167583-1997-People S Initiative For Reform Modernization

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129754. September 23, 1997.]
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND ACTION

(PIRMA), ET AL., ETC. , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondent.
RESOLUTION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En
Banc dated SEPTEMBER 23, 1997 .
G.R. No. 129754 (People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
et al., etc. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.)
The Court NOTED the reply to petitioners' comment led by Intervenor Joker P.
Arroyo, dated September 22, 1997. The Court then deliberated on the petition in relation to
the comments and other pleadings on record, and thereafter voted on the issues
thereunder arising.
The Court ruled, rst, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition led by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court
in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court,
namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was
no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said
second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other
members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ.,
opined that there was need for such a re-examination. Justices Davide, Bellosillo, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban wrote separate opinions which are hereto attached. aIcDCA
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Mendoza, J., is on official leave.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
By:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

(SGD.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR. , J.:
With much more vigor do I reiterate my view that this case must be summarily
dismissed and should not be allowed to stay a moment longer before this Court. It is
undeniable and inescapable that this Court already decreed, with nality, the inadequacy
and insu ciency of R.A. No. 6735 in implementing the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. The petition
then makes a mockery of the judicial process and breaches the principle which bars
relitigation of issues between parties and doctrines related thereto; moreover, it is a
brazen insult to the intelligence of the Members of this Court.
For this Court to now yield to petitioners' antics and stratagems is to in ict upon
itself dishonor, if not, shame, and to allow itself to be the unwitting villain in the farce
surrounding a demand, disguised as that of the people, which has divided the country,
shaken the economy and sired political instability which may ultimately obliterate the gains
the nation has achieved in its transition to full democracy after decades of authoritarian
rule. As the last bulwark of democracy, this Court should stand ever rm and be
unrelenting in observing its mandate of respect for nothing else but the rule of law. Never
again should it allow itself to be used as a legitimizing tool for those who wish to
perpetuate themselves in power.
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings led here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact
that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles
played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in
the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in
both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-pro t organization duly organized
and existing under Philippines laws with o ce address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199
Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA" as among its "o cers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as
founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein,
"proposes to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding
members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago speci cally declared that PIRMA was duly represented at
the hearing of the Del n petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-
petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted
that said movement was "[l]ater identi ed as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in
Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by
their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Del n or
his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res
judicata, which needs no further elaboration.
Second, the present petition is, in effect, a second motion for reconsideration. This
Court denied with nality the PEDROSA's motion for reconsideration of the decision of 19
March 1997 in Santiago. Aware of the futility of ling a second motion for reconsideration,
the PEDROSAS, in their attempt to circumvent the judicial process, led a petition with the
COMELEC, making PIRMA the principal petitioner and bringing in other alleged interested
parties to make it appear that the petition was an entirely new case. But I venture that it
would be the height of naivete to afford them the presumption of good faith. The present
recourse was clearly contrived to prevent the application of the rule on res judicata. This
petition was, in fact, a brazen attempt to seek a second reconsideration which, had it been
led with this Court, would have been denied outright for absence of prior leave ( Ortigas
and Company v. Velasco, 254 SCRA 234 [1996]) and in light of paragraph 7 of the
resolution of 7 April 1988 of the Court en banc, which reads: DHSCTI
7. Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and
decrees the denial to be final, no motion for leave to le [a] second motion
for reconsideration shall be entertained . . .
The true nature of the petition as a second motion for reconsideration is blatantly
revealed by petitioners' plea that Santiago be re-examined because, inter alia, the Court
acted beyond its authority when it declared R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate or incomplete,
when what it could do was merely to declare a law either as constitutional or
unconstitutional. This issue was speci cally raised by the PEDROSAS in their motion for
the reconsideration of the Santiago decision of 19 March 1997.
Third, petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping. When they led a second petition
with the COMELEC, not as original intervenors-petitioners as was their role in the earlier
Del n petition, but as petitioners in COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001, from where
originated the instant petition, PIRMA and the PEDROSAS were equally guilty of forum-
shopping. Having been effectively rebuffed by this Court in Santiago, petitioners sought
refuge in another forum, hoping they could obtain a ruling from COMELEC that R.A. 6735
was complete and adequate, and that COMELEC would, in the process, disregard Santiago
for, as petitioners arrogantly contend, the decision therein was reached by a divided court
and the vote in its resolution of 10 June 1997 on the motion for reconsideration "in fact
granted the motions for reconsideration." At bottom, PIRMA and the PEDROSAS sought a
reversal of the Santiago decision by the COMELEC, as if the latter were a tribunal superior
to this Court.
Fourth, even if we go into the merits of this petition, it is apparent that the COMELEC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in its challenged resolution of 8 July 1997
dismissing Special Matter 97-001, in view of the decision in Santiago. In so doing, the
COMELEC merely complied with said decision and refused to be used by petitioners
herein. Hence, COMELEC must be commended for strict adherence to the rule that
decisions of this Court applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
the legal system of the Philippines (Article 8, Civil Code).
The only valid issue in a special civil action for certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is whether a tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Here, petitioners cite only grave abuse of discretion. But
having shown above that the COMELEC did not commit any abuse of discretion, it follows
that no further issue should be entertained by this Court. To yield to the importuning that
this Court reexamine Santiago can serve no legitimate purpose other than to promote
judicial instability and leave this Court vulnerable to charges that it succumbed to
pressure.
Fifth, I nd it appropriate to expose once more the baselessness of the repeated
claim, sought again to be highlighted in the instant petitions, that this Court can declare a
law void only on the ground that it is unconstitutional, but not on the ground of its
inadequacy or incompleteness. Such a view betrays ignorance of basic principles in
constitutional law. I need only to reiterate what I stated in my separate opinion anent the
denial of the PEDROSAS' motion to reconsider the 19 March 1997 decision in Santiago.
There, the PEDROSAS unquali edly and unconditionally acceded to a discussion of ve
issues, the first two being:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled an Act Providing for the System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to
include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of speci c provisions on the conduct of
such initiative.
AECcTS
These two issues raise the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735. At its core
lays the principle of non-delegation of legislative power and the exceptions thereto, both of
which are xed and invariable subjects of constitutional law (ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 161-166 [2nd ed. 1997]; JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE
1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY 610-618
[1996 ed.]; 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
224-247 [8th ed. 1927]). It has been aptly said that "[t]he problem of delegation of
legislative powers like that of separation of powers involves constitutional law rather than
statutory construction" (1 SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Â§301, p. 54
[3rd ed. 1943]).
Since a law may be declared unconstitutional where it delegates non-delegable
legislative authority, or that any attempt to do so would be tainted by unconstitutionality
(FERNANDO, op. cit., 161), then a law which purports to delegate a delegable legislative
power may also be declared unconstitutional or invalid if it fails to comply with the
"completeness" and "su cient standard" tests. Only courts, in the exercise of its judicial
authority, can determine if a statute has met these tests. ( Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122
Phil. 965 [1965]; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 [1970]). In their motion for reconsideration in
Santiago, the PEDROSAS argued that "the delegation of power to the COMELEC hurdles
both the completeness and su cient standard tests prescribed in Pelaez vs. Auditor
General . . . ." By so arguing, the PEDROSAS admitted that a constitutional issue was,
indeed, involved. Thus, the terms incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential details
used by this Court in the decision in Santiago had reference to the "completeness and
su cient standard tests," and to none other. The intent then of the law, which is the
concern of statutory construction, is not a su cient guidepost. This puts to naught for
being clearly misplaced, if not irrelevant, the plea that we should give full life to the intent of
the law to include initiative on constitutional amendments, as well as the warning that to
suppress the intent of the law would be tantamount to determining the wisdom,
reasonableness, adequacy or su ciency of the law, a role exclusively pertaining to the
legislature. IDaCcS
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A.
No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness
and su cient standard tests" with respect to permissible delegation of legislative power
or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in Santiago,
the conclusion is inevitable: the portion of R.A. No. 6735 pertinent to the dispute was held
to be unconstitutional.
Finally, as a coup de grÃ¢ce, I may as well consider the third issue in Santiago, a
discussion of which the Court then found unnecessary, if not academic, viz.:
1. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local o cials, as
proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 constitution" would
constitute revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
Before continuing, however, let me make myself clear that this I do ad arguendo,
without in any way conceding that a reexamination of Santiago is proper.
The lifting of term limits is the subject of herein petitioners' proposal in its petition
before the COMELEC, to wit:
Do you approve of amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the
President the chance to be re-elected for another term, similarly with the Vice-
President, so that both highest o cials of the land can serve for two consecutive
terms of six years each, and also other elective government o cials, thus giving
Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for the purpose, Section 4 of
Article VII, Section 8 of Article X, respectively. (Petition, 20).
There is no debate that only amendments to — not revision of — the Constitution may
be proposed through the system of initiative. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish
the two concepts.
More than two (2) decades ago, Vicente G. Sinco, former Dean of the College of Law
and later President of the University of the Philippines and Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, elaborated on the distinction between a revision and an amendment:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of
different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the
whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor
that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan
authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change

of only a few speci c provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to
consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve speci c parts of the existing
constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect. (PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 43-44 [1954 ed.],
underscoring supplied)
It is then clear that revision may either be of the whole, or only a part, of the
Constitution. That part need not be a substantial part; a change may qualify as revision
even if limited to only some of the important provisions, as long as the "intention and plan
[to be] carried out . . . contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution
to determine which one should be altered or suppressed whether the whole document
should be replaced with an entirely new one."
After a scrutiny of the above-quoted proposition, I respectfully submit that while on
its face, it affects only four sections of the Constitution, at bottom, however, it seeks to
negate, obliterate and ultimately, nullify, the following principles which form part of the
foundation of our system of government:
(a) the fundamental state policy guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties, solemnly enshrined in
Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution;
(b) the mandate directing reduction of political inequalities and equitable
diffusion of political power in Section 1 of Article XIII on Social Justice and
Human Rights; and
(c) the sound and patriotic civic, moral, and political creed that infuses upon
elective o cials a greater sense of accountability, responsibility, integrity,
and sel essness by cultivating and nurturing in them a conscious
obsession for a glorious place in history through a legacy of achievement
which only limited terms can ensure.
Verily, an elective o cial who knows the limited duration of his term and the limits
as to the number of terms he may serve, but who has an eye for a respected place in
history, will give nothing short of his best to serve as a memorial of his deeds for the
generations to come. This is the magni cent obsession of all decent people. On the other
hand, under a regime of unlimited terms, an elected o cial would be subjected to the
irresistible temptation or compulsion to perpetuate himself and his family in power.
History has shown that the concentration of political and economic power in one man or
family imperils democracy and insures nothing but prejudice to the people and the
common good. It has been said, and quite correctly, that power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely. cSEaDA
There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Constitution perpetually banning
the President from seeking another term, and xing limits to the terms of o ce of other
elective o cials were meant, as follows: rst, to promote equal access to opportunities
for public service; and, second, to discourage, if not prevent, accumulation or
concentration of political and economic power in one man, one family and, on a broader
plane, in one dominant political party. As to the latter, Commissioner Edmundo Garcia
provided certain insights in support of the motion of Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla to
reconsider the earlier action of the Commission which prohibited the President from
seeking immediate reelection only and, instead, to perpetually ban him from seeking
another term, thus:
The problem we face here is the problem of the accumulation of power in
the O ce of the President. Furthermore, the problem is not the accumulation of
power in one man, but the accumulation of power in the dominant party. The
problem in Mexico is that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional is the dominant
party manipulating the succession to the presidency in such a way that the
Tapado, the person chosen by the President to go on to the next term, is a
succession in the dominant political party itself. There are many parties in Mexico
right now, but the one dominant party determines the country's future and
political direction. That is what we want to avoid, not just the accumulation of
political power in the person of the President but in one dominant party. And I
think this is a very important thing that we can stop now, by making sure that no
reelection takes place. That is why I am supporting the position of Commissioner
Padilla. (II Record of the Constitutional Commission, 249).
The Padilla motion was granted and his proposal to perpetually ban the President
from seeking another term was approved by a vote of 26 as against 15 with one
abstention (Id., 250).
An unlimited term for an elective public o cial is a crucial factor in spawning
political dynasties. It must be understood that, as eloquently stated by Commissioner Blas
Ople, political dynasties have their roots in a society with a feudal socio-economic
structure. In his interpellation of Commissioner Nolledo on what is now Section 26 of
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner Ople remarked: CcaASE
I believe that the roots of political dynasties, to the extent that these are
repugnant in a democratic society, are in the society itself — a feudal socio-
economic structure — whereby those who were advantaged by the accident of
birth and have been born to considerable possessions and property can acquire
an unfair advantage over others. But I think, ultimately, the solution should be to
reform these inequities social and political structures, but we should minimize
invasions into the domains of privacy of people; that is the freedom of choice of
the electorate. The right to be voted upon is inherent in the right of suffrage, and I
hope that Commissioner Nolledo will accept that interpretation. (IV Record of the
Constitutional Commission, 763).
Hence, it should be clear that political dynasties thrive well in a society with a feudal
socio-economic structure; accordingly, political dynasties can only ensure the continuity of
the structure. Evidently concerned with the evils of this immutable linkage between
political dynasties and a feudal socio-economic structure of society, the Constitution
deemed it expedient and wise in Section 1 of Article XIII on Social Justice and Human
Rights to direct Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good."
Therefore, the lifting of term limits of national and local elective o cials, as
proposed by petitioners, involves not just the sections enumerated therein, but the
alteration of fundamental principles essential to a vibrant, living, participatory democracy
and of the envisioned social, economic and political structures therein. Under any
language, petitioners' proposal involves a revision of, and not just an amendment to, the
Constitution. Thus, in NO way can petitioners' proposal be accomplished through the
system of initiative.
I vote then to dismiss the instant petition.
VITUG , J.:
An ideal government exists and functions in accordance with, and in the

pursuit of, the will and aspirations of the people, and that those who reign are
themselves the governed. The martial law era until just a little over a decade ago
has all but virtually vested oracular power in one man or in just a few. Thus, a
salient feature of the 1987 Constitution is the institutionalization of people
empowerment into the basic legal framework in order to help ensure that the
people would not be left out in their own governance. It is a part of this privilege
which has lately become an immediate concern. AcHCED
The Constitution allows, under certain conditions, the people to directly

propose amendments to the fundamental law. Such amendments can only be
valid if ultimately rati ed by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. It
should be, for any charter change can have enduring effects on the nation, and it
is the citizenry, not any agency or segment of society, who must give the nal
verdict. cHSIAC
In the instant case, petitioners aver that the prerequisite conditions set forth by the
Constitution have been fully met for such a referral to our people to take place.
The Petition. —
The petitioners, claiming to represent 5,793,924 Filipino voters or 15.9% of the total
number of registered voters nationwide, seek to nullify and set aside the resolution of
public respondent refusing to assume and exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby
dismissing, a petition led for a people's initiative to effect Charter changes. Petitioners
pray that —
"a) Upon the ling of this Petition, due notice and hearing, and
posting of the requisite bond, this Honorable Court issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the Commission on Elections to instruct its
Election O cers in all the municipalities and cities of the 204 legislative districts
to verify the 5,793,924 signatures of the registered voters, using as basis the
voters' a davits used in the May 12, 1997 Barangay elections pursuant to Sec. 7,
R.A. 6735.
"b) Thereafter, this Honorable Court give due course to this Petition
and, after due proceedings, render judgment as follows:
"(i) Declaring as null and void, and setting aside the COMELEC
En Banc Resolution dated 8 July 1997 in Special Matter No. 97-001 and
ordering the COMELEC to assume and exercise jurisdiction over the PIRMA
Petition; and
"(ii) Declaring R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
as valid, adequate, and su cient to implement a people's initiative in
proposing amendments to the Constitution."
The lssues. —
It is not for the Court to determine whether the proposed constitutional
amendments are sound or unsound (over which not any of the Justices has expressed or
is expected to express an opinion); that matter lies within the exclusive domain of the
people themselves. The Court, instead, is merely called upon to ascertain the due
observance of the conditions prescribed by the fundamental law which should rst be
hurdled by petitioners before their proposals can be submitted to the people for their
consideration in a plebiscite.
In this instance, two other basic questions must now likewise be resolved. The rst
is whether or not the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 necessarily constitutes a
bar to the instant proceedings, and the second, perhaps a more formidable one than the
rst, is whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in rejecting
the PIRMA petition before it. cEaACD
Prefatory Statement. —
In G.R. No. 127325, the Court, in its decision of 19 March 1997, granted the petition
of Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., and ruled (by a unanimous vote) that the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") should have dismissed outrightly the Del n petition. The Delfin
petition, led with the COMELEC and signed by Atty. Jesus S. Del n in his capacity as a
"founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative," sought the introduction of
certain "amendments" to the 1987 Constitution through a "people initiative." Section 2 and
Section 4, Article XVII, of the Constitution spelled out the requirements for such an
amendatory process, to wit:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
c e n t u m of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within ve years following the rati cation
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
"The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"SEC. 4.. . . .
"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
rati ed by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certi cation by the Commission on Elections of the su ciency of the
petition."
Considering that the Del n petition had failed quite evidently to meet the basic
conditions laid out by Section 2, Article XVII, of the fundamental law, the Court was left
with no other choice but to direct COMELEC to discard the petition.
The resolution of the case could have ended there. Some Justices believed, however,
that it was preferable to have the ponencia likewise deal on an alternative, albeit
signi cant, ground raised by the petitioners, i.e., whether or not there was, in the rst place,
a law to implement the exercise of the people's right to directly propose constitutional
amendments. The Court, this time, was far from being consentaneous on the issue (see
ponencia of 19 March 1997). Initially, eight Justices (Chief Justice Narvasa and Justices
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima and Torres) opined that
Republic Act No. 6735 did not cover a people's initiative while ve justices (Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban; Justice Padilla inhibited himself from the case
due to his close relationship with counsel) expressed the opposite view. aTIEcA
I took the position that it was best for the Court to let well enough alone
the matter until it would have become ripe for judicial adjudication. In my view,
the issue, not being then the controlling lis mota of the case, not to mention the
irreconcilable difference of opinion among the justices in the challenge of a
measure enacted by a co-equal branch of government, did not augur well for the
Court to take on the question at that stage. It might be recalled that there was
as yet then no valid petition for a people's initiative that could have
necessitated a resolution on the scope of Republic Act No. 6735 and on whether
the contemplated changes were in the nature of mere amendments or were, in
fact, tantamount to a revision of the Charter. In my separate opinion in G.R. No.
127325, I said that any statement formulated by the Court at that point would at
best be only a non-binding obiter dictum. It behooved the Court, I strongly felt,
to yet refrain from making unnecessarily any precipitate pronouncement on
those sharply divided issues until such time as it would have been
unquestionably propitious to make it. (The division among the Justices became even
more pronounced than before when Justice Hermosisima later joined the then minority
opinion in, and Justice Torres recused himself from, the resolution, dated 10 June 1997, of
the Court on the motion for reconsideration. Since the motion for reconsideration
principally anchored itself upon the contention that Republic Act No. 6735 was the
appropriate enabling law to implement the Constitutional provision on people's initiative,
which I maintained to be still then a premature issue, my vote was also obviously a denial
of the motion for reconsideration.)
Is the Decision in Delfin a Bar to the Pirma Petition?
It is claimed that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 should be held to be
the law of the case even insofar as the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action ("PIRMA") is concerned. It cannot be. As so elaborately explained by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in G.R. No. 127325, "the
inclusion of the Pedrosas (as founding members of PIRMA) in the petition is utterly
baseless." Not only did Pedrosas refrain from joining the Del n petition before the
COMELEC, but that also the PIRMA organization itself has not been impleaded a party in
G.R. No. 127325. In my separate opinion in G.R. No. 127325, I have observed that the "TRO
earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia
should be held to cover only the Del n petition and must not be so understood as having
intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas." The controlling
lis mota in G.R. No. 127325 relates to whether or not the Del n petition is su cient in form
and substance. Having been found to be utterly de cient, the Del n petition did not thereby
require any further ruling on whether Republic Act No. 6735 is adequate or inadequate as
an enabling law for a people's initiative.
The Present Milieu. —
The petition recently led with the COMELEC being, on its face, su cient in form
and substance, it is the one that, I believe, should have bound the Court to rule on the issue
of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 can be held to be the adequate law which the
1987 Constitution mandated Congress to enact in order to implement the exercise of the
people's right to directly propose Constitutional amendments. There is no need on my part
to belabor anew the respective argument so exhaustively and so eloquently discussed and
expounded by my colleagues here and in the Court's decision of 19 March 1997 and
resolution of 10 June 1997.
The second paragraph of Section 2, Article XVII, of the Constitution holds that
"Congress shall provide for the implementation" of the right of the people to directly
propose constitutional amendments. Obviously, this provision on the people's initiative is
not self-executory, and it would need a law rst duly enacted by Congress to implement
the Constitutional mandate. That a legislative imprimatur is indispensable becomes even
more evident when one reads the deliberations and exchanges had by the delegates on the
provision very carefully outlined by Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his ponencia in G.R.
No. 127325.
Like most, I have gone over the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 with meticulous
care. In the end, I am inclined to believe that the above legislative enactment su ciently
covers the people's initiative to amend the Charter contemplated by Section 2, Article XVII,
of the Constitution. Let me quote some pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6735; viz.:
CDISAc
"SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a

system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
"SEC. 3. De nition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
"(a) 'Initiative' is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through
an election called for the purpose. cSTHAC
"xxx xxx xxx.

"SEC. 5. Requirements. . . . .
"(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after ve
(5) years from the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter."
With due respect, I cannot seem to grasp the opinion of some of my colleagues that the
various provisions found in the topic on "II. — National Initiative and Referendum"
exclude a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 9, in relation to Section
8, of the law, I submit, should dispel that notion. Thus:
"SEC. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. —
"(a) The proposition for the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of
the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
"If, as certi ed to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a

majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or
amendment shall become effective fteen (15) days following completion of its
publication in the O cial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. If, as certi ed by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national
law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be
deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fteen (15) days
following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certi cation by
the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. SEIDAC
"However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be
rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.
"(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
"(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of

the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fteen
(15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission."
"SEC. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The

Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.
"Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the
Commission shall, upon determining the su ciency of the petition, publish the
same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be
earlier than forty- ve (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the
determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
The speci c reference in Section 9 (b) of the law to a people "initiative on the
Constitution" leaves little room for doubt but that the provisions on "national" initiative
have been meant to govern not only instances of statutory enactments but also direct
proposals from the people to effect changes on the basic Charter.
The imperfection in the structure or language of Republic Act No. 6735, even if
conceded to be beyond just a case of calligraphic weakness, cannot ignore the undeniable
circumstance, acknowledged by Mr. Justice Davide himself, that the Act, a consolidation of
House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17, has been designed to be the law that would
deal on an initiative to propose constitutional amendments. It seems to me that the Court
should be the last to ignore the clear intent of Congress, a co-equal body, and implicitly
discard in the process the basic postulates underlying the separation, but balanced,
powers among the three branches of government.
Neither do I really nd the law to be depletive of standards that might thereby
cripple COMELEC in the promulgation of needful and implementative rules and regulations
(see Sec. 20, R.A. 6735). Not even the most outspoken critique on Republic Act No. 6735
has come up with a contestation that the Act, in itself, is unconstitutional. Indeed, coupled
with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, "which have
been incorporated and made to apply to all initiatives and referenda" under Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 6735, as well as Section 2 (1), Article IX C, of the Constitution which
provides that COMELEC shall "(e)nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," Republic Act No.
6735 should be in amply good state to enable COMELEC to carry on satisfactorily without
any risk of its acting beyond legal mandate.
Unlike the earlier Del n petition which has sought to encompass broad matters of
Constitutional changes and accordingly so branded as calling for a revision, rather than a
mere amendment, of the Constitution, the "PIRMA" petition, however, would speci cally
tackle only the proposed amendments "to allow the President to serve, similarly with the
Vice-President, a maximum of two (2) consecutive terms of six (6) years each, and lift the
term limits for other elective government o cials, amending for the purpose Section 4 of
Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, and Section 8 of Article X, respectively" (Summary
of Proposition, Special Matter 97-001).
It has been advanced that the veri cation of signatures under Section 7 of Republic
Act 6735 "on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters a davits and voters
identi cation cards used in the immediately preceding election" has been rendered
impossible of compliance with the enactment of 8189 that has caused to be inoperative
the voters list after the May 1997 barangay elections. I would not go that far. Republic Act
No. 8189, it seems to me, could not have intended to discard the value of the voters list
used in the 1997 national elections even for purposes of the application of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735. Neither explication nor implication of that kind is evident from the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189.
I realize the ill-effects of taking too lightly the degree of constancy that a
Constitution must have. In Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections (248 SCRA
387), I have had the occasion to caution that —
"The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal
system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It
only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its
goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it
does, it must be changed —
but not simply to accommodate "perceived transitory needs," or prevailing and

momentary "societal attitudes," if we intend to maintain the desirable quality of
constitutional strength and endurance. If it were otherwise the Constitution ceases to
be an enshrined fundamental law and perhaps not really that much better than an
ordinary piece of legislation that responds basically to contemporary demands.
But, of course, nothing must supplant the bounden duty of a judge to stand by the
law and for the law, as well as, and most importantly, to apply that law regardless of
personal thoughts or inclinations. The Court is completely apolitical, it caters to no gallery
nor is it subservient to a passing milieu. While it cannot be impervious to perceived public
opinion, it must remain, still foremost, to be the guardian of the rights of the people
guaranteed by and expressed in the Constitution. Our people deserve nothing less.
I, again, call attention to the fact that any amendment to the Constitution
through a people's initiative can become effective only "when rati ed by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certi cation by the Commission
on Elections of the su ciency of the petition." And so, whether the proposed
constitutional amendments are timely or precipitate and salutary or unwise, the
decision must come not from the Court, nor from any one sector of society for
that matter, but from all the people to whom those questions should
appropriately be addressed.
The plebiscite need not be, and it should not be, divisive; it is and can be
made the triumph of the rule of law that upholds the will of the majority even as
it offers the best safeguard against any pretense or pretext by those who seek
or wield power that theirs alone is the mandate of the people. Diversity, rather
than divisiveness, is the hallmark of democratic institutions. Supreme power
resides in the people, and at the polls their voice is heard and their command is
given in the exercise of that sovereignty. Mu e that voice or frustrate that
command, and you have a system that survives merely on illusion.
The sad experience of the country in recent history has left its indelible
mark, and it certainly is best to remain vigilant, but let us not build it up to
paranoia. The time may now be hereabout when we must start to leave the
lurking dark shadow behind and, instead, come to grips with the fundamental
problems that hinder the growth of the nation, and so the social, political and
economic well-being of its people as well, before we are pushed back to the tail
end of the region in its visible resurgence and progress. EICScD
Regrettably, the People's Initiative Will Have to Wait Awhile. —

Pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A), of the Constitution, any decision, order, or ruling
of Constitutional Commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari . . . ." In
the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
Court, the focal issue relates to the matter of jurisdiction in which the petitioner asserts
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the part of the respondent. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions of the COMELEC has been held in Aratuc vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251; see also
Omar vs. COMELEC, 102 SCRA 611), to be merely con ned, outside of an outright want of
jurisdiction, to instances of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the latter. This Court
has there further explained:
" A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which
may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an
indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. . . . ."
Aptly, then the critical question is: Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition of PIRMA for a people's initiative?
Grave abuse of discretion, albeit an "elastic term" (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1991 ed., p. 229), has always been understood as implying "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or that the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility," so gross as
to amount to a patent disregard of a clear duty (Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, in his
treatise on the "Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions," 1993 edition, at pp. 10-11, citing
court cases).
The unequivocal nal disposition by the Court of G.R. No. 127325 scarcely offered
to the COMELEC any course of action other than to proceed on the premise that there is
yet no law to implement a people's initiative. In its verdict on 19 March 1997, this Court
explicitly decreed:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
"a) GRANTING the instant petition;
"b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
"c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the

Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
"d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
"The temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made

permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against
private respondents.
"Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
"SO ORDERED."
On 10 June 1997, the Court DENIED WITH FINALITY the motion for reconsideration
filed by the proponents of the people's initiative.
In decreeing that Republic Act No. 6735 was inadequate to implement the
constitutional right of the people to directly propose amendments to the fundamental law,
the Court thereby effectively restrained COMELEC from acting in a manner inconsistent
with the judgment. When the COMELEC dismissed PIRMA's petition, it did so not in
disregard of sound discretion, let alone in grave abuse of discretion, but, indeed, in
deference to and conformably with the decision of the Court. The Constitutional
proscription, aforequoted, does not accord to the Court the instant petition as being the
proper vehicle to permit the re-examination of the Court's doctrine in Delfin.
More primordial than the personal view I have heretofore expressed is the stability
and respect that must be accorded to the basic law and nal judgments of the Court. I, like
everyone else, bow to the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In the Court's original 19 March 1997 decision, I joined Mr. Justice Davide's
scholarly opinion ordering the Commission on Elections to dismiss the Del n petition on
the ground that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the people's initiative to amend
the constitution. Likewise, in the Court's resolution of 10 June 1997, I voted to deny
respondents' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The decision's thorough
exposition of the issues in that petition did not, however, have the effect of either putting
to rest the principal questions raised therein or dampen the zeal of the respondents.
Rather, the debate has intensified to a degree that it now threatens the political landscape.
Emboldened by the alleged 5,793,213 signatures it has gathered, PIRMA brings
another petition before this Court in its relentless pursuit to have the voice of the people
heard — or so it pompously claims.

I
Looking into the Court's checkered history of the past few decades, I am disturbed
to nd that the only situation which parallels that which confronts us today is the one
which the Court faced when the question of the legitimacy of the 1971 Constitution came
before it. We now know that the Court's legal prestidigitations in Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary 1 provided the stamp of legitimacy to former President Marcos' martial law
regime. That decision, among other events, prompted the framers of the current
Constitution to install safeguards providing term limits, proscribing political dynasties and
expanding the Court's jurisdiction to include the power to "determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 2 As an ironic twist in the events
which followed the EDSA revolution, the people's initiative provision, one of the safeguards
installed by the authors of the 1987 Constitution aimed at preventing a repetition of the
abuses of power during the Marcos regime, is now being invoked to justify the lifting of
term limits of elective public officials who are barred from running for re-election.
The most compelling argument foisted in favor of petitioners' stance is the idea that
in any case it will be the people, through Pirma's signature campaign, who will ultimately
decide the question of whether or not a people's initiative to amend the Constitution
should push through (consequently, the people's voice should be heard on the matter). I
nd this idea seductive and beguiling in its simplicity because it glosses over the nature of
our system of government in the process of cloaking its adherents in sanctimonious
populist garb.
In the rst place, ours is a democratic and republican government. Being republican,
it is representative, run by functionaries who derive their mandate from the people
themselves. Direct participation by the people in governmental affairs is an infrequent
option requiring great energy. Precisely because of this, the people have expressed their
desired system of government in a document more or less fundamental and permanent.
In overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the people did express their will in
a fundamental law which, being an embodiment of sovereignty, should not be easily tri ed
with. To do so lightly, without an appropriate enabling law and at the instance of groups
whose interests are highly suspect, would be a violation of the people's choice, as
singularly expressed in their almost-unanimous rati cation in February 1987 of the present
Constitution. EICSDT
Underscoring the fundamental and permanent nature of a Constitution-as-

embodiment-of-the-vox populi, Justice Marshall, in his groundbreaking opinion in Marbury
vs. Madison, 3 wrote, referring to the process of drafting a Constitution that:
. . . . The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor
ought it be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are
deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme,
and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 4
Constitutional "permanence" does not negate amendments appropriately called to

respond to the changing times. Marshall wrote his Marbury decision referring to a U.S.
Constitution which itself embodied provisions allowing amendments. But, to my mind,
constitutional amendments must be seen as rare exceptions to the rule because they
disturb the harmony of a document which, having been rati ed by the people, stands as a
repository of their will. Thus, it has been observed that:
A good constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement
and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must
yield to the thought of the people — not to the whim of the people or the thought
evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if
the government is to be safe, can be allowed e cacy. Changes in government are
to be feared unless the bene t is certain. As Montaigne says: "All great mutations
shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil
may succeed, and a worse." 5
In fact, it has been said that the Constitution is the protector of the people against
injury by the people. 6
Consequently, constitutions such as ours make the process of revision or
amendment fairly di cult. More so, a direct exercise, through a people's initiative, should
necessarily be even more di cult since it disrupts the basic tenets of a republican
government willed by the sovereign people in adopting the Constitution. As the well of
public opinion could be easily poisoned by those who readily have the resources to do so,
any call supposedly made in behalf of the people to tamper with a document so
sacrosanct should be met with healthy skepticism. I submit that a look into the provision
on amendments to the Constitution and the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission would support the view that the people's initiative as the third alternative to
amend the Constitution ought to be resorted to only if Congress unreasonably fails to
respond to the urgent demands for change.
A judicious review of the proceedings of the 1987 Constitutional Commission would
reveal that Section 2, which provides for a people's initiative, was intended to be a last-
resort option. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Article XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the total number of registered
voters therein. No amendments under this section shall be authorized within ve
years following the rati cation of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the amendment provisions in Section 1 are self-executory, while Section 2
requires an enabling law, which, in Santiago, et al. v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 127325,
through Justice Davide's scholarly opinion, has found inadequate. This might suggest that
the initiative provision does rank behind the other methods of amendment in procedural
importance.
That the inclusion of this third mode of introducing amendments was plainly
intended by the members of the commission as a safeguard in the event that the rst two
modes fall is, as I stated earlier, inescapable from a reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. Quoted below are a few pertinent excerpts:
MR. BENGZON:
Is section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not su cient channel for expression of the
will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ:
Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20
years under the March administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a
manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or
the President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could
not be obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that
the people could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for
amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National
Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or call a
constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed the
people's desire and clamor. So, this is a third avenue that we are proving
for the implementation of what is now popularly known as people's power.
MR. SUAREZ:
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of
the entire Constitution, as we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. Also this power could be
susceptible to abuse to such extent that it could very well happen that the
initiative method of amendment could be exercised, say, twice or thrice in a
matter of one year; thus, a necessity of putting limitations to its exercise.
The committee members also felt that putting a limitation within a ve-
year period after the date of the last plebiscite held is reasonable, as well
as the percentage arrived at. The general idea as agreed upon is for us to
try to make the process of amendment a little more di cult in order that
we can have an enduring and lasting constitution. After all there are two
other methods of amendment, the traditional ones, which we have
provided under subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1. So, our committee
decided to propose this particular Section as it is now embodied in the
complete committee report. (Underscoring ours.)
Again, when the suggestion was made by Commissioner Rodrigo that the initiative
provision be deleted entirely from the Constitution its adherents defended their
proposition by clearly stating that initiative was merely a last alternative, describing this as
a "reserve power" of the sovereign people:
MR. RODRIGO:
I propose the following amendment: delete the whole Section 2.
Madam President, this new provision is not necessary. There is no need for it. The
present provisions on the proposal for amendments to the Constitution are
most satisfactory, very democratic. This is done by either the National
Assembly composed of representatives elected by the people all over the
Philippines by a vote of three-fourths or by a constitutional convention,
again, composed of delegates elected on the basis of their stand on certain
constitutional issues.
Madam President, ours is a republican government which means a representative

democracy. This satis es the essence of democracy. I do not know why all
of a sudden we now insist on this reserved "people power," that is one
event in our history which I think, can hardly be repeated — bloodless
revolution that toppled the dictator. Now, we want to use people power
even in enacting laws and in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Non sequitur, Madam President, it does not follow. There is no popular
clamor of this. I do not know that our people, because of the EDSA
peaceful revolution, are now clamoring to initiate constitutional
amendments directly. And so why clutter the Constitution with a provision
that is untried and impractical. Let us not go into controversial matters like
this which we can hardly be understood by our people who, after all are the
ones who are going to ratify or reject this constitution. Let us go to basics.
Let us not depart radically from what we have found to be satisfactory in
our country for the last half-century, and that is a republican form of
government — a government run by duly elected representatives of the
people. This is practical. It is not perfect, but it is the best kind of
government that we know. CSDcTH
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ: DTCAES
The Committee regrets that it cannot accept the amendments by deletion

submitted by the Honorable Rodrigo. First we want to provide a
mechanism that is very responsive to the sentiments of the people.
Second, the fact that it is supposed to be impractical is fallacious in that
sense that if a situation develops where the mechanisms provided under
Section 1 (a) and (b) could not be fully implemented in this wise, a time
may come when in spite of the clamor of the people for proposing
amendments to the Constitution, the National Assembly may not be able to
muster enough votes in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly
or to call a constitutional convention. So, in that sense, it is a very practical
avenue or safety valve which is available to the people. (Underscoring
ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE:
there is no necessary incongruity or super uity in saying that the people may act
directly through initiative because then that puts the stamp of a great
democratic institution or tradition on this formulation which means the
Gentlemen connects to the great tradition of democracy. We are not really
reinventing the wheel in installing initiative as an additional mode of
proposing an amendment to the Constitution, and as a reserve power of
the sovereign people, when they are dissatis ed with the National
Assembly and, therefore, if there is default of the National Assembly in
responding to a critical situation requiring a constitutional amendment,
this initiative vests the power of direct action in the people themselves. It is
largely, I think, reserve power, precisely a fallback position of the people in
the event that they are dissatisfied. . . . . (Underscoring ours.)
The people's initiative would thus be akin to a contingency plan — the proverbial
backdoor. Being dernier ressort and considering its exceptional nature, where the people
would directly initiate and participate, the enabling law that Congress should enact must
be of such a nature that would forestall any and all forms of abuse. In the people lies the
supreme power, true, but its vulnerability to manipulation and abuse is as immense as the
extent of the power. Hence, this awesome might would not only require but demand the
promulgation of precise, arduous and very stringent rules for its implementation:
. . . . It has been commented that any process of changing the constitution
has been purposely made cumbersome, in order that the organic law may not be
easily remolded to fit situations and sentiments which are relatively transitory and
fleeting. 7
While Senate Bill No 17 8 includes a de nite procedure for a people's initiative to

amend the Constitution, its absence in R.A. No. 6735 I suspect (notwithstanding a
smattering of casual references to the process) signi es the legislature's reticence to
foray — early in the life of the present Constitution — into a new area of immense
constitutional signi cance. The lawmakers obviously intended to leave a lacuna in the law,
for the possibly-bolder legislation of another day. No amount of statutory construction
could fill in the gap left wide by the Congress' failure to enact appropriate legislation on the
matter. Moreover, bridging a gap so huge through the prestidigitations of statutory
construction would amount to judicial legislation.
Viewed in this light, R.A. No. 6735 hardly comes up to par. This law is sadly deficient.
A postscript: Pursuant to Sec. 1, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, a resolution
has been led in the House of Representatives to convene Congress into a constituent
assembly for the purpose of amending the Constitution. The Members of Congress are the
duly elected representatives of the people. It is through them that the voice of the people
shall be heard. This signi cant development thus foils petitioners' seeming contention that
it is only through a people's initiative that the will of the people can be determined.
Congress should be given the opportunity to perform its duty to the people. To reiterate,
Sec. 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution is the people's nal alternative which should
be resorted to only in the event that the two other modes of constitutional amendment
prove to be unsuccessful.
II
A crucial development in the case at hand, which makes it extremely di cult to
discern the people's will on the proposed charter change, is the enactment and recent
implementation of R.A. No. 8189, otherwise known as "The Voter's Registration Act of
1996." CHcESa
In order to "establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters," 9 said
law has decreed that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) undertake a new
registration of voters (which in June 1997 has begun) and consequently, has speci cally
declared ineffective and inoperative the certi ed list of voters used in the May 8, 1995
elections and May 12, 1997 barangay elections. Section 7 of R.A. 8189 distinctly states
that:
SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. — Immediately after the
barangay elections in 1997, the existing certi ed list of voters shall cease to be
effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections,
plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recalls, subsequent thereto, the Commission
shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election
Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and subject to the discretion of the
Commission on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
The Comelec would thus be faced with a serious dilemma: how to verify the alleged
5,793,213 signatures gathered by PIRMA (assuming arguendo that R.A. No. 6735 1 0 is
applicable, following petitioners' reasoning). These signatures, as expressly admitted by
PIRMA, were based on the lists of registered voters in the May 8, 1995 elections and May
12, 1997 barangay elections. 1 1 However, after the June 1997 general registration, new
voters' lists are drawn up and all registered voters now have new identi cation numbers 1 2
and new identi cation cards 1 3 and the list of voters utilized by PIRMA has become legally
inexistent. Intervenor Joker P. Arroyo puts it succinctly:
If the relief prayed for by the petitioners is granted, what will happen?
COMELEC will compare the PIRMA signatures with a dead list which cannot
legally be resurrected. Each voter who registered in June 1997 has a new serial
number in the voter's list, a new a davit, new thumbprints, new precinct. The
practical and legal effects would be an impossible verification. 1 4
This predicament further highlights the inadequacy of the law which is supposed to
implement the constitutional provision on people's initiative. The lack of speci c rules and
proper guidelines would inevitably lead to these kinds of problems. EcAISC
III
The 1987 Constitution makes a careful distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" a distinction which was absent in the 1935 Constitution. The eminent
constitutionalist Vicente G. Sinco expounds on the difference between the two terms in
this wise:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of
different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the
whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor
that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan
authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one. TcIAHS
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change

of only a few speci c provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to
consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve speci c parts of the existing
constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed
conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect. 1 5
In recognition of this distinction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution consciously

adopted only the rst two modes — proposal by Congress upon a vote of 3/4 of all its
members or by means of a Constitutional Convention — for amendments and revisions.
Cognizant of the fact that the third mode, the people's initiative, is a last resort measure
the Constitutional Commission deliberately limited it to amendments. This intent has been
repeated often enough in the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission as disclosed
in the record thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes).

The sponsor may proceed with his sponsorship speech on Proposed Resolution
No. 322.
MR. SUAREZ.
One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment."
However, the Committee nally agreed to use the terms — "amendment" or
"revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to
the substantial difference in the connotation and signi cance between the
said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations
made in the famous — or notarious — Javellana doctrine, particularly the
decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the
following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing
Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution.
On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change
of speci c provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of speci c
parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of
new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental Chapter embodying new political, social and
economic concepts.
So, the Committee nally came up with the proposal that these two terms should
be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or
revisions to the new Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx.
MR. SUAREZ . . . .
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of
the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
MS. AQUINO.
Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing

amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of
submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ.
No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO.
But as stated now, it is the process.
MR. SUAREZ.
It is.
MS. AQUINO.
In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. DCSTAH
We would be amenable except that, as we clari ed a while ago, this process of

initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO.
In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas,
the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
xxx xxx xxx.

MR. MAAMBONG.
My rst question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on the line 1
refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as de ned by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE.
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by

Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not " revision." EaHATD
xxx xxx xxx.
From another perspective, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the

Constitutional Commission opines:
First, "initiative" can be used only for proposal of "amendments;" it cannot
be used to "revise" the Constitution. This is because it would be practically
impossible to have a total review of the Constitution through action by the entire
electoral population. . . . . 1 6
In this case, on its surface, the proposed "amendment" envisages a change of only
speci c provisions. However, when a change in a speci c provision alters the tenor of the
Constitution or when it results in an incompatibility with other important provisions so that
it eventually becomes necessary to amend those other provisions to avoid con ict, the so-
called amendment is really a revision. For instance, when the foundations of a building are
removed or destroyed, the building crumbles:
When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the
same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house or do you have
a new house? Some of the material contained in the old house may be used
again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter
the fact that you have altogether another new house. We conclude that the
instrument as contained in Ga. L. 1945, pp. 8-89, inclusive is not an amendment
of the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new
constitution. 1 7
In other words, every proposal which effects a fundamental change or requires a re-
examination of the foundations of the Constitution is a revision. The test which ought to be
applied does not involve a quantitative assay but a qualitative determination.
The proposal to lift term limits, under any guise, cannot therefore be deemed an
amendment. The proferred change strikes at the heart of our political system and gives
birth to something utterly alien to the representative form of government. It makes a
complete mockery of the concept of democracy.
The proposed "amendment," if adopted, would apparently become inconsistent with
several fundamental provisions in our Constitution, prominent among which are the
following: IHCSTE
ART. II.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.
xxx xxx xxx
STATE POLICIES
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities

for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
These provisions are the bedrock of our system of government. The proposed
amendment totally alters the philosophy of democracy and representation upon which our
government is founded. Petitioners, therefore, cannot contain and belittle the
consequences of this seemingly simple "amendment." It is clear that its effects are so
pervasive and encompassing that it amounts to a revision — a complete upheaval — of the
fundamental law. Being so, Section 2 of Article XVII, the people's initiative provision,
cannot apply.
IV

Over four centuries ago, Francis Bacon warned the magistrates that they should be
like lions at Solomon's throne, supporting the sovereign but being prudent enough not to
check or oppose any points of sovereignty. 1 8 The sovereign will has been reposed in a
Constitution which deserves this Court's protection. Seen in its entirety, it is a Constitution
which abhors power, except that which legitimately emanates from the sovereign people
themselves. Our role, I believe, should be like the docile lions of biblical lore, subordinate to
the sovereign, and constantly zealous and vigilant in protecting its genuine will.
Ascertaining that will occasionally requires us to take stock of the lessons of history.
We should, therefore, be wary not to be mesmerized by the mere incantations of
"democracy" and "people's will." We echo the famous words of Madame Rowland, a
champion of libertarian ideas during the French Revolution, just before she was guillotined:
"O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!"
I vote to DISMISS the instant petition.
FRANCISCO , J.:
A "petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term limits of elective o cials by

people's initiative" 1 was led before the COMELEC in accordance with R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Res. 2300. The propriety of that petition was questioned in a petition for
prohibition before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997,
the Court by a vote of 8-6 declared that R.A. No. 6735 is "inadequate" to cover an initiative
on the Constitution, ordered the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative and made
permanent the TRO it earlier issued but this time only against the COMELEC. In the
subsequent motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision, the Court with only
6 members voting to grant the motion out of the 13 members who participated in the
deliberations, "denied" the motion "with finality". 2
Petitioners PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa who were parties in G.R. No. 127325
led with the COMELEC a new petition for an initiative on the Constitution which was
accompanied by more than ve (5) million signatures. This new petition sought to require
the COMELEC to verify its supporting signatures and determine the su ciency of the
petition in form and substance. The COMELEC in an en banc resolution, dated July 8, 1997,
dismissed that new petition on the ground that it (COMELEC) was permanently restrained
by the Supreme Court in G.R. 127325 from acting on such kind of petitions. Hence
petitioners claiming to represent more than ve (5) million registered voters, led the
instant petition for mandamus and certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC for its refusal to take cognizance of their petition for initiative.
Petitioners' prime argument is that the Court's pronouncement in G.R. No. 127325 did not
bar the new petition for initiative because of the divided opinion of the Court in its June 10,
1997 Resolution which cannot be considered as a binding ruling on the insufficiency of R.A.
No. 6735. In the alternative, petitioners argue that the ruling in G.R. No. 127325 should be
re-examined.
I reiterate my stand in G.R. No. 127325 that R.A. No. 6735 is su cient to cover the
system of the people's initiative on the Constitution. It is the people's sovereign power,
right and authority to propose changes to the fundamental law of the land if they deem it
inadequate to address their grievances. Sovereignty resides in the people, especially in a
Republican country, like ours. The people's sovereign power, in my view, may not be
restrained, or altered as they are free to "establish a Government that shall embody our
ideals and aspirations." 3
In its eighteen (18) Articles, the 1987 Constitution referred to the "people" thirty
(30) times. The highest and fundamental law of the land, in its preamble, likewise
recognizes the people as the authors of the Constitution 4 which adopted the democratic
principle that the people is the sovereign in this country. 5 Moreover, the same people
"reserved" for themselves legislative powers such as the power of initiative not only on
legislation 6 but also on amendments to the Constitution. 7 To say, therefore, that R.A. No.
6735 is inadequate would in effect be to disable: CDAHaE
"the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means". 8
To restrain the people of their power of initiative on the Constitution would also run
counter to the mandate of Section 16, Article XIII which provides that:
"The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged." (emphasis supplied).
At the risk of being repetitious, government authority emanates from the people. 9 If
the people desires and decides to alter the governmental set-up by changing the terms of
the covenant under which the people agreed to be governed, they may do so subject only
to the existing covenant. Not even the people's established government, much less
the judiciary, which merely derived its authority from the people can defeat,
prevent or frustrate the presumptive will of an individual citizen or that of the
people by just some rule of legal hermeneutics . As one Con-Com member said
during the deliberations on the Constitution:
"In our long history of struggle for national independence and social change the
people have shown their decision and de nitiveness to ght for what is right.
The people themselves can decide whenever they wish to, especially on matters
pertaining to the Republic or the State which they claim to represent." 10
When the motion for reconsideration of G.R. No. 127325 was denied via 6-6 vote, it
means that the original decision of March 19, 1997 was a rmed. However, the Court
should not be denied the power to re-examine its previous decision especially when there
is a diversity of opinion among its members, most particularly when there is a change in
their views and when new circumstances, not present during the earlier case, had
supervened. Indeed, the Court is not powerless to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm " any of its previous decisions or resolutions so long as this is done with the court
sitting en banc. 1 1 Thus, the Court is not proscribed from acting on a new case where the
subject raised appears to have been previously passed upon. Decisions of this Court
should not be blindly construed as a self-limitation of its powers to adjudicate
controversies. Precedents are good, but when there is an opportunity for re-
examining an assailed doctrine, the Court should not foreclose the possibility of
review. At times, it is necessary to break the vessel so that its perfume will ll
the air. There is nothing providential in a tenuously decided case, like G.R. No.
127325.
This is not the rst time the Court is called upon to re-examine a previous decision
that has become nal and executory. It has been done before, particularly in the cases
involving the changing doctrines on the issue of whether the proclamation of Martial Law
and/or suspension of the privilege of writ of the habeas corpus is a political question. In
fact, the ruling in the 1901 case of Barcelon vs. Baker, 1 2 reiterated in Montenegro vs.
Castañeda 1 3 was abandoned in Lansang vs. Garcia. 1 4 Lansang in turn was reversed in
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 1 5 reverting back to the Barcelon and Montenegro cases. On the
issue of determining just compensation in expropriation cases, the Court in EPZA vs. Dulay
1 6 abandoned its previous ruling in NHA vs. Reyes. 1 7 Just recently, the Court in De Guzman
vs. Sandiganbayan 1 8 ruled that its powers are "so pervasive and encompassing so as
to alter even that which this court itself has already declared nal " as it was
compelled to do in that case. In People vs. Martin Simon, 1 9 the Court likewise re-examined
and in fact reversed the long standing doctrine on the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL) in special crimes which carries penalties with the same nomenclature
as that of offenses under the Penal Code.
The case at bar should neither be treated nor be considered as different from the
above cases since what is involve herein is of primary importance to the sovereign people
and a determination of the expression of their will. The instant petition provokes a re-
examination on a paramount legal matter, giving the Court of last resort an opportunity of
either rea rming the rst PIRMA doctrine or abandoning it, and adopting a new one.
Besides, a single decision will not afford a basis for the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis. 20
With respect to the issue raised by intervenors Senator Roco (who supported in the
original petition the view that the law was adequate) and Representative Arroyo that the
COMELEC cannot verify the gathered signatures because the previous list of registered
voters had been rendered ineffective by R.A. 8189, 2 1 su ce it to state that it is
unnecessary to pass upon such issue at this point for its prematurity. Besides, the
verification process is a task left to the COMELEC, and not with this Court.
Perhaps a more compelling reason why, to my mind, the Court should take a second
hard look on its previous decision in G.R. No. 127325 is its constitutional infirmity.
Again, let me unwind the facts for this purpose.
On March 19, 1997, the Court in G.R. No. 127325, speaking through Mr. Justice
Davide, declared that "R.A. No. 6735 [is] inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide su cient standard for
subordinate legislation," 2 2 but nowhere did the Court declare R.A. No. 6735 as
unconstitutional . A perusal of the March 19, 1997 decision starting from page 1 (title
page) and ending on page 38 (dispositive portion with the Justices' signatures), in fact,
shows that the Court shun n from categorizing R.A. No. 6735 as an unconstitutional
enactment. The probe was limited to the issue of whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is su cient
to cover an initiative on the constitution.
In the subsequent motion for reconsideration which stressed the undisputed intent
of R.A. No. 6735 to cover an initiative on the Constitution that the Court is duty bound to
recognize and enforce, Mr. Justice Davide introduced the so called "completeness" and
"su cient standard" tests in his June 10, 1997 ponencia to avoid such an insurmountable
issue. Thus:
"Since a law may be declared unconstitutional where it delegates
non-delegable legislative authority, or that any attempt to do so would
be tainted by unconstitutionality (Fernando, op. cit., 161), then a law which
purports to delegate a delegable legislative power may also be declared
unconstitutional or invalid if it fails to comply with the completeness
and ' su cient standard ' tests . Only courts, in the exercise of its judicial
authority, can determine if a statute has met these tests. ( Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 122 Phi. 965 [1965]; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 [1970])."
xxx xxx xxx
"Neither may we succumb to the arguments raised in ground 4 of the

Pedrosa's motion. Although we recognized that 'R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history
reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution',
we cannot otherwise read into the statute non-existent provisions in
order to make it complete and set forth therein a su cient standard,
and thus validate the delegation of the power to promulgate
implementing rules to the COMELEC . To do so would constitute unabashed
judicial legislation, an act offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers.
We stated earlier that the issue of delegation of legislative

powers is properly a subject of constitutional law, and not statutory
construction . In short, our primary task was merely to determine if R.A. No. 6735
'hurdled', to use a word used by the Pedrosas, the 'completeness and su cient
standard tests' in the investiture of rule-making powers to the COMELEC relative
to initiative on constitutional amendments. When we then declared it to be
inadequate or insu cient in that respect, we simply meant that it failed to 'hurdle'
the tests. Put differently, the terms incomplete, inadequate and wanting
in essential details in our challenged Decision have reference to the
'completeness and su cient standard tests,' and to none other. The
intent of the law, which is the concern of statutory construction, is not
a su cient guidepost. This puts to naught for being clearly misplaced,
if not irrelevant, the plea that we should give full life to the intent of the
law to include initiative on constitutional amendments, as well as the
warning that to suppress the intent of the law would be tantamount to
determining the wisdom, reasonableness, adequacy or su ciency of
the law, a role exclusively pertaining to the legislature . Accordingly,
Nebbia v. New York (291 U.S. 507, 537, 78 L. Ed. 940, 957 [1934]) and
Government v. Springer, (50 Phil. 259 [1927]), cited by Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno in his Separate Opinion, are inapplicable. Nebbia involved a New York law
establishing a Milk Control Board with the power, among other things, to ' x
minimum and maximum retail prices to be charged by stores to consumers for
consumption off the premises where sold,' and was challenged under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. While as regards Springer,
simply, it did not involve non-delegation of legislative powers and the tests for
permissible exceptions thereto." 2 3 (underscoring supplied)
The foregoing shows that the issue on the adequacy or inadequacy of R.A. No. 6735
to implement an initiative on the Constitution was dislodged from the realm of statutory
construction to which it rightly belongs and brought into the sphere of constitutional law.
The Court's declaration that "R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in
essential terms and conditions" 2 4 was suddenly given signi cation to refer "to the
'completeness and su cient standard tests '". Failure to hurdle this "completeness and
su cient standard tests" makes the law, R.A. No. 6735, unconstitutional . But for R.A. No.
6735 to be declared unconstitutional , certain parameters must be observed the absence
of which will render the declaration in rm. And here the Constitution is unequivocal. Hence:
SHIcDT
"ARTICLE VIII

"JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
xxx xxx xxx

"SEC. 4.. . .
"(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to
be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon ."
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue
of whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be
granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief
Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion;
while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication". 2 5 In other words, only ve, out of the other twelve justices, joined Mr.
Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia nding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its
failure to pass the so called "completeness and su ciency standards" tests. Obviously,
seven votes are needed to reach a "majority ", not six. The "concurrence of a majorit y of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations" which Article VIII, Section 4 (2) of
the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not
complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the constitutional
requirement on the concurrence of the "majority " was initially reached in the March 19,
1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion
for reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735
was settled with nality, sans the constitutionally required " majority. " The Court's
declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with in rmity and wanting in force
necessitating, in my view, the re-examination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It
behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this opportunity accorded by this
new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's pronouncement from constitutional
infirmity.
Therefore, while no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on the COMELEC in
not acting on PIRMA's new petition, it is my humble submission that the instant petition
presents a tting occasion for this Court to re-examine its pronouncements in G.R. No.
127325.
PANGANIBAN , J.:
Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission

dismissing their petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition
before the Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million
signatures 1 constituting about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3%
in each legislative district. The petition now before us presents two grounds:
1. In refusing to act on the PUMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution" and "declaring void those parts of
Resolution 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to
the Constitution," the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 127325 2
entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Commission on Elections
(hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined because
said Decision is allegedly "unconstitutional," and because, in any event,
the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June
10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes on each side.
The following is my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Comelec's Refusal to Act
The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the PIRMA petition
cannot in any wise be branded as "grave abuse of discretion." Be it remembered that the
Court's Decision in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution . . . ."
While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless
the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Del n petition
which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago , I believed,
and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping
injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it,
too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi . Respondent Comelec was
directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey.
Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the
PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action
would have constituted de ance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave
abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the nal
arbiter of justiciable controversies. 3
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
I repeat my rm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover
initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may
have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution
2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to
"promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws
which the Commission is required to enforce and administer . . . ." Finally and most
relevantly, Section 20 of RA 6735 speci cally authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." SEHaTC
In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at
the right time and for the right reason. " 4 Let me explain further.

The Right Thing
A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that
citizens may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured
feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value
and worth in our legal rmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of
initiative) of the people . . . ." 5 Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. Comelec, 6 this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and
referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty. And this
Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and
promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735
and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than su cient authority to implement,
effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." 7 Let me now
demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be
taken — the right way — to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative. 8
Pursuant to Section 3 (f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the
petition which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under
Sec. 5 (c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:
"c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be . . . amended,
. . .;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein; 9

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of
the petition."
Section 8 (f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition
include a formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition
precedent to the ling of the petition, and is jurisdictional. 1 0 Without such requisite
signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they
may thence le the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the su ciency
thereof 1 1 and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
a davits and voters' identi cation cards. 1 2 In deciding whether the petition is su cient,
the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it
consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral
body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice. 13
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its
su ciency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. 1 4 The
conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety
(90) days after certi cation by the Comelec of the su ciency of the petition. 1 5 The
proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective
as of the day of the plebiscite. 16
From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the
adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to
amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still
satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change — the lifting of the term limits of
elective officials 1 7 — constitute a mere amendment and not a
revision of the Constitution? 1 8
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures
in the petition? This question is relevant considering that
under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995
national elections was voided after the barangay elections on
May 12, 1997, while the new list may be used starting only in
the elections of May 1998. 19
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution
really emanate from the people who signed the petition for
initiative? Or is it the bene ciaries of term extension who are
in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interests?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and veri able? Do they
really belong to quali ed warm bodies comprising at least
12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein?
I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question
Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined
by argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues
but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus
test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in
proving — not just alleging — that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend
the Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not
even the President or Congress.
It took only one million people 2 0 to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the
very rafters and foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On
the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six
million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are fraudulent, then
let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-veri cation process
conducted under our open system of legal advocacy. cHDEaC

More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court
and as a citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these six million
signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory
inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA
6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the
clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who
signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the bene ciaries 2 1 of term extension who are in
fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests? In other words,
is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution
and our laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?
I n Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 2 2 we described initiative, along with
referendum, as the "ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance." In Subic Bay, we speci ed that "initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate . . . a process of lawmaking by the people themselves without the participation
and against the wishes of their elected representatives." A s p o nent e o f Subic Bay, I
stand foursquare on this principle: The right to amend through initiative belongs
only to the people — not to the government and its minions . This principle nds
clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners like those quoted
below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatis ed
with the National Assembly . . . [and] precisely a fallback position of the people
in the event that they are dissatisfied." — Commissioner Ople 23
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only
if the legislature is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." —
Commissioner Gascon 24
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the
people [which] should not be frivolously resorted to." — Commissioner Romulo
25
Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it,
our Charter itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional
convention or constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are o cialdom's
weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's
organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms?
This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore,
because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is
inadequate or insu cient insofar as initiatives to the Constitution are concerned. With
such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is
why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to
relieve him of pain." I rmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to
"burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be
exposed as such in the ways I have discussed — short of abrogating the right itself. On the
other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate — if it hurdles the four issues I
outlined earlier — by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory
of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted — unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view — any
judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth
into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be
proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within ve years following [its]
rati cation . . . nor oftener than once every ve years thereafter." Since its rati cation, the
1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the ve-year prohibition is now
inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.
Be that as it may, I believe — given the present circumstances — that there is no
more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998
polls. Between today and the next national elections, less than eight (8) months remain.
Santiago, where the single issue of the su ciency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this
Court three (3) months, 2 6 and another two (2) months to decide the motion for
reconsideration. 2 7 The instant case, 2 8 where the same issue is also raised by the
petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These
time spans could not be abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all
parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 — as I
believe it should — and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month
period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues 2 9 I mentioned earlier,
considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on
any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, 3 0 and reconsiderations
on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.
Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is
enormously time-consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of
each and every signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on
appeal and nally, before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite
itself — assuming such stage can be reached — may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but
not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, nally
declare the petition to be sufficient.
Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, 3 1 political parties, groups,
organizations or coalitions may start selecting their o cial candidates for President, Vice
President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for ling certi cates of
candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for
national o cials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective
o cials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready — if
ever — for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by the
elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for
the 1998 elections.
That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's
initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my rm conviction that RA 6735 is su cient
and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the
power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In
fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely
now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After
all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the
morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our
people's right to initiative.
Epilogue
I believe in democracy — in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people
to express their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution,
internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people — as basic as the right to
elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that
Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of
initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity. HSIDTE
Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular
o cial or group of o cials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to
democracy. My rm conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the
constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA
petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards
to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and
abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it. Second,
the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of voters and/or
voters' identi cation cards. Third, initiative is a reserve power of and by the people, not of
incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures
must be veri ed as real and genuine; not concocted, ctitious or fabricated. The only legal
way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide
veri cation process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such veri cation, it
bears stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at
EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that
number, not just from the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this
claim true? Or is it just an empty boast? By preventing the veri cation of this claim through
the invention of its novel theory of statutory insu ciency, the Court's majority has sti ed
the only legal method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed
a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected o cials, and whether six million voters want
to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such
questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the bene t of the legal
presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it
burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic
constitutional right.
In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail.
This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to
build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial
litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in
this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived not only of a
basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the
truth.

BELLOSILLO , J.:
We are taken to task once again to determine the propriety of a petition to propose
amendments to the Constitution through people's initiative. But, unlike in the rst case 1
where constitutional and statutory questions were essentially raised, the instant case is
primarily concerned with the matter of grave abuse of discretion purportedly committed
by the Commission on Elections and the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata.
But rst, a ashback on Santiago v. COMELEC, 2 the earlier case. In that case, Atty.
Jesus S. Del n, relying on RA No. 6735 3 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 4 led before
the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
O cials, by People's Initiative (DELFIN Petition) and prayed for an order (a) xing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (b) causing the necessary
publication of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,"
in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (c) instructing Municipal Election
Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. 5
Apparently, Atty. Del n and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, as founders
of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Sec. 2, Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution, 7 in
relation to RA No. 6735, and seek the assistance and intervention of the COMELEC
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 in gathering the required number of
signatures.
The DELFIN Petition, UND No. 96-037 (INITIATIVE), was accordingly set for hearing,
after which, Atty. Del n and the oppositors 8 were directed to le their respective
memoranda. It was at this time when Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla
and Maria Isabel Ongpin led, speci cally on 18 December 1996, a special civil action for
prohibition before this Court (SANTIAGO Petition) and prayed that a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering respondent COMELEC to
desist from proceeding with the petition led by private respondent Del n and ordering
the Pedrosas spouses to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative
to amend the Constitution and, after due deliberations or after hearing, as the case may be,
a permanent order be issued prohibiting respondent COMELEC from taking cognizance of
the Del n petition and from issuing orders, rules and regulations to implement a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution and, in addition, declaring COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 null and void for being violative of the Constitution and therefore without force and
effect. 9
Senator Santiago and her co-petitioners argued in the main that the constitutional
provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution could not be invoked yet
because there was still no implementing law to govern it. For while RA No. 6735 provides
for three (3) systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, initiative on
statutes, and initiative on local legislations, it failed to provide for any subtitle on the
initiative on the Constitution, thus indicating that the initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future legislative enactment. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 promulgated to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws" is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned since the COMELEC has no power to promulgate rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 19 March 1997, after intense deliberations, this Court 10 struck down RA No.
6735 as "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by 'empowering' the COMELEC 'to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'" 1 1 There
we concluded that the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a su cient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. 1 2 Hence we
rendered judgment: (a) granting the petition of Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago; (b)
declaring RA No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and to have failed to provide su cient standard for subordinate legislation;
(c) declaring void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and, (d)
ordering the COMELEC to forthwith dismiss the DELFIN Petition. The Temporary
Restraining Order we issued on 18 December 1996 was made permanent as against the
COMELEC but lifted as against private respondents. 1 3
On 10 June 1997 the Motion for Reconsideration was denied with nality "the
arguments therein set forth not being of su cient cogency to persuade the requisite
majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1997." 1 4
On 23 June 1997 or barely two (2) weeks after we denied the Motion for
Reconsideration PIRMA, 1 5 seemingly unfazed by its initial setback and theorizing that its
rst petition merely lacked the required signatures, led before the COMELEC another
petition denominated as Petition of the People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition, docketed as COMELEC Special Matter
No. 97-001 claimed it was accompanied and supported by 5,530,999 signatures of Filipino
voters, later increased to 5,793,924," representing more than the twelve percent (12%)
requirement of the registered Filipino voters and the three percent (3%) requirement for
every legislative district computed on the basis of the total number of registered voters
both of the 8 May 1995 and the 12 May 1997 elections." The petition prayed that (a) it be
accordingly published in Pilipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and
local circulation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition; (b) the COMELEC
o cers be ordered to verify all signatures collected in behalf of the petition and to submit
these to the Commission; (c) after due hearing, the Commission declare the Petition
su cient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution; (d) the
Commission schedule the plebiscite at a date not earlier than sixty (60) days but not later
than ninety (90) days from the determination of the su ciency of the petition in
accordance with the Constitution; and, (e) the following proposition be submitted for
ratification by the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be scheduled by the Commission —
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President
the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so
that both the highest o cials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of
six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government
o cials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that
purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of
Article X respectively? 1 6
On 8 July 1997 the COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition thus —

. . . in accordance with the permanent restraining order of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the Commission hereby DISMISSES the petition at bench and,
therefore, will not act on the "prayers" therein. No hearing will be scheduled to
determine the su ciency of the petition, and the Commission will not order its
election officers to verify the signatures submitted.
AacSTE
Accordingly, petitioners may retrieve all the le folders containing the

forms and signatures of Five Million, Five Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand, Nine
Hundred Ninety Nine (5,530,999) * registered voters within ve (5) days from
nality of this resolution. The Commission will not assume responsibility for the
safekeeping of these files upon the expiration of the period granted.
This resolution effectively resolves the motions of movants-oppositors

Raul S. Roco and HELP Foundation, Inc.
Hence, on 25 July 1997, PIRMA led the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Named
respondents were the COMELEC, Sen. Raul S. Roco, Heightened Ethics League of the
Philippines (HELP) Foundation, Inc., represented by Atty. Mar R. Torres Reyes, and Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) represented by Atty. Ceferino Padua. They were
later joined in as Intervenors by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang Konstitusyon (DIK), and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and Rep. Joker P.
Arroyo.
Interestingly the Solicitor General who is supposed to represent COMELEC joins and
agrees with petitioners. They congruently argue thuswise:
First. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to act on the PIRMA Petition since Santiago v. COMELEC did not
enjoin COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over it. What was made permanent by this
Court was only the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 enjoining
COMELEC from proceeding with the DELFIN Petition, not any other petition already led or
still to be filed.
Second. Petitioners claim that the principle of "law of the case" invoked by
COMELEC does not apply because there is no de nitive ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as
shown by the deadlock voting on the motions for reconsideration thereof, and as such,
there is no "law of the case" to speak of. The Solicitor General, using instead the term res
judicata, holds that COMELEC should not be barred by the precept. In ne, both maintain
that there is no identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action and reliefs prayed for in
Santiago v. COMELEC and the instant case.
Petitioners urge us to re-examine our ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC since our
insistence on the insu ciency of RA No. 6735 is by itself unconstitutional. They posit that
the power of the Supreme Court is limited to the determination of whether a law is
constitutional or unconstitutional so that it cannot declare a law merely as "insu cient."
Thus, in so declaring RA No. 6735 as "insu cient" the Supreme Court overstepped the
authority of its o ce and "acted unconstitutionally." In any case, the Solicitor General
maintains that the holding that RA No. 6735 is "inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and fails to provide su cient standard for
subordinate legislation," 1 7 is only an obiter dictum because the determination of the
constitutionality of the law was not necessary in resolving the SANTIAGO Petition. Since
the Justices who voted on the DELFIN Petition were unanimous in holding that it should be
dismissed because it lacked the required supporting signatures, it was not necessary for
this Court, as it did, to consider the constitutionality of RA No. 6735.
But, be that as it may, according to petitioners and the Solicitor General, the votes of
the six (6) Justices cast on 10 June 1997 on the motions for reconsideration to maintain
our decision in Santiago v. COMELEC were not enough to declare RA No. 6735
unconstitutional. Since there were thirteen (13) Justices who deliberated on the issues and
voted thereon, the votes of at least seven (7) justices were needed to declare RA No. 6735
unconstitutional. And since only six (6) Justices voted to deny the motions for
reconsideration in Santiago v. COMELEC, the votes were not su cient to declare the law
unconstitutional insofar as it purported to serve as the implementing law for the
constitutional provision on people's initiative on the Constitution. 18
The same proponents of PIRMA argue that, as matters stand, the 1987 Constitution
and RA No. 6735 impose upon COMELEC the ministerial duty to order its election o cers
to verify the 5,793,924 signatures of the registered voters. Since the PIRMA Petition is
su cient in form and substance, as it is accompanied by the requisite signatures, it is the
mandatory and ministerial duty of COMELEC to order the veri cation of the signatures and
make a nding on the su ciency of the Petition. Worse, according to them, if COMELEC
fails to act on the PIRMA Petition, the 5,793,924 registered voters stand to suffer grave
and irreparable injury as they will otherwise be disenfranchised and silenced by the mere
inaction of COMELEC. It is their stand that indeed there is need to re-examine the ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC in view of the inconclusiveness thereof on the su ciency or
constitutionality of RA No. 6735, the clamor of some 5,530,999 Filipino registered voters,
and the great public interest involved.
Except for Intervenor Rep. Joker P. Arroyo, respondents Sen. Raul S. Roco, HELP
Foundation, LAMP, and Intervenors Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, DIK, MABINI, and IBP
are one in holding that res judicata and law of the case or stare decisis bar the PIRMA
Petition as Santiago v. COMELEC has already ruled that RA No. 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The fact that PIRMA was
able to procure almost six million signatures does not make RA No. 6735 adequate,
su cient and complete to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Consequently, COMELEC could not have unlawfully neglected the performance of a legal
duty. Neither could it have committed grave abuse of discretion as it merely acted in lawful
obeisance to the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC. To
comply faithfully with our decision cannot be grave abuse of discretion.
Intervenor Joker P. Arroyo surfaces with a twist. In his Petition in Intervention, he
postulates that under Sec. 7, RA No. 6735, the accompanying signatures are required to be
veri ed on the basis of three (3) separate documents, namely, registry list of voters,
voters' a davits and voters' identi cation cards used in the immediately preceding
election. But petitioners seek to limit the comparison of the signatures they claim to have
gathered only with the voters' a davits. Sec. 7 of RA No. 8189, otherwise known as "The
Voter's Registration Act of 1996" provides that "[i]mmediately after the barangay elections
in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative."
aSDCIE
Accordingly, the voters' list used in the May 1997 barangay elections has been
erased, expunged, and has ceased to exist. Consequently, the voters' list and the voters'
a davits which have been likewise nulli ed by virtue of Sec. 7 herein quoted cannot be
used as basis for comparison of signatures petitioners have allegedly gathered. Emphatic
is the wording of the second sentence of the law that for purposes of elections,
plebiscites, referenda, and recalls after the May 1997 elections, COMELEC has to
undertake a General Registration of Voters. And since registration was already undertaken
as mandated by law, each voter in the new list has a new serial number in the voters' list,
new a davit, new thumbprints and new precinct. Logically, this new set of voters' lists
cannot also be the basis for comparison of signatures petitioners allegedly gathered prior
to the June 1997 General Registration of Voters.
Rep. Arroyo thus prays that the PIRMA Petition be dismissed, and if by any chance
this Court's previous ruling be reconsidered, that petitioners be directed to gather
signatures anew on the basis of the new voters' a davits, registry of voters and
identi cation cards since this is the only way Sec. 7, RA No. 6735, may be harmonized with
Sec. 7, RA No. 8189.
On the basis of the pleadings submitted, the Court discerns two (2) main issues:
first, whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA
Petition, and second, whether the PIRMA Petition is barred by the res judicata.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended only to keep a tribunal,
board or o cer within the limits of its jurisdiction, to prevent acts in excess of authority or
jurisdiction, as well as to correct manifest abuses of discretion committed by an inferior
tribunal, when appeal does not prove to be more speedy and adequate remedy. It is a truly
extraordinary remedy and its use is restricted only to extraordinary cases, e.g., cases in
which the actions of a tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions are wholly void. 1 9 But in order for certiorari to lie, abuse of discretion alone on
the part of a tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, is not
su cient. Rather, it must be shown that he acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so grave
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 2 0
In the instant case, we cannot nd anything from the records suggesting that
COMELEC acted whimsically or capriciously as to amount to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in dismissing the PIRMA Petition. On the contrary, COMELEC acted precisely in obedience
to the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC prohibiting
COMELEC from taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on the Constitution. We have
already categorically mandated that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
su cient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system." 2 1 Accordingly, in dismissing the PIRMA Petition COMELEC simply obeyed our
decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, and that can hardly be said to amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. For that matter, obedience to the Supreme
Court cannot in any way be considered as an unlawful neglect in the performance of a duty
or an illegal exclusion of another from the exercise of a right of o ce. As respondent
LAMP succinctly observed, "COMELEC simply kept abreast with the Rule of Law" when it
dismissed the PIRMA Petition. 2 2
With the foregoing, the instant petition should already be dismissed for lack of
merit. But, for the satisfaction of all and sundry, let us proceed to the second issue on res
judicata or "law of the case."
Firmly embedded in our jurisprudence is the principle of res judicata which means "a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment." 2 3 This doctrine is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom, sancti ed by age,
and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should
be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.
2 4 Thus in Legarda v. Savellano 2 5 we explained —
As we have repeatedly enunciated, public policy and sound practice

enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once.
It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the
solemn and deliberate sentence of the law pronounced by its appointed organs,
upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a nal and
conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a
rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is
too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural
system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become nal at some de nite date xed by
law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 2 6
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be nal;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
rst and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action. 2 7
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res
judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC , which was
promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with
nality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly nal. The said Decision was rendered by this Court
which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein
was on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the evidence presented by the
parties as well as their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. And,
as between the Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001
subject of the present petition, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. aAHSEC
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the
parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to
the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Del n, spouses Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the
instant case, Atty. Del n was merely removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made parties to the petition. In other
words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the PIRMA Petition was led by an
entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the parties involved in Santiago
v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido 2 8 —
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply
including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as parties
in the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The joining of new
parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if
the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the
rst action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply joining new
parties. TaISDA
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA Petition but
were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior
judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.
Petitioners' pretense that there is no identity of subject matter, causes of action and
reliefs between the PIRMA Petition and the DELFIN Petition, deserves no serious
consideration. For, the PIRMA Petition is nothing more than a continuation of the DELFIN
Petition. The bottomline in both refers to the same thing — the su ciency of RA No. 6735
to activate the constitutional provisions on people's initiative. And this Court has already
ruled that RA No. 6735 is insu cient. While the reliefs sought are seemingly not the same,
the difference is more apparent than real. In truth, the prayer in the DELFIN Petition for
COMELEC assistance and sanction for the gathering of signatures, and the prayer in the
PIRMA Petition for COMELEC veri cation of signatures already gathered are interlocking
and indispensable stages of the entire amendment process by initiative. Thus, there is but
one cause of action and relief sought, and that is to set the entire amendment process of
people's initiative in motion and to commence the process that will lead to the exercise of
the people's initiative in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be litigated twice. 2 9 To sustain the instant petition will be to revive a cause
that has already been adjudicated with nality by this Court and establish a precedent that
will open the oodgates to endless litigations. Parties who are dissatis ed with the ruling
of the court can then repeatedly litigate their cause until a favorable judgment shall have
been obtained. We have always frowned upon such a practice on the theory that it is
deleterious to the orderly administration of justice. As a matter of fact, there is a modern
tendency to widen rather than restrict the application of res judicata by requiring the
parties to sue once and for all in the same case all the proceedings and remedies to which
they are entitled. 3 0 aCIHcD
The contention of the Solicitor General that there is no de nitive judgment in

Santiago v. COMELEC that RA No. 6735 was inadequate or unconstitutional as the
implementing law of the constitutional provisions on people's initiative because during the
voting on the motion for reconsideration only six (6) Justices 3 1 out of the original eight (8)
voted to maintain the decision is misplaced, to say the least. To begin with, petitioners as
well as the Solicitor General proceed on a wrong premise, i.e., that only six (6) Justices
voted to maintain the Santiago decision when in fact seven (7), including Justice Vitug,
voted to sustain the decision. In Santiago v. COMELEC we already categorically stated that
"RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." 3 2 We could not
have been more direct and precise. And since a su cient number of votes, i.e., eight (8),
already declared that RA No. 6735 was "insu cient" or "inadequate," and therefore did not
comply with the constitutional standards, we also concluded that it was unconstitutional.
In the resolution of the motions for reconsideration, movants unfortunately failed to
muster enough votes to reverse our ruling, hence, our Decision stands. It was not reversed
by the requisite number of votes. As we explained in our Resolution of 10 June 1997 —
Thirteen (13) Members having taken part in the deliberation, and only six
(6) having voted to grant the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be
as they are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, the arguments therein set forth not
being of su cient cogency to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to
modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1997.
Obviously, since there were only six (6) Justices who voted to grant the motions for
reconsideration out of the thirteen (13) who participated in the deliberations, the
holding that "RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" 3 3
stays, and in fact has become final.
That our pronouncement in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate
or unconstitutional is merely an obiter dictum, is a misguided observation. The rst issue
in that case in fact is whether RA No. 6735 entitled an Act Providing for the System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative. 3 4 Undoubtedly, this issue puts the constitutionality of
RA No. 6735 in question, for it determines whether it is su cient or not, or if it is valid or
not. Consequently, any ruling by this Court on the matter cannot be shunned as a mere
obiter dictum.
For, obiter dictum is de ned as merely words of a prior opinion entirely unnecessary
for the decision of the case; statements in opinion wherein courts indulged in generalities
that had no actual bearing on issues involved; a remark made or opinion expressed by a
judge in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not
directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. 3 5
In ne, a perusal of the 38-page Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC readily shows that the
discussion therein centers on the inadequacy of RA No. 6735 and why it cannot be the
implementing law for the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. HDTCSI DCSTAH
That the law imposes upon the COMELEC the ministerial mandatory duty to order its
Election O cers to verify the signatures already gathered as provided in Sec. 7, RA No.
6735 —
The election registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry
lists of voters, voters' a davits and voters' identi cation cards used in the
immediately preceding election,
is devoid of merit. We have categorically stated that Art. XVII, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution,
providing for a system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is not a self-
executing provision. 3 6 Consequently, it cannot operate without an implementing
legislation. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode which
bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it is still dependent on
congressional action. 3 7 As we have repeatedly said, RA No. 6735 as the enabling law
of the system of initiative on the Constitution, is "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
empowering the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to implement as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act."
Hence, there is nothing upon which petitioners and the Solicitor General can
predicate their claim that COMELEC has the mandatory duty to assume jurisdiction over
their petition. The remedy of mandamus under Rule 65, Sec. 3, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, may be resorted to only when any tribunal, corporation, board, o cer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty
resulting from an o ce, trust or station. Being an extraordinary remedy, it is essential that
the applicant has a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative
duty of the defendant to perform the act required. The writ will not issue to compel an
o cial to do anything which is not his duty to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. 3 8
There being no valid enabling law to operationalize the system of initiative, there is
no corresponding duty on the part of the COMELEC to entertain any petition dealing with
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Thus until and unless Congress enacts an
implementing legislation or corrects the incompleteness and inadequacy of RA No. 6735,
the COMELEC cannot proceed with the initial process of veri cation of signatures for
purposes of constitutional initiative. There can be no ministerial duty where there is no law
passed by Congress commanding or directing the COMELEC to verify the voters'
signatures submitted together with the petition. ESTCDA
The fact that the petition was supported by more than ve (5) million signatures
(which were gathered, by the way, with no procedure or guidelines to ensure an authentic,
free and intelligent choice, and with no legal authority to recognize and validate them) is of
no consequence. For, such signatures, no matter how many, can neither give birth to a valid
enabling law nor cure the deficiency of RA No. 6735.
Petitioners indulge in legal niceties and heavy technicalities in the hope of giving
their petition some semblance of merit, arguing that the PIRMA Petition is not covered by
the permanent injunction issued by this Court against the COMELEC. And, that what was
made permanent by this Court was only the temporary restraining order enjoining the
COMELEC from proceeding with the DELFIN Petition. This is not quite correct. Again as we
have categorically stated, "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
su cient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system." The practical effect of our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC is virtually to bar any
petition concerning the system of initiative until a valid implementing law shall have been
enacted by Congress. It is unfortunate that petitioners, whether wittingly or unwittingly,
have failed to appreciate this simple pronouncement. SIcEHD
This Court is likewise accused of overstepping the power of its o ce by declaring a

law "insu cient" supposedly without authority. Su ce it to say that when we declared RA
No. 6735 "insu cient," we in effect declared it "invalid." After all, "insu ciency" is
embraced within the term "invalidity."
The novel proposition of Intervenor Rep. Joker P. Arroyo deserves serious
consideration. In the instant case, petitioners would like the COMELEC to instruct all its
election o cers in all municipalities and cities of the 204 legislative districts to verify the
more than ve million signatures they submitted, using as basis the voters' a davits used
in the 12 May 1997 barangay elections contrary to the express provision of Sec. 7, RA No.
6735 which mandates —
Sec. 7. Veri cation of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list voters, voters' a davits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
These requirements set forth in the law are not empty formalities. They are precisely
intended to safeguard and ensure that the signatures gathered are authentic, not
simulated or ctitious, and that the signatures represent at least twelve percent (12%) of
the registered Filipino voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) thereof. Hence, petitioners cannot con ne the comparison of
signatures with the voters' a davits alone on the imsy excuse that the reference in the
law of voters identi cation cards is misplaced or that it is not advisable to compare the
signatures with those appearing in the list of voters because of the possibility of
substitute voting.
Compounding the woes of petitioners is the fact that the certi ed list of voters used
in the 12 May 1997 barangay elections has already ceased to be effective by virtue of Sec.
7, RA No. 8189 which provides —
Sec. 7. General Registration of Voters. — Immediately after the
barangay elections in 1997, the existing certi ed list of voters shall cease to be
effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections,
plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission
shall undertake General Registration of Voters before the Board of Election
Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and subject to the discretion of the
Commission on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act. ECTSDa
Having been nulli ed by law, the voters' list and the voters' a davits can no longer
be used as basis for comparison of signatures. We do not agree that the old list can still
be used for purposes of comparing the signatures as in the eyes of the law this list has
been erased, expunged and has ceased to exist.
That there is a con ict between Sec. 7, RA No. 6735, and Sec. 7, RA No. 8189 is
devoid of merit. In construing apparently con icting provisions of two statutes, an
interpretation which will leave both statutes operative and weave them into a harmonious
and intelligent whole is always preferred. The presumption then is that when Congress
enacted RA No. 8189, it had full knowledge and took full cognizance of RA No. 6735, for it
could not have intended to be inconsistent with itself and create an absurd situation where,
while the voters' list used in the immediately preceding election has ceased to be valid by
operation of law, the same can still be used for purposes of verifying signatures gathered
pursuant to RA No. 6735. Accordingly, Congress could have only meant that the registry
list of voters referred to in RA No. 6735 where the veri cation of signatures is to be based
is a new list of voters made pursuant to RA No. 8189. This is another reason that calls for
the enactment of another law. ECaScD
A word more. While we do not object to, as we in fact encourage, people

empowerment to ourish, we have to follow the rule of law and not allow the mob to force
their issues on the people. In a real democratic society there are rules to follow. True, the
proponents of charter change can talk as loud as they wish, propose amendments to the
Constitution till the end of time, and even persuade others to conform to their beliefs, as
theirs are the rights of free speech and assembly. But until they convince Congress to
enact an enabling law to implement the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, their efforts may as well be relegated to a mere impotent discourse.
For all the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
Footnotes
KAPUNAN, J.:
1.50 SCRA 30 (1973).
2.Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
3.5 U.S. 135 [1 Cranch] (1803).
4.Id., at 175.
5.Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 NE 1, 231 US 250, 58 L. Ed. 206, 34 S Ct. 92.
6.Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 NW 1037, 157 NW 245.
7.Rivera-Cruz v. Gray (Fla) 104 So 2d 501.
8.Authored by Senators Gonzales, Romulo, Pimentel, and Lina.
9.Sec. 2, R.A. No. 8189.
10.Sec 7. Verification of signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used
in the immediately proceeding elections.
11.Annex B, Petition.
12.Sec. 26, R.A. No. 8189.
13.Id., Sec. 25.
14.Petition in intervention, p. 5.
15.Sinco, Vicente G., Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept, 1962, p. 46.
16.Bernas, Joaquin G., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, Vol.
II, 1988, p. 571.
17.Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d. 322, 327.
18.E. Errington, The Lions Start to Roar, The Times of London, March 11, 1997, p. 51.
FRANCISCO, J.:
1.Santiago vs. COMELEC, (Decision), G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, p. 2.
2.Santiago vs. COMELEC, (Resolution), G.R. No. 127325, June 10, 1997.
3.Preamble, 1987 Constitution.
4.Ibid.
5.Section 1, Article II, supra.
6.Article VI, Section 1 provides: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
7.Section 1, Article XVII, supra.
8.Section 15, Article XIII, supra.
9.Section 1, Article II, supra.
10.Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p.
11.Section 5, Article VIII, supra.
12.5 Phil. 87.
13.91 Phil. 882.

14.42 SCRA 448.
15.121 SCRA 472.
16.149 SCRA 305.
17.123 SCRA 245.
18.256 SCRA 171.
19.234 SCRA 555.

20.Frink v. Darst, 14 III. 305, 58 Am. Dec. 575; Montgomery County Fiscal Ct. v. Trimble, 104 Kv.
629, 47 S. W. 733, 42 L.R.A. 738; Quaker Realty Co. v. Labasse, 131 La 996, 60 So. 611,
Ann. Cas. 19144, 1073 cited in Vicente Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 509.
21.Section 7, R.A. 8189 also known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."
22.Santiago, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, p. 37.
23.Separate Opinion, Davide, J., Santiago, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127325, June 10,
1997, pp. 7-9.
24.Santiago, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, p. 33.
25.Santiago, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127325, Minute Resolution, June 10, 1997, p. 2.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
1.Originally, petitioners claim to have submitted 5,530,999 signatures to the Comelec. On July
25, 1997, they presented 262,925 more, bringing the total to 5,793,924 (Petition, p. 11).
For brevity's sake, this Opinion will refer to them at the rounded figure of six (6) million.
2.The Decision was promulgated on March 19, 1997; and the Resolution denying
reconsideration, on June 10, 1997.
3.Development Bank vs. NLRC, 242 SCRA 59, 68, March 1, 1995.
4.An esteemed friend has taken umbrage at my failure in my Separate Opinion in Santiago to
cite my source for this quotation. To set the records aright, I first heard this from former
Sen. Rene A.V. Saguisag. More recently, however, Daniel Goleman, in his best-selling
book Emotional Intelligence (pp. ix and xiii), 1996 ed., credited a similar quote to Aristotle
who in The Nicomachean Ethics described the rare skill "to be angry with the right
person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way."
While on the topic of correct source-citing, may I add that Sen. Saguisag disputed my
attribution to Voltaire of the famous "I may disagree with what you say but I will defend
to the death your right to say it." My source for this is Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, 1980
ed., p. 344, which "attributed" the epigram to Voltaire. Bartlett's own footnote, though,
says that "this sentence is not Voltaire's but was first used in quoting a letter from
Voltaire to Helvetius in the Friends of Voltaire (1906) by S.G. Tallentyre (E. Beatrice Hall).
. . ."
5.Santiago vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, pp. 36-37.
6.G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996.
7.Separate Opinion in G.R. No. 127325, supra, p. 7.
8.In Santiago, the dissenters, particularly Justices Puno, Francisco and myself, joined in by
Justices Melo, Mendoza and, later, Hermosisima, explained the legal principles and
jurisprudential precepts supporting the adequacy of RA 6735, in particular:
"R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law [sic]. As
aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz. : "The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution , laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to
canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's
initiative [citing Sec. 5 (b), RA 6735], directs how initiative proceeding is commenced
[citing Sec. 5 (b), RA 6735], what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for
initiative [citing Sec. 7, RA 6735], how a proposition is approved [citing Sec. 9 (b), RA
6735], when a plebiscite may be held [citing Sec. 8, RA 6735 in relation to Sec. 4, Art. XVII
of the Constitution], when the amendment takes effect (citing Sec. 9 (b), RA 6735] and
what matters may not be the subject of any initiative [citing Sec. 10, RA 6735]. By any
measure, these standards are adequate.
"Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that 'a sufficient standard is intended
to map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy
and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The
purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative
power from the lawmaking body to the delegate' [citing Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1995 ed., p. 98]. In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally
transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC.
A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the
procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. The debates [referring to July 8, 1986 Debates of the
Concom, p. 399] in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of
procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated . . . ." [Justice Puno's
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, pp. 15-16; emphasis in the original.]
In his Separate Opinion to the June 10, 1997 Resolution of this Court in Santiago, Justice
Puno further proffered the following "catalogue of concerns": (1) the need to recognize
the clear intent of Congress in enacting RA 6735, which is to implement the provisions of
the Constitution giving the people the power to amend the fundamental law through
initiative; (2) the traditional duty of the Court to interpret the law in accordance with its
intent as expressed by its authors in Congress and comprehended by the implementing
administrative agency whose expertise and long experience should carry considerable
weight in determining whether the law is clear and enforceable; for the inadequacy of a
statute is not a ground for invalidating it, and it is not for this Court to say how well the
statute succeeds in attaining its purpose; (3) the "need to avoid the danger of over-
checking the power of Congress to make laws," for such power is plenary in nature, while
courts should only invalidate laws that offend the Constitution; and (4) the duty to be
liberal in interpreting the constitutional provision giving our people a direct, participatory
role in the amendment of their fundamental law to meet their changing needs.
In this opinion, I am demonstrating in practical terms the step-by-step method of actually
implementing an initiative to amend the Constitution, to show beyond doubt the
sufficiency of the Roco law on initiative — RA 6735.
9.Sec. 10 of R.A. 6735 provides:
"Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of initiative or
referendum petition:
"(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
"(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90)
days after its effectivity."
10.42 Am. Jur. 2d, Â§26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer, 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d 475,
250 Ala 137; Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458; Hoxie v. Scott; 45 Neb
199, 63 NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176, 76 SE 203.
11.Second paragraph of Sec. 4, Art. XVII of the Constitution which states:
"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days not later than
ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of
the petition."
12.Sec. 7, R.A. 6735; Sec. 30, Comelec Res. 2300.
13.Sec. 12, ibid.; Sec. 32, ibid.
14.Sec. 8, ibid.; Secs. 33 & 34, ibid.
15.Supra, note 11.

16.Sec. 9(b), R.A. 6735.
17.The petition (p. 21) of PIRMA, et al. before the Comelec seeks to have this proposition
submitted to the people in a plebiscite:
"Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to
be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest
officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to
lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters
the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose Section 4 of Article VII, Section[s] 4
and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X respectively?"
The proposed amendments to the Constitution are the following:
"1. Sec. 4, Article VII . The President and the Vice President shall be elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six
years thereafter. Any person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for only one (1) subsequent election to the
same office at any time. No President and Vice-President shall serve for more than two
successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he
was elected.
"2. Sec. 4, Art. VI . The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
"3. Sec. 7, Art. VI . The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
"4. Sec. 8, Art. X . The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." [pp. 13-14]
18.Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution partly provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative . . ."
19.Section 7 of RA 8189 provides:
"Sec. 7. General Registration of Voters. — Immediately after the barangay elections in
1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For
purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives,
and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of
voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and, subject to
the discretion of the Commission, on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act."
Intervenor Joker P. Arroyo additionally points out that the signatures in the petition should
not only be compared with voters' affidavits as sought by PIRMA, but likewise with the
(1) registry list of voters and (2) voters' identification cards. He claims, however, that
"petitioners are barred from insisting that the signatures they had gathered can be
authenticated on the basis of the old voter's affidavits for the simple reason that the
latter have been nullified by operation of law." He adds, "For this reason, petition states
no cause of action over which this Honorable Court can exercise jurisdiction." [Petition in
Intervention, p. 5.]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that Sec. 7 of RA 8189, a general law on
election matters, cannot prevail over Sec. 7 of RA 6735, a special law dealing with
people's initiative, which declares the voting records used in the immediately preceding
elections (barangay elections in May 1997) as the basis for verification of the signatures
submitted in support of the petition. The statement in Sec. 7 of RA 8189, "[T]he existing
certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative," means that said list can
no longer be used for the purposes "of the May 1998 elections, and all elections,
plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto"; it does not necessarily
mean that the signatures of the registered voters in the list are no longer genuine and
cannot be used to verify the signatures of the 5,793,924 voters who signed the petition.
20.In a speech delivered at Harvard University on September 22, 1986, then President Corazon
C. Aquino talked of "hundreds of thousands" of Filipinos who took to the streets "to
make themselves a human shield for the military revolt." For brevity, we round off the
number to a million.
21.Respondent-Intervenor Miriam Defensor Santiago cites in her Comment-in-Intervention, an
article in the July 31, 1997 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 23, naming
alleged financiers of the movement to amend the Constitution in order to lift the term
limits of the President and other elective officials, as including PLDT President Antonio
Cojuangco and SMC Chief Executive Officer Andres Soriano III. I would have wanted a
judicial ascertainment of this and other allegations, a search made impossible by the
majority's theory of statutory inadequacy.
22.237 SCRA 279, 289, September 30, 1994.
23.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 405; also cited in Respondent Raul S.
Roco's Comment.
24.Transcript of Committee Meetings, Legislative 4, June 23, 1996, p. 23, cited in Respondent
Raul S. Roco's Comment.
25.Ibid., p. 2.
26.The petition in G.R. No. 127325 was filed on December 18, 1996, and this Court's Main
Decision was promulgated on March 19, 1997.
27.The motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1997, and this Court's Resolution was
promulgated on June 10, 1997.
28.Filed on July 28, 1997.
29.(1) Does the proposed change — the lifting of the term limits of elective officials —
constitute a mere amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution?
(2) Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition?
(3) Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the
people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension
who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests?
(4) Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified
warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
30.Appeals to this Court from any decision of the Comelec may be brought within thirty (30)
days from notice of such decision.
31.Approved en banc on September 16, 1997 (per Manila Bulletin, September 17, 1997 issue).
BELLOSILLO, J.:
1.Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325,19 March 1997.
2.Ibid.
3.An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, also known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
4.In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
5.Rollo of G.R. No. 127325, p. 17.

6.Later identified as People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA).
7.Sect. 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution provides that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein .
. . ."
8.The oppositors included Sen. Raul S. Roco, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol and Konstitusyon (DIK), the Public Interest Law Center (PILC),
and the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
9.See Rollo of G.R. No. 127325, pp. 11-12.
10.Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero, Messrs. Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr., and Justo P. Torres, Jr. concurred. Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took
no part. Messrs. Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo
J. Francisco, and Artemio V. Panganiban dissented. Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug wrote a
Separate Opinion.
11.Decision in G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, p. 33.
12.Id., p. 36.
13.Id., p. 37.
14.Resolution in G.R. No. 127325, 10 June 1997, p. 2.
15.PIRMA's co-petitioners were Spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, Alfonso Michael G.
Policarpio III, Eliza U. Salapantan, Horacio M. Montefrio, Support Initiatives for the Good
of the Nation (SIGN) Movement, Inc., Atty. Jose C. Calida, Mayor Monico L. Imperial Sr.
Memorial Foundation, Ma. Corazon K. Imperial, Movimiento sa Electoral na Reforma
Susug sa Initiativo kan Tawo (MERIT), Linda Montayre, Movement for Reform and
Enlightenment, Joaquin (Bobby) P. Yuseco, and Robert Ong, in behalf of at least 12% of
the registered voters from 204 legislative districts of the Republic of the Philippines.
16.PIRMA Petition before COMELEC, docketed as Special Matter No. 97-001, p. 21.
17.Clarified by the ponente, Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his Separate Opinion on
10 July 1997, to mean that RA No. 6735 is "unconstitutional or invalid since it fails to
comply with the completeness and sufficiency standard test."
18.Seven (7) Justices actually voted to maintain our decision in Santiago v. Comelec with
Justice Jose C. Vitug manifesting that his vote which was not counted earlier should
have been counted as a vote for affirmance.
19.Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. v. Jacala, 108 Phil. 177, 184 (1960).
20.Arguelles v. Young, G.R. No. 59880, 11 September 1987, 153 SCRA 690.
21.Decision in G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, p. 36.

22.See Comment of LAMP, p. 9, Rollo, p. 436.
23.Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82475, 28 January 1991, 193 SCRA 437.
24.Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
66059-60, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 728.
25.No. L-38892, 26 February 1988, 158 SCRA 194.
26.A similar but less familiar concept is the doctrine of the "law of the case," which means that
if an appellate court has passed upon a legal question and remanded the cause to the
court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate
court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal given the same case and
substantially the same facts (Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 61 Mich App 62, 232 NW 2d
302, and Hinds v. McNair, 413 NE 2d 606, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., pp.
886-887). Like res judicata, it is necessary to enable the courts to perform their duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, and as a matter of policy to end litigation. The doctrines
"law of the case" and res judicata are sometimes used interchangeably, although
technically, these are two distinct concepts.
27.Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, 31 July 1989, 175 SCRA 808, 811, 812;
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, 29 January 1993, 218
SCRA 118.
28.No. L-35440, 19 August 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. L-29689, 14 April
1978, 82 SCRA 337.
29.Clemente v. H.E. Heacock Co., 126 Phil. 443 (1967); Ibabao, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., G.R. No. 74848, 20 May 1987, 150 SCRA 76; Sangalang v. Caparas, et al.,
No. L-49749, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 53.
30.Paz v. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608 (1954).
31.See Note 21.

32.Decision, p. 33.
33.Ibid.
34.Id., p. 14.
35.Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951), citing Noel v. Olds, 78 US App. D.C. 155, 138 F2d 581,
586; Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 S2d 581, 586.
36.Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, p. 18.
37.Bernas, Joaquin G., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary , 1st
Ed., 1988, p. 571.
38.Gonzales v. Board of Pharmacy , 20 Phil. 367 (1911).

n Note from the Publisher: should read as 'shunned'.

167583-1997-People S Initiative For Reform Modernization

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167583-1997-People S Initiative For Reform Modernization

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129754. September 23, 1997.]

PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND ACTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Very truly yours,

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The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change

An ideal government exists and functions in accordance with, and in the

The Constitution allows, under certain conditions, the people to directly

"SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a

"xxx xxx xxx.

"If, as certi ed to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a

"(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of

"SEC. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The

but not simply to accommodate "perceived transitory needs," or prevailing and

Regrettably, the People's Initiative Will Have to Wait Awhile. —

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"a) GRANTING the instant petition;

"b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of

"c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the

"The temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made

"Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

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Underscoring the fundamental and permanent nature of a Constitution-as-

Constitutional "permanence" does not negate amendments appropriately called to

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

(2) A constitutional convention.

Section 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

xxx xxx xxx

Madam President, ours is a republican government which means a representative

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SUAREZ: DTCAES

The Committee regrets that it cannot accept the amendments by deletion

While Senate Bill No 17 8 includes a de nite procedure for a people's initiative to

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change

In recognition of this distinction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution consciously

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes).

Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing

We would be amenable except that, as we clari ed a while ago, this process of

xxx xxx xxx.

No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by

xxx xxx xxx.

From another perspective, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities

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A "petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term limits of elective o cials by

"Neither may we succumb to the arguments raised in ground 4 of the

We stated earlier that the issue of delegation of legislative

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xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission

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c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein; 9

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On 8 July 1997 the COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition thus —

Accordingly, petitioners may retrieve all the le folders containing the

This resolution effectively resolves the motions of movants-oppositors

As we have repeatedly enunciated, public policy and sound practice

The contention of the Solicitor General that there is no de nitive judgment in

This Court is likewise accused of overstepping the power of its o ce by declaring a