Educ Stud Math (2010) 75:345–358

DOI 10.1007/s10649-010-9261-6

Discussing a philosophical background

for the ethnomathematical program

Denise Silva Vilela

Published online: 6 August 2010

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract This article examines the extent to which Wittgenstein's analytical framework
may be relevant to philosophical reflection on ethnomathematics. The discussion develops
Bill Barton's suggestion that a philosophical basis for the ethnomathematical program
should include and explain culturally different mathematics systems, and the coexistence of
different conceptions of mathematics and rationality. Wittgenstein's concept of mathematics
as normative statements rather than descriptions is introduced to dialogue with ethno-
mathematics research and its anthropological descriptions of how mathematics is used and
propagated in specific practices. It is argued that although the formulations in Wittgenstein's
analytical framework alone are insufficient to account for the political character of
ethnomathematics, they do provide a starting point for ethnomathematics as a non-
metaphysical version of mathematics.

Keywords Ethnomathematics . Philosophy . Wittgenstein

This article analyzes Barton's suggestion (1998, p. 3) in relation to the association of

Wittgenstein's philosophy with ethnomathematics.1 In seeking philosophical elements as
a basis for this program, Barton discusses the difficulties raised by certain philosophical
approaches for this purpose, and notes that the emergence of ethnomathematics required a
non-traditional philosophical basis that may only be developed on the basis of current
non-metaphysical philosophy (1998, p. 16). In this respect, I shall further pursue two
aspects mentioned by Barton. Firstly, in addition to a humanistic focus, a philosophical
basis for ethnomathematics must explain the possibility of culturally different

1
Earlier versions of this work were submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Brazilian Ethnomathematics Congresses.
(See Vilela, 2009b).
D. S. Vilela (*)
Universidade Federal de São Carlos, Km 235-Via Washington Luis, São Carlos, SP, Brazil
e-mail: denisevilela@ufscar.br

D. S. Vilela
Rua Eliza Gonzales Rabello, n. 1070/40, São Carlos, SP, Brazil CEP 13564-335
346 D.S. Vilela

mathematics existing simultaneously, and how different conceptions of mathematics and

rationality might co-exist:
The challenge for anyone attempting a philosophical basis for ethnomathematics is not
just to ensure that there exists an account of the way in which mathematics is structured,
understood, and communicated. It is also to ensure that the account is consistent in
general with sociological and anthropological descriptions of how mathematics is
spread and used. Furthermore, the account must support the way in which mathematics
arises differently in different cultures, including different mathematical subcultures.
Ethnomathematicians need to be able to discuss the possibility of the simultaneous
existence of culturally different mathematics: it would therefore be helpful to be able to
explain how different conceptions of mathematics and different standards of rationality
may co-exist. It would be of further help to explain how they can co-exist in cognisance
of each other, i.e. how holders of these views may know about the views of others and
accept them as right in some rational sense. (Barton, 1998, p. 2)
In order to further develop this theme, this paper attempts to identify opportunities for
clarifying the ethnomathematical program on the basis of certain concepts raised by
Wittgenstein (1889–1951),2 who is often associated with the linguistic turn in philosophy.
A more extensive study of this subject posed a dialogue between mathematical education
and the concepts of language-games, family resemblances, life-forms, grammar and rule
(Vilela, 2007). The present article focuses mainly on the latter two concepts.
Taking a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy, attempting to understand what is
manifest, my references are ethnomathematical studies providing anthropological descrip-
tions of how mathematics is used and propagated in specific practices. In other words,
mathematical knowledge is seen as practice or process rather than a product or a domain of
knowledge that may be referenced to 'metaphysical realism' - the notion that an object may
be known in itself, in pure form, separate from human practices. Platonism and empiricism
can be seen as examples of metaphysical conceptions of mathematics, whereas Wittgenstein
does not see mathematics as describing reality; its propositions do not refer to anything that
may be discovered, but may be seen as rules or procedures, as models. This point will be
discussed in section 3.
In this context of mathematical practices, the following question is posed: is a non-
metaphysical philosophical basis a necessary condition for ethnomathematics research (and
for studies of mathematics and culture)? In the context of mathematical practices, could not
ethnomathematics be seen as a non-metaphysical version of mathematics? Within the
perspective of answering these questions affirmatively, I shall start with some brief
historical and philosophical contextualization in order to show how the notion of
mathematical practice is constituted through negation of 'metaphysical realism', and to
show how this expression is used here.

1 Non-metaphysical philosophy and ethnomathematics: a historical approach

If we take different mathematical practices, such as academic or school mathematics, or

those found in different spheres of everyday life, their possible interpretations depend on

2
References to Wittgenstein throughout this article allude to the period subsequent to Tractatus, Logico-
Philosophicus (1921), commonly referred to as the second Wittgenstein', and in particular his book
Philosophical Investigations (PI). (Wittgenstein, 2001).
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 347

the theoretical reference adopted. For example: they could be seen as different facets of the
same mathematics, the latter being a domain of knowledge, with a metaphysical existence
expressed in different ways, and reflected in ways more or less close to that of the reference
domain; or they may be seen as practices that occur in use, as a varied set of language-
games (Wittgenstein, PI, § 66), that would have no existence outside situations in which
they occur, with meanings depending on their uses rather than on an essence situated
independently of practices.
The various mathematical practices, if taken as different facets of the same product
called mathematics, would be classified by levels of depth. In other words, if we assume
that the different mathematical practices mentioned in specific studies of mathematical
education are related by a "unique correlate",3 or are applications of a mathematics that is
unique and independent of practices in which they occur, then we must assume a
hierarchical - although non-linear - relationship between them.
The notion of mathematics as product leads us to an essence of mathematics, or a unique,
universal, eternal and true meaning, that may be associated with what is often seen as the
early age of Western philosophy. It involves the pursuit of essences, discovering reality in
itself, revealing the 'truth' behind appearances, in other words metaphysics.4 Finding the
ultimate foundations—the essence—in some versions of the history of philosophy, was still
the aim of philosophy centuries later, although the subject of philosophy was no longer reality
itself, but reason or rationality. More recently, some philosophers have dropped the pursuit of
essence to take as their primary interest 'knowledge of structures and forms of our
consciousness, and language as its means of expression' (Chauí, 1999, p. 54).
In this context, as opposed to metaphysics, Wittgenstein's philosophy focuses on
language as the means of expressing knowledge. Wittgenstein shows that the structure of
language structures reality. Thus mathematical practice, as part of the grammatical basis for
different communities, must indicate conditions for meaning or, as Barton puts it (1998, p.
13–14) must determine their meaning systems, i.e., everything that is intelligible. On the
one hand, language organizes experiences, on the other it is through language that what is
meaningful in a form of life is expressed: “what exists” is expressed in language.
The pursuit is no longer of reality itself, or the form of mental structure identifying a true
essence, but the way in which language, as a rule-based system of symbols, shows us the
world. Instead of foundations, the focus is how we are inscribed in public language, in the
habits or usages of a community, which cannot be explained but only described. If there is a
foundation at all, it relates to something that is inseparable from linguistic practice: “For
what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us” (Wittgenstein, PI, § 126).
I would emphasize two not unrelated ways in which Wittgenstein's philosophy may
plausibly be associated with the ethnomathematics program. One is the non-metaphysical
aspect of his philosophy, in which meanings are not fixed or predetermined, as a necessary
condition for examining various culturally different mathematical practices. The other is
that meaning is not indifferent to linguistic practices, or practices in general, since language
is part of the context in which it develops. These concepts may provide a philosophical
basis for examining mathematics as social practice (Miguel, 2003; Vilela, 2009a).
The question of practice is here related to Wittgenstein's philosophy through his
emphasis on usage. Philosophical Investigations sought to rid language of referential
conceptions in which each word is associated with an object or thing, regardless of human

3
Wittgenstein, PI, § 96.
4
Metaphysics may be seen as a branch of philosophy concerned with trying to understand and describe the
nature of reality.
348 D.S. Vilela

rules or usages. Language must be investigated in linguistic practice. This assertion refers
both to the role of language in Wittgenstein's philosophy and to the importance of practices.
Firstly, language is taken as being composed from elements of our knowledge. For
philosophy, then, what exists is less important than how we speak, interpret and understand
things, i.e. our usage. Thus there is no interest in language for its own sake, but insofar as it
expresses our knowledge, as that which may be seen, in a non-subjective or realistic
manner, in other words the object focused is not essence “underlying appearances”.
It is in linguistic practice that the meaning of language is investigated, as opposed to a
fixed reference external to usage, a product or domain of knowledge:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
(Wittgenstein, PI, § 43)
Practice involves context of use; taking language out of context (“language goes on
holiday”, (Wittgenstein, PI, § 38)) may lead to confusion: on pursuing a meaning outside
the context of usage or language-games, the tendency is to seek an absolute sense, an
essence. In this case, Wittgenstein says, “when a philosopher (...) attempts to apprehend the
essence of the thing”, confusion may be avoided by taking a word back to its usage:
(...) one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the
language which is its original home? -
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
(Wittgenstein, PI, § 16)
Before proceeding to relate these philosophical concepts to work based on an
ethnomathematics approach, I would point to the methodological orientation that emerges
from taking Wittgenstein's philosophy as reference, namely examining meanings of
practices, or pursuing that which is made manifest rather than that which is hidden.
I shall also mention the potential and limitations of using only the formulations
from Wittgenstein's analytical framework to account for the political character of
ethnomathematics.

2 Wittgenstein’s philosophy: broadening of meanings and humanistic focus

Wittgenstein sees meanings in usages, which may vary and are not definitely determined.
As opposed to an essence that would ensure a unique meaning, I am taking Wittgenstein's
perspective and assuming that meanings are built and transformed through their uses in
different contexts, and in this sense may vary depending on the language-game of which
they are part.
Based on this idea, we may elucidate matters by looking at different mathematical
practices in the same way as we examine the meanings of words and concepts in language:
rather than assuming any “unique correlate” between them and things, but, leaving aside
this common-sense illusion as inappropriate for philosophical practice:
Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken
of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture of the world.
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other,
each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-
game in which they are to be applied is missing). (Wittgenstein, PI, §96)
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 349

This allusion to a “missing language-game” points to the fact that practice is not
considered, and the prevailing focus is on an ideal mathematics, which would be a reference
for various practices that may be associated with formalized or academic mathematics.
Thus meanings are not located outside of language in the external world, or in a
universal and necessary mental structure, but within the use of language. From this point of
view, the philosophical question is no longer “what is reality in itself?”, or “what exists?”,
but rather how an expression or word is used in language practice. The present study
examines mathematical practices recorded by ethnomathematical research and disseminated
in our academic environment: “We want to understand something that is already in plain
view” (Wittgenstein, PI, § 89).
In this sense, it is not a philosophy that criticizes science and its methods, like a court of
reason vested with the power to pronounce whether something is correct or incorrect
mathematics or not mathematics at all. Nor is it a “scientific philosophy”, one that advances
toward definitive solutions to problems (Spaniol, 1989, p. 115).
This leads to another necessary condition in the pursuit of a philosophical basis for
ethnomathematics: “any account must explain how one mathematics culture has come to be
predominant, and, apparently, so highly developed compared with other mathematics
cultures” (Barton, 1998, p. 3, 12).
On this latter point, Restivo (1998) develops a historical explanation related to the
institutionalization of the profession of the mathematician in the context of the 18th century,
noting that professional mathematics has a sophisticated language provided by its
symbolisms, generational sequences and other aspects, which, linked to their insertion in
a historical dimension, the value attached to rationality in the Enlightenment project, helps
to explain the great power of academic-scientific mathematical practices5 Working toward
an explanation on this basis, we maintain the non-prescriptive aim of philosophy, since the
importance and development of academic mathematics are not denied or questioned. At the
same time, I point to the limitation of this philosophy in dealing with the power relations
involved in such an explanation.
The other point made by Barton (1998) as a prerequisite for the philosophical basis of
ethnomathematics is “a humanistic focus”. There are several different interpretations of a
humanistic focus in Wittgenstein's philosophy (Lurie, 1989, p. 377). First of all, it is
necessary to point out that Wittgenstein's philosophical purpose is not enough by itself for
accounting for the political character of ethnomathematics. Despite that, relationships may
be assembled from Wittgenstein's distinction between culture and civilization. Culture
relates to the soul of man, with its spiritual dimension, with ceremonies and aesthetics.
Civilization relates to the intelligentsia, to rationality, to the materiality and functionality of
human life (Lurie, 1989, p. 377). Civilization represents the West's self-image and therefore
prioritizes “language of difference”, or self-reference, making judgments and placing
demands on the basis of a specific language-game. Judgment assumes a horizon of truth
that emerges from contact with a different and inferior other. This language of difference is
distinct from “exploring otherness” (Prado, 2004, p. 55), and more pertinent to the present
proposal of philosophy. Exploration of otherness may be pursued through various language-
games, in an activity that does not prioritize any one game.
The present study therefore attempts to broaden meanings rather than posing one true
argument instead of another. This perspective shifts the issue toward practice, which is not
compatible with the pursuit of a 'unique correlate'. Any possibility of dogmatic metaphysics

5
In Vilela (2007) see chapter 4, section 3.
350 D.S. Vilela

must be rejected, since the aim is not to propose a new metaphysical system to replace one
that has been criticized.6 As Wittgenstein (PI, §124) says: “It leaves everything as it is.”
Therefore, seeking one single philosophical theory for ethnomathematics would also be
mistaken. The proposal is at most one possible (elucidative) basis for the ethnomathematics
program rather than the philosophical basis. It is in this sense that I take D'Ambrosio's
allusion to “epistemological cages”, in posing ethnomathematics as “research program”
rather than “discipline”:
It seemed to me appropriate to avoid ethnomathematics emerging as yet another
discipline. It is more appropriate to treat it as a research program7. (D'Ambrosio,
2004, p. 136)
As a program rather than a discipline, D'Ambrosio asserts it is not subjected to the
epistemological cages that subordinate modern knowledge. He goes on to ask three
“guiding questions” for the “ethnomathematics program”, all starting with “how”: “how
ad hoc practices and solutions to problems developed into methods; how methods
developed into theories; how theories developed into scientific inventions”8 (D'Ambrosio,
2004, p. 137).

3 Ethnomathematics research and Wittgenstein's philosophy

3.1 Grammar and non-relativism

I shall now look at some of Wittgenstein's concepts and the possibility of interpreting them
in the context of ethnomathematics research.
A detailed elaboration of Wittgenstein's concepts of language-game and family
resemblances, with a view of mathematical education issues based on these concepts, is
presented in Vilela (2007). Therefore I only mention these concepts in passing and take up
the concepts of grammar and rules in more detail in order to interpret mathematical
practices as 'meaning systems' (Barton, 1998, p. 14).
Specific mathematical practices have their own rules. In this respect, standards and rules
are incisive and give directions, but they are not absolute, so relativism is limited because,
in practice, intentionality would be restricted to the possibilities of language established in a
certain game, being based on a grammar anchored to life-forms.
Looking simultaneously at the different mathematical practices, broadly mentioned in
ethnomathematics-related studies, enabled me to develop some points of view on what they
represent. Mathematical practices as used in the street, in schools, in academia, or by
professional groups, etc., are a varied set of language-games or different uses of
mathematical concepts in specific practices and thus do not constitute a single building of
knowledge named mathematics, but specific theoretical schemes that shape conditions for
the meaning, significance and intelligibility of different situations, times and places in life.
As in games we are familiar with, if we conduct an exercise to find the essence of what
characterizes them, we can always find another one, which although also a game, does not

6
The term 'metaphysics' is used in this sense here, rather than as operative metaphysics
7
“Pareceu-me adequado evitar que a Etnomatemática surgisse como uma outra disciplina. Mais
apropriadamente, é tratá-la como programa de pesquisa”.
8
“como práticas ad hoc e soluções de problemas se desenvolveram em métodos; como métodos s se
desenvolveram em teorias; como teorias se desenvolveram em invenções científicas”.
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 351

partake of the previously determined essence. So games, like other terms of language, do
not have an essence, but at most show family resemblances, meaning they look like one
another in terms of features of their eyes, or hair color, etc.9 In other words, practices are
not narrowed down to a single meaning, but point toward different meanings depending on
the language-games in which they are involved.
Meanings are not previously defined in a definitive manner, as a ready-to-use
mathematics, in a domain of knowledge. They are found in the practice of language, in
customs, but at the same time, they are not arbitrary. They are directed by grammar, a
specific concept in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Before explaining the risk of relativism that
arises due to the idea of non-fixed meanings, I would point out that grammar generally
means a complex of language rules, or the structure of language.
In Wittgenstein's philosophy, grammar does not have its usual meaning. It involves
the structure of language and shows how expressions may be used in different contexts.
Depending on rules, grammar shows how expressions may be used in different contexts.
It indicates procedures for the use of words, what makes sense and what is right or
wrong.
Grammar contains the rules of use, and even the meanings of a language's words: what
is an object of grammar—words—will be stated by the set of uses of rules we may
make of it. For example, “blue is a color” is a grammatical proposition because is
functions as a rule or definition, whereas in 'this table is blue', is functions as a
description (Gottschalk, 2004, p. 315). To distinguish whether is is being used in a
descriptive or normative role, Condé (1998, p. 115) notes that if it is a grammatical
proposition the opposite of the sentence cannot be posed since, qua definition, its
contrary propositions would be incompatible, so the negation refutes the definition. For
example, what we conventionally call a triangle—“a triangle is a closed three-sided
polygon”—is a grammatical proposition, and to deny it would involve altering the
definition of what a triangle is. Other characterizations of grammatical propositions help
us understand the notion of grammar. According to Monk (1995, p. 415), Wittgenstein
characterized grammatical propositions in many different ways: “self-evident proposi-
tions”, “concept-building propositions”, “rules”, etc. Thus we define not only objects
that have empirical referents (ostensive definitions), but also mental states, vague
expressions, mathematical objects, among others: “Grammar tells what kind of object
anything is” (Wittgenstein, PI, § 373).
From Wittgenstein's non-metaphysical perspective, grammar is autonomous, because—
among other reasons—it does not depend on its referent to be meaningful:
In Investigations, grammar is autonomous, which means that in language there are
grammatical rules that operate without the need to be based on a “name-object”
correspondence. These grammatical rules arise from uses of expressions rather than
denominating objects10. (Condé, 1998, p. 113)
Therefore the fact that we share meanings is not due to some essence; rather it is the
common practice of usage that generates grammatical rules.
Moreno explains the limits of autonomy of grammar (and its non-arbitrary character)
which, although independent of experience, “is not absolutely so” (Moreno, 2005, p. 185)

9
See (Wittgenstein, PI, §66, 67).
10
“Nas Investigações a gramática é autônoma, isto é, na linguagem existem regras gramaticais que
funcionam sem a necessidade de fundamentar-se na adequação “nome-objeto”. Tais regras gramaticais
surgem dos usos das expressões e não da denominação dos objetos”.
352 D.S. Vilela

since some rules have empirical origins. At the same time, this characterization shows that
language seems to “coincide” with experience, since conventions are not arbitrary. In
particular, mathematics or Euclidean geometry, as a set of grammatical rules, are applied
because these rules must have an empirical origin and became rules, or forms of intelligibility:
For example, choices made in Euclidean geometry have their roots in life-forms
that used different measuring techniques (such as those of the ancient Egyptians,
when the Nile was flooding or ebbing). This does not mean to say that this
geometry has empirical foundations, but merely that there are empirical reasons that
led to a certain geometric formulation (among other reasons of a non-empirical
nature)11. (Gottschalk, 2004, p. 331)
Grammatical rules are conditioned by life-forms, but are not definitively or universally
predetermined. As Bourdieu (1983, p. 59) puts it, they do imply regularities, but are not
regulations. To a certain extent, rules lead to modes of proceeding without a conscious
decision being involved. You do not take a decision: you just do a certain thing. It is a
matter of a certain practice (Wittgenstein, quoted by Jesus, 2002, p. 49).
After incorporating a rule, which is a way of organizing experiences, a form of
intelligibility and interaction, these rules appear to be obvious, or rather seem to be
necessary, so that things seemingly could not be otherwise.
Grammar does not unequivocally determine what is right or wrong, but the rules for
using words, what makes sense, the possibilities of intelligible use. As part of human
practices, or community activities, grammatical rules are subject to change, but not
through deliberate practices, thus they are not made up of decisions based on empirical
agreements. Rules, as characterized in Wittgenstein's philosophy, show a certain fluidity
and give rise to a dynamic aspect of language, the transformation of grammatical
propositions. What exists is expressed in language, but if a term loses its interest it may
fall into disuse and vanish:
There is nothing that cannot be said—all it takes is creating a technical language—
and all that is said may cease to be said—if it merely loses interest and importance for
some life-form12. (Moreno, 2005, p. 181)
A rule does not necessarily imply one fixed use, or way of acting. The importance of
language as practice is restated in the concept of 'following a rule', i.e. each course of action
is in accordance with a rule. The use of a word, for example, may or may not be limited by
a rule. We act in accordance with rules, but are not completely determined by them
(Wittgenstein, PI, § 201).
Despite their several possible uses, the rules of grammar, and those of mathematics
in particular, are not arbitrary, and may not be read any way at all! They are based on
life-forms, which are crystallizations of experiences that depend on the world, on
commonly shared agreements or public ideas, so conventions are not just arbitrary, like
cards or chess. They may have empirical roots, but if they are part of grammar, they have

11
“Por exemplo, as escolhas feitas na geometria euclidiana têm raízes em formas de vida que utilizavam
técnicas diversas de medição (como as dos antigos egípcios, empregadas para medir suas terras em épocas de
enchentes e vazantes do rio Nilo) Isso não quer dizer que essa geometria tenha fundamentos empíricos,
apenas que existem razões empíricas que levaram a uma determinada formulação geométrica, dentre outras
razões (de natureza não empírica)”.
12
“Nada há que não possa ser dito—bastando para tanto a criação de uma técnica lingüística—e tudo o que é
dito pode deixar de sê-lo—bastando que perca seu interesse e importância para alguma forma de vida”.
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 353

been crystallized and become rules, and we do not easily perceive their conventional
nature.13
Although they are a priori in some sense, or prior to a situation, rules are not fixed or
absolute. The use of a word, for example, may or may not be limited by a rule. “A rule
stands there like a sign-post” (Wittgenstein, PI, § 85).
Thus, the notion of grammar must be taken together with the notion of life-form. This is
because while it indicates rules using words, or projecting language in situations to organize
them, it contains the terms of language that make sense, that are instituted by our life-form,
through concepts crystallized by their use. In this respect, life situations are projected in
grammar too; therefore, certain rules and standards of the latter show signs of a life-form, as
illustrated at the end of the next section.

3.2 Interpretation: anthropological descriptions of specific mathematical practices

as normative system of meanings

The concept of grammar and others cited here are closely related to Wittgenstein's view of
mathematics, which is in turn taken as a reference point for this study and extended to
general mathematical practices. His concept of mathematics, as opposed to a descriptive
one, asserts a normative power of formulations of each group, that is, they provide systems
of meanings. The normative function of mathematics is opposed to a view of mathematics
as describing reality. It prompts us to ask what may or may not be used, as ways of
understanding things. This conceptual universe that comprises the 'mathematical grammar',
as part of our grammatical repertoire, states conditions for meaning, or determines our
systems of meanings, and determines what is intelligible: Wittgenstein claims that
mathematical statements are normative descriptions of how the world is seen, of what is
meant by being intelligible (Barton, 1998, p. 13). Glock explains that the role of
mathematics is normative, despite its descriptive appearance: nothing that contradicts it may
be taken as an intelligible description of reality (Glock, 1988, p. 243).
The following excerpts from the studies analyzed illustrate the different uses of
mathematical concepts, with their own rules for each of the practices. In other words,
different rules may be identified in these studies, taken as a whole:
A brief look at differences between the 'street' arithmetic used in everyday life and the
school version suggests that each involves its own meanings and ways of proceeding
and appraising the outcomes of these procedures, and suggests that such differences
eventually constitute legitimacies, since in the same way as the school version excludes
street methods—describing them as informal and of limited applicability—street
mathematics precludes school methods as complicated, meaningless, and unneeded in
the street, in everyday life14. (Lins & Gimenes, 1997, p. 17, emphasis in the original.)

13
Note that Wittgenstein's view of mathematics as a language is not confined to the typical conventionalist
view that mathematics, like chess, is a game played with symbols according to rules (Jesus, 2002, p. 49).
While a language determines one way (among other possible ways in that language) of approaching
situations, it was formulated from situations related to the empirical world, with public ideas, that is to say,
language is based on life-forms. (See also Barton, 1998, p. 15).
14
“A breve olhada para as diferenças entre a aritmética da rua e a escolar sugere que cada uma delas envolve
seus próprios significados e suas próprias maneiras de proceder e avaliar os resultados desses procedimentos,
e sugere que essas diferenças acabam constituindo legitimidades, pois do mesmo modo que a escola proíbe
os métodos da rua—em geral chamados de informais, e dizendo que são de aplicação limitada—a rua proíbe
os métodos da escola, chamando-os de complicados e sem significados, e dizendo que não são necessários na
rua”.
354 D.S. Vilela

(...) For example, if we are faced with the task of distributing equal amounts of beans
after harvest (...) counting them would be perfectly correct from a mathematical point
of view, but inappropriate in terms of the task posed15. (Carraher, Carraher, &
Schliemann, 1988, p. 13)

The relationship between coal mined and monthly wage earned is defined by a
formula of the type S ¼ a þ bx. This would not sound convenient and would become
ridiculous, since it is entirely removed from the everyday language and cultural
patterns of the locality. Everyday language, in the case of this community, is much
more comprehensive and persuasive than the scholarly language that translates
scientific concepts16. (Damazio, 2004, p. 13)
(...) no problems in stores or kitchens have ever been resolved using school
algorithms. (...) In fact, the question should be: “Is there anything that is
transferred?”17 (Lave, 2002, p. 66. n. 1).
Clearly the mathematical rules used by people in everyday life or in certain occupational
situations are unlike those used in a school or academic context. At most, there may be a family
resemblance, and the element common to the first two cases that will not be recognized in the
latter which, in turn, would resemble the first in one aspect and the second in another.
The rules associated with each mathematical practice are prior to experience - not in the
sense that they presuppose that the actual sensory experience would be impossible without
this knowledge, but in the sense that these rules constitute the grammar that defines the
meanings of their shared uses. Use of rules—and mathematical propositions in particular—
is not arbitrary or factual, but specified in language-games. In everyday mathematics, there
are different rules, while school mathematics selects different ways of playing with
mathematical concepts. Each mathematical practice possesses its own appropriate family
resemblances and strangeness too.
As shown in the book Mathematics in the Streets and in Schools (Carraher et al., 1988),
for example, or by Lins (2004), people engaged in different occupational activities may
have difficulties with school mathematics, just as pupils also often have difficulty using
their school knowledge to solve problems in other practices:
There is a considerable gap between academic mathematics (official, school, formal,
mathematician's) and street mathematics, and the problem is not just that academia
ignores or disapproves of the street, but also that the latter ignores and disapproves of
the former18. (Lins, 2004, pp. 93–94)
This is another argument supporting the focus posed herein, of mathematical practices as
systems of meanings that have their own legitimacy.

15
“Por exemplo, se tivermos diante de nós a tarefa de distribuir iguais quantidades de feijão obtido após uma
colheita (...) a contagem de grãos é um processo perfeitamente correto do ponto de vista matemático, mas
inapropriado do ponto de vista da tarefa que se deseja realizar.”
16
“A relação entre o carro de carvão que extraía e o seu salário mensal é definida pela função do tipo
S ¼ a þ bx. Isso não soaria conveniente e se tornaria ridículo, pois foge totalmente da linguagem cotidiana e
dos padrões culturais da localidade. A linguagem cotidiana, no caso dessa comunidade, é muito mais
abrangente e convincente do que a linguagem escolar que traduz conceitos científicos.”
17
“(...) praticamente nenhum problema em uma loja ou na cozinha foi resolvido sob forma do algoritmo
escolar. (...) De fato, a questão devia ser: “existe algo que é transferido?”.”
18
“Há um considerável estranhamento entre a Matemática acadêmica (oficial, da escola, formal, do
matemático) e a Matemática da rua, e o problema não é apenas que a academia ignore ou desautorize a rua,
mas também que a rua ignora e desautoriza a Matemática acadêmica.”
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 355

Moving on now to illustrate the reflective nature of language: we use the structure of
grammar to organize experience, meaning that language is projected into situations to
organize experience, but language also reveals “what there is”, and is composed of
significant elements of a life-form, so life situations are projected in grammar. Costa (1998)
studied potters in the Jequitinhonha Valley (Brazil), for whom the word 'triangle' would not
be included in what we call grammar:
When we asked them what a triangular figure looked like, they replied that it looked
like a blunt square, or a square that had lost its tip19. (Costa, 1998, p. 66)
Costa concluded that they see a triangle as part of a rectangle. In another situation
illustrating a grammar that indicates a specific life-form, Bandeira (2004) explored the
concept of “five-pairs”, which was part of the grammar of gardeners in his survey. To the
extent that they project this concept of grammar in situations, it is only within this
language-game that the term makes sense:
-How are vegetables counted?
-We count by “five-pairs”. We have been counting this way for a long time. We say
twenty “five-pairs” is a hundred.
After that, is there another way of counting?
-No. Only “five-pairs”20. (Bandeira, 2004, p. 25)
In this case, a “pair” is not a set of two elements, since it has five, as the above quotation
shows. Other examples may be used to illustrate the relationship between grammars and
life-forms. Costa notes that the term “right time” used by the potters he studied did not
depend on a clock, but on wind, sun, temperature, or humidity; it was a precise point during
the drying of a piece of pottery, so it was part of a specific language-game, and its meaning
related to that situation.
This takes us back to the way in which Wittgenstein poses the relationship between
language-game and life-form:
But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command?—
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”,
“words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all;
but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence,
and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this
from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form. (Wittgenstein, PI, § 23)
When we say that mathematics is normative, we mean that it does not show us how
something is, but how it should be, which rules must be followed for it to behave as
defined. This is because rules are profoundly rooted in life-forms. As part of this conception

19
“A esta pergunta [ao que a figura triangular mostrada parecia], respondiam que aquilo era um quadrado
despontado ou que parecia um quadrado que perdeu a ponta.”
20
“-Como é feita a contagem das hortaliças?
-A gente conta em par de cinco. Há muito tempo que a gente conta em par de cinco. A gente conta vinte par
de cinco é cem.
-Depois do par de cinco tem outra contagem?
-Não. Só de par de cinco”
356 D.S. Vilela

of mathematics as rule, which involves context, group, language, etc., I would say that there
are many possible mathematical practices with different and exclusive legitimacies.
Moreover, norms establish a model of mathematical knowledge that ranks different
mathematical practices in hierarchies based on the presumption of a unique mathematics, or
specific mathematical practices representing imperfect manifestations of an independent
and universal mathematics. For instance, sports statistics provide scores and rankings that
establish hierarchies among sportsmen rather than showing a real set of performances. In
this sense, they represent a set of practices designed to build a social pattern of
mathematical knowledge.

4 Final remarks

As suggested by Barton (1998), I set out to look at the possibility of building a

philosophical basis for ethnomathematics by examining Wittgenstein's philosophy,
which proved to be fruitful for analyzing the simultaneous existence of different
mathematical practices as particular and specific schemes appropriately used for different
practical and concrete situations in life. There seems to be a situational logic that
eventually determines—or even imposes—rules and specific ways of mobilizing
mathematical objects.
I see the notion of shared rules as a particularly elucidative Wittgensteinian concept that
enables us to perceive pedagogical developments through relationships that may be
established between cases shown above and Lave's notion of situated learning (2002).
Situated learning emphasizes the fact that the learning process is determined by the medium
that structures practice in its specific situation. From Lave's perspective, knowledge is
constituted on acting in locus. In this context, I would emphasize that situated learning is
conceived as the opposition between mathematics as product or domain of knowledge and
on the other hand, mathematics as process, which is reflected in the mathematical activities
of a professor, academic or layman in everyday situations, that is, mathematics as used in
different practices (Lave, 2002, p. 66).
Against the view that certain forms of knowledge may be universally inserted in any
situation, Lave's theory of situated learning emerges from research findings that show no
transfer of knowledge between different practices, including school practices involving
mathematics.
In this sense, learning mathematics in school does not come naturally; in other words,
there is no natural rationality21 based on thought unrelated to values and sociocultural
questions. The idea of a so-called linear development of rationality that would necessarily
lead students to the mathematical contents, desired by teachers, in pedagogical terms may
lead to their excluding pupils unfamiliar with school culture, since school mathematics
prioritizes ruling class language and culture, which maintains a particular, diverse and
specific relationship with students' natural everyday language.
On examining the construction and transmission of mathematical knowledge from a
Wittgensteinian perspective, Gottschalk (2008) questions “natural rationality”, a so-called
causal link between mental structures and certain school-curriculum contents based on
constructivist perspectives inspired by Piaget's psychogenetic theories. Taking Wittgen-
stein's philosophy as reference, she suggests that learning means being able to see in a
different way (Gottschalk, 2008, p. 87).

21
See Gottschalk (2008).
Philosophical background for the ethnomathematical program 357

Wittgenstein did not view rules, grammar and language as fixed, rigid, or eternal. We
must know what the game is and then throw a ball according to its rules:
In a conversation: one person throws a ball. The other does not know: whether he is
supposed to throw it back, or throw it to the third person, or leave it on the ground, or
pick it up and put it in his pocket, etc. (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 110)
In the same way, I would say that the outcome of children doing mental calculations in
school, or writing, depends not only on a child's knowing how to operate, but also on
knowing the language-game in which these operations are to be performed. Only then can a
child produce the correct answer22 among several possible answers.
I conclude by noting that the idea of different rules and grammars does not fit the notion
of natural development of mathematical knowledge, or the notion of a single path to follow,
or a “unique correlate”. As opposed to a natural rationality, from an etnomathematics
perspective, I would say that understanding mathematics depends on knowing what the
game is. Since there are many possible meanings rather than an absence of meanings,
“knowing” mathematics would need involvement with the language and rules of the given
situation. For example, if pupils are not familiar with school mathematics, its language and
corresponding questions and answers, then they will have to take in its rules in order to do
what is expected of them.
It leads to a possible answer to another of the issues raised by Barton (1998, p. 15):
“What happens when different mathematical systems meet?” I would ask whether these
meetings are not relatively frequent. I believe that, by elucidating rules that are specific to
each one of many mathematical practices, we can deal with these peculiar features with
more chance of success, exploring otherness.
This interpretation of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, even without having a political
character, revives a sense of strangeness or “otherness” and wonder that is peculiar to
philosophical thought; in particular it points to the non-dogmatic and non-metaphysical
character of philosophy. Otherness, I believe, may support research highlighting the
visibility of different mathematical practices and, instead of naturalizing a unique form of
thought, might also become part of the educational scene.
By looking at that which is manifest, ethnomathematics shows a plurality of language-
games of which mathematics is part, and these language-games, in turn, express their own
rules in specific mathematical practices.

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