revised
Penal Code or existing laws.
During the pendency of the case, no property or income used or derived therefrom which may be confiscated and
forfeited shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be
admitted for the release of the same.
The trial prosecutors shall avail of provisional remedies provided for under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Upon conviction, all proceeds, gambling paraphernalia and other instruments of the crime including any real or
personal property used in any illegal numbers game operation shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
State. All assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him/her in his/her name or in the name of
another person found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to
be proceeds of the offense and shall likewise be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.

Art. 200. Grave scandal. — The penalties of arresto mayor and public censure shall be imposed upon any person
who shall offend against decency or good customs by any highly scandalous conduct not expressly falling within
any other article of this Code.

Elements
1. That the offender performs an act/s
2. That such act/s be highly scandalous as offending against decency or good customs
3. That the highly scandalous conduct is not expressly falling within any other article of this Code
4. That the act/s complained of be committed in a public place or within the public knowledge

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows. — The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine,
shall be imposed upon:
(1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
(2) (a) the authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit, indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which (1) glorify
criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are
contrary to law, public order, morals, and good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts;
(3) Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive
to morals.

[GRN 20569 October 29, 1923]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant and
appellant.
The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress
and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent. Surprising as it may
seem, the question is one of first impression not alone in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States, Great
Britain, and elsewhere. This will explain why a case which otherwise would be heard and voted in Division has been
submitted to the court in bane for decision.
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta,
Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger,
the manager of the company.
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and
indecent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. To this information, the defendant interposed a
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense and were not contrary
to law; but the trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly excepted thereto. Following the
presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense, judgment was rendered finding the defendant guilty
of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and the costs.
The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this court divide themselves into two general issues. The first
point sustained by counsel for the appellant is in nature a technical objection, growing out of the defendant's
demurrer. The second point, in reality the decisive issue, is as suggested in the beginning of the decision. We will
take up the assignments of errors as thus classified in order.
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Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included therein is a section, No. 12, making obscene or indecent
publications misdemeanors. Said section 12 which, it is contended by the Government, has here been violated, and
which, appellant argues, does not apply to the information and the facts, reads as follows:
"Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for sale, distributes, or exhibits
any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, or who designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or
otherwise prepares, any obscene picture or print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any obscene or
indecent figure, or who writes, composes, or prints any notice or advertisement of any such writing, paper, book,
print, or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or
by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both."
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law which is intended to bear
out his thesis, first, that section 12 does not prohibit the taking, selling, and publishing of alleged obscene and
indecent pictures and prints, and second, that the information in this case charges no offense prohibited by section
12. Recall, however, that the law provides punishment, among other things, for any person who keeps for sale or.
exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the information charges the
defendant, among other things, with having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale, distribution, or exhibition,
obscene and indecent pictures.
The phrase in the law "or other matter," was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which
is of the same kind as its antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked
by counsel is by no means a rule of universal application and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the
legislative intent. Even if the phrase "or other matter" be construed to mean "or other matter of like kind," pictures
and postcards are not so far unrelated to writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the general words
(Commonwealth vs. Dejardin [1878], 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown vs. Corbin [1889], 40 Minn., 508).
The line of argumentation is more refined than practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act No. 277 does not
cover the present case, there yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of the Penal Code, and section 730 of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section of the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it
provides in part that no person shall "exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or give or deliver to
another, or cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent, or obscene book, picture, pamphlet, card, print, paper,
writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other thing."
While admittedly the information is lacking in precision and while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is not
as inclusive as it might be, we yet conclude that the information is not fatally defective, and that said section 12
covers the alleged facts.
We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that our own researches have confirmed the statement of
counsel that not one parallel case can be found. We must perforce reason from the general to the specific and from
universat principle to actual fact.
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines., Bontoc
Woman." Exhibit A,-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines,"
Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend
"Igorrot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines." Exhibit A-5 has the
legend "Moros, Philippines."
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-
cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures represented
the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the
pictures are true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines, corroborated by other
witnesses, testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra, Palawan,
and Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various
occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them.
Are such pictures obscene or indecent?
The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastity,
decency, or delicacy. "Indecency" is an act against good, behaviour and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed
by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the
statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene
may fail. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the 'ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
(29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.)
The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the
words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common use and every person of
average intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures
themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is
obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48
Am. Rep., 635.)
Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the use of the mails for
obscene matter and prohibiting the importation into the Philippine Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent
character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 Stat. at L., 135; 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
"Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or
lascivious publication, according to the United States Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form
 200

of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in
prosecutions for obscene libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; - U. S. vs. Males [1892], 51 Fed., 41;
6 Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The case of United States vs. Harmon ([1891], 45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for depositing an obscene
publication in a United States post-office in violation of the Postal Law. Judge Philips said:
"The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms 'obscene,' etc., further than may be implied by
the succeeding phrase, 'or other publication of an indecent character.' On the well-recognized canon of construction
these words are presumed to have been employed by the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use.
As they cannot be said to have acquired any technical significance as applied to some particular matter, calling, or
profession, but are terms of popular use, the court might perhaps with propriety leave their import to the
presumed intelligence of the jury. A standard dictionary says that 'obscene' mean 'offensive to chastity and
decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be
exposed! This mere dictionary definition may be extended or amplified by the courts in actual practice, preserving,
however, its essential thought, and having always due regard to the popular and proper sense in which the
legislature employed the term. Chief Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L. R. 3 Q. B., 360), said: 'The test of
obscenity is this: Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;' and where 'it
would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the
most impure and libidinous character.' So, also, it has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive to
decency or chastity, which its immodest, which is indelicate, impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral
tendency' U. S. vs. Bennett, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed:
"'The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to chastity; something that is foul or filthy,
and for that reason is offensive to pure-minded persons. That is the meaning of the word in the concrete; but when
used, as in the statute, to describe the character of a book, pamphlet, or paper, it means containing immodest and
indecent matter, the reading whereof would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose
hands the publication might fall whose minds are open to such immoral influences.'
"Laws of this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in particular. So, while there may be
individuals and societies of men and women of peculiar notions or idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense would neither
be depraved nor offended by the publication now under consideration, yet the exceptional sensibility, or want of
sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as a standard by which its obscenity or indecency is to be tested. Rather is
the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it? What is its probable,
reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society, extending to the family, made up of men
and women, young boys and girls, the family, which is the common nursery of mankind, the foundation rock upon
which the state reposes?
"* * * To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life. There is in the popular
conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the
fruit of the tree of knowledge they passed from that condition of perfectibility which some people nowadays aspire
to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned that there was both good and evil; 'and they knew that they were
naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.' From that day to this civilized. man has
carried with him the sense of shame,' the feeling that there were some things on which the eye-the mind-should
not look; and where men and women become so depraved by the use, or so insensate from perverted education,
that they will not veil their eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government should perform the office for them in
protection of the social compact and the body politic."
As above intimated, the Federal statute prohibits the importation or shipment into the Philippine Islands of the
following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations,
figures or objects of obscene or indecent character or subversive of public order." There are, however, in the
record, copies of reputable magazines which circulate freely thruout the United States and other countries, and
which are admitted into the Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those
forming the basis of the prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine Government have also been offered in
evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of
the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in which are found illustrations either exactly the same or
nearly akin to those which are now impugned.
It appears therefore that a national standard has been set up by the Congress of the United States. Tested by that
standard, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged would be held obscene or indecent by any
state of Federal court. It would be particularly unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines
than in the United States, or for that matter in the rest of the world.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people
in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. We are convinced that the post-card pictures
in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this prosecution. We fully
appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a different view of the case. We would be the last to offend the
sensibilities of the Filipino people and to sanction anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of
mankind. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social ethics. We are
dealing with a legal question predicated on a legal fact, and on this question and fact, we reach the conclusion that
 201

there has not been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. When other cases predicated on other states
of facts are brought to our attention, we will decide them as they arise.
We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern whom he represents
would on his own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be misled as
to them. Indeed, he might even go further and out of consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers,
withdraw from sale certain pictures which can be pointed out to him.
We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen
in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing
therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes
our duty to order the dismissal of the information.
Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo was present at the time this case was voted and then voted with Mr. Justice
Romualdez. (Sgd.) E. FINLEY JOHNSON.
ROMUALDEZ, J., with whom concurs ARAULLO, C. J., dissenting:
I do not agree with the view taken by the majority as to the nature of the photographic pictures in question. While
said pictures cannot, strictly, be termed obscene, they must, however, be regarded as indecent, for they are so.
Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and for this reason, they are indecent. This is shown by common
sense. No woman claiming to be decent would dare to stand before the public in Manila, where said pictures were
exhibited, in the same fashion as these pictures are.
It is alleged that these pictures were taken from nature in non-Christian regions. We agree that in said regions
they are not, perhaps, regarded as offensive to modesty, and, therefore, are accidentally not indecent there. But in
the City of Manila where they were exhibited, no doubt they are.
And the law prohibits the exhibition not only of obscene pictures, but of indecent as well. (Sec. 12, Act No. 277.)
1 understand that the judgment appealed from should have been affirmed.
Judgment reversed; defendant acquitted.
[GRN L-7491 August 8, 1955]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. GO PIN, defendant and appellant.
CRIMINAL LAW; EXHIBITION OF INDECENT AND/ION IMMORAL PICTURES.-Paintings and pictures of women in the
nude, including sculptures of that kind are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of
art but rather for commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the
exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and the cause of art only of secondary or minor importance.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Villamor, J.
Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code for
having exhibited in the City of Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large number of one-real 16-
millimeter films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. At first, he pleaded
not guilty of the information but later was allowed by the court to change his plea to that of guilty which he did.
Not content with the plea of guilty the trial court had the films in question projected and were viewed by it in order
to evaluate the same from the standpoint of decency and morality. Thereafter, and considering the plea of guilty
entered by the accused, and the fact that after viewing the film's the trial court noted only a slight degree of
obscenity, indecency and immorality in them, it sentenced the appellant to 6 months and 1 day of prision
correcional and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He
is now appealing from the decision.
Go Pin does not deny his guilt but he claims that under the circumstances surrounding the case, particularly the
slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality noted by the court in the films, the prison sentence should be
eliminated from the penalty imposed. His counsel brings to our attention some authorities to the effect that
paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind are not offensive because they are
made and presented for the sake of art. We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures
and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used
not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said
pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit
would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be
surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were
not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and
for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and
shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.
Before rendering sentence the trial court asked the prosecuting attorney for this recommendation and said official
recommended that "considering that the accused Go Pin is an alien who is supposed to maintain a high degree of
morality while he is in the Philippines", and "considering that be engaged in a very nefarious trade, which degene
rates the moral character of our youth, who are usually the regular customers of his trade", he recommended that
appellant be sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of P300. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the trial
court as already said, probably considering its opinion that the pictures were not so obsecnce, indecent and
immoral but only slightly so, gave appellant only 6 months and 1 day of prision correcional in addition to P300 fine.
 202

The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range provided by Article 201 of the Revised Code. We are
satisfied that in imposing the penalty the trial court made use of its sound discretion, and we find no reason for
modifying the said sentence. The Solicitor General in his brief even urges that we recommend to the proper
authorities that deportation proceedings be instituted against appellant as an undesirable alien. The trial court
could have done this but did not do so, believing perhaps that it was warranted. We repeat that we do not feel
justified in interfering with the discretion of the trial court in the imposition of the sentence in this case.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
[GRN L-7295. June 28, 1957]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA, COSME ESPINOSA,
ERNESTO REYES and JOSE FAJARDO, defendants. MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA and JOSE FAJARDO,
defendants-appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Gatmaitan, J.
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Marina Padan, Jose Fajardo y Garcia, Cosme Espinosa, and Ernesto Reyes
were charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of September, 1953, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously exhibit or cause to be exhibited inside a building at the corner of Camba Ext. and Morga Ext., Tondo,
this City, immoral scenes and acts to wit: the said accused Jose Fajador y Garcia, being then the manager and
Ernesto Reyes y yabut, as ticket collector and or exhibitor, Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hired their co-
accused Marina Palan y Alova and Cosme Espinosa y Abordo to act as performers or exhibitionists to perform and
in fact performed sexual intercourse in the presence of rnanw spectators, thereby exhibiting or performing highly
immoral and indecent acts or shows thereat."
Upon arraignment, all pleaded not guilty. Later, however, Marina Padan, with the assistance of her counsel de
parte and counsel de oficio, asked for permission to withdraw her former plea of not guilty, which was granted, and
upon rearraignment, she pleaded guilty to the charge. In a decision dated October 12, 1953, Marina Padan was
found guilty as charged and sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional and a fine of P200, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by the law, and to pay the proportionate costs. After trial of the three remaining accused, they
were all found guilty; Cosme Espinosa and Ernesto Reyes were sentenced each to not less than six months and one
day of prision correccional and not more than one year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional, to pay
a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to pay the proportionate costs. Jose Fajardo was sentenced to not less than one year, one month and ten days
of prision correccional and not more than one year eight months and twenty days, also of prision correccional, to
pay a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty and to pay the proportionate costs. The army steel bed, the army woolen blanket, the pillow, the ladies'
panties, and the men's underwear, described in Exhibit C, were declared confiscated.
The four accused appealed in the decision, the appeal having been sent to us. Appellants Espinosa and Reyes failed
to file their briefs within the period prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by resolution of this Court of
November 25, 1955, and the decision as to them became final and executory on January 7, 1956, as appears from
the entry of judgment.
Because of her plea of guilty in the lower court, appellant Marina in her appeal does not question her conviction;
she merely urges the reduction of the penalty by eliminating the prison sentence. We do not feel warranted in
interfering with the exercise of discretion in this matter, made by the lower court presided by Judge Magno S.
Gatmaitan. According to his decision of October 12, 1953, in imposing the sentence, he already considered
Marina's plea of leniency, and so despite the recommendation of the fiscal that she be fined P600.00 in addition to
the prison sentence of six months and one day, his honor reduced the fine to only P200.
We believe that the penalty imposed fits the crime, considering its seriousness. As far as we know, this is the first
time that the courts in this jurisdiction, at least this Tribunal, have been called upon to take cognizance of an
offense against morals and decency of this kind. We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of
still or moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals.
In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and
painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in
sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of
lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear
and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing
but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that
because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive
nor unreasonable.
Going to the appeal of Jose Fajardo y Garcia, while he does not deny the fact of the commission of the offense
charged, he insists that he was not the manager or the person incharge of the show or proceedings on the night of
September 13, 1953; that his participation, if he participated at all, was to play the role of an innocent by stander,
but that because of his popularity in the neighborhood, being popularly known as a "siga-siga" character, he was
requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus
before the spectators; that after making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left the scene
and returned to it only when he heard a commotion produced by the raid conducted by the police.
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The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of the show is however
ample, even conclusive. We have carefully examined such evidence, and we are satisfied that they fully support the
findings of the trial court. Such facts may be briefly stated as follows: At the corner of Morga Extension and Camba
Extension, Tondo, Manila, was a one story building which judging from the picture exhibited is nothing but a shed,
with a floor space of eight by fifteen meters which was mainly used for playing ping-pong. A ping-pong table must
have been placed in the center and on two sides were built benches in tiers, so that the spectators seated on them
could look down and see the game. On September 13, 1953, however, the building was used for a different
purpose. It was to be the scene of what was said to be an exhibition of human "fighting fish", the actual act of
coitus of copulation. It must have been advertised by word of mouth; tickets therefor were sold at P3 each, and the
show was supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the evening. About that time of the night, there was already a
crowd around the building, but the people were not admitted into it until about an hour later, and the show did not
begin until about 9:15. The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and
provided several of its members who later attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after the show conducted a
raid and made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually took place inside the building. About
two civilians who attended the affair gave testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes. He also
collected tickets. In all, there were about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were allowed to enter free,
presumably friends of the management. Jose Fajardo y Garcia was clearly the manager of the show. He was at the
door to see to it that the customers either were provided with tickets or paid P3.00 entrance fee. He even asked
them from whom they had bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the
floor, covered with an army blanket and provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were
crowded inside that small building, the show started. Fajardo evidently to arouse more interest among the
customers, asked them to select among two girls present who was to be one of the principal actors. By pointing to
or holding his hand over the head of each of the two women one after the other, and judging by the shouts of
approval emitted by the spectators, he decided that defendant Marina Padan was the subject of popular approval,
and he selected her. After her selection, the other woman named Concha, left. Without much ado, Fajardo selected
Cosme Espinosa to be Marina's partner. Thereafter, Cosme and Marina proceeded to disrobe while standing around
the bed. When completely naked, they turned around to exhibit their bodies to the spectators. Then they indulged
in lascivious acts, consisting of petting, kissing, and touching the private parts of each other. When sufficiently
aroused, they lay on the bed and proceeded to consummate the act of coitus in three different positions which we
deem unnecessary to describe. The four or five witnesses who testified for the Government when asked about their
reaction to what they saw, frankly admitted that they were excited beyond description. Then the police who were
among the spectators and who were previously provided with a search warrant made the raid, arrested the four
defendants herein, and took pictures of Marina and Cosme still naked and of the army bed, which pictures were
presented as exhibits during the trial.
From all this, there can be no doubt that Jose Fajardo y Garcia contrary to what he claims, was the person in
charge of the show. Besides, as found by the trial court and as shown by some of the tickets collected from the
spectators, submitted as exhibits, said tickets while bearing on one side printed matter regarding an excursion to
Balara to be held on August 30, 1953, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., sponsored by a certain club, on the other side
appears the following typewritten form, reading:
"P3.00 Admit one
PLEASURE SHOW
Place: P. Morga Ext. and Camba Ext.
Time: 8:00 o'clock sharp"
and superimposed on the same is the rubber stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which defendant Fajardo admits to be
his name. Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the most
guilty of the four, for he was the one who conducted the show and presumably derived the most profit or gain from
the same.
As regards the penalty imposed by the trial court on appellant Fajardo, we agree with the Solicitor General that the
same is correct, except the minimum thereof which is beyond the legal range, and which should be reduced from
one year, one month, and ten days of prisión correccional to only six months of arresto mayor.
With the modification above-mentioned, the decision appealed from by Marina Padan and Jose Fajardo are hereby
affirmed, with costs against both.
G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
LEO PITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 1 rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive
relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as
well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. There is no controversy as to the
facts. We quote:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon
D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP
of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
 204

Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
plaintiff Leo Pita.
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or
from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
By order dated December 8, 1 983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction on December
14,1983 and ordered the defendants to show cause not later than December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for
should not be granted.
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order. against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut
Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining order on December 14, 1983.
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27,1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and
burning of obscence reading materials on December 1 and 3, 1983, but claimed that the said materials were
voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that the said confiscation and seizure was
(sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. In opposing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendant pointed out that in
that anti- smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the
magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs
establishment was not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 5,1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can without a court order confiscate or
seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".
The restraining order issued on December 14,1983 having lapsed on January 3,1984, the plaintiff filed an urgent
motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed by defendant on the ground that issuance of a
second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983, providing for
the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a temporary
restraining order shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and/or Rejoinder Memorandum in support of his opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the
parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized,
confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiffs motion to be given three days "to file a reply to
defendants' opposition dated January 9, 1984, serving a copy thereof to the counsel for the defendants, who may
file a rejoinder within the same period from receipt, after which the issue of Preliminary Injunction shall be
resolved".
Plaintiff's supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18, 1984. Defendant filed his Comment on plaintiff s
supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff filed his "Reply-Memorandum" to defendants'
Comment on January 25, 1984.
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. 2
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as follows:
We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly obscene publications or
materials deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in
print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure
(Sec. 3, Art.IV). It must be equally conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we
have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications (Sec. I , Art. 201, Revised Penal
Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969). Also well settled is the rule that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or
seizure, (People vs. Malesugui 63 Phil. 22) or search is an incident to an arrest, (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169;
Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure (See Papa vs. Magno, 22 SCRA
857). 3
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police
officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of
their determination that they are obscene.
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2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court
could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was
merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction. 4
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce what "obscene" means
or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, 5 the Court laid down
the test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." 6 "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is
that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. " 7 Kottinger hastened to say,
however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, 8 and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached
by it." 9
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in generalizing a problem that
has grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a
corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the
question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it would leave the final say to
a hypothetical "community standard" — whatever that is — and that the question must supposedly be judged from
case to case.
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a prosecution under Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go Pin, was also even hazier:
...We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibit
and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no
offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so
that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if
not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see
those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested
in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather
people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the
youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and
perverting effects of these pictures. 11
xxx xxx xxx
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake
but rather for commercial purposes," 12 the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
It was People v. Padan y Alova , 13 however, that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming" element
that should accompany the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote:
...We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude,
which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there
was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in
the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux
vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency,
and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a
corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. ... 14
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For one thing, if the exhibition was
attended by "artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy
and improve their artistic tastes," 15 could the same legitimately lay claim to "art"? For another, suppose that the
exhibition was so presented that "connoisseurs of [art], and painters and sculptors might find inspiration," 16 in it,
would it cease to be a case of obscenity?
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted an ad lib of
Ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene and what is art.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, 17 the Court, following trends in the United States, adopted
the test: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 18 Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger
in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated
passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion
Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues to journey from development to
development, which, states one authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as "unstable as it is
unintelligible." 19
Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 20 a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as one "utterly without any
redeeming social value," 21 marked yet another development.
 206

The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, 22 which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established
"basic guidelines," 23 to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 24
(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United States 25 which repeated Miller, and Jenkins
v. Georgia, 26 yet another reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the producers of the motion picture,
Carnal Knowledge, in the absence of "genitals" portrayed on screen, although the film highlighted contemporary
American sexuality.)
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the
reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem . 27 Apparently, the courts have
assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable
to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it
will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject — as in
all speech — to regulation in the interests of [society as a whole] — but not in the interest of a uniform vision of
how human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed." 28
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So
is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the
present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered
important literature today. 29 Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the
world's most prestigious museums.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is
the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to
answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging trend in
American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in
sight.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a "perfect" definition of
"obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after
all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
However, this much we have to say.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In
free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. 30 But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing,
31 "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on
the. . . authorit[ies]." 32
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger." 33 "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does
not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." 34
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present
danger test." 35
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so only we may arrive at
one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper perspective, that is, as a genuine
constitutional issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due process and illegal
search and seizure.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that
the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the
Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of
evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were
not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them
to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that ... freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the
right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." 36 Neither do we. But it
brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so confiscated "pornographic"? That we have laws punishing the
author, publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D.
No. 960 and P.D. No. 969)," 37 is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under
the statute?
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in
disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 38 We defined police power as "state
 207

authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare ." 39 Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by
themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of
the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process
of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves
lay down procedures for implementation. We quote:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. — The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as
amended) shall be governed by the following rules:
(a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Government to be destroyed.
(b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral
literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation
referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary.
(c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after
his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The
decision of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No, 960 as amended by
PD No. 969.)
Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. — Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:
1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section I hereof, the
penalty as provided herein shall be imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be imposed . 40
Under the Constitution, on the other hand:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 43 We counter-minded the orders of the
Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila
dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it
no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or
"obscene".
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing),
provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of personarrested. — A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. 44
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must
be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against
any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused
of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant," 45 and that "violation of penal law [must] be
punished." 46 For starters, there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second, to say that
the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful
search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.
We make this resume.
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity
rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear
and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a
case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are
indeed "obscene".
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse
of official power under the Civil Code" 47 or the Revised Penal code . 48
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It
appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure ave been destroyed, the Court declines
to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
 208

G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006

GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated
September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25796, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582.
The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article 2012 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969, and sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows.
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police
surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999,
Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren
Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay
Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.3
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to
the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and
confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
On September 13, 1999, petitioners with Warren Tingchuy, were charged in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 5, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, publicly and jointly exhibit indecent or immoral acts, scenes or shows at Music Fair, located
at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay [S]t., Quiapo[,] this City[,] by then and there selling and exhibiting obscene
copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women having sexual intercourse[,] lewd photographs
of nude men and women in explicating (sic) positions which acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for lust or pornography to public view.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, petitioners and Tingchuy pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution offered the confiscated materials in evidence and presented the following witnesses: Police
Inspector Rodolfo L. Tababan, SPO4 Rolando Buenaventura and Barangay Chairperson Socorro Lipana, who were
all present during the raid. After the prosecution presented its evidence, the counsel for the accused moved for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which the court granted. On October 5, 2000, the RTC however
denied the demurrer to evidence and scheduled the reception of evidence for the accused. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present evidence and instead submitted the case for decision.5
The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused GAUDENCIO FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum, to
pay fine of P6,000.00 each and to pay the cost.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused WARREN TINGCHUY beyond reasonable doubt, he is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The VHS tapes and the nine (9) magazines utilized as evidence in this case are hereby confiscated in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the appellate courtlatter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court, as follows,
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the part of the trial court, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence the instant petition assigning the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at the time of the raid.8
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they were selling
pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling
obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and that he was selling the said
materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate court’s reason for convicting him, on a presumption of
continuing ownership shown by an expired mayor’s permit, has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed to
 209

prove his ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in
Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.9
The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held liable
under Article 201, and petitioner Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the
Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited materials and liable under the Information. The
Solicitor General also maintains that Estorninos was identified by Barangay Chairperson Socorro Lipana as the store
attendant, thus he was likewise liable.10
At the outset, we note that the trial court gave petitionersthem the opportunity to adduce present their evidence to
disprove refute the prosecution’s evidence.11 . Instead, they waived their right to present evidence and opted to
submitted the case for decision.a1 12 The trial court therefore resolved the case on the basis of prosecution’s
evidence against the petitioners.
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate
to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation
or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a)
the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave
away such materials.13 Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
Almost a century has passed since the Court first attempted to define obscenity in People v. Kottinger.14 There the
Court defined obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the
existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as
being obscene may fall.15 Another test according to Kottinger is "that which shocks the ordinary and common
sense of men as an indecency."16 But, Kottinger hastened to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.17
Thereafter, the Court in People v. Go Pin18 and People v. Padan y Alova, et al.,19 involving a prosecution under
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, laid the tests which did little to clearly draw the fine lines of obscenity.
In People v. Go Pin, the Court said:
If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be
viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures
here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the
supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or
minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their
exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for
the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their
morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who because of their
immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
pictures.20
People v. Padan y Alova, et al. in a way reaffirmed the standards set in Go Pin but with its own test of "redeeming
feature." The Court therein said that:
[A]n actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it,
there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense
to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting
influence specially on the youth of the land.21
Notably, the Court in the later case of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,22 involving motion pictures, still applied the
"contemporary community standards" of Kottinger but departed from the rulings of Kottinger, Go Pin and Padan y
Alova in that the Court measures obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the material taken as a "whole"
rather than in isolated passages.
Later, in Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court recognized that Kottinger
failed to afford a conclusive definition of obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions
than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and persons interested in art and who generally
go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or that if they
find inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene.23 Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave
too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and "two-cents worths" among
judges as to what is obscene or what is art.24
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy jurisprudence is on
obscenity and how jurisprudence actually failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of
human civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization.25 It seems futile at this point to formulate a
perfect definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.26 But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude
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that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive."27 No one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.28 Examples included (a) patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.29 What
remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case
basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such
findings. The trial court in ruling that the confiscated materials are obscene, reasoned as follows:
Are the magazines and VHS tapes confiscated by the raiding team obscene or offensive to morals? . . .
Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine (9) confiscated magazines
namely Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery and two (2) issues of QUI are offensive to
morals and are made and shown not for the sake of art but rather for commercial purposes, that is gain and profit
as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition. The pictures in the magazine exhibited indecent and immoral
scenes and acts…The exhibition of the sexual act in their magazines is but a clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring…lust and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence especially
on the youth. (Citations omitted)
The VHS tapes also [exhibit] nude men and women doing the sexual intercourse. The tape entitled "Kahit sa
Pangarap Lang" with Myra Manibog as the actress shows the naked body of the actress. The tape exhibited
indecent and immoral scenes and acts. Her dancing movements excited the sexual instinct of her male audience.
The motive may be innocent, but the performance was revolting and shocking to good minds...
In one (1) case the Supreme Court ruled:
Since the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees were usually not artists or persons
interested in art to satisfy and inspire their artistic tastes but persons who are desirous of satisfying their morbid
curiosity, taste and lust and for [love] of excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not
in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of the pictures, the display of such
pictures for commercial purposes is a violation of Art. 201. If those pictures were shown in art exhibits and art
galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense
committed (People vs. Go Pin, 97 Phil 418).
[B]ut this is not so in this case.30
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this
Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts.31 In this case, petitioners neither presented contrary evidence nor questioned the trial
court’s findings. There is also no showing that the trial court, in finding the materials obscene, was arbitrary.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials?
We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is
not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene
materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is
publicity.32 The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the
public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair, named after
petitioner Fernando.33 The mayor’s permit was under his name. Even his bail bond shows that Hhe lives in the
same place.34 Moreover, the mayor’s permit dated August 8, 1996, shows that he is the owner/operator of the
store.35 While the mayor’s permit had already expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and
operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit and illegal
operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary
evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his.36
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene
materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search,
identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was served.37 Tababan had no motive for
testifying falsely against Estorninos and we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
Lastly, this Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in their findings.38 In our view, no reversible
error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as
charged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE SIX

Grave Scandal (1996)
Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at its penthouse
every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at the adjoining tall buildings
reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she
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sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the town. 1) What crime, if any, did Pia commit?
Explain, 2) What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Pia did not commit a crime, the felony closest to making Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act
is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In the first place, it
was not done in a public place and within public knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it was discovered by the
executives accidentally and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude.
2) The business executives did not commit any crime. Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness [as there was
no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly
imputed to the business executives, and besides such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule.

TITLE SEVEN: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Art. 203. Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles
of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, of
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
The term “public officers” embraces every public servant from the highest to the lowest.

Requisites:
To be a public officer, one must be:
1. Taking part in the performance of public functions in the Government
OR
Performing in said Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official
of any rank or class; AND
2. That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be:
a. By direct provision of the law,
b. By popular election,
c. By appointment by competent authority

Relate Art. 226, RPC

Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. — Any public officer who shall remove,
destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage shall have been
caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
whenever the damage to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been serious.
In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
disqualification shall be imposed.

Elements:
1. That the offender be a public officer.
2. That he abstracts, destroys or conceals documents or papers.
3. That the said documents or papers should have been entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office.
4. That damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public interest should have been caused.

FELIPE FAJELGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO M. MOLINA AND HON.
RAMON V. JABSON, MEMBERS, SECOND DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Petition for review on certiorari of the
Sandiganbayan's decision,** dated 18 June 1982, in Criminal Cases Nos. 3690 and 3691 finding petitioner guilty of
Falsification of Public Documents through reckless imprudence in the first case and Infidelity in the Custody of
Documents in the second case.
The facts spanning both cases are as follows:
On 5 November 1979, Serenico Ablat signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Used Kawasaki motorcycle
for Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P8,500.00) in favor of the provincial government of Batanes represented
by Provincial Engineer Telesforo Castillejos. The motorcycle, however, was then registered in the name of
petitioner Fajelga, a driver in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, on detail as driver messenger in the Office of the
Provincial Auditor, who had bought the motorcycle in 1978 for Five Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P5,900.00)
only. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed pursuant to a Purchase Request signed by Provincial Engineer
Castillejos, as requisitioning officer of the provincial government, for a motorcycle to be used by then Provincial
Auditor Felix Balisi.
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But the sale of the motorcycle to the provincial government of Batanes was not consummated because Felix Balisi
resigned and the new Provincial Auditor, Elena Alcantara, deemed the motorcycle impractical for her own use.
Therefore, the sale was cancelled. Mrs. Alcantara then gave the cancelled vouchers and other supporting
documents related to the sale, which she had received from the Provincial Treasurer's office to the petitioner who
allegedly placed the documents in a cabinet in the Provincial Auditor's office which was subsequently burned in a
fire which occurred in said office.
Petitioner, Provincial Engineer Telesforo Castillejos and Serenico Ablat were indicted for violation of Republic Act
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for engaging in a transaction prejudicial to the
government and for violating various circulars governing transactions with local government units. But they were
acquitted of the graft charge as the prohibited act was not consummated. Petitioner and his co-accused were,
however, convicted in Criminal Case No. L-3690 of falsification of public document under paragraph (4), Art. 171 of
the Revised Penal Code and each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum; to pay a fine of P3,000.00, and the proportionate costs of the proceedings. Petitioner was also held
liable in Criminal Case No. L-3691 for Infidelity in the Custody of Documents, under paragraph 2, Art. 226 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from three (3) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and costs.1
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decisions2' and on 18 June 1982, the Sandiganbayan in a
resolution, modified its decision in Criminal Case No. 3690, by finding petitioner and his co-accused guilty of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence as defined and penalized under Article 171 (2) in
relation to Art. 365 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and reduced the penalty imposed upon them to four (4) months
of arresto mayor and a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) each. Reconsideration of the judgment of conviction
in Criminal Case No. 3691 (Infidelity in the Custody of Documents) was, however, denied.3
Petitioner now alleges that he cannot be convicted of falsification under either paragraph (2) or paragraph (4) of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as he was not a party to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale, nor did he
impersonate anybody in furtherance of the sale. He also questions his conviction under Art. 171 (2) as he pleaded
to and was tried on the basis of an information charging him with falsification under paragraph (4) of Art. 171. He
contends that to convict him under paragraph (2) of said Article would be to deprive him of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy. The motive and intent to falsify attributed to him are likewise alleged to be baseless, as
there really was a contract of sale between him and Ablat executed two (2) months before the questioned sale
between Ablat and the provincial government of Batanes.
Finally, petitioner contends that, even assuming that there was falsification as defined in Art. 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, still, no conviction against him can lie as no material damage was caused the government by reason of
non-consummation of the sale.
The Solicitor General, upon the other hand, maintains that the offense committed is falsification, defined and
penalized under paragraph (4) of Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code since the claim of the petitioner that Ablat
was the owner of the motorcycle is untruthful and petitioner was an active participant in the making of the
untruthful narration of facts.
After careful consideration of the facts of the case and the law, we find that petitioner is entitled to an acquittal
from the charges against him. Article 171, paragraphs (2) and (4) of the Revised Penal Code Provides:
"Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.-The penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
"x x xx x x x x x
"2. Causing it to appear the persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate:
"x x xx x x x x x
"4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
"x x xx x x x x x."
In the case of People vs. Quasha,4 the Court said:
"Commenting on the above provisions, Justice Albert, in his wellknown work on the Revised Penal Code (new
edition, pp. 407-408), observes, on the authority of U.S. vs. Reyes, (1 Phil., 341), that the perversion of truth in
the narration of facts must be made with wrongful intent of injuring a third person; and on the authority of U.S. vs.
Lopez (15 Phil., 515), the same author further maintains that even if such wrongful intent is proven, still the
untruthful statement will not constitute the crime of falsification if there is no legal obligation on the part of the
narrator to disclose the truth. Wrongful intent to injure a third person and obligation on the part of the narrator to
disclose the truth are thus essential to a conviction for the crime of falsification under the above articles of the
Revised Penal Code."
In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was adjudged to be a falsified document because it
conveyed the impression that Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when such
was not the case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner of the said motorcycle, thereby making
an untruthful narration of facts.
It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle in question is not
altogether untruthful since the petitioner Fajelga. had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale
 213

may not have been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat nevertheless became the owner
thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial government of Batanes.
Besides, malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither the government nor any third person
incurred any loss by reason of the "untruthful" narration.
But, most importantly, as Justice Albert says: "in the falsification of public or official document under Art. 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification be committed by a public officer; it is also necessary
that it should be committed by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instrument, indentures,
certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reason of his office."5
In the instant case, however, the information filed against the petitioner and his co-accused alleged that the
petitioner, although a public officer, acted in his private and personal capacity. Hence, there was no abuse of
official position. Besides, the petitioner Fajelga could not have abused his position, as driver, in falsifying the
document adverted to. In view thereof, the petitioner cannot be convicted of falsification under Art. 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As for petitioner's conviction for infidelity in the custody of documents, he alleges that his acts did not constitute
said crime of infidelity as he was not officially entrusted with the documents allegedly lost, and that the documents
even if entrusted to him, were mere scraps of paper, the transaction they reflect having been cancelled.
Petitioner's above arguments are meritorious. The elements of the offense of infidelity in the custody of documents
are: 1) that the offender be a public officer; 2) that there be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed; 3)
that the document destroyed or abstracted be entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office, and 4) that
damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third person be caused by the removal, destruction or
concealment of such document.6
Not all four (4) elements of the offense are present in this case. While petitioner is a public officer as defined in Art.
203 of the Revised Penal Code,7 and while vouchers and supporting papers of the aborted sale were given to him-
documents he was later unable to produce-it is doubtful whether such papers were required to be officially kept
and; further, whether they were entrusted to him by reason of his office or position. The Provincial Auditor, Elena
Alcantara, admitted as follows:
"Q.Once a voucher has been cancelled, what is the status of that voucher, is it just a scrap of paper?
A.Yes, Your Honor.
Q.And a cancelled voucher did not have to be officially kept for record purposes?
A.No, sir."
[T.s.n., p. 122, 16 Feb. 1982]
Moreover, the cancelled documents and papers were given to petitioner without any instruction as to what to do
with themwhether to keep them or to bring them to a specific entity or office-as Mrs. Alcantara's testimony also
shows:
"Q.Mrs. Witness, after you had cancelled the voucher and delivered that cancelled voucher with the supporting
documents to Mr. Fajelga, you did not tell Mr. Fajelga to deliver those documents to anybody else?
A.I did not. Your Honor.
Q.You just delivered to him without any instructions to what to do with them?
A.I did not."
[T.s.n., p. 122,16 Feb. 1982]
Petitioner's act or omission, not having met all the requisites for the offense of infidelity in the custody of
documents to exist, he cannot be held liable therefor. It must be noted, however, in passing that petitioner's
allegation that there was no damage to public interest, the sale evidenced by the lost documents having been
aborted, is an argument not really accurate or impressive, because destruction of documents which could issuance
of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.
prosecution of an illegal transaction or an anomalous sale involving misrepresentation and falsification, results in
damage to public interest.8
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the two (2) charges filed against him. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment
in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge
2. That he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision
3. That the judgment is unjust
4. That the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.

Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. — Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by
arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.
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Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge.
2. That he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision
3. that the judgment is manifestly unjust
4. That it is due to his inexcusable negligence or ignorance

[GRN 137354 July 6, 2000]

SALVADOR M. DE VERA, petitioner, vs. HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City; and EVALUATION AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents. THIRD DIVISION
"It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client."
In Re: Joaquin Borromeo 241 SCRA 408 (1995)
The case is a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 [Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] assailing
the Evaluation Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, dated October 2, 1998
referring petitioner's complaint to the Supreme Court and its Memorandum, dated January 4, 1999,2 [In CPL No.
98 - 2911.] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
We state the relevant facts.
Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing some awareness of legal principles and procedures, he represents
himself in this petition.
On August 28, 1996, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City a special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the municipal trial court from proceeding with a complaint for
ejectment against petitioner.3 [In SCA No. 1151, Sps. De Vera v. Hon. Quijano, Presiding Judge MTC Taguig, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin MTC, Branch 74 from
proceeding with a complaint for ejectment against them.] When the Judge originally assigned to the case inhibited
himself, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo.4 [Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, Pasig
City. He retired on March 31, 1999.]
On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration. The court denied the same on September 1, 1998.5 [Rollo, p. 98.]
On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint6 [Rollo, pp. 26-
33.] against Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 2067 [Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory
order.] and 2078 [Malicious delay in the administration of justice.] of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No.
3019.9 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.]
On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer, Erlinda S. Rojas submitted an Evaluation Report
recommending referral of petitioners' complaint to the Supreme Court. Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Apotadera approved the recommendation.10 [Rollo, pp. 51-52.] We quote the decretal portion of the report:11
[Rollo, p. 52.]
"FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in accordance with the ruling in Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, it is
respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The
same is hereby considered CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as this Office is concerned."
On October 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court.12 [Rollo, p. 53.]
On November 6, 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
On January 4, 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.13 [Roland B. Galvan, Assistant Graft
Investigative Officer I submitted a memorandum ("Comment and Recommendation") recommending denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Angel C. Mayoralgo, Jr., Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman recommended approval. The recommendation was approved
by Abelardo L. Aportadera, Assistant Ombudsman, EIO (Rollo, pp. 61-62)]
Hence, this petition.14 [Petition filed on February 17, 1999, Rollo, pp. 3-25. On January 24, 2000, we gave due
course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 108-109)]
The issue is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against a judge of
the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases before the court.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence15 [Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993) and Dolalas v. Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, 265 SCRA 818 (1996)] cited by the Office of the Ombudsman as erroneous and not
applicable to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a judge, it was
within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve whether a crime was committed and the
judge prosecuted therefor.
The petition can not succeed.
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman did not exercise his power
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.16 [Arsenio P. Reyes, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 136478, March 27, 2000; Director Guillermo Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No.
129904, March 16, 2000.] There was no evasion of positive duty. Neither was there a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by law.17 Barangay Blue Ridge "A" of Quezon City v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 11854, November
24, 1999.]
 215

We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting the
writs prayed for.18 [Memorandum filed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio
L. Villamor and Solicitor Derek R. Puertollano (Rollo, pp. 140-143.)] The issues have been settled in the case of In
Re: Joaquin Borromeo.19 [241 SCRA 408, 460 (1995)] There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal
action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can
be entertained, there must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or order in
question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result from either:20 [Ibid, at 464.]
(a).....an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or
(b).....an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust
judgment or order.
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an
exclusive judicial function.21 [In Re: Borromeo, supra, at 461.]
"To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other
branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision -- whether final and
executory or not -- and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone (underscoring ours)."22
[Ibid.]
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when he
referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
respondent, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Evaluation Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office,
Office of the Ombudsman dated October 2, 1998 and its memorandum, dated January 4, 1999, in toto.
No costs.

Art. 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and
public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
(As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
2. that he accepts gifts,
3. that the said gifts are offered to him by reason of his office.

Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except those
of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises
or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.

Elements:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises or gives gifts or presents to a public officer
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents given to a public officer, under the circumstances
that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

RA 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

G.R. No. 155574 November 20, 2006

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside and
nullify the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan dated 6 May 2002 which convicted petitioner Timoteo A. Garcia of 56
counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24098 (except 24078), and its Resolution 2 dated 2
October 2002 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against petitioner, then Regional Director,
Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, employees of the same office, for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro
Asian Automotive Center Corporation (Company). Finding probable cause for violation thereof, Graft Investigation
Officer II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa be
indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and
Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 24042 reads:
 216

That on or about the period covering January 9, 1993 to January 10, 1993 or sometime prior thereto, in Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, TIMOTEO A. GARCIA,
GILBERT G. NABO and NERY TAGUPA, being then public officers or employees of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Cagayan de Oro City, taking advantage of their respective official positions, and conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain personal use or benefit, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously borrow One (1) unit Asian Automotive Center’s Service Vehicle – Fiera Blue KBK-732, in
good running condition, spare tire, tools from Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, which is engaged in the business
of vehicle assembly and dealership in Cagayan de Oro City, knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with
the accused’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis
numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report and other similar transactions which require the
prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and employees and/or their said LTO office
in Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and prejudice of and undue injury to said Oro Asian Automotive
Corporation, including complainant Maria Lourdes Miranda. 3
The fifty-six other Informations are similarly worded except for the alleged dates of commission of the offense, and
the types/descriptions of the vehicles allegedly borrowed by them. The pertinent data in the other informations are
as follows:
CASE NUMBER DATE OF COMMISSION TYPE/DESCRIPTION OF
VEHICLE

24043 January 16, 1993 to January 17, 1993 One (1) unit FIERA BLUE

24044 January 23, 1993 to January 24, 1993 One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732,
service vehicle of Asian Automotive
Center, in good running condition
with tools, spare tire

24045 February 6, 1993 to February 7, 1993 One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in
good running condition with tools

24046 February 13, 1993 to February 14, One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in
1993 good running condition
24047 March 13, 1993 to March 14, 1993 One (1) unit TOYOTA TAMARAW
yellow, KBN-156, in good running
condition, with tools and spare tire

24048 Morning of March 20, 1993 to One (1) unit TOYOTA HSPUR YELLOW
afternoon of March 20, 1993 KBN-156, with spare tools, in good
condition

24049 Morning of March 27, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR,
afternoon of March 27, 1993 yellow in color, KBN-156, in good
condition, with spare tire, with jack
and tire wrench

24050 April 24, 1993 to April 25, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR,
Yellow in color, KBN-156, in good
condition, with spare tire, jack and
tire wrench

24051 April 25, 1993 and have been returned One (1) unit AERO D VAN KBN-865,
after use maroon in color Asian Automotive
Center’s Vehicle, in good running
condition, with spare tire, tools, jack
and tire wrench

24052 May 15, 1993 to May 16, 1993 One (1) unit TOYOTA Fierra, yellow in
color, engine no. 4k-0907126, chassis
 217

no. CMCI-109247-C, in good

condition, jack, spare tire, tire wrench

24053 May 29, 1993 to May 30, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24054 June 5, 1993 to June 6, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24055 June 19, 1993 to June 20, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24056 June 26, 1993 to morning of June 26, One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
1993 156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24057 July 17, 1993 to July 18, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24058 July 31, 1993 to August 1, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24059 July 24, 1993 to July 25, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24060 August 7, 1993 to August 8, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24061 August 14, 1993 to August 15, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24062 August 21, 1993 to August 22, 1993 One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-
156, yellow in color, in good running
condition, w/ spare tire, jack and tire
wrench

24063 September 4, 1993 to September 5, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, white in color, with engine no.
C190-484232, Chassis no. SMM90-
 218

6787-C, in good running condition

upholstered seats

24064 Morning of September 11, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
evening of September 11, 1993 375, white in color, in good running
condition, upholstered seats, jack,
tire wrench, spare tire

24065 September 18, 1993 to September 19, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, in good running condition,
upholstered seats, side view mirrors,
rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats

24066 September 25, 1993 to September 26, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, good running condition,
upholstered seats, side view mirrors,
rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats

24067 October 23, 1993 to October 24, 1993 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
375, good running condition,
upholstered seats, side view mirrors,
rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats

24068 October 30, 1993 to October 31, 1993 One (1) unit ISUZU, NNJ-917, white
in color, in good running condition,
side view mirror, jack w/ tire wrench

24069 November 6, 1993 to November 7, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, good running condition,
upholstered seats, side view mirrors,
rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats

24070 November 13, 1993 to November 14, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, good running condition,
upholstered seats, side view mirrors,
rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, seats

24071 November 27, 1993 to November 28, One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, good running condition, jack w/
handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24072 December 4, 1993 to December 5, One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
1993 375, good running condition, jack w/
handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24073 December 11, 1993 to December 12, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
1993 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24074 December 18, 1993 to December 19, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
 219

1993 color, KBP-375, full in dash

instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24075 January 8, 1994 to January 9, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24076 Morning of January 15, 1994 to late One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
afternoon of January 15, 1994 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition.

24077 January 29, 1994 to January 30, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-
375, white in color, w/o plate number

24078 Withdrawn per Court Resolution dated July 3, 1998, p. 103 Crim. Case # 24042
24079 February 5, 1994 to February 6, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24080 February 12, 1994 to February 13, One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
1994 375, in good running condition, jack
w/ handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24081 February 26, 1994 to February 27, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
1994 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24082 March 4, 1994 to March 5, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24083 March 12, 1994 to March 13, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24084 March 19, 1994 to March 20, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, in good running
condition, with jack, tire wrench,
spare tire.

24085 April 9, 1994 to April 10, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24086 April 30, 1994 to May 1, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
 220

wrench in good running condition

24087 May 7, 1994 to May 8, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24088 May 14, 1994 to May 15, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24089 May 21, 1994 to May 22, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24090 June 4, 1994 to June 5, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
375, in good running condition, jack
w/ handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24091 June 11, 1994 to June 12, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
375, in good running condition, jack
w/ handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24092 June 17, 1994 to June 19, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-
375, in good running condition, jack
w/ handle, tire wrench, spare tire

24093 July 2, 1994 to July 3, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24094 July 23, 1994 to July 24, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition

24095 August 25, 1994 to August 28, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D VAN with engine
no. C190-542416, chassis no.
SMM90-8370-C, full in dash
instrumentation, maroon in color with
plate no. KBN-865, in good condition

24096 Morning of September 3, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
afternoon of September 3, 1994 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack, tire wrench, in
good running condition

24097 September 17, 1994 to September 18, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
1994 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, in good running
condition
 221

24098 November 26, 1994 to November 27, One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in
1994 color, KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench in good running condition [4]
On 22 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three accused 5 and for the holding of
their departure from the country. 6 On 6 October 1997, petitioner posted a consolidated surety bond for his
provisional liberty. [7]
In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. 24078 was granted. [8]
On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "not
guilty" to the charges. 9 Accused Nabo remains at large.
On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded. 10 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:
ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed as the driver and liaison
officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (hereinafter, "the Company"), an establishment engaged in
the assembly of motor vehicles, during the period covering the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to
officially report to the Land Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis
numbers prior to the assembly of any motor vehicle. In the process, the Company had to secure from the LTO a
Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has been completely assembled, for purposes of carrying out the necessary
road testing of the vehicle concerned. After the said road testing and prior to its eventual sale/disposition, the
vehicle has to be first properly registered with the LTO. Accused Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO
of Cagayan de Oro City, during all times relevant to the instant cases, was the approving authority on the aforesaid
reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct Permits.
By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would always personally talk to
accused Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct Permit for any newly assembled vehicle. Yungao
would secure from accused Garcia as many as 30 to 40 of such permits in a year.
In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to inform either Aurora or
Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused Garcia) would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of
visiting his farm. When Yungao could not be contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the Company and
talk to the owners thereof to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the
assigned government vehicle for his own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this reason that
he had to borrow vehicles from the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles from the Chiongs during the
period covering January of 1993 up to and until November of 1994. Accused Garcia would always ask his
representative to take the Company’s vehicle on a Saturday morning. However, Yungao never reported for work on
Saturdays; thus, he was not the one who actually released the borrowed motor vehicles to the representative of
accused Garcia. Nonetheless, Yungao would be aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles
requested because, for every such instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is placed on top of his
table for him to place in the Company’s record files on the following working day. The numerous delivery receipts
would show and indicate the actual number of times accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the Company.
Finally, Yungao identified the affidavit which he executed in connection with the subject cases.
On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating to the road testing of the
motor vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits were secured by him from accused Garcia before the
vehicles were eventually put on display or presented to potential buyers. Although there was a Regulation Officer
at the LTO before whom the request for the issuance of a Conduct Permit is to be presented, Yungao was often told
to go straight up to the room of accused Garcia so that the latter could personally sign the said permit. It was only
when accused Garcia is absent or is not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO were attended to by his
assistant.
Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the Company’s motor vehicle
verbally and on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he was not very familiar with the signature of accused
Garcia, and that the latter’s signature did not appear in any of the delivery receipts.
During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia failed to approve the
Company’s request, and this was a request for an extension of the usual "5-day road test" period granted to the
Company. Nonetheless, the Company found the said disapproval to be acceptable and proper.
On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the persons who actually
received the Company’s vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts. However, Yungao does not
recognize the signatures appearing on the said delivery receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa,
because Yungao was not present when the vehicles were taken.
The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma. Lourdes V. Miranda (hereinafter,
"Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao testified. Prior to her presentation, however, the parties agreed to
enter into stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a child named Jane,
who was run over and killed in a vehicular accident; that the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused
Nabo; that Miranda, thereafter, successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of
numerous delivery receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that said discovery led to the
institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. As a result of such admissions and stipulations, the
proposed testimony of Miranda was, thereafter, dispensed with.
 222

AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and General Manager of the
Company, a business establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles. In the process, the Company has
to submit a Dealer’s Report to the LTO prior to the assembly of a motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed,
the Company has to secure a permit from the LTO for purposes of conducting the necessary road testing of the
newly assembled motor vehicle.
In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was the officer who
approves the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles. He was also the LTO officer who
approves and signs the Company’s annual LTO Accreditation Certificate.
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to transport water thereto. For
this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor vehicle, either by asking from
Chiong directly through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would
borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by
the person whom accused Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the company officer
who signed the delivery receipt for the release of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative of accused
Garcia. When she was not in office, she would authorize her personnel to place [their] initials on top of her name.
On several occasions, Chiong had seen accused Nabo affixing his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out
the borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very sure that the driver who picked up the motor vehicle from the
Company was the personnel of accused Garcia because the latter would always call her up first before sending his
representative to get a vehicle. Chiong was likewise very familiar with the voice of accused Garcia because she had
been dealing with him for a long period of time already, and all the while she had always maintained a cordial
relationship with him.
On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask his driver to get a vehicle
on a Saturday at around 6:30 o’clock in the morning. He would return it in the late afternoon of the same day.
There was only one instance when accused Garcia returned the motor vehicle on the day after, and this was the
time when the said vehicle had figured in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of a certain Jane, the
daughter of Miranda. Chiong was not the complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could not
afford to offend or antagonize accused Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of motor vehicles to
accused Garcia as a public relation thing.
Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused Garcia were all company service
cars and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she testified that she gets irritated whenever accused Garcia would
ask for a vehicle at a time when she herself would also need it. However, under the circumstances, she had to give
in to his request. [11]
For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not present any evidence.
Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the LTO from August, 1987 to
December, 1994. He downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from the Company arguing that his signatures
never appeared in the Delivery Receipts [12] submitted by the prosecution. [13] He admitted, though, that the
Company has been continually transacting business with his office properly and officially, and has not, even for a
single instance, violated any rules with respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was no reason for the
owners of the Company to harbor any ill-feelings against him. [14] He further admitted that he had known Atty.
Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, even before he became Regional Director
when he was still the Chief of the Operations Division. [15] He added that employees of the LTO are used to
borrowing vehicles from their friends and that this practice has been going on prior to his being Regional Director.
He claimed he repeatedly warned his subordinates about the illegality of the same but they merely turned a deaf
ear. [16] Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and visited him
at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo
were merely borrowed from his (Nabo) friends. [17]
On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases
against accused Nabo, who remained at large, were archived. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of fifty-six (56) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to: (i) in each case, suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) month, as maximum; (ii) suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.
With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA, by reason of the total lack of any evidence against him, he is hereby
ACQUITED.
As for accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction over his person had yet to be
acquired, let the case as against him be achieved. [18]
Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019 WERE PRESENT IN CRIM. CASES NOS. 24042 TO 24098 (EXCEPT 24078) AND IN FINDING THE HEREIN
PETITIONER GUILTY OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION THEREOF;
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF FATALLY
DEFECTIVE INFORMATIONS WHEREIN THE FACTS CHARGED NEVER CONSTITUTED AN OFFENSE;
 223

3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF
EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT (EVEN FOR A SINGLE COUNT);
4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF
THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN IT SUPPLIED THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITH
ASSUMPTIONS WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF JUSTICE BY ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER’S CO-ACCUSED TAGUPA AND CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN THE SAME REASONING
SHOULD HAVE LED ALSO TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
[19] To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) [20] of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received a
gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in
connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity
under the law, has the right to intervene. [21]
Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established by the prosecution. Petitioner
focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues that the prosecution failed to show the specific transactions of
the Company with the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that he could
borrow from, or be lent by, the Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of fifty-
six counts of violation of Section 3(b) for allegedly borrowing the Company’s vehicle fifty-six times, the
Sandiganbayan, he stresses, should have at least pointed out what these transactions were. This, petitioner claims,
the Sandiganbayan failed to show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds that the prosecution did not even
attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or transaction was pending before the LTO over which
petitioner had the right to intervene being the Regional Director when, at the period stated in all the fifty-six
informations, he borrowed a vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is
very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit
must be in connection with "a contract or transaction" [22] wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what transactions the Company had
with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company. It is
insufficient that petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required is
that the transaction involved should at least be described with particularity and proven. To establish the existence
of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved
must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution’s allegation that the Company regularly
transacts with petitioner’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and
chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report, and other similar transactions, will not
suffice. This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged borrowings with their corresponding
transactions.
Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we find no need to discuss the presence or
absence of the elements.
The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime (i.e., Direct Bribery or Indirect
Bribery) charged in the informations?
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 [23] of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following
elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or
present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission
of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. [24] Thus, the acts
constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by
accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his
official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise. [25]
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that petitioner
committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention
anything about petitioner asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act
in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the
Company, testified that the Company complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any
intervention from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. [26] From the evidence on record, petitioner
cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery.
Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The
essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 [27] of the Revised Penal Code is that the public
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution
able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company? The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by
petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner
 224

borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts [28]
allegedly signed by petitioner’s representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and received the vehicles
subject matter of the 56 informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his
representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We,
however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received the vehicles considering
that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner’s
representatives who picked up the vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly
received the vehicles from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the person who
allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was
petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or
founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
[29] In the case before us, we are constrained to apply the exception rather than the rule. We find that the ruling
of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners actually received the vehicles through his representatives is grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on record. The certainty of
petitioner’s receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal use was not substantiated.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and 24079 to 24098 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the
petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the informations. No costs.

Art 211-A Qualified Bribery – If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift, or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death. (As added
by RA 7659)

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement
2. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting a person who has committed a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and/or death
3. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting the offender in consideration of any promise, gift or
present.

Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon a public officer who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business in
which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provisions is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, shall take part in
any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which
they shall have acted, and to the guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their wards or
estate.

Persons liable:
1. Public officer who, directly or indirectly, became interested in any contract or business in which it was his official
duty to intervene.
2. Experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, took part in any contract or transaction
connected with the estate or property in the appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which they had acted.
3. Guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their wards or the estate.

GRN L-51065-72 June 30, 1987.*]

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused
Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the
Sandiganbayan. The eight informations substantially allege the same set of circumstances constituting the offense
charged. Criminal Case No. 002 reads as follows:
 225

That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent
conspiring and confederating together with two (2) other John Does whose true identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment
in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the government having been
affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta CruzCalamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused,
Arturo A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and after said claim was
approved and the corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00
given only P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and converting to themselves the
amount of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon and the government in the
aforementioned amount of P6,200,00.
Contrary to law.
Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private party, the PNB Check
number, the amount involved and the number or John Does, the seven other informations are verbatim repetitions
of the above.
The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of
Public Works on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer,
Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to
negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of
compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-
Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin,
Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of
Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them that he
could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of
said highway. In the process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the
Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct
improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the documents
were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants
were made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to
Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements "as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00
lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn,
supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value exactly
the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran
where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that said
Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other
persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District
Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants
in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by certifying as to their identities and guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which
was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to
each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share
in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his
armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig,
Metro Manila, narrating in their supporting sworn statements what they later testified to in court.
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by
the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan isa court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres.
Dec. No. 1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as
provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction
of petitioner is correct is a question of law which this Honorable Court is authorized to pass upon.
1. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective
in that it failed to allege the essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019.
 226

The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful.
***
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or
other concessions, then he is not the officer contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared
unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under
the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision
to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public officer. This, the informations did
not fail to allege.
Second that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwanted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were allegedly
made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in
preparing. The fact, however, is that the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having
inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District
Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis of
payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty
was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of
compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of
their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were
deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was
done through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the complainants and
the government must have been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the complainants, he was no longer
discharging his official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his
position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and
sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was
evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested
the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the allegation that petitioner
cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not
the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We find no variance
between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to establish
through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused
damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of
the compensation they received was part of the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the
claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of the PasigSta. CruzCalamba Road. The evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this case. He argues that
before the Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the
justices shall have been duly constituted and appointed.
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119
SCRA 337). In that case, the petitioner De Guzman questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and
decide his case on the same ground that herein petitioner assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of
the Sandiganbayan saying that:
 227

Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that
it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the
"Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each" while Section 5 thereof provides that the
unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of
the other. As long as a division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding
as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the
requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-
six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and
insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 (1957)]. Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration"
of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of
penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of
these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed
against the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968,
25 SCRA 759, 783-784):
Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate
and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed
by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the
power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and
unusual (See Veniegas v. People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 790,792).
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 112584 May 23, 1997
DOMINGO INGCO, ERNESTO MAGBOO and HERMINIO ALCASID, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondent.
Petitioners Domingo Ingco, Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid have lodged the instant civil action of certiorari
and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order, to nullify the resolution, 1 dated 07 October 1993 2
and 08 November 1993, 3 of the Sandiganbayan which denied petitioners' motion to quash the information and
motion for a consideration of the denial.
The case began when, on 26 May 1987, Domingo Ingco, a former Vice-President of the Philippine National Bank
("PNB"), was charged, along with top officials of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation, namely, its Chairman of the
Board of Directors Ernesto Magboo and its President Herminio Alcasid, by PNB before the Presidential Blue Ribbon
Committee with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 ("Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"). The matter was at once
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman.
In a resolution, 4 dated 22 June 1993, the Committee on Behest Loans under the Office of the Special Prosecutor
in the Office of the Ombudsman made a narration of its factual findings; viz:
Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation is a domestic corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 3, 1976 and whose primary purpose is to engage in the domestic and/or overseas cargo
and passenger shipping business.
Its officers and directors included Ernesto S. Magboo as Chairman of the Board of Directors and controlling
stockholder; Herminio Alcasid as President and General Manager; Mario Ramos, Nora Roasa and Nelson Magboo as
directors.
The Corporation started operations sometime in July 1977. At the time of the filing of the instant complaint, it
maintained and operated nine vessels which carried logs, lumber and wood products, copper, iron ore, heavy
machineries and general cargo to Southeastern Asian countries.
Sometime in 1977 and 1978, it obtained two (2) loan accommodations from the Philippine National Bank, which
are now the subject of the instant complaint.
Through Board Resolution No. 703 dated September 22, 1977, PNB extended a loan accommodation to Cresta
Monte in the amount of US$5,910,000.00 to be utilized for the purchase of two cargo vessels from Japan. Said loan
was secured by 1) a Guaranty Loan of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) as approved
under its Board Resolution No. 223 dated December 22, 1976 amounting to US$7.8M; and 2) the joint and several
signatures of Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid and their spouses.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned NIDC loan was secured by 1) a chattel mortgage on the second-hand vessel to be
purchased from the proceeds of the said loan, at an acquisition price of US$1.89 Million (P14,150,430.00); 2) the
joint and several signatures of Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid and their spouses; and 3) a pledge of 100%
shares of stocks.
Subsequently, per Board Resolution No. 642 dated March 27, 1978, PNB again approved Cresta Monte's request for
PNB to advance the amount of US$7.5 Million to be remitted to the Bank of Tokyo, Shimbashi Branch, Tokyo,
Japan for the account of Liberation Maritime Carriers Co. Ltd. to cover the purchase price of two brand-new
 228

oceangoing vessels with the unit cost of US$3.75 Million. Said loan was similarly secured by 1) a Guaranty by the
NIDC in the amount of US$7.8 Million approved under its Board Resolution No. 223 dated December 22, 1976; and
2) the joint and several signatures of Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid and their spouses.
On the other hand, the NIDC loan was secured by 1) a chattel mortgage on second-hand vessels at an acquisition
cost of US$1.89 Million or P14.175 Million (P7.50 = $1); 2) a chattel mortgage on two cargo vessels (M/V Amasia
and M/V Kusonaki Maru) at an acquisition cost of US$5.91 Million or P44.325 Million; and 3) the joint and several
signatures of Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid and their spouses. The value of the collateral security totaled
P58.500 Million.
In the instant complaint, PNB charges Domingo Ingco with conspiring with the other respondents in having the loan
applications approved even without a project feasibility study and notwithstanding the fact that the credit rating
submitted by the Credit Department showed more adverse comments. It further alleged that the collaterals offered
by Cresta Monte were deficient. PNB likewise charged the officers and directors of Cresta Monte with persuading
and inducing respondent Ingco to recommend the approval of the loans under disadvantageous terms and
conditions.
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Domingo Ingco denied the imputation of conspiracy with the other
respondents. He further declared that contrary to the allegation in the complaint, the commercial viability of the
project was thoroughly evaluated by the Credit Department which thereafter gave the company a rating of "B-1,"
meaning good quality. He likewise stated that he cannot be faulted for the alleged failure to require the Magboo
and Alcasid spouses to submit their joint and several signatures since the implementation of approved loans as well
as the compliance with the requirements devolved on the operating department, which is the International
Department. He also asserted that there was no collateral deficiency on the part of Cresta Monte at the time when
the loans were granted and that the NIDC had the recognized stature and capacity to act as guarantor for the
loans. Moreover, the loans were granted with the proper safeguards and conditions to protect PNB's interests and
with the approval of the Monetary Board after evaluation by the Central Bank. 5
On the basis of the foregoing, the Committee arrived at its following assessments and inferences, to wit:
The allegations in the complaint hinge on a single issue, namely, whether the loan accommodations extended by
PNB to Cresta Monte were in the nature of behest loans granted by a government financial institution to a select
corporation which ultimately caused prejudice to the Government or were manifestly disadvantageous to.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the records of the case reveals that Domingo Ingco, in his capacity as Sr. Vice-President of PNB,
recommended to the Board of Directors of the PNB, and the latter approved the release of the loans for $5.91M in
September 1977 and $7.5M in March 1987 (should be 1978) in favor of Cresta Monte. Said loans were secured
only by the Guaranty of NIDC and the Joint and Solidary Signatures of Messrs. Ernesto S. Magboo and Herminio M.
Alcasid and their respective spouses. It must be remembered that NIDC is but a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
PNB. The President of the PNB and all the members of the PNB Board of directors are also the President and
members of the NIDC Board of Directors, respectively. Considering above information, it would appear that the
guarantee made by NIDC to PNB with respect to Cresta Monte's loan is but illusory. It is as if one creditor extended
a loan in favor of a particular debtor with a guarantee/assurance coming from the same creditor. This is
tantamount to having no guaranty being submitted at all. For PNB's sake and interest, PNB's management should
have required Cresta Monte a security/guaranty emanating from credible private lending institutions and not from
its own subsidiary corporations. Moreover, with respect to the $7.5M loan, records are clear that said loan was
released to Cresta Monte without the requisite Joint and Solidary Signatures of Messrs. Ernesto S. Magboo and
Herminio M. Alcasid and their respective spouses, which were submitted only a year after the approval and
implementation of said loan. It is basic in banking procedure that upon approval of the loan by the board, the
covering Board Resolution is forwarded to the operative department for the proper documentation of the account
and the compliance by the borrower with all the terms and conditions imposed on the approved loan, including the
submission of the Joint and Solidary Signatures of the borrower.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on our earlier observation, it is very clear that PNB's loan to Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation amounting
to US$13.4M falls within the category of a behest loan. Evidently, there was pressure and instructions from high
government officials for the release of said loan. This is so because in spite of the many risks and deficiencies
attendant to the approval of the loan, as discussed above, the owners of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation were
still able to obtain the loan and at concessionary lending terms at that.
It is indubitably clear that the strong recommendation and direction made by Senior Vice-President Domingo Ingco,
who conspired and confederated with Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid, were chiefly responsible for the grant
of the loans to Cresta Monte under manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions which resulted in
undue damage and prejudice caused to the PNB. Needless to say, the violation of some of the warranties, pre-
requisite terms and conditions of the loans should have merited their disapproval but as previously discussed, all
these were overlooked when the loans were granted. In this respect, respondents Ingco, Magboo and Alcasid are
indictable for Violation of Sec. 3(e) in relation to Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. 6
Accordingly, on 21 July 1993, an information 7 was filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e), in
relation to Section 3(g), of R.A. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioners. The inculpatory statements in the
information read:
That on or about September 22, 1977 and March 27, 1978, and for some time prior or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Domingo
Ingco, being then the Senior Vice-President of the Philippine National Bank, a government-owned bank, and hence
 229

a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and conspiring
and confederating with Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid, both private individuals, being then the Chairman of
the Board of Directors and the President and General Manager, respectively, of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation,
a private corporation engaged in the maritime industry and duly organized and registered in accordance with
Philippine law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith and manifest partiality
cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner: accused Domingo Ingco favorably recommended
the approval of the applications for loan of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation in the amount of US$5.91 Million
and US$7.5 Million and the subsequent release of such loans notwithstanding the fact that Cresta Monte had a
capitalization of only P1 Million; that the loans were guaranteed only by the National Investment Development
Corporation, a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank; that the joint and several signatures of accused Ernesto
Magboo and Herminio Alcasid and their spouses were not given in violation of the terms and conditions of the
guaranty loan by NIDC; that a project feasibility study was not conducted to evaluate the commercial viability of
the proposed undertaking covered by the aforesaid loans; that the Credit Rating submitted by the PNB Credit
Department contained adverse comments; and that the collaterals offered by Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation
were deficient, thereby allowing the Government to enter into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract,
and as a result of the grant of said loans and their subsequent release in complete disregard of the aforementioned
factors which should have justified their disapproval, undue injury and damage was consequently caused to the
Government by the default of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation in the payment of its loan obligations, thereby
leaving an unpaid balance of P511.437 Million as of March 31, 1986. 8
Petitioners moved for the quashal 9 of the information on the ground, inter alia, that the facts alleged in the
information did not constitute an offense under the invoked law, and that the offense charged, in any case, had
already prescribed. Expectedly, the motion was opposed by the prosecution.
On 07 October 1993, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash; it likewise turned down the motion for a
reconsideration of the denial.
The appeal hinges on the resolution of two main issues, i.e., (1) whether or not the offense has already prescribed,
and (2) whether or not the facts charged under the information indeed constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, the Court affirms the holding of the Sandiganbayan that the offense has not as yet
prescribed. 10 Although, it is true that more than ten years have elapsed from the time of the alleged commission
of the offense on 22 September 1977 and/or 27 March 1978 to the date of filing of the information on 21 July
1993, the then 11 applicable 10-year prescriptive period has, however, been effectively suspended by the filing of
the complaint on 26 May 1987 with the Ombudsman. In Llenes vs. Dicdican, 12 the Court has underscored what
should now be the settled rule on this question; viz:
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint or information had been the
subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People vs. Tayco (73 Phil. 509), People vs. Del Rosario (110 Phil.
476), and People vs. Coquia (8 SCRA 349), this Court held that it is the filing of the complaint or information with
the proper court, viz., the court having jurisdiction over the crime, which interrupts the running of the period of
prescription. On the other hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte (108 Phil. 756), a case for libel, this Court
held that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court even for preliminary investigation purposes
only interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the second case of People vs. Olarte (19 SCRA 494)
resolved once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial
court even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period . . . .
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals (122 SCRA 538), this Court not only
reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. . . .
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila (227 SCRA 56).
Summing up, the Court made the following observations and thereupon concluded:
A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose duties involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of government. The petitioner, being an Education Supervisor II of
the Regional Office of Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the petitioner for grave oral
defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the first Olarte case, reiterated as the controlling doctrine in the second
Olarte case, which was broadened in Francisco and reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman against public officers and employees for purposes of preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner with
the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of the said offense. 13
The complaint filed on 26 May 1987 before the Ombudsman, in fine, is deemed to have tolled the running of the
prescriptive period, and thus the filing of the information on 21 July 1993, following the approval by the
Ombudsman on 12 July 1993 of the resolution recommending the prosecution of herein petitioners, must perforce
be held to be well within the ten-year prescriptive period.
Turning now to the second issue, respondent Sandiganbayan downgraded the motion to quash with this
ratiocination:
The facts charged in the information do constitute the offense of Violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section
3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, since the accused are alleged to have acted in conspiracy when they initially applied
for loans to Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation out of PNB funds and which were granted/approved upon
 230

recommendations which were supposedly irregular, improper and prejudicial to the Government. What is only
required is for an information to describe and charge an indictable offense which is likewise required to be clearly
specified and designated, to wit, it should contain all the essential elements constituting the particular offense.
Under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, two of the requisite elements are that the alleged violations
thereof is attended by evident bad faith and manifest partiality and which caused undue injury to the Government,
which elements are recited in the information, similarly as under Section 3(g), ibid, wherein the essential elements
go into the execution of contracts and transactions alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government, irregardless (sic) of personal gain or profit, and which are likewise alleged. 14
Section 3(a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the quashal of an information when the facts
therein averred do not amount to an offense. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to
quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. 15 In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered. 16 Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court requires, inter
alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive of the offense.
Petitioners have been charged with having violated Section 3(e), in relation to Section 3(g), of R.A. No. 3019.
These provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Under Section 3(e), the elements of the offense are: (1) That the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of
their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether
the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. 17 To determine the culpability of an accused in relation, in turn, to Section 3(g) of
the law, it needs to be established (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The information against Domingo Ingco expressed that he had favorably recommended the approval of the
application for loan of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation in the amount of US $5.91 million and US $7.5 million,
notwithstanding that: [a] Cresta Monte had a capitalization of only P1 million; [b] no project feasibility study was
conducted; [c] the PNB Credit Department submitted an adverse comment; and [d] the collaterals for the loans
were deficient. With regard to the other petitioners, Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid, the information alleged
that their joint and several signatures and those of their spouses, in violation of the terms and conditions of the
loan, were not given.
In gist, the information would have it that petitioner Ingco should be made criminally liable for the grant by the
PNB of the loans to Cresta Monte under what had been so claimed as "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
terms and conditions" to the bank's damage and prejudice. Petitioner Ingco might have been a ranking official of
PNB but, unassailably, he neither had the title nor the authority to conclude and bind the bank to the questioned
transactions. Like any other corporate banking institution, PNB's affairs were directed and its properties managed
and preserved and its corporate powers exercised by its Board of Directors. 18
Concomitantly, it was the President of the Bank who had the power and duty to execute all contracts and to enter
into all authorized transactions in behalf of the Bank. 19 Ingco's role was confined to a mere evaluation and study
of the loan applications and thereafter to make his report and give his recommendation to the Board of Directors.
The Board certainly was under no obligation or compulsion to approve and to favorably act on the
recommendation.
It is probable, evident in retrospect, that Ingco has had a wrong appreciation of and even a poor assessment on
the loan application of Monte Cresta, but it is not much more than an error of judgment. It would be hard to
accept, let alone to render a firm verdict, that such an error, to which all public officials are, at one time or
another, susceptible of making in their years of service to the government, would constitute the crime
contemplated in Section 3(e), in relation to Section 3(g), of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither of petitioners Magboo and Alcasid is a public officer. Independently of Ingco, they cannot be prosecuted
under the provisions of the law in question. The remedy of the PNB against them would lie elsewhere.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the questioned resolutions, dated 07 October 1993 and 08 November
1993, are hereby also SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 231

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).

Elements COMMON TO ALL acts of malversation:

1. That the offender be a public officer
2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.

Acts punishable in malversation

1. By appropriating public funds or property.
2. By taking or misappropriating the same.
3. By consenting or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property.
4. By being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

RA 3019: ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 2. Definition of terms.
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as
defined in the preceding subparagraph.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself
or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or
will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without
prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
 232

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or
act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in
such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee,
panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly
unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for
or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his
official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or
offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or
untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with
the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily
disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.

Suspension mandatory but not automatic

[GRN L-45376 July 26, 1988.*]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, in his capacity as Judge
of Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District, Davao City and City Mayor ANTONIO C. ACHARON &
ROSALINA BERNABE, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Circuit Criminal Court of Davao City. Albano, J.
Petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the order of the Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District,
Davao City, dated 20 December 1976, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (255) and Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-
2-GSC (256), which denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of a previous order, dated 28 October 1976,
resolving that the informations filed therein are "invalid ab initio" and consequently dismissing said criminal cases.
On 11 June 1971, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 255, charging City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon for violation of
Paragraphs (e) and (f), Section 3 of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The information reads as follows:
"That for the period from January to December 1968, in the City of General Santos, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused being then the incumbent Municipal Mayor of General Santos,
South Cotabato, and thereafter from July 8, 1968 to the present is the City Mayor of the City of General Santos,
Philippines, and being the public officer charged with the grant of license or permit to operate cockpits in the said
City (formerly a Municipality), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, deny the application for
renewal of one EMILIO EVANGELISTA for license or permit to operate his cockpit situated at Labangala, now City of
General Santos, Philippines, and issuing instead-in the same year 1968-a license and permit to operate, as in fact
said accused did issue a license or permit to LUIS ACHARON, his uncle (relative within the third civil degree) to
operate a new cockpit about 250 meters away from the cockpit of Emilio Evangelista and inspite of the order of the
CFI in Civil Case No. 840, entitled "MANDAMUS" in which Emilio Evangelista is the Petitioner, directing the then
Municipal Mayor to accept arid give due counse to the application of petitioner Emilio Evangelista for- a license or,
permit to operate his cockpit; the said accused failed and refused to accept and give due course to said application
for a license or permit, thereby causing injury to said applicant and gave his uncle, LUIS ACHARON, an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in connection with which City Mayor under Section 10 of Republic
Act 5412, known as the City Charter of General Santos City, has the sole charged (sic) of issuing license or
permits, giving his relative within the third civil degree preference in the discharge of his official functions thru his
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and/or he has neglected or refused after due
demand or request of Emilio Evangelista for the renewal of his permit to operate his cockpit without any sufficient
justification, thus, giving directly or indirectly his own uncle, LUIS ACHARON, benefit or advantage or has
discriminated on Emilio Evangelista in the performance of his official duties.
CONTRARY TO PARAGRAPHS (c) and M of Section 3, Republic Act No. 3019, x x x"1
On the same day, another information was filed in the same court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 256 charging
City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon and then City Vice-Mayor Rosalina Bernabe of violating Section 3, in relation to
Section 1, of Republic Act 3019. Said information reads as follows:
 233

"That for the period July to December, 1969, in the City of General Santos, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, said accused, being the incumbent City Mayor and City Vice Mayor, respectively, of General
Santos City, Philippines, taking advantage of their positions as City Mayor and City Vice Mayor, which positions and
offices are public trust, conspiring, confederating together and mutually assisting one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use the names of 327 employees of the city government of General Santos
City, fraudulently procure and purchase 1,635 sacks of rice in bulk with the Regional Office of the Rice & Corn
Administration, Region No. XIII, stationed at General Santos City, by using their own money and after obtaining
said 1,635 sacks of RCA rice at a price very much lower than the prevailing price in the open market for the same
quality of rice, dispose the same illegally to persons other than the said 327 employees of the city government in
violation of paragraph (a), (e), (b) and (j) of Section 3, in relation to Section 1 of Republic Act 3019, the accused
City Vice Mayor Rosalina Bernabe persuading, inducing or influencing accused City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon to
make a fraudulent official procurement of rice from the RCA and accused City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon allowed
himself to be so persuaded, induced or influenced to make said fraudulent official procurement and, as a result the
accused City Mayor has caused injury to the government by the fraudulent official procurement of rice from the
RCA and has given accused City Mayor an unwarranted benefit and advantage thru said fraudulent official
procurement of rice from the RCA; the Mayor being an officer charged with the grant of concession, namely, the
official procurement of rice for city employees without whose intervention no such rice in bulk can be obtained
except from RCA accredited retailers by the gantas, and/or both accused, directly or indirectly, had financial or
pecuniary interest in the fraudulent procurement of rice from the RCA in connection with which the said accused
intervened in their official capacities, the accused City Vice Mayor having used her own money in paying the low
price of said rice and, thereafter, Ilegally disposing of the same and accused City Mayor knowingly approved or
granted the privilege or benefit in favor of the accused City Vice Mayor who was not qualified or legally entitled
from procuring said rice in bulk from said agency, the official request being a privilege or a benefit.
CONTRARY To Section 3, in relation to Section 1, Republic Act No. 3019. x x x"2
The prosecution then filed an Urgent Motion for the issuance of an order suspending the accused from office. The
accused Rosalina Bernabe filed a Motion to Dismiss in Criminal Case No. 256. The trial court thereupon issued a
"show cause" order in both criminal cases, directing the accused to show the invalidity of the informations filed
against them.
Before the pre-suspension hearings in the two (2) cases could be held, the accused were arraigned, both pleading
not guilty. Likewise, pursuant to a resolution of this Court, both cases were transferred to the Circuit Criminal
Court, 6th Judicial District, Davao City (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) for trial and disposition. Criminal
Case No. 255 and Criminal Case No. 256 were re-docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (255) and
Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-2-GSC (256), respectively.
On 30 October 1972, the cases were set for trial. However, at the instance of the Acting District State Prosecutor,
and on the latter's manifestation that a petition for reinvestigation had been filed with his office by accused
Acharon, and that the granting of the same was still pending determination, trial was postponed. Likewise, the
presiding judge who was hearing the cases was subsequently appointed to another court: hence, the trial of the
cases was further delayed until herein respondent judge, Hon. Rodolfo B. Albano was appointed in December 1975
presiding judge of the trial court.
In September 1976, the cases were again set for hearing. On the date of hearing, 4 October 1976, accused
Acharon filed a Motion to hear the validity of the informations filed against him.
In said hearing, the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity or invalidity of
the two (2) informations on the basis of the records of each case. And with such submission, the trial court
subsequently issued an Order, dated 28 October 1976, deciding the cases on the merits by making findings of fact
based on its assessment of the records of the antecedent proceedings had in the cases, taking into consideration
matters of defense of the accused, resolving that the informations in both cases are "invalid ab initio" and
consequently dismissing said cases. The prosecution moved for reconsideration: however, on 20 December 1976,
the trial court issued its Order denying the same.
Hence this petition by the prosecution.
Basically, petitioner challenges the manner in which the trial court arrived at its conclusion that the informations
filed in both cases are invalid. Petitioner assigns as reversible errors the following:
"1. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH BOTH ACCUSED ARE
CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPT PRAC71CES ACT (R.A. No. 3019)
BY TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION MATTERS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.
"2. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS WITHOUT TRIAL;
CONSEQUENTLY, THE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL IS NULL AND VOID AB INTIO FOR WANT OF DUE PROCESS."3
This assignment of errors raises in turn the following issues:
1. whether in a pre-suspension proceeding to determine the validity or invalidity of an information filed under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a court may consider matters not alleged in the information under
consideration.
2. whether a court may, without a trial proper, decide a case on the merits by making findings of fact after an
assessment of the evidence on the record, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused, and, on the
basis thereof, dismiss the same.
Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 provides that:
"x x x Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended. Should he be convicted
 234

by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in
the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him."
The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer is mandatory.4
However, suspension cannot be automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the validity of the information
appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy
determination of the issues involved in (the) cases."5 Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on
the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to
determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the
accused, and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss
the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.
As the Court held:
"x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which
he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of
the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or
he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court x x x."6
It should be stressed that the right to challenge the validity of the information, in prosecutions under the anti-graft
law, is not limited to the right to challenge the completeness or sufficiency of the recitals in the information vis-a-
vis the essential elements of the offense as defined by substantive law. Considering the serious and far-reaching
consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, the right to challenge the validity of an
information entitles the accused to challenge the validity of the CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS leading to the filing of the
information against him.
However, this right of the accused does not divest the prosecution of its right to prove the guilt of the accused in a
trial on the merits, nor should the pre-suspension hearing substitute the trial proper.
Thus, in a pre-suspension proceeding, the accused is accorded the right to prove that the information filed against
him was filed without prior and due preliminary investigation to which he is entitled under the law.' This is to
protect him from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.
I While an irregularity in a proceeding may not affect the validity of an information in the narrow sense of the
word, it may result in a serious defect tantamount to an infringement of the right of an accused to due process of
law that would warrant the invalidity of the criminal proceedings against him. This can be explained as follows:
This Court has consistently ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
criminal information or render it defective. Much less does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over a case. Thus, in
the absence of a preliminary investigation, a court, instead of dismissing an information, should either conduct
such preliminary investigation or order the provincial fiscal to make it. (People v. Casiano, 111 Phil. 73; People v.
Manlapaz, 5 SCRA 883; People v. Figueroa).
However, in anti-graft cases, the right to a preliminary investigation, being one made available to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, aside from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, (Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438; Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216;
U.S. v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122) plays an important role in protecting the right of a public officer from being unduly
disturbed in his office. To dispense with the right in a criminal proceeding against a public officer prosecuted under
the Anti-graft law or the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, under an information valid on its face,
may occasion the denial of the latter's right to due process of law because under the law a valid proceeding against
him mandates his suspension. Thus, as a way of protecting the accused, a criminal proceeding should be struck
down as invalid in the absence of a preliminary investigation
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for
which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised
Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117
of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused
is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way
of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of
the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the
information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep, Act 3019 or
the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
Private respondent Bernabe objects to this procedure, contending that:
"x x x This would render nugatory the purpose of the pre-suspension hearing. Considering the harshness of
suspension from office, an accused should be allowed to present evidence in his behalf to refute the allegations in
the information. Otherwise, any public officer can be suspended from the office on the basis of an information
complete and regular upon its face but which may have been based on false, malicious and unfounded imputation
by unscrupulous persons. x x x"8
 235

Contrary to private respondent's contention, the right to be secured against false, malicious and unfounded
imputations is already covered by the right to a due preliminary investigation granted to the accused. The law does
not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before the trial on the
merits proceeds. Nor does it Prohibit the trial, and thus the suspension, of the innocent.
The law permits the trial of the accused based merely on probable cause, as long as probable cause has been
properly determined. And for honest lapses in its administration, the law provides for remedial measures upon
which an innocent public officer is vindicated and compensated. As the law provides:
". . . Should he [the accused] be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under the law, but IF HE IS ACQUITTED, HE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND TO THE SALARIES AND
BENEFITS WHICH HE FAILED TO RECEIVE DURING THE SUSPENSION, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him."9 (Italics supplied)
Considering the mandatory suspension of the accused under a valid information, the law does not contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence, so that a court can have a valid basis in evaluating the advisability
of his suspension pending the trial proper of the case filed against him.10 Besides, a requirement that the guilt of
the accused must first be established in the pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can proceed would
negate the ruling of the Court that the "x x x mandatory suspension . . . requires at the same time that the hearing
be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act"11 and
make the trial proper a surplusage.
In the case at bar, respondent Antonio Acheron does not claim that he was denied his right to due preliminary
investigation. Private respondent Bernabe filed a motion to dismiss dated 18 June 1971, on the ground that the
facts alleged in the information against her do not constitute an offense. Further, respondent Antonio Acheron filed
a motion, dated 4 October 1976, praying that a pre-suspension hearing of the cases be held to determine the
validity of the informations against him, but he did not specify any ground upon which he challenged the validity of
the same.
In any event, when the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity of the
informations on the basis of the records of the cases, among others,12 to determine whether accused Acheron can
be mandatorily suspended, the trial court was competent to inquire only whether or not (1) accused Acheron had
been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for
which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, not deemed waived in view of the previous arraignment of the
accused.13
Consequently, the submission by the parties of the issue of invalidity of the informations on the basis of the
records of the case makes said records, in addition to facts admitted by the prosecution and indubitable facts
contained therein, only a legal source from which the trial court can inquire whether accused Acharon was afforded
due preliminary investigation before the informations were filed against him.
Likewise, in determining whether the acts for which respondent Antonio Acharon was charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court
should have limited its inquiry to (1) the averments in the informations, as hypothetically admitted, (2) facts
admitted by the prosecution, and (3) indubitable facts.
To traverse the allegations contained in the information, and conclude that "no law had been violated by the
accused,"14 merely on the basis of the records of the case which contain evidence submitted by the prosecution in
the preliminary investigation, pre-emptively denies the prosecution its right to exhaustively present its evidence
against the accused at the trial proper.
Considering- that the law does not require the conviction of the accused in the pre-suspension proceeding but only
the determination of the validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of the information, and given the
ability of the latter to overcome a motion to quash, the prosecution should not be faulted if what it presents as
evidence in the presuspension proceedings does not satisfy a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
accused.
The records of the instant case do not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against
the accused were tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, a reading of the informations
shows that the allegations contained therein meet the essential elements of offense as defined by substantive
law.15 The record is also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the
culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave
abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the cases and, as a
consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its
fundamental right to due process.16 With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976,
are therefore null and void.17 Likewise, for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a
claim of double jeopardy.18 As held by the Court:
"x x x to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
 236

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d)
a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or
trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy."19
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the trial court are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (255) and Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-2-GSC (256) are remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with law, No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Maximum duration of preventive suspension of an elective official, 90 days

[GRN 86899 May 15, 1989.*]
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated February 10,
1989 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the
criminal cases) pendente lite from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may
be holding.
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he
occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him
of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses
to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zarnbales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the
issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the
payment of rentals.
The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other
complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of
violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except for the names of the individuals who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and
the dates when these favors were made, the informations uniformly alleged:
'That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambaler, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru. a
loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of said tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to
the Municipality of Botolan." (Rollo, p. 30)
A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's resolutions
denying the petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and
executory on October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
charges against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite Pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his position as
Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for
implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof." (Rollo, p. 94)
The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution
and implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the
merits of the petition. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the
trial of the cases which was denied in an order dated February 22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said:
'The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7, 1989 at
8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims that this period is
ordinately far, the Court must also be contend with its own calendar. It will be easy enough for this Court to give
 237

the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will be best a pretence since other cases have already been
set between now and May 16 where in many instances the accused themselves are also under suspension by
reason of the same provision of law. Under the above circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the
accused without making that setting merely a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally
have a right to expect priority." (Rollo, p. 135)
In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development, and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10,
1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law
(Republic Act No. 3019).
This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After considering the
facts as well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on
the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. We instead, decided the case in relation to the principles of
due process and equal protection of the law.
Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, we apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and
decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection without having to
declare categorically whether or not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as
invalid. We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite
suspension becomes unreasonable.
As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which would result if
the Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act:
"The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower than that
of removal and it would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension more serious consequences than
are attached to the penalty of removal. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate restoration of the respondent to
his position once the favorable result of the election is known.
"Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon and
Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of the commencement of the
investigation of the charges, which, according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be made within one year prior to an
election.
"And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court toward
efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of Congress upon the said
issues. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a suggestion that the interplay of legal
provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.
"In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting effects of the
provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local official is concerned. In no uncertain
words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an elective
local official taking the form of the filing of a valid information against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in an administrative case involving the same offense.
"I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could effectively
frustrate an elected or reelected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the entire term of his
office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. I likewise asked the Court to consider the situation
where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected despite the fact that he is under
suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a definitive
answer to the question. What then would happen to the suspension meted out to him since it is the National
Assembly that determines whether he should assume and continue in office?'
"All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the sweeping
statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases. It is the ex cathedra
attitude, this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and therefore deplore." (Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA
163, 197-198 [1974])
Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections. The
regular term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision
of the Constitution. (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII, Constitution). He was, however, ordered
suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite
period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated
sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's
plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to
expect priority.
Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus
raising a due process question. As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, (supra):
"Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until
1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-
 238

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded
against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice
inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve
as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest.
It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted."
Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on the issue as to
whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days,
provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the
petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the National Science Development Board appointed by the
President of the Philippines. He was charged with electioneering and dishonesty in office. Pending investigation of
the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary by authority of the
President. In view of his indefinite suspension, he filed a petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed
in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired, he be reinstated in the service pursuant
to Section 35 of the said Act. The respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was a
presidential appointee and therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the
then Civil Service Act. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. In ruling in
favor of the petitioner, the Court stated:
'To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges can
be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can,
in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due
process). x x x In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in
effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.
x x x." (at pp. 8-9)
The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by
no less than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the
Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13, thereof.
The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Executive
Secretary. Thus, we explained in the Layno case, to wit:
"x x x If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be
applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein
enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: 'In all cases, preventive suspension shall not
extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.' (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last
sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues
are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the
continuance in office of the respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence'). It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil. 348 [1962]).
According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the
President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.' (Ibid. 351-352) Further;
'In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly
then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee." (at
p. 542)
The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies
with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The
interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load
of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly
extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder,
 239

malversation of public funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to
the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. We
rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019
should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree,
which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by Batasan Pambansa
Blg. 192 to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as
incumbent does not apply to him since he is now occupying the position of governor and not mayor, the position
wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.
This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984),
in this wise:
"x x x Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position
different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019
or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word 'office' the same applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged."
One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the
prerogatives of the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent court is not bereft of
remedies or sanctions. The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an
automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by
virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited to only ninety (90) days after
which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation
of the trial of the pending cases against him in the Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

PD NO. 807: PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, PRESCRIBING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is
not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when
the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Preventive suspension follows the public officer or employee wherever he maybe transferred or re-
assigned

RA No. 7080: An Act Defining and Penalizing the crime of Plunder

Section 1. Definition of Terms
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.

[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]

 240

JOSE “JINGGOY” E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is
the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be
excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family,
his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing
with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents
therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10,
2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a “Motion to Quash or Suspend” the Amended Information on the ground that
the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent
Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis,
petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion” alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to
put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling
and not in a “series or combination of overt or criminal acts” as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged
from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by
respondent court.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a “Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.”
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a “Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To
Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents.”
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s “Motion to Quash and
Suspend” and “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.” Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
arraignment of all accused. The court held:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated
June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable
cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he
be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused.”
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied
the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to
enter a plea of “not guilty” for him.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
“1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him
the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with
whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious -
results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality.”
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the
equal protection of the laws.
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has
been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan. We take off from the Amended Information which charged
petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie “Atong” Ang, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
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“AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. “ASIONG SALONGA” AND a.k.a “JOSE VELARDE”,
together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for
HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000]
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE”;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE” AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001”
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise
that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He
then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided
into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder
together with petitioner Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong” Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and
others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of
plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of
the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who
committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is
of “receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit x x x.” In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with
the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s
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posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling “on several instances.” The
phrase “on several instances” means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the
Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase
“several instances” is to indulge in a twisted, nay, “pretzel” interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words “combination” or “series” as they appear in
R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their
popular, not technical, meaning, the word “series” is synonymous with the clause “on several instances.” “Series”
refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word
“combination” contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items.
Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of
the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause
to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2
million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is
not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against
petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
“x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious
collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov.
Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an
emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and
another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged “listahan” of jueteng recipients listed him as one “Jingle Bell,” as
affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].”
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as “jueteng haul” on “at least two occasions.” The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum
with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
“x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from
arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x.”
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable
cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the
petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is
now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue
cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that “the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the
courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense.” Thus, he posits the following questions:
“For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on
one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty?
What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty
imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not
provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called
to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended.”
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with
only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of
the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to
death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is.
Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in
the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these
allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former
President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, viz:
“Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.”
III.
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Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for “sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to
the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process.”
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-
paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a
principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second
paragraphs of the Amended Information.
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime
of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how
plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former
President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to
the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling,
and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion
of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item
[1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead
names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of
stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation
which became part of the deposit in the “Jose Velarde” account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate
acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that
the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does
and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name “Jose Velarde” at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold
that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts
alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A
study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of
ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found
no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former
President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of
multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were
filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was
enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No.
733, viz:
“Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the
use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth
and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting
in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute
books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power.”
There is no denying the fact that the “plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy” is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
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acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the “hub”)
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy,
usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a “wheel” conspiracy. The hub is
former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common
goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve
as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under
Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our
jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to
commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy
itself is the gravamen of the offense. The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by
concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful,
by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or
more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying
substantive offense.
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy –
conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer.
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, as follows:
“Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.”
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
“Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or
District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust
or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means
any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or
to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while
engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him
in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than six years, or both.”
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and
(2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to “commit any offense against
the United States” refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. It refers to an act punished by statute.
Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory. These laws
cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank
robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud,
lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation.
Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is
generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense, hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.
The conspiracy to “defraud the government” refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or
money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner
whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law on how
conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time,
place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such
specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it
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alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt
acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that
they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to
allege an agreement. The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged,
it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object
is charged as a substantive offense.
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with
cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place,
circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a
mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a
crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain
the following averments:
“Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.”
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by
statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date
of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in
order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by
reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information must also state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must
be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of “conspiracy to commit treason” is
committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government
or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. The elements of this crime
are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war
against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and
other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities
in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant
only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as
co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective
and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People
v. Quitlong, we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the
Information, viz:
“x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to
hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts
done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others
(People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof,
like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts
connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the
indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
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language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal
or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be
held sufficient “if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the
words “conspired” or “confederated” or the phrase “acting in conspiracy,” must aptly appear in the information in
the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of
purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term
“conspire” or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy
must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter
that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct
proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x.”
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts.
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement,
a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually
pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused
committed the crime of plunder. It used the words “in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused.” Following the
ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before
this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons.”
Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to
him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which
petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the
motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for
petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an “Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution
of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations.” Petitioner reiterated the
motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and
requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for “lack of factual basis.” Basing its finding on the earlier
testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner “failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that
purpose that he be allowed to post bail.”
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
“Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
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provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein
both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The
burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should
be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December
20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five
months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

BAR QUESTIONS ON TITLE SEVEN

Bribery & Corruption of Public Official (2001)

Deputy Sheriff Ben Rivas received from the RTC Clerk of Court a Writ of Execution in the case of Ejectment filed by
Mrs. Maria Estrada vs. Luis Ablan. The judgment being in favor of Estrada, Rivas went to her lawyer's office where
he was given the necessary amounts constituting the sheriffs fees and expenses for execution in the total amount
of P550.00, aside from P2,000.00 in consideration of prompt enforcement of the writ from Estrada and her lawyer.
The writ was successfully enforced. a) What crime, if any, did the sheriff commit? (3%) b) Was there any crime
committed by Estrada and her lawyer and if so, what crime? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The sheriff committed the crime of Direct Bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210, Revised Penal
Code, since the P2,000 was received by him "in
consideration" of the prompt enforcement of the writ of execution which is an official duty of the sheriff to do.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
a) On the premise that even without the P2,000, Sheriff Ben Rivas had to carry out the writ of execution and not
that he would be implementing the writ only because of the P2,000.00, the receipt of the amount by said sheriff
may be regarded as a gift received by reason of his office and not as a "consideration" for the performance of an
official duty; hence, only indirect Bribery would be committed by said sheriff.
b) On the part of the plaintiff and her lawyer as giver of the bribe-money, the crime is Corruption of Public
Officials under Article 212, Revised Penal Code.
Direct Bribery: Infidelity in the Custody of Documents (2005)
During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih was arrested for selling 20 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih, through an intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence Custodian of the PNP
Forensic Chemistry Section, the amount of P500,000.00 in consideration for the destruction by Patrick of the drug.
Patrick managed to destroy the drug. State with reasons whether Patrick committed the following crimes: (7%)
1.] Direct Bribery;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Patrick committed the crimes of Direct Bribery and Infidelity in the Custody of Documents. When a public officer is
called upon to perform or refrain from performing an official act in exchange for a gift, present or consideration
given to him (Art. 210, Revised Penal Code), the crime committed is direct bribery. Secondly, he destroyed the
shabu which is an evidence in his official custody, thus, constituting infidelity in the custody of documents under
Art. 226 of the Revised Penal Code.
2.] Indirect bribery;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Indirect bribery was not committed because he did not receive the bribe because of his office but in consideration
of a crime in connection with his official duty.
3.] Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
See. 3(e), R.A. No. 8019 was not committed because there was no actual injury to the government. When there is
no specific quantified injury, violation is not committed. (Garcia-Rueda vs Amor, et al., G.R. No. 116938,
September 20, 2001)
4.] Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Patrick committed the crime of obstruction of justice although the feigner penalty imposable on direct bribery or
infidelity in the custody of documents shall be imposed. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1829 refers merely to the imposition of
the higher penalty and does not preclude prosecution for obstruction of justice, even if the same not constitute
another offense.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Obstruction of Justice is not committed in this case, because the act of destroying the evidence in his custody is
already penalized by another law which imposes a higher penalty. (Sec. 1, P.I). No. 1829)
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Jurisdiction; Impeachable Public Officers (2006)

Judge Rod Reyes was appointed by former President Fidel Ramos as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for a term
of 7 years commencing on July 5,1995. Six months thereafter, a lady stenographer filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint for acts of lasciviousness and with the Supreme Court a petition for disbarment against
him. Forthwith, he filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint for acts of lasciviousness and petition for
disbarment, claiming lack of jurisdiction over his person and office. Are both motions meritorious? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss the complaint of the Deputy Ombudsman for the acts of lasciviousness should be denied as
only the Ombudsman is included in the list of impeachable officers found in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his prosecution (Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. 146486,
March 4, 2005). Likewise, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition for disbarment, as he is a member
of the bar. His motion to dismiss should be denied (See Rule 139 and 139 of the Rules of Court).
Malversation (1994)
Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an armalite rifle (Ml6) and a Smith and Wesson Revolver. Cal. 38.
After a year, the NBI Director made an inspection of all the firearms issued. Randy, who reported for work that
morning, did not show up during the inspection. He went on absence without leave (AWOL). After two years, he
surrendered to the NBI the two firearms issued to him. He was charged with malversation of government property
before the Sandiganbayan.
Randy put up the defense that he did not appropriate the armalite rifle and the revolver for his own use, that the
delay in accounting for them does not constitute conversion and that actually the firearms were stolen by his
friend, Chiting. Decide the case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is accountable for the firearms they issued to him in his official
capacity. The failure of Randy to submit the firearms upon demand created the presumption that he converted
them for his own use. Even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, his failure to
50 of 86
account for the government property is enough factual basis for a finding of malversation. Indeed, even his
explanation that the guns were stolen is incredible. For if the firearms were actually stolen, he should have
reported the matter immediately to the authorities. (People vs. Baguiran , 20 SCRA 453; Felicilda us. Grospe, GR
No. 10294, July 3, 1992)
Malversation (1999)
What constitutes the crime of malversation of public funds or property? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Malversation of public funds or property is committed by any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, (Art, 217,
RPC)
Malversation (1999)
A Municipal Treasurer, accountable for public funds or property, encashed with public funds private checks drawn in
favor of his wife. The checks bounced, the drawer not having enough cash in the drawee bank. The Municipal
Treasurer, in encashing private checks from public funds, violated regulations of his office. Notwithstanding
restitution of the amount of the checks, can the Municipal Treasurer nevertheless be criminally liable? What crime
did he commit? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, notwithstanding the restitution of the amount of the check, the Municipal Treasurer will be criminally liable as
restitution does not negate criminal liability although it may be considered as a mitigating circumstance similar or
analogous to voluntary surrender. (People vs. Velasquez, 73 Phil 98), He will be criminally liable for malversation.
However, if the restitution was made immediately, under vehement protest against an imputation of malversation
and without leaving the office, he may not be criminally liable.
Malversation (2001)
Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were former warehousemen of the Rustan Department Store. In 1986, the
PCGG sequestered the assets, fund and properties of the owners-incorporators of the store, alleging that they
constitute "Ill-gotten wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their application, Reyes and Santos were appointed as
fiscal agents of the sequestered firm and they were given custody and possession of the sequestered building and
its contents, including various vehicles used in the firm's operations. After a few months, an inventory was
conducted and it was discovered that two (2) delivery vans were missing. After demand was made upon them,
Reyes and Santos failed to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans were missing or to turn them over to the
PCGG; hence, they were charged with Malversation of Public Property. During the trial, the two accused claimed
that they are not public accountable officers and, if any crime was committed, it should only be Estafa under Art.
315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What is the proper offense committed? State the reason(s) for your
answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The proper offense committed was Malversation of Public Property, not estafa, considering that Reyes and Santos,
upon their application, were constituted as "fiscal agents" of the sequestered firm and were "given custody and
possession" of the sequestered properties, including the delivery vans which later they could not account for. They
 249

were thus made the depositary and administrator of properties deposited by public authority and hence, by the
duties of their office/position, they are accountable for such properties. Such properties, having been sequestered
by the Government through the PCGG, are in custodia legis and therefore impressed with the character of public
property, even though the properties belong to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans were missing, is prima facie
evidence that they had put the same to their personal use.
Malversation (2006)
1. In 1982, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then a government banking institution, hired Henry dela Renta, a
CPA, as Regional Bank Auditor. In 1992, he resigned and was employed by the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC), another government-owned and controlled corporation. In 1995, after the PNB management
unearthed many irregularities and violations of the bank's rules and regulations, dela Renta was found to have
manipulated certain accounts involving trust funds and time deposits of depositors. After investigation, he was
charged with malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan. He filed a motion to dismiss contending he
was no longer an employee of the PNB but of the PDIC. Is dela Renta's contention tenable? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention of Henry dela Renta is not tenable. Dela Renta may be prosecuted for malversation even if he had
ceased to be an employee of the PNB. At the time of the commission of the offense, PNB was a government owned
and controlled corporation and therefore, any crime committed by the Regional Bank Auditor, who is a public
officer, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (See R.A. 7975 as amended by RA. 8249).
2. After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion for his suspension pendente lite, to which he filed an
opposition claiming that he can no longer be suspended as he is no longer an employee of the PNB but that of the
PDIC. Explain whether he may or may not be suspended. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dela Renta may still be suspended pendente lite despite holding a different public office, the PDIC, when he was
charged. The term "office" in Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 applies to any office which the officer might currently be holding
and not necessarily the office or position in relation to which he is charged (Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
122740, March 30,1998).
Malversation vs. Estafa (1999)
How is malversation distinguished from estafa?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Malversation differs from estafa in that malversation is committed by an accountable public officer involving public
funds or property under his custody and accountability; while estafa is committed by non-accountable public officer
or private individual involving funds or property for which he is not accountable to the government.
Malversation: Anti-Fencing: Carnapping (2005) Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Gerona, was in
a hurry to return to his office after a day-long official conference. He alighted from the government car which was
officially assigned to him, leaving the ignition key and the car unlocked, and rushed to his office. Jules, a
bystander, drove off with the car and later sold the same to his brother, Danny for P20,000.00, although the car
was worth P800,000.00.
What are the respective crimes, if any, committed by Allan, Danny and Jules? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for malversation committed through negligence or culpa. The government
car which was assigned to him is public property under his accountability by reason of his duties. By his act of
negligence, he permitted the taking of the car by another person, resulting in malversation, consistent with the
language of Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Danny violated the Anti-Fencing Law. He is in possession of an item which is the subject of thievery.
P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) under Section 5 provides that mere possession of any good, article, item, object
or any thing of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie, evidence of fencing.
Jules is guilty of carnapping. He took the motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent. (R.A. No.
6539)
What, if any, are their respective civil liabilities? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Allan is under obligation to restitute the vehicle or make reparation if not possible.
Jules must pay the amount he gained from the sale of the car which is P20,000.00.
Danny must make reparation corresponding to the value of the car which is P800,000.00.
Malversation; Properties; Custodia Legis (2001)
Accused Juan Santos, a deputy sheriff in a Regional Trial Court, levied on the personal properties of a defendant in
a civil case before said court, pursuant to a writ of execution duly issued by the court. Among the properties levied
upon and deposited inside the "evidence room" of the Clerk of Court for Multiple RTC Salas were a refrigerator, a
stock of cassette tapes, a dining table set of chairs and several lampshades. Upon the defendant's paying off the
judgment creditor, he tried to claim his properties but found out that several items were missing, such as the
cassette tapes, chairs and lampshades. After due and diligent sleuthing by the police detectives assigned to the
case, these missing items were found in the house of accused Santos, who reasoned out that he only borrowed
them temporarily. If you were the fiscal /prosecutor, what would be the nature of the information to be filed
against the accused? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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If I were the fiscal/prosecutor, I would file an information for Malversation against Juan Santos for the cassette
tapes, chain and lampshades which he, as deputy sheriff, levied upon and thus under his accountability as a public
officer. Said properties being under levy, are in custodia legis and thus impressed with the character of public
property, misappropriation of which constitutes the crime of malversation although said properties belonged to a
private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
Juan Santos misappropriated such properties when, in breach of trust, he applied them to his own private use and
benefit. His allegation that he only borrowed such properties is a lame excuse, devoid of merit as there is no one
from whom he borrowed the same. The fact that it was only "after due and diligent sleuthing by the police
detectives assigned to the case", that the missing items were found in the house of Santos, negates his pretension.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
An information for Theft may be filed, considering that the sheriff had already deposited the properties levied upon
in the "evidence room" of the Clerk of Court and may have already been relieved of his accountability therefor.
If Juan Santos was no longer the public officer who should be accountable for the properties levied upon and found
in his house, his taking of such properties would no longer constitute Malversation but Theft, as there was taking
with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the consent of the latter.
Malversation; Technical Malversation (1996)
Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as municipal
treasurer, from the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the amount of P100,000.00 known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation, betterment,
and Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in Masinloc, Zambales, a project
undertaken on proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the fund was already exhausted while the
concreting of Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a representative of the Commission on Audit conducted a
spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to account for the Pl00,000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth, who was charged with
malversation of public funds, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but was nevertheless convicted,
in the same criminal case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal, Elizabeth argued that her conviction was
erroneous as she applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a public purpose without violating any law or ordinance
appropriating the said amount for any specific purpose. The absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established. Is the contention of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for illegal use of public funds (technical malversation) was erroneous, is
legally tenable because she was charged for malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code
but was convicted for Illegal use of public funds which is defined and punished under Art. 220 of said Code. A
public officer charged with malversation may not be validly convicted of illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) because the latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation. The Sandiganbayan should have followed the procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court and order the filing of the proper Information. (Parungao us. Sandiganbayan. 197 SCRA 173.) From the
facts, there is no showing that there is a law or ordinance appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose. As
a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that the absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established." So, procedurally and substantially , the Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from serious Infirmity.
Public Officers; definition (1999)
Who are public officers? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Public Officers are persons who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippines, or performs in
said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank
or class (Art. 203, RPC)
Public Officers; Infidelity in Custody of Prisoners (1996)
A chief of police of a municipality, believing in good faith that a prisoner serving a ten-day sentence in the
municipal jail, would not escape, allowed said prisoner to sleep at the latter's house because the municipal Jail was
so congested and there was no bed space available. Accordingly, the prisoner went home to sleep every night but
returned to jail early each morning, until the ten-day sentence had been fully served. Did the Chief of Police
commit any crime? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Chief of Police is guilty of violation of Art. 223, RPC, consenting or conniving to evasion, the elements of which
are (a) he is a public officer, (b) he is in charge or custody of a prisoner, detention or prisoner by final judgment,
(c) that the prisoner escaped, and (d) there must be connivance.
Relaxation of a prisoner is considered infidelity, thus making the penalty ineffectual; although the convict may not
have fled (US vs. Bandino, 9 Phil. 459) it is still violative of the provision. It also includes a case when the guard
allowed the prisoner, who is serving a six-day sentence in the municipal Jail, to sleep in his house and eat there
(People vs. Revilla).
Public Officers; Infidelity in Custody of Prisoners (1997)
During a town fiesta. A, the chief of police, permitted B, a detention prisoner and his compadre, to leave the
municipal jail and entertain visitors in his house from
10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. B returned to the municipal jail at
8:30 p.m. Was there any crime committed by A?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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Yes, A committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a detention prisoner. As Chief of
Police, A has custody over B. Even if B returned to the municipal Jail at 8:30 p.m. A, as custodian of the prisoner,
has maliciously failed to perform the duties of his office, and when he permits said prisoner to obtain a relaxation
of his imprisonment, he consents to the prisoner escaping the punishment of being deprived of his liberty which
can be considered real and actual evasion of service under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Leon
Bandino 29 Phil. 459).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No crime was committed by the Chief of Police. It was only an act of leniency or laxity in the performance of his
duty and not in excess of his duty (People vs. Evangelista (CA) 38 O.G. 158).
PD 46 & RA 6713 & Indirect Bribery (2006)
Commissioner Marian Torres of the Bureau of internal Revenue (BIR) wrote solicitation letters addressed to the
Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and to certain CEOs of various multinational corporations
requesting donations of gifts for her office Christmas party. She used the Bureau's official stationery. The response
was prompt and overwhelming so much so that Commissioner Torres' office was overcrowded with rice cookers,
radio sets, freezers, electric stoves and toasters. Her staff also received several envelopes containing cash money
for the employees' Christmas luncheon. Has Commissioner Torres committed any impropriety or irregularity? What
laws or decrees did she violate? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Commissioner Torres violated the following:
1. RA. 6713 — Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees when he solicited and
accept gifts (Sec. 7[d]).
2. P.D. 46 — Making it punishable for public officials and employees to receive, and for private persons to give,
gifts on any occasion, including Christmas.
3. Indirect Bribery (Art. 211, Revised Penal Code) for receiving gifts offered by reason of office.
PD 46 (1994)
Gino was appointed Collector of Customs and was assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Gerry, an
importer, hosted a dinner for 100 persons at the Westin Philippine Plaza in honor of Gino. What are the offense or
offenses committed by Gino and Gerry?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Both Gino and Gerry are liable for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46, which punishes any public official or
employee who receives, directly or indirectly, and for private persons who give, offer any gift, present or valuable
thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift or valuable thing is given by reason of his official
position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors, or the giver hopes or expects to receive
a favor or better treatment in the future. Being an importer, Gerry reasonably expects future favor from Gino.
Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainment in honor of the official or employee or of
his immediate relatives.
PD 46 (1997)
A, who is the private complainant in a murder case pending before a Regional Trial Court Judge, gave a judge a
Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive wines, easily worth
P10.000.00. The judge accepted the gift knowing it came from A. What crime or crimes, if any, were committed?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Judge committed the crime of Indirect bribery under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The gift was offered
to the Judge by reason of his office. In addition, the Judge will be liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes
the receiving of gifts by pubic officials and employees on occasions like Christmas.
Plunder under RA 7080; Prescriptive Period (1993)
Through kickbacks, percentages or commissions and other fraudulent schemes /conveyances and taking advantage
of his position, Andy, a former mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets amounting to P10 billion which is grossly
disproportionate to his lawful income. Due to his influence and connections and despite knowledge by the
authorities of his Ill-gotten wealth, he was charged with the crime of plunder only after twenty
(20) years from his defeat in the last elections he participated in. 1) May Andy still be held criminally liable? Why?
2) Can the State still recover the properties and assets that he illegally acquired, the bulk of which is in the name
of his wife and children? Reason out.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Andy will not be criminally liable because Section 6 of RA 7080 provides that the crime punishable under this
Act shall prescribe in twenty years and the problem asked whether Andy can still be charged with the crime of
plunder after 20 years.
2) Yes, because Section 6 provides that recovery of properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or
their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
Ra 3019; Preventive Suspension (1999)
A public officer was accused before the Sandiganbayan of a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Just after arraignment and even before evidence was presented, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order for his suspension pendente lite. The accused questioned the said Order contending
that it is violative of the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. Will you sustain the objection of the
accused? Why? [2%]
(c) What pre-conditions are necessary to be met or satisfied before preventive suspension may be ordered? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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(b) No, I will not sustain the objection of the accused. Suspension of the accused pendente lite is not violative of
the constitutional provision against ex-post facto law. Ex-post facto law means making an innocent act a crime
before it is made punishable.

(c) The pre-conditions necessary to be met or satisfied before a suspension may be ordered are: (1) there must
be proper notice requiring the accused to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to RA 3019, as amended; and (2) there must be a determination of a valid
information against the accused that warrants his suspension.

RA 3019; Preventive Suspension (2000)

A month after the arraignment of Brad Kit Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, who was
charged with violation of Section 3 (h) of Republic Act 3019 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the
Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law. The Court granted the motion and suspended accused Brad Kit for a period of 90
days. Accused assailed the constitutional validity of the suspension order on the ground that it partakes of a
penalty before Judgment of conviction is reached and is thus violative of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent. He also claimed that this provision of the law on suspension pendente lite applies only to elective officials
and not to appointed ones like him. Rule with reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suspension order does not partake of a penalty and is thus not violative of Brad Kit's constitutional right to be
presumed innocent. Under the law, the accused public officers shall be suspended from office while the criminal
prosecution is pending in court (Sec. 13, RA. 3019). Such preventive suspension is mandatory to prevent the
accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation (Rios vs. Sandiganbayan,279 SCRA 581 (1997);
Bunye vs. Escareal 226 SCRA 332 (1993)). Neither is there merit in Brad Kit's claim that the provision on
suspension pendente lite applies only to elective officials and not to appointed ones like him. It applies to all public
officials Indicted upon a valid information under RA. No. 3019, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or noncareer service (Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,
288 SCRA 328 [1998]).
RA 3019; Public Officer (2003)
The Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas}, by a resolution of the monetary board, hires Theof Sto Tomas, a
retired manager of a leading bank as a consultant. Theof later receives a valuable gift from a bank under
investigation by the Central Bank. May Theof be prosecuted under Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) for accepting such a gift? Explain. 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Theof may not be prosecuted under Rep. Act 3019, but may be prosecuted for violation of Pres, Decree No. 46,
under which such act of receiving a valuable gift is punished.
Although Theof is a "public officer" within the application of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), yet
his act of receiving such gift does not appear to be included among the punishable acts under Rep. Act 3019 since
he is not to intervene in his official capacity in the investigation of the bank which gave the gift. Penal laws must be
strictly construed against the State. In any case, Theof is administratively liable.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
Yes, Theof may be prosecuted under Rep. Act 3019 because he is a "public officer" within the purview of said law,
and Theof received the valuable gift from a bank which is under investigation by the Central Bank where he is
employed as a "public officer". Receiving gift, directly or indirectly by a public officer from a party who has a
transaction with the Government is wrong, more so when the gift-giver is under investigation by the government
office to which the public officer is connected.
Ra 6713; Coverage (2001)
Robert Sy, a well known businessman and a founding member of the Makati Business Club, aside from being a
classmate of the newly-elected President of the Philippines, had Investments consisting of shares of stocks in the
Urban Bank, the PNB, the Rural Bank of Caloocan City and his privately-owned corporation, the RS Builders
Corporation and Trans-Pacific Air. After the
President had taken his oath and assumed his office, he appointed Robert as Honorary Consul to the Republic of
Vietnam. Robert took his oath before the President and after furnishing the Department of Foreign Affairs with his
appointment papers, flew to Saigon, now Ho Chi Min City, where he organized his staff, put up an office and stayed
there for three months attending to trade opportunities and relations with local businessman. On the fourth month,
he returned to the Philippines to make his report to the President. However, the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed a complaint against Robert for (1) falling to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities within thirty
(30) days from assumption of office; (2) failing to resign from his businesses, and (3) falling to divest his shares
and investments in the banks and corporations owned by him, as required by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Will the complaint prosper? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint will not prosper because the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (Rep. Act. No. 6713), expressly exempts those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity from
filing Statements of Assets and Liabilities, and from resigning and divesting themselves of interest from any private
enterprise (Secs. 8A and 9).
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ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the complaint will prosper under Sec. 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended], which requires all public officers within 30 days from assuming public office to file a true, detailed sworn
statement of assets and liabilities. Violations of this law are mala prohibita which admits of no excuses.
Art. 217 Malversation (2008)
Eman, a vagrant, found a bag containing identification cards and a diamond ring along Roxas Blvd. Knowing that it
was not his, he went to a nearest police station to seek help in finding the owner of the bag. At the precint PO1
Melvin attended to him. In the investigation Eman proposed to PO1 Melvin, "in case you don't find the owner let's
just pawn straight to the pawnshop and pawned the ring for P50,000.00 Eman never saw PO1 Melvin again.
What is the criminal liability of PO1 Melvin, if any? Explain ( 3% )
PO1 Melvin committed the crime of malversation of property under Art. 217, RPC since the subject ring appears to
be his accountability and the act of pawning the same constitutes misappropriation.
Art. 217 Malversation (2008)
Eliseo, the deputy sheriff, conducted the execution sale of the property of Andres to satisfy the judgment against
him in favor of ABC Corporation, a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. However,
the representative of the corporation failed to attend the auction sale. Gonzalo , the winning bidder, purchased
property for P100,000 which he paid to Eliseo. Instead of remitting the amount to the Clerk of Court as ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff, Eliseo lent the amount to Myrna, his officemate, who promised to repay the amount within two
months, with interest thereon. However, Myrna reneged on her promise. Despite demands of ABC Corporation,
Eliseo failed to remit the said amount.
1. State with reasons, the crime or crimes, if any, committed by Eliseo. ( 4% )
Eliseo committed Malversation for allowing Myrna to misappropriate the money for which he, as Sheriff, is
accountable (Art. 217, RPC). In this case, the act of Eliseo of lending the amount to his officemate is tantamount to
permitting any other person to take the public funds, considering that the P100,000 involved is a public funds, it
should be turned-over to the Office of the Clerk of Court.
2. Would your answer to the first question be the same if ABC Corporattion were a private corporation?
Explain. ( 3% )
The answer would be the same since even if ABC is a private corporation, Eliseo is still accountable for it, and the
same should be delivered to the Court.
Art. 211 Indirect Bribery & RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) (2009)
Charina, Clerk of Court of an RTC Branch, promised the plaintiff in a case pending before the court that she would
convince the Presiding Judge to decide the case in plaintiff’s favor. In consideration therefor, the plaintiff gave
Charina P20,000.00.
Charina was charged with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, prohibiting any public officer from
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, percentage, or benefit in connection with any
contract or transaction x x x wherein the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law.
While the case was being tried, the Ombudsman filed another information against Charina for Indirect Bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. Charina demurred to the second information, claiming that she can no longer be
charged under the Revised Penal Code having been charged for the same act under R.A. 3019.
Is Charina correct? Explain. (3%)

Art. 211 Qualified Bribery/Art. 216 Possession of Prohibited Interest by a Public Officer/Art. 171
Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister (2009)
To secure the release of his brother Willy, a detention prisoner, and his cousin Vincent, who is serving sentence for
homicide, Chito asked the RTC Branch Clerk of Court to issue an Order which would allow the two prisoners to be
brought out of jail. At first, the Clerk refused, but when Chito gave her P50,000.00, she consented.
She then prepared an Order requiring the appearance in court of Willy and Vincent, ostensibly as witnesses in a
pending case. She forged the judge’s signature, and delivered the Order to the jail warden who, in turn, allowed
Willy and Vincent to go out of jail in the company of an armed escort, Edwin. Chito also gave Edwin P50,000.00 to
leave the two inmates unguarded for three minutes and provide them with an opportunity to escape. Thus, Willy
and Vincent were able to escape.
What crime or crimes, if any, had been committed by Chito, Willy, Vincent, the Branch Clerk of Court, Edwin, and
the jail warden? Explain your answer. (5%)
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Art. 171 Falsification of public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister/RA No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)/Art. 217 Malversation (2009)
Roger and Jessie, Municipal Mayor and Treasurer, respectively, of San Rafael, Leyte, caused the disbursement of
public funds allocated for their local development programs for 2008. Records show that the amount of P2-million
was purportedly used as financial assistance for a rice production livelihood project. Upon investigation, however, it
was found that Roger and Jessie falsified the disbursement vouchers and supporting documents in order to make it
appear that qualified recipients who, in fact, are non-existent individuals, received the money.
Roger and Jessie are charged with malversation through falsification and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 for
causing undue injury to the government. Discuss the propriety of the charges filed against Roger and Jessie.
Explain. (4%)