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www.brennancenter.org

Written Testimony of
Chisun Lee
Senior Counsel, Democracy Program
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 1

Submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Elections

at the Hearing Concerning Campaign Finance Reform and
a Small Donor Public Financing System for New York State

March 20, 2019

The Brennan Center is a nonpartisan law institute that for nearly 25 years has studied, litigated,
and drafted legislative solutions regarding money in politics, among other issues of democracy
and justice.

We urge this Legislature to approve small donor public financing as proposed by the Executive
in this year’s budget. Last year’s election showed that New Yorkers want a sea change in the
way our state conducts politics. And New Yorkers delivered the legislative majorities necessary
to make that change happen. Now is the time to act, finally, on promises made year after year.

Small donor public financing is not some vague, unexplored promise. The solution has been
known, proposed in virtually identical legislation by each Chamber and the Executive, and
carefully studied, for years. We have extensive research quantifying the enormity of big-donor
dominance in New York elections. We have research showing how the very $6-to-$1 match
program proposed in the current budget would dramatically change that balance. We have data-
based projections to show what the level of participation and cost is very likely to be. We have
solutions for funding the program, and we know that the relatively minimal cost will be recouped
in more efficient, accountable government decisions.

Last-minute alarms we have heard — about disabling candidates against independent

expenditures, out-of-control costs, a punitive compliance agency — do not reflect the actual facts
of the current proposal nor of the very similar proposals issued by Assembly and Senate
Democrats as recently as last year. In 2018, New Yorkers demanded change. It seems likely

1
The Brennan Center is a non-partisan public policy and law institute that focuses on the fundamental issues of
democracy and justice. The opinions expressed in this testimony are only those of the Brennan Center and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of NYU School of Law.
they would view any delay in passing this well-known and urgent pro-voter reform as a return to
business as usual in Albany.

Simply put, small donor public financing is the most powerful solution available in the age of
Citizens United to counter the overwhelming influence of wealth in politics. The U.S. House of
Representatives, including the entire New York Democratic delegation, just passed it as part of
their historic pro-democracy package known as H.R. 1. 2

New York needs it even more. We found that in 2018, small donations made up less than 5
percent of the money raised by New York state candidates — much less than the 19 percent of
money raised from small donors by federal candidates, which is already low. 3 The biggest 100
donors to New York candidates gave more than all the roughly 137,000 small donors combined. 4
The majority of contributions to New York candidates came from donors who gave more than
$10,000 each. 5 Even out-of-state donors outweighed New York’s small donors. Non-New
Yorkers gave this state’s candidates nearly three times as much as all small-donor New Yorkers
combined, almost all in gifts of $1,000 or more. 6

The voices of regular New Yorkers are drowned out by a handful of mega donors or, nearly as
bad, perceived to be. We hear about record low voter engagement in this state, and about deep
public cynicism. 7 The data show there is good reason for this public sentiment.

Data also show that the $6-to-$1 small donor match proposal in the executive budget would
dramatically increase the role of regular New Yorkers as donors. Had the program been in place
in 2018, the small donation share could have jumped from less than 5 percent of all fundraising
to nearly a third of all fundraising. 8

And this boost for small donors would not have come at a cost to candidates. To the contrary,
SUNY Albany professor Michael Malbin of the nonpartisan Campaign Finance Institute found
that, by using the $6-to-$1 match program, nearly every Assembly candidate in 2018 and 91
percent of Senate candidates would have raised as much as, or more than, they actually did. 9

Small donor public financing also affords candidates and constituents the benefit of greater
engagement with one another. Users of the New York City program, from numerous legislators
to now-Attorney General Letitia James, have praised this reform for, in her words, keeping them

2
Tim Lau, House Passes Historic Democracy Bill, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 8, 2019)
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/house-passes-historic-democracy-reform-bill.
3
We define “small donation” as $175 or less. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR SMALL DONOR
PUBLIC FINANCING IN NEW YORK STATE 2 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/small-donor-public-
financing-ny (attached as Attachment A).
4
The top 100 donors that live in New York state contributed $7,525,311 and an estimated 137,000 small donors
contributed $5,807,914. See id. at 2.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Close to 90 percent of out-of-state money came in donations of $1,000 or more. See id.
7
Id. at 2-3.
8
Id. at 9.
9
MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, SMALL-DONOR MATCHING FUNDS FOR NEW YORK STATE ELECTIONS
10 (2019), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/State/NY/Policy-Analysis_Public-Financing-in-NY-
State_Feb2019_wAppendix.pdf (attached as Attachment B).

2
“free from the stranglehold of . . . big donors” and giving them more time to represent all
constituents. 10

Regular New Yorkers understand these benefits. It is an extremely popular reform. Last
November 80 percent of New York City voters approved a ballot question to increase the city’s
public financing match from $6-to-$1 to $8-to-$1. Support was overwhelming all over. In the
Riverdale section of the Bronx, more than 80 percent were in favor. In Central and Southern
Queens, also more than 80 percent. In the South Bronx and Northeast Bronx, 85 percent voted
for the increase. Across most of Brooklyn, support was higher than 85 percent. 11 And Suffolk
County passed a small donor match program in 2017. 12

Small donor public financing is well understood by New York voters as the reform that will give
them a real voice in the mega donor-dominated era of Citizens United.

But recently we have seen reports of lawmakers voicing concerns that indicate a serious
misunderstanding of the current budget proposal. One common misconception is that the
proposal puts a spending cap on participating candidates and thus disables them from responding
to unlimited independent expenditures. This claim is simply false. There is no spending cap.
Candidates who max out on available public funds may keep privately raising money and
spending it without aggregate limits. Public financing is thus a floor that boosts candidates, not a
ceiling that limits them. And of course, candidates can choose not to participate in the voluntary
program in the first place.

Another misconception is that the program would attract unpredictably huge and costly numbers
of participants — that state elections would come to look like the recent special election for New
York City Public Advocate, where an unusually high number of candidates received matching
funds. 13 This claim is also false.

To begin with, that special election was a complete outlier even for New York City, with a
uniquely low threshold for qualifying for matching funds in a nonpartisan contest for a high-
profile office. The more sensible measure is the rate of participation in a normal election cycle.
Our review of the number of candidates who received matching funds in the city’s 2017 City
Council election cycle showed an average of under two candidates per seat. 14

10
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 11.
11
We determined support for Question 1 in specific areas of New York City by looking at the electoral results for
the ballot proposal by Assembly district. The specific calculations behind these assessments are on file with the
Brennan Center for Justice.
12
David M. Schwartz, Suffolk Legislature OKs public financing of county campaigns, NEWSDAY (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/suffolk-public-financing-1.15523881.
13
This statistic considers only the candidates who are recorded as having received the matching funds, not everyone
who is listed as a participant. See Press Release, New York City Campaign Finance Board, New Matching Funds
Program Sparks Higher Public Funds Payments and Increase in Small-Dollar Fundraising (Feb. 27, 2019)
https://www.nyccfb.info/media/press-releases/new-matching-funds-program-sparks-higher-public-funds-payments-
and-increase-in-small-dollar-fundraising/.
14
Using the New York City Campaign Finance Board Campaign Finance Summary for the 2017 Citywide
Elections, we determined the number of candidates for each City Council seat who received public financing –
including those who ran in both the primary and the general elections. We then took the average of the number of

3
And we have an estimate of the cost of a state program that uses actual state election trends.
Professor Malbin of the Campaign Finance Institute has projected a cost of approximately $60
million per year, assuming that every candidate on the ballot for a statewide or legislative office
in 2018 participated in the program — $39 million for matching funds, and $21 million for
administrative resources. 15 But the assumption of 100 percent participation is unrealistically
generous, as Malbin points out, because the qualification thresholds of total small-dollar
donations required to receive matching funds under the budget proposal are exceedingly high.
Fewer than a third of 2018 candidates would have qualified for public financing. 16 We
recommend that the qualification thresholds be lower. Malbin’s study provides reasonable
alternatives.

The relatively minimal cost of the public financing program would more than pay for itself in
more efficient and accountable government, as the Moreland Commission pointed out in its
endorsement of the reform. 17 Even so, there are additional funding streams to tap. The Majority
Leader’s 2018 small donor public financing bill included a surcharge on state securities fraud
penalties under the Martin Act — similar to surcharges in the federal measure the House just
passed. A surcharge could be placed on the sizeable fines won by the state’s Department of
Financial Services in fraud actions against banks and insurance companies. For example, in
2017, Deutsche Bank received a $425 million fine for involvement in money laundering, and
BNP Paribas received a $350 million fine for attempting to manipulate foreign exchange
currency prices. 18 And the current budget proposal allows a $40 tax checkoff.

Another misconception is that state public financing would come with a punitive compliance
regime. This is also false. The power to shape administration of this program lies in your hands.
We are able to offer specific legislative language to ensure procedural protections and decisional
standards that would avoid overly burdening candidates while still protecting the public fisc.
The budget bill already reflects a much less burdensome review process than the one New York
City follows, instead opting for Connecticut’s approach. Solutions exist for these concerns.

The Brennan Center urges this Legislature to approve the $6-to-$1 small donor public financing
program in the current proposed budget. The details, research, and solutions all exist in
abundance. There is nothing to be gained by delaying, and no good reason to do so. We are
ready to assist in finalizing this historic and long-awaited reform to restore New York’s
democracy. Thank you.

public financing recipients for the 51 districts and found that, on average, 1.86 candidates per City Council district
race received public financing. See Campaign Finance Summary 2017 Citywide Elections, NEW YORK CITY
CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD.,
https://www.nyccfb.info/VSApps/WebForm_Finance_Summary.aspx?as_election_cycle=2017&sm=press_12&sm=
press_12 (last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
15
MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 9, at 12.
16
Id. at 14.
17
COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE PUBLIC CORRUPTION, STATE OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY REPORT 47 (2013),
https://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/default/files/moreland_report_final.pdf.
18
NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2017),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/reportpub/annual/dfs_annualrpt_2017.pdf.

4
ATTACHMENT A
 The Case for
Small Donor
Public Financing in
New York State

Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law

Table of Contents

What Is Small Donor Public Financing? 1

Introduction 2

New York’s Big Donor–Dominated Politics 3

The Small Donor Solution 4

The Benefits 8

Conclusion 11

Endnotes 12
 What Is Small Donor
Public Financing?

Small donor public financing is the most powerful, proven solution available to counter
the overwhelming influence of wealth on our political process in the aftermath of
the Citizens United decision, which gave the green light to unlimited special interest
spending. It is built on six components:

 A
 $6-to-$1 match of small donations. For each small contribution by an in-state
resident, a candidate for a state office would receive six times that amount in public
money. A contribution of $10 would then be worth $70. This would boost the voices of
regular New Yorkers.

 Q
 ualifying thresholds. To ensure that funds are not wasted on frivolous or
uncompetitive candidates, public financing participants would have to first
demonstrate reasonable levels of support by collecting a minimum number of small
donations from constituents.

 R
 educed contribution limits. New York’s contribution limits are currently sky high.
Individuals can give as much as $69,700 to a candidate for statewide office, $19,300
to a state Senate candidate, and $9,400 to a state Assembly candidate in an election
cycle.1 That’s much higher than federal contribution limits or those in most states.
Candidates participating in small donor public financing would be required to agree
to lower limits, to further the program’s goal of focusing fundraising on everyday
constituents and voters rather than deep-pocketed donors.

 A
 cap on public funds, but no limits on total fundraising or spending. Participating
candidates would be able to compete in the face of unlimited independent spending
after Citizens United. They would be allowed to raise private funds even after hitting the
public funding cap, subject to individual contribution limits, and to spend without limit
if they need to do so.

 Transparency and oversight. To protect New York’s investment of public funds, the
program would require public disclosure by participating candidates of fundraising
and spending and enforce compliance rules effectively. Drawing on experience in
Connecticut, it would establish effective oversight while making compliance easy and
inexpensive.

 Adequate and reliable funding. If the program had been in place in 2018, even an
aggressive projection of the cost to New York — assuming that every candidate opted
in — would have come to less than 1/10 of one percent of the state budget for funding
and administration, or less than a penny per day per New Yorker.2

T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 1
 Introduction: The Moment
N
ew York State has a chance to take a bold step to
strengthen democracy: enacting small donor public
financing. This system has worked for decades in
New York City. Expanded to state elections, it would be
the biggest single response in the nation to the decision
in Citizens United. And it would meet a surging public
demand for change.
Countering big money in elections would help transform
New York politics. It would free legislators to better
represent their constituents. It would bolster the diversity
of donors, officeholders, and candidates. It would curb
corruption. It would respond to the explosion of civic
engagement seen in the 2018 election and boost it further.
And it would enhance public confidence.3
Reshaping the way campaigns are financed is widely
popular; all across the country, the public has demanded
reform.4 The very first bill introduced in the new U.S.
House of Representatives — H.R. 1 — would enact small
donor public financing nationwide.5 With opposition
from the Senate majority leader, that package will likely
not become law this year.6 But with a governor and a new
majority in the state legislature that have expressed support
for progressive change, New York has the chance to lead.
How does small donor public financing work?
Constituents who give small amounts to participating
candidates will see their contributions matched by public
money.7 The system is voluntary: Candidates opt in by
raising enough small initial donations to qualify, and they
accept conditions including lower contribution limits.8
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s current proposal would
provide a $6-to-$1 match on each private contribution of
up to $175. Under this formula, a constituent donation
of $10 would be worth $70 to a participating candidate,
and $175 would be worth $1,225. The Assembly passed a
similar bill several years ago, and leaders of both legislative
houses have proposed comparable plans in the past.9
The system reviewed in this report is based on New York
City’s program, considered to be the nation’s best. The
city’s system has transformed the political participation of
non-wealthy residents both as donors and as candidates.
The vast majority of candidates who run for district
or citywide office participate in the program.10 In the
past few years alone, eight local governments including
Washington, D.C., and Suffolk County, New York,
have adopted similar reforms.11 Following the 2010
Citizens United decision, which enabled unlimited special
interest spending, and with a Supreme Court today that
is unlikely to reverse course soon, small donor public
2 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
financing is the most powerful solution available to
counter the influence of wealth on our political process.
New York State needs this transformative change. For too
long, Albany has fostered a “pay-to-play political culture
[that] is greased by a campaign finance system in which
large donors set the legislative agenda,” as the Moreland
Commission to Investigate Public Corruption put it in
2013.12 In 2018 big donors almost completely dominated
New York’s state elections. The top 100 donors gave more
to candidates than all of the estimated 137,000 small
donors combined.13 Small donations made up 5 percent
of all money given to New York State candidates — a far
smaller share than the 19 percent in small donations at the
federal level in 2018.14 Between a system that enables huge
donations to dominate, and processes that make it too
hard to vote, it is little wonder that New York suffers one
of the lowest civic engagement records in the country.15
Now, with a new Democratic majority in the Senate for
the first time in a decade, it is time for change . . . . .
[W]e must set up a public finance system in which the
state would give six dollars for each dollar donated by
a member of our community . . . . Throughout our lives,
despite all our efforts to organize and push for laws
that would benefit us, the voices of our community have
not been heard sufficiently in Albany. Now we have the
opportunity to transform our state’s democracy. We
cannot lose."i
– Assemblymember Maritza Davila,
Op-Ed, El Diario, December 19, 2018
This is the year to enact small donor public financing.
Governor Cuomo’s current proposal closely resembles bills
recently carried by now-Senate Majority Leader Andrea
Stewart-Cousins and by Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie,
presenting a genuine chance for change. A broad and
diverse coalition of more than 200 groups has joined to
press lawmakers to finally enact this powerful democracy
reform that they have supported in name for years. The
coalition includes major unions; environmental, racial
justice, and reproductive rights groups; politically active
community organizations; and business and civic leaders.16
By taking this step, New York would lead the nation.
It would be the first to enact a robust small donor
matching program statewide. Passage would send a
message to the nation that even in the age of Citizens
United, transformative change to take back democracy for
everyday people is still possible.
 New York’s Big Donor–Dominated Politics
Since Citizens United, a small group of wealthy
megadonors have come to dominate U.S. election
financing.17 The problem is especially acute in New York
State. Not only do big donors have a disproportionate
impact on the political system, but small donors play
virtually no role at all. It’s a sharply tilted political system
that gives a tiny number of big donors big power.
Like many others running this year, I worked hard to raise
the majority of my donations from small donors. But
the temptation to make shortcuts and take the $18,000
windfalls is very strong. A system of matching funds for
small, local donations turns campaign fundraising into a
positive exercise in participatory democracy.”ii
– Sen. Rachel May, Op-Ed, Syracuse Post-Standard, February 1, 2019
Today New York State has unusually lax campaign finance
rules. Individuals can give as much as $69,700 to a
candidate for statewide office, $19,300 to a state Senate
candidate, and $9,400 to a state Assembly candidate in an
election cycle.18 (The federal cap on individual donations
is $5,600 per election cycle.)19
As a result, big donors almost completely dominated the
2018 New York State elections, with small donors pushed
to the sidelines:
 The top 100 donors gave more to candidates than all
of the estimated 137,000 small donors combined.20
(This does not even include the millions of dollars
contributed by LLCs and corporations, which would
skew the data even further to the wealthiest donors.)
 Small donations amounted to only 5 percent of all
funds raised by candidates in New York State in the
2018 election cycle. This was the smallest source of
funding to candidates.21
 The majority of funds to candidates came from
people or entities who gave more than $10,000.22
The most recent available studies by the nonpartisan
Campaign Finance Institute show that New York
consistently ranks among the worst states in the country
when it comes to small donor participation.23
At a time when diversity is rising as a social value, the
T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 3
campaign finance system amplifies the voices of only a
few New Yorkers. Big New York donors underrepresent
the geographic, socioec‍onomic, and racial diversity of the
state. In the 2018 New York State elections:24
 Two-thirds of big donors (who gave $10,000 or
more) came from just three affluent counties: New
York, Nassau, and Westchester.
 Big donors typically lived in neighborhoods that
were whiter and wealthier and had more college-
educated and employed people than neighborhoods
where small donors lived.
 Donors from out of state gave nearly three times
more than all small-donor New Yorkers combined.
Close to 90 percent of that out-of-state money came
in donations of $1,000 or more.
Today’s big-money politics, of course, tilts policy. Tax
policy, environmental policy, real estate regulation, and
more are shaped by the contours of the political money
system. A massive study of federal policies over two
decades found that the class of “economic elites” in the
United States has “substantial” impact on government
decisions, while “average citizens have little or no
independent influence.”25
So, too, in New York. The Moreland Commission found
that “access to elected officials comes at a price, and that
the fight over legislation is often between entities with
vast financial resources at their disposal.”26 It concluded,
“When political power and access is so closely and
disproportionately tied to large donations, the majority of
New Yorkers are shut out of the political process.”27
Events of recent years have created a wide public
perception of corruption in New York State. Governor
Cuomo established the Moreland Commission in 2013
“in response to an epidemic of public corruption that has
infected this State.”28 The group of more than two dozen
ethics scholars, prosecutors, defense attorneys, federal
officials, and other civic leaders reported:
In recent years, too many local and state elected officials,
staff members, and party leaders have been indicted
and convicted for offenses running the gamut of shame:
bribery, embezzlement, self-dealing, and fraud....One out
of every eleven legislators to leave office since 1999 has
done so under the cloud of ethical or criminal violations,
and multiple sitting officials are facing indictments on
public corruption charges.29

As we continue our own work to empower women, . .
. . we urge the New York state government to act . . . .
Implementing a voluntary public campaign financing
system for all legislative and statewide races in New
York into law is within our reach. The governor and the
Legislature must move this proposal past the finish
line. New York deserve nothing less.”iii
– Senate Majority Leader (then Senate Democratic Leader)
Andrea Stewart-Cousins and Attorney General (then New York City
Public Advocate) Letitia James, Op-Ed, Journal News and LoHud,
March 22, 2014.
The Commission also cited numerous instances where
moneyed interests were accused of offering quid pro quo
exchanges of donations for favors.30
The Small Donor Solution
A small donor public financing system offers the best
chance to improve politics in New York. It is based on —
and enhances — the successful system used in New York
City and recently enacted in Suffolk County, and it has
the following features.
We may not be able to shut off the spigot of money into
the system, but by providing public financing we can
increase public participation and ensure that deserving
candidates, not only rich and well-connected ones, have
an opportunity to run and compete for elected office.”iv
– Gov. Andrew Cuomo, Op-Ed, Huffington Post, May 6, 2014.
1. $6-to-$1 Match of Small Donations
Governor Cuomo’s current small donor public financing
proposal would provide $6 in public funds for every $1 of
a donation from a New York resident up to $175, similar
to New York City’s longtime model.36 Previous bills in the
Senate and Assembly have also provided a $6-to-$1 match,
though the matchable amount has varied, up to $250.
A multiple match on small donations, especially combined
with lower contribution limits (discussed below), provides
a strong incentive for candidates to spend more time
raising money from and talking to their own constituents.
Officeholders who have campaigned in both New York
4 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
In the past decade, 19 New York State legislators have
been convicted on federal corruption charges, giving
New York one of the worst records in the nation.31,32 A
2015 analysis by FiveThir‍‍‍‍tyEight found that from 1976 to
2010, New York had more public officials convicted on
federal corruption charges than any other state.33
New Yorkers want better for their state. A 2018 poll
found that 85 percent of New Yorkers think government
corruption is either a “very serious” or a “somewhat
serious” problem.34 And recent polls consistently
show that large numbers of New Yorkers want state
officeholders to reduce the influence of money in politics
and end corruption.35 Stronger campaign finance laws
would help yield higher voter engagement. Public anger
about corruption helps dampen participation. The sense
that only big donors have a say gives voters less reason to
turn out and engage politically in other ways.
City’s small donor public financing program and the
state’s private financing system confirm this. Attorney
General Letitia James, for instance, explained to the press
that in running for statewide office, she needed to raise
funds from the biggest donors to compete, in contrast to
the way she could turn to constituents for support when
she ran under the city’s system.37
The Campaign Finance Institute found that New York
City’s small donor public financing program “brought
more low-dollar donors into the system,” leading to
a “substantial increase not only in the proportional
role of small donors but in their absolute numbers
per candidate.”38 In essence the reform, by increasing
the value of small donors’ modest contributions, can
transform candidates into agents of civic participation
who bring more — and new — constituents into the
political process.
The table on page 5 makes plain the multiplier effect of a
$6-to-$1 match on contributions up to $175 from New
Yorkers. Adjusting the matchable amount to $250, as in
last year’s State Senate bill, does not change the essential
mechanisms of the program.
To ensure that small donor public financing meets its
intended purpose — to encourage candidates to seek
reasonable support from constituents rather than huge
checks from wealthy interests or out-of-state donors —
certain restrictions should apply to contributions that are
matched. For instance, as mentioned above, contributions
 Table 1: The value of New Yorkers’ small donations after a $6-to-$1 match, compared
with other donations under Governor Cuomo’s proposal.
Contributor Contribution Amount
New Yorker $10
New Yorker $50
New Yorker $175
Out-of-State Donor $250
Corporations/LLC/PAC $1,000
should be matched only up to a modest amount —
$175 or $250, as New York bills have specified. And
only donations from human beings — who could give
to multiple candidates — residing in New York State
should be matched. The governor’s current bill and recent
proposals of the Legislature all contain such restrictions
on matchable contributions.
2. Reduced Contribution Limits
New York State’s contribution limits are unusually high.
Individuals can give as much as $69,700 to a candidate for
statewide office, $19,300 to a state Senate candidate, and
$9,400 to a state Assembly candidate in an election cycle.39
These limits are so high that, according to the Moreland
Commission, “they can scarcely be called limits at all.”40
Any comprehensive campaign finance proposal for Albany
should decrease contribution limits for all candidates.
Candidates who wish to participate in small donor
public financing should, in exchange for receiving public
matching funds, be held to still lower contribution
limits. The reduced contribution limits for participating
candidates, coupled with a multiple match on small
donations, would further encourage these candidates to
focus their fundraising efforts on constituents who cannot
afford to write the large checks that current limits allow.
3. A Cap on Public Funds, but No Limits on Total
Fundraising or Spending by Candidates Who
Participate in Public Financing
Unlike some other plans, proposals in Albany for small
donor public financing, including the governor’s current
bill, have not set limits on how much participating
candidates would be able to spend. The Brennan Center
supports this choice, which acknowledges the perception
and occasional reality in the post–Citizens United era
that campaigns will have to contend with high spending
by independent expenditure groups such as super PACs.
T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 5
Total Value of Contribution
Match Amount
to Candidate
$60 $70
$300 $350
$1,050 $1,225
$0 $250
$0 $1,000
Candidates should not have to skip the benefits of public
financing because they fear they will not be able to run a
competitive campaign.
Participating candidates would be free to continue to raise
funds privately, subject to individual contribution limits,
once they maxed out on public funding. To limit the total
expense of a public financing system, Governor Cuomo’s
bill, as with all recent proposals, sets a maximum in
available matching funds for each type of office.41
[T]he matching funds program . . . . has helped us
transform how we serve our constituents. [In New
York City], I have no choice but to listen to and engage
the [constituents] in an overall discussion about what
direction the city should go. I think the campaign finance
program has a lot to do with that. And I really think that
how we do it in New York should serve as a model for
the rest of the country.”v
—City Councilmember Eric Ulrich, in “Breaking Down Barriers: The
Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,” 2016.
4. Qualifying Thresholds
To ensure that funds are not wasted on frivolous or
uncompetitive campaigns, candidates seeking to join a
small donor public financing program should first have
to demonstrate a viable base of support by collecting
a minimum number of small donations in New York.
Governor Cuomo’s bill includes a qualifying threshold of
$650,000 in small donations for gubernatorial candidates,
made up of at least 6,500 small contributions (between
$10 and $175) from New York residents. Similarly,
candidates for state Senate would have to raise $20,000,
including at least 200 small contributions, and candidates
 Table 2: Limits on matching funds under Governor Cuomo’s proposal.
Matching Funds
Office
Cap – Primary
Governor $8 million
Lieutenant Governor $4 million
Attorney General $4 million
Comptroller $4 million
Senate $375,000
Assembly $175,000
for State Assembly would have to collect $10,000,
including at least 100 small contributions.42
Imagine if you could spend a little less time [making
fundraising calls], and a little more time in someone’s
living room, listening to concerns that they have,
hearing the ideas that they may have. You can become
a much more engaged and responsive candidate and
hopefully elected official.”vi
— Sen. José M. Serrano, in “Breaking Down Barriers: The Faces of
Small Donor Public Financing,” 2016.
According to an analysis by the Campaign Finance
Institute, only 17 percent of gubernatorial candidates
in 2018 would have qualified for funding. In the state
Senate and Assembly, only 29 percent and 28 percent
of candidates, respectively, would have qualified.43 Yet
candidates can change those results, the analysis observes,
by changing their fundraising strategies. Indeed, the point
of small donor public financing “is to give [candidates] a
good reason to look for small donors from their districts.”
That said, the thresholds should not be so inaccessible
that candidates do not even try to take advantage of
matching funds. The CFI report concludes that “the
sponsors would be well advised to revise the qualification
requirements as they perfect a new bill.”44
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Matching Funds
Total Matching Funds Cap
Cap – General
$18 million (including
$10 million (shared with $10 million shared with
lieutenant governor) lieutenant governor in
general election)
$14 million (including $10
$10 million (shared with
million shared with gover-
governor)
nor in general election)
$4 million $8 million
$4 million $8 million
$375,000 $750,000
$175,000 $350,000
The New York City program’s thresholds may provide
guidance for determining the qualifying levels for state
elections. To receive the city’s match in the 2021 elections,
mayoral candidates must raise $250,000 from at least 1,000
small-dollar contributors residing in New York City. City
Council candidates must raise $5,000 from at least 75 small-
dollar contributors residing in their districts.45
5. Transparency and Oversight
A successful public financing program requires fair
and efficient oversight, with ample support services so
that candidates can participate without having to hire
sophisticated compliance staff. This oversight should
include standard internal processes to identify and resolve
minor reporting or administrative issues, to ensure that
only sufficiently serious issues receive a formal compliance
review, and to make sure that all candidates are treated
equally. Also necessary is public disclosure of participants’
compliance with requirements such as individual
contribution limits, to preserve the integrity of the
program and the public’s trust.
This proposal improves on the New York City system
and its enforcement methods. Many legislators in New
York State are familiar with the Campaign Finance Board,
the agency charged with oversight of New York City’s
public financing system. Lessons learned from candidates’
experience with the CFB have been incorporated into
current public financing proposals in New York State.
Connecticut has a statewide public financing program
that also provides important insight for how New York
can achieve transparency and robust compliance in its
public financing program without unduly burdening
candidates. Connecticut’s State Elections Enforcement
Commission (SEEC) has developed a reputation among
candidates for being supportive and committed to
minimizing undue administrative burdens, and its public
financing program has only grown in popularity, with a
record 335 candidates receiving funds in 2018.46
One significant decision Connecticut’s SEEC made to
reduce the burden of compliance on candidates was to
restrict postelection audits to no more than 50 percent of
all legislative campaigns, selected by lottery (weighted by
recency of any past audit), although all statewide office
campaigns do get audited.47 Even though this lottery
method is less burdensome to candidates than New York
City’s approach of auditing 100 percent of campaigns,
the SEEC reports that its system has been effective
at enforcing compliance. Governor Cuomo’s current
proposal contains an audit procedure like Connecticut’s.48
6. Ensuring an Adequate Funding Stream
To serve the democracy-enhancing interests of New York
State and the need of participating candidates for sufficient
funds to compete, the small donor public financing
program must receive adequate and reliable funding.
The Campaign Finance Institute analyzed what it would
cost to sustain the program proposed in Governor
Cuomo’s current bill. Its most aggressive estimate —
which assumes that every statewide and legislative
candidate in 2018 would opt in and that a far greater
number of donors would make matchable contributions
than is currently the case — is an annual cost of
Opponents of matching programs like NYC’s will use
twisted logic to try to convince you that taxpayers
shouldn’t have to pay for candidates’ campaigns. They
want you to believe that you can have something for
free — elected officials who will represent what you
need, even though they are paid for by wealthy donors
whose interests are the opposite of yours. The truth
is, if we don’t pay for our elected officials’ campaigns
directly, we will most certainly pay indirectly, through
higher rents, higher health costs, and higher prices on
everything else big donors have to sell. So which would
you choose?”vii
– Sen. Alessandra Biaggi, Op-Ed,
The Journal News/lohud.com, February 4, 2019.
$38.6 million in disbursements and $20.9 million in
administrative costs.49 The $59.5 million total amounts to
less than 0.1 percent of the state’s $175 billion budget, or
less than a penny a day per New Yorker.
The bill designates funding for the public financing
program from a $40 tax check-off ($80 for joint filers),
the abandoned property fund, contributions from
individuals and organizations, transfers from other
funds or sources when authorized by law, and backup
funding from the general fund.50 But as the Moreland
Commission noted, once small donor public financing
begins to take effect and reduces government favors for
powerful donors, “the elimination of just one wasteful tax
expenditure or one unnecessary spending program could
cover the full cost of the program.”51

Table 3: Comparison of small donor public financing qualifying thresholds in a proposed program
for New York State and in New York City’s established program.

Governor Cuomo’s Proposed New York City’s 2021

Qualifying Thresholds Qualifying Thresholds

Executive Office
Mayoral candidates:
Gubernatorial candidates:
$250,000 from 1,000 small donors ($175
$650,000 from 6,500 small donors
or less, or $250 or less, depending
(between $10 and $175)
on program option chosen)

State Senate State Assembly

candidates: candidates: City Council candidates: $5,000 from
Legislative Office
$20,000 from 200 $10,000 from 100 75 small donors
small donors small donors

T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 7
 Public Financing in the Era of Super PACs
Would small donor public financing matter in the age of super PACs and dark money? Yes. In fact, it is the
only reform that can counter the corrosive impact that such groups have had on our politics, altering a
dynamic that has given an increasingly large voice to a tiny number of big donors at the expense of regular
constituents.

Importantly, none of the current proposals caps what participating candidates can raise or spend. So if
a candidate faces super PAC spending, she can continue to raise money from private donors to counter
independent expenditures even after she has reached the maximum public cap.

This reform does not pretend to take all private money out of the political system. The Supreme Court
would not allow such a reform in any case. But it gives candidates a chance to forge a campaign fueled by
constituents while retaining the ability to fight outside money without having to resort to dark money.

Already, New York State has taken key steps that limit the ability of super PACs to have undue influence
on candidates. It was the first state to enact accountability measures for online ads; it has also demanded
increased disclosure and banned coordination between candidates and super PACs. A small donor public
financing system would complement these changes, allowing candidates to focus on small donors,
amplifying the voice of everyday constituents, bringing greater diversity, and inspiring a much-needed
renewal of public faith in government.

The Benefits
1. Increasing the Voice of Small Donors
Public financing would increase the importance of small
donors. Applying the $6-to-$1 match to donations from
New Yorkers in 2018 state contests, as well as other
aspects of Governor Cuomo’s public financing proposal,
we find a dramatic increase in the proportion of money
candidates would have raised from small donors (see
Figures 1, 2, and 3 on page 9).
small donors in future elections would be even greater.
In a recent study, the Campaign Finance Institute noted
that while it is impossible to know how many more small
donors would participate if the state adopted a public
financing program, a threefold increase in small donors
is reasonable to expect. Figure 3 (on page 9) shows the
impact that such an increase in small donations would
have had on the share of funds from small donors in 2018.

Experience in New York City and elsewhere shows that
adopting a small donor public financing system can lead
to candidates engaging more of their constituents when
fundraising, and voters responding by adding their voices
with more small donations. If this were to happen in New
York State (as we expect), the percentage of funds from
The Campaign Finance Institute further broke down
what this kind of increase in small donor giving would
have meant in 2018:52
 Assembly candidates would have raised more than
four times as much from small donors, making
small donors the single largest source of Assembly
campaign funds.

 Senate candidates would have raised six times as

[Public financing] gives members of the public the ability
to feel much more vested in the elections process, . .
. . that they’re not powerless against the high money
interest, but that they too, through the matching
funds program, can be very significant in supporting
candidates who they believe represent the issues that
they care about.”viii
— Sen. José M. Serrano, in “Breaking Down Barriers: The Faces of
Small Donor Public Financing,” 2016.”
much from small donors.
 Small donors would have been the biggest source of
funding for a majority of legislative candidates.
 Nearly every Assembly candidate and 91 percent
of Senate candidates would have raised at least as
much as they actually did, if not more, if they had
participated in a small donor public financing system.

8 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
2. Allowing Candidates to Focus on Their Figure 1: Small donation share of all contributions to candidates
in 2018 New York State elections under the status quo.
Constituents Instead of on Big Donors
One whispered concern among lawmakers about adopting
small donor public financing is their assumption that  mall
S
donations by
it will serve to displace incumbents. But as longtime 5% individuals
users of the New York City program have noted, and as 11% ($175 and
below)
independent studies have confirmed, the chief impact of
 onations by
D
the reform is to enable all candidates to shift their focus individuals
(between $176
from deep-pocketed donors to constituents — not to and $2,000)
advantage any type of candidate over another.53  onations by
D
26% individuals
58% (above
$2,000)

Donations by
entities (PACs,
We need a small-donor public financing system that unions, and
allows grassroots candidates to compete against a corporations)

corporate-driven financing system that now exists.

Small donor matching makes it easier for elected
officials to represent the values of the people of New Figure 2: Small donation share if Governor Cuomo’s $6-to-$1
public financing proposal had applied in the 2018 New York
York by encouraging candidates to spend their time
State elections.
talking to regular voters. If we do not change how
elections are financed in New York, we will never be
able to truly win for tenants.”ix  mall
S
donations by
— Sen. Zellnor Myrie, Op-Ed, New York Daily News, January 14, 2019 individuals
23% ($175 and
30% below)

 onations by
D
individuals
Small donor public financing enables people to win and (between $176
and $2,000)
stay in office by being more representative of constituents
than of wealthy donors.54 Attorney General Letitia James 17%  onations by
D
individuals
said in a 2015 interview, when she was New York City’s (above
$2,000)
Public Advocate, that she “would not be in this position
but for campaign finance reform and the support of 30% Donations by
entities (PACs,
working-class people.”55 In a speech last year, she said unions)*
that participating in small donor public financing meant
that “I’m free from the stranglehold of ...big donors
demanding meetings and policy changes. Every New
Figure 3: Small donation share (with increased small donor
Yorker ...know[s] they can come to my door, and their participation) if Governor Cuomo’s $6-to-$1 public financing
voices will be heard. Because every elected official in proposal had applied in the 2018 New York State elections.
this country needs the freedom to represent the interest
of Americans. And it is through public financing that
 mall
S
we will get one step closer to ensuring that our elected donations by
representatives are representatives of our electorate.”56 8% individuals
($175 and
below)
This benefit applies to officeholders as well as candidates. 17%
 onations by
D
In Albany, a small donor public financing system would individuals
45% (between $176
enable elected officials to spend more time and energy and $2,000)
on their constituents. The Moreland Commission noted,  onations by
D
“Instead of having to shape their official actions to the individuals
(above
values and concerns of large donors, elected officials and $2,000)
candidates will be able to focus on ordinary citizens.”57 30%
Donations by
entities (PACs,
unions)*
Increasing the relative importance of small donors
also increases the diversity of viewpoints influencing *The Governor’s campaign finance reform package also bans corporations from
officeholders who court contributors. In the 2018 New making direct contributions.

T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 9

Matching funds from campaign finance gives
candidates a chance to involve community members
and get people excited about the campaign. Especially
at a time when I did not have political support from
traditional political organizations or elected officials, it
was a grassroots movement and campaign financing
really helped me.”x
– City Councilmember Margaret Chin, in the “Breaking Down Barriers:
The Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,” 2016.
York State elections, small donors lived in neighborhoods
that were far more representative of the real makeup of
New York than big donors’ neighborhoods in terms of
race, income, and education level.58 Small donors also
hailed from every county in the state.59
The prospect of amplifying the power of constituents like
hers in Bushwick, Brooklyn, prompted Assemblymember
Maritza Davila and community board member Gladys
Puglla to make a powerful case for enacting statewide
small donor public financing. In an op-ed in El Diario
last December, they argued that Davila’s constituents need
more resources for public schools, affordable housing,
and immigrant protection. The state’s inability to produce
results, they said, “in large part, is due to a system that
allows the rich and large corporations to give massive
contributions to protect their interests, without giving an
opportunity to working class and low-income people to
raise their voices.”60 Further, they argued:
Now, with a new Democratic majority in the Senate
for the first time in a decade, it is time for change....
[We must transform our democracy....[W]e must set
up a public finance system in which the state would
give six dollars for each dollar donated by a member of
our community....which would benefit the candidate
and assure that the candidate is looking for help from
African-Americans, Latinos and women on average
have less disposable income to contribute to political
campaigns. [Small donor public financing] reduces
the disparity in political participation based on wealth,
and empowers groups who, historically, have been
disproportionately less powerful in the political process.”xi
– Former Manhattan Borough President C. Virginia Fields, “Small
Donor Matching Funds: The NYC Election Experience,” 2010.”
10 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
within our communities — not just from the rich who
can send large checks....Throughout our lives, despite
all our efforts to organize and push for laws that would
benefit us, the voices of our community have not
been heard sufficiently in Albany. Now we have the
opportunity to transform our state’s democracy. We
cannot lose.61
3. Changing the Perception of Cronyism and
Corruption in Albany
To address “an epidemic of public corruption that has
infected this State,” the Moreland Commission in 2013
urged “[f ]undamental reform” to the state’s campaign
finance system “that promotes public trust and democracy,
changes our pay-to-pay political culture, and empowers
ordinary New Yorkers.” 62 Its top recommendation:
enacting small donor public financing. The reform would
work against the state’s culture of big-money cronyism by
“leveraging the power of ordinary individuals and reducing
the influence of large donors and special interest money.”63
The success of small donor public financing in New York
City shows how transformative this reform could be for
the state. Downstate, just three decades ago, cronyism
and bribery ran rampant through City Hall. Campaign
finance reform, centered on public financing, was a major
part of the city’s response. Although occasional donor-
related scandals still arise, systemic corruption among
the city’s elected officials has by all accounts decreased
substantially. In the past decade, while New York State
racked up a troubling record of 19 federal corruption
convictions of legislators, New York City saw only four.64
As a 2018 New York magazine article put it, “it would be
hard to find a cleaner, more dynamic, more progressive,
and less corrupt big city in America.”65
Beyond reducing outright corruption, the Moreland
Commission noted, small donor public financing would
reduce the financial wastefulness of governance based on
cronyism. It wrote that “the Commission believes that
reducing the role of big donors in financing campaigns
will reduce in turn the pressures donors place on our
elected officials to provide targeted tax breaks for special
interests and to spend public funds on pork barrel projects
of doubtful public value.”66 Once small donor public
financing begins to take effect at the state level, “the
elimination of just one wasteful tax expenditure or one
unnecessary spending program could cover the full cost of
the program.”67
Newspapers that have covered state corruption scandals
for years have called on Albany to use its new governing
majority to enact small donor public financing as a part
of comprehensive campaign finance reform. Lawmakers
must “approve public financing of statewide elections
along the lines of New York City to help take special-
interest money out of elections or at least reduce its
importance,” wrote the editorial board of Long Island’s
The Island Now.68 “The short but urgent list includes
campaign finance reforms that reduce the influence of big
money in politics,” wrote the Albany Times Union’s editors,
who go on to suggest “a fair, honest and affordable system
of publicly-funded elections.”69 The Times Herald–Record
urged legislators “to reduce the temptation and corruption
that money has on elections following the example of
New York City which is moving toward more public
funding of elections.”70 Newsday called public financing
“probably the best solution” to the corrosive influence
of big money on the state’s politics.71 The New York
Times, which has long urged the legislature to adopt this
transformative change, has called it “the most crucial
reform of all.”72
Conclusion: Excelsior
Albany’s new governing majority took office this
January with the promise of a new day. They would not
do business as usual. They would move long-awaited
progressive reforms swiftly to passage. The people of New
York could count on them.
So far, the governor and legislature have been true to their
word. Early voting passed quickly. So did the Gender
Expression Non-Discrimination Act, the Reproductive
Health Act, and the DREAM Act. These are significant
and even bold actions. But along with them has come the
quiet message that not everything worthy can happen this
year. Some changes may take patience. Lawmakers may
not be ready for some of the biggest ones.
The urgency of achieving small donor public financing
for New York State cannot be overstated. That’s because,
as Senate Elections Committee Chair Zellnor Myrie
wrote in the Daily News in January with Jonathan Westin,
T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 11
[With public financing] I’m free from the stranglehold of.
. .big donors demanding meetings and policy changes.
Every New Yorker . . . know[s] they can come to my
door, and their voices will be heard . . . . [E]very elected
official in this country needs the freedom to represent
the interest of Americans. And it is through public
financing that we will get one step closer to ensuring
that our elected representatives are representatives of
our electorate.”xii
— New York Attorney General (then Public Advocate) Letitia James,
speech at Unrig the System Summit, February 2018.
executive director of New York Communities for Change,
“It doesn’t matter who’s in power. Where the power goes,
the money follows.”73 A new day for Albany could all too
quickly become business as usual, they warned.
A champion of tenants’ rights in his Brooklyn district,
Myrie noted how quickly real estate developers had
switched their support in the final days of the election
from their traditional Republican advocates to the Senate
Democrats who were clearly about to prevail. “If we do
not change how elections are financed in New York, we
will never be able to truly win for tenants,” he and Westin
wrote. “We need a small-donor public financing system
that....makes it easier for elected officials to represent the
values of the people of New York.”74
This year Albany has the rare chance to restore faith in
democracy for all New Yorkers. That faith will reverberate
across the nation. It is a chance too precious to let slip away.
Endnotes
1 New York State Board of Elections, “Contribution
Limits,” accessed February 15, 2019, https://www.
elections.ny.gov/cfcontributionlimits.html#Limits.
2 Michael J. Malbin and Brendan Glavin, “Small-Do-
nor Matching Funds for New York State Elections:
A Policy Analysis of the Potential Impact and Cost,”
Campaign Finance Institute, February 2019, 12,
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/State/NY/Policy-Analysis_
Public-Financing-in-NY-State_Feb2019_wAppendix.
pdf.
3 
See Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Cor-
ruption, “Preliminary Report,” State of New York,
December 2, 2013, 41, 47, https://publiccorruption.
moreland.ny.gov/sites/default/files/moreland_re-
port_final.pdf (observing the increased influence
of everyday people and greater trust in government
under public financing); DeNora Getachew and Ava
Mehta, Breaking Down Barriers: The Faces of Small
Donor Public Financing, Brennan Center for Justice,
June 9, 2016, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Faces_of_Public_Financ-
ing.pdf (offering candidate testimonies on how pub-
lic financing allows them to focus on constituents);
Spencer A. Overton, “The Participation Interest,”
Georgetown Law Journal 100, 2012: 1279, https://
scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1167&context=faculty_publications (observing
that “financial participation” can lead to other forms
of civic engagement).
4 Tim Lau, “A Bid to Counter Big Money in Politics
Is Gaining Steam,” Brennan Center for Justice,
January 15, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/bid-counter-big-money-politics-gaining-steam.
See also Bradley Jones, “Most Americans Want to
Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors Have
Greater Political Influence,” Pew Research Center,
May 8, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-
campaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-greater-po-
litical-influence/; “The Democracy Project Report,”
Democracy Project, June 26, 2018, https://www.
democracyprojectreport.org/report.
5 Mike DeBonis, “House Democrats to Unveil Politi-
cal Reform Legislation as ‘H.R.1,’ ” Washington Post,
November 30, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2018/11/30/house-democrats-un-
veil-political-reform-legislation-hr/?utm_ter-
m=.039837851c82.
12 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
6 Mitch McConnell, “Mitch McConnell: Behold the
Democrat Politician Protection Act,” Washington
Post, January 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/call-hr-1-what-it-is-the-democrat-
politician-protection-act/2019/01/17/dcc957be-
19cb-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html?utm_ter-
m=.7c60583df784.
7 Brent Ferguson, State Options for Reform, Brennan
Center for Justice, 2015, 1, https://www.brennan-
center.org/sites/default/files/publications/State_Op-
tions_for_Reform_FINAL.pdf.
8 Ibid.
9 Office of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, “Assem-
bly Passes 2013 Fair Elections Act,” May 7, 2013,
https://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20130507/. In
2016, State Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie spon-
sored the 2016 Fair Elections Act (A09281); see
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&-
leg_video=&bn=A09281&term=2015&Summa-
ry=Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y. Similarly, Andrea Stew-
art-Cousins, now the State Senate majority leader,
has sponsored versions of the Fair Elections Act in
the 2013–2014 (S4705C), 2015–2016 (S3502), and
2017–2018 sessions (S7593). See 2014 Fair Elec-
tions Act, S.B. 4705C, 2013 Leg., 236th Sess. (N.Y.
2013); Fair Elections Act, S.B. 3502, 2015 Leg.,
238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015); Fair Elections Act, S.B.
7593, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
10 In the most recent city elections, in 2017, 218 of
the 325 candidates running for office participated
in the city’s matching funds program. See “Candi-
date List: 2017 Citywide Elections,” New York City
Campaign Finance Board, last updated January 22,
2019, https://www.nyccfb.info/follow-the-money/
candidates/2017.
11 The following jurisdictions have passed small donor
public financing laws since 2010: Montgomery
County, Maryland (see Bill Turque, “Montgom-
ery Council approves plan for public finance of
local campaigns,” Washington Post, September 30,
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
md-politics/montgomery-council-approves-plan-
for-public-finance-of-local-campaigns/2014/09/30/
b3e2b15c-482d-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.
html?utm_term=.5abdd95ccbe5); Portland, Oregon
(see Ian Vandewalker, “Portland Enacts Small Donor
Public Financing,” Brennan Center for Justice,
December 16, 2016, https://www.brennancenter.
org/blog/portland-enacts-small-donor-public-fi-
 nancing); Berkeley, California (see “Public Financ-
ing Program,” City of Berkeley, accessed February
20, 2019, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/
Elections/Public_Financing_Program.aspx); Suffolk
County, New York (see David M. Schwartz, “Suffolk
Legislature OKs public financing of county cam-
paigns,” Newsday, December 19, 2017, https://www.
newsday.com/long-island/politics/suffolk-public-fi-
nancing-1.15523881); Howard County, Maryland
(see Andrew Michaels, “Howard County Council
passes small donor finance system to begin in 2022
election cycle,” Baltimore Sun, June 6, 2017, https://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/howard/
columbia/ph-ho-cf-council-campaign-funding-0608-
20170606-story.html); Washington, District of
Columbia (see Martin Austermuhle, “Bowser Signs
Bill Creating Public Financing Program For Political
Campaigns — And Will Fund It,” WAMU, March
13, 2018, https://wamu.org/story/18/03/13/bows-
er-signs-bill-creating-public-financing-program-po-
litical-campaigns-will-fund/); Prince George’s
County, Maryland (see Rachel Chason, “Prince
George’s approves matching funds for local candi-
dates — starting in 2026,” Washington Post, October
24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
md-politics/prince-georges-approves-public-finance-
system-for-local-candidates/2018/10/24/47f7b75a-
d738-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?utm_
term=.398b30cbd735); and Denver, Colorado (see
Hazel Millard, “Another Election Winner — Public
Financing,” Brennan Center for Justice, November
12, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/an-
other-election-winner-%E2%80%94public-financ-
ing).
12 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 10.
13 Chisun Lee and Nirali Vyas, “Analysis: New York’s
Big Donor Problem & Why Small Donor Public Fi-
nancing Is an Effective Solution for Constituents and
Candidates,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 28,
2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/nypf.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.; Sean Morales-Doyle and Chisun Lee, “New
York’s Worst-in-the-Country Voting System,” The At-
lantic, September 13, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.
com/ideas/archive/2018/09/new-yorks-worst-in-the-
country-voting-system/570223/.
16 The Fair Elections for New York coalition includes
Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ,
Communications Workers of America District 1
T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 13
(all of New York State), Natural Resources Defense
Council, Reverend Al Sharpton’s National Action
Network, Planned Parenthood Empire State Acts,
Color of Change, Demos, End Citizens United, and
Sierra Club. A full membership list and more details
about Fair Elections for New York can be found at
https://fairelectionsny.org/about. NY LEAD, a bipar-
tisan group of the state’s business, civic, philanthrop-
ic, and cultural leaders, includes individuals like Alec
Baldwin, Dr. Hazel N. Dukes, Chris Hughes, Chris
Jackson, Andrew Rasiej, and Jonathan Soros, among
others. A full membership list and more details about
NY LEAD can be found at http://nylead.org/who-
we-are/.
17 Ian Vandewalker and Lawrence Norden, “Small
Donors Still Aren’t as Important as Wealthy Ones,”
The Atlantic, October 18, 2016, https://www.the-
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/campaign-fi-
nance-fundraising-citizens-united/504425/.
18 
New York State Board of Elections, “Contribution
Limits,” accessed February 15, 2019, https://www.
elections.ny.gov/cfcontributionlimits.html#Limits.
19 Federal Election Commission, “Contribution
Limits,” accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.fec.
gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-tak-
ing-receipts/contribution-limits/.
20 Chisun Lee and Nirali Vyas, “Analysis: New York’s
Big Donor Problem.”
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 S ee Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, and Brendan
Glavin, “Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York
City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation
and States,” Election Law Journal 11, no. 1 (2012):
14,http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/nyc-as-a-mod-
el_elj_as-published_march2012.pdf; Michael J.
Malbin, “Sources of Funds in 2012 State Legislative
and Gubernatorial Elections,” Campaign Finance
Institute, October 2014, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/
state/tables/States_12_table2.pdf; Michael J. Malbin,
“Sources of Funds in 2014 State Legislative and Gu-
bernatorial Elections,” Campaign Finance Institute,
October 2014, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/ta-
bles/States_14_table2.pdf.
24 Chisun Lee and Nirali Vyas, “Analysis: New York’s
Big Donor Problem.”
25 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing The-
ories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups,
and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12,
no. 3 (2014): 572, 575, https://scholar.princeton.
edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_
page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.
doc.pdf.
26 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 34.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 3.
29 Ibid., 3-4.
30 Ibid., 33-34.
31 This number was reached by reviewing relevant press
coverage on corruption convictions of New York
State elected officials from 2008 to 2018. Sources in-
cluded major New York news outlets such as the New
York Times, New York Daily News, Rochester Democrat
& Chronicle, and others.
32 Dan Clark, “Yes, New York Has More Corrupt
Officials Than Any Other State,” PolitiFact, Septem-
ber 19, 2016, https://www.politifact.com/new-york/
statements/2016/sep/19/elaine-phillips/new-york-
has-been-most-corrupt-state-decades/.
33 Harry Enten, “Ranking the States From Most to
Least Corrupt,” FiveThirtyEight, January 23, 2015,
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ranking-the-
states-from-most-to-least-corrupt/.
34 Quinnipiac University, “New Yorkers Say Almost
4–1 Increase Abortion Rights, Quinnipiac University
Poll Finds; But Few Say Abortion Is Most Important
in Gov Race,” Quinnipiac University Poll, July 19,
2018, https://poll.qu.edu/new-york-state/release-de-
tail?ReleaseID=2556.
35 
See End Citizens United, “New York CD 11 Survey
Results,” September 4-5, 2018, https://endcit-
izensunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
NY11-Results.pdf; Siena College, “Cuomo Begins
’14 in Strong Position; Ratings With Voters Up,”
Siena College Research Institute, January 20, 2014,
https://scri.siena.edu/2014/01/20/cuomo-begins-
14-in-strong-position-ratings-with-voters-up/;
Siena College, “Majority of Voters Think Silver
Should Step Down as Speaker,” Siena College
Research Institute, June 13, 2013, https://scri.
14 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
siena.edu/2013/06/13/majority-of-voters-think-
silver-should-step-down-as-speaker/; Jefrey Pollock
and Kieran Mahoney, “NY Friends of Democracy
Survey: Strong Support for Campaign Finance
Reform,” Global Strategy Group/Mercury, May 6,
2013, https://fairelectionsny.org/cms/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/MayPollingMemo.pdf.
36 FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget: Good
Government and Ethics Reform Article VII Legisla-
tion, Part B, § 14-206(2), (N.Y. 2019), https://www.
budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/artvii/gger-art-
vii.pdf.
37 Russell Berman, “The Battle to Be Trump’s Javert in
New York,” The Atlantic, August 6, 2018, https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/
trump-teachout-attorney-general-new-york/566819/.
38 Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, and Brendan
Glavin, “Small Donors, Big Democracy,” 9.
39 
New York State Board of Elections, “Contribution
Limits,” accessed February 15, 2019, https://www.
elections.ny.gov/cfcontributionlimits.html#Limits.
40 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 35.
41 FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget: Good
Government and Ethics Reform Article VII Legisla-
tion, Part B, § 14-205.
42 Ibid., Part B, § 14-204(2).
43 These percentages are based on how much candidates
had raised by September 1, 2018, which the Cam-
paign Finance Institute’s analysis estimates would
have been the approximate date by which candidates
running in a general election would need to meet
qualifying thresholds for public funds. See Michael J.
Malbin and Brendan Glavin, “Small-Donor Match-
ing Funds for New York State Elections,” 14.
44 Ibid.
45 New York City Campaign Finance Board, “Limits
& Thresholds: 2021 Citywide Elections,” Candidate
Services, accessed January 22, 2019, https://www.ny-
ccfb.info/candidate-services/limits-thresholds/2021/.
46 Max Reiss, “Public Campaign Financing Sees
Record Year as Governor Picks Ignored It,” NBC
Connecticut, December 12, 2018, https://www.
nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Public-Campaign-
 Financing-Sees-Record-Year-as-Governor-Picks-Ig-
nored-It-502623861.html.
47 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-7b(5)(B) (2017).
48 FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget: Good
Government and Ethics Reform Article VII Legisla-
tion, Part B, § 14-209(1).
49 Michael J. Malbin and Brendan Glavin, “Small-Do-
nor Matching Funds for New York State Elections,”
12.
50 FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget: Good
Government and Ethics Reform Article VII Legisla-
tion, Part B, § 9.
51 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 47.
52 Michael J. Malbin and Brendan Glavin, “Small-Do-
nor Matching Funds for New York State Elections,”
6-7, for findings that follow.
53 
See Elisabeth Genn, Sundeep Iyer, Michael Malbin,
and Brendan Glavin, Donor Diversity Through Public
Matching Funds, Brennan Center for Justice, May
14, 2012, 13, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/publications/DonorDiversityRe-
port_WEB.PDF; DeNora Getachew and Ava Mehta,
Breaking Down Barriers, 27; Michael J. Malbin, Peter
W. Brusoe, and Brendan Glavin, “Small Donors, Big
Democracy,” 12-13.
54 Adam Skaggs and Fred Wertheimer, Empowering
Small Donors in Federal Elections, Brennan Center
for Justice, 2012, 14, http://www.brennancenter.
org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Small_do-
nor_report_FINAL.pdf.
55 Samar Khurshid, “After Making History, James Seeks
Change,” Gotham Gazette, March 22, 2015, http://
www.gothamgazette.com/government/5631-af-
ter-making-history-james-seeks-change.
56 Letitia James, “Public Financing” (speech, Unrig the
System Summit, New Orleans, Louisiana, February
2-4, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M-
WxzfB2L_ks.
57 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 50.
58 Chisun Lee and Nirali Vyas, “Analysis: New York’s
Big Donor Problem.”
T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 15
59 Ibid.
60 Maritza Davila and Gladys Puglla, “Necesitamos
Transformar la Democracia en Nueva York,” El
Diario, December 19, 2018, https://eldiariony.
com/2018/12/19/necesitamos-transformar-la-democ-
racia-en-nueva-york/.
61 Ibid.
62 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 41.
63 Ibid.
64 These numbers were reached by reviewing relevant
press coverage on corruption convictions of New
York State’s and New York City’s elected officials and
their government office staff members from 2008 to
2018. Sources include major New York news outlets
such as the New York Times, New York Daily News,
Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, and others. Even
considering federal corruption convictions in terms
of respective rates, New York State has seen a higher
rate of conviction: 4.87 percent of unique New York
State legislators convicted, as compared with 3.67
percent of unique New York City legislators, over the
same time period.
65 David Freedlander, “Not That Long Ago New
York City Really Was Run From a Smoke-Filled
Backroom,” New York magazine, June 2018, http://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/06/when-new-york-
city-really-was-run-from-a-smoke-filled-room.html.
66 Moreland Commission, “Preliminary Report,” 47.
67 Ibid.
68 
Island Now Editorial Board, “Editorial: Put Up or
Shut Up on Cleaning Up Albany,” The Island Now,
November 13, 2018, https://theislandnow.com/opin-
ions-100/editorial-put-up-or-shut-up-on-cleaning-
up-albany/.
69 
Albany Times Union Editorial Board, “Editorial:
All the Power in New York,” Albany Times Union,
November 10, 2018, https://www.timesunion.com/
opinion/article/Editorial-All-the-power-in-New-
York-13380635.php.
70 
Times Herald-Record Editorial Board, “Editorial:
Dems Have to Make a Difference,” Times Herald-Re-
cord, November 7, 2018, https://www.recordonline.
com/news/20181107/editorial-dems-have-two-years-
 to-make-difference.
71 
Newsday Editorial Board, “Break Up the Game
Among Long Island Political Insiders,” Newsday,
March 3, 2018, https://www.newsday.com/opinion/
editorial/gary-melius-oheka-castle-long-island-poli-
tics-1.17047730.
72 
New York Times Editorial Board, “New York Reform
= Public Financing,” New York Times, April 19, 2013,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/opinion/
new-york-reform-public-financing.html.
73 Zellnor Myrie and Jonathan Westin, “Fight for Low-
er Rents by Fixing Campaign Finance: Moving to a
System That Prioritizes Small-Dollar Donations Will
Weaken the Influence of the Real-Estate Lobby,”
New York Daily News, January 14, 2019, https://
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-fight-for-
lower-rents-by-fixing-campaign-finance-20190114-
story.html.
74 Ibid.
Endnotes – Pullquotes
i Maritza Davila and Gladys Puglla, “Necesitamos
transformar la democracia en Nueva York,” El
Diario, December 19, 2018, https://eldiariony.
com/2018/12/19/necesitamos-transformar-la-democ-
racia-en-nueva-york/.
ii Rachel May, “Sen. May: Let’s get big money
out of NY politics (Commentary),” Syracuse.
com, February 1, 2019, https://www.syracuse.
com/opinion/2019/02/sen-may-lets-get-
big-money-out-of-ny-politics-commentary.
html?outputType=amp&__twitter_impres-
sion=true&fbclid=IwAR2Mjuq4AFu1tpiVUjfM0P-
wueaag_IVIN3cxsTVdY7-NsLsNVKIZYO2JSrw.
iii Andrea Stewart-Cousins and Letitia James, “Cam-
paign finance reform benefits women,” The Journal
News/lohud, March 22, 2014, https://www.lohud.
com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/03/22/cam-
paign-finance-reform-aids-women/6713369/.
iv Andrew Cuomo, “Finishing the Job Teddy Roosevelt
Started: Public Financing of Elections,” Huffington
Post, May 6, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/andrew-cuomo/finishing-the-job-teddy-
r_b_5275864.html.
16 | BR E N N A N C E N T E R F O R J U S T I C E
v DeNora Getachew and Ava Mehta, Breaking Down
Barriers: The Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,
Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, 34, https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Faces_of_Public_Financing.pdf.
vi DeNora Getachew and Ava Mehta, Breaking Down
Barriers: The Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,
Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, 29, https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Faces_of_Public_Financing.pdf.
vii Alessandra Biaggi, “Deep-pocketed donors hold sway
over New York politics, and all of us suffer: Sen. Bi-
aggi,” The Journal News/lohud.com, February 4, 2019,
https://www.lohud.com/story/opinion/contribu-
tors/2019/02/04/alessandra-biaggi-new-york-cam-
paign-finance-reform/2747978002/.
viii DeNora Getachew and Ava Mehta, Breaking Down
Barriers: The Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,
Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, 29, https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Faces_of_Public_Financing.pdf.
ix Zellnor Myrie and Jonathan Westin, “Fight for lower
rents by fixing campaign finance: Moving to a system
that prioritizes small-dollar donations will weaken
the influence of the real-estate lobby,” New York Dai-
ly News, January 14, 2019, https://www.nydailynews.
com/opinion/ny-oped-fight-for-lower-rents-by-fix-
ing-campaign-finance-20190114-story.html
x DeNora Getachew and Ava Mehta, Breaking Down
Barriers: The Faces of Small Donor Public Financing,
Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, 27, https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Faces_of_Public_Financing.pdf.
xi Angela Migally and Susan Liss, Small Donor Match-
ing Funds: The NYC Election Experience, Brennan
Center for Justice, 2010, 13, http://www.bren-
nancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Small%20
Donor%20Matching%20Funds-The%20NYC%20
Election%20Experience.pdf.
xii Letitia James, “Public Financing,” (speech, Unrig the
System Summit, New Orleans, Louisiana, February
2-4, 2018), YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MWxzfB2L_ks.
Endnotes – Pie Charts
Figure 1: During the 2018 election cycle, small donations
to state candidates totaled $6,787,176; overall contribu-
tions to state candidates totaled $136,288,852.

Figure 2: This projection assumes that all state can-

didates participate in the program; for comparison,
candidate participation rates in the most recent elections
in New York City and Connecticut, areas that have
well-established public financing systems, are upwards
of 65%, according to records provided by the New York
City Campaign Finance Board and the Connecticut State
Elections Enforcement Commission. This projection also
assumes that all unitemized donations ($99 and below),
for which residential and identification data is unavail-
able, are made by New York state residents. Additionally,
all individual contributions in this analysis were subjected
to the contributions limits in Cuomo’s most recent public
financing proposal. To calculate total small donations
under a $6-to-$1 public financing system, this analysis
multiplied each small-dollar contribution by 6 to deter-
mine the total amount of public funds candidates would
receive. The analysis then added total small-donor public
funds with total small-donor private funds. Total unitem-
ized contributions to state candidates were $1,596,645;
this total grew to $11,176,516 under a $6-to-$1 public
financing system. Each individual contribution above
$175 receives an additional $1,050 in public funds.

Figure 3: To calculate the number of new donors, this

analysis replicated the methodology in the Campaign
Finance Institute’s most recent analyses of New York
State’s 2018 elections. This analysis assumes that, under a
$6-to-$1 match system, candidates would attract enough
new small donors such that 1.5 percent of the voting-age
population in the state would contribute small donations
($50) in a given election cycle. See Michael J. Malbin and
Brendan Glavin, “Small-Dollar Matching Funds for New
York State Elections,” 4.

T H E C A S E F O R S M A L L D O N O R P U B L I C F I N A N C I N G I N N E W Y O R K S TAT E | 17
For More Information
Please contact these experts at the Brennan Center for Justice:

Lawrence Norden
Chisun Lee
Joanna Zdanys
Ian Vandewalker

This paper was written by Lawrence Norden, Chisun Lee, Nirali Vyas, and Hazel Millard. Michael Waldman, Wendy
Weiser, Alexandra Ringe, and Joanna Zdanys provided critical input. Peter Miller and Kevin Morris contributed data
analysis guidance. Lisa Benenson, Stephen Fee, Alden Wallace, Morgan Goode, Ryan Witcombe, Ashni Mehta, and
Yuliya Bas provided important communications strategy and support. Special thanks to Michael J. Malbin and Brendan
Glavin, director and senior data analyst of the Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money
in Politics, for providing essential data and insight.

Learn More About Small Donor Public Financing

To learn more about small donor public financing, please visit the Brennan Center’s website:
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/public-financing.

About the Brennan Center for Justice

The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is a nonpartisan law and policy institute that works to reform,
revitalize — and when necessary defend — our country’s systems of democracy and justice. At this critical moment, the
Brennan Center is dedicated to protecting the rule of law and the values of constitutional democracy. We focus on voting
rights, campaign finance reform, ending mass incarceration, and preserving our liberties while also maintaining our
national security. Part think tank, part advocacy group, part cutting-edge communications hub, we start with rigorous
research. We craft innovative policies. And we fight for them — in Congress and the states, in the courts, and in the
court of public opinion.

About the Brennan Center’s Democracy Program

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broad citizen participation by promoting voting and campaign finance reform. We work to secure fair courts and to
advance a First Amendment jurisprudence that puts the rights of citizens — not special interests — at the center of our
democracy. We collaborate with grassroots groups, advocacy organizations, and government officials to eliminate the
obstacles to an effective democracy.

Acknowledgments
The Brennan Center gratefully acknowledges Carnegie Corporation of New York, Change Happens Foundation,
Democracy Alliance Partners, Ford Foundation, Lisa and Douglas Goldman Fund, The William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, The JPB Foundation, The Kohlberg Foundation, The Leo Model Foundation, Mertz Gilmore Foundation,
Open Society Foundations, The Overbrook Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and The WhyNot Initiative for their
generous support of our money in politics work.

© 2019. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license. It may be reproduced in
its entirety as long as the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link to the Center’s web pages is provided,
and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Center’s
permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint.
1 2 0 B R O A D W AY
17TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10271
W W W. B R E N N A N C E N T E R . O R G
ATTACHMENT B
 Small-Donor Matching Funds for New York State Elections:
A Policy Analysis of the Potential Impact and Cost*

By

Michael J. Malbin Brendan Glavin

* †
The Campaign Finance Institute and The Campaign Finance Institute
University at Albany, SUNY National Institute on Money in Politics

February 2019

Campaign finance will be high on the legislative agenda for the New
York State Assembly and Senate in 2019. Governor Andrew Cuomo’s KEY FINDINGS
Executive Budget in January included proposals to create a small-
donor matching fund system for state elections modeled after the Instead of a system
successful one in New York City. The proposal would also reduce the dominated by large
state’s high contribution limits and eliminate a loophole in current donors, it is likely small
law that benefits limited liability corporations (LLCs). The goal would donors would generate
be to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption by more money than any
making the state’s elected officials less dependent on large donors other part of the
while at the same time heightening the connections between public fundraising whole.
officials and their less wealthy constituents. With the Majority Virtually every candidate
Leaders in both chambers having sponsored similar bills in the past, would be better off
the prospects for passage look higher than they have been for financially.
decades.
The cost would be modest
– less than one penny per
This report hopes to inform discussions over these proposals by
day per New Yorker.
analyzing some of the major effects a new law would be likely to
have. The conclusions are derived from a rigorous analysis of how One problem: The bill’s
the key provisions in the Governor’s package would have affected qualifying rules for public
each of the candidates who ran in 2018. The analysis uses the funds would prevent many
reports that candidates filed with the New York State Board of from participating and
Elections for the full 2018 election cycle, after the records were need to be rethought.
processed and standardized by the National Institute on Money in
Politics (NIMP).

*
This paper revises one CFI published in December 2018. The earlier paper was based on post-election campaign
finance data filed at the end of November. While the new paper’s conclusions are unchanged, all of the data are
new and the text has been revised.
†
The Campaign Finance Institute (CFI) is a nonpartisan and rigorously objective research institute founded in 1999.
In 2018 CFI became part of the equally nonpartisan and objective National Institute on Money in Politics.
Michael J. Malbin was co-founder and remains the director of CFI. He is also a Professor of Political Science at
the University at Albany (SUNY). Brendan Glavin is CFI’s senior data analyst.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 2

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The key findings to emerge from the analysis were these:
 Lowering the contribution limits and instituting a system of matching funds would substantially
increase the importance of small donors to candidates across the board while decreasing their
dependence on large donors.
 Virtually every candidate in the system, with only a few exceptions, would be better off
financially under the new system than under the status quo.
 The cost would be modest – less than one penny per day for each New Yorker over the course of
four years.
 The one major problem with the proposal as currently drafted is that the requirements to
qualify for matching funds are set too high for most candidates. Without an adjustment, many
would not benefit as intended. However, a simple adjustment would correct the problem.

The outline of the paper is as follows:

 The analysis begins by summarizing the governor’s most recent proposal.
 It then describes the data and methodology used.
 The first (and longest) section of the results views the proposal’s likely effects on the balance of
funds candidates would receive from small and large donors.
 Next it considers whether candidates will be better or worse off financially than they were
under the status quo. (An appendix provides this information for each major party candidate in
the 2018 general election.)
 The following section will estimate the program’s cost.
 The report next describes a problem with the current proposal’s qualification requirements.
 Finally, the conclusion places the proposal in the context of other state and local public
campaign finance proposals in recent years.

THE GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL

Governor Cuomo’s most recent campaign finance proposal differs only slightly from ones he has
introduced since taking office in 2011. (CFI’s analyses of these earlier bills and others may be found
here.) The key provisions are as follows:

 Contribution limits: under current law, an individual donor in 2018 was allowed to contribute
up to $8,800 in a primary and general election combined to a candidate for the Assembly,
$18,000 to a Senate candidate, and anywhere from $51,000 to $65,000 to a candidate for
governor or other statewide office. These are the country’s highest contribution limits among
the 38 states that limit individual donors. Under the proposed bill there would be different
limits for candidates who choose to participate in a public matching fund system (see below)

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 3

and those who do not. For non-participants the limits for primary and general election
combined would drop to $6,000 for the Assembly, $10,000 for the Senate, and $25,000 for
statewide office. For candidates who choose to participate, the limits would be $4,000 for the
Assembly, $8,000 for the Senate, and $12,000 for statewide office.
 Public campaign financing: Under the governor’s proposal, New York State would introduce a
new, voluntary program to provide public matching funds to candidates.
o Matching rates: Under this program, candidates who meet minimum qualifying
threshold requirements would receive $6 in public matching funds for every $1 they
raise, up to the first $175 per donor. Under this formula a $175 contribution would be
worth $1,225 to a candidate. It is the same formula New York City used for the
elections of 2011 through 2017. (In 2018, the city’s voters approved a revision to the
city’s charter that would increase the matching rate to eight to one.)
o Caps: The governor’s proposal would not impose a spending limit on candidates, but it
would place a cap on the maximum amount of public money that any one candidate
could receive. The caps ranged from $350,000 for the Assembly (primary and general
election combined) and $750,000 for the state Senate to $18 million for governor. In
the scenarios developed later in this paper, all matching fund caps were applied where
appropriate.
o Qualification thresholds: To qualify for public funds, candidates must raise a minimum
amount of money from at least a minimum number of donors. For statewide
candidates these donors must be residents of New York. For legislative candidates,
qualifying donors must live in the district the candidate is seeking to represent. The
qualification requirements vary by office.

DATA AND METHODS

The analysis of the proposal’s potential impact began with each candidate’s Election Board filings. We
assumed that every donor who gave to a candidate in a past election would continue to give the same
amount, up until the maximum amount that would be allowed under the new contribution limits. To
determine how much each donor gave to each candidate in the aggregate, one must first decide which
of a set of similar seeming names in fact belong to the same person. NIMP’s standardization procedures
assign unique identifiers to donors, allowing us to calculate how much each donor gave in total and to
each individual candidate. This donor-candidate matching procedure lets us determine how much of
each donor’s aggregate contributions (if anything) the candidate would lose to a new contribution limit.
It also gives us the basis for calculating how much of the donor’s contribution would be eligible for
matching and, with that, how much matching money the candidate would receive as a result. This
procedure was followed for each of the many thousands of donor-candidate pairs in the records. The
sum of the matching funds calculated in this manner, limited by each candidate’s public funding cap,
also gives us the basis for calculating the new program’s cost.

While it was straightforward to determine how much of a donor’s gift would be lost under a new
contribution limit, the procedure was more complicated for limited liability corporations (LLCs). New
York State lets corporations contribute a total of $5,000 per year to all candidates combined. However,
the law also lets LLCs contribute as if they were individuals, with no aggregate contribution limit. This

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 4

loophole permitted one LLC to contribute as much as $197,700 to candidates in 2018. The proposal
would restrict LLCs to the same aggregate $5,000 limit as applies to other corporations.

To calculate how the candidates of 2018 would have fared financially under the new rules, therefore, we
had to calculate how much each LLC would be like to have contributed to each candidate if the new
rules had been in place. Under the current system, LLCs could make dozens of contributions aggregating
to many thousands of dollars. (The three most active LLCs in 2018 each gave at least forty contributions
for an average cumulative total of $174,800.) It would have been easy, and not too far off the mark, to
have treated all of the LLC contributions as if they had effectively been zeroed out. Instead, this study
took each LLC’s contributions to all of the 2018 candidates, calculated what portion of its total it gave to
each candidate, and then proportionally allocated the new $5,000 aggregate cap for LLCs to each of the
candidates the LLC had supported. For example, if an LLC gave 10% of its total contributions to a
particular candidate in 2018, we assumed the LLC would give the same candidate 10% of the $5,000
limit under the new rules. While it is highly unlikely that LLCs would follow so complicated a procedure,
we could think of no other objective way to allocate their funds under the proposed hypothetical.

When calculating the impact of the new rules on past donors and candidates, the analysis does not take
into account the fact that new rules will sometimes lead donors to alter their behavior. For example, if
$175 will be worth $1,225, a previous $1,000 donor may decide to divide her/his money among several
candidates. We expect this will happen, but there is no way to estimate the extent or direction of this
kind of change in our scenario.

Similarly, the analyses will assume that every candidate chooses to participate in the voluntary public
financing system. This will not occur in fact. Self-financing candidates and candidates with ready access
to large contributions may prefer to opt out. However, the program’s impact on candidates will be
better understood by making this assumption for the purpose of projecting outcomes.

Finally, our first set of estimates calculates the impact of the proposed system on the sources of
candidates’ funds. Each comparison involves three scenarios. The first presents the situation as it
actually existed in 2018. The second presents what the distribution would look like if all of the same
donors continue to give as much as they did previously (but only up to the new contribution limit) and
matching funds (with caps) are introduced. Under this scenario, we imagine no new donors coming into
the system. Of course, one of the stated reasons for creating a matching fund system is to stimulate
participation by new donors who give small amounts of money to their favored candidates. Therefore,
we have also created a third scenario in which we estimated the outcomes if new donors participated.

It is difficult to estimate how many new donors might be drawn into the system, but there are some
guidelines. For many years, candidates running for office in New York State raised their money from a
lower proportion of the state’s adults than in all but a handful of other states. In 2014, only 0.5% of New
York’s adult population gave any money at all to a state legislative or gubernatorial candidate. Spirited
Democratic primary campaigns for the Senate and Governorship brought the number of small donors up
in 2018, but still not up to the level that New York City achieves in a contested election year with its
matching fund program. About 1.5% of the adult population contributed to mayoral and city council
candidates in 2013, a year with contested mayoral primaries in both parties. While it would not be
prudent to predict that New York State’s elections will draw this number of donors immediately, it is a
reasonable number to hold out as a goal for comparison. In fact, 1.5% was still below the donor
participation rate of a dozen states in 2014. For the purpose of this third scenario, therefore, we
assumed that (a) enough new donors would come into the system to bring the donor pool up to 1.5% of

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 5

the adult population, (b) each of the new donors would give $50, and (c) the new donors would be
distributed among the existing candidates in the same proportion as the donors of 2018.

RESULTS: SOURCES OF FUNDS

The next three pages present a series of bar charts, with three charts per page. The top chart on the
first page shows the actual sources of funds for Assembly candidates in 2018. The middle chart shows
how the distribution would have looked for the same Assembly candidates with the same donors, the
proposed contribution limits, and matching funds. The third (or bottom) chart shows the distribution
with enough new $50 donors to bring donor participation up to 1.5% of the adult population. In the
charts that include matching fund money, the public funds are incorporated into the same bars as the
donors who trigger the match. The following two pages repeat the same three charts for the 2018
Senate and Gubernatorial candidates. Similar charts for other statewide candidates and for all 2014
candidates are available on request. They are not reproduced here because their basic shapes are
similar to the ones shown.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 6

Figure 1. 2018 NYS Assembly Candidates:

Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill

NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 7

Figure 2. 2018 NYS Senate Candidates:

Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill

NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 8

Figure 3. 2018 NYS Gubernatorial Candidates:

Sources of Funds Now and Under the Proposed Matching Fund Bill

NOTES: NPO = Non-party organizations, including PACS. LLC = Limited Liability Corporation.
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 9

As these charts should make clear, the new contribution limits and small-donor matching funds would
fundamentally alter the sources of financial support for New York State candidates. In 2018, Assembly
candidates raised a combined 64% of their money from non-party organizations, LLCs and individuals
who gave them $1,000 or more. Only 10% came from small donors who gave $175 or less. With
matching funds, lower contribution limits, and no new donors, the small-donor portion would more
than triple (to 32%) while the large-donor proportions (NPOs, LLCs and individuals who give $1,000 or
more) would be cut almost in half (33%). At this level, and with no new donors, the large donors would
be roughly equal to the small donors. If one adds new donors, the small donors would become the most
important donors in the system, accounting for 41% of all candidates’ receipts.

The story for Senate candidates would be fundamentally the same. The three large-donor bars would
shrink from 67% to 36% while the small-donor proportion would multiply by more than six (from 5% to
33%). And for the gubernatorial candidates, the large-donor portion would shrink from an astounding
92% to 49%. In all three cases, we can see that instead of being an afterthought, small donors would
become the single most important component of candidates’ campaign fundraising strategies.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 10

WILL THE CANDIDATES BE BETTER OR WORSE OFF?

All of these results depend upon one crucial factor. Public financing systems must be voluntary under
existing constitutional law. As a result, no system can achieve its intended effects unless candidates
freely choose to join in. For some candidates, the decision might be easy. Some will participate because
of the political signal it sends. Others will opt in because it relieves them from dialing for dollars or
holding out their hands to collect checks in a board room. And for still others – those who do not have
access to large contributions – public financing may be the lifeline that gives them a chance to compete.

But for many candidates the decision will be rooted in practicality. It will depend upon whether opting
into the new system would leave them financially ahead or behind where they would stand by opting
out. The following table shows the percentage of 2018 candidates who would have been ahead
financially with the new system’s contribution limits and public matching funds. The table compares a
matching fund system with no new donors (the middle of the previous bar charts) to the system that
actually prevailed in 2018. The data understate the incentives for participating in two ways: (1) First, it
assumes the participating candidates do nothing to recruit new donors. (2) Second, it compares
participating candidates to ones who use the contribution limits that were then in effect. But the LLC
loophole has already been abolished. And if the proposal becomes law, non-participating candidates will
have to follow lower contribution limits than they did in 2018 (although higher than the limits for
participating candidates). As a result, the financial calculations will favor opting in even more than these
tables suggest.

Table 1. Number and Percentage of Candidates Who Would Have Gained or Lost
under the Proposed System as Compared to the Status Quo, assuming the same
donors
2018 Candidates
Net Gain Net Loss
# % # %
Assembly 229 94% 15 6%
Senate 107 91% 11 9%
Governor 5 83% 1 17%
Attorney General 4 57% 3 43%
Comptroller 2 67% 1 33%
Lt. Gov. 2 100% 0 0%

SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

This table shows that almost all Assembly candidates, most Senate candidates, and a strong majority of
the statewide candidates would be better off under the new system than under the status quo. The
clear exceptions would include the sitting governor and two or three of the eleven Senate candidates
who showed a significant net loss. The remaining Senate candidates would have needed only a few new
donors to have come out ahead. Similarly, in the Assembly only two of the fifteen showed a significant
loss. A complete list of candidates, showing how each would have fared, is attached to this report as an
appendix.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 11

HOW MUCH WOULD THE SYSTEM COST?

One frequent complaint about public financing is about how much the system supposedly costs. How
much may be too much is inherently subjective. From some perspectives, the projected cost looks like a
bargain.

The following table provides high estimates for the likely cost of a new system by assuming that all
candidates opt in. One set of figures shows the cost with no new donors. The other assumes an
optimistic 1.5% of adults giving. In both cases, we also assume that public financing will bring at least
some new candidates into the system. To estimate the costs for these new candidates, we imagine that
all candidates will face at least some opposition in either a primary or general election and that the new
candidates will require the same amount of public money as the average non-incumbent.

Finally, we note that these calculations only cover the cost of matching funds. The system will also have
significant administrative costs for rulemaking, record keeping, analysis, auditing, and other compliance
functions. The Campaign Finance Institute has no basis for estimating these administrative costs, which
include staff, office space, equipment, and other items. However, a New York State Senate Committee
five years ago asked the New York City Campaign Finance Board (NYCCFB) to provide such an estimate
for an almost identical bill. The NYCCFB did so in a letter dated June 10, 2013. (The five-page letter was
made public at the time and is available from the authors upon request.) For our purposes, we assume
these estimates remain valid and include them in our table. The letter estimated that the annual cost
would fall somewhere between $17.52 million and $20.94 million. Our table uses the NYCCFB’s high
estimate. It is not possible to subdivide these costs across types of candidates, but the full cost is labeled
and included in our totals.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 12

Table 2. The Potential Cost of Matching Funds

Same Donors
Other
Legislature Governor Total
Statewide
ASSUMING ALL 2018 CANDIDATES HAD
PARTICIPATED
Four-year matching fund cost, same candidates $86,554,716 $12,546,180 $8,560,584 $107,661,480
Four-year matching fund cost, new candidates $16,513,893 $16,513,893
Four-year matching fund cost, total $103,068,609 $12,546,180 $8,560,584 $124,175,373
Annual matching fund cost (average / 4 years) $25,767,152 $3,136,545 $2,140,146 $31,043,843
Annual administrative cost $20,940,000
Combined annual cost $51,983,843
Annual cost, per New Yorker $2.62

New Donors (to 1.5% of Adults)

ASSUMING ALL 2018 CANDIDATES HAD Other
Legislature Governor Total
PARTICIPATED Statewide
Four-year matching fund cost, same candidates $102,732,212 $20,568,279 $10,358,136 $133,658,627
Four-year matching fund cost, new candidates $20,725,729 $20,725,729
Four-year matching fund cost, total $123,457,941 $20,568,279 $10,358,136 $154,384,356
Annual matching fund cost (average / 4 years) $30,864,485 $5,142,070 $2,589,534 $38,596,089.00
Annual administrative cost $20,940,000
Combined annual cost $59,536,089
Annual cost, per New Yorker $3.00
SOURCE: The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics

Table 2 shows:
 The cost of matching funds over a full four-year election cycle would be about $124.2 million
with no new donors in the system. This includes one election for the statewide offices and two
sets of regular elections for the legislature.
 The cost of matching funds would go up to about $154.4 million if 1.5% of the state’s adult
population made contributions.
 On a per year basis, this averages out to $31 million per year with the same donors and $38.6
million with new donors.
 Adding $20.9 million in administrative costs bring the average annual total to $52 million with
the same donors and $60 million with new donors.
 If we divide this cost by the number of people who live in New York (19.85 million in 2017), that
means the cost of the program, including administrative overhead, would be $2.62 per New
Yorker per year if there were no new donors and $3.00 with new donors.
 Either way, the cost per New Yorker would be less than a penny per day.

Finally, it should be emphasized that these are very conservative (high) estimates. They assume that
every candidate participates. They also assume a generous number of new candidates will be drawn into
the system. (The procedures for estimating new candidates are contained in an appendix.) And finally,
they assume the upper end of the range for administrative costs. The real cost is likely to be less.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 13

QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BECOME BARRIERS

All of the previous tables and charts assume not only that candidates would want to participate in public
financing but that they would qualify to do so. All public financing systems set some requirements
before candidates can qualify to receive public money. This protects the government’s resources from
being spent to underwrite frivolous campaigns. Qualifying thresholds are particularly important in
jurisdictions that provide full public funding grants large enough to pay for all of a campaign’s costs.
These flat-grant or “Clean Election” programs exist in Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut. Having a high
threshold is somewhat less important in a matching funds system because candidates who qualify still
have to raise private funds to receive a public match. Having some kind of a threshold can protect the
system against non-serious adventurers, but setting the threshold too high may prevent the system
from achieving its basic goals.

When policy makers set threshold requirements, they often are flying blind with little to guide their
instincts. This has been true in most jurisdictions. Fortunately, the methods used to create the estimates
in this study also provide a firmer basis for estimating the effects of these requirements. For this study,
we asked how many of the 2018 candidates would have qualified for public matching funds under three
different sets of requirements. The first is the proposal Governor Cuomo has put forward. The second
and third are hypotheticals with easier requirements. The proposals are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Three Sets of Qualifying Thresholds

Total Amount
Other requirements
Required
GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL
At least 100 in-district donors whose contributions to the
Assembly $10,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
At least 200 in-district donors whose contributions to the
Senate $20,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
At least 6,500 in-state donors whose contributions to the
Governor $650,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, AND
MUST BE BETWEEN $10-175.
At least 50 in-district donors whose contributions to the
Assembly $5,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
At least 100 in-district donors whose contributions to the
Senate $10,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
At least 2,000 in-state donors whose contributions to the
Governor $400,000
candidate aggregate to $10-$175.
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, IN ANY
MATCHABLE AMOUNT
Assembly $5,000 At least 50 in-district donors giving any matchable amount
Senate $10,000 At least 100 in-district donors giving any matchable amount
Governor $400,000 At least 2,000 in-state donors giving any matchable amount

As the above table shows, the thresholds vary in three ways: the total amount of money each candidate
has to raise from “qualifying” contributions; the number of donors who must make qualifying
contributions to each candidate; and whether one can count toward the qualification requirements any
donors whose matchable contributions to a candidate exceed $175.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 14

The next table shows the percentage of 2018 candidates running for each office who would have
qualified for matching funds under these three sets of requirements. Only candidates who filed financial
reports with the Board of Elections are counted. Because we have not had the time to geo-code the
donors by their legislative districts, we counted all in-state donors to Assembly and Senate candidates as
if they counted toward qualification. As a result, even fewer legislative candidates would have qualified
than these numbers suggest.

The results are shown in two columns. The column on the right shows the percentage of candidates who
would have qualified by the end of the full two-year cycle, based on all contributions during the cycle.
However, candidates must receive matching funds during the campaign for the money to be useful.
Therefore, the middle column shows the percentage who would have qualified by September 1.

Table 4. Percentage of 2018 Candidates Who Would Have Qualified for Matching
Funds Under Four Different Qualifying Thresholds, Assuming the Same Donors Only
By September 1 Over the full Two-Year Cycle
GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL
Assembly 28% 37%
Senate 29% 39%
Governor 17% 17%
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, AND
MUST BE BETWEEN $10-175.
Assembly 53% 62%
Senate 46% 59%
Governor 33% 50%
THRESHOLDS WITH LOWER TOTALS, FEWER CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED, MUST BE IN-DISTRICT, IN ANY
MATCHABLE AMOUNT
Assembly 69% 74%
Senate 65% 72%
Governor 50% 67%

These tables make it clear that it would be tough for most candidates to qualify for matching funds
under the governor’s proposal. Less than 30% would have qualified by September 1; less than 40% by
the end of the year. We did not present categories of candidates in the table, but this is a problem that
would plague incumbents from both major parties as well as challengers.

Even with easier requirements, many candidates will have to change their behavior to qualify. Of course,
the goal is precisely to persuade the candidates to change. It is to give them a good reason to look for
small donors from their districts. But the goal must be within reach for the candidates to bother trying. If
they do not, the system will have failed. At the same time, the potential risk from setting the threshold
too low seems minimal. Therefore, the sponsors would be well advised to revise the qualification
requirements downward as they perfect a new bill.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 15

CONCLUSION
Gov. Cuomo has proposed public matching fund programs since he took office in 2011, but the
proposals have foundered in the Senate. The political situation has now changed. After the 2018
election put Democrats in a clear majority in both chambers, the Assembly and Senate will each have as
its leader someone who has been on record as a sponsor of small-donor matching funds. While nothing
can ever be certain, the odds clearly have changed.

In 2010, as is well known, the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizen United v. FEC paved the way for mega-
donors to underwrite independent spending. In that same year, in a decision that dealt a setback to one
specific feature of Clean Elections-style systems, the Supreme Court upheld public financing more
broadly. Since these cases local governments in Washington DC, Baltimore (Maryland), Montgomery
County (Maryland), Howard County (Maryland), Prince George’s County (Maryland), Suffolk County
(New York), Seattle (Washington), and Denver (Colorado) have taken steps to enact or implement new
matching fund or voucher systems. New York City and Los Angeles have upgraded theirs. Washington
State narrowly turned back a referendum for vouchers in 2016. South Dakota adopted a voucher
referendum in 2016 only to have it reversed by the legislature in 2017. Despite all of this action, no
state has adopted and successfully implemented a public financing system for gubernatorial and
legislative elections since Connecticut in 2006. New York’s would be the first new system statewide
since Citizens United. If adopted, it would surely be taken as a signpost by others.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-1

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF NEW CANDIDATES

AND THE COST FOR THEIR MATCHING FUNDS

Table 2 of this paper estimates the potential cost of matching funds. Much of the paper relies on
estimates based on the candidates who actually ran in 2018 and the first line of Table 2 does the same.
In doing so, it captures all candidates who raised or spent enough money to file campaign finance
reports. However, it seems likely that a new matching fund system would encourage more candidates to
run, particularly for the Assembly and Senate. (The statewide races were already contested.) The
question when estimating costs is how to get a handle on how many would run over four years.

To do so, we considered the pool of candidates in 2016 as well as 2018. For the sake of this cost
estimate, we wanted to be generous with respect to the number of candidates, and more candidates
ran in 2016 than 2018. We then made different assumptions for primaries than general elections.

Primary Elections: There were only 39 challengers who ran and lost Senate or Assembly primary
election campaigns in 2016 and 2018 combined. For the purpose of reaching a conservative (high)
estimate of the cost, we assumed that four times that number would run under the new system. We
also assumed for the “no new donors” scenario that each new candidate would raise the same amount
and have the same donor profile as the candidates who did run and lose. The average matching fund
cost for these was $46,000 for Assembly candidates and $89,000 per Senate candidate. We then
applied the same averages per candidate to the new candidate pool to arrive at the estimated matching
fund cost for the new candidates in the primaries. The total cost for new candidates in the primaries
would be $6.5 million with the same donors and $8.8 million with new donors.

General Elections: For the general election, we used a somewhat more complicated method. Slightly
more than half of the districts already had two major party general election candidates in 2016 and
2018. The challenge was to estimate how many new candidates would run in the other districts. In the
Assembly, there were 96 such districts in 2016 and 91 in 2018. In the Senate, there were 31 in 2016 and
30 in 2018. We did not want to assume that every district would have two major-party candidates
running in the general election because too many of the state’s districts fall within parts of New York
City with few Republican voters. However, we did want to assure enough public funding for at least one
primary or general election challenger in every district. Quadrupling the number of losing primary
candidates statewide should be enough to cover all of the districts in the city. Outside the city, we
assumed at least one general election challenger in every district. This added 82 Assembly and 18 Senate
candidates over four years. We also assumed, as we did in the primaries, that each of the new emergent
candidates would qualify for the same amount of matching funds, on average, as the ones who did run.
These are both very generous assumptions. The estimate added 87 Assembly candidates over the two
cycles at $62,000 each. It added 18 Senate candidates at $255,000 each. The total for new general
election candidates would be $10 million with the same donors and $11.9 million with new donors.

Combined cost for new candidates: $16.5 million with the same donors; $20.7 million with new donors.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-2

APPENDIX B

HOW EACH OF THE CANDIDATES WHO RAN IN 2018

WOULD HAVE FARED FINANCIALLY UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

The following pages show how each of the major party general election candidates in 2018 would have
fared under the proposed system’s contribution limits and matching funds. The table contains the
following information: the candidate’s name, district, party, incumbency status, whether the candidate
won or lost, and then three pieces of financial information assuming the same donors or new donors:
how much the candidate actually raised in 2018; how much we estimate the candidate would have
raised under the proposed system, and the net gain or loss.

One caveat should be expressed. A number of candidates show little increase in receipts from an
increased donor pool. This stems from the way we made the estimates and is not meant to be
predictive. There would have to be an 83% increase in the number of donors for 1.5% of the state’s
adults to contribute. We therefore decided to increase each candidate’s small-donor dollars by 83% over
the actual small-donor receipts in 2018. This is plausible for estimating in the aggregate but less so for
individuals. A candidate who raised little money from small donors would not get much by boosting a
small number by 83%. But for some, it would not take a great effort to triple their money (or more) from
these sources. On the individual level, we therefore believe that the results understate the potential
benefits for candidates who relied mostly on large donations in 2018.

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-13

Appendix B1: 2018 StatewideCandidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates

Governor
CUOMO, ANDREW M DEM I Won-General $36,805,338 $19,575,189 -$17,230,149 $36,805,338 $19,900,521 -$16,904,817
MOLINARO, MARCUS (MARC) REP C Lost-General $2,266,214 $4,347,673 $2,081,459 $2,266,214 $5,380,067 $3,113,853

Attorney General
JAMES, LETITIA (TISH) DEM O Won-General $3,754,876 $3,607,375 -$147,501 $3,754,876 $3,911,539 $156,663
WOFFORD, KEITH H REP O Lost-General $1,951,553 $1,639,463 -$312,090 $1,951,553 $1,693,391 -$258,162

Comptroller
DINAPOLI, THOMAS P DEM I Won-General $4,285,159 $3,133,460 -$1,151,699 $4,285,159 $3,324,520 -$960,639
TRICHTER, JONATHAN REP C Lost-General $254,021 $279,737 $25,716 $254,021 $293,099 $39,078

Lt. Governor
HOCHUL, KATHLEEN COURTNEY (KATHY) DEM I Won-General $2,235,493 $2,598,429 $362,936 $2,235,493 $2,687,644 $452,150
KILLIAN, JULIE REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-10

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
LAVALLE, KENNETH P 1 REP I Won-General $175,460 $258,245 $82,785 $175,460 $265,805 $90,345
FISCHER, GREG 1 DEM C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
FLANAGAN JR, JOHN J 2 REP I Won-General $1,203,069 $973,511 -$229,558 $1,203,069 $980,063 -$223,006
CLEARY, KATHLEEN BRADBURY 2 DEM C Lost-General $57,667 $134,553 $76,886 $57,667 $167,218 $109,552
MURRAY, DEAN 3 REP O Lost-General $783,166 $850,569 $67,403 $783,166 $875,108 $91,942
MARTINEZ, MONICA 3 DEM O Won-General $581,406 $713,082 $131,676 $581,406 $819,678 $238,272
BOYLE, PHILIP M 4 REP I Won-General $270,538 $330,050 $59,512 $270,538 $349,265 $78,727
DAMARO, LOU 4 DEM C Lost-General $239,644 $283,734 $44,090 $239,644 $296,989 $57,345
GAUGHRAN, JAMES 5 DEM C Won-General $1,221,360 $1,413,517 $192,157 $1,221,360 $1,413,517 $192,157
MARCELLINO, CARL L 5 REP I Lost-General $1,245,146 $1,283,967 $38,821 $1,245,146 $1,296,063 $50,917
HANNON, KEMP 6 REP I Lost-General $463,613 $473,844 $10,231 $463,613 $479,199 $15,586
THOMAS, KEVIN 6 DEM C Won-General $118,439 $282,575 $164,136 $118,439 $347,875 $229,436
PHILLIPS, ELAINE R 7 REP I Lost-General $1,315,596 $1,481,414 $165,818 $1,315,596 $1,504,157 $188,561
KAPLAN, ANNA MONAHEMI 7 DEM C Won-General $799,621 $1,055,100 $255,479 $799,621 $1,055,100 $255,479
BROOKS, JOHN E 8 DEM I Won-General $1,202,362 $1,193,585 -$8,777 $1,202,362 $1,228,928 $26,566
PRAVATO, JEFFREY 8 REP C Lost-General $1,054,416 $1,239,386 $184,970 $1,054,416 $1,255,262 $200,846
KAMINSKY, TODD D 9 DEM I Won-General $1,337,421 $1,368,360 $30,939 $1,337,421 $1,409,310 $71,889
BECKER JR, FRANCIS 9 REP C Lost-General $48,833 $135,613 $86,780 $48,833 $173,444 $124,612
SANDERS JR, JAMES 10 DEM I Won-General $53,569 $80,241 $26,672 $53,569 $89,565 $35,996
LIU, JOHN 11 DEM O Won-General $498,556 $558,824 $60,268 $498,556 $808,808 $310,252
RAMOS, JESSICA 13 DEM C Won-General $437,750 $960,212 $522,462 $437,750 $969,302 $531,552
COMRIE JR, LEROY 14 DEM I Won-General $80,939 $136,473 $55,534 $80,939 $169,737 $88,798
SULLIVAN, THOMAS 15 REP C Lost-General $94,450 $203,666 $109,216 $94,450 $251,798 $157,348
STAVISKY, TOBY ANN 16 DEM I Won-General $175,044 $226,100 $51,056 $175,044 $228,116 $53,072
SALAZAR, JULIA 18 DEM O Won-General $276,017 $778,182 $502,165 $276,017 $789,210 $513,193
PERSAUD, ROXANNE J 19 DEM I Won-General $57,225 $111,973 $54,748 $57,225 $121,045 $63,820
FERRETTI, JEFFREY J 19 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
PARKER, KEVIN S 21 DEM I Won-General $376,720 $535,841 $159,121 $376,720 $574,208 $197,488
SAVINO, DIANE J 23 DEM I Won-General $343,630 $346,702 $3,072 $343,630 $360,373 $16,743
KRAINERT, DAVID 23 REP C Lost-General $1,053 $7,371 $6,318 $1,053 $10,647 $9,594
LANZA, ANDREW J 24 REP I Won-General $284,035 $340,271 $56,236 $284,035 $355,895 $71,860
KAVANAGH, BRIAN P 26 DEM I Won-General $109,378 $136,246 $26,868 $109,378 $151,429 $42,051
ARIAS, ANTHONY 26 REP C Lost-General $13,307 $25,327 $12,020 $13,307 $30,115 $16,808
HOYLMAN, BRAD M 27 DEM I Won-General $309,159 $533,683 $224,524 $309,159 $571,539 $262,381
KRUEGER, LIZ 28 DEM I Won-General $102,075 $106,325 $4,250 $102,075 $110,861 $8,786
HOLMBERG, PETER 28 REP C Lost-General $20,098 $62,548 $42,450 $20,098 $83,968 $63,870
COLON, JOSE A 29 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-11

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
CRUMP, MELINDA 31 REP C Lost-General $1,500 $2,550 $1,050 $1,500 $2,550 $1,050
SEPULVEDA, LUIS R 32 DEM I Won-General $198,833 $213,973 $15,140 $198,833 $246,922 $48,089
DELICES, PATRICK 32 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
DENIS, MIGDALIA 32 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
RIVERA, J GUSTAVO 33 DEM I Won-General $322,490 $349,271 $26,781 $322,490 $353,807 $31,317
BIAGGI, ALESSANDRA 34 DEM C Won-General $650,337 $896,234 $245,897 $650,337 $896,234 $245,897
RIBUSTELLO, RICHARD A 34 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
STEWART-COUSINS, ANDREA 35 DEM I Won-General $1,021,623 $1,056,948 $35,325 $1,021,623 $1,154,472 $132,849
BAILEY, JAMAAL T 36 DEM I Won-General $189,574 $193,840 $4,266 $189,574 $208,834 $19,260
MAYER, SHELLEY B 37 DEM I Won-General $999,474 $962,963 -$36,511 $999,474 $962,963 -$36,511
CARLUCCI, DAVID S 38 DEM I Won-General $571,717 $569,596 -$2,121 $571,717 $600,756 $29,039
SKOUFIS, JAMES G 39 DEM O Won-General $1,579,906 $1,683,390 $103,484 $1,579,906 $1,683,390 $103,484
MURPHY, TERRENCE P 40 REP I Lost-General $800,918 $857,601 $56,683 $800,918 $900,945 $100,027
SMYTHE, KAREN STRAIN 41 DEM C Lost-General $697,805 $970,705 $272,900 $697,805 $970,705 $272,900
SERINO, SUSAN J 41 REP I Won-General $442,172 $588,671 $146,499 $442,172 $627,731 $185,559
RABBITT, ANN 42 REP O Lost-General $276,363 $377,260 $100,897 $276,363 $437,236 $160,873
JORDAN, DAPHNE 43 REP O Won-General $583,290 $662,902 $79,612 $583,290 $710,782 $127,492
GLADD, AARON 43 DEM O Lost-General $541,654 $750,724 $209,070 $541,654 $750,724 $209,070
LITTLE, ELIZABETH O C (BETTY) 45 REP I Won-General $353,949 $552,448 $198,499 $353,949 $607,982 $254,034
MARTZ, EMILY 45 DEM C Lost-General $75,234 $271,050 $195,816 $75,234 $337,320 $262,086
AMEDORE JR, GEORGE A 46 REP I Won-General $385,683 $442,531 $56,848 $385,683 $462,250 $76,567
GRIFFO, JOSEPH A 47 REP I Won-General $300,609 $429,924 $129,315 $300,609 $508,705 $208,097
OSTRELICH, MICHELLE 49 DEM C Lost-General $205,299 $544,499 $339,200 $205,299 $544,499 $339,200
TEDISCO II, JAMES N 49 REP I Won-General $215,528 $361,273 $145,745 $215,528 $460,322 $244,794
MANNION, JOHN 50 DEM O Lost-General $484,821 $699,718 $214,897 $484,821 $789,634 $304,813
SEWARD, JAMES L 51 REP I Won-General $559,181 $690,326 $131,145 $559,181 $740,474 $181,293
ST GEORGE, JOYCE 51 DEM C Lost-General $88,758 $177,506 $88,748 $88,758 $234,773 $146,015
AKSHAR II, FREDERICK J 52 REP I Won-General $493,213 $647,374 $154,161 $493,213 $704,181 $210,968
MAY, RACHEL 53 DEM C Won-General $270,167 $519,784 $249,617 $270,167 $801,268 $531,101
HELMING, PAMELA A 54 REP I Won-General $177,327 $211,793 $34,466 $177,327 $231,216 $53,889
BALDRIDGE, KENAN 54 DEM C Lost-General $16,463 $60,941 $44,478 $16,463 $81,605 $65,142
FUNKE, RICH 55 REP I Won-General $466,424 $468,087 $1,663 $466,424 $473,221 $6,798
LUNSFORD, JENNIFER 55 DEM C Lost-General $117,459 $364,914 $247,455 $117,459 $476,664 $359,205
COONEY, JEREMY 56 DEM C Lost-General $206,798 $487,674 $280,876 $206,798 $551,298 $344,500
YOUNG, CATHARINE M 57 REP I Won-General $564,015 $627,135 $63,120 $564,015 $663,076 $99,062
OMARA, THOMAS F (TOM) 58 REP I Won-General $248,094 $406,555 $158,461 $248,094 $419,338 $171,244
KIRCHGESSNER, AMANDA 58 DEM C Lost-General $51,859 $165,625 $113,766 $51,859 $243,966 $192,107

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-12

Appendix B2: 2018 Senate Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
GALLIVAN, PATRICK M 59 REP I Won-General $268,701 $491,578 $222,877 $268,701 $548,782 $280,081
JACOBS, CHRISTOPHER L 60 REP I Won-General $468,738 $717,454 $248,716 $468,738 $772,957 $304,219
EL BEHAIRY, CARIMA 60 DEM C Lost-General $65,754 $163,135 $97,381 $65,754 $210,076 $144,322
RANZENHOFER, MICHAEL H 61 REP I Won-General $623,762 $734,363 $110,601 $623,762 $753,263 $129,501
SEAMANS, JOAN 61 DEM C Lost-General $112,700 $239,485 $126,785 $112,700 $315,558 $202,858
ORTT, ROBERT G 62 REP I Won-General $227,383 $431,599 $204,216 $227,383 $549,774 $322,391
KENNEDY, TIMOTHY M 63 DEM I Won-General $1,045,554 $1,143,360 $97,806 $1,045,554 $1,262,291 $216,737

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-3

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
THIELE JR, FRED W 1 DEM I Won-General $22,825 $46,375 $23,550 $22,825 $54,691 $31,866
OCONNOR, PATRICK 1 REP C Lost-General $250 $250 $0 $250 $250 $0
PALUMBO, ANTHONY H 2 REP I Won-General $36,674 $59,283 $22,609 $36,674 $68,254 $31,580
SMITH, RONA 2 DEM C Lost-General $34,103 $77,390 $43,287 $34,103 $91,754 $57,651
DESTEPHANO, JOSEPH 3 REP O Won-General $36,797 $92,117 $55,320 $36,797 $109,253 $72,456
PARKER, CLYDE 3 DEM O Lost-General $24,425 $82,109 $57,684 $24,425 $93,197 $68,772
ENGLEBRIGHT, STEVEN 4 DEM I Won-General $53,199 $106,404 $53,205 $53,199 $127,698 $74,499
KALINOWSKI, CHRISTIAN 4 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
SMITH, DOUG 5 REP I Won-General $54,444 $216,844 $162,400 $54,444 $216,844 $162,400
HALL, TIMOTHY 5 DEM C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
RAMOS, PHILIP R 6 DEM I Won-General $109,905 $173,354 $63,449 $109,905 $183,182 $73,277
GARBARINO, ANDREW R 7 REP I Won-General $112,476 $206,344 $93,868 $112,476 $231,387 $118,911
MURRAY, TOM 7 DEM C Lost-General $2,921 $12,071 $9,150 $2,921 $15,095 $12,174
FITZPATRICK, MICHAEL J 8 REP I Won-General $50,250 $87,050 $36,800 $50,250 $92,090 $41,840
MORRISSEY, DAVE 8 DEM C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
PELLEGRINO, CHRISTINE 9 DEM I Lost-General $482,579 $529,362 $46,783 $482,579 $529,362 $46,783
LIPETRI, MICHAEL 9 REP C Won-General $62,043 $172,851 $110,808 $62,043 $198,555 $136,512
STERN, STEVE 10 DEM I Won-General $101,028 $173,490 $72,462 $101,028 $195,502 $94,474
WILLIAMS, JEREMY 10 REP C Lost-General $5,486 $29,852 $24,366 $5,486 $39,428 $33,942
JEAN-PIERRE, KIMBERLY 11 DEM I Won-General $69,899 $111,963 $42,064 $69,899 $125,319 $55,420
SABELLA, KEVIN 11 REP C Lost-General $3,678 $9,972 $6,294 $3,678 $14,823 $11,145
RAIA, ANDREW 12 REP I Won-General $115,744 $232,095 $116,351 $115,744 $258,681 $142,937
ROSEN, AVRUM J 12 DEM C Lost-General $29,511 $50,779 $21,268 $29,511 $58,276 $28,765
LAVINE, CHARLES D 13 DEM I Won-General $53,524 $137,838 $84,314 $53,524 $157,223 $103,699
MONTELEONE, ANDREW 13 REP C Lost-General $14,812 $40,768 $25,956 $14,812 $42,532 $27,720
MCDONOUGH, DAVID G 14 REP I Won-General $48,274 $85,818 $37,544 $48,274 $93,378 $45,104
REID, MICHAEL F 14 DEM C Lost-General $2,477 $14,189 $11,712 $2,477 $18,851 $16,374
MONTESANO, MICHAEL A 15 REP I Won-General $58,425 $104,393 $45,968 $58,425 $112,709 $54,284
FOLEY, ALLEN 15 DEM C Lost-General $53,573 $88,979 $35,406 $53,573 $116,019 $62,446
DURSO, ANTHONY 16 DEM I Won-General $106,022 $225,298 $119,276 $106,022 $242,591 $136,570
DIVINS JR, BYRON 16 REP C Lost-General $70,581 $119,171 $48,590 $70,581 $134,543 $63,962
MIKULIN, JOHN 17 REP I Won-General $29,795 $243,143 $213,348 $29,795 $266,831 $237,036
SNOW, KIMBERLY L 17 DEM C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
RAYNOR, TAYLOR 18 DEM O Won-General $144,405 $200,595 $56,190 $144,405 $228,037 $83,633
LAMARRE, JAMES 18 REP O Lost-General $5,350 $18,250 $12,900 $5,350 $24,550 $19,200
RA, EDWARD P 19 REP I Won-General $150,604 $294,524 $143,920 $150,604 $297,044 $146,440
CARR, WILLIAM 19 DEM C Lost-General $19,720 $48,200 $28,480 $19,720 $62,564 $42,844

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-4

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
MILLER, MELISSA L 20 REP I Won-General $78,008 $177,893 $99,885 $78,008 $195,659 $117,651
VIDES, JUAN 20 DEM C Lost-General $8,113 $43,741 $35,628 $8,113 $80,048 $71,935
GRIFFIN, JUDY 21 DEM C Won-General $100,312 $220,644 $120,332 $100,312 $262,432 $162,120
CURRAN, BRIAN F 21 REP I Lost-General $61,393 $223,371 $161,978 $61,393 $235,393 $174,000
SOLAGES, MICHAELLE C 22 DEM I Won-General $44,580 $50,686 $6,106 $44,580 $54,718 $10,138
MONCION, GONALD 22 REP C Lost-General $3,740 $15,830 $12,090 $3,740 $20,114 $16,374
PHEFFER AMATO, STACEY G 23 DEM I Won-General $115,696 $185,426 $69,730 $115,696 $197,522 $81,826
PECORINO, MATTHEW 23 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
WEPRIN, DAVID I 24 DEM I Won-General $221,073 $369,278 $148,205 $221,073 $369,278 $148,205
ROZIC, NILY D 25 DEM I Won-General $51,735 $96,511 $44,776 $51,735 $117,427 $65,692
BRAUNSTEIN, EDWARD C 26 DEM I Won-General $107,791 $205,280 $97,489 $107,791 $218,636 $110,845
BRESSLER, DAVID L 26 REP C Lost-General $23,624 $111,662 $88,038 $23,624 $146,627 $123,003
ROSENTHAL, DANIEL A 27 DEM I Won-General $60,277 $104,673 $44,396 $60,277 $111,729 $51,452
HEVESI, ANDREW D 28 DEM I Won-General $62,897 $64,984 $2,087 $62,897 $67,819 $4,922
MAIO, DANNIEL 28 REP C Lost-General -$452 -$452 $0 -$452 -$452 $0
HYNDMAN, ALICIA L 29 DEM I Won-General $78,846 $167,636 $88,790 $78,846 $205,688 $126,842
BARNWELL, BRIAN 30 DEM I Won-General $92,130 $164,700 $72,570 $92,130 $200,106 $107,976
BUTKIEWICZ, ERIC 30 REP C Lost-General $5,363 $33,527 $28,164 $5,363 $52,421 $47,058
TITUS, MICHELE R 31 DEM I Won-General $21,800 $21,700 -$100 $21,800 $22,960 $1,160
COOK, VIVIAN E 32 DEM I Won-General $500 $500 $0 $500 $500 $0
VANEL, CLYDE 33 DEM I Won-General $27,693 $55,286 $27,593 $27,693 $65,114 $37,421
ETWAROO, LALITA 33 REP C Lost-General $500 $1,550 $1,050 $500 $1,550 $1,050
DENDEKKER, MICHAEL G 34 DEM I Won-General $113,485 $145,149 $31,664 $113,485 $157,497 $44,012
AUBRY, JEFFRION 35 DEM I Won-General $29,955 $42,485 $12,530 $29,955 $49,888 $19,933
SIMOTAS, ARAVELLA 36 DEM I Won-General $80,400 $130,750 $50,350 $80,400 $132,514 $52,114
NOLAN, CATHERINE T 37 DEM I Won-General $108,999 $175,734 $66,735 $108,999 $195,390 $86,391
MILLER, MICHAEL G 38 DEM I Won-General $38,661 $75,077 $36,416 $38,661 $85,913 $47,252
CRUZ, CATALINA 39 DEM C Won-General $229,539 $576,334 $346,795 $229,539 $576,334 $346,795
KIM, RONALD T 40 DEM I Won-General $66,920 $117,502 $50,582 $66,920 $120,526 $53,606
WEINSTEIN, HELENE E 41 DEM I Won-General $106,700 $104,033 -$2,667 $106,700 $104,537 -$2,163
BICHOTTE, RODNEYSE 42 DEM I Won-General $252,831 $425,263 $172,432 $252,831 $446,431 $193,600
WILLIAMS, MATTHEW 42 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
RICHARDSON, DIANA 43 DEM I Won-General $3,749 $5,309 $1,560 $3,749 $6,569 $2,820
CARROLL, ROBERT C 44 DEM I Won-General $101,633 $270,825 $169,192 $101,633 $270,825 $169,192
GOLDBERG, YEVGENY 44 REP C Lost-General $623 $1,811 $1,188 $623 $2,095 $1,472
CYMBROWITZ, STEVEN 45 DEM I Won-General $258,271 $284,144 $25,873 $258,271 $286,412 $28,141
FRONTUS, MATHYLDE 46 DEM O Won-General $84,221 $201,203 $116,982 $84,221 $253,115 $168,894

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-5

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
SAPERSTEIN, STEVEN 46 REP O Lost-General $73,222 $136,320 $63,098 $73,222 $160,764 $87,542
COLTON, WILLIAM 47 DEM I Won-General $136,002 $291,042 $155,040 $136,002 $291,042 $155,040
LASALLE, FLORENCE 47 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
EICHENSTEIN, SIMCHA 48 DEM O Won-General $259,935 $335,184 $75,249 $259,935 $351,816 $91,881
ABBATE JR, PETER J 49 DEM I Won-General $285,845 $358,538 $72,693 $285,845 $380,179 $94,334
LENTOL, JOSEPH R 50 DEM I Won-General $108,418 $132,068 $23,650 $108,418 $132,824 $24,406
ORTIZ, FELIX W 51 DEM I Won-General $10,400 $8,000 -$2,400 $10,400 $8,000 -$2,400
SIMON, JO ANNE 52 DEM I Won-General $35,824 $130,874 $95,050 $35,824 $153,806 $117,982
RAMOS, DANIEL 52 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
DAVILA, MARITZA 53 DEM I Won-General $129,897 $164,394 $34,497 $129,897 $169,182 $39,285
DILAN, ERIK MARTIN 54 DEM I Won-General $83,804 $135,661 $51,857 $83,804 $138,685 $54,881
CHOWDHURY, KHORSHED 54 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
WALKER, LATRICE MONIQUE 55 DEM I Won-General $49,075 $44,403 -$4,672 $49,075 $45,663 -$3,412
JACKSON, BERNEDA 55 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
WRIGHT, TREMAINE S 56 DEM I Won-General $18,165 $87,705 $69,540 $18,165 $140,562 $122,397
MOSLEY III, WALTER T 57 DEM I Won-General $131,149 $245,860 $114,711 $131,149 $270,745 $139,596
PERRY, N NICK 58 DEM I Won-General $193,880 $410,395 $216,515 $193,880 $427,255 $233,375
WILLIAMS, JAIME R 59 DEM I Won-General $56,340 $110,240 $53,900 $56,340 $122,084 $65,744
WASHINGTON, BRANDON 59 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
BARRON, CHARLES 60 DEM I Won-General $18,764 $56,704 $37,940 $18,764 $80,140 $61,376
BATES, LEROY 60 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
FALL, CHARLES 61 DEM O Won-General $120,995 $282,423 $161,428 $120,995 $313,923 $192,928
REILLY, MICHAEL 62 REP O Won-General $61,497 $233,937 $172,440 $61,497 $304,371 $242,874
CUSICK, MICHAEL J 63 DEM I Won-General $170,757 $276,007 $105,250 $170,757 $300,703 $129,946
MALLIOTAKIS, NICOLE 64 REP I Won-General $60,847 $151,717 $90,870 $60,847 $169,861 $109,014
BAUMEL, ADAM 64 DEM C Lost-General $15,952 $42,178 $26,226 $15,952 $69,394 $53,442
NIOU, YUH-LINE 65 DEM I Won-General $115,343 $226,023 $110,680 $115,343 $251,223 $135,880
GLICK, DEBORAH J 66 DEM I Won-General $153,219 $265,105 $111,886 $153,219 $284,635 $131,416
ROSENTHAL, LINDA B 67 DEM I Won-General $84,346 $144,276 $59,930 $84,346 $155,679 $71,333
RODRIGUEZ, ROBERT J 68 DEM I Won-General $134,259 $182,144 $47,885 $134,259 $189,792 $55,533
CARRERAS, DABY 68 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
ODONNELL, DANIEL J 69 DEM I Won-General $43,080 $79,560 $36,480 $43,080 $86,333 $43,253
COTENESCU, CORINA 69 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
DICKENS, INEZ E 70 DEM I Won-General $143,035 $281,546 $138,511 $143,035 $288,350 $145,315
TAYLOR, ALFRED (AL) 71 DEM I Won-General $62,094 $126,142 $64,048 $62,094 $157,219 $95,126
DE LA ROSA, CARMEN N 72 DEM I Won-General $122,744 $231,310 $108,566 $122,744 $272,890 $150,146
GOODMAN, RONNY 72 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-6

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
QUART, DAN 73 DEM I Won-General $310,847 $450,628 $139,781 $310,847 $450,628 $139,781
ASCHERMAN, JEFF 73 REP C Lost-General $59,750 $129,056 $69,306 $59,750 $143,420 $83,670
EPSTEIN, HARVEY 74 DEM I Won-General $176,365 $508,289 $331,924 $176,365 $508,289 $331,924
COOPER, BRYAN 74 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
GOTTFRIED, RICHARD N 75 DEM I Won-General $104,989 $165,149 $60,160 $104,989 $188,837 $83,848
SEAWRIGHT, REBECCA A 76 DEM I Won-General $212,239 $349,509 $137,270 $212,239 $349,509 $137,270
JOYNER, LATOYA 77 DEM I Won-General $37,250 $36,400 -$850 $37,250 $36,400 -$850
CARMICHAEL, TANYA 77 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
RIVERA, JOSE 78 DEM I Won-General $13,250 $14,728 $1,478 $13,250 $14,728 $1,478
WALTERS, MICHAEL E 78 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
BLAKE, MICHAEL A 79 DEM I Won-General $300,764 $434,514 $133,750 $300,764 $434,514 $133,750
TORRES, GREGORY 79 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
FERNANDEZ, NATHALIA 80 DEM I Won-General $128,050 $198,976 $70,926 $128,050 $198,976 $70,926
PERRI, LOUIS 80 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
DINOWITZ, JEFFREY 81 DEM I Won-General $126,841 $227,633 $100,792 $126,841 $246,785 $119,944
REED, ALAN H 81 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
BENEDETTO, MICHAEL R 82 DEM I Won-General $93,795 $117,992 $24,197 $93,795 $122,276 $28,481
ENGLISH, ELIZABETH 82 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
HEASTIE, CARL E 83 DEM I Won-General $699,674 $657,283 -$42,391 $699,674 $659,299 -$40,375
LEE, ASTON 83 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
ARROYO, CARMEN E 84 DEM I Won-General $81,300 $152,670 $71,370 $81,300 $165,270 $83,970
NIEVES, ROSALINE 84 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
CRESPO, MARCOS A 85 DEM I Won-General $378,887 $366,085 -$12,802 $378,887 $368,101 -$10,786
LENNON, SHONDE 85 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
PICHARDO, VICTOR M 86 DEM I Won-General $152,375 $145,250 -$7,125 $152,375 $145,754 -$6,621
RIVERA-DIAZ, ARIEL 86 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
REYES, KARINES 87 DEM O Won-General $141,082 $187,344 $46,262 $141,082 $211,284 $70,202
MARCUS, ALPHEAUS 87 REP O Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
PAULIN, AMY R 88 DEM I Won-General $167,760 $256,251 $88,491 $167,760 $268,032 $100,272
PRETLOW, JAMES GARY (GARY) 89 DEM I Won-General $52,801 $51,202 -$1,599 $52,801 $51,454 -$1,347
SAYEGH, NADER 90 DEM O Won-General $118,358 $228,051 $109,693 $118,358 $244,935 $126,577
PINION, JOE 90 REP O Lost-General $14,071 $47,976 $33,905 $14,071 $60,621 $46,549
OTIS, STEVEN 91 DEM I Won-General $26,000 $26,000 $0 $26,000 $26,567 $567
ABINANTI, THOMAS J 92 DEM I Won-General $33,975 $92,505 $58,530 $33,975 $110,996 $77,021
BUCHWALD, DAVID 93 DEM I Won-General $125,085 $333,936 $208,851 $125,085 $374,286 $249,201
NUCULOVIC, JOHN 93 REP C Lost-General $12,920 $51,370 $38,450 $12,920 $60,159 $47,239
GASHI, VEDAT 94 DEM C Lost-General $249,824 $354,374 $104,550 $249,824 $354,374 $104,550

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-7

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
BYRNE, KEVIN M 94 REP I Won-General $65,450 $223,877 $158,427 $65,450 $239,049 $173,599
GALEF, SANDRA R 95 DEM I Won-General $7,580 $13,460 $5,880 $7,580 $14,720 $7,140
CHIULLI, LAWRENCE 95 REP C Lost-General $5,975 $21,575 $15,600 $5,975 $28,631 $22,656
ZEBROWSKI JR, KENNETH P 96 DEM I Won-General $77,114 $147,440 $70,326 $77,114 $192,857 $115,743
JAFFEE, ELLEN C 97 DEM I Won-General $59,497 $141,636 $82,139 $59,497 $163,434 $103,937
PRESTI JR, ROSARIO 97 REP C Lost-General $47 $329 $282 $47 $581 $534
BRABENEC, KARL A 98 REP I Won-General $92,419 $204,917 $112,498 $92,419 $246,617 $154,198
MARTENS, SCOTT 98 DEM C Lost-General $26,769 $125,721 $98,952 $26,769 $169,078 $142,309
RETTIG, MATTHEW 99 DEM O Lost-General $251,389 $328,613 $77,224 $251,389 $363,389 $112,000
SCHMITT, COLIN J 99 REP O Won-General $110,072 $209,324 $99,252 $110,072 $251,723 $141,651
GUNTHER, AILEEN M 100 DEM I Won-General $84,825 $134,729 $49,904 $84,825 $139,769 $54,944
MCEVOY, CHAD 101 DEM C Lost-General $87,616 $250,032 $162,416 $87,616 $250,032 $162,416
MILLER, BRIAN D 101 REP I Won-General $17,999 $64,163 $46,164 $17,999 $87,347 $69,348
TAGUE, CHRISTOPHER 102 REP I Won-General $71,572 $211,326 $139,754 $71,572 $228,772 $157,200
OCONNOR JR, AIDAN 102 DEM C Lost-General $61,960 $190,094 $128,134 $61,960 $231,857 $169,897
CAHILL, KEVIN A 103 DEM I Won-General $156,431 $174,629 $18,198 $156,431 $186,202 $29,771
JACOBSON, JONATHAN 104 DEM O Won-General $28,880 $66,436 $37,556 $28,880 $79,099 $50,219
MANLEY, SCOTT 104 REP O Lost-General $41,764 $124,038 $82,274 $41,764 $145,962 $104,198
GIARDINO, LAURETTE 105 DEM C Lost-General $8,094 $37,608 $29,514 $8,094 $55,658 $47,564
LALOR, KIERAN MICHAEL 105 REP I Won-General $5,640 $21,180 $15,540 $5,640 $32,331 $26,691
BARRETT, DIDI 106 DEM I Won-General $567,696 $837,846 $270,150 $567,696 $888,372 $320,676
TRUITT, WILLIAM 106 REP C Lost-General $42,422 $92,294 $49,872 $42,422 $119,743 $77,321
HOUGHTLING, TISTRYA 107 DEM C Lost-General $269,147 $440,719 $171,572 $269,147 $440,719 $171,572
ASHBY, JACOB C 107 REP I Won-General $56,762 $231,562 $174,800 $56,762 $231,562 $174,800
MCDONALD III, JOHN T 108 DEM I Won-General $114,513 $219,448 $104,935 $114,513 $270,566 $156,053
FAHY, PATRICIA A 109 DEM I Won-General $103,639 $271,221 $167,582 $103,639 $272,161 $168,522
PORTER, ROBERT 109 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
STECK, PHILLIP G 110 DEM I Won-General $101,918 $220,994 $119,076 $101,918 $261,333 $159,415
CAREY, CHRISTOPHER 110 REP C Lost-General $15,385 $40,245 $24,860 $15,385 $51,585 $36,200
SANTABARBARA, ANGELO L 111 DEM I Won-General $125,319 $170,262 $44,943 $125,319 $195,890 $70,571
MCGARRY, BRIAN 111 REP C Lost-General $61,360 $175,804 $114,444 $61,360 $231,811 $170,451
WALSH, MARY BETH 112 REP I Won-General $49,206 $122,541 $73,335 $49,206 $134,637 $85,431
WOERNER, CARRIE 113 DEM I Won-General $135,117 $242,123 $107,006 $135,117 $269,433 $134,317
ZEGERS, MORGAN 113 REP C Lost-General $28,484 $100,658 $72,174 $28,484 $145,250 $116,765
STEC, DANIEL G 114 REP I Won-General $58,038 $118,627 $60,589 $58,038 $129,967 $71,929
JONES, D BILLY 115 DEM I Won-General $55,397 $111,867 $56,470 $55,397 $125,979 $70,582
JENNE RUSSELL, ADDIE 116 DEM I Lost-General $257,457 $256,631 -$826 $257,457 $265,350 $7,893

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-8

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
WALCZYK, MARK 116 REP C Won-General $66,222 $101,054 $34,832 $66,222 $116,930 $50,708
BLANKENBUSH, KENNETH D 117 REP I Won-General $28,705 $53,183 $24,478 $28,705 $65,279 $36,574
SMULLEN, ROBERT 118 REP O Won-General $28,831 $106,309 $77,478 $28,831 $150,869 $122,038
RUBINO, KEITH 118 DEM O Lost-General $20,547 $85,029 $64,482 $20,547 $132,197 $111,650
BUTTENSCHON, MARIANNE 119 DEM O Won-General $68,676 $243,676 $175,000 $68,676 $243,676 $175,000
BOVA JR, DENNIS 119 REP O Lost-General $3,510 $17,070 $13,560 $3,510 $19,338 $15,828
BARCLAY, WILLIAM A 120 REP I Won-General $103,733 $135,048 $31,315 $103,733 $153,054 $49,320
TOSH, GAIL 120 DEM C Lost-General $7,753 $36,397 $28,644 $7,753 $58,094 $50,341
MAGEE, BILL 121 DEM I Lost-General $132,461 $237,097 $104,636 $132,461 $306,435 $173,974
SALKA, JOHN J 121 REP C Won-General $6,667 $17,359 $10,692 $6,667 $23,911 $17,244
CROUCH, CLIFFORD W 122 REP I Won-General $101,149 $242,606 $141,457 $101,149 $284,601 $183,453
LUPARDO, DONNA A 123 DEM I Won-General $111,427 $192,224 $80,797 $111,427 $239,329 $127,902
BATROWNY, BILL 124 DEM C Lost-General $6,785 $32,633 $25,848 $6,785 $45,989 $39,204
FRIEND, CHRISTOPHER S 124 REP I Won-General $225 $375 $150 $225 $533 $308
LIFTON, BARBARA S 125 DEM I Won-General $21,462 $86,404 $64,942 $21,462 $124,972 $103,511
FINCH, GARY D 126 REP I Won-General $129,496 $289,369 $159,873 $129,496 $295,883 $166,387
BATMAN, KETIH 126 DEM C Lost-General $68,897 $185,322 $116,425 $68,897 $226,039 $157,142
STIRPE JR, ALBERT A 127 DEM I Won-General $215,674 $299,247 $83,573 $215,674 $312,697 $97,024
PARO, NICHOLAS 127 REP C Lost-General $39,309 $116,799 $77,490 $39,309 $135,195 $95,886
HUNTER, PAMELA JO 128 DEM I Won-General $78,271 $143,579 $65,308 $78,271 $175,936 $97,665
MAGNARELLI, WILLIAM 129 DEM I Won-General $117,017 $196,926 $79,909 $117,017 $213,936 $96,919
OTT, EDWARD 129 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
COMEGYS, SCOTT 130 DEM O Lost-General $13,244 $59,708 $46,464 $13,244 $84,152 $70,908
MANKTELOW, BRIAN 130 REP O Won-General $19,254 $41,054 $21,800 $19,254 $53,402 $34,148
KOLB, BRIAN M 131 REP I Won-General $294,641 $311,252 $16,611 $294,641 $319,014 $24,373
PALMESANO, PHILIP A 132 REP I Won-General $74,626 $148,654 $74,028 $74,626 $187,273 $112,647
BYRNES, MARJORIE L 133 REP C Won-General $29,702 $93,458 $63,756 $29,702 $146,453 $116,752
BAER, BARBARA A 133 DEM C Lost-General $8,510 $35,270 $26,760 $8,510 $44,216 $35,706
LAWRENCE, PETER A 134 REP I Won-General $23,700 $48,546 $24,846 $23,700 $49,491 $25,791
JOHNS, MARK C 135 REP I Won-General $37,335 $71,955 $34,620 $37,335 $78,255 $40,920
GILCHRIST, ANDREW 135 DEM C Lost-General $5,402 $7,650 $2,248 $5,402 $9,906 $4,503
ROMEO, JAMIE 136 DEM O Won-General $48,371 $139,553 $91,182 $48,371 $177,945 $129,574
GANTT, DAVID F 137 DEM I Won-General $31,183 $29,101 -$2,082 $31,183 $29,857 -$1,326
BRONSON, HARRY B 138 DEM I Won-General $222,440 $349,546 $127,106 $222,440 $349,546 $127,106
IACOVANGELO, PATSY 138 REP C Lost-General $8,183 $7,150 -$1,033 $8,183 $8,095 -$88
HAWLEY, STEPHEN M 139 REP I Won-General $66,695 $184,955 $118,260 $66,695 $214,313 $147,618
SCHIMMINGER, ROBIN L 140 DEM I Won-General $116,691 $185,876 $69,185 $116,691 $224,596 $107,905

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics
 A-9

Appendix B3: 2018 Assembly Candidates Under Governor Cuomo's Public Funding Proposal - Major Party General Election Candidates
Notes: The first comparison shows how candidates would fare with their actual 2018 donor pool. The second comparison shows how they would fare if the proposal brought more small donors into the
system. The amount of small donors added is based on increasing donor participation to 1.5% of the voting age population, across legislative and gubernatorial elections. This is done by increasing small
donors, each giving $50. If candidates did not already have any small matchable donors ($100), no new ones are added.
The table includes some candidates who were on the ballot, but have no reported receipts.

Comparing 2018 Candidates (Same Donors) Comparing 2018 Candidates (w/New Donors)
v. Status Quo v. Status Quo
Net Gain/Loss Net Gain/Loss
Actual Total Projected Actual Total Projected
From Status Quo From Status Quo
Candidate District Party ICO* Status Receipts (less Adjusted Total Receipts (less Adjusted Total
for Participating for Participating
Self-Funding) Receipts Self-Funding) Receipts
Candidates Candidates
OHAR, ADAM 140 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
PEOPLES-STOKES, CRYSTAL 141 DEM I Won-General $211,635 $331,265 $119,630 $211,635 $346,889 $135,254
KOSTECKY, ROSS M 141 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
BURKE, PATRICK 142 DEM C Won-General $252,882 $390,533 $137,651 $252,882 $390,533 $137,651
BOHEN, ERIK T 142 REP I Lost-General $130,757 $452,881 $322,124 $130,757 $452,881 $322,124
WALLACE, MONICA P 143 DEM I Won-General $125,908 $288,708 $162,800 $125,908 $288,708 $162,800
CENTINELLO SR, DANIEL 143 REP C Lost-General $4,126 $13,936 $9,810 $4,126 $23,291 $19,166
NORRIS, MICHAEL J 144 REP I Won-General $139,396 $313,334 $173,938 $139,396 $313,334 $173,938
DIPASQUALE, JOSEPH 144 DEM C Lost-General $19,649 $63,173 $43,524 $19,649 $92,179 $72,529
MORINELLO, ANGELO J 145 REP I Won-General $70,865 $125,942 $55,077 $70,865 $140,558 $69,693
MCMAHON, KAREN 146 DEM C Won-General $542,473 $709,691 $167,218 $542,473 $709,691 $167,218
WALTER, RAYMOND W 146 REP I Lost-General $271,317 $438,538 $167,221 $271,317 $438,538 $167,221
WOCHENSKY, LUKE 147 DEM C Lost-General $84,579 $255,779 $171,200 $84,579 $255,779 $171,200
DIPIETRO, DAVID J 147 REP I Won-General $37,072 $139,540 $102,468 $37,072 $177,013 $139,940
GIGLIO, JOSEPH M 148 REP I Won-General $5,250 $17,550 $12,300 $5,250 $29,709 $24,459
RYAN, SEAN M 149 DEM I Won-General $136,120 $226,826 $90,706 $136,120 $241,877 $105,757
TOTARO, JOSEPH 149 REP C Lost-General $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
GOODELL, ANDREW 150 REP I Won-General $37,034 $109,704 $72,670 $37,034 $136,794 $99,760
EINACH, JUDITH 150 DEM C Lost-General $12,656 $55,442 $42,786 $12,656 $83,420 $70,764

* ICO stands for (I) Incumbent; (C) Challenger, (O) Open Seat

The Campaign Finance Institute, a division of the National Institute on Money in Politics