International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijhydene

Analysis of hazard area associated with hydrogen gas

transmission pipelines
Young-Do Joa,∗ , Bum Jong Ahnb
a Institute of Gas Safety Technology, Korea Gas Safety Corporation, 332-1, Daeya-dong, Shihung-shi, Kyunggi-do 429-712, Republic of Korea
b Graduate School of Energy, Korea Polytechnic University, Jungwang-dong, Shihung-shi, Kyunggi-do 429-793, Republic of Korea

Received in revised form 30 December 2005; accepted 4 January 2006

Available online 2 March 2006

Abstract
Hydrogen is considered to be the most important future energy carrier in many applications reducing significantly greenhouse
gas emissions, but the safety issues associated with hydrogen applications need to be investigated and fully understood to be
applicable as the carrier. Generally, the locations of hydrogen production and consumption are different. Hydrogen must be
transported from the point of production to the point of use. Pipeline delivery is cheaper than all other methods for large
quantities of hydrogen. The rupture of a hydrogen pipeline can lead to outcomes that can pose a significant threat to people and
property in the immediate vicinity of the failure point. In this work, a simplified equation of hazard analysis is proposed for the
pipeline transporting hydrogen, which relates the diameter, the operating pressure and the length of the pipeline to the size of
the affected area in the event of a failure of the pipeline. The dominant hazards are thermal radiation from sustained fire and
shock pressure from gas cloud explosion. For a transmission pipeline of hydrogen gas, the hazard area from the fire is slightly
larger than by the other event. The hazard area is directly proportional to the operating pressure raised to the power one-half,
and to the pipeline diameter. This simplified equation to estimate the hazard area will be a useful tool for safety management
of hydrogen gas transmission pipelines.
䉷 2006 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Hazard analysis; Hydrogen gas pipeline; Hazard area; Thermal radiation; Release rate

1. Introduction a lot of advantages for considering hydrogen as energy

Worldwide demand for energy has been steadily on
the increase along with economic development and in-
crease in population. Until now, fossil energy plays a
significant role but it induces global climate change.
Therefore, hydrogen is considered to be the most impor-
tant future energy carrier in many applications reducing
greenhouse gas emissions significantly [1,2]. There are
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +82 31 310 1450;
fax: +82 31 815 4361.
E-mail address: ydjo@kgs.or.kr (Y.-D. Jo).
0360-3199/$30.00 䉷 2006 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhydene.2006.01.008
carrier. First, hydrogen can be produced from natural
gas, biomass, ethanol, clean coal, solar, wind or nuclear
energy [3]. And not only the sources of hydrogen are
abundant but also the hydrogen power will dramatically
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For hydrogen to be
applicable as energy carrier, the safety issues associated
with hydrogen applications need to be investigated and
fully understood.
Generally, the locations of hydrogen production and
consumption are different. Hydrogen must be trans-
ported from the point of production to the point of use.
Pipeline delivery is cheaper than all other methods for
 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130
Nomenclature
Ap cross-sectional area of pipe, m2
C decay factor, dimensionless
D dose of load (N/m2 for explosion,
s (kW/m2 )4/3 for fire)
H relative humidity, dimensionless
HC heat of combustion, J/kg
I radiational heat flux at the location of
interest, J/m2 s
L pipe length, m
M total mass of released hydrogen, kg
MP minimum proximity of pipeline to
normally occupied buildings, m
P probability of death, dimensionless
Pr probability unit, dimensionless
Qeff effective mass release rate, kg/s
Qpeak initial peak gas release rate from hole,
kg/s
Qsteady-state mass release rate at steady-state, kg/s
a, b empirical constant, dimensionless
d pipeline diameter, m
fF Fanning friction factor, dimensionless
large quantities of hydrogen. Pipelines can be classified
into transmission, gathering and distribution lines [4].
Transmission pipelines are normally operated on high
pressure and have large diameter. Hydrogen is pressur-
ized at production site and passed directly into a trans-
mission pipeline or liquefied and loaded into tankers
for shipment to distribution pipeline network terminals.
These pipeline networks would incorporate facilities for
storing hydrogen in either gaseous or liquid form. The
hydrogen would then be distributed as it is needed to
energy consumers for use either as a direct heating fuel,
as a raw material for various chemical processes, or as
a source of energy for the local generation of electric-
ity. The hazards associated with the pipeline carrying
hydrogen gas have to be fully understood to make a
safety guideline for the pipeline. Failure of the pipeline
can lead to various outcomes, some of which can cause
significant damage to people and properties in the im-
mediate vicinity of the failure location. The area of
hazard associated with the damage will depend on the
type of pipeline failure, time to ignition, environmental
condition at the failure point and meteorological condi-
tion. The high-pressurized gas will be discharged con-
tinuously from the pipe, and the relatively long duration
will be self-regulated by the gas leaving the pipeline
at sonic velocity. Tensile stress in the pipe wall is
2123
mTNT equivalent mass of TNT, kg
pa atmospheric pressure, N/m2
pE explosion overpressure, N/m2
p0 stagnant pressure at gas supply station
or compressor station, N/m2
r distance from failure point of
pipeline, m
rexpl hazard distance from explosion, m
rfire hazard distance from the center of jet
flame, m
t time, s
ze scaled distance, m/kg1/3

ratio of effective hole area to pipe
cross-sectional area, dimensionless
 specific heat ratio, dimensionless
 ratio of total heat radiated to total heat
released from fire, dimensionless
0 density of gas at operation condition,
kg/m3
a atmospheric transmissivity, dimension-
less
multiplied and concentrated on the vicinity of the punc-
ture. The highly compressible gas flow leaves a high
level of energy in the vicinity of the puncture for a
sufficient period of time to allow for a small hole grow-
ing eventually into a full-bore rupture under certain cir-
cumstances. The research by British Gas shows that a
defect will be either propagating to full-bore rupture or
remaining as leak. Following the research, British Gas
concluded that leaks may propagate to full-bore rup-
tures if the ratio of operating stress to yield stress of a
pipe is greater than about 0.3 [5]. Therefore, the design
affects the failure type of the pipeline being full-bore
rupture or remaining as a hole. The hazard area from a
hydrogen gas pipeline assuming full-bore rupture may
be important to determine the minimum proximity of
buildings to the pipeline and thus land use planning.
This study is focused on a proposed simple and de-
pendable approach to sizing the ground area potentially
affected by the failure of transmission pipeline carrying
hydrogen.
2. Accident scenarios
Fig. 1 summarizes various possible outcomes from
the failure of a pipeline transporting hydrogen gas.
2124 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130
Gas Immediate Near delayed Far delayed
release ignition ignition ignition Fire ball
Jet fire
Yes
Explosion
No Yes Jet fire
Jet fire
No Yes
No significant
hazard
No
Fig. 1. Event tree for hydrogen transmission pipeline.
Hydrogen is a colorless, odorless, highly flammable
material. The flammable zone in air at atmospheric
pressure is from 4% to 75% by volume, and the mix-
ture can be detonated over the range from 20% to 60%
given good mixing. Initiation can be realized with a
very-low-energy ignition source, i.e. 0.02 mJ [6]. The
possibility of a significant flash fire or vapor cloud
explosion resulting from far delayed remote ignition
is extremely low due to the buoyant nature of the hy-
drogen, which generally precludes the formation of a
persistent vapor cloud at ground level. But within few
seconds after the start of the release, a large flammable
gas cloud could be formed due to the turbulent mixing
between hydrogen and ambient air. This cloud has the
potential to produce an explosion due to the nature
of hydrogen gas. Hydrogen has a very high burning
rate compared to other flammable gases. In the event
of rupture, a mushroom-shaped gas cloud would form
and then grow in size, and rise due to momentum and
buoyancy of the discharged gas. This cloud would,
however, disperse rapidly, and a quasi-steady gas jet
would establish itself. If the released gas ignited imme-
diately with the rupture of pipeline, it makes a jet fire
just after a short-lived fireball. But if the mushroom-
shaped gas cloud is ignited delayed by a nearby ignition
source, it produces a significant gas cloud explosion
as shown in Fig. 1. Dominant hazards could be, there-
fore, the overpressure effect of vapor cloud explosion
by ignition within few seconds after leak, and the heat
effect of thermal radiation from a sustained jet fire,
which may be preceded by a short-lived fireball or
the explosion.
The ground area affected by a credible worst-case
failure event can be estimated, therefore, both from a
gas cloud explosion model that characterizes the explo-
sion pressure, and from a fire model that characterizes
the heat intensity. Because magnitude of explosion and
size of jet fire depend on the flow rate at which the gas
escapes, the corresponding size of the affected hazard
area depends on the effective rate of gas release. The
release rate can be shown to be dependent on the op-
erating pressure of the pipeline, the pipeline length and
the effective hole size [7].
For full-bore rupture, where the effective hole size
is equal to pipeline diameter, governing parameters
of the hazard area are pipeline diameter, operating
pressure and pipeline length from gas supply point to
failure point. Given the wide range of actual transmis-
sion pipeline sizes, operating pressures and pipeline
length, a meaningful hazard model should acknowledge
explicitly the impact of these parameters on the area
affected.
3. Hazard area analysis
Hazard event of the credible worst case is the full-
bore rupture of a high-pressure pipeline resulting in ex-
plosion and fire. In this work, the hazard model is based
on a consequence model which consists of three parts:
(1) an effective release rate model for a hole in a highly
pressurized pipeline, (2) a fire model that relates the ef-
fective release rate of a gas to the heat intensity of the
fire, and (3) vapor cloud explosion model that relates the
maximum gas cloud to overpressure of the explosion as
a function of distance from the point of leak. Basis for
each model, as well as the underlying assumptions, is
described in the following section.
3.1. Release rate from pipeline
The gas release rate through a hole on the pipeline
varies with time. Within seconds of failure, the release
rate will have dropped rapidly to a fraction of the peak
initial value. It will decay even further over time until
steady-state. The peak initial release from the transmis-
sion pipeline can be estimated by assuming the sonic
flow through an orifice by the following equation [7,8]:


 
d 2
2 (+1)/(−1)
Qpeak = 0 p0 , (1)
4 +1
where
is the dimensionless hole size which is the ratio
of effective hole area to the pipe cross-sectional area,
d the pipe diameter, 0 the stagnation density of gas
at operating conditions, p0 the stagnation pressure at
operating conditions and  the specific heat ratio of gas.
The release rate at steady-state can be estimated
approximately by assuming choked flow at the re-
lease point and constant pressure at gas supplying
 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130 2125

station [7]: By assuming the specific heat ratio  = 1.41, gas den-
sity at atmosphere =0.09 kg/m3 , and Fanning friction
Qpeak
Qsteady-state =  , (2) factor fF = 0.0026 conservatively for steel pipeline, the
1 + 4
2 fF L/d(2/( + 1))2/(−1) effective rate of hydrogen release from a hole on the
pipeline is given as
where fF is the Fanning friction factor and L is the pipe
Qeff = 6.47 × 10−4 Ap
p0
length from the gas supply station to the release point.
The numerator in the above equation is the release
, (6)
rate without friction loss through the pipeline, while
the denominator acts as a decay factor due to the wall
friction loss of pipeline at steady-state.
The effective release rate associated with the prob-
ability of a person killed by fire and explosion would
depend on the exact time of ignition. The probability
of death from jet fire can be estimated by approximat-
ing the transient jet fire as a steady-state fire that is
fed by the gas released at the effective rate. The ef-
fective release rate, CQpeak , is a fraction of the peak
initial release rate. It can be used to obtain the heat
flux comparable to that from the real transient fire ig-
nited with a slight delay. In general, the most appro-
priate value for the decay factor would depend on the
pipe size, the pressure of pipeline, the assumed time
to ignition, and the time period required to cause harm
to people. In one-dimensional transient flow through
the arrested crack tip of a tube with constant cross-
section, the decay factor is expressed by the following
equation [9]:
 
 − 1 2/(−1)
C= 1− . (3)
+1
In a study of risks of hazardous pipelines in the UK
conducted by A. D. Little Ltd. [10], the authors quoted
0.25 as the decay factor. A more conservative value of
0.3 is adopted here for the factor. The intensity of the
sustained fire associated with the nearly immediate igni-
tion of leaked gas from large-diameter pipelines should
not be underestimated. However, sometimes the decay
factor appearing at steady-state is larger than 0.3. This
is determined by the denominator of Eq. (2). Therefore,
the decay factor has to be taken as the larger value be-
tween 0.3 and the value at steady-state:
⎡ 
⎤ formed by turbulent mixing just after the rupture of
2f L
 2/(−1)
4
2 the hydrogen pipeline. The hydrogen released into the
C= max ⎣0.3, 1 ⎦ . (4)
F
1+
d +1
The effective release rate for the hazard analysis of
jet fire can be estimated by using Eqs. (1) and (4) as
follows:
Qeff = CQpeak . (5)
 
1
× max 0.3,
1 + 4.187 × 10−3
2 (L) /d
where
is the dimensionless hole size, p0 the stag-
nation pressure at operating conditions and L the pipe
length from the gas supply station to the release point.
From Eq. (6), if the dimensionless group,
2 (L/d), is
larger than about 2400, the effective release rate will
be constant. It means that if the location of accident is
remote, e.g. several kilometers from hydrogen gas sup-
ply station or pump station, to analyze the hazard area,
the effective hydrogen release rate from the pipeline
can be considered as constant. The effective release
rate for gas cloud explosion will be discussed in the
next section.
3.2. Pressure effect from gas cloud explosion
The probability of death as a function of the hazard
intensity in an accident can be estimated by using Probit
(Pr: probability unit), a linearized probability function,
as follows [11,12]:
1
 P r−5
P=√ e−s /2 ds.
2
(7)
2 −∞
Argument of the function is the probability unit, Pr,
characterizing the dose–effect relationship between the
doses of concrete harmful load, e.g. pressure, heat, or
toxicity, and recipient categories, e.g. death or injuries,
Pr = a + b ln(D), (8)
where a and b are the empirical constants that reflect
the hazard specifics of a harmful load studied and the
susceptibility of recipients to the load, while D is a dose
of the load for a given exposure time.
An accident scenario is an explosion of a gas cloud
ambient environment is mixed with surrounding air,
forming a huge gas cloud partly in flammable concentra-
tion, and subsequently ignited to produce a vapor cloud
explosion. The positive buoyancy and rapid molecular
diffusion of gaseous hydrogen means that any release
will quickly mix with the surrounding gases. The buoy-
ant velocity of hydrogen in normal temperature and
2126 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130

Table 1 hydrogen gas cloud is estimated by

Physical property data of hydrogen at 288 K
mTNT = 4.57 × 10−3 d 2
p0 . (11)
Parameter Value Unit

Specific heat of gas 28.78 J/mol K

The explosion pressure with distance can be solved
Specific heat ratio 1.41 — by the empirical equation [16]
Density of gas at 1 atm 0.09 kg/m3
Viscosity of gas 0.8272×10−5 N s/m2 pE 1616[1 + (ze /4.5)2 ]
=   ,
Heat of combustion 1.419×108 J/kg pa
1+(ze /0.048)2 1+(ze /0.32)2 1+(ze /1.35)2
(12)
where
pressure is 1.2–9 m/s [13]. The flammable volume of
r
hydrogen–air mixture, i.e. where hydrogen volume con- ze = (13)
centration is between the lower and upper flammable 0.166(
d 2 p0 )1/3
limits, depends on release rate and release time. It is 1/3
is the dimensional distance scaled with mTNT .
known that the flammable volume of the mixture is max-
The Probit of death from explosion pressure due to
imized at about 10 s after the start of the release due
lung hemorrhage can be estimated as [16]
to the turbulent mixing between hydrogen and ambient
air. If the turbulence mixing did not exist then the max- Pr = −77.1 + 6.91 ln(pE ), (14)
imum would be at the end of the release period or at
the steady-state [14]. The total mass released hydrogen where pE is overpressure.
at 10 s after failure is estimated very conservatively by The death probability from gas cloud explosion of
assuming constant release rate without the friction loss hydrogen with distance can be estimated conservatively
of the pipeline: by using Eqs. (7), (12)–(14).

M = 10Qpeak . (9) 3.3. Thermal effect from jet fire

If the hydrogen gas cloud is ignited and detona-
tion occurs, the reacting zone is a shock wave and
the accompanying blast wave has much greater poten-
tial for causing personnel injury or equipment damage.
By assuming that the explosion of hydrogen gas cloud
behaves like the explosion of TNT on an equivalent en-
ergy basis, the explosion pressure with distance can be
estimated simply from an equivalent mass of TNT and
the characteristics of the blast from the explosion of a
TNT charge. The equivalent mass of TNT is estimated
by using heat of combustion of hydrogen, total mass of
released hydrogen, explosion efficiency and the energy
of explosion of TNT. A typical value for the energy of
explosion of TNT is 4686 kJ/kg. The empirical explo-
sion efficiency of vapor cloud explosion for hydrogen
gas cloud is given as 0.03 in a CCPS guideline [15].
Therefore, the maximum equivalent mass of TNT is es-
timated by using Eqs. (1) and (9) as

simple equation for hazard analysis, even though the
 
2 (+1)/(−1)
mTNT =0.03×75d
0 p0
2
. (10)
+1
By using the specific heat ratio  = 1.41 and gas den-
sity at atmospheric pressure  = 0.09 kg/m3 as shown
in Table 1, the maximum TNT equivalent mass of
For the fatality of a person from heat effect of the
fire, the Probit can be expressed as [16]
 4/3
tI
Pr = −14.9 + 2.56 ln , (15)
104
where t is the exposure time and I is the radiational heat
flux at a specified location of interest.
The heat flux at a certain distance from a jet fire
depends on the shape of flame. A jet flame can be
idealized as a series of point source heat emitters
spread along the length of the flame. The total heat
flux reaching a given point is obtained by summing
the radiation received from each point source emitter.
By collapsing the set of heat emitters into a single
point source emitter located at ground level, the total
heat flux received by ground-level damage receptor is
estimated conservatively. This assumption has the ad-
vantage to avoid tedious calculation and it gives very
result has some error. Therefore, heat flux at a certain
distance from the fire source, which is defined by the
receiver per unit area, can be calculated as suggested in
API RP 521 [17]:
a Qeff Hc
I= , (16)
4r 2
 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130 2127

where  is the ratio of the radiated heat to total heat re- 140
leased from the fire, a the atmospheric transmissivity,
Qeff the effective gas release rate, Hc the heat of com- 120
bustion and r the radial distance from the fire to the
100

Damage Distance (m)

location of interest.
Radiation fraction () cannot be estimated theoreti- 80
cally, and is normally estimated from the data measured
with radiometer. It is suggested to be 0.15 for hydrogen 60
gas from the laboratory data [12]. 99% Fatalities
The duration of exposure depends on so many cir- 40 50% Fatalities
cumstances that it would not be possible in fact to es- 1% Fatalities
tablish any specific rule to evaluate the degree of harm. 20
Rausch recommends a value of 30 s as exposure time
0
for the people in an urban area [18]. Therefore, Probit 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
equation for death at a specified location from the jet Operation Pressure (bar)
flame of hydrogen gas can be written as the following
Fig. 2. Damage distances from gas cloud explosion with operation
equation, with the heat of combustion of hydrogen gas
pressure of pipeline (d = 1 m, full-bore rupture).
at room temperature, Hc = 1.419 × 108 J/kg, and the
atmospheric transmissivity assumed conservatively as
unity, a = 1, Table 2
Pr = 19.18 + 3.4 ln(Qeff /r ),
2
(17) Damage caused to people by explosion blast
Fatalities (%) Reduced distance (ze ) Peak overpressure (kPa)
where r is the distance from a specified location to the
fire. 99 2.718 202.5
The death probability from the fire can be evaluated 50 3.166 144.5
1 3.71 103.2
by using Eqs. (7) and (17) with gas release rate and the
distance from the fire to a specified location.

3.4. Hazard range or hazard distance 400

1% Fatalities
The probability of death at a specified location from Structures collapse
the full-bore rupture of hydrogen gas pipeline can be 300
Damage Distance (m)

estimated now simply by using the above equations.

The chance of 99%, 50% and 1% fatalities due to lung
200
hemorrhage from the overpressure of the explosion are
shown in Fig. 2, which are corresponding to the values
of Probit of 7.33, 5 and 2.67. Peak overpressures cor- 100
responding to these values of Probit are 202.5, 144.5,
and 103.2 kPa, as shown in Table 2. These values are
estimated by using Eqs. (7) and (14). The distance to 0
1% fatalities reaches to over 100 m with high operating 0 30 60 90 120
pressure. The overpressure of explosion causing dam- Operation pressure (bar)
age to people is very high considering the strength of
Fig. 3. Comparing the damage distance of 1% fatalities to structure
most structural elements of a building. For example, collapse (d = 1 m, full-bore rupture).
most building structures collapse at gauge pressure
of 21.3 kPa [19,20]. The overpressure of 21.3 kPa is
enough to break windows and to produce a poten- distance for structural demolishment is much higher
tially fatal effect. But the effect of window fragments than that for 1% fatalities from the overpressure of
depends on the situation of an accident and it is dif- the explosion. By considering the possibility of death
ficult to estimate the fatalities. Therefore, this work of a person inside a building due to demolition of the
considers only the collapsing of building and ignores building, the hazard distance of the explosion may
the effect of glass fragments. As shown in Fig. 3, the be defined as the distance reaching 21.3 kPa of the
2128 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130

explosion overpressure. Therefore, the hazard dis- 2.5

Ratio of hazard distance (explosion/fire)

tance can be estimated simply for a hydrogen trans- 10 bar-m2
mission pipeline associated with structural damage 2 50 bar-m2
from gas cloud explosion by using the Eqs. (12) 100 bar-m2
and (13):
1.5
1/3
rexpl = 1.58
1/3 d 2/3 p0 . (18)
1

If a high consequence distance from thermal radia-

0.5
tion is defined as the area within which both the extent
of property damage and the chance that serious or fatal
injury can be expected to be significant, it follows that 0
0 0.3 0.6 0.9
this distance can be defined reasonably by a heat inten-
Dimensionless hole size
sity contour corresponding to a threshold value below
which Fig. 4. Ratio of hazard distance of explosion to that of fire from
hydrogen pipeline.
• property, as represented by a typical wooden struc-
ture, would not be expected to ignite and burn;
• people located outdoors at the time of failure would 900
be exposed to a finite but low chance of 1% fatality. 800 Explosion
Fire1
700 Fire2
Surface of materials, as represented by a wooden
Hazard Distance (m)

600
structure, can catch fire as a consequence of heat ra-
diation. The longer the exposure time, the weaker 500
the radiation intensity required to ignite the surface 400
of materials. Below a certain value of radiation in-
300
tensity, ignition will not occur, no matter how long
it might be exposed. This limiting value defines the 200
concept of “critical radiation intensity”. The criti- 100
cal radiation intensity of wood for ignition of flame 0
is about 15 kW/m2 [11]. This information presented 0 25 50 75 100
on thermal load suggests that a wooden structure Operating Pressure (bar)
would not be expected to burn, below 15 kW/m2 .
This degree of heat intensity also means approx- Fig. 5. Hazard distance increasing with operating pressure of the
pipeline (d = 1 m, full-bore rupture; Explosion: corresponding dis-
imately 1% of fatality for persons exposed for tance to 21 kPa; Fire1: corresponding distance to 15 kW/m2 with
30 s before reaching shelter. It can be predicted by decay factor assumed as 0.3; Fire2: corresponding distance to
Eq. (15). A heat flux of 15 kW/m2 has been adopted, 15 kW/m2 with decay factor assumed as 1).
therefore, as the threshold heat intensity for the pur-
pose of sizing a high consequence area by thermal
radiation. The ratio of the hazard range from explosion to that
Substitution of Eq. (6) into Eq. (16) gives the fol- from fire is given by the following equation:
lowing expression for radial distance from the fail- −1/6
rexp 6.58
−1/6 p0 d −1/3
ure point to the location where heat flux is equal =  .
to the threshold value of 15 kW/m2 , with the atmo- rfire
−3
max 0.3, 1/ 1+4.187 × 10
(L)/d
2
spheric transmissivity assumed conservatively as unity
(a = 1): (20)

 As shown in Figs. 4 and 5, the hazard distances re-

   lated to the two events, i.e. explosion and fire, are of
 1

rfire = 0.24 max 0.3, the same order. The hazard distance from explosion is
1+4.187×10−3
2 (L)/d slightly greater than the other event for a distribution
√
× d
p0 . (19) pipeline, i.e. small diameter and low operating pressure
 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130 2129

600 Fig. 6. These graphs are derived under the assumptions

made for deriving Eq. (2), e.g. a constant pressure at
Pressure = 20 bar
Pressure = 40 bar
the pumping end, so that due to friction in the steady-
Pressure = 60 bar state the release rate diminishes with increasing length.
Hazard distance (m)

400 As shown in Fig. 6 and 7, the hazard distances from

pipelines vary with the length of pipeline from gas sup-
ply station to the location of interest, when the length is
less than about 2400 m. As the pipeline gets longer over
200
several kilometers, the predicted hazard distance will
be constant. The radius of hazard area thus found turns
out to be as large as over 300 m in the bigger pipeline
at higher pressure. The radius varies rather more sensi-
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 tively with pipe size than with the operating pressure.
Pipeline length (m) Minimum proximity of pipeline for the transmission
of natural gas to normally occupied buildings is de-
Fig. 6. Hazard distance as a function of pipeline length and operating fined as a function of diameter and operating pressure
pressure (d = 1 m, full-bore rupture).
and pipeline diameter by IGE [21]. For the transporta-
tion of massive amounts of hydrogen from one location
600 to another location by pipeline, the minimum proxim-
ity is important to reduce consequences from an ac-
d = 0.3 m cident and to safety management. When the point of
d = 0.6 m
leak of hydrogen from pipeline is not very close to
Hazard distance (m)

400
200
0
0 1000 2000
Pipeline length (m)
Fig. 7. Hazard distance as a function of pipeline diameter and
pipeline length (p0 = 60 bar, full-bore rupture).
of pipeline. For transmission pipeline, i.e. high operat-
ing pressure with large diameter of pipeline, the hazard
distance from the fire is larger than in the case of ex-
plosion. Therefore, the worst-case event is the fire for
transmission pipeline (or the explosion for distribution
pipeline) carrying hydrogen gas. Eq. (19) can be used
to estimate the radius of a circular area surrounding the
failure point of hydrogen transmission pipeline, within
which the impact on people and property would be
expected to be consistent with the adopted definition of
hazard area. Fig. 6 shows the approximate radius of the
hazard area, calculated from Eq. (19) with 1 m diameter
and full-bore rupture for the pipelines being operated
in the range from 20 to 60 bar of operating pressure.
Fig. 7 shows also the hazard area estimated for
various sizes of pipelines with the same conditions as in
d = 0.9 m
the gas supply station, the effective hydrogen release
rate and hazard distance may be constant as shown in
Figs. 6 and 7. If the minimum proximity of transmission
pipeline of hydrogen gas is defined as the hazard dis-
tance assuming a full-bore rupture, it can be estimated
by using Eq. (19):
√
MP = 0.12d p0 . (21)
3000 4000 The hazard distance from transmission pipeline car-
rying hydrogen is directly proportional to the square
root of the operating pressure, and to the pipeline diam-
eter. It would be of help to set a safety guideline speci-
fying how far a building, which is difficult to evacuate,
should be apart from the high-pressure pipeline carry-
ing the hydrogen gas.
4. Conclusions
Rupture of a hydrogen transmission pipeline can lead
to outcomes that can cause serious damage in the imme-
diate vicinity of the failure location. It will be needed,
therefore, to prevent such potential losses by estimating
the hazard area.
A simplified equation has been derived to predict the
inflicted range by the flame of a fire and a gas cloud
explosion which usually follow upon the release of
hydrogen gas. The hazard range is set beyond the dis-
tance at which even a wooden surface would not catch
fire, as well as only a low chance of fatality can occur
2130 Y.-D. Jo, B. Ahn / International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31 (2006) 2122 – 2130
to people exposed due to radiation heat, and a build-
ing structure would not collapse due to overpressure
of explosion. By comparing the hazard distance by ex-
plosion and fire, the hazard distance from jet fire turns
out to reach farther when the operating pressure is high
enough. The hazard distance has been found to be over
300 m for a larger pipeline at higher pressure. It is di-
rectly proportional to the square root of the operating
pressure and to the pipeline diameter, when the leak
is not very close to gas supply station. The simplified
equation to predict the hazard range would be helpful
in safety management of a high-pressure pipeline trans-
porting hydrogen gas.
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