Summary of the case 3. Pasei v drilon 1988 the complaint.
3. Pasei v drilon 1988
CONSTI CASES
1. Macariola v Asuncion 114 SCRA 77 (1972)
2. Francisco v House of Representatives gr no160261 November 10 2003
3. US vs bull 15 P 259 1910
4. People vs perfecto gr no 18463 october 4 1992
5. 1935 constitution – mabanag v lopez vito 78 p 11947
1. 1973 constitution – A. planas vs comelec 49 scra 105
2. B. jevellana v sec 50 scra 30
3. C. sanidad v comelec 73 scra 333
4. D. occena v comelec 104 scra 1
5. 1986 constitution phil bar association v comelec 140 scra 455
1. Lawyers league v pres Aquino gr 73748 may 22 1986
2. In re saturnine Bermudez 145 scra 160
3. 1987 constitution de leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602
Constitutional amendments
4. Art 17 sec 1,2,3,4 ra 6735 aug4 1989
5. Gonzales v comelec 21 scra 774 1968
1. Santiago v comelec gr 127325 mar 19 1997
2. Lambino v comelec gr 174153 oct 25 2006
3. Tolentino v comelec 41 scra 702 1971
4. Mutuc v comelec 36 scra 229 1970
5. Alih et al vs castro 151 scra 279 1987
1. Manila prince hotel vs gsis gr 122156 feb 3 1997
2. Reagan v cir 30 scra 968 1969
3. Cir v campos rueda42 scra 23 1971
4. Rule of majority Pablo ocampo v hret gr 158466 june 15 2004
5. Villavecencio v lukban 39 p 778
1. Accfa v cugco 30 scra 649 1969
2. Bacani v nacoco
3. Valmonte v Belmonte 170 scra 256 1989
4. Miaa vs CA gr 155650 july 20 2006
5. People v sandiganbayan gr 145951 aug 21 2003
1. Co kim cham v valdez tan keh p113 371 (1946)
2. Peralta v prisons gr L-49 nov 12 1945
3. Laurel v misa gr L 409 jan 30 1947
4. Lawyers league v Aquino
State immunity
5. Republic v Feliciano 148 scra 424
1. Phil aguila satellite vs lichauco gr 134887 july 27 2006
2. Sayson v singson 54 scra 282
3. Republic v Purisima 78 scra 470
4. Merit v govt 34 P 311
5. PNB v cir 81 scra 314
1. SSS vs CA 120 scra 707
2. Farolan v cta 217 298
3. RP v sandiganbayan gr 85384 feb 28 1990
4. Froilan v pan oriental shipping
5. Lim v brownell 107 P 344
1. Santiago v republic 87 scra 294
2. Torio v Fontanilla
3. City of manila v teotico
4. The holy see v Rosario dec 17 1994
5. USA v ruiz 136 SCRA 487
1. USA v Guinto GR 76609 feb26 1990
2. Minucher v CA gr 142396 feb 11 2003
3. REP of Indonesia v vinzon gr 154705 june 26 2003
4. WHO v Aquino GR L 35131 NOV 29 1972
5. DFA v NLRC gr 113191 sept 18 1997
1. Animas v pvao 176 SCRA 214
2. Lansang v CA gr 102667 feb 23 2000
3. Shauf v CA 191 SCRA 713
4. REP v Sandoval gr 45607 mar 19 1993
5. Mejoff v DIR of prisons 90 P 70 1952
1. Agustin v edu 1979
2. In re Garcia 2 SCRA 984
3. People v lagman and zosa 66 P 13 (1938)
4. Estrada v escritor AM no p 02 1651 AUG 4 2003
5. German v barangan mar 27 1985
1. Bayan v exec sec ovt 10 2000
2. Lim v exec sec gr 151445 april 11 2002
3. Pamatong v comelec april 13 2004
4. Calalang v Williams 1940
5. Pldt vs ntc 190 scra 717
1. Manger v Borja sept 7 1965
2. Simon v chr jan 5 1994
the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through
4. Tablarin v Gutierrez 152 scra 370
5. Prc v de guzman june 21 2004
1. Ep board of regents v ca gr134629 aug 31 1999
2. Camacho v coresis aug 22 2002
3. Mandaluyong v Francisco jan 29 2001
4. Sss emp assoc v CA 175 scra 686 1989
5. Prov of rizal v exec sec dec 13 2005
1. Tanada v angara gr 118295 dec 13 2005
2. Pldt vs ntc gr 88404 oct 18 1990
3. Legaspi v csc 150 scra 530
4. De jesus v coa gr 109023 aug 12 1998
5. Chavez v phil estate auth & Amari gr 133250 july 9 2002
Macariola vs Asuncion
114 SCRA 77 - Gab
Facts: On October 16, 1963, a project of partition of a lots was submitted to
Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner
Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the lots in the project of partition was bought by Dr. Arcadio Galapon
on July 31, 1964. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold the lot to Judge Asuncion
and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interest in the bought lot to the Traders Manufacturing &
Fishing Industries Inc. where Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife
Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the
stockholders of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a
Judge" for violating the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New
Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA
3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Issue: WON Judge Asuncion was guilty of “Acts unbecoming to a judge”
Ruling: Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting
of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his
private and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the said lot Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased
the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot from Dr.
Galapon the said property was no longer the subject of litigation.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from Spain to the US
and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce,
which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been
abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political
laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
corporation and sold their respective shares, and it appears that the
corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court. The Judge
realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon
25.
Francisco et al vs house of representatives
Gr no 160261 - GAB
Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives. Since the first impeachment
complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing
petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of
the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1
year period.
Issue: WON the second impeachment valid?
Ruling: The second impeachment is not valid.
Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution states:
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
“Initiate” is to begin, to commence, or set going. The Court pried the
Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the
verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
US vs Bull
GR L – 5270 - GAB
Facts: On December 2, 1908, a foreign steamship vessel engaged in the
transport of animals named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the
port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng,
Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the
animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.
Cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution.
Issue: WON the court had jurisdiction on an offense committed on a foreign
vessel while within the territorial waters of the Philippines
Ruling: when the vessel is within the territorial waters of the Philippines, the
Philippine laws shall apply.
The court ruled that the defendant is guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
People v Perfecto
GR L - 18463 - Gab
Facts: Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article, in a newspaper called “La
Nacion”, against the senate. Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code,a provision that punishes those who insult the
ministers of the crown,of the spanish penal code
Issue: WON Perfecto is guilty of violating Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code
Ruling: Mr Perfecto is not guilty of violating Article 256. The court ruled that
the Article 256 was enacted to protect officials who were representatives of the
king. In this case however we no longer have kings nor those of its provisions
to protect. The Philippines no longer honor Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code on the idea that we are no longer a spanish colony.
Tolentino v comelec
Gr no L – 34150 - GAB
Facts: The Constitutional convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
which seeks to amend Section 1 article 4 of the constitution, lowering the
voting age to 18. COMELEC resolved to follow the resolution of the convention
and which shall hold a plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8 1971.
Issue: WON the actions COMELEC is valid
Ruling: The court ruled that there can only be one “election” or “plebiscite” as
stated in article 1 section XV of the constitution. The court ruled that it does not
deny the right to vote, but it is merely following the constitution which states
that the election and plebiscite must be separate.
 Sanidad v Comelec
GR no L - 44640 - GAB
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national referendum through the so-
called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the
issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to
specify the questions that are to be asked during the referendum on. The first
question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the
second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the
existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
national referendum in October 16.
Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16, and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and
that the issue raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by
the court.
ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the
constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).
RULING: The Court ruled that the issue is a justiciable one. This is because
the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose
amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the
period of transition.
The court questions the authority of the president to propose amendments to
the constitution.
De Leon v Esguerra
GR no 78059 - Gab
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of
1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall
have elected and shall have qualified.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.
Issue: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the Memoranda issued by respondent Governor
Esguerra appointing officials based on the Provisional constitution has no legal
force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent governor could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3
of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 should still govern.
CIR v Rueda
GR no L - 13250 - GAB
FACTS: Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the
deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by reason of her
marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco (a tiny
principality) up to her death. At the time of her demise she left, among others,
intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The CIR then issued an
assessment for state and inheritance taxes of Php. 369, 383.96. Rueda filed
an amended return stating that intangible personal properties should be
exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law
of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code because Tangier, Morocco is a principality and not recognized as a
foreign country.
ISSUE: WON the tax exemption is valid.
RULING: The court ruled that it is not necessary for the principality of Tangier
to be recognized by our government to entitle Rueda the exemption of our tax
code.
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at
the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."
The court cited an example that the State of California, which is a part of the
United States of America, is considered within the terms of “foreign country”.
Valmonte v Belmonte
GR no 74930 - Gab
Facts: Valmonte filed a request to the GSIS general manager (Belmonte), to
furnish a copy of the names of the members of UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure loans immediately after the elections as guaranteed by
then first Lady Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Belmonte denied the request stating that the GSIS has a duty to preserve
confidential information regarding its customers.
Valmonte filed a suit invoking the right to information as stated in the
constitution.
Issue: WON the request to publish the names of those who secured the GSIS
loans
Ruling: The court ruled that the constitution afforded the right to information
but it does not compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like.
The court ruled that GSIS should allow petitioners to access such documents
as long as it is within reasonable regulations of GSIS.
ALEJO MABANAG vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO
G.R. No L-1123
March 5, 1947
Facts:
This is a petition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated
“Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto”.
Three of the plaintiff senators were suspended by the Senate shortly while the
eight of the
Plaintiff representatives had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except
to take part on
the election of Speaker, both on account of alleged irregularities on their
election.
As a consequence the petitioners did not take part in the passage of
questioned resolution nor
was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these
members had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court (Judiciary) has jurisdiction.
Held:
No. lol. The political questions are not within the province of the judiciary
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads
to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each
other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution “consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.”
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that
character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is highly political
function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is
even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judiciary inquiry into the validity of a proposal
than into that of ratification.
“In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the
question of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress
within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.”
So basically hugas kamay mode. Very stat con aa.
Judiciary be like “i got 99 problems, but political aint one”
Laurel vs Misa
Gr no L – 409 - Gab
Facts:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus. He was then charged and
held for the crime of treason during the Japanese occupation. He anchors his
petition based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change
of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
Issues:
1. WON the legitimacy of the government of the Philippines and the allegiance
of its citizens was suspended a military occupation
2. WON the change in form of the government qualify for an exemption in the
crime of treason.
Ruling:
A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in fidelity
and obedience, to his government or sovereign. It cannot be equated to the
qualified or temporary allegiance w/c a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives.
This absolute and permanent allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government is not transferred to the occupier,
a theory adopted in the Hague Convention of 1907. Thus, it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government.
The change in form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during when it was a Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the
same government and the same sovereign people.
Republic of the Philippines v Purisima
GR no L-36084 - Gab
Facts: Purisima basically rendered a decision in a civil case where one of the
plaintiff was suing the government.
Issue: WON the case has jurisdiction
Ruling: Constitution runs a doctrine of the non-suability of a state, including its
offices and agencies, from a suit without its consent.
Basically you cannot sue the government without consent, but the government
can sue you.
Farolan vs court of tax appeals
G.R. No. 42204 - Gab
Facts:
Farolan was in his capacity of commissioner of customs seized a shipment of
screen net of a certain Bagong Buhay Trading. The shipment was seized
because the actual contents of the shipment did not match as to what it was
declared. Bagong Buhay Trading was forced to pay duties and tax fees for the
alleged fraud in its actions.
Bagong Buhay Trading raised the issue to the Court of tax appeals on the
basis that they did not commit fraud and it was their foreign supplier who
should be tried.
Court of tax appeals reversed the decision of Farolan.
Bagong Buhay Trading filed a case for damages against Bureau of Customs.
Issue:
WON the Bureau of customs can be sued
Ruling:
The political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent,"
categorically applies. The bureau of customs, which is an office of the
government, cannot be sued.
Teotico v city of manila
G.R. No. L-23052 - Gab
Facts:
Teotico fell in an uncovered manhole of a national road in the city of manila.
Teotico sustained multiple injuries in the said accident.
Teotico filed a complaint against the City of Manila for damages incurred.
The City of Manila urged that it cannot be liable because it occurred in a
national road, and that the City of Manila takes cares of its roads properly
Issue:
WON Teotico’s complaint is justifiable
Ruling:
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
“provinces, cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective
streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged
defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon
Gr 154705 - Gab
Facts:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah,
entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole
proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the
Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a
period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of
Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the
Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and
unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by
invoking immunity from suit.
Issue:
1. WON the Republic of Indonesia waived its immunity by entering in a private
agreement
2. WON Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued
Ruling:
The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was
entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental
functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Therefore the Republic of Indonesia cannot be sued.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a
diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the
receiving State. Therefore Minister Counsellor Kasim cannot be sued.
JOSUE JAVELLANA, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The validity of the ratification process was questioned in the case of Javellana
v Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up
with the necessary votes to declare the act as unconstitutional forced it into the
conclusion that "there are no further obstacles to considering the constitution in
force and effect.
Case: The petition is filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a
qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
all citizens and voters similarly situated,”. After reciting in substance the facts
set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the
President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New
Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are
acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commanderin-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held
to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Rule: The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by
the members of the Court in their respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as
follows:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal andCastro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is
claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the
question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will,
but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles
whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the
issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry."
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by
qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that
in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the
votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements
thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to
recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the
votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the
necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am
constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense,
the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that
in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be
said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article
has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has
been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,
or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in
effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the
aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by
the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that
there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or
repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando
states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed
and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence
of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined
by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law,
with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the
people have accepted the Constitution."
4. On the fourth question of relief,
six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice
Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity
of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question
posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an
therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give
due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankeencast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the
third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people
have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that
the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo,Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting
votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all
the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973 JOSUE
JAVELLANA, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause
of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto8 government but in fact and law
a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under
her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs.
Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs.
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,
mutatis mutandis13, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate
President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines for the above-
quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Lambino v. COMELEC
Case: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before”
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there
is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign
on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change
the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit
Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
Reagan v. CIR
Case:The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix
Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical
assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base
Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour duty expires,
petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More
than two months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air
Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the
condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed Forces
or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases. On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the
car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point,
Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date
William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a
deed of sale executed in Manila. The respondent after deducting the landed cost
of the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as
his net income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering
him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund
from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the
Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of
interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by
respondent from petitioner.
Held: The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over
certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native soil and
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not
disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of
the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the
construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and residing in
the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his
income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his
automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory
to tax.
Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468, 471-472
In modern political science, the term government, is that institution or aggregate
of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess
the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of
authorities which rule a society. Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468, 471-472
Peralta v. Prisons
Case: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of
Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement
and distribution of goods and other necessaries as denned in section 1 of Act
No. 9 of the National Assembly of the ... so-called Republic of the Philippines,
was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as denned and penalized by section
2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly.
He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he
commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines...
pursuant to the authority... conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the said Republic.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special
and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims
and purposes of... which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States
of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions ... of said
Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional
rights"; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve...
the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that
the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided
for in the Revised Penal Code."
The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in
his own opinion... the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created... by... said
Ordinance No, 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman
of the Executive Commission, are tinged with political... complexion; that the
procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the constitutional rights of
accused persons
The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiæ. In his
memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the
following grounds:
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed
by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights
of an accused are; that the court may interrogate the accused and witnesses
before trial... in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the
accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that
if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the
defendant is ... guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the
sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which
cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special ...
division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
"In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission,
which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the
military forces of... occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British
in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck
says, 'the government... established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that
code imposes. It is of little... consequence whether vsuch government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of
its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws
of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of... such territory or the rest of
the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts.'
(Vol. 2 p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
... and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese
nationals is of no consequence."... dissenting
Issues:
The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the
law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted
for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the
petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military
occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive
sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of
the Commonwealth Government.
Held: As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government
of the second kind... the questions involved in the present case cannot be
decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government;
because the belligerent occupant... was totally independent of the constitution
of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory;
and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
cases involving the validity of judicial and... legislative acts of the Confederate
States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to
the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto
government of paramount force.
The Constitution... of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be
applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested
(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the
authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It
is... well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the
laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law
martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be
asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is
defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary
courts and authorities of the... occupied district." (Taylor, International Public
Law, p. 598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality
of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create
the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of
a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty
of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and ...
sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature
or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to
the validity of the creation of the court in question.
With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7
A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead
of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration
of justice by the ordinary courts
The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent
occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law
as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military
purposes, that... is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection
of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulation
It is obvious that the... summary procedure under consideration does not violate
those precepts.
It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity
(2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner,
depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate Act
No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907
"indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of, first, the
territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and social...
and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that
any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is
enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial... law
as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any
of the rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest
in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within... the
district to the invading army. and its followers, it being necessary for the
protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them,
that acts committed to their detriment shall not only Jose what justification the...
territorial law might give them. as committed against enemies, but shall be
repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed
against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the
invaded, so far as it may... fall within the criminal department whether by the
intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by
the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and ...
referred to what is called martial law." (Westlake, International Law, Part II,
War, p. 96.)... the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact
in relation to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system
of law, or to a special agency... entrusted with its administration.
And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the
belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military
necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come
into being as a result of military rule; that is,... those which establish new crimes
and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the
country and the protection of the army,... Although these crimes are defined
in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.
65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded
by military necessity, incident to a state of war,... and necessary for the control
of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the
army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its
operations.
They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons
charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution... of foods and other necessaries; and the
penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than
those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The
acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or
Revised Penal Code
The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, to wit: treason, espionage, inciting to war,
violation of neutrality, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's
country, piracy; and the crimes... against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by
Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a... political complexion
It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted
power or... competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law
penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.
(3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the
Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is,
whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence
which petitioner is now... serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that
time.
It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper
to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and
void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive
effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate the punitive sentence
rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the
proclamation, had... already become null and of no effect.
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good
and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese
forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these
Islands and the restoration... therein of the Commonwealth Government.
Sayson v. Singson, 54 SCRA 282
Case: Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money
claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost
of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming
momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the
claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim
against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the
suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State . In other words,
the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office,
under the provisions of Com. Act 327 … which prescribe the conditions under
which money claim against the government may be filed". Commonwealth Act
No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the
settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of
Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need
reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period
aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper
decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated:
"The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the
decision, take an 9appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States,
pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the
Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme
Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."
With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the
appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary
of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured,
an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such
statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be
exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if
thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no
ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the
matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not
legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite
obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity Sayson v. Singson, 54
SCRA 282 (1973).
Occeña vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-56350, 104 SCRA 1 [Apr 2, 1981]
Facts: Upon the call of President-Prime Minister F. Marcos, the Interim
Batasang Pambansa convened as a constituent assembly. Acting as such, it
passed 3 resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposed the allowing of a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area
of land for residential purposes. Resolution No. 2 dealt with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly. Resolution
No. 3 dealt on the amendment to the Article on COMELEC) proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Occeña et al. challenged the validity of these
proposals, attacking the validity of the 1973 Constitution itself and the validity
of the power of the Int. Batasang Pambansa to propose such amendments.
Issues:
(1) WON 1973 Constitution the fundamental law.
(2) Does the Int. Batasang Pambansa have the authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution?
(3) Did the Interim Batasang Pambansa exceed its authority by allegedly
proposing revisions and not merely amendments?
(4) Are the proposals invalid because the allegedly required three-fourths vote
was not complied with?
(5) Where the proposals properly submitted to the people for ratification?
Ruling:
(1) The court ruled that it is much too late in the day to deny the force and
applicability of the 1973 Constitution. The ruling in Javellana v. Exec.
Secretary is authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution whose
provisions have been applied in several cases already.
(2) Yes. By express provision of the 1976 Constitutional amendments, the Int.
Batasang Pambansa has the same powers as the Int. National Assembly.
(Amendment 2: “The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers
and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” (N.B. The int. Batasang
Pambansa was created in lieu of the int. National Assembly – Amendment 1)
and in Art XVII, Sec 15 of the 1973 Const., the Int. National Assembly was
vested with the power to propose amendments by special call of the Prime
Minister by a vote of a majority of all its members. When, therefore, the Int.
Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of President-Prime Minister F. Marcos, met
as a constituent assembly, it acted by virtue of such competence.
(3) No. A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. Thus,
whether [the Int. Batasang Pambansa acting as a constituent assembly] will
only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution xxx is of no moment because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification.
(4) No. When the Int. Batasang Pambansa is sitting as a constituent
assembly, only a majority vote is needed to propose amendments. A three-
fourths vote is not required in a Constitutional Convention. It is not a
requirement either when, in this case, the Int. Batasang Pambansa exercises
its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the
presumption that the requirement of threefourths vote applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
(5) Yes. Art XVI, Sec 2 of the 1973 Const. provides that the plebiscite called
for the ratification of the amendments shall be held not later than 3 months
after the approval of such amendment or revision. The resolutions were
approved on Feb 5 and 27, 1981 and the plebiscite is set on April 7, 1981. It is
thus within the 90-day required period. As for the people being adequately
informed, it cannot be denied that by this time the proposed amendments have
been intensively and extensively discussed at the Int. Batasang Pambansa, as
well as through the mass media, [so that] it cannot be said that our people are
unaware.
Amelito R. Mutuc, petitioner vs. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-32717 [November
26, 1970]
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner
Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act
of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however
contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was
its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded
or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under
the phrase “and the like.”
Issue: WON “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda
gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.
Ruling: The court ruled that for respondent Commission, the last three words
sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was
done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets
of the kind referred to as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
the candidate responsible for distribution.
Rule of majority Pablo Ocampo vs Hret G.R. 158466 [June 15, 2004]
Facts: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the
6th district of Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was
elected for lack of residency in the district and was ordered to vacate his office.
Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he should be
declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue: WON a second placer in congressional elections can be proclaimed the
duly elected Congressman.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the fact that the candidate who had the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does
not give rise to the right of the candidate who garnered the second highest
vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most
basic precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse
to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.
Note: Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a ‘substitute
congressman’ in the eventuality that their first choice dies, resigns, is
disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post vacant. There can only be
one representative for that particular legislative district. There are no runners-
up or second placers. Thus, when the person vested with the mandate of the
majority is disqualified from holding the post he was elected, the only recourse
to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.
MIAA vs CA G.R. 155650 [July 20, 2006]
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport located at Paranaque city. MIAA received Final Notices of
Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years
1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624
million.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings
should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate
tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-
controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An
international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of
the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim
that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic.
The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public
property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in
such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAwA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws?
Ruling: The Court ruled that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt
from real estate tax imposed by local governments.
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-
stock corporation must have members.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate
powers.
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport
Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the
public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not
remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
public use.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the
commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of
public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution
or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion
are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the
Republic.
d. Transfer to MIAA was meant to implement Reorganization
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air
Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of
these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to
reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and
autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport
Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party
claims any ownership rights over MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use
thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person
following are exempted from payment of the real property tax.
Lawyers League for a better Philippines vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 73748 - May
22, 1986)
Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Issue: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Ruling: The court ruled that the petition furthermore states no cause of action.
Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the a fore quoted provision
is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to
no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday
of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution.
Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping GR l-6060 [September 30, 1954]
Facts: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-
appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the
Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and
agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the
balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel
in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the
non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping
Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the
President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all
his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff
had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession
of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
Issue: WON he Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.
Rulings: The court ruled that the government impliedly allowed itself to be
sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim
for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The
immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an
action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state.
The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. GR 101949, 238 SCRA 524 [Dec 1, 1994]
Facts: The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A,
located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-
B and 5-D registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corp. The three lots
were sold to Licup through an agent. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the
sale to respondent Starbright Enterprises (Starbright). In view of the refusal of
the squatters to vacate said lots, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has
the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Thereafter, the
Holy See (a foreign state exercising sovereignty over the Vatican City) through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, sold Lot 5-A to a third person (Tropicana
Corp.). Lot 5-A was previously acquired by the Holy See by donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila for constructing thereon the official place of residence of
the Papal Nuncio. In subsequently selling the lot, no profit was intended. The
Holy See merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for them to use it. Starbright filed a
complaint against the Holy See who pled sovereign/diplomatic immunity.
Starbright insists that the doctrine of nonsuability does not apply for the Holy
See has divested itself of such cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a
commercial transaction for the sale of parcel of land located in the Phils. The
trial court upheld Starbright. Meanwhile, the DFA moved to intervene in behalf
of the Holy See, and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Phils exempt from
local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and im;munities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.
Issue: WON the Holy See entitled to sovereign immunity.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the restrictive application of State immunity is
now the rule, limiting it to proceedings that arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.30 In this case, the
projects—the repair of wharves or shoreline—are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the U.S. and the Phils.,
indisputably a function of the gov’t of the highest order; they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
WHO v. Aquino [November 29, 1972]
Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, assigned on Dec. 6, 1971 by the WHO from his
last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to
the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Phil. Government
and the World Health Organization. Diplomatic immunity carries with it, among
other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of
the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from
taxation and customs duties. Dr. Verstuyft's personal effects entered the
Philippines on Jan. 10, 1972. They were allowed free entry from duties and
taxes. Judge Aquino issued on March 3, 1972 upon application of COSAC
[Constabulary Offshore Action Center] officers of a search warrant for alleged
violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said
crates.
Issue: WON Dr. Verstuyft the search warrant should be quashed in view of his
diplomatic immunity.
Ruling: (1) The court ruled that the search warrant should be quashed
because Dr. Verstuft’s diplomatic immunity. The executive branch of the
Philippine Government has expressly recognized that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The
DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official
position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine
court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the
Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since
his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed free entry from
all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been
"unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by
respondents COSAC officers. (2) Judge Aquino should not have relied on the
suspicions of the COSAC officers regarding the unopened crates which
contained Dr. Verstuyft’s persona effects rather than on the assurance of the
OSG that Dr. Verstufyt did not abuse his diplomatic immunity, which is based
on the official positions of the highest exec. (3) There was a clear lack of
coordination between the various departments involved in the subject matter.
Such lack of coordination allowed the COSAC to go against the determination
of the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Finance.
Republic v. Sandoval GR 84607, 220 SCRA 124 [Mar 19, 1993]
Facts: Following the “Mendiola Massacre” in 1987, Pres. Aquino created the
Citizen’s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation
of the disorder. She also joined the farmers-marchers days after the ill-fated
incident as an “act of solidarity” and promised that the government would
address the grievances of the rallyists. The Mendiola Commission
recommended, among others, that the victims be compensated by the
government. Where upon the petitioners filed a formal letter of demand for
compensation. Due to the apparent inaction by the government, the
petitioners sued for damages against the Republic. The Solicitor General
contends that this is a case of the State being sued without its
consent. Petitioners countered and maintained that the State consented to
suit when the Commission recommended that the victims be indemnified.
They likewise contend that the actuations of Pres. Aquino following the
incident constitute a waiver of the State immunity. Judge Sandoval upheld the
State.
Issue: WON the State waives its immunity from suit? (2) Does this case qualify
as a suit against the State.
Ruling: No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding indemnification of the victims of the incident by the gov’t does not in
any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. Notably, A.O.
No. 11 which created the Commission expressly states that its purpose was to
conduct an “investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place.” Evidently, it is only a fact-finding committee so that whatever may be
its findings, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that
any party decides to litigate his claim. Its recommendations cannot in any way
bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having been final and
executory. The President’s actuations likewise cannot be taken as a waiver of
State immunity. The act of jointing the marchers days after the incident, to
borrow the words of the petitioners, was but “an act of solidarity by the
government with the people”. Her promise to address the rallyists’ grievances
cannot in itself give rise to the inference that the State has admitted any
liability, much less can it be inferred therefrom that it has consented to the suit.
(2) No. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability
does not pertain to the govt. Although the anti-riot forces were discharging
their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission
findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms. Moreover, the members of the anti-riot forces committed an unlawful
act as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. An
officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under
the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.
Alejandro Estrada, petitioner v. Soledad S. Escritor, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 [August 4, 2003]
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more
than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband
died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate
respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her
religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue: WON the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.
Ruling: The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right
to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as
one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the
most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has
not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion
Calalang v. Williams No. 47800, 70 PHIL 726 [Dec 2, 1940]
Facts: The National Traffic Commission, under the direction of respondent
Williams, resolved to recommend to the Dir. of Public Works and to the Sec. of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along parts of Rosario St. and Rizal Ave. during certain periods
of time. Resolution was approved and executed. Petitioner Calalang, in his
capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer, prayed for a writ of prohibition
against respondents contending, among others, that CA 548, under which said
resolution was acted upon, infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice.
Issue: WON CA 548 an infringement of social justice.
Ruling: The court ruled that promotion of social justice xxx is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice therefore must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among xxx
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups xxx consistent with the fundamental objective xxx of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number. Property ownership
is impressed with a social function.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez No. L-78164, 152 SCRA 730 [Jul 31, 1987]
Facts: Petitioners Tablarin et al. sought admission into schools of medicine
for SY 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully
take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education thereby rendering them unqualified/disqualified for
admission to medical school under RA 2382 (Medical Act of 1959). Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of said RA as amended averring, among others,
that it unduly delegated legislative power to the Board of Medical Education.
Issue: WON the Medical Act of 1959 an invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
Ruling: The court ruled that necessary standards are set forth in Sec 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education”
and xxx the body of the statute itself. These considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle. Petition
dismissed. The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be applied
concurrently, not alternatively.
SSS Employees Assoc. v. Court of Appeals250 GR 85279, 175 SCRA 686
[July 28, 1989]
Facts: SSS Employees Association (SSEA) went on strike after the Social
Security Service (SSS) failed to act on the union’s demands. Hence, SSS filed
with the RTC a complaint which prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the strike, for the strikers to be ordered to return to work,
for the SSEA to be ordered to pay damages, and for the strike to be declared
illegal.
Issue: WON the employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes.
Ruling: Under the Constitution “the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters”252 and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
Rodulfo S. De Jesus, petitioner v. Commission on Audit, respondents
G.R. 109023 [August 12, 1998]
Facts: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing A
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government
and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized
salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from
consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated
members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-
CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989,
all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.
Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate
auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and
enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that the Circular is
inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to
implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it
was not published in the Official Gazette.
COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-
CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very
law it is intended to implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the
honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the
reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.
Issue: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its
lack of publication in the Official Gazette
Ruling: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA
446), publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an
administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an
existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No.
10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal
regulation. Before the said circular under attack may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees
concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out
whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the
matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and
rudiments of fairness and transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular
makes resolution of the other issues at bar unnecessary.
Petition is granted.