CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A.
CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
IV. RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SC
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER
1987 Constitution. Art. VIIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers: xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
1987 Constitution. Art. VIIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
Power subject to constitutional limitations:
1. The Rules must concern the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged;
2. They must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and
3. Must not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Another limitation appeared in both the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions: legislature then had the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. This
has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution.
Re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption (PHCCI)
SC cited A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, denying the GSIS an exemption
from paying legal fees carved out by Congress, saying that the
Constitution “molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary; took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure;
and held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the
Executive.”
Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary under the
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Constitution also recognizes the power and authority of the SC
to levy, asses and collect fees, including legal fees.
“The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of [the] government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of [the Supreme] Court.”
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Article VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Cooperatives can no longer invoke RA 6938, as amended by
RA 9520 (Philippine Cooperative Act), as a basis for exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Rule 141.
Power to Amend and Suspend the Application of the Rules
In peculiar circumstances, the SC may exercise its exclusive
prerogative to suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case form its operation.
The rules have been drafted with the primary objective of
enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. If their application
and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, the suspension of the rules is justified. The rules on
technicality were promulgated to secure, not to override,
substantial justice.
This power can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter
even that which the high court has already declared to be final.
Consequently, the SC will also decide actions on the merits in
order to expedite the settlement of a controversy and if the ends
of justice would not be promoted by a remand of the case.
McBurnie v. Guanzon, et al.
In a labor case involving a complaint filed by an Australian
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national, the SC ruled on the propriety of accepting a 3 motion
for reconsideration filed by the respondents.
As a general rule, second and subsequent motions for
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reconsideration are prohibited by virtue of Sec. 2, Rule 52 and
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the doctrine of immutability of judgments. This general rule,
however, admits of exceptions.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the SC, it has
nd
entertained 2 motions for reconsideration "in the higher
interest of substantial justice," when the assailed decision is:
1. Legally erroneous;
2. Patently unjust; and
3. Potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
It has also been recognized that in some instances, the prudent
action towards a just resolution of a case is for the SC to
suspend rules of procedure, for its power “to suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be
questioned.”
Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety
There are serious allegations in the petition that if the decision
of the Court is not vacated, there is a far-reaching effect on
similar cases already decided by the Court. Thus, by a vote of 4
to 1 in the Second Division that rendered the decision, the case
was elevated to the En Banc for acceptance, in accordance
with the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly
Section 3 (n), Rule 2 thereof which states that the Court en
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Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained.
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"At some point, a decision becomes final and executory…all litigations
must come to an end."
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banc can act on matters and cases that it deems of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.
NO VESTED RIGHTS TO RULES OF PROCEDURE
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.
Petitioner assailed the petition for certiorari filed by respondent
with the CA, alleging it was filed beyond the 60-day period
prescribed by the 1997 Rules. Respondent claimed it was filed
on time as the new period did not apply and it had 90 days
under the previous Rules.
Procedural laws may operate retroactively to pending cases
even without express provision to that effect. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent.
Rules of procedure may be modified at ant time to become
effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested
rights. It is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights to
rules of procedure.
The designation of the 60-day period for actions under Rule 65
is purely remedial/procedural in nature. It did not alter or modify
any substantive right of the respondent even though the period
had been shortened because they still had 21 days to file the
petition for certiorari upon the effectivity of the 1997 Rules.
SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF THE RULES
Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, et al.
Petitioner had been availing of the wrong mode of appeal
(ordinary appeal instead of petition for review) in appealing
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts prescribed under RA 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Because they had
more than 60 cases filed before the CA via ordinary appeal,
they were all in danger of dismissed outright on technical
grounds.
On Exemption from the Retroactive Effect of Procedural Laws
The Court declared that under the circumstances, their decision
in this case, declaring the proper mode of appeal, affected
substantive rights. It was thus given only a prospective
application, based on equity, fair play, and the constitutional
tent that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.
Retroactive application would have prejudiced petitioner’s right
to appeal because its pending appeals in the CA would have
been dismissed outright on mere technicality.
On the Suppletory Application of the Rules
Sec. 60 of RA 6657 is constitutional and does not violate the
Court’s rule-making power. Because the Rules of Court does
not prescribe the exclusive mode of appeal from decisions of
the Special Agrarian Courts, it does not encroach on the SC’s
power. (last sentence of Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution)
WHEN RULES CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Tan Jr. v. CA
Changes in the rules on finality of judgment affected from when
the period of redemption of the property would be reckoned
from. Applying the old rule, where it was reckoned from the
appellate court’s entry of judgment, it was redeemed within the
period. However, the CA applied the new rule (reckoned from
finality of judgment) retroactively and it was held to be an error.
Procedural laws cannot be applied retroactively where (1) the
statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that
pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where (2) to
apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.
Because the new rule would result in great injustice to the
petitioner, who has the substantive right to redeem the subject
property, it should not be given retroactive effect.
San Luis v. CA
Amendments to Sec. 4, Rule 65 changed the counting of the
60-day period to file. Previously, litigants were given 60 days to
file, with a motion for reconsideration only interrupting the
running of the period. Under the new rule, the period starts to
run from the receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
Remedial statutes, which do not create new rights or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the
general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
The new period was given retroactive effect and made
applicable to pending cases, including this case. SC reversed
the CA even though the amendment became effective only
after the CA had ruled on the petition and the subsequent MR.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES
When Proper
Rule 1, Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
The Rules should be construed as to effectively assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding. Generally, that objective should call for a
liberal construction of the Rules in order that litigants may have
ample opportunity to pursue their respective claims and that a
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities
may be avoided.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party. The ends of justice are better served
when cases are determined on the merits rather than on
technicality or some procedural defects.
Liberality of construction, however, should not be a remedy for
all procedural maladies. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Suico, et al. v. Lagura-Yap
The lower court had basis to order the dismissal of petitioner’s
action due to the non-appearance of the petitioner’s counsel
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during the pre-trial conference. Petitioners invoked a liberal
interpretation of the rules but the grounds or circumstances
where such construction can be justified were not present.
Citing BPI V. Dando, the Court mentioned the reasons that may
provide a justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence
to procedural rules, namely:
(a) Matters of life, liberty, honor, and property;
(b) The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) The merits of the case;
(d) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(e) A lack of any showing that the review sough is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and
(f) The fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.

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Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
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V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM JUDICIAL POWER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION; COURTS VESTED WITH
JUDICIAL POWER; AUTHORITY OF THE SC TO RESOLVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND PROHIBITING OR
NULLIFYING LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTS
PURSUANT TO ITS CERTIORARI JURISDICTION
Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of DAP. Respondents,
however, claim that the controversy is not ripe for judicial
determination, and certiorari and prohibition are not the proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality of DAP.
On Judicial Power
The Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. It also states that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The courts, cannot
entertain hypothetical questions.
Courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.
The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature. The courts cannot evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
There are remedies by which grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be
determined under the Constitution, governed by Rule 65:
Certiorari
Its sole is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law
Prohibition
It is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said
entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions.
Certiorari and prohibition in the context of the SC:
With respect to the Court, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board
or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
CLASSES OF COURTS
General as Distinguished from Special Jurisdiction
Agtarap v Agtarap
Petitioners assailed the action of the RTC, acting as an
intestate court with limited jurisdiction, claiming that it was not
vested with the power to determine questions of ownership
and that such power belongs to another court with general
jurisdiction.
The general rule is that jurisdiction of the trial court, either as
a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having
to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership because such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
Limitations on Power of a Court of General Jurisdiction in
an Action for Reconveyance of Property
Natcher v CA
Petitioner wants to reinstate the decision of the RTC which
ruled that the deed of sale executed between the petitioner
and her late husband is prohibited but can be considered as
an advance inheritance of petitioner as heir of the deceased.
Matters involving estate are special proceedings falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of a probate court in the exercise of
its limited jurisdiction. RTC, acting in its general jurisdiction,
has no authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
petitioner. RTC was not properly constituted as a probate
court.
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Courts of Exclusive Jurisdiction
Ong v Parel
Petitioner assails the Final Order for Compliance issued by
the Ministry of Labor and Employment, saying that all money
claims of workers arising from employer-employee
relationship are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, stating that
Article 217 uses the words "original and exclusive." Thus, with
respect to the money claims of workers, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving said
claims pertains to the labor arbiters alone.
Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law
and facts. Exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of co-
existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to the exclusion
of others." Article 217 of the Labor Code does not empower
the regional director to share in the "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" conferred on the labor arbiters.
Distinguished from Concurrent Jurisdiction; Relate to
Principle of Hierarchy of Courts
In cases where remedy is available in the lower court in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, litigants
should not disregard the hierarchy of courts by seeking relief
directly to the higher courts.
The SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling reasons justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.
Mendoza, et al. v. Villas, et al.
Petitioner assailed the dismissal of his petition before the RTC
(filed bank’s withholding of barangay funds due to controversy
surrounding position of Punong Barangay) directly with the SC.
Concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as as absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of courts. There is a hierarchy
of courts determinative of the venue of appeals and serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs.
Direct recourse to the SC may only be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition (Rule 65) or if the case only
involves a question of law (Rule 45).
Heirs of Bertuldo v. Melicor
A petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders of
the RTC was filed directly with the SC. The procedural error
violated the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy
of courts
Rationale for the rule:
(1) It would be an imposition upon the precious time of the
Court; and
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Fairness never contradicts the law.
(2) It would cause an inevitable and resultant delay in the
adjudication of cases.
The SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling reasons, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.
Courts of Original Jurisdiction Distinguished from Appellate
Jurisdiction
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Leal
Respondent filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition seeking
to prohibit the Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR) from
implementing its revenue orders. The CIR then filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
review the questioned revenue orders and to enjoin their
implementation. Petitioner contends that the subject revenue
orders were issued pursuant to his power "to make rulings or
opinions in connection with the implementation of the
provisions of internal revenue laws." Thus, the case falls within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
While the SC exercises original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, such power is not exclusive to
this Court but is concurrent with the CA and the RTCs. An
appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a
continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new
action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari.
COURTS OF LAW AND COURTS OF EQUITY
GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona
Respondent was terminated as coach by virtue of a void clause
in a written contract. The action was for breach of a written
contract filed 6 years after the breach occurred. (Art. 1144:
Must be brought within 10 years from when the action accrues).
Petitioner put up the defense of laches.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Our courts are basically courts of law, not courts of equity.
Laches cannot be invoked to evade enforcement of an existing
legal right. Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice
outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never
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against, statutory law. Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the statutory period of
prescription, recovery therefor cannot be barred by laches. The
doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at
law, unless, as a general rule, inexcusable delay in asserting a
right and acquiescence in existing conditions are proven.
Carceller v. CA, et al.
Petitioner was in delay in giving the required notice to exercise
his option to purchase. While he expressed his willingness to
buy before the deadline, the formal exercise was done after the
deadline. SC noted that respondent intended to dispose of the
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property, and petitioner indubitably intended to buy it and in fact
made significant improvements and renovations as a lessor.
Petitioner cannot insist, however, on purchasing the property
based on the agreed upon price. Neither could the respondent
take advantage of the situation by increasing the selling price
by nearly 90% of the price originally agreed upon.
Courts of law, being also courts of equity, may not countenance
such grossly unfair results without doing violence to its solemn
obligation to administer fair and equal justice for all. The case
was remanded to ascertain the fair market value when the
contract was consummated plus expenses to be paid by the
petitioner for using the lot.
When Principle of Equity Cannot Be Applied
PTA of St. Matthew’s Christian Academy v. Metrobank
Petitioners assailed the writ of possession for respondent who
was awarded the land on which the school stood on the basis
of a foreclosure sale. Act No. 3135 provides that it is the
ministerial duty of the court to issue such writ after the
foreclosure sale.
Equity, aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all
abstract arguments based on equity contra legem. For all its
merit, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as
its replacement.
As such, justice demands that the Court conform to the positive
mandate of the law as expressed in Act No. 3135. Equity has
no application as to do so would be tantamount to overruling or
supplanting the express provisions of the law.
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER DISTINGUISHED
FROM EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manzo
Petitioners assailed the CA order granting respondents’ petition
for annulment of the RTC’s decision on the basis that the RTC
decision was promulgated due to lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause. Exercise of
jurisdiction refers to the decision actually rendered.
The ground for annulling a decision is absence of jurisdiction. In
such case, the court without jurisdiction should not take
cognizance of a petition at all because the law does not vest it
with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the MTC
decision appealed to it fell under its appellate jurisdiction.
However, its exercise of such jurisdiction was erroneous
because it decided the issue of ownership in an ejectment suit.
ERROR OF JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM ERROR
OF JUDGMENT
An error of judgment is one Error of jurisdiction is one
which the court may commit where the act complained of
in the exercise of its was issued by the court
jurisdiction and is reversible without or in excess of
only by appeal. jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
Relate to Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
Rule 65, Sec 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. xxx
Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. xxx
Julies Franchise Corp. v. Ruiz, et al.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari raising errors of judgment
on the part of the CA which ruled that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in refusing to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by respondent.
The Court noted that the arguments raised by petitioner are not
errors involving jurisdiction but one of judgment which is
beyond the ambit of a certiorari proceeding. A certiorari
proceeding is an extraordinary remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
ADHERENCE TO JURISDICTION
Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc.
Petitioner assail the ruling of the CA which ordered the
consolidation of the case she filed against RBCI before the
RTC-Iriga with the liquidation case of RBCI being tried before
the RTC of Makati. Petitioner claims that the consolidation is
contrary to the principle of adherence jurisdiction.
The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction admits of exceptions
such as when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
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NON-INTERFERENCE WITH THE ORDERS AND
PROCESSES OF A COORDINATE AND CO-EQUAL COURT
Cabili v. Balindong
Petitioner’s clients were awarded damages from a case
involving a vehicular accident before RTC Iligan. A notice of
garnishment was issued against Mindanao State University but
the OSG opposed and filed a petition before RTC Marawi.
Judge of the latter RTC violated the rule of non-interference
with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court provides
that no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or
orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
Rationale: A court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, to its execution and its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
A case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued
a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement
of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes.
To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in
execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Euro-Med Laboratories, Phils., Inc. v Province of Batangas
Petitioner filed a civil case for sum of money against
respondent Province of Batangas. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over
petitioner’s money claim was lodged with the COA.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such
that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort
to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.
It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the
claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Exception to the Rule on Primary Jurisdiction:
(a) Where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine;
(b) Where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) Where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) Where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) When its application may cause great and irreparable
damage;
(h) Where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy;
(k) When strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) In quo warranto proceedings.
Republic v. Lacap
Petitioner assails the decision of the CA on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and for being contrary to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. Corollary to this is
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Courts cannot determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the latter, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules.
Decision of a Division of the SC Modifying a Doctrine
Lu v. Lu (Resolution dated 15 February 2011)
The Supreme Court initially affirmed the decision of the RTC in
granting the complaint for nullity of share issue, receivership
and dissolution filed by petitioner. However, upon appeal of
respondent, the SC overturned its previous ruling saying that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the consolidated
cases because petitioner failed to pay the correct amount of
docket fees. Upon its second motion for reconsideration, the
SC wants to reinstate its first resolution, ruling that the correct
amount of docket fees was paid. Three members of the SC
found that the cases were appropriate for referral to the Court
En Banc to resolve all doubts on the validity of the challenged
resolutions as they appear to modify or reverse doctrines or
principles of law.
The Court ruled that the Court has the power to review its own
decision based on its legitimate and valid exercise of residual
powers. The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
to final and executor decisions. Since the consolidated cases
may involve a reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle,
the judgment rendered by the Court’s Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never
become final. The Court also claimed that it has the power to
suspend its rules and exempt a case from their operation if and
when justice requires it.
Judicial Courtesy
Re: Complaint of Leonardo Velasco
Complainant accused Sandiganbayan Justices of evident
partiality, bias and impropriety in favor of the accused by
forestalling the execution of his final sentence of conviction
instead of merely performing the ministerial duty of executing
such sentence and not entertaining his motions or pleadings.
The actions of the Justices respecting the execution of the final
judgment against the accused were shown to be in respectful
deference (judicial courtesy) to the SC’s action on the various
petitions filed by the accused, who apparently exhausted what
he perceived were valid remedies under the law.
However, their becoming modesty in this case cannot detract
from the fact that the judgment of conviction should have been
immediately executed, absent any restraining order from the
SC. Judicial courtesy can no longer be invoked by the Justices
in the execution of the final judgment against the accused.
RESOLVING MOOT ISSUES
When the Issue is Susceptible of Repetition
Sps. Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et al.
An issue arose over applicability of a rule requiring payment of
interest before an injunctive writ to enjoin a foreclosure could
be issued. While a Rule 65 petition was filed, proceedings in
the lower court continued. Upon reaching the SC, the complaint
against the foreclosure had been dismissed.
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or useful purpose that
can be served in passing upon the merits.
Article VIII, Sec. 3 of the Constitution provides that judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. As a condition precedent to the exercise of
judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first
exist.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.
Caneland Sugar Corp. v. Alon, et al.
The propriety of the non-issuance of an injunctive order was
rendered moot and academic because the act sought to be
6
enjoined, a foreclosure sale, was already fait accompli.
6
A completed act. Something that has already happened or been decided
before those affected hear about it, leaving them with no option but to
accept it.
An injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined
have already been accomplished. There was therefore no more
actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the
RTC’s refusal to enjoin the sale was concerned.
However, the SC resolved the merits of the issue for the future
guidance of the bar and bench. As it held in the case of Acop v.
Guingona, Jr., “courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
RESIDUAL POWER OF THE COURT
Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall
apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the
Supreme Court.
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. v. DOTC
The Court invoked Sec. 1, Rule 10 to motu proprio dismiss a
petition where in the pleadings or evidence on record, it
appears said petition was barred by prior judgment.
Although the provision appears under the rules on proceedings
before the trial court, the power to dismiss provided therein is
among the residual prerogatives which the CA and SC may
exercise by virtue of Sec. 2, Rule 1.
INTERLOCUTORY DISTINGUISHED FROM FINAL ORDERS
Alma Jose v. Javellana, et al.
Petitioner assailed the appeal of respondent to the RTC order
affirming the dismissal of the civil case against the petitioner
because such order was not the proper subject of an appeal
considering that Sec. 1, Rule 41 provides that no appeal may
be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
However, petitioner was mistaken because denial of the MR left
nothing more to be done by the RTC. It confirmed the dismissal
of the case. It was clearly a final order.
A final order disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined.
An interlocutory order does not completely dispose of the
case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial
on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
Whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether
appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable.
The remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.
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Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al. (16 December 2011)
Petitioner sought to include the testimony of Mr. Bane to prove
their case during trial. This was denied in the 1998 resolution.
They filed 2 more motions but both were also denied. While
petitioner alleged that it had not yet attained finality because it
was an interlocutory order, respondents allege that the denial in
the 1998 resolution had attained finality for failure to file an
appeal or MR within 15 days.
Denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as
something still had to be done to achieve this end.
An interlocutory order remains under the control of the court
until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The court may
therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
shown any time before final judgment.
Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. IAC, et al.
Petitioner assailed the order considering them as having
waived the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the other
party because petitioner did not move for the reconsideration
until after 38 days.
The lower court erred in assuming the order in question was
final and appealable when in fact it was interlocutory. A motion
for reconsideration thereof was not subject to the limiting 15-
day period of appeal prescribed for final judgments or orders.
INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS TO AMEND AND
CONTROL ITS PROCESSES
Cansino, et al. v. CA
In an ejectment case, RTC initially ruled for petitioner but upon
MR of private respondents, where they appended more
evidence, it reversed its earlier decision. Rule 37 is clear that
an MR cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence.
Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to
make them conformable to law and justice. This prerogative,
however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature. They merely cover
formal changes or such that will not affect the crux of the
decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors.
Courts will violate due process if they make substantial
amendments in their decisions without affording the other party
the right to contest the new evidence presented in an MR.
FUNCTUS OFFICIO ORDERS
Ramnani, et al. v. QBE Insurance Phils., Inc.
RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal,
leading the sheriff to garnish bank deposits of the respondent.
The latter then assailed the orders of the RTC arising from the
grant of the motion for execution.
A previous case decided by the Court nullified of the orders of
the RTC granting the motion for execution. Because the RTC
rulings assailed by QBE were only issued because the RTC
granted the motion for execution, it follows that the RTC rulings
7
Something which once had life and power, but which now has no virtue
whatsoever.
7
challenged in this case have been rendered functus officio by
the nullity of the order (granting the motion for execution)
infusing life to the right to an execution pending appeal.
COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE WRONG COURT DOES
NOT TOLL RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
Rances v. NLRC
Petitioner claims that the POEA and NLRC are both mistaken
in denying his claim for collection of a sum of money on the
ground of prescription because he earlier filed a complaint for
the enforcement of the Dubai decision before the POEA.
The Supreme Court held that the filing of a wrong suit does not
have the effect of tolling the running of the prescriptive period.
Change of Theory is Proscribed
Maxicare PCIB Cigna Healthcare, et al. v. Contreras
Petitioner is involved in a labor claim where it is being accused
of constructive dismissal. Petitioner answered the complaint
filed against it in the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however, ultimately
decided against petitioner claiming that it is indeed guilty of
constructive dismissal. Petitioner now assails the decision of
the CA claiming that there exists no employer-employee
relationship between it and respondent.
A party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the
case is tried and decided by the lower court, will not be
permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at
such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material
to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware
of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
In the case at bench, it may be recalled that respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner before the LA.
Petitioner never questioned the LA’s jurisdiction from the very
beginning and never raised the issue of employer-employee
relationship throughout the LA proceedings. Surely, it is not
unaware of Art 217 of the Labor Code which enumerates the
cases where the LA has exclusive and original jurisdiction.
Petitioner definitely knows the basic rule that the LA can
exercise jurisdiction over cases only when there is an
employer-employee relationship between the parties in dispute.
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
VI. JURISDICTION
OVERVIEW
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: Acquired by the filing
of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court
by the plaintiff or petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: Acquired by the
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or
respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the
court to him, generally by the service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter: Conferred by law and,
unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the
court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: Determined and
conferred by
i. The pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or
ii. By their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or,
iii. at times by their implied consent as by the failure
of a party to object to evidence on an issue not
covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5,
Rule 10.
Jurisdiction over the res (the property or thing which is the
subject of the litigation): Acquired by
i. the actual or constructive seizure by the court of
the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia
legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or
ii. by provision of law which recognizes in the court
the power to deal with the property or subject
matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil
status or real property in the Philippines of a
non-resident defendant.
A. OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Remedy: Motion to Dismiss
Rule 16, Sec. 1 – Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim
How Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter is Acquired;
Distinguished from over the Person, over the Issues and over
the Res in a Civil Action is Acquired
De Joya v. Marquez
The plaintiff sought certiorari and prohibition against a warrant
of arrest for estafa issued against him. The SC went over the
evidence establishing probable cause according to Section
12, Rule 116: documents supporting the fact that he lured the
private complainant to give P114 million to invest in his
corporation. When the investments were due, the checks
issued by the plaintiff bounced.
The SC noted that the petitioner is not entitled to seek relief
neither from them nor the trial court because he who invokes
the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction. The
purpose of an arrest warrant is to place him under jurisdiction;
his evasive stance shows his intent to circumvent the legal
process.
WHAT DETERMINES SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Allegations of the Complainant; Cannot Depend on Defenses
Pleaded in the Answer
Yuki vs. Co
Co, building owner, refused to extend Yuki’s lease agreement
contracted under the previous owner and filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Manila. The MeTC sided
with Co. Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter held, inter alia,
that the case hinged on whether there was an implied new
lease, a question incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
therefore beyond the MeTC’s jurisdiction.
After Co won a Rule 42 appeal to the CA, Yuki filed the instant
petition for review with the SC. The SC went on to say that the
question of a new lease was an allegation of the defense, and
could not determine jurisdiction. It is properly determined by
the allegations in the complaint, even if the facts proved in trial
do not support it.
The Court held that there was no implied renewal, Yuki was
properly notified to vacate, and he had no preferential right to
buy the premises.
COCOFED v. Republic
One of the cases involving the litigation of the coco levy funds.
After EDSA, EO No. 14 conferred exclusive and original
jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases with the
Sandiganbayan, provided that the technical rules and
procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly to these
cases.
A partial summary judgment of the Sandiganbayan ordered
the reconveyance of the 27% share block held by San Miguel
to the government. However, it was undetermined whether the
assets were ill-gotten wealth. COCOFED, whose members
own the block, filed an omnibus motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, which was denied.
When they brought the issue to the SC via Rule 45, they ruled
that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution
or by law; rules of procedure give way to substantive law.
Based on the allegations, jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan
is proper.
LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY TIME
Francel Realty v. Sycip
In general, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. This
defense may be determined from the factual allegations of the
complaint, regardless of the answer or even before the answer
is filed.
The parties entered into a contract to sell but instead of paying
the balance, Sycip filed a complaint with the HLRUB, alleging
he was sold a defective townhouse under PD 957. Sycip
countered Francel’s illegal detainer suit with a motion to
dismiss, citing lack of jurisdiction. After a full blown trial, the
case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal was
affirmed by the CA.
The SC sustained the dismissal after the full blown trial, citing
the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction to decide rights and
obligations of parties to a sale of real estate. Francel should’ve
filed a counter-claim instead of splitting the action.
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Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived Nor Acquired Through
Agreement of the Parties; Exception—Estoppel To Question
Jurisdiction
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy & Manila Surety
After a writ of execution issued in 1948 by the CFI against
Sibonghanoy was unsatisfied, Tijam moved to execute
against the surety bond to recover P1,908. Manila Surety’s
motion to quash and prayer for affirmative relief was denied,
and they appealed. The CA decided in 1962.
After an MR, Manila Surety filed a motion to dismiss on the
following theory: since the original action was filed a month
after the Judiciary Act, it was the inferior courts and not the
CFI which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of claims
<P2,000.
Though lack of jurisdiction can be assailed any time, there is
an exception: Laches apply in cases where lack of jurisdiction
must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned
or declined to assert it. Here, it was against public policy for
respondents to drag the case out for 15 years only to assail
jurisdiction.
Here the Court held that a party may be barred from
questioning jurisdiction after being invoked to secure
affirmative relief against their opponent.
Exception Under the Tijam Doctrine to be Applied Only in
Extreme Cases
Figueroa vs. People
Plaintiff was tried in 1994 in the RTC Bulacan for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. He challenged the CA’s
jurisdiction on appeal in 1998, but the latter held Figueroa
estopped by laches from questioning it. Raising the same on
certiorari, the Court granted the petition without prejudice.
At the time the petition was fined, BP 129 was amended by
RA 7691, conferring the MTC/MeTC/MCTC the original
jurisdiction over all offenses not exceeding 6 years,
irrespective of fines. Figueroa’s crime was punishable by
prision correccional med-max and should have been properly
tried there.
Here, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
attach. Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain that
defense unless it further appears that the party, knowing his
rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be
then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.
Republic vs. Bantigue Point Dev’t Corp
Respondent filed with the RTC to register a parcel of land
worth P14k. Republic challenged their jurisdiction before the
case was remanded to the MTC as a land registration court.
Upon granting registration, Republic raised the jurisdictional
challenge with the CA, which was again denied.
Republic was not barred from questioning jurisdiction.
Petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction
of the MTC because the case was not yet with that court.
Though it did not file any answer with the MTC, its answer with
the CA does not come within laches as explained in Tijam.
The MTC though had the proper jurisdiction to hear the case.
Firstly, though the hearing was set on Oct 22 (1 day outside
the 90-day window from order of setting hearing, per Property
Registration Decree), that was the clerk of court’s fault and it
would be unfair to dismiss the respondent. Secondly, the
requirement of ordering a hearing within a five-day period from
the application receipt is merely directory. Thirdly, the MTC is
the proper court for land registration where the selling price
does not exceed P100k.
Raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in the
Supreme Court
Lamsis v. Dong-e
If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue
of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for
petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first
time in their petition before this Court. The original case was
filed in 1998. The decision appealed from was decided in
2007.
B. OVER THE PERSON
See Rule 14 – Summons. Portions pertinent to the syllabus
discussed in the Regner v. Logarta case below.
Remedy: Motion to dismiss
Rule 16, Sec. 1 – Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party
How Jurisdiction Acquired over the Person of the
Respondent in Original Special Civil Actions for
Certiorari/Prohibition/Mandamus/Quo Warranto
Rule 46, Sec. 4 – The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the Party-Plaintiff; Acquired Upon the Filing
of the Complaint
Regner v, Logarta
In this case, the second wife of Luis Regner filed a declaration
of nullity of a deed of donation against two daughters of his
first wife, the property in question being shares at Cebu
Country Club. Summons was properly to only one of them,
who moved to dismiss because her sister was an
indispensable party to the case.
The Court granted the dismissal as the party was not served
according to the recognized modes of service for actions in
personam. Moreover, it had been 15 months from the filing of
action and the granting of the dismissal, between which the
plaintiff only served the summons to the party who happened
to visit the Philippines, but did nothing to serve the party
residing abroad.
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
Jurisdiction over Party-Defendant in Actions in Personam;
Distinguished from Jurisdiction over the Res in Actions in
Rem and Quasi-In-Rem
Action in personam Action in rem or quasi in
rem
8
Against the person on the Against the thing itself,
basis of personal liability; instead of against the
includes recovery of property person.
Binding upon the parties and Binding upon the world, i.e.
successors in interest, but land registration
not upon strangers
Jurisdiction over the person Jurisdiction over the res or
of the defendant is essential. thing is essential; serving
summons to the defendant is
not for acquiring jurisdiction,
but for complying with the
rules of fair play or due
process.
NOT THE SAME as personal actions and real actions. A real
action may at the same time be an action in personam and not
necessary an action in rem. (c.f. provisions on venue and
9 c.
jurisdiction, infra)
Example: An action for forcible is an action in personam with
respect to acquiring jurisdiction through the service of summons
because it concerns the right of the plaintiff to enjoy his property
and the obligation of the plaintiff not to enter it.
However it is a real action because it concerns the recovery of title
to or possession of real property or an interest therein, and the
action must then be filed in the court where the property is
situated.
C. OVER THE RES OR PROPERTY IN LITIGATION
Biaco v. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank
The RTC issued a writ of execution against the Spouses Biaco
for the balance of a foreclosure. The husband received a
summons to which he failed to reply, causing the issuance of
the writ. Now the wife assailed it on the grounds that there was
extrinsic fraud on the bank’s part, and the lack of personal
service to her without any explanation deprived the court of
jurisdiction.
The Court held that extrinsic fraud could not exist, as there
was no effort on the bank’s side to prevent her from presenting
her case. Rather, everything was the fault of her husband with
whom she shared the interest in the property.
Although it was not essential that the RTC serve the wife with
summons to acquire jurisdiction, this being an action in rem,
the judgment was annulled for the lack of due process.
Moreover, the court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res
by rendering a personal judgment against the spouses. While
the court acquired jurisdiction over the res, it is limited to a
8
Quasi in rem: “as if against the thing, i.e. based on the fact that an
individual has property located in the state, and the jurisdiction over the
defendant is unobtainable due to their absence from the state.
9
JDL: I suggest looking at Rule 14, Sec. 15 (extraterritorial service of
summons) for guidance as to what is an action in rem or quasi in rem.
Since actions in personam are not covered by extraterritorial service,
then necessarily the rule covers actions in rem and quasi in rem. These
are the following instances:
rendition of judgment over it and cannot extend its jurisdiction
beyond it, issuing a judgment against the wife’s personal
liability.
Rule 57 – Preliminary Attachment
What is attachment and when may it be availed of?
At the commencement or any time before entry of judgment, a
plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered in the following cases:
a. For the recovery of a specified amount of money or
damages, other than moral or exemplary, on a cause of
action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or
quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from
the Philippines with an intent to defraud his creditors;
b. Action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to his own use by a public
officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney,
factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
Action to recover the possession of property unjustly or
fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the
property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or
taken by the applicant or an authorized person;
d. Against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof;
e. Against a party who has removed or disposed of his
property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his
creditors; or
f. Action against a party who does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be
served by publication. (Rule 57, Sec. 1)
What are its requirements?
1. Initiated ex parte or with notice and hearing.
2. Affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who
knows the facts, filed with the court.
3. Required bond in the amount fixed to answer all the costs
and damages that may be adjudged and/or sustained by
the adverse party by reason of the attachment, should
the court find that the applicant was not entitled to the
writ.
4. Must order the sheriff to attach so much of the property
of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s
demand. (Rule 57, Sec. 2-4)
What must be alleged in the affidavit?
1. That a sufficient cause of action exists
2. That the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1
3. That there is no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced
1. Action affects the status of the plaintiff
2. Action relates to, or the subject of which, is the property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent
3. Relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines
4. Property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines
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4. That the amount due to the applicant is as much as the
sum for which the order is granted above all legal
counterclaims. (Rule 57, Sec. 3)

What are the remedies against preliminary attachment?

1. Deposit or bond equal to the amount sufficient to satisfy
the applicant’s demand, exclusive of costs. (Rule 57,
Sec. 2 cf. Sec. 12)
2. Motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that
the same was irregularly issued or enforced, or that the
bond (of the applicant) is insufficient. The attachment
shall be set aside. (Rule 57, Sec. 13)
3. If the attachment is excessive, the discharge shall be
limited to the excess. The attachment may be set aside
if the defect is not cured. (Rule 57, Sec. 13)
4. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the
movant and not otherwise, the attaching party may
oppose by counter-affidavits or other evidence in
addition to that on which the attachment was made.
(Rule 57, Sec. 13)

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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
VII. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
1987 Constitution. Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
1987 Constitution. Art. VIII, Sec. 1. The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
1987 Constitution. Art. VIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
A. SUPREME COURT
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to Issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Habeas Corpus and Injunction
Not Exclusive
Mangahas, et al. vs. Paredes
Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC
which was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition with Prayer For
Provisional Remedy before the Supreme Court.
Petitioners’ direct recourse to the SC is an utter disregard of the
hierarchy of courts and should have been dismissed outright. This
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the RTCs and the CA. A
direct recourse of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Petitioners have not offered any exceptional reason not to observe
the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition should have been filed
with the RTC.
Noteworthy is petitioners’ resort to the Court through petition for
declaratory relief. This action is not among the petitions within the
original jurisdiction of the SC. Rule 63 which deals with actions for
declaratory relief.
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
1. Petitions for Issuance of Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus against the CA
R.A. 296, Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - The
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original
and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of
Appeals. xxx
2. COMELEC and COA
Decisions, Orders or Rulings of COMELEC and COA via Rule
65 Petition for Certiorari
1987 Constitution. Art. IX, Sec. 7 – Each Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Section 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
3. Sandiganbayan
1987 Constitution. Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court
known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.
R.A. 10660, Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads:
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent and higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
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"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
xxx
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Rule 45 Petition for Review of Decisions and Final Orders of
the Sandiganbayan on Pure Questions of Law
R.A. 8249, Sec. 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. – xxx
"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. xxx
R.A. 7975, Sec. 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed
with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power
to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal
rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the
rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the
internal operations of the court which shall be inforced until
repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."
4. Court of Tax Appeals
R.A. 9282, Sec. 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby
amended as follows:
"SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by
a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari
pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."
CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OF THE SC RIGOROUSLY
STREAMLINED
Lagua vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition before the SC alleging GAD on
the part of the lower court in declaring the appeal abandoned.
SC ruled that its certiorari jurisdiction is rigorously streamlined,
such that Rule 65 only admits cases based on the specific
grounds provided therein. The Rule applies if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Certiorari will lie only if GAD is alleged and proven
to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
GAD, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. In this
case, the CA merely exercised the authority expressly granted to
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it under Section 8, Rule 124.
10
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. –
The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion
and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file
Propriety of the Remedies of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus before the SC to Assail Constitutionality of DAP
and all Implementing Executive Issuances
Araullo, et al. vs. Aquino III, et al.
With respect to the SC, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but
also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL
JUDGMENTS
Keppel Cebu Shipyard vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety
There are serious allegations in the petition that if the decision of
the Court is not vacated, there is a far-reaching effect on similar
cases already decided by the Court. Thus, by a vote of 4 to 1 in
the Second Division that rendered the decision, the case was
elevated to the En Banc for acceptance, in accordance with the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3 (n),
Rule 2 thereof which states that the Court en banc can act on
matters and cases that it deems of sufficient importance to merit
its attention. (See Internal Rules of the SC, supra.)
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL WITH THE CA
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
R.A. 7902, Sec. 1. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
"(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction;
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power
to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or
hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must
his brief within the time prescribed by this rule, except in case the appellant
is represented by a counsel de oficio.
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be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice."
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, et al.
The Court held that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was
that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have
noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes
of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
the SC and the CA; whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress.
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL WITH THE CA, SANDIGANBAYAN
AND RTC
1. Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
SEC. 2. Who May File. – The petition may be filed by the
aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following
order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party;
b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the immediate
family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right
of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the
filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the
aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the
order established herein.
SEC. 3. Where to File. – The petition may be filed on any day and
at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the
threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the
writ shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or
any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any
justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where
the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may
be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before
the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices,
or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
2. Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-69-SC)
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition
for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the
Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides,
or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the
petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public
data files of government offices.
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. – xxx The writ
of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL WITH THE CA AND RTC
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo
Warranto, and Habeas Corpus
R.A. 296, Sec. 17. Supra.
R.A. 7902, Sec. 1. Supra.
R.A. 296, Sec. 44. Original Jurisdiction. - Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
(h) Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have the
power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective
provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of
Court.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1987 Constitution. Art. VIIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
(5) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
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Mode of Appeal - Petition for Review
Rule 45, Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.
WHERE ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE INVOLVED
Santos vs. Committee on Claims Settlement, et al
Petitioner avers that the CA erred in dismissing his petition which
raised both questions of law and fact which are well within its
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 43.
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought
to this Court since Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII of the Constitution
includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction "all
cases in which only an error or question of law is involved."
It should not be overlooked, however, that the same provision
vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein
is prefaced by the statement that it may "review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide," the judgments or final orders of lower courts
in the cases therein enumerated.
Rule 43 constitutes an exception. A question of fact or question of
law alone or a mix question of fact and law may be appealed to
the CA via Rule 43.
Rule 43, Sec. 3. Where to appeal. — An appeal under this Rule
may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Rule 42, Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals…xxx
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in
seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall…(c) set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues
raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; xxx
Appeals from RTC on Pure Questions of Law; Consequence
of Wrong Mode of Appeal to the CA
Equatorial Realty Dev. Corp. vs. Spouses Frogoso, et al.
Petitioner appealed an Order of the RTC to the CA, raising the
question of whether the RTC erred in ordering the cancellation
of the annotation of the notice of levy. CA denied the appeal on
the ground that the issues raised, being pure questions of law,
were not reviewable by it.
Sec 9, BP 129, vests in the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final decisions and orders of the RTCs, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the SC in accordance
with the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1948. Among the
cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC and,
thus, outside the CA’s appellate jurisdiction are appeals where
only questions of law are involved. In such case, the appeal to
the SC shall be taken by petition for certiorari, which shall be
governed by Rule 45.
The dismissal by the CA of petitioner’s appeal was in order,
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9,
1990, which mandates the dismissal of appeals involving pure
questions of law erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals.
DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS
People v Azarraga
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the Court did not commit
any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines.
Rather, it merely obeyed Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution, which mandates that the rules promulgated by the
Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all
persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Petitioner interprets Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 to mean that a court
must be specifically designated by the Supreme Court as a special
court. But what is Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC if not
an express designation of a special court?
INTERNAL RULES OF THE SC (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC)
RULE 2
THE OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 3. Court en banc matters and cases. – The Court en
banc shall act on the following matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls;
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en
banc or by a Division may be modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more
divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial
impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases
that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the Division
who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the
Court en banc;
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient
importance to merit its attention;
Section 11. Actions on cases referred to the Court en banc. –
The referral of a Division case to the Court en banc shall be
subject to the following rules:
(a) the resolution of a Division denying a motion for referral to
the Court en banc shall be final and shall not be appealable to
the Court en banc;
(b) the Court en banc may, in the absence of sufficiently
important reasons, decline to take cognizance of a case
referred to it and return the case to the Division; and
(c) No motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Court en
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banc declining cognizance of a referral by a Division shall be
entertained.
RULE 3
THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Section 1. The Supreme Court a court of law. – The Court is a
court of law. Its primary task is to resolve and decide cases and
issues presented by litigants according to law. However, it may
apply equity where the court is unable to arrive at a conclusion
or judgment strictly on the basis of law due to a gap, silence,
obscurity or vagueness of the law that the Court can still
legitimately remedy, and the special circumstances of the case.
Section 2. The Court not a trier of facts. – The Court is not a
trier of facts its role is to decide cases based on the findings of
fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself,
in the exercise of its discretion, decides to receive evidence,
the reception of evidence may be delegated to a member of the
Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one of the Division Clerks
of Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its justices who
shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the
basis of the evidence presented.
Section 3. Advisory opinions proscribed. – The Court cannot
issue advisory opinions on the state and meaning of laws, or
take cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject only
to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues.
Section 4. Cases when the Court may determine factual
issues. – The Court shall respect factual findings of lower
courts, unless any of the following situations is present:
(a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture;
(b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(c) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the
case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by
the evidence on record; and
(k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review
of the lower courts’ findings of fact.
RULE 13
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Section 6. Manner of adjudication. – The Court shall
adjudicate cases as follows:
(a) By decision, when the Court disposes of the case on its
merits and its rulings have significant doctrinal values; resolve
novel issues; or impact on the social, political, and economic
life of the nation. The decision shall state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall bear the
signatures of the members who took part in the deliberation.
(b) By signed resolution, when the Court comprehensively
resolves the motion for reconsideration filed in the case or
when a dissenting opinion is registered against such resolution.
The signed resolution shall no longer discuss issues resolved
in the decision and need not repeat the facts and the law stated
in it. It shall also bear the signatures of the Members who took
part in the deliberation.
(c) By unsigned resolution when the Court disposes of the case
on the merits, but its ruling is essentially meaningful only to the
parties; has no significant doctrinal value; or is minimal interest
to the law profession, the academe, or the public. The
resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
(d) By minute resolution when the Court
(1) dismisses a petition filed under Rule 64 or 65 of
the Rules of Court, citing as legal basis the failure of
the petition to show that the tribunal, board or officer
exercising or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
(2) denies petition filed under Rule 45 of the said
Rules, citing as legal basis the absence of reversible
error committed in the challenged decision, resolution,
or order of the court below;
(3) Dismisses an administrative complaint, citing as
legal basis failure to show a prima facie case against
the respondent;
(4) denies a motion for reconsideration, citing as legal
basis the absence of a compelling or cogent reason
to grant the motion, or the failure to raise any
substantial argument to support such motion; and
(5) dismisses a petition on technical grounds or
deficiencies.
Section 7. Dissenting separate or concurring opinion. – A
Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its
conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the
Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion,
setting forth the reason for such dissent. A Member who agrees
with the result of the case, but based on different reason or
reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence "in the
result" should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A
Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express
other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring
opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must
be within one week from the date the writer of the majority
opinion presents the decision for the signature of the Members.
RULE 15
FINALITY OF DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS
Section 1. Finality of decisions and resolutions. – A decision or
resolution of the Court may be deemed final after the lapse of
fifteen days from receipt by the parties of a copy of the same
subject to the following:
(a) the date of receipt indicated on the registry return card
signed by the party-or, in case he or she is represented by
counsel, by such counselor his or her representative- shall be
the reckoning date for counting the fifteen-day period; and
(b) if the Judgment Division is unable to retrieve the registry
return card within fifteen days from mailing, it shall immediately
inquire from the receiving post office on (i) the date when the
addressee received the mailed decision or resolution; and (ii)
who received the same, with the information provided by
authorized personnel of the said post office serving as the basis
for the computation of the fifteen-day period.
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Section 2. Motion for reconsideration. – A motion for
reconsideration filed within the fifteen-day period from receipt
of a copy of the decision or resolution shall stay the execution
of such decision or resolution unless, for good reasons shown,
the Court directs otherwise.
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court
shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and
any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is
not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or
by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to
elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En
Banc.
Rules for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
PART II
CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 2
PLEADINGS AND PARTIES
Section 4. Who may file. — Any real party in interest, including
the government and juridical entities authorized by law, may file
a civil action involving the enforcement or violation of any
environmental law.
Section 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation
of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall
be governed by their respective provisions.
Section 8. Issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO). - If it appears from the verified complaint with a
prayer for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order
(EPO) that the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of the multiple-sala court before raffle or the presiding
judge of a single-sala court as the case may be, may issue ex
parte a TEPO effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from
date of the receipt of the TEPO by the party or person enjoined.
Within said period, the court where the case is assigned, shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TEPO
may be extended until the termination of the case.
The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor
the existence of acts that are the subject matter of the TEPO
even if issued by the executive judge, and may lift the same at
any time as circumstances may warrant.
The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for
the issuance of a TEPO.
Section 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction. - Except the Supreme Court,
no court can issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
against lawful actions of government agencies that enforce
environmental laws or prevent violations thereof.
PART III
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available
to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any
public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the
Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals.
RULE 8
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
Section 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such
right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying
that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform
the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping.
Section 2. Where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed
with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or
with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
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B. COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals consists of a Presiding Justice and 68
Associate Justices who are appointed by the President.
The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices have the same
qualifications as those provided in the Constitution for Justices of
the Supreme Court. (Sec. 7, B.P. 129)
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
B.P. 129, Section 9. Jurisdiction. (as amended by R.A. 7902)
— The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment of Regional Trial Courts;
Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47; Requisites
Rule 47, Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for Annulment. – The annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Requisites for Annulment under Rule 47
1. An independent action for annulment is commenced within
the prescribed period;
2. The action must be grounded on lack of jurisdiction or
extrinsic fraud; and
3. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available without
the fault of the petitioner.
Republic vs. Spouses De Castro
CA denied the petition for annulment of the respondents but
nullified the RTC decision sought to be annulled due to the
alleged failure to receive a copy of said decision.
A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action is never
resorted as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
Citing Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas:
Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47,
it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move
for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
the said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him.
If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient
justification, he cannot resort to the action to annulment
provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his
own inaction or negligence.
Having failed to avail of any of the available remedies without
any justification, respondents were barred from resorting to the
action for the annulment of judgment under Rule 47.
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
B.P. 129, Section 9. Jurisdiction. (as amended by R.A. 7902)
— The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs
or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within
its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings
in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief
Justice.
Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Supreme Court:
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the:
a. Regional Trial Courts;
b. Municipal Trial Courts and other bodies;
c. Civil Service Commission;
d. Employees Compensation Commission;
e. Securities and Exchange Commission;
f. Social Security Commission;
g. National Labor Relations Commission (see St.
Martin Funeral Homes case);
h. Other quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial functions; and
2. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts:
1. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
MTCs and other bodies; and
2. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils. Inc. v. Metrobank
Petitioner sought to enjoin the implementation of a writ of
possession issued by the RTC to preserve the status quo until
the case he filed before another branch was resolved. Petitioner
filed before the CA a petition for a preliminary injunction, which
the appellate court denied.
The CA only has original jurisdiction over actions for annulment
of RTC judgments, and to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto, and auxiliary writs
whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The original action for preliminary injunction filed was beyond the
CA’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction. It’s
jurisdiction to grant such a writ is limited to actions or
proceedings pending before it (Sec. 2, Rule 58), or in a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus (Sec. 7, Rule 65).
Meaning of “…in aid of its appellate jurisdiction”
R.A. 296. (Judiciary Act of 1948) Section 30. Original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other
auxiliary writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Miailhe et al. v. Halili, et al.
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CFI rendered judgment against the petitioner in a case beyond
11
the appellate jurisdiction of the CA due to the amount involved.
During the pendency of the appeal, the CFI, upon petitioner’s
motion, issued writs of execution pending appeal. Upon
respondent’s petition for certiorari to the CA, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the writs issued. Petitioners
alleged that the CA had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The basis of the jurisdiction of the CA to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, etc. is its power to review the
final judgment in the main case. That is, the CA would have
jurisdiction to issue said writs if an appeal could be made to the
CA from the judgment of the lower court.
Because the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the main
case, it did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to
enjoin execution thereof pending appeal. Otherwise, it would be
in aid of appellate jurisdiction that did not exist.
EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1. Quasi-Judicial Agencies, Instrumentalities, Boards or
Commissions
B.P. 129, Section 9. Jurisdiction. (as amended by R.A. 7902)
— The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of
the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Jurisdiction over Rulings of Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Wong v. Wong
Petitioner assailed the ruling of the BOI Board of Commissioners
ordering his deportation. SC then went into the propriety of the
recourse of the petitioner to the CA.
Citing the case of Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete, it was
clarified that the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies
under Sec. 1, Rule 43 is not exclusive. The phrase "among these
agencies" confirms that the enumeration in the Rule is not
exclusive to the agencies therein listed.
Although unmentioned in the enumeration, SC held that the
decisions rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners may be
appealable to the CA via Rule 43.
Appeals from the NLRC under Rule 65
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC
There is an illogical and impractical procedural gaffe in Sec. 9(3)
of B.P. 129, which excludes from the appellate jurisdiction of the
11
This decision was rendered in April 30, 1958, when the substantive law
governing jurisdiction of courts was still R.A. 296. Sec. 17 provided that
appeals from all civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeded
P50,000, exclusive of interests and costs, were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
12
NB: CA cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
NLRC. Instead, they exercise original jurisdiction via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
CA labor cases in accordance with the Labor Code. The appeal
then from the NLRC cannot be brought to the CA, but to the SC.
Due to the growing number of labor cases being elevated to the
SC, which is not a trier of facts, and because the CA is
procedurally equipped for such a purpose, there was an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases.
All references in the amended Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 to supposed
“appeals” from the NLRC to the SC was interpreted and declared
12
to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 , which
should be initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
2. Decisions of MTCs in the Exercise of their Delegated
Jurisdiction Over Cadastral or Land Registration Cases
B.P. 129, Section 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral
and Land Registration Cases. (as amended by R.A. 7691) –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering
lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by
the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective
claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding
tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts.
3. Appeals of Petitions for Review in Cases Appeal to the
RTCs from the MTCs
B.P. 129, Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision
of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals
which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima
facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law
that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed.
RULE 43 APPEAL DISTINGUISHED FROM RULE 65
CERTIORARI
Celestial v. Cachopero
Petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the petition
for certiorari filed by the respondent assailing two DENR
Orders , because it was in the nature of an “appeal” falling under
13
the jurisdiction of the CA under Sec. 9, B.P. 129.
Petitioner confused the separate and distinct remedies of an
appeal (Rule 43) and a special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65).
13
Respondent filed his petition before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
took effect. The present Rules provide that if the petition “involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency…the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.” (Sec. 4, Rule 65)
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
An appeal brings up for review errors of judgment committed by
a court with jurisdiction. The certiorari issues to correct errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion.

Appellate jurisdiction is also separate and distinct from the

jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari.
 Appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a
continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a
new action.
 In contrast, to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ
of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and
original action, independent of the proceedings which gave
rise to the questioned decision or order.

RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari, which

imputed GADALEJ on the part of DENR officials.

Uniform “fresh 15-day period” from a denial of an MR

Rule 45, Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and
served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an
extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

Gagui v. Dejero
While respondent alleged that the petition for review of the CA
resolution was filed out of time, it was ruled that the petition was
filed within the prescribed 15-day period.

Counting from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a

new trial or motion for reconsideration, a fresh period of 15 days
within which to appeal. Citing Neypes v. CA:
This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to…Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the [RTCs] to the [CA]; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA] and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the [SC]. The new rule aims
to…make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from the
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

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C. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
There are thirteen RTCs, one in each of the thirteen judicial
regions. (Sec. 13, B.P. 129) Each branch of the RTCs is presided
over a Regional Trial Judge.
The qualifications of RTC Judges are provided for in Section 15 of
B.P. 129 and the Constitution.
B.P. 129, Section 15. Qualifications. — No persons shall be
appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for
at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
1987 Constitution. Article VIII, Section 7.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
1. Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation
B.P. 129, Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. (as
amended by R.A. 7691 ) — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
14
exclusive original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
Test to Determine Whether the Action is Incapable of
Pecuniary Estimation
Heirs of Padilla v. Magdua
Citing Singson v. Isabela Sawmill:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the [MTC] or in the [RTC] would depend on the
amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable by [the RTCs].
Russel v. Vestil
While reiterating the criterion in Singson, SC also gave examples
of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Examples include those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment, actions
questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale
or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission,
which is a counterpart of specific performance.
14
Section 5 of R.A. 7691 provides that 10 years after the effectivity of the
law (passed April 15, 1994), the jurisdictional amounts in Sec. 19(3), (4),
and (8) are increased to P300,000, and in case of Metro Manila, P400,000.
Plea for Permanent Injunction is Incapable of Pecuniary
Estimation
Bases Conversion Authority v. Uy
The case arose from the termination of the Landscaping and
Construction Agreement by PEA. Respondent contested this
through an injunction case.
The SC ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint of
the respondent it being a case in which the subject of litigation
for permanent injunction against the termination of his contract
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
2. Title or Possession of Real Property or Any Interest
Therein
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the [MTCs];
15
3. Actions in Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the
demand or claim exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00);
Test to Determine Maritime Jurisdiction
Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. v. M/V Lok Maheshwari, et al.
Petitioner, a foreign supplier of marine fuel, sought the payment
of unpaid supplies furnished by it in a foreign port to a vessel of
foreign registry that is owned, chartered and sub-chartered by
foreign entities through a maritime lien.
In our jurisdiction, whether a contract is maritime depends not on
the place where the contract is made and is to be executed, but
on the subject matter of the contract, making the true criterion a
maritime service or a maritime transaction.
A contract for furnishing supplies like the one involved in this
case is maritime and within the jurisdiction of admiralty.
4. Matters of Probate, Testate and Intestate
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00);
16
5. Involving Contract of Marriage and Marital Relations
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
6. Cases Not Within the Exclusive Jurisdiction of Bodies
Performing Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Functions
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
7. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and of the Court
of Agrarian Relations
15
The jurisdiction of courts of law over cases concerning ships or the sea
and other navigable waters; maritime law.
16
Note the jurisdiction of Family Courts. (R.A. 8369)
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law;
8. Other Cases (B.P. 129)
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00);
On the Applicability of Sec. 19(8)
Ouano v. PGTT Int’l Investment Corp., et al.
Complainant sought to recover from the respondent ownership
and possession of the lots and the payment of damages.
Sec. 19(8) of B.P. 129 applies only to all other cases other than
an action involving title to or possession of real property. The
exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining
the jurisdictional amount in the provision applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action.
However, where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
9. Other Cases (A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC)
Re: Consolidation of Intellectual Property Courts with
Commercial Courts
The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts are
designated and called as Special Commercial Courts to try and
decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights
which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Upon the effectivity of the Resolution, all IP cases were
transferred to the designated Special Commercial Courts except
those which have undergone the pretrial stage in civil cases or
those where any of the accused has been arraigned in criminal
cases which were retained by the court previously assigned to
try them.
TOTALITY RULE ON JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v, Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
The "totality rule" is exemplified by Sec. 33(1) of B.P. 129 which
states, among others, that:
[W]here there are several claims or causes of action between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in
all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
B.P. 129, Section 21. Original Jurisdiction in Other Cases. —
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
17
SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. - In any action which involves the
validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General
shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or
regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls.
Concurrent Jurisdiction with the SC and CA:
3. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the
Municipal Trial Courts and other bodies; and
4. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
RTC also exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the SC in
actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls.
Constitutionality of a Statute, PD, or EO
Spouses Mirasol v. CA, et al.
RTCs have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in the SC, but in all.
However, it was improper for the trial court to have declared P.D.
579 unconstitutional since petitioners had not complied with Rule
17
64, Sec. 3 , which requires the plaintiff in any action which
involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation
to notify the Solicitor General.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
B.P. 129, Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. —Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted
by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The
decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which
may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie
that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment
sought to be reviewed.
Regional Trial Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by the MTCs in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
However, decisions of MTCs in the exercise of the latter’s
delegated jurisdiction over cadastral or land registration cases are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
SPECIAL JURISDICTION
B.P. 129, Section 23. Special Jurisdiction to Try Special
Cases. — The Supreme Court may designate certain branches
of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases,
juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban
land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of
quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special
cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
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THREE MODES OF APPEAL FROM THE RTC

Latorre v. Latorre
Three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC:
(1) Ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction;
(2) Petition for review, where judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) Petition for review to the SC.

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E. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
BP 129, Sec. 33, as amended. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant
of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount
of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or
causes of actions between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession;
and
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lot
1. Civil Actions and Probate Proceedings
The value does not exceed P300,000, or P400,000 in Metro
Manila, exclusive of interest, damages, and fees.
2. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Ownership shall only be resolved to determine possession.
Exclusive Jurisdiction – Forcible Entry, Unlawful Detainer
Bejar v. Caluag
Bejar sold half of his house to Mijares, who sold the same
portion to Caluag. Bejar, who owned the land on which the
house was built, sought to evict Caluag. Caluag maintained
that the action should be one for the enforcement of a contract
of sale, thus properly lodged with the RTC. The Court held that
it was an unlawful detainer suit.
Forcible Entry: action to recover possession of a property from
the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the
beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.
Unlawful Detainer: an action for recovery of possession from
the defendant whose possession of the property was
inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied)
with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto
possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.
3. Title to or Possession of Real Property
Provided the value does not exceed P20,000, or P50,000 in
Metro Manila, exclusive of interest, damages, and fees.
MTC Jurisdiction Over Real Actions or Those Affecting Title
to Real Property, etc.
Barrido v. Nonato
Spouses’ marriage was declared void based on Art. 36, FC.
The house and lot cost P8,080. MTCC has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real
property
Action for Recovery of Title, Interest and Share Over Real
Property with an Assessed Value of P11,900
Genesis Investment v. Heirs of Ebarasabal
The property in this case involved a property with the above
assessed value. However the Court ruled that it was actually
not reconveyance but the annulment of documents of an
extrajudicial partition, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, SC has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought.
a. If primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
b. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, the Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by the
RTC.
Accion Reinvindicatoria Within MeTC Jurisdictional Amount
San Pedro v. Asalda
A motion to dismiss an accion reinvindicatoria for lack of
jurisdiction was denied, despite the respondent’s allegation that
the property involved was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
Court upheld the appraisal of the value of the Batasan Hills lot of
around P30,000, and upheld the MeTC’s dismissal of the motion.
RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first
level courts to include all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest within the specified
amounts limited.
TOTALITY OF CLAIMS RULE
Flores v. Mallare-Philipps
If a defendant is sued in two or more separate causes of action,
the jurisdictional amount shall be the total amount of claims
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regardless whether they are from the same or different
transactions.
If two or more plaintiffs join in a single complaint against one
defendant, or if one plaintiff has separate causes of action in a
single complaint against two or more defendants, the causes
of action should arise from the same transaction or same series
of transactions, and there should be a common question of law
or fact.
Purpose
Victorias Milling Co. v. CA
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without
regard to technical rules… in accord with justice, the policy of
speedy and inexpensive determination of cases, and the
proper administration of justice.

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs

or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the
claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to
state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint
separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

Authority to Grant Provisional Remedies

Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services v. Cyborg Leasing
Respondents filed a complaint involving the rental of a forklift
at P11,000/month, which was in the petitioner’s possession,
and wanted a writ of replevin.

Petitioner successfully proved that while the MTC has the

power to issue provisional remedies, they must follow the
jurisdictional amount, excluding interest, damages, attorney’s
fees and costs. Cyborg cannot claim that the actual damages
sought for unpaid rentals are merely incident to their cause of
action, when these were the amounts specifically sought.

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Summary procedure shall be used in the following civil cases:
1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective
of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered. Where attorney’s fees are awarded, the same
shall not exceed P20,000.
2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total
amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed P100,000, or
P200,000 in Metro Manila, exclusive of interest and costs.

Prohibited Pleadings:
1. Motion to dismiss or quash the complaint;
Except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or failure to comply with the requirement, if any, to refer
the case to the Lupon for conciliation.
2. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or
for reopening of trial;
3. Petition for relief from judgment;
4. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any
other paper;
5. Memoranda;
6. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
7. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
8. Dilatory motions for postponement;
9. Reply;
10. Third party complaints; and
11. Interventions.

NB: Procedure very similar to a preliminary investigation in a

criminal case. File a complaint and answer, have a preliminary
conference, submit affidavits and position papers, and the court
renders judgment.

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F. FAMILY COURTS
RA 8369, Family Courts Act of 1997
Section 5. Jurisdiction of family courts. - The Family Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of
age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time
of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain
any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of
application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code;
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity
of marriage and those relating to marital status and property
relations of husband and wife or those living together under
different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions
of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines;
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned,
dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or
involuntary commitment of children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases
cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive
Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence
that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women; and other
forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats
and coercion which violate a woman's personhood,
integrity and freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer
shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding
penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise
as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said
incident shall be determined in that court.
Section 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of
violence among immediate family members living in the same
domicile or household, the Family Court may issue a
restraining order against the accused of defendant upon
verified application by the complainant or the victim for relief
from abuse.
The court may order the temporary custody of children in all
civil actions for their custody. The court may also order support
pendente lite, including deduction from the salary and use of
conjugal home and other properties in all civil actions for
support.
Section 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court
shall promulgate special rules of procedure for the transfer of
cases to the new courts during the transition period and for the
disposition of family cases with the best interests of the child
and the protection of the family as primary consideration taking
into account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
Section 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall
be appealed in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as appeals from the ordinary Regional Trial Courts.
Family Courts have jurisdiction over:
1. Criminal cases where the accused is between 18 and 9 years
old, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time
of the commission of the offense;
2. Guardianship, custody of children, and habeas corpus in
relation to the latter;
3. Adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
4. Petitions concerning marital status and property relations;
5. Support and/or acknowledgement;
6. Summary proceedings under the Family Code;
7. Declaration of the status of children;
8. Constitution of the family home;
9. Cases against minors under the Dangerous Drugs Act;
10. VAWC violations; and
11. Domestic violence against women and children.
Garcia v. Drilon
Wife filed a VAWC case against husband. Husband questioned
the constitutionality of having family courts in the first place.
The question was included in a petition for certiorari to the CA
when he assailed a temporary protection order which the family
court issued against him.
SC explained the jurisdiction of family courts. They are the
same level as RTCs and have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children, granted under Sec. 7, RA 9262.
In spite of designation as a family court, it retains its jurisdiction
as such, including ruling on the constitutionality of a statute.
Taglay v. Daray
The Family Courts Act grants Family Courts with exclusive
original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of
the accused is below 18 years of age but not less than 9 years
of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense.
AM No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99 authorize MTC,
MeTC, and MCTC to transfer cases filed prior to the issuance
of said resolution to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary
implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts after
the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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G. SANDIGANBAYAN JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS FOR FORFEITURE OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTIES
R.A. 10660, Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature for being actions in
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
rem. In proceedings under RA 1379, there is forfeiture of
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
properties illegally acquired in favor of the state.
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
of RA 1379. The law does not enumerate any prohibited acts
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to be
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
followed in case a public official has acquired during his
the commission of the offense:
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
to his salary as such public official. It provides a penalty but it
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’
is only imposed upon the public official who transfers the
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the official for
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, it imposes the
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
the public official.
engineers, and other provincial department heads:
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
It is logically congruent that violations of RA 1379 are placed
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
department heads;
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
acquired property amounts to a penalty.
consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent and higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Serena v. Sandiganbayan
It was created by PD 1486, promulgated by Pres. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. This was amended by PD 1606 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the SB. PD 1861 amended this
again. RA 7975 further amended the law, as well as RA 8249.
As it now stands, the SB’s current jurisdiction is in Sec. 4 of RA
8249 (amending PD 1606).

On the other hand, RA 3019 is a penal statute approved on Aug

17, 1960. It does not enumerate the cases over which the SB
has jurisdiction, but simply has a prohibition on private
individuals. In short, PD 1606 defines the jurisdiction of the SB,
while RA 3019 defines graft and corruption practices and
provides for their penalties.

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H. SHARI’A COURTS
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines
Article 143. Original Jurisdiction.
(1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship,
legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this
Code;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death
and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the
Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two
of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in
which the parties are Muslims, if they have not
specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District
Court shall have original jurisdiction over
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family
home, change of name and commitment of an insane
person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned
in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or
declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or
the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
Article 144. Appellate Jurisdiction.
(1) Shari'a District Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction over
all cases tried in the Shari'a Circuit Courts within their territorial
jurisdiction.
(2) The Shari'a District Court shall decide every case appealed
to it on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted as
well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as the
parties may submit.
RA 9054 – An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the ARMM
Article III
Section 5. Customs, Traditions, Religious Freedom
Guaranteed. – xxx
The Shari'ah courts shall have jurisdiction over cases involving
personal, family and property relations, and commercial
transactions, in addition to their jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving Muslims.
The Regional Assembly shall, in consultation with the Supreme
Court, determine the number and specify the details of the
jurisdiction of these courts. xxx
Article VIII
Section 5. Shari'ah Courts. - The Regional Assembly of the
autonomous region shall provide for the establishment of
Shari'ah courts. Shari'ah courts existing as of the date of the
approval of this Organic Act shall continue to discharge their
duties. The judges, thereof, may, however, be reshuffled upon
recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator of the
autonomous region.
Section 7. Shari'ah Appellate Court. -There is hereby created
a Shari'ah Appellate Court which shall have jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 9 of this Article.
Section 9. Jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Appellate Court. -The
Shari'ah Appellate Court shall:
(a) Exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary
writs and processes only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; and,
(b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried
in the Shari'ah district courts as established by law.
Section 10. Shari'ah Appellate Court Decisions. - The
decisions of the Shari'ah Appellate Court shall be final and
executory. Nothing herein contained shall, however, affect the
original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as
provided in the Constitution.
Section 18. Shari'ah Courts. - The Shari'ah district courts and
the Shari'ah circuit courts created under existing laws shall
continue to function as provided therein. The judges of the
Shari'ah courts shall have the same qualifications as the judges
of the regional trial courts, the metropolitan trial courts or the
municipal trial courts, as the case may be. In addition, they
must be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence.
Section 20. Jurisconsult in Islamic Law. - The Regional
Assembly shall give priority consideration to the organization of
the office of jurisconsult in Islamic law as established under
existing law and provision for its facilities to enable the proper
functioning of the office.
Section 21. Customary Law. - The Regional Assembly shall
provide for the codification of indigenous laws and compilation
of customary laws of the Muslims and the indigenous cultural
communities in the autonomous region.
Section 22. Application and Interpretation of Laws. - The
provisions of the Muslim code and the tribal code shall be
applicable only to Muslims and other members of indigenous
cultural communities respectively and nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of the non-Muslims and
non-members of indigenous cultural communities.
In case of conflict between the Muslim code and the tribal code,
the national law shall apply.
In case of conflict between the Muslim code or the tribal code
on the one hand, and the national law on the other, the latter
shall prevail.
Except in cases of successional rights to property, the regular
courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies involving
real property located outside the area of autonomy. Muslims
who sue other Muslims or members of indigenous cultural
communities who sue other members of indigenous cultural
communities over matters covered respectively by Shari'ah or
by tribal laws may agree to litigate their grievances before the
proper Shari'ah or tribal court in the autonomous region. The
procedure for this recourse to the Shari'ah or tribal court shall
be prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Section 23. Bases for Interpretation of Islamic Law. - Subject
to the provisions of the Constitution, the Shari'ah courts shall
interpret Islamic law based on sources such as:
(a) Al-Qur'an (The Koran);
(b) Al-Sunnah (Prophetic traditions);
(c) Al-Qiyas (Analogy); and
(d) Al-Ijima (Consensus).
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Section 24. Shari'ah Powers and Functions. - The powers and

functions of the Shari'ah courts and the Shari'ah Public
Assistance Office shall be defined by the Regional Assembly
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.

Tomawis v. Balindong
The averments of the complaint were for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of real property. Under BP 129,
such cases were vested under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC/MTC. However, this does not mean that
the same cannot be filed in Shari’a District Courts under PD
1083.

PD 1083 is a special law. BP 129 is a law of general application

to civil courts that has no application to, and does not repeal,
the provisions of PD 1083. We must recognize the SDC’s
concurrent jurisdiction.

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I. COURT OF TAX APPEALS decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
R.A. No. 9282. Section 7. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
amended to read as follows: jurisdiction."

"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:


 "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as

herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides
a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts
in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected,
fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by
the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases
elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the
case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff
and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic
Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to
impose or not to impose said duties.

xxx

"c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases
involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally
decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
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VIII. SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him. (Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros)
Relate to Rule 16, Section 1(a) on Motion to Dismiss
Rule 16. Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party; xxx
CONTENTS OF SUMMONS
Rule 14, Section 2. Contents. — The summons shall be directed
to the defendant, signed by the clerk of court under seal and
contain (a) the name of the court and the names of the parties to
the action; (b) a direction that the defendant answer within the
time fixed by these Rules; (c) a notice that unless the defendant
so answers plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be
granted the relief applied for.
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian
ad litem if any, shall be attached to the original and each copy of
the summons.
A.M. No. 03-1-09
I. PRE-TRIAL A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to
defendant to observe restraint in filing a motion to dismiss and
instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses in the Answer…
Summons directed to the defendant:
1. Must be signed by the clerk of court under seal;
2. Contain the following:
a. Name of the court and the parties to the action;
b. Direction that the defendant answer within the time
fixed by the Rules;
c. Notice that unless defendant so answers, plaintiff
will take judgment by default and may be granted
the relief applied for;
d. Reminder to observe restraint in filing a motion to
dismiss; and
3. Original and each copy must have a copy of the complaint
and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any.
Failure to attach a copy of the complaint or a copy of the order
appointing a guardian ad litem are mere technical defects and the
service of summons vests jurisdiction in the court. (Regalado)
PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO SERVE SUMMONS
Rule 14, Section 3. By whom served. — The summons may be
served by the sheriff, his deputy, or other proper court officer, or
for justifiable reasons by any suitable person authorized by the
court issuing the summons.
Summons may be served by any of the following:
1. Sheriff or his deputy;
2. Other proper court officer;
3. For justifiable reasons, any suitable person authorized by the
issuing court; and
4. Upon a person confined in a jail or institution, the officer
having the management of such jail or institution. (Sec. 9)
The enumeration of persons is exclusive. Summons served by a
person without authority granted by the court is invalid and the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. (Regalado)
Certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out
therein, fortified by presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty. To overcome such presumption, evidence against
it must be clear and convincing. (Sansio Philippines, Inc. v. Mogol)
Return of Service of Summons
Rule 14, Section 4. Return. — When the service has been
completed, the server shall, within five (5) days therefrom, serve
a copy of the return, personally or by registered mail, to the
plaintiff's counsel, and shall return the summons to the clerk, who
issued it, accompanied by proof of service.
Proof of service is required to be given to the plaintiff’s counsel to
enable him to move for a default order should the defendant fail to
answer on time, or, in case of non-service, so that the alias
summons may be sought. (Regalado)
Issuance of Alias Summons (When and at Whose Instance)
Rule 14, Section 5. Issuance of alias summons. — If a
summons is returned without being served on any or all of the
defendants, the server shall also serve a copy of the return on
the plaintiff's counsel, stating the reasons for the failure of
service, within five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, or if the
summons has been lost, the clerk, on demand of the plaintiff,
may issue an alias summons.
Alias summons is a second summons issued in the same cause,
when the original summons was lost or returned without being
served upon any or all of the defendants.
Issuance of Alias Summons Proper Recourse in Case of
Improper Service, Not Dismissal of Complaint
Phil. American Life & Gen. Insurance Co. v. Breva
In a case for reimbursement of insurance premiums, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss for improper service of summons. RTC
denied the motion and issued an alias summons instead.
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Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. IAC: A case should not be dismissed
simply because an original summons was wrongfully served.
An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

In General

Rule 14, Section 18. Proof of service. — The proof of service of

a summons shall be made in writing by the server and shall set
forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any
papers which have been served with the process and the name
of the person who received the same; and shall be sworn to
when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy.

When Service Made by Publication

Rule 14, Section 19. Proof of service by publication. — If the

service has been made by publication, service may be proved
by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of
the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a
copy of the publication shall be attached and by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known address.

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MODES OF SERVICE
There are four modes of service of summons in civil actions:
1. Personal service (Sec. 6);
2. Substituted service (Sec. 7);
3. By publication (Sec. 12, 14, 15, 16); and
4. Extraterritorial service (Sec. 15, 16)
Mode Depends on the Nature of the Case; Sufficiency of
Allegations in Complaint to Plead a Cause of Action
Lucas v. Lucas
Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition to establish his
illegitimate filiation with respondent. The latter alleged that the
RTC had no acquired jurisdiction over him for lack of summons.
Corollary to the issue of lack of summons was the nature of the
action (to determine the proper mode of summons).
On Mode of Service Depending on the Nature of the Action
The nature of the petitioner’s action must be ascertained to
determine whether service of summons is necessary for a court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability. Jurisdiction over the person is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case.
An action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of a
person. An action quasi in rem names a person as a defendant,
but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to
a corresponding lien or obligation. In these cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided it has jurisdiction over the res.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
merely for satisfying the due process requirement.
The petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem.
By filing of the petition, RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
On Sufficiency of Allegations to Plead a Cause of Action
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the
following elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
The test of sufficiency of the allegations to constitute a cause
of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court
could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint. The inquiry is confined to the four
corners of the complaint.
Test to Determine Nature of Action; Binding Effect of
Judgment Determines Cause of Action
Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr.
Petitioners were defendants in a suit for libel filed by respondent.
They assailed the substituted service of summons effected.
Jurisdiction over the person is the power of the court to render
a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action
to the judgment and rulings rendered. It is an element in due
process essential in all actions except actions in rem or quasi in
rem, where jurisdiction over the defendant is not required.
Domagas v. Jensen: The aim and object of an action determines
its character. Whether a proceeding is in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem is determined by its nature and purpose only.
This case was an action in personam considering that it sought
to enforce a liability directly upon the petitioners. Service of
summons was required for the court to have jurisdiction over
them. SC ruled that the substituted service was validly done.
Domagas v. Jensen
Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent,
who was residing at Norway. Validity of service is anchored on
the issue of whether the action was in personam or quasi in rem.
Proceeding in personam: To impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon person of the
defendant. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
Proceeding quasi in rem: An individual is named defendant to
subject his interest in the obligation/loan burdening the property.
The action for forcible entry is a real action and in personam
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or
liability on the defendant to vacate, restore possession, and pay
damages. MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent
for failure of service of summons in accordance with Sec. 7 & 8.
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS, HOW EFFECTED
On Individual Defendant
Rule 14, Section 6. Service in person on defendant. —
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling
a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas Construction
A petition for injunction was filed before the RTC. Respondents
sought to nullify the proceedings due to lack of jurisdiction
because it was petitioner, instead of respondents, who signed as
recipient of the summons.
In an action in personam, personal service is the preferred mode
of service, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant
in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
Since respondent was only a sole proprietorship, without juridical
personality, the suit may be instituted only against its owner,
Marcial Vargas. Accordingly, summons should have been
served on Vargas himself, following Rule 14, Sec. 6 & 7.
Where Served
Sansio Phils., Inc. v. Sps. Mogol
Petitioner filed a complaint against Sps. Mogol. The process
server served summons at the courtroom of another MeTC
Branch, where they were waiting for a scheduled hearing.
The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a
copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may
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be found; wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
Nothing in the Rules demand that service may only be effected
in the address stated in the documents.
Sec. 6 merely requires that, whenever practicable, summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant, or if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
There was a valid service of summons when respondents,
through their counsel, received the documents from the process
server and read the same in the presence of the process server
before giving it back and refusing to sign for it. The subsequent
act of returning the same to the process server was immaterial.
Sps. Manuel v. Ong
Complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed against petitioners
and summons was attempted to be served at their address but
they requested that service be made at another time because
petitioner Sandra Manuel’s mother was ill at the time. Another
attempt was made, but petitioners refused to accept the
summons and complaint so the sheriff tendered the same. In a
motion to lift the order of default against them, petitioners alleged
that they did not reside at the house where service was made.
Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location
where summons is served. Sec. 6 is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant. What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is the person of
the defendant, not the locus of the service.
On Domestic Private Juridical Entities
Rule 14, Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical
entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Civil Code. Article 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest
or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member.
In the enumeration of the juridical persons under Art. 44 of the
Civil Code, the first and second groups of juridical persons refer
to the public corporations in Rule 14, Sec. 13. The third group is
otherwise known as private juridical entities.
If it is created under the laws of the Philippines, it is a domestic
private juridical entity referred to in Sec. 11. Otherwise, it is a
foreign juridical entity referred to in Sec. 12.
Service on a domestic private juridical entity made be made upon:
1. President;
2. Managing partner;
3. General manager;
4. Corporate secretary;
5. Treasurer; or
6. In-house counsel.
The modified provision changed the officers or persons upon
whom summons on a domestic private juridical entity may be
made: general manager instead of manager; corporate secretary
instead of secretary; in-house counsel as distinguished from
outside counsel; treasurer instead of cashier; and the exclusion of
agent and directors. (Feria)
Rationale for the exclusive list: Service must be made on a
representative integrated with the corporation sued as to make it
supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what
he should do with any legal papers served on him.
Paramount Insurance Co. v. A.C. Ordonez Corp.
Petitioner, as subrogee of its insured, filed before the MTC a
complaint for damages against respondents. Summons was
served on respondent corporation through Samuel D. Marcoleta
of its Receiving Section. Respondent alleged that summons was
improperly served because it was made to a secretarial staff.
Sec. 11 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who
can receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of
summons to someone other than those enumerated is not valid,
following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios
est exclusio alterius.
The service of summons to respondent corporation’s Receiving
Section through Marcoleta is defective and not binding.
Entity Without Juridical Personality
Rule 14, Section 8. Service upon entity without juridical
personality. — When persons associated in an entity without
juridical personality are sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all
the defendants by serving upon any one of them, or upon the
person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in
such name. But such service shall not bind individually any
person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice,
been severed before the action was brought.
Rule 3, Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as
defendant. — When two or more persons not organized as an
entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may
be sued under the name by which they are generally or
commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the
persons composing said entity must all be revealed.
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As a general rule, under Rule 3, Sec. 1, only natural and juridical
persons may be parties in a civil action. Entities authorized by law
may likewise be parties to a suit.
Accordingly, Sec. 15 of said Rule provides that an entity without
juridical personality may be sued under the circumstances
prescribed therein. (Regalado)
Service made be effected in two ways:
1. Upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them; or
2. Upon the person in charge of the office or place of business
maintained in such name.
In the first manner, it is enough that one of the persons be served
with summons and it has the effect of service upon all of them.
Prisoners
Rule 14, Section 9. Service upon prisoners. — When the
defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or institution, service
shall be effected upon him by the officer having the management
of such jail or institution who is deemed deputized as a special
sheriff for said purpose.
The officer who has the management of the prison facility shall be
charged with the duty of complying with the provisions under
Secs. 4 & 5 with regard to the return on the summons. (Regalado)
Minors and Incompetents
Rule 14, Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. —
When the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an
incompetent, service shall be made upon him personally and on
his legal guardian if he has one, or if none his guardian ad litem
whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the
case of a minor, service may also be made on his father or
mother.
Service must be made upon the defendant and his guardian.
Foreign Private Juridical Entities
Rule 14, Section 12. Service upon foreign private juridical
entities. — When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may
be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the
Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the
following means:
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in
the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the country where the defendant may be found and by serving a
copy of the summons and the court order by-registered mail at
the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could
generate proof of service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.
(Amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, dated March 15, 2011)
Note that Sec. 12 merely requires that the foreign corporation has
transacted business here. (Regalado)
Service upon a foreign corporation that has transacted business
in the Philippines:
1. By serving upon the agent designated in accordance with the
law to accept service of summons;
2. If there is no resident agent, by service on the government
official designated by law to that effect; and
3. By serving on any officer or agent of said corporation, within
the Philippines.
Service upon a foreign corporation not registered in the
Philippines or without a resident agent may be effected outside of
the Philippines but it must be with leave of court.
Service upon a foreign corporation not registered in the
Philippines or has no resident agent may be made by:
1. Personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the
foreign country with the assistance of the DFA;
2. Publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country where the defendant may be found and by serving a
copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail
at the last known address of the defendant;
3. Facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could
generate proof of service; and
4. Such other means as the court in its discretion may direct.
Government officials designated to receive summons:
1. Insurance Commissioner, in case of a foreign insurance
company;
2. Superintendent of Banks, in case of a foreign banking
corporation; and
3. Securities and Exchange Commission, in case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
Acquiring Jurisdiction Over the Person of a Non-Resident
Foreign Corporation
NM Rothschild & Sons v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.
The action in this case was to declare the contracts between the
parties void with prayer for damages. Petitioner company does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines.
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The provision on extraterritorial service is the specific provision
which deals with the service of summons on a defendant which
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines.
It is important to distinguish the nature of an action as being
either in personam, in rem, or, quasi in rem. Extraterritorial
service cannot apply if the action is in personam, since a PH
courts cannot try a person who is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the country unless he voluntary submits himself to
the court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the action is in personam.
Because of the circumstances, PH courts cannot try any case
against the petitioner because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in court.
Residents Temporarily Out of the Philippines
However, because the petitioner sought affirmative reliefs from
the court, it was deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Public Corporations
Rule 14, Section 13. Service upon public corporations. — When
the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be
effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected
on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the
law or the court may direct.
Defendant Whose Identity, Whereabouts Unknown
Rule 14, Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the defendant
is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order.
Service upon a defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown by publication must be made with leave of court.
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp.
Personal service to the petitioner failed as he could not be
located in his last known address. RTC allowed service of
summons by publication.
Sec. 14 applies in any action, whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem, where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons
despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts and was
granted leave of court to effect service of summons by
publication, petitioner was properly served with summons.
Pua v. Deyto
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against respondents, co-owners of JD Grains Center. Summons
was served on Deyto, but not on Ang, who had absconded.
Summons by publication was allowed by the court on Ang. The
case was eventually dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute.
Despite the ruling in Santos, it was held that there must be prior
resort to personal service and substituted service, and proof that
these were ineffective before service by publication may be
allowed for defendants whose whereabouts are unknown.
Pua’s delay was limited to his failure to move the case forward
after the summons for Ang had been published. He cannot be
faulted for the delay in the service of summons on her. Until
summons had been served on her, the case could not proceed
since she was an indispensable party to the case.
Rule 14, Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the
Philippines. — When any action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who
is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
(preceding section refers to Sec. 15 on extraterritorial service)
Montefalcon, et al. v. Vasquez
Vasquez was ordered to give child support to his illegitimate son.
Summons could not be served because he was not in his
residence both in the province and in Manila. Later, his caretaker
received it and was declared in default. As an overseas seafarer,
Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country.
Because Sec. 16 uses the words may and also, it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under
the Rules, such as substituted service of summons, may be
availed of in such cases. In this case, substituted service of
summons was resorted to when it was left with the caretaker of
his residence in Taguig.
Here, the substituted service of summons was valid. Previous
attempts were made, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were
evidently exerted. The person residing at Vasquez’s dwelling
who received the summons was of suitable age and discretion.
Rule 14, Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates
to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered
mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such
leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer.
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Extraterritorial service is proper when the:
1. Action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2. Action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent;
3. Relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or
4. Property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines;
Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected by:
1. By personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
2. By publication and sending a copy of the summons and order
of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known
address, with leave of court; or
3. By any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros
Respondent filed a case for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Art. 36 FC. Petitioner was residing in the US. Because
it affected the personal status of the plaintiff, RTC authorized
extraterritorial service of summons. The prescribed mode of
service the RTC authorized fell under the third mode specified in
Sec. 15, which refers to any other means that the judge may
consider sufficient. The service was held valid.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION
Service by publication can be done, with leave of court:
1. On foreign private juridical entities; (Sec. 12)
2. Where the identity or whereabouts or the defendant is
unknown; (Sec. 14)
3. In cases of extraterritorial service; (Sec. 15) and
4. Where a resident is temporarily out of the country. (Sec. 16)
Service by Publication to Acquire Jurisdiction through a Writ
of Preliminary Attachment; Determine Necessity
PCIB v. Alejandro
A complaint for a sum of money was filed against respondent,
and it was alleged that the latter was a resident temporarily out
of the Philippines upon whom service of summons may be
effected by publication, and therefore qualifies as among those
a writ of attachment may be issued under Rule 57, Sec. 1(f).
One of the purposes of preliminary attachment is to acquire
jurisdiction in instances where personal or substituted service on
the defendant cannot be effected. However, in actions in
personam against residents temporarily out of the Philippines,
the court need not always attach the defendant’s property to
acquire jurisdiction.
If the sole purpose of attachment is for the court to acquire
jurisdiction, the court must determine whether, from the
allegations, substituted service will suffice, or whether there is a
need to attach the property of the defendant and resort to service
of summons by publication in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent had a residence in Quezon City and an office in
Makati City so summons could have been served by substituted
service instead of attaching defendant’s property. The latter
should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Rule 14, Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office
or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service.
Only if personal service cannot be made promptly can the process
server resort to substituted service.
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to
establish the following circumstances:
1. Personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible;
2. Efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
3. Summons was served upon either:
a. Person of suitable age and discretion residing
at the party’s residence; or
b. Competent person in charge of the party’s
office or regular place of business.
It is required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances
are stated in the proof of service.
Failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing
requirements renders the service of summons ineffective.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
This case involved the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties
Maj. Gen Garcia, his wife, petitioner in this case, and children,
had amassed. She alleged lack of jurisdiction over her person
due to defective substituted service. It was allegedly done
through Maj. Gen. Garcia, who was incarcerated at the PNP.
No valid substituted service was made because the first two
requirements were not complied with and the third was not
strictly complied with. Service was made not at the petitioner’s
residence but at the detention center where Maj. Gen. Garcia
was detained, even if he was of suitable age and discretion.
Sps. Jose v. Sps. Boyon
Respondents argued that the case filed against them was an
action for specific performance, an action in personam. But RTC
issued an order granting summons by publication to enable the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in
the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
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substituted service. Extraterritorial service or summons by charged with authority to receive court documents for the
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi company as well as its officers who held office in that company.
in rem.
It is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant’s
While the Return stated that efforts to locate them were regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive
ineffectual because respondents were in the United States and the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge.
in Bicol, it did not exactly mention what efforts, if any, were
undertaken to find them. It did not specify where the process
server obtained the information on their whereabouts.

Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or

of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement
that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of
complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.

Sagana v. Francisco
The process server attempted to personally serve summons to
respondent but the occupant of the house at the address, who
refused to give his identity, told him that respondent is unknown
at said address. He also stated that diligent efforts were exerted
to serve the summons but these proved to be futile. RTC also
attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office through
registered mail but respondent failed to pick up the summons.

Personal service of summons was made impossible by the acts

of the respondent in refusing to reveal his whereabouts, and by
the act of his brother in claiming that respondent no longer lived
at the given address, yet failing to disclose his brother's location.

An overly strict application of the Rules was not warranted, as it

would clearly frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do injustice
to the parties, who have been waiting for 15 yrs. for a resolution.

Robinson v. Miralles
Summons was first served on petitioner at her given address.
However, petitioner no longer resided there. 
RTC issued an
alias summons to be served at petitioner’s new address.

The sheriff explained to the village security guard that he was to

serve summons. Despite this, he was not allowed to effect the
service per instructions of petitioner not to let anyone proceed to
her house if she was not around. Summons was served by
leaving a copy of the summons to the guard so he would be the
one to give the same to the defendant.

It was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted

service upon petitioner due to her strict instructions to the guard.
She must bear the consequences of her instructions. Summons
deemed to have been properly served upon petitioner.

Gentle Supreme v. Consulta

Gentle filed a collection case against CTC, its president
Consulta, and vice-president Sarayba. Sheriff failed to serve
summons on any of the authorized officers so it was left with the
secretary of the vice-president, who, according to the return, was
an authorized representative of the president and vice-president.
Consulta filed a petition to annul the adverse RTC decision.
18
The substituted service was valid as to the president as it was
served at his place of business with a competent person in
charge thereof. The secretary who received it was a person

18
No ruling on the validity of the service of summons on the company as
it was only Consulta who filed the petition for annulment.
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
Resort to Substituted Service, Condition Precedent
Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr. (supra)
To warrant substituted service, serving officer must first attempt
to effect it upon the defendant in person. Only after attempt at
personal service has become futile or impossible within a
reasonable time can there be resort to substituted service.
Substituted service is extraordinary in character. It may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized.
Impossibility of Prompt Service
Montefalcon, et al. v. Vasquez (supra)
Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. As an
overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a resident temporarily out of
the country. Personal service was not practicable. To proceed
with personal service on a defendant who went on overseas
work would only be impractical, futile, and absurd.
The substituted service was valid because previous attempts
were made, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently
exerted. The person residing at Vasquez’s dwelling who
received the summons was of suitable age and discretion.
Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr.
Respondent argued the MeTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction over him due to improper service because it was
served on an incompetent person (housemaid of his daughter).
Manotoc v. CA: A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity and is considered
to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a
summons.
Discretion is the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.
The sheriff must determine if the person is of legal age, the
recipient's relationship with the defendant, and whether the
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of summons
and his duty to deliver it to the defendant or at least notify him.
STRICT OBSERVANCE OF PROCEDURE IN SERVICE
Sps. Lourdes and Alfredo Valmonte v. CA
Respondent filed a complaint for partition of real property and
accounting of rentals against the petitioners. Summons was
served on Atty. Alfredo. He accepted the summons but refused
to do so in behalf of his wife, who was residing in the US at the
time, on the ground that he wasn’t authorized.
Since the action was an action quasi in rem, the service of
summons must be made in accordance with Sec. 15. In this
case, the summons was not served in compliance with the rules
(not made outside the Philippines, not upon order of court,
without prior leave of court), it is thus invalid. Strict compliance
with the requirements can assure observance of due process.
DEFECTIVE SERVICE RENDERS JUDGMENT VOID
Ong v. Co
Ong belatedly found out that her marriage with respondent had
already been declared void ab initio. The summons regarding
her annulment was only given to the security guard.
If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for
substituted service, the Court has no other option but to strike
down the judgment as void. Given that the requirements were
not met, the judgment was annulled for lack of jurisdiction over
the petitioner’s person because of invalid substituted service.
WAIVER OF DEFECT, IMPROPER SERVICE
Voluntary Appearance
Rule 14, Section 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service
of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
David v. Gutierrez, et al.
Service of summons failed as petitioner was abroad. RTC
ordered service by publication. Petitioner stressed the alleged
defects in the service of summons by publication.
However, his voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of
summons. It cured any alleged defect in the service of summons.
The motions petitioner filed before the court were not motions to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On the contrary, the motions invoked the RTC's jurisdiction while
seeking affirmative reliefs. Petitioner waived any defect in the
service of summons by publication or even want of process
because for the RTC to validly act on his motions, it necessarily
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Voluntary Appearance By Seeking Affirmative Relief
NM Rothschild & Sons v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.
Respondent sought to nullify some of the contracts it had with
the petitioner. Summons were served to the petitioner via the
Consulate in Sydney. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the case
on various grounds, among them was lack of jurisdiction due to
defective service of summons.
A party which seeks affirmative reliefs, distinguished from an
affirmative defense, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of said court. Seeking an affirmative relief, other
than dismissal, is tantamount to voluntary appearance. A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The second sentence of Sec. 20 referring to other grounds refers
to affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.
Petitioner voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court when it sought affirmative reliefs. It filed a motion for leave
to take the deposition of its Risk Management Director, and a
motion for leave to serve interrogatories to Lepanto.
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
SERVICE OF SUMMONS WHERE BOTH PRINCIPAL, AGENT
CO-DEFENDANTS
Atiko Trans. Inc., Cheng Lie Navigation v. Prudential Guarantee
Cheng Lie was a foreign company while Atiko, a domestic
corporation, was its agent. Prudential filed a complaint against
them. Petitioners alleged that summons was not properly served.
Atiko was not properly served with summons as the person who
received it on behalf of Atiko (a cashier) was not one of the
corporate officers enumerated in Sec. 11 but the MeTC acquired
jurisdiction over it through its voluntary appearance.
However, jurisdiction was not acquired over Cheng Lie. There
was no proper service of summons upon the agent (Atiko) so it
follows that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the principal (Cheng Lie). To rule otherwise would create an
absurd situation where service of summons was valid upon the
purported principal but not on the co-defendant cum putative
agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru said agent.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS VIS-À-VIS IMPLEMENTATION OF
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Torres v. Satsatin, et al.
Respondents argued that the writ of attachment issued against
them was improper as it was implemented without serving upon
them the summons together with the complaint. As a result, it
was issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents.
A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail
of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court.
Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the
grant of the remedy at the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment. This references a time before
summons is served, or even before summons issues.
However, Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. CA provides that acts
done by the court prior to acquisition of jurisdiction over the
defendant do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant
until jurisdiction over his person is obtained by the court.
Prior or contemporaneous to serving of the writ of attachment,
service of summons, must be served upon him, together with a
copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the
applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the order.
At the time the writ was implemented, however, the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the respondents since no summons
was yet served. The writ had no binding effect.
REMEDY IF PROCESS SERVER NEGLECTS SERVICE OF
SUMMONS
The plaintiff can file a motion to direct the clerk of court to issue
the summons. (AC)
Tan v. Azcueta
Complainant alleged that summons was issued November 2010
but remained unserved until the complaint was filed in May 2011.
Respondent allegedly tried to serve the summons four times but
defendant was always not around. Due to his heavy workload, it
took him sometime to complete the service of summons.
Although sheriffs are not expected to be sleuths and cannot be
faulted when defendants engage in deception to thwart orderly
administration of justice, they must be resourceful, persevering,
canny and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.
Although respondent had many other cases to attend to as
process server and special sheriff, respondent should have
exerted extra effort to effect the service of summons as possible
so as not to delay the speedy administration of justice.
SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT; VENUE
Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Co.
The proper service of summons differs depending on the nature
of the civil case instituted by plaintiff – whether it is in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.
Sufficiency of Allegations
When a Motion to Dismiss is grounded on failure to state a cause
of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts
alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue
based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For
it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of
plaintiffs right to due process.
Venue
The stipulation as to the venue of a prospective action does not
preclude the filing of the suit in the residence of the respondent
under Rule 4, Sec. 2. Despite the venue stipulation in the
agreement, the RTC of the Philippines cannot be considered as
an improper venue. The venue stipulation was really in the
alternative. Courts of Singapore or the Philippines; thus, the RTC
is not an improper venue for the present case.
However, the RTC had no power to hear and decide the case
against the petitioner because the extraterritorial service of
summons was not validly effected upon the petitioner and the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person.
LEAVE OF COURT, HOW OBTAINED WHEN NECESSARY
Rule 14, Section 17. Leave of court. — Any application to the
court under this Rule for leave to effect service in any manner for
which leave of court is necessary shall be made by motion in
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on
his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.
Leave of court is required where:
1. The identity of the defendant is unknown (Sec. 14);
2. The whereabouts of the defendant is unknown (Sec. 14);
3. Where the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines but the suit can be properly maintained against
him here, being in rem or quasi in rem (Sec. 15); and
4. Where the defendant is a resident of the Philippines but is
temporarily out of the country. (Sec. 16)
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
IX. PAYMENT OF DOCKET/FILING FEES
Payment in full upon filing of initiatory pleading
Rule 141, Sec. 1. Payment of fees. — Upon the filing of the
pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.
Condition Sine Qua Non to Assumption of Jurisdiction
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-II Builders, Inc, et al.
At issue here was whether the docket fees paid by R-II Builders
were correct. The Court looked into the nature of the action and
although it had paid the proper fees had the action been one
incapable of pecuniary estimation (as it alleged in its amended
and supplemental complaint), the true nature of the action was
one involving the recovery of title or possession of real property.
The docket fees currently paid were insufficient.
For failure to pay the correct docket fees, the jurisdiction over the
case has yet to properly attach. A case is deemed filed only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both
mandatory and jurisdictional.
Non-Dismissal Due to Non-Payment
Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing Jr.
Consing and Unicapital entered a loan and mortgage agreement
over the former’s property, with the latter holding the option to
buy the same. Unicapital bought the lot in pursuit of a joint
venture with Plus Builders. However, Messrs. Teng and Yu
claimed ownership over the property and contested the sale.
Unicapital then asked for the return of the payments it made to
Consing owing to the latter’s now dubious claims.
Consing moved for declaratory relief from the court. Unicapital
sought dismissal of this petition due to Consing’s non-payment
of docket fees. The Court held that the non-payment of docket
fees is not a ground for automatic dismissal of the complaint. The
plaintiff may pay within the applicable prescriptive period of the
action according to the New Civil Code.
Deficient Payment Due to Wrong Assessment by Clerk
Fedman Dev. Corp. v. Agcaoili
Agcaoili won a complaint against Fedman with the RTC. The
court, however, awarded higher sums in damages than Acgaoili
prayed for. Fedman then agrued that since the docket fees
already paid by Agcaoili did not correspond to the award, there
was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees and thus
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The SC said the non-specification or discrepancy of the amounts
of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the
government. When the docket fees paid are insufficient in
relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court/
authorized deputy must make a deficiency assessment, and the
plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency.
Even when a deficiency assessment is not made, and the
deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court still continues to
have jurisdiction over the complaint. The deficiency will be
collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation of Sec. 2, Rule
141. The party who acted in good faith should not be punished
for the omission of the clerk of court.
Rule 141, Sec. 2. Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final
judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from,
or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned
shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall
assess and collect the corresponding fees.
Filing fees in real actions
Ruby Shelter Builders Realty Dev. Co. v. Formaran III, et al.
In a case involving five parcels of land, at issue whether Sec.
7(a) of Rule 141 and Sec. 7(b)(1) of the same rule should be
used to assess the docket fee of the subject complaint.
The Court ruled that the applicable provision in this case is Sec.
7(a) of Rule 141 as the case appears to be ultimately a real
action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title
to and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents.
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the
Rule requires that "the fair market value of the property, or if
there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."
In Ruby Shelter, the SC made an important clarification as to the
difference between the values of real property relevant to the
court’s jurisdiction and the filing fees:
Determined by the assessed
Jurisdiction value as stated in the tax
declaration. (BP 129)
Filing fees in actions Determined by the fair market
involving property value, as stated in the current
Filing fees in actions tax declaration or current BIR
involving money claims and zonal valuation, whichever is
relief pertaining to property higher. (Rule 141, Sec. 7(a))
Filing fees where action is
Fixed rate (Rule 141, Sec.
incapable of pecuniary
7(b))
estimation
Assessed Value of Property in Real Action Determines
Jurisdiction
Heirs of Concha v. Lumocso, et al.
Petitioners, claiming to be forcibly ejected from their land, filed
two complaints: one for reconveyance of four parcels of land,
and another actual damages for the value of their trees which
the respondents cut. These were filed before the RTC, on the
theory that the sum of assessed value of the real property plus
the value of their trees met the jurisdictional amount.
Respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the complaints because the assessed values of the subject lots
alone amounted to less than P20,000. Petitioners countered that
the cases involve actions the subject matters of which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus within original
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
The SC explained the actions were either for reconveyance or to
remove a cloud on title. Regardless, it is an action involving the
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. In
such cases it is the assessed value of the real property alone
which determines jurisdiction; since the lots were collectively
assessed at P11,000 the case should’ve been filed with the
MTC.
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
X. COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL ACTION
Rule 13, Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined. — Filing is the act
of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.

By filing of original complaint in court

Rule 1, Sec. 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an
additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action
is commenced with regard to him on the dated of the filing of such
later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its
admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.

Filing interrupts period of prescription

Civil Code. Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted
when they are filed before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Spouses Bamachea v. CA
Respondents filed their complaint for ejectment against
petitioners on Oct 20, 1998. The complaint was dismissed on
Dec 8, 1999 but was revived on April 5, 2000. Summons was
served on April 13, 2000.

Petitioners claim that since the initial demand was made on Aug
31, 1998, the complaint had prescribed according to the one-
year period for bringing an action for unlawful detainer or forcible
entry under Rule 70, Sec 1.

The Court disagreed. The one-year period is both a prescriptive

period as well as a jurisdictional requirement. According to Art.
1155 of the Civil Code, the filing of a complaint in court interrupts
the running of prescription of actions. So while it is true that the
one-year period began to run from Aug 31, 1998 it was
interrupted nearly two months later when the complaint was filed
on Oct 20, 1998 until it was dismissed on Dec. 8, 1999. The
period ran again for about four months until the complaint was
revived on Apr 5, 2000. Evidently, the period when the
prescriptive period effectively ran does not add up to the one-
year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the
ejectment case.

Interrupted regardless when service of summons effected

Cabrera v. Tiano

Cabrera’s father and siblings sold their land to Tiano on July 2,

1947 without her knowledge and consent. On June 20, 1957, she
filed a complaint for damages. Tiano alleges that the action had
now prescribed because he was served summons on July 2,
1957, which was the end of the period.

The Court disagreed. Firstly, the end of the prescriptive period,

counting from when the cause of action arose, is July 3, 1957.
So even if petitioner were correct in saying that summons causes
interruption of prescription, the petitioner properly filed it within
the period. But more importantly it is actually the filing of the
complaint that determines the interruption. Thus the June 20,
1957 complaint was seasonably filed.

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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
XI. VENUE
Venue is the place of trial or geographical location on which an
action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction
of the court. Venue dictates the territorial limits within which
judicial power is exercised over an action or proceeding.
Distinguished from jurisdiction
Nocum, et al. v. Tan
Jurisdiction Venue
Authority to hear and The place where the case is to
determine a case be heard
A matter of substantive law A matter of procedural law
Establishes relation between Establishes relation between
the court and the subject the plaintiff/petitioner and the
matter defendant/respondent
Fixed by law, cannot be May be conferred by the
conferred by the parties act/agreement of the parties
Improper venue is a ground for a motion to dismiss
Rule 16, Sec. 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
 improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the
When objection to improper venue waived
Salas v. Matusalem
Petitioner claims that the venue for the action was improperly
laid. The Court agreed with petitioner, saying that since the issue
of improper venue was raised the first time in the Answer itself
and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed.
Under the old Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an
objection to an improper venue must be made before a
responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived. Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s objection on
venue is therefore deemed waived.
COMPARE: Current rule
BPI v. Spouses Benedicto and Teresita Yujuico
BPI then sought to recover the deficiency between the auction
sale of foreclosed properties and the outstanding loan
obligation of the respondents before the Makati RTC.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, citing res judicata, no
cause of action, and that the claim had been
waived/abandoned/extinguished. This motion was denied. So
in their answer, the respondents raised the ground of improper
venue since the subject properties were located in Manila.
The Court deemed the defense improperly raised since it was
not made seasonably at the earliest opportunity. But what is
important in this case was that it cited Rule 9, Sec. 1 with
special emphasis that defenses not seasonably raised either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
Therefore, the prevailing rule is that objections to venue may
be raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer,
provided that it be done so at the earliest possible opportunity.
Rule 9, Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. —
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when
it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there
is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Court cannot preempt defendant’s prerogative
Spouses Bang v. Mendez, Sr.
Spouses Sy Bang filed and administrative against RTC of
Gumaca, Quezon judge Mendez for gross impropriety, and
knowingly issuing unjust orders in the civil case against them.
They claim that despite the pendency of a case of a similar
nature against them before the Makati RTC, said judge still gave
due course to the case filed against them by Suarez-Agro
Industrial Corp. before the Gumaca RTC.
The Court ruled in favor of the RTC judge. Citing the case of
Dacoycoy v. IAC, the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's
prerogative to object to the improper venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case, because venue may be waived expressly
or impliedly.
Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the
parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
devised.
Motu proprio dismissal grounded on improper venue is
fundamentally flawed
Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque
The trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue.
According to Dacoycoy, motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue is not the appropriate
course of action; venue may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss and allows the trial to be held and a decision
to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue.
Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss, it is deemed waived.
VENUE DEPENDENT ON NATURE OF ACTION
Test to Determine Nature of Action
Ruby Shelter Builders Realty Dev. Corp. v. Formaran III
Petitioner avers that its Complaint is primarily for the annulment
of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. However, the nature of an action
is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or
Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.
What petitioner failed to mention was that pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement with the respondents, which clearly
provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, the
respondents had already acquired TCTs over the real properties
in question in their own names, as well as possession over the
same.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them,
the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint appears to
be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
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 CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER (A. CRUZ) | E2018 | DE LEON, DEL ROSARIO, ELAMPARO, NUÑEZ
petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land
from respondents.
Real action Personal action
Actions affecting title to or All other actions
possession of real property, or
interest therein.
Commenced and tried in the At the election of the
proper court which has plaintiff:
jurisdiction over the area 1. Where the plaintiff or any
wherein the real property of the principal plaintiffs
involved, or a portion thereof, resides, or
is situated. 2. Where the defendant or
any of the principal
defendants resides, or
3. In the case of a non-
resident defendant,
where the plaintiff
resides
Real Actions
Rule 4, Sec. 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Ramos, et al. v. Ramos
Petitioners, who are heirs of Paulino Chanliogco (a co-owner of
the property involved in this case), filed with the CA a Motion to
Set Aside the RTC Decision which declares as valid the sale of
the disputed property. They contended that they had not been
served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons. Neither
had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC.
The Court explained that the complaint filed by respondents
called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real
property in question which forced persons claiming an interest in
the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of
them owned the property. It was therefore a real action, because
it affected title to or possession of real property.
Personal Actions
Rule 4, Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Representative parties are not real parties in interest; venue
when plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines
Ang v. Spouses Ang
Petitoners executed an SPA in favor of Atty. Aceron to file an
action against respondents. Aceron filed the complaint in QC
because he resided there. Respondents opposed the complaint
saying that it since petitioners are abroad, the action should have
been filed in Bacolod City where they reside.
The Court explained that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their
agent only to file and prosecute the complaint against the
respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that
he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest. His residence is irrelevant.
The action should have been filed before the Bacolod City RTC
where respondents reside.
Personal actions distinguished from real actions
What controls between the two types of actions is the primary
objective of the action. If it is for the recovery of title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein, it is a real
action regardless of what it is actually called.
BPI v. Hontanosas (2014)
The issue here is whether an action for annulment of a real
estate mortgage is a personal or real action. Citing the case of
Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena the SC explained that since
title or possession had not actually transferred yet, it should be
considered as a personal action.
Go v. UCPB, et al. (2004)
Like BPI v. Hontanosas, the issue is whether an action for
annulment of a real estate mortgage is a personal or real action.
The Court, however, ruled that it is a real action considering that
here the bank had already proceeded with the foreclosure and
secured title over the property.
Fortune Motors, Inc. v. CA, Metrobank
(this case is Footnote 25 in the Go v. UCPB case)
Though the action was called an annulment or rescission of sale,
it was closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building in question. The caption does not efface the prime
objective and nature of the case, which was to recover the real
property involved and was thus a real action.
Non-resident defendant not in the Philippines
1. The action must be an action in rem or quasi-in-rem
(personal status of plaintiff, property of defendant located
in the Philippines)
2. Venue is where the plaintiff resides, or if it is against
property, where the same or any portion of it is situated
or found
Rule 4, Sec. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any
of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court
of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or
any portion thereof is situated or found.
Stipulation of parties on venue of action
Rule 4, Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not
apply:
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
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Lack of Qualifying and Restrictive Words

Auction in Malinta, Inc. v. Luyaben

Respondent filed a complaint with the Kalinga RTC (place of his

residence) because petitioner could not deliver the property it
had sold. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the
Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement
governing the sale provided that all court litigation procedures be
lodged before the appropriate courts of Valenzuela City.

The Court examined the stipulation and held it did not preclude
parties from bringing a case in other venues. Exclusivity is
demonstrated through the use of qualifying or restrictive words,
such as "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other
venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import.
Otherwise the stipulation should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting the venue to
the specified place. In the instant case, the stipulation in the
parties’ agreement lacked the language that would limit the
venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City.

COMPARE: Venue stipulation found restrictive

Paglaum Management & Dev. Corp., et al. v. Union Bank

The provisions of the real estate mortgages and the later

restructuring agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties
to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not
only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The
phrase "waiving any other venue" plainly shows that the choice
of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in
connection with the restructuring agreement and the collateral,
with the real estate mortgages being explicitly defined as such,
is exclusive.

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XII. CAUSE OF ACTION China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Rule 2, Section 1. Ordinary Civil Action – Every ordinary civil
action must be based on a cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another (Sec. 2, Rule 2).
Three elements of a cause of action:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
Relate to Rule 16, Section 1(g) on Motion to Dismiss
Rule 16, Section 1. Grounds – Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action.
Lack of cause of action distinguished from failure to state a
cause of action
Failure to state a cause of action Lack of cause of action
Refers to the insufficiency of the Refers to a situation where
pleading the evidence does not
prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleading
Remedy is move for dismissal Remedy is to demur to the
under Rule 16 evidence under Rule 10,
Sec. 5
Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc.
Petitioners filed an action for accounting and damages. A
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, alleging that petitioners were not real parties in interest,
was filed by respondents after their filing of an answer and after
pre-trial. The RTC denied the motion, but the CA reversed,
citing Dabuco v. CA that lack of cause of action may be raised
at anytime during the proceedings. SC found that Dabuco was
not applicable because it pertains to a lack of cause of action,
while the present case pertains to a failure to state a cause of
action. Thus, it ruled that respondents did not timely file its
motion to dismiss; therefore, it already constituted waiver.
Cause of action distinguished from right of action
AFPSLAI filed a complaint for a sum of money against CBC.
The latter filed a motion to dismiss invoking prescription,
claiming that the uniform maturity date under the Home Notes
indicate the date of accrual of the cause of action.
The Court held that the cause of action does not accrue until
the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply
with its duty. Accordingly, a cause of action on a written
contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation
thereof accrues. In this case, said action accrued only when
AFPSLAI’s demand for payment was refused by CBC. It cannot
be said to accrue on the uniform maturity date because at that
point, the third essential element of a cause of action had not
yet occurred.
Cause of action [breach or violation] must exist at the time of
the filing of the complaint
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. CA
Christian filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against Swagman, claiming that the latter violated the terms of
the notes. It was only during the pendency of the case did two
of the notes become due and demandable. RTC and CA
rendered a decision in favor of Christian, explaining that Sec.
5, Rule 10 allows a complaint that does not state a cause of
action to be cured by evidence presented without objection
during trial. SC declared that the lower courts’ interpretation of
the said rule is erroneous, and that the complaint should have
been dismissed.
SC explained that Sec. 5, Rule 10 applies to situations wherein
evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is
presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such
evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion
of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of
action may be cured by evidence presented during trial.
However, this curing effect is applicable only if a cause of action
in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint
is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
Splitting a cause of action – prohibited
Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or
indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and
instituting two or more actions upon them. (Chu v. Spouses
Cunanan).
Rule 2, Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A
party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action.

Rule 2, Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.

Cause of Action
The act or omission by which
a party violates a right of
another
Requires the existence of a
right, and the violation of said
right
Matter of substantive law
Right of Action
– If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
Right to file a suit; the
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
consequence of the violation
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
of the plaintiff’s right
others.
Requires the existence of a
cause of action
Chu, et al. v. Spouses Cunanan
Matter of procedural law
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. In this case, the Court found that the petitioners were
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not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which
a special relief was sought, and then to leave the rest to be
presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation, which would violate the policy against multiplicity of
suits. Thus, the case was dismissed on the ground of bar by
res judicata.
Joinder on causes of action; effect of misjoinder of causes of
action
A joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more
than one cause of action in a declaration. (Spouses Perez v.
Hermano)
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for
joinder under Sec. 5, Rule 2 are not met.
Rule 16, Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may
in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply
with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court
provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein;
and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Rule 16, Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. – Misjoinder
of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately.
Spouses Perez v. Hermano
RTC dropped Hermano from the complaint on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action. On the other hand, petitioners
insist that there are common questions of law and fact between
the causes of action against the respondents. The Court
agreed with the petitioners, stating that there was no misjoinder
in this case, and that joinders should be liberally construed.
Joinder of causes of action disallowed
Republic v. Hernandez
Spouses Moran filed two petitions with the RTC: to adopt Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran, and to change his name to Aaron Joseph,
according to the baptismal name he received in their community.
The Republic opposed the joinder, but the RTC granted both
motions, hence the petition for certiorari to the SC on questions
of law.
Joinder of actions require a conceptual unity; unrelated suits
should be taken up individually. The lack of relation is clear:
adoption is governed by Arts. 183-193, FC and Rule 99, ROC,
while change of name is governed by Arts. 364-380, NCC and
Rule 103, ROC.
In petitions for adoption, the court considers the adopter’s fitness
and qualifications. In petitions for change of name, the court
evaluates the propriety of the change (is it ridiculous, confusing,
embarrassing, etc). The former affects family relations, the latter
does not.
The Court modified the RTC ruling: adoption granted, but
disallowed the name change on lack of merit.
Alternative causes of action may be pleaded in the complaint
Subject to the following:
a) Rules on joinder of parties;
b) Not covered by special civil actions;
c) Not governed by special rules.
Baluyot, et al. v. CA
1) The government recognized the claim of the residents
of 42 hectares of rice land, which were included in UP
Diliman’s land title.
2) Pursuant to this claim, UP agreed to address the claims
through a deed of donation, covering 15.8 hectares, in
favor to the QC government. The latter would distribute
the land to qualified residents.
UP reneged on delivering the land title for the QC government to
change the title. Thus petitioners, members of the KNL
Homeowners Association, sought both the recovery of the 42
hectares (addressing #1) and specific performance against UP
pursuant to the deed of donation (addressing #2).
UP alleged that specific performance (surrender the titles) and
recovery of land are inconsistent causes of action and sought the
dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that under Rule 8,
Sec. 2, parties may plead alternative causes of action,
regardless of consistency. Here, the subject matter of each claim
does not pertain to the same land, and each cause of action
consists of a definite and distinct claim.
As long as one claim is sufficient, the insufficiency of the others
will not warrant a dismissal.
Case remanded for trial on the merits.
Mis-joined cause of action is not a ground for dismissal. It
will simply be severed upon (a) a motion of a party or (b) the
court motu proprio; otherwise subject to waiver.
Ada v. Baylon
Parties are the heirs to the estate of Spouses Baylon. Lilia Ada,
together with her grand-nieces and grand-nephews, filed for the
partition of 43 parcels of land against Lilia’s siblings Rita and
Panfila, and their nephew Florante.
During the pendency of the case, Rita effected a donation inter
vivos over some of the land in question in favor of Florante. The
petitioners then filed a supplemental pleading* to rescind the
deed of donation.
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The trial court held that some of the parcels of land which Rita
held were indeed co-owned and ordered a partition, as well as a
rescission of the donation. Florante appealed the rescission.

The Court stepped in to say that there was a misjoinder, though

nobody had recognized it. Partition is a special civil action (Rule
69) while rescission is governed by the ordinary rules. Their
variance precludes their joinder in one complaint. Though the
RTC erred procedurally, it does not invalidate its adjudication of
the issues.

Therefore:
a) as long as the court had jurisdiction, and
b) there is no objection to the improper joinder by the
parties, and
c) the court did not motu proprio direct a severance
then there is no bar to their simultaneous adjudication.

Donation rescinded. However, case remanded to determine the

ownership of the donated lot because it will affect whether it will
be partitioned with the rest of the Baylon estate or Rita’s.

*Rule 10, Sec. 6 allows the filing of supplemental pleadings

which justify, enlarge or change the relief sought. It may include
occurrences after the filing of the original pleading, even if the
supplemental facts constitute another cause of action, as long
as it has some relation to the original cause of action in the
original complaint.

In Planters Dev’t Bank v. LZK Holdings and One Dev’t Corp. the
Court clarified, contrary to previous rulings, that a new cause of
action brought up through a supplemental pleading does not bar
its allowance. It is only a matter of the court in the exercise of its
discretion. In such cases, a broad definition of “cause of action”
should be applied.

Causes of action between same parties but pertain to

different venues or jurisdiction

The petition should be filed with the RTC, provided that

a) One of the causes of action falls within the RTC’s
jurisdiction, and
b) The venue lies in the RTC

Spouses Decena v. Spouses Piquero

Through a MOA, Spouses Decena sold a house and lot in

Paranaque to Spouses Piquero, payable through post-dated
checks. When the checks bounced, the petitioners filed a
complaint for annulment of the MOA, recovery, and damages
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, as they resided in the area.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
proper venue was the RTC of Paranaque as it was essentially
an action in rem.

According to Rule 2, Sec. 5(c), where causes of action between

the same parties pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the
joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided that one of the
causes of action falls within its jurisdiction and the venue lies
therein. However this rule does not apply to the case. There is
only really one cause of action which was the recovery of the real
property, to which the annulment of the MOA is merely
accessory. The action should’ve been properly filed in the
Paranaque RTC.

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XIII. PARTIES
Who is a real party in interest?
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. —
Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law19 may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may
refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff. The term
"defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counter-claim, the cross-defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.) — party defendant.
Art. 44, NCC. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted according to law;
and Tayactac are suing Maranon and Stronghold for damages.
The RTC held Maranon and Stronghold solidarily liable, and
affirmed by the CA.
Stronghold now comes to contest their solidarity liability.
Ultimately the issue before the SC was whether the Cuencas
and Tayactac may recover damages from the wrongful
attachment of Arc Cuisine’s assets. The Court ruled that only
Arc Cuisine may properly bring the suit for damages. Though
the complainants were stockholders of Arc Cuisine, they may
not bring the instant suit, unless in a representative capacity of
the company, because it would be tantamount to an illegal
division of company assets prior to its dissolution.
A complaint filed against one who is not a real party in
interest should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action
Guizano v. Veneracion

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party who entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
Caete et al v. Genuino Ice Company, Inc.
Petitioners sought to annul OCT 614 and its derivative titles,
alleging that they were entitled to it as its bona fide occupants
and beneficiaries of its distribution under the Friar Lands Act.
Respondent countered that petitioners were not real parties in
interest.
The parties a successors-in-interest of a pair of lots sold to them
by the siblings Lucia Santos and Nicasio Bernardino. Bernardino
sold his lot to the Spouses Guizano and a TCT was issued in
their son Emmanuel’s name. Lucia sold her portion to
Veneracion based on a geodetic engineer’s survey due to the
lack of documentary evidence of her share. But later on,
Carmencita Guizano realized that the lot bought by Veneracion
was part of the land covered by her TCT so she asked to put on
hold Veneracion’s subdivision plan.
Veneracion sued the Spouses Santos together with Carmencita
as the owner/attorney in fact of Emmanuel for the recovery of the
land. The Court held that both the lower and appellate courts
overlooked the fact that Emmanuel is the real party in interest
since the land was in his name. Veneracion alleged that
Carmencita was her son’s attorney-in-fact, but this wouldn’t
excuse him excluding Emmanuel under Rule 3, Sec. 2.

The Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint. Firstly, they

only pleaded as occupants, conceding that they are not owners
of the said lots.

Further, the land is actually titled in the name of the Philippine

government under the Friar Lands Act, passed by the US
Congress. The Act allowed the government’s disposal of the land
to “actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the government,” disregarding the settlement and
occupation of persons before said acquisition. Any cancellation
of OCT 614 would result in the reversion of the land to the public
domain. Hence petitioners’ right here is only an expectancy that
if the title is cancelled, they are only potential qualified
beneficiaries under the Act.

Stronghold Insurance v. Cuencas, Tayactac and Maranon

Maranon had previously enforced a writ of preliminary

attachment against Arc Cuisine, Inc. There he also impleaded
Tayactac as a defendant and was required to execute a bond,
issued by Stronghold, in the Cuencas’ favor. But the writ was
later found to be issued with GADALEJ, and now the Cuencas

19
Examples of entities authorized by law to be parties in a civil
action: estates, legitimate labor organizations, registered political
parties.
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Real parties in interest in relation to indispensable and Legal capacity to sue; real parties in interest
necessary parties; effect of non-inclusion Rule 8, Sec. 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a
An indispensable party is a A necessary party is one party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
party in interest without who is not indispensable but existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
whom no final determination who ought to be joined as a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to
can be had of an action. party if complete relief is to be the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to
(Rule 3, Sec. 7) accorded as to those already sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by
parties, or for a complete specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars
determination or settlement of as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
the claim subject of the action.
(Rule 3, Sec. 8)
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon
Both are considered as real parties in interest since they stand Strait, et al v. Reyes
to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
Their non-joinder in an action is not a ground for dismissal of The case involved consolidated petition assailing the legality of
the case. a service contract for resource development in the Tanon Strait,
The remedy is to implead When it is claimed that a as well as a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
the non-party claimed to be necessary party is not joined, against its implementation.
indispensable. Parties may be the pleader shall set forth his
added by order of the court on name, if known, and shall The Court recognized the rights of persons besides natural and
motion of the party or on its state why he is omitted. juridical persons, specifically dolphins, whales and porpoises in
own initiative at any stage of Should the court find the this case, to be represented in actions for violations of
the action and/or at such reason for the omission environmental laws. Citing US jurisprudence, if inanimate
times as are just. unmeritorious, it may order objects such as a ship or a corporation receive personality under
the inclusion of the omitted the law, then so may natural formations or animals; people who
necessary party if jurisdiction have a meaningful relation to said thing must be able to speak
over his person may be out for it.
obtained.
The court may dismiss the The failure to comply with the Though the enabling rules, specifically the Rules of Procedure
complaint if the petitioner order for his inclusion, without for Environmental Cases, were passed after the institution of the
refuses to comply with an justifiable cause, shall be case, the Court reiterated that procedural laws are construed as
order to implead an deemed a waiver of the applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
indispensable party. claim against such party. their passage.

It is the non-compliance of The non-inclusion of a Additionally, plaintiffs impleaded PGMA as an unwilling co-
the court’s order to implead an necessary party does not plaintiff and cited her express declaration and undertaking in
indispensable that justifies the prevent the court from protecting natural habitats, inter alia, when she signed the
dismissal of the complaint. proceeding in the action, ASEAN Charter. The Court said she cannot be made a party to
and the judgment rendered the suit because it would be contrary to public policy to sue the
therein shall be without president in the performance of the office, as such would hinder
prejudice to the rights of the same.
such necessary party.
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Sec. 5. Citizen
suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
Rule 3, Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
at any stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
with separately. general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.
Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply (supra, cause of
action) Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall
be governed by their respective provisions.
Re: non-inclusion: In the case, the Spouses Pacana were not
initially impleaded as indispensable parties to the suit to Soriente et al v. Estate of Concepcion, represented by Nenita
recover the business. The Court resolved conflicting Concepcion
jurisprudence and here held that their non-inclusion is not a
ground for dismissal and curable at any stage of the The occupants of Arsenio Concepcion’s lot refused to vacate,
proceedings (e.g. amending the complaint to conform to the prompting his wife to file a suit for unlawful detainer. After losing
evidence), even after judgment. in the MTC, petitioners raised as an error to the RTC that the
complaint should’ve been dismissed outright for lack of legal
capacity to sue on the grounds that the complainant was unable
to establish her legal capacity to represent the estate.

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It is true that the lack of legal capacity is a grounds for dismissal
under Rule 16, Sec. 1(d) and thus the court may motu proprio
dismiss a complaint on those grounds under Sec. 4 of the Rules
of Summary Procedure. However they must be read in
conjunction with Rule 4, Sec. 8 which states that a party desiring
to raise an issue as to the capacity of any party to sue or be sued
must do so by specific denial in the answer. The lack of such
specific denial in the petitioner’s answer and the non-dismissal
of the MTC gave rise to a presumption of regularity in the
rendering of the decision.
Furthermore, Concepcion’s wife need not sue in a representative
capacity of the estate because she is a co-owner of the lot in
question and therefore a real party in interest.
Lack of legal capacity to sue as distinguished from lack of
personality to sue (not a real party in interest)
LACK OF CAPACITY TO LACK OF PERSONALITY
SUE TO SUE
Refers to a plaintiff’s general Refers to the fact that the
disability to sue, i.e. minority, plaintiff is not the real party in
insanity, incompetence, lack interest.
of juridical personality, or any
other general disqualifications
of a party.
Ground for a motion to dismiss Ground for motion to dismiss
based on lack of legal capacity based on the fact that the
to sue. (Rule 16, Sec. 1(d). complainant, on the face
thereof, evidently states no
cause of action. (Rule 16, Sec.
1(g).
Columbia Pictures et al. v. CA, Sunshine Home Video, and
Pelindario
Petitioners were foreign movie studios who lodged a complaint
with the NBI against video establishments using pirated copies
of the petitioners’ films. Respondent questioned the petitioners’
20
personality to sue. Citing Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, he
alleges that a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines but without a license may not maintain or intervene
in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative
agency in the country.
The Court said that obviously the petitioners had personality to
sue as the real parties in interest, being copyright owners of
distribution rights over movies. As to capacity, the Court said a
license to do business is not a requirement to having the capacity
to sue. Such license is precisely required only to do business in
the Philippines, and statutorily, a foreign corporation doing of
business in the Philippines without a license is not capacitated
to sue. But since petitioners were shown by the Court to not
doing business the country, Sec. 133 is completely irrelevant.
Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc.
DISI was the exclusive distributor of Steelcase’s furniture in the
Philippines. Following a breach of contract, Steelcase sued DISI
for unpaid sums and damages. DISI answered inter alia that
Steelcase, as a company doing business in the Philippines
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation
20
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or
assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding
in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may
without the required license, lacked the legal capacity to sue
locally.
Examining Sec. 133 of the Corp. Code, the appointing of
domiciled representative or distributor who transacts in its own
name and for its own account, such as DISI, does not constitute
as doing business in the country. Therefore Steelcase is not
hindered from suit by its lack of a license. Assuming arguendo
that Steelcase was indeed doing business without a license, DISI
is estopped from questioning Steelcase’s capacity as they
themselves benefited from the transactions.
Distinguish indispensable party from necessary party; a
necessary party, like an indispensable party, has the right to
appeal form an adverse ruling
Gabitin v. Land Bank
Petitioners contested the valuation of their lands fixed by the
DAR and Land Bank. Only the latter appealed the decision of the
Special Agrarian Court, and this was questioned by the
petitioners, arguing that “when indispensable parties are not
before the courts, the action should be dismissed,” pursuant to
MWSS v. CA.
First, the Court said that Land Bank had an independent and
indispensable role once the expropriation process begins.
Secondly, assuming arguendo that it was only a necessary party,
there is nothing in the Rules which prohibit an appeal on the
ground that one is not an indispensable party. The only
requirement in an appeal is that one must have a present interest
in the subject matter of the litigation and must be aggrieved or
prejudiced by the judgment. The fact that one was made a party
to a case and eventually held liable under the judgment gives
him the right to appeal. To hold otherwise is an outright violation
of the rules on fair play.
Necessary parties; also on effect of deficient verification
Christine Chua v. Torres and Beltran
Jonathan Chua issued a check in payment for his sister
Christine’s fuel purchase at a Caltex Service Center owned by
Torres and managed by Beltran. The checks bounced, and since
Beltran’s demands from Christine went unheeded (she went lol I
didn’t issue the check anyway) he filed a BP 22 case against her.
She in turn filed a complaint for malicious prosecution/serious
defamation against Beltran, and a torts case against Torres.
Christine impleaded her brother as a necessary party-plaintiff.
RTC dismissed Christine’s complaint for Jonathan’s failure to
sign his verification, which she contested.
Re: Necessary party: The Court gave an example of a necessary
party, citing Seno v. Mangubat: therein petitioner sought the
reformation of a deed of sale to X and Y, and the annulment of
the subsequent sale to Z, on the ground that the sale was
actually an equitable mortgage. While X and Y no longer have
any interest in the subject land, they are parties to the instrument
sought to be reformed. Their presence is necessary to settle all
possible issues of the controversy.
Although Christine insisted that Jonathan was a necessary party,
the Court said she failed to establish the same because he does
not stand to be affected by whatever the outcome of the case. At
be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
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most he may be called on to testify that he was the one who
issued the check.
Re: verification: The absence of a proper verification renders a
pleading dismissible. However, if it concerns the signature of a
misjoined party, it is not a grounds for dismissal—said party has
no business participating in the case anyway and may simply be
motu proprio dropped by the court at any stage.
Failure to implead a necessary party
Rule 3, Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded.
— Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his
name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the
court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction
over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against
such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the
court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party.
Failure to implead all indispensable parties does not
constitute failure to state a cause of action; non-joinder does
not warrant dismissal of complaint, the remedy being to
implead the indispensable parties
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may
be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at
such times as are just.
The court may dismiss the complaint if the petitioner
refuses to comply with an order to implead an
indispensable party.
It is the non-compliance of the court’s order to implead
an indispensable that justifies the dismissal of the
complaint.
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian
Sps. Mesina bought two parcels of land from Sps. Fian. But when
the latter died, their heirs denied the sale and refused to accept
payments. When the Sps. Mesina died, their heirs filed an action
for quieting of title, impleading only Theresa Fian Yray to
represent the defendant heirs. Theresa claimed that “Heirs of
Mesina is not a juridical person/entity authorized to file a suit, nor
could “Heirs of Fian” be named as a defendant. Further, she
claimed that there was a failure to state a cause of action since
not all the heirs of both sides were individually named, being
indispensable parties. Thus the complaint is infirm and
warranted dismissal. The RTC and CA agreed, hence this
petition.
Rule 38, Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. —
21
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
The Court however held otherwise. The elements of a cause of
action are present (right, correlative obligation, violating act or
omission). The infirmity is a non-joinder of an indispensable
party.
COMPARE: Case law that non-impleader of an indispensable
party deprives the court of jurisdiction to pass upon the
controversy.
Metrobank v. Hon. Alejo and Sy Tan Se
Spouses Acampado secured a loan from petitioner bank with a
mortgage. Later, Sy Tan Se filed a declaration of nullity of the
mortgaged property’s title. Despite being the registered
mortgagee of the property, Metrobank was neither impleaded
nor made aware of the suit’s existence. Metrobank then
foreclosed the property. The Spouses did not exercise their right
to redemption. But when Metrobank went to the Register of
Deeds to consolidate their title, they were informed of the RTC
decision awarding ownership of the property to Sy Tan Se.
Firstly, the Court held that annulment as the proper remedy per
21
Rule 38, Sec. 1 due to the extrinsic fraud by respondent in
excluding the petitioner as a defendant.
Next, the nullification of the title carried with it that of the
mortgage annotation. This exposed Metrobank to real prejudice
because its rights over the property would not be known to third
parties. It is thus an indispensable party that should’ve been
impleaded. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actuation of the court null and void for want of
authority to act/lack of jurisdiction, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
NB: The difference with the Mesina case and the Alejo
case is that in the latter, no indispensable party was
actually impleaded whereas in the other case, one heir
was impleaded.
The auction sale was entered in the Register of Deeds
on July 28, 1997. The decision awarding the property to
Sy was dated August 12, 1998. So when judgment was
finally rendered against Spouses Acampado, they were
merely necessary parties and not indispensable.
Therefore no decision was actually rendered against
any indispensable party rendering the complaint
dismissible.
Non-impleader of an indispensable party
Pascual v. Robles
The case is a dispute in determining the heirs to the estates of
Anton and Hermogenes Rodriguez, and who shall be their
administrator. Robles, a party asking to be an administrator,
filed this motion for reconsideration.
RTC rendered a decision against Robles denying him
administration of the estate. He filed a notice of appeal which
was denied. Against this denial he filed for the annulment of the
RTC decision with the CA. Then, CA annulled the RTC
judgment in Robles’ favor. This decision became final and
executory.
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside
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Pascual, a buyer of real property belonging to the Rodriguez
estate from one of Robles’ oppositors, intervened in the case
and assailed the CA decision before the SC, but only
impleaded the CA and RTC. In the instant petition, the Court
agreed with Robles in saying that the latter was an
indispensable party to the action pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 5
and should’ve been impleaded by Pascual. But nevertheless,
Pascual had no business assailing a final and executory
decision.
Rule 65, Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. —
When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private
respondent or respondents with such public respondent
or respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the
duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both
in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and
not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in
or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either
party, the public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in
the proceedings therein.
COMPARE: Any co-owner may file a case for ejectment
without impleading the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
Plasabas et al v. CA
Petitioners seek to recover title to property with damages and
prayed for the defendants’ ejectment. Defendants allege that
petitioners are not the sole and absolute owners of the land,
contrary to the latter’s allegations. The trial court then
dismissed the case without prejudice upon motion of the
defendants.
The Court explained that generally speaking, a co-owner may
22
file reinvindicatory actions without joining the other co-owners,
as it is deemed to be for the benefit of the rest. Adverse
judgement, however, does not prejudice the rights of
unimpleaded co-owners. The only exception is when the action
is for the benefit who claims to be the sole owner. Here, the
action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads all
indispensable properties.
As applied in this case, the non-joinder of other owners was
immaterial since the petitioners acknowledged the fact of co-
ownership, and that they were authorized to pursue the case in
their behalf.
22
Art. 487, NCC. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
It is the non-compliance of the court’s order to implead an
indispensable that justifies dismissal of the complaint
Comm. Domingo v. Scheer
Scheer, a German national in residing locally, was initially
thought to be a wanted criminal in Germany. A deportation
order was issued against him by the Board of Commissioners
(BOC) which he filed an urgent motion for reconsideration. This
was left unresolved until he was subsequently cleared abroad.
However, the new immigration commissioner Domingo re-
arrested him and, deeming the unresolved petition as final and
executory, moved anew to have him deported. Sheer filed a
Rule 65 petition against Domingo. She argued that the BOC of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation should’ve been
impleaded as an indispensable party.
The Court agreed that the BOC should’ve been impleaded, but
the non-joinder does not render the case dismissible. It may be
cured by joining the BOC. However, if the plaintiff refuses to
join an indispensable party the court may dismiss the same.
Unincorporated association cannot be a party in a civil
action.
Association of Flood Victims v. COMELEC
Petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Hernandez filed a
special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule
65, asserting that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the subject minute resolution.
The Court ruled that since AFV is still in the process of
incorporation, it cannot be considered a juridical person or an
entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil action.
An unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling
law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the
name of the association. It is not a legal entity distinct from its
members. Thus, all members of the association must be made
parties in the civil action. Further, members of the association
cannot represent the association without valid authority.
A party who stands to be benefited by the revival of a
judgments is a real party in interest
Clidoro v. Jalmanzar
In 1998, Rizalina, et. al. won the case for partition against
Onofre, et. al. In 2003, the former filed a complaint for revival
of judgment against the latter. By that time, most of the
plaintiffs, defendants, and interested parties have already died,
and that some of the parties are mere representatives of the
original parties.
Being a new and independent action, there would be instances
where the parties in the original case and in the subsequent
action for revival of judgment would not be exactly the same.
The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the
complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names
of the parties in the original case would not necessarily mean
that they are not real parties-in-interest. What is important is
that, as under Sec. 1, Rule 3 of ROC, they are “the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.”
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Parties in interest; it is the beneficiary, not the representative
that instituted the action on the latter’s behalf, that is the real
party in interest
A representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity is
deemed a real party in interest. They are:
1. A trustee of an expert trust
2. A guardian
3. An executor or administrator
4. A party authorized by law or the Rules
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue/be sued without joining the
principal, except when the contract involves the principal’s
things.
Rule 3, Sec 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall
be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to
the principal.
Ang v. Ang (supra, venue)
Petitioners, residents of Los Angeles, USA, filed an action for
the collection of money through their agent Atty. Aceron against
respondents. Aceron filed the complaint in QC where he
resided, believing it to be the proper venue on the premise that
he is a real party in interest.
The Court ruled that it was the principals Ang and the
defendants Ang who were the real parties in interest, as Aceron
did not stand to lose or gain by the decision of the court. His
residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the
complaint.
Legal Capacity to sue of a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines to enforce a foreign arbitral award
Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc.
Tuna Processing, a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, won a case against Phil. Kingford
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the
State of California, US. To enforce the award, TPI filed a
Petition for Confirmatio, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitrral Award before the RTC of Makati, which was
denied since Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code prohibits the
filing of a suit by a foreign corporation.
The Court reversed the ruling of the lower court, holding that a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, may sue to enforce a foreign arbitral award. As
between a general (Corp. Code) and special law (Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the latter shall prevail. And
under the ADRA, the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may refuse
the enforcement of the award by raising those grounds
enumerated under Art. V of the New York Convention. Under
said provision, not one ground touched on the capacity to sue
of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the
award. Moreover, Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules, enumerating
the contents of such petition, do not include capacity to sue.
It is also in the best interest of justice to bar the rule against
foreign corporations from maintaining a suit in our courts when
the losing party entered into a contract containing a foreign
arbitration clause and, in fact submits itself to arbitration. The
parties become bound conceding the capacity of the other
party to cause the implementation of the result.
No capacity to sue – sole proprietor
Excellent Quality Apparel v. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc.
In an unorganized business owned by one person, the sole
proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations
of the business. It does not possess a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the
enterprise. Thus, Mulit-Rich, being a sole proprietorship,
cannot file or defend an action.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit and claim the
receivables of its predecessor in business, in this case a sole
proprietorship, it must show proof that the corporation had
acquired the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship.
Instead of Win (a corporation) asking for a change of name of
the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich, it could have shown a deed
of assignment.
Spouses as parties
Navarro v. Escobido
All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Spouses are co-owners
of said property, hence, either of them may bring an action for
the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners.
Remedy in case of an unwilling co-plaintiff
Autocorp Group v. Intra Strata Assurance Corp.
ISAC filed an action against Autocorp and Rodriguez (sureties
under the Indemnity Agreements) to recover the payment of the
face value of two bonds, plus attorney’s fees. ISAC impleaded
BOC as a necessary plaintiff in order that the reward of money
shall be adjudged unto the latter.
As the BOC, through the Solicitor General, was not the one who
initiated the civil case, and nether was its consent obtained for
the filing of the same, it may be considered an unwilling co-
plaintiff of ISAC in said action. The proper way to implead BOC
as a necessary party should have been in accordance with Sec.
10, Rule 3 of ROC. Nonetheless, the irregularity in the inclusion
of the BOC as a party in this case would not in any way affect
the disposition thereof. It would be a graver injustice to drop a
necessary party.
Upon motion with notice, court may allow the action to be
continued by or against a party who becomes incompetent or
incapacitated
Rule 3, Sec. 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party
becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion
with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against
the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal
guardian or guardian ad litem.
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Impleading a defendant whose identity is unknown
Rule 3, Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. —
Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he
may be sued as the unknown owner heir devisee, or by such
other designation as the case may require, when his identity or
true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended
accordingly.
Phil. Charter Insurance Corp. v. Explorer Maritime Co., Ltd.
When all the parites have been properly impleaded, the
resolution of the Motion to Disclose is unnecessary for the
purpose of setting the case for pre-trial.
PCIC properly impleaded respondent Explorer Maritime (then
referred to as Unknown Owner of vessel M/V Explorer)
pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 3 by alleging that said defendant is a
foreign corporation whose identity or name or office address
are unknown to PCIC but is doing business in the Philippines
through its local agent, co-defendant Wallem Shipping, a
domestic corporation. Moreover, under Sec. 3, Rule 3, an
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to
the principal, hence an agent may be properly sued without
impleading the principal.
Minor or incompetent persons as parties
Rule 3, Sec. 5. Minor or incompetent persons. — A minor or a
person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the
assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a
guardian ad litem.
Alternative defendants
Rule 3, Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. —
Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he
may be sued as the unknown owner heir devisee, or by such
other designation as the case may require, when his identity or
true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended
accordingly.
Death of party; duty of counsel
Rule 3, Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever
a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative
or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty
shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor
or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and
the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
Salas v. Matusalem
The death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties provided in
Sec. 16, Rule 3 thus applies.
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted
died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided
for by Sec. 16, Rule 3 of ROC. In the present case, since
Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person
and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted. The proper
course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is the dismissal of the case against him.
Compare with rule when it is the plaintiff who dies before final
judgment
UST v. Court of Appeals
UST filed an ejectment complaint against Canicosa on the
ground of violation of the terms of the lease agreement. While
the case was pending, Canicosa died and was substituted by
his wife. Because of Canicosa’s death, UST claimed that
respondent’s counterclaim should have been dismissed
pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of ROC.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint or cause
of action against the plaintiff so that a counterclaimant is the
plaintiff in his counterclaim. Thus, with respect to the
counterclaim, respondent Canicosa was not the defendant but
the plaintiff, and that UST was the defendant. Hence, Sec. 21,
Rule 3 is not applicable as that pertains to a defendant who
dies before final judgment.
If it is the plaintiff who dies, a mere substitution of the heirs or
legal representative for the deceased is all that needs to be
done, in accordance with procedure set out in Sec. 17, Rule 3.
Transfer of interest pendent lite
Rule 3, Sec. 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person
to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the
action or joined with the original party.
Associated Bank v. Spouses Pronstroller
The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
Spouses Vaca, as it was belatedly filed. The Court explained
that the purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an
action to become a party to protect his interest, and the court,
incidentally, to settle all conflicting claims. The Spouses are not
strangers to the action as they have a legal interest in the
litigation from the sale of the subject property by Petitioner in
their favor during the pendency of said case.
As transferee pendent lite, the Spouses are the successors-in-
interest of the transferor, the Petitioner, who is already a party
to the action. Thus, they do not have a right to intervene, as
they stand exactly in the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest.
Essentially, the law already considers the transferee joined or
substituted in the pending action, commencing at the exact
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moment when the transfer of interest is perfected between the
original party-transferor and the transferee pendente lite.
Effect if defendant, in an action for recovery of money arising
from contract dies before final judgment
Rule 3, Sec. 20. Action and contractual money claims. —
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in
the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
Gabriel v. Bilon
If the defendant in an action for recovery of money arising from
a contract dies prior to the finality of judgment, the money
claims survive the deceased and shall be enforced against his
estate.
and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30)
days after the successor takes office or such time as may be
granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by
any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or
maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or
threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or continue the action
of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or
officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall
be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and
accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Notice to Solicitor General discretionary on the court; in
cases involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations
Rule 3, Sec. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any action
involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive
order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its
discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor General
who may be heard in person or a representative duly
designated by him.

Indigent party and right to free access to the courts Concept of “quasi-party”
Rule 3, Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized Tijam v. Sibonoghanoy
to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the Although the action filed by Tijam, originally, was exclusively
party is one who has no money or property sufficient and against the Sibonghanoy spouses, the Surety became a quasi-
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and party when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ
his family. of attachment issued by the court of origin. Since then, it
acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of connection with the pending case.
docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic
notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The
amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent
was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at

any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the
court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property,
the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the
time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court
may impose.

Re: Query of Prioreschi re exemption from eegal and filing fees

of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.

The Court denied to foundations like Good Shepherd the same

exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. Under the Rules of Court, only a
natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant.
Being a corporation, it has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of its members. The Constitution has explicitly
premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.

Death or separation of a party who is a public officer

Rule 3, Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public
officer. — When a public officer is a party in an action in his
official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued
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