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True Blue

Internal branding as a strategic corporate communications tool


A case study of JetBlue Airways

By Tim Leberecht
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Abstract

This paper focuses on internal branding as a burgeoning corporate communications


practice for so-called ‘service brands.’ As a theoretical framework, the rationale and
evolution of synchronizing external and internal branding efforts is outlined before the
implementation process is described in detail. Exemplified by JetBlue Airways, a U.S.
airline that has implemented internal branding from its very start as an essential
component of its business model, corporate practice is examined and measured against
the theoretical framework. Through the analysis of secondary sources such as magazine
articles and primary sources such as email correspondence, newsletters, and Intranet
content, this paper will illustrate how the airline gains its high customer loyalty by
making its employees understand and experience the brand character. In addition, in-
depth interviews, with both a JetBlue employee, who is a member of the internal target
audience, and JetBlue’s vice president of corporate communications, who oversees the
company’s internal branding strategy, provide insight into the presentation and reception
of internal branding messages. Based on observed gaps between theory and practice, a
perspective is offered for maximizing the positive effect of internal branding on
employee satisfaction and corporate brand value.

Keywords: internal branding, integrated branding, holistic branding, corporate


branding, service brand, employee satisfaction, employee motivation, value
communication, quality management, internal communications, JetBlue
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About The Author

Tim Leberecht has more than 8 years experience in corporate communications and
marketing for companies in the high-tech and entertainment industries. He worked with
Deutsche Telekom and managed media relations for the International Athens 2004
Olympic Torch Relay. Mr. Leberecht holds an M.A. degree in Applied Cultural Sciences
from the University of Luneburg in Germany and an M.A. in Communication
Management from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He is a member
of the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC), the International
Communication Association (ICA) and the German-American Business Association
(GABA). He currently works with the software company Mindjet in San Francisco. Mr.
Leberecht can be reached at tleberecht@aol.com.
“A rose is a rose is a rose” (Gertrude Stein)

Introduction

For years there has been intense debate about what a brand is and how it can be
established in the minds and hearts of consumers (Aaker, 1996; Aaker, 1997; Arnold,
1992; Farquhar, 2000; Kapferer, 1997; Kotler, 1997). Knapps, in her seminal book “The
Branding Mindset” (2001), defines a brand as “the internalized sum of all impressions
received by consumers resulting in a distinctive position in their mind’s eye based on
perceived emotional and functional benefits” (p. 22). Davis understands a brand as “all of
the promises and perceptions that an organization wants its customers to feel about its
product and service offerings” (Davis, 2003). Kotler (1997) sees it as “a seller’s promise
to deliver a specific set of features, benefits, and services to the buyers” (p. 443). This is
congruent with Blumenthal’s approach (2003), which states “brands [now] provide a
sense of meaningful identity that is distinct from the particular product or service being
offered” (p. 2).
In an overview of all these definitions, Grassl, in his ontological approach to
marketing (1999), classifies those cited above as ‘idealistic’ views of branding, which he
thoroughly distinguishes from a ‘materialistic’ view. In his framing (Grassl, 1999),
idealists see brand value as being anchored in customer awareness -- as intangible assets,
constructed in customers’ minds by the functions of brand management (Aaker, 1996;
Arnold, 1992; Keller, 1993). Accordingly, brands can be reduced to names, terms, signs,
symbols or designs (Kotler, 1997). Brand materialists, however, oppose the idealistic
concept of branding as “the creation of human meaning” (Blumenthal, 2003, p. 3) and
reject the idea of branding as an added psychological value to a product (LePla & Parker,
1999; Macrae, 1996). They argue that many companies make the mistake of developing a
grandiose brand promise that they cannot keep (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000; De
Chernatony, 2001; Keller, 1998; Tosti & Stotz, 2001). For them, the brand is interrelated
with the product’s (or company’s) ‘essence’ and cannot be separated from it (De
Chernatony, 2001). Brand idealists will usually rely more heavily on advertising and
promotions whereas brand materialists will seek to build the brand value upon behavior
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and actual product or service features. However, despite all these differences, both camps
prioritize the external audiences and largely ignore the internal. Even for brand
materialists, who would naturally be more concerned about the internal reality of a brand,
branding is ultimately conceived of as an outbound process that reaches out to customers
(product branding) and/or stakeholders (corporate branding). Only recently, both
idealistic and materialistic theorists have begun challenging this external focus
(Blumenthal, 2003). They now address the synchronization of internal and external brand
perception, or as Mitchell (2002) aptly puts it: “You tell customers what makes you great.
Do your employees know?” (p. 99). If the chasm between managers’ and consumers’
views of brands had been the center of attention in the traditional marketing literature for
years (De Chernatony & Dall’Olmo Riley, 1997; Knox & Maklan, 2001), concern has
now shifted to a potential gap between the customers’ and the employees’ view (Davis,
2002; Donath, 2001). In other words: If customers ‘own’ the brand, employees -- who in
large part are supposed to be an intrinsic part of the brand and ultimately responsible for
delivering on its ‘promise’ -- also own part of the brand (Tosti & Stotz, 2001). In many
ways employees are the brand and should be treated as apriority audience. Hence the
paradigm of brand thinking has taken a more balanced perspective by “striving to ensure
satisfaction amongst both customers and employees“(Thomson et al, 1999, p. 820).
Employees are now seen as a critically important constituent of the brand, and as such
they need to develop a shared understanding of brand values, anchored in their hearts and
minds to manifest brand-supporting behaviour (De Chernatony, 2001; Faust & Bethge,
2003). This is where internal branding as a strategic concept comes into play, with a
plethora of relevant literature expanding on this concept (Charland, 2001; De
Chernatony, 2000, 2001; Donath, 2001; Faust & Bethge, 2003; Keller, 1999; Knox &
Maklan, 2001; LePla & Parker, 1999; Macrae, 1996; Mitchell, 2002; Tosti & Stotz,
2001). All these authors recognize the importance of internal brand management as a
process to align staff behavior with brand values, and agree that, as Mitchell (2002)
suggests, “by applying many of the principles of consumer advertising to internal
communications, leaders can guide employees to a better understanding of, and even a
passion for, the brand vision” (p. 99).
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The look inside – different approaches

This introspective view is not a revolutionary model. Although Vallaster and De


Chernatony (2003) claim that authors have just recently started to recognize the
importance of internal branding, the general idea of integrating externally-oriented
marketing research and internally-oriented management has continously emerged among
corporate communications theorists since the 1980s. In their classic ‘excellence’ studies,
Peters and Waterman (1982) pionered the cultural dimension of succesful organizations
and the importance of aligning management’s vision with that understood by employees.
Similarly, large parts of the strategic management literature, suggesting a ‘resource-based
view’ of the firm, argue that organizations gain competitive advantage through their
unique combination of resources with people as the most important asset (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) Focusing on core competencies and the balanced scorecard approach,
work in this field highlights the need to balance the satisfaction of external demands and
the management of internal processes and people. Another school of thought, the
‘employer of choice’ concept, became popular in the late 1990s when the ‘war for talent’
hit the headlines (Herman & Gioia, 2000). This notion is based on research that addresses
the unwritten promises and expectations that form the basis of the employment
relationship. An understanding of this idea has led to many organizations reviewing their
commitment to staff and the values on which the employment relationship is based
(Herman & Gioia, 2000). For the human resources function, it became more and more
critical to develop a compelling organizational story for existing and potential employees
(Weick, 1995, 2001). Also, the shift away from product branding to corporate branding
increased the need for people management issues to be taken into account in the branding
process. This led to the concept of ‘employer branding,’ which replaced that of ‘employer
of choice’ and established people management specialists as a critical part in managing
the brand (Bose, 2001; Frook, 2001; Hatfield, 1999; McDonald, 2001; Ruch, 2000;
Walsh, 1998; Woods, 2001). Employer branding applies to the employment experience
the same care and coherence used by marketing and sales people in the management of
valued customers (Board, 2001; Donath 2001). It encompasses the firm’s values,
systems, policies and behaviors toward the objectives of attracting, motivating, aligning
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and retaining the firm’s current and potential employees. As Tosti and Stotz put it,
“Values describe a preferred way of behaving (2001, p. 29). In return, for values to
become reality within an organization, they must become manifest in observable
practices in organizational ‘communities’ (Aldrich, 1999). These ‘communities of
practice’ are based upon shared narratives that establish and cultivate ‘small worlds’
within an organization with a high adaptive and learning capability (Aldrich, 1999). Co-
evolutionary theory (Aldrich, 1999) asserts that organizations that can establish and
succesfully maintain ‘communities of practice’ have a long-term competitive advantage
and will build up a distinct corporate brand. A corporate brand has been described as the
immediate mental picture that audiences have of an organization (Balmer & Gray, 2003;
Harris & De Chernatony, 2001). Corporate identity, as a similar concept, may be used to
differentiate a company from its competitors, based on strengths, corporate culture,
corporate style, future direction, and CEO reputation (Balmer & Gray, 1997; Board,
2001; Fombrun, 1996). While corporate identity focuses on the values and behavioral
practices that are either determined by the bottom or the top of an organization, the
corporate brand consists only of those values and behavioral practices that are relevant to
customers (Harris & De Chernatony, 2001; Schultz & Hatch, 1997). This concludes in a
laterally inverted phenomenon: the corporate brand may internally be an element of the
umbrella concept of corporate identity, whereas externally, in relation to customers,
corporate identity may in fact be an element of the corporate brand.
This distinction became obsolete as the brand thinking was progressing in the
direction of the substance behind the brand, taking a more materialistic view, in Grassl’s
(1999) terms. The previously independent courses of corporate identity and brand were
headed towards the same territory that Ludlow & Schmidt (2002) used as the groundwork
to develop their concept of ‘holistic branding.’ This form of branding draws upon the
‘interactional theory of communication’ (Clevenger, 1996; Watzlawick et al, 1967). ‘You
cannot not communicate,’ Watzlawick et al (1967) postulate; every sign, clothing, or
building communicates the brand to customers. Holistic solutions for brand development
and management thus propose synergetic use of all of the dimensions -- culture, behavior,
products and services, markets and customers, design, and communications -- in order to
create differentiation (Ludlow & Schmidt, 2002). In the holistic brand-customer-
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employee relationship not only must a compelling message be delivered, but a consistent
brand experience must also be distributed throughout the entire organization (Davis,
2003). This concept has become most visible within the Disney Group (Charland, 2001).
Lastly, the most radical (and most Orwellian) approach to branding individual
employees stems from Peters who in his 1999 landmark manifesto “The Brand you 50”
ultimately annihilates the borders between organization and individual by creating the
notion of a ‘branded human personality’ (Peters, 1999).

Internal branding as a strategic concept

Notwithstanding the previous work outlined above, the underlying notion has only
recently turned into a particular discipline of branding that is being branded itself:
Whether labeled as employer branding (Ruch, 2002), integrated branding (LePla &
Integrated branding (Parker, 1999), inclusive/holistic branding (Ludlow &
Schmidt, 2002), or internal branding (Tosti & Stotz, 2001) -- the concepts may differ by
their names and their emphasis, but the essential idea remains the same. Either of these
concepts is concerned with both the need for employees to ‘live the brand’ and the
“company’s image as seen through the eyes of its associates and potential hires” (Ruch,
2002, p. 14). Management literature meanwhile widely acknowledges that branding --
both corporate and product branding -- may be largely aimed at external audiences, but in
fact has important internal implications (Getting it right on the inside: the challenge of
internal branding, 2003). Internal branding (this term is used in the following since it
appears to be most appropriate for the case study subject) translates this insight into a
strategic concept that strives to put the external marketing strategy of a company in sync
with its internal values and behavioral practices. It includes promoting the main corporate
brand (and product brands) to the employee base in a fashion that makes them understand
the connection between brand promise and brand delivery. Tosti & Stotz (2001)
indirectly refer to Aldrich’s ‘communites of practice’ (1999) when they emphasize the
integration of marketing and performance technology, which they define as “a body of
knowledge about systematic, results-oriented principles and methods for improving the
performance of individuals, groups, and organizations” (p. 30.). Extremely put, while
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performance management intends to make employees want to work for what the
organization needs them to work for, internal branding makes employees want to work
for what customers value about their organization. Internal branding then leads to a
marketing strategy that occurs in fact -- on its internal level --- as an ongoing change
management, in which change means the changes in the customers’ attitudes and
expectations.
The business world has been eager to adopt this new paradigm (Stamler, 2001).
Thomson et al (1999) contend that organizations are increasingly realizing that
“employees need to fully understand the values of their brands and internalize these to the
extent that they are aligned and committed to enacting the values” (p. 820). Especially in
service industries, internal branding has seen a significant rise. The nature of services
brings about a close, almost intimate relationship between service provider and service
recipient: “People’s impressions of brands are more strongly influenced by the staff they
interact with” (De Chernatony 2001, p. 5). Berry (2000) refers to service brands’
intangibility. Consumers would find it difficult to assess competing service brands and
rather rely on favorable experiences and confidence resulting from customer delighting
behaviour (De Chernatony & Dall’Olmo Riley, 2000). Employees of service brand
companies are supposed to deliver on the brand promise through their behavior in order
to ensure the integrity of the explicit and implicit brand messages (Berry, 2000). To do
so, they will need to be adequately informed and supported to fulfill their tasks. Therefore
internal branding intends to clearly lay out the behavior implicit in the brand promise --
whether it is customer service directives or production quality guidelines -- for employees
(Tosti & Stotz, 2001). The brand needs to be operationalized into objectives and roles
each corporate function can adapt. In addition, the company needs to announce and
implement any additional training or incentives that will be necessary to encourage,
support, and reward the required behavior. Often there will be an element of ‘policing’
the brand, and the human resources function will link its messages to branding and
marketing.
Further, some authors even advocate leveraging employees as ‘brand
ambassadors’ (De Chernatony & Segal-Horn, 2001). For them, making sure that
employees understand and help deliver the brand is not sufficient; they want employees
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to proactively promote and demonstrate the key elements of the brand promise. When
employees are informed about the brand after the brand has been defined and positioned,
they will be a passive audience only. The authors propose a more responsive approach
and call on companies to apply the same logic and assumptions with employees that they
apply with consumers (De Chernatony & Segal-Horn, 2001). Using marketing and
advertising would not succeed in selling a product or idea that ignores customer behavior
and has little apparent affinity or demand among them (De Chernatony & Segal-Horn,
2001). Indeed, although advertising and public relations can influence attitudes and
behavior over time, it is very unlikely that marketing and incentive tactics can create a
brand in a vacuum or in spite of entrenched perceptual barriers. In this sense, a
disconnection between the external marketing message and the realities within the
company will be detrimental. Companies can save considerable time and effort (and
expense) by ensuring a measure of compatibility between their employees and their
corporate or product brand. On the other hand, no brand can be developed solely based
on internal values and desires. Also, it is important to note that in some cases low brand
awareness or an ambiguous brand character definition (in line with Eisenberg’s concept
of strategic ambiguity, 1984) might actually be an advantage, providing more leeway for
adjustments.
According to Baum et al (1998), inspiring brand vision elements (values and
purpose) instigate higher employee commitment. Companies, who want employees to be
effective ambassadors for the company, need to go beyond simply informing their
employees if they expect genuine enthusiasm and commitment: “The only way to really
motivate employees to live the brand is to ensure they helped create it; that it is partly
theirs” (Tosti & Stotz, 2001, p. 32). Moreover, Bennis and Nanus (1985) assert that for an
organization to be successful, the brand vision “must outgrow the needs of the entire
organization and must be ‘claimed’ or ‘owned’ by all important actors” (p. 109). It is as
much ‘branding the experience’ as ‘experiencing the brand.’ The core idea is to spur
commitment through action, a motivational model that is well founded in social
psychology literature (Cialdini, 1985; Kanter, 1968). Per Kanter (1968), commitment is
the process through which individual interests become attached to the carrying out of
socially organized patterns of behavior. Commitment may start on the top organizational
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level, reflecting the faith leaders have in their brand vision and its purpose (Snyder et al,
1994). Leaders of the organization must thoroughly understand, support, and actively
demonstrate commitment to the internal branding process (Snyder et al, 1994). But the
process for ensuring that employee behavior expresses service brand values consistently
also requires what Weick (1995, 2001) calls ‘sensemaking.’ Sense-making can be defined
as being “about such things as the placement of items into frameworks, comprehending,
redressing surprise, constructing meaning, interacting in the pursuit of mutual
understanding, and patterning” (Weick, 1995, p. 6). Based on research in transactive
memory (Cannon-Bowers et al, 1993), Vallaster and De Chernator (2003) argue that only
when employees have a shared mental model of their brand, does consistent brand
supporting behavior becomes possible. Through dialogue, existing knowledge structures
regarding the brand’s promise become more refined over time.
Communication leads to the internalization of brand values to facilitating
employees’ alignment and commitment to behave in a brand supporting manner.
Thomson et al’s (1999) research results suggest that employees’ understanding and
commitment towards the brand “lead to greater advocacy, and therefore provide
organizations with the much-needed champions” (p. 828). In the most extreme scenario,
the employees’ brand commitment may exhibit characteristics that researchers coin as
“Organizational Citizenship Behavior,” or OCB (Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1990). OCB is
defined as contributions from employees that go beyond the action formally required by
their job descriptions (Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1990). The concept translates the
corporate citizenship model, which makes corporations socially responsible actors
committed to public goods, to the organizational micro-level.

Implementation process

Despite this abundance of literature, there have been only few academic suggestions on
how internal branding can be successfully implemented. De Chernatony et al (2003)
provide a model, identifying main actors and vehicles. Thomson et al (1999) also propose
a variety of communication channels and events to promote internal branding. Tosti and
Stotz (2001), however, question the effectiveness of a series of communication events,
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promoting the brand through one-way campaign vehicles such as employee meetings,
memos, or newsletters. Instead, they contend, turning a brand promise into an
organizational reality requires coordinated planning and action at all organizational levels
(Tosti & Stotz, 2001). Not only must all the messages during the implementation and
afterwards be directed at employee ‘touchpoints’ (Macrae, 1999), internal branding is
also a leadership operation. In other words: Internal branding itself has an internal
(analysis) and external (manifestation) aspect, too. The more comprehensive
implementation models from Tosti and Stotz (2001) and De Chernatony et al (2003)
acknowledge that dimension and constitute four critical procedural factors for successful
internal branding:
1. Brand character: - Measurement of key customer value indicators -
Clarification of internal brand reception
2. Alignment: - Alignment of leadership, culture and work process with
the specific business values and practices that deliver value to
customers - Structural empowerment of employees to ‘live the brand’
3. Education and enrollment: - Education and enrollment of employees in
the internal branding effort through human resources management and a
variety of internal communications media/vehicles
4. Evaluation: - Measurement of internal branding effectiveness
Based upon this approach, a detailed six-phase plan for implementing an internal brand
strategy can be crafted:
Phase 1: The brand vision is reviewed: What core values does the brand stand
for? What is the purpose of the brand? What desired future development will drive the
brand activities? (De Chernatony 2001). Then the brand is analyzed from an internal
perspective. The major goals of this analysis are to clarify the brand proposition or
promise of value to customers; to establish the brand character that will best deliver that
value; to translate the brand character into values and behavioral practices (‘communities
of practice,’ in Aldrich’s terms, 1999) -- both for company leaders and other employees.
Lastly, the phase is about examining current practices (including human resources
management) to determine their compatibility with the brand promise. This evaluation
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identifies the strategic ‘performance gap,’ that is, a disconnection between brand values
and lived practices.
Phase 2: Senior management executives ought to be instructed so that they
thoroughly understand, support, and actively demonstrate commitment to the internal
branding process. Baum et al (1996) indicate that leadership vision is ranked as the most
important effect on follower performance and attitudes. The early engagement of
executives is crucial for the success of the internal branding strategy. Tosti and Stotz
(2001) suggest an orientation session in order to communicate the results of the prior
analysis; to develop commitment to and ownership of the brand character, values, and
practices; and to establish responsibilities for action.
Phase 3: Mid-management joins the process and will be educated about the
results of the previous phases. Mid-managers are a pivotal group because they provide
the day-to-day leadership in the branding process. The phase includes three primary
activities: Pre-workshop preparation, workshop participation, follow-up planning
activities and review feedback. These activities conclude with each participant drafting a
‘brand plan’ for his/her area of responsibility.
Phase 4: The next step is to enroll the rest of the employees in the internal
branding process. Employees are given the chance to experience the brand.
Phase 5: Tactical planning sessions start. These sessions link mid-managers with
their supervisors and all participants learn about the connection of the internal branding
and the external marketing strategy. They are also educated on the extent to which
cultural practices between groups support or inhibit the delivery of the brand promise.
Phase 6: Local ‘brand plans’ are developed: Supervisors in collaboration with
their teams develop specific ways to support the brand proposition at the respective level
and link these efforts to meeting business needs. Thus, this phase translates the analysis
and learning stages of the implementation process into direct employee action. There are
few publicized examples of companies who have exactly followed this ideal model in
their internal branding efforts, but many examples of companies who run an internal
branding program. As mentioned above, a prominent example is Disney, an organization
that has built its entire employee infrastructure -- from hiring, through training and
human resources policies -- specifically to support and promote the attributes and
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messages inherent in its ubiquitous brand (Charland, 2001). The company also carefully
monitors its brand through a ‘brand equity team’ to ensure it is not used inappropriately
or over-exposed. This vigilance includes employee service, behavior and dress. As a
result, employees seem to have a clear understanding of what the corporate brand stands
for, and how they should behave to support it. In addition to Disney, many other
corporate executives have begun to pay more attention to their internal constituents, to
incorporate their ‘internal reality’ in branding decisions and use their brands’ power to
motivate employees. Aramark, GlaxoSmithKline, Holiday Inn, Home Depot, Host
Marriott Services, Nestle, Saab, Southwest Airlines, Starbucks, and Wal-Mart are some
of these companies, although they may not specifically use the term internal branding
(Blumenthal, 2003).
A survey of 138 companies in 2001 indicates that about 40% of survey
respondents use the techniques and resources of corporate branding such as print and
Internet and Intranet communications to lure and retain good employees (Donath, 2001).
Frequent meetings and management role modeling are also mentioned as key employer
branding tools (Donath, 2001). Furthermore, the report indicates that human resources
and senior managers are the key internal-branding stewards; internal and corporate
branding processes are closely related; internal branding efforts tend to emphasize
tactical “corporate-family-friendly” issues such as benefits; and Intranets are the most
used vehicle for the internal branding efforts. Interestingly, only about a fifth of
respondents have metrics for measuring internal branding effectiveness (Donath, 2001).
In the following section, this paper will look closely at JetBlue Airways Corp., a
company selected for examination for three reasons: First, it is a service brand; second, it
is a relatively young organization (founded in 2000); third, it has implemented internal
branding from the very beginning as a founding pillar of its business model.

Methodology

The study uses qualitative research methods and draws on both primary and secondary
sources. Through the analysis of secondary sources including articles and magazine
features the brand character as perceived by customers is identified. Primary sources,
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including email correspondence, newsletters, or Intranet content, indicate how the airline
accomplishes its strong customer loyalty by making its employees understand and
experience the brand character. Access to these internal documents was provided by
employees of JetBlue Airways. In addition, in-depth interviews with both an in-flight
crewmember (the company’s official term for its flight crew) and the Vice-President of
Corporate Communications were conducted. The in-flight crewmember was chosen
because his/her function represents the typical JetBlue employee and the vice president of
corporate communications because he oversees the internal branding strategy.
In-depth interviewing entails asking questions, listening to and recording the
answers, and then posing additional questions to clarify or expand on a particular issue
(Black & Champion, 1976). Questions are typically open-ended, and respondents are
encouraged to express their own perceptions in their own words. However, closed
questions may also be used for initial background information or for aspects that rely on
the comparability of the gathered data. There are three basic approaches to in-depth
interviewing that differ mainly in the extent to which the interview questions are
standardized beforehand: the informal conversational interview; the semi-structured
interview; and the standardized open-ended interview (Black & Champion, 1976). For
this study, the format of a semi-structured interview was chosen since this format allows
for detailed and elaborate data collection while also facilitating comparability among the
respondents.
The in-depth interview with the in-flight crewmember was conducted on March
13, 2004 in Los Angeles. The interview took place in a café, lasted one hour, and was
recorded by the author. The employee wanted her name not to be mentioned and will thus
appear in the following as “JetBlue employee.” The employee has been with JetBlue for
three years. The in-depth interview with Gareth Edmondson-Jones, vice president of
corporate communications at JetBlue Airways since its inception, was conducted on
March 16, 2004 on the phone, lasted one hour, and was recorded by the author. Mr.
Edmondson-Jones spoke on behalf of the company and agreed to the use of his name.
Both interviews were based upon the same guideline, which can be found in the appendix
of this paper. The use of this interview guideline is a good way to examine at which
points and in which aspects the response from employees and mangers differed,
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indicating a gap at least in the understanding of the branding strategy. Although the
sample size of this study does not allow generalization of any findings, this comparison
may serve as random check as to whether the brand as conceived of by the
communication manager is in fact internalized by the staff.

The case of JetBlue Airways

JetBlue Airways Corp. has spent $31.8 million on measured media -- a seemingly small
ad budget for the first three years in the life of a new airline (Gahilan, 2003). Yet its seat-
sales percentages are the best in the U.S. airline business; and it has developed a high
level of customer loyalty (Gahilan, 2003). JetBlue’s productivity is excellent, based upon
a unit labor cost of 1.9 cents per ASM (available seat mile); in comparison, Delta
Airlines’ is around 4.4 cents (Gahilan, 2003). JetBlue flies bigger aircraft more hours,
managing to operate for 13.2 hours per day, 23.2% over the mainline average in the first
quarter of 2003 (Gahilan, 2003). The airline offers a very clear pricing system: The
highest one-way fare is $299. All fares are one-way, carry no travel restrictions and are
non-refundable. They must be purchased at the time the reservation is made but can be
changed for a $25 fee. The emphasis is on online marketing and sales: Tickets can be
bought online or from call center, and all tickets are electronic, so that the company saves
on paper, postage, employee time and back-office processing. The lowest fares are
always available on the website.
In the following section, the four critical dimensions of internal branding
identified above, are applied to assess JetBlue’s corporate practice.
Brand character
Like the Starbucks Corp. in its early years, JetBlue has achieved its success by
creating a customer experience that prompts consumers to recommend it to friends, and
by employing advertising and public relations to do most of the initial brand-building
work without breaking the bank. Asked about the one sentence s/he would use to describe
the JetBlue brand, the interviewed in-flight crewmember stuck to the official company
slogan: “Bringing humanity back into the airline industry” (JetBlue employee, 2004).
This would include the full range of the ‘JetBlue experience,’ as the brand markets itself -
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- leather seats, live TV for every customer, and snacks. It also includes the
“extraordinarily friendly and efficient service” (JetBlue employee, 2004) that customers
receive from reservation agents, ground staff and flight crew. On the same note, the vice
president of corporate communication states that in comparison with another strongly
branded airline such as Virgin, for whom he had worked previously, JetBlue was more
about “service first, brand second.” The brand is “fresh, maybe not so stylish and taking a
more familiar, low-key approach towards customers” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). Despite
the paramount importance of branding, JetBlue would be ultimately “more cost-focused,
having a steady eye on the bottom line” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004): “Ironically, our brand
externally is perceived as ‘hip’ and ‘trendy,’ which is a nice thing to have. But this is
actually not the way we would portray ourselves. First of all, in most cases, if you call
yourself ‘hip’ and ‘trendy,’ you are definitely not! Beyond that, we don’t want our staff
to be cool and aloof. At heart, you have to be familiar, not trendy. We are striving for a
low-key stability and want to be approachable and hands-on. The predominant feeling is:
We are all in this together (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). Edmondson-Jones understands that
“customers love the brand” and employees “feel proud to be associated with it”
(Edmondson-Jones, 2004). This has triggered a dynamic that has even surprised the
executives. Merchandising products such as badges or buttons have turned into highly
‘hot items’ for collectors and are traded on eBay. Some are now produced to honor
special occasions or even features (such as the ‘Extra-legroom-button’): “By accident we
have tapped into another channel of spreading the word both to customers and
employees,” comments Edmondson-Jones (2004).
A strong brand can build a goodwill buffer for crisis events. Like Apple, JetBlue
has an anti-establishment quality as an alternative to the legacy carriers -- which is not
hampered even by the fact that the airline cooperates with Microsoft for content
management and Intranet publishing solutions (Flint, 2003). The anti-establishment
character of the brand helped the company overcome the major PR debacle when it was
revealed that it had provided data on more than a million passengers to a military
contractor for use in identifying terrorists (Is JetBlue’s reputation grounded after its PR
debacle?, 2003; Singel, 2003). The company took this setback in stride and responded in
an “upfront, forthright fashion” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). There was no other option
True Blue 18

than “complete honesty” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004) in communicating the misbehavior to


both customers and employees. Surprisingly, in retrospect, this scandal did not really
hurt the brand, which, as Edmondson-Jones explains, was because of the enormous credit
the company had earned before: “We consumed some of the goodwill, but there was still
enough left” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). Edmondson-Jones concedes that other airlines
might have been destroyed by the same event whereas JetBlue’s fresh and young brand
helped keep up sympathy from most of its customers (Edmondson-Jones, 2004).
Alignment
The concept of internal branding applies to JetBlue technically, but not literally.
No one at JetBlue would use the term internal branding (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). What
the company dislikes about the term is that it connotes the loss of individuality, whereas
exactly the opposite (“bringing humanity back to the airline industry”) is JetBlue’s
central mission, both on the customer and employee levels (Edmondson-Jones, 2004).
This view is supported by the in-flight crewmember who appreciates that JetBlue appears
to be a network “that you can log-on to or not” beyond your actual time on the job, but if
you do not, it would not be of disadvantage (JetBlue employee, 2004). Accordingly, the
employee rejects the notion of the company as a “cult” (JetBlue employee, 2004). On the
contrary, s/he appreciates that privacy is respected by the company and feels “a
considerable amount of freedom” (JetBlue employee, 2004): “The company leaves you
alone and trusts its brand to make all JetBlue members feel connected rather than banging
the drum to artificially foster a family feeling” (JetBlue employee, 2004). However,
JetBlue recognizes the necessity of aligning employees with the brand and
communicating the brand values to employees. “Each employee shall serve as a brand
ambassador,” says Edmondson-Jones (2004) in accordance with the theoretical
suggestions by De Chernatony and Segal-Horn (2001), “but this shall not be determined
by the brand in a sense of indoctrination or uniform behavior.” For a service brand such
as JetBlue, front-line crewmembers are the most important interface to the customers
(Edmondson-Jones, 2004): “Crewmembers carry the brand,” Edmondson-Jones (2004)
describes. This “carrying of the brand” becomes literal in the case of the clothing
manufacturer Gap Inc., which follows a similar approach through its employee discount
features. By receiving significant discounts on all Gap products, the employees’
True Blue 19

commitment to the brand is ensured and constantly enhanced (Zimberoff, 2004).


Moreover, in an interesting correspondence to Roger’s diffusion theory (1995),
employees function as ‘early adopters,’ being the first ones who see the new clothes and
the first ones who wear them (Zimberoff, 2004).
In the case of JetBlue, employee commitment is also spurred by several
participatory elements. The company involves employees in decisions that concern them
and has made it as much of a priority to communicate internally as externally (Labetti,
2002). This helps explain why staffers, though not as well paid as many of their peers at
other airlines (JetBlue employee, 2004), are motivated to go out of their way for
customers and take every consumer contact as a branding opportunity (Labetti, 2002).
Vinny Stabile, vice president of people at JetBlue, names a few employee motivators
(Labetti, 2002): 1. Level the playing field 2. Never stop communicating 3. Back up your
promises 4. Give managers operational freedom.
Viewing intrinsic motivation as the main driver of people’s behavior, JetBlue
translates the concept of ‘organizational citizenship’ (Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1990) into
daily behavior. For instance, as part of the company’s ‘Holiday Helper Program’ during
peak travel periods, management staff trek out to the airport to help facilitate the
operations, including everything from “pushing wheelchairs, giving out snacks to the
customers or guiding people through the terminal, whatever it takes” (JetBlue employee,
2004). It has come as no surprise that over the Easter/Passover holiday in mid-April
2003, the airline completed a nine-day span during which it achieved a 100% completion
factor and 93% on-time arrival rate with an average 90% load factor (Flint, 2003).
JetBlue cultivates a low-hierarchy culture that communicates a strong idea of
what the brand is all about but claims not to exert a very rigid formalization of the
corporate brand (JetBlue employee, 2004). Overall, the feeling of a “small company” that
takes care of its employees is salient, tells Edmondson-Jones, adding that the company is
“very aware of changes because of the ongoing expansion and the concern of employees
about this development” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). JetBlue would communicate that
very pro-actively, openly, and forthrightly to keep employees in the loop at all times
(Edmondson-Jones, 2004).
True Blue 20

The same ‘informal’ freedom that the airline gives to it customers is applied to the
employees, Edmondson-Jones (2004) says. The company “believes in the employees to
do the right thing” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004): “We want to signal that it is ok to take a
risk and act on your own as long as it is in keeping with the brand values” (Edmondson-
Jones, 2004). This statement however is in fact paralleled with a rigid control of
corporate identity consistency and permanent efforts of brand protection. Emails from
Eric Brinker, manager for brand and product development at JetBlue, regularly educate
employees about uses of email signatures and email fonts (Marketing crew needs your
help: e-mail signature format, 2004), apparently struggling with an, at times, overly
enthusiastic and individualistic crewmember base: “Dear HQF friends, Please help! The
brand team needs your assistance to protect JetBlue. One easy way you can help is to
ensure that your e-mail signature meets JetBlue brand standards. As e-mail is used for
both external and internal communications, we all have to be very careful about not only
what is written in them but how that information is presented. Using a logo in a design
that has not been created and approved by the marketing department is not appropriate.
While we certainly appreciate the enthusiasm and obvious pride Crewmembers put into
creating a signature, it could be misconstrued by people inside and outside the company
as being an official ‘logo’ of the company. It really runs the danger of diluting our brand
image, and that’s something none of us want to do (Marketing crew needs your help: e-
mail signature format, 2004).”
Education and enrollment
Human resources management: The internal branding begins in the hiring
process, which, along with online marketing and sales and the entire online culture the
company embraces, happens in large part online (JetBlue employee, 2004). After the
initial online application, a one-on-one interview is conducted. The next stage is a group
interview that is labeled BlueReview and is designed to check the social interaction skills
of the applicant. The JetBlue employee emphasizes that this group interview was much
less formal than a comparable one at American Eagle, the company she was employed at
before (JetBlue employee, 2004). Each newly hired employee is then invited to a training
camp in Orlando, Florida or New York, where s/he learns more about the ‘five basic
values’ of JetBlue (Safety, Caring, Integrity, Fun, and Passion) as well as all technical
True Blue 21

knowledge and basic information about the company such as history, fleet size, type of
planes etc. (JetBlue employee, 2004). As a result, even in the event that the candidate is
not hired, the applicant as a potential customer has at least experienced the JetBlue brand
and culture. And in the event of a hiring, the new employee is immersed in the corporate
culture from the very beginning – s/he is ‘brandnew.’ Like Southwest Airlines, JetBlue
does not automatically consider experience at another airline a plus: “I would call it a
neutral, not a pro or a con,” says Stabile (Flint, 2003): “For anybody who is going to have
direct contact with customers, we look for a minimum of two years in some kind of
customer-service-related environment. Ideally, we look for people who have worked in
the kind of environment where the nature of the service they provide is at the kind of
level that would be of interest to us, somebody, for example, who has worked at a Ritz
Carlton or at a Nordstrom’s [department store]” (Flint, 2003).
JetBlue’s focus on people extends to its employees, with the idea that employee
satisfaction leads to customer satisfaction. The company has a flexible, visionary
workforce, and it has undertaken some truly innovative policies to ensure this. JetBlue’s
goal is to accommodate employee preferences, such as time off and flex time, while at
the same time maintaining workforce productivity and keeping costs down. Using a
newly developed reservation system, 500 of the airline’s nearly 600 reservations agents
work from their homes on a part-time basis and are enjoying this freedom: “We have
probably the happiest reservations agents in the industry,” declares vice-president
customer service Nigel Adams (Donnelly, 2004). JetBlue also uses automated airport
check-in kiosks-sparingly. Adams says, “We know a lot of customers enjoy interfacing
with our crewmembers and so we’re going to use kiosks in an innovative way to
supplement service, not to just reduce headcount” (Donnelly, 2004). Some 27% of
JetBlue reservations are handled by the reservation staff, with 70% come via JetBlue.com
(Donnelly, 2004). Although the airline does not pay a commission, agencies provide 3%
of sales, according to the vice president of sales and business development Tim Claydon
(Donnelly, 2004). Pilots are hired on individual five-year contracts, as are all FAA-
licensed employees such as dispatchers and technicians. Contracts automatically renew
unless either side elects not to, in which case three months’ notice is provided. Contract
employees receive stock options and layoff protection and only may be terminated for
True Blue 22

cause. Pilots are paid on a productivity model: 70 hours guaranteed per month (Donnelly,
2004).
The workforce is nonunion and the company clearly wants to stay that way,
although Stabile says, “We really don’t position ourselves as an antiunion organization.
Our belief is [that] if in fact our crewmembers were to feel that they needed a union to
represent their interest, we as management absolutely have failed” (Flint, 2003). All of
JetBlue’s 4,000 ‘crewmembers,’ as all employees are called, participate in profit-sharing
and 15% of pre-tax profit is set aside for this purpose (BlueBenefits, 2004), which
according to Stabile translated for example in 2002 into 15.55% of pay (Flint, 2003). The
company offers a stock participation program enabling employees to acquire stock at a
15% discount (BlueBenefits, 2004). Pay scales are not at the bottom of the airline’s peer
group and JetBlue reviews compensation scales annually, adjusting salaries upward for
its in-flight and reservation staff (Flint, 2003). In addition, the company provides
recognition awards to all functions for excellent performances (JetBlue employee, 2004).
Internal communications media/vehicles: JetBlue employs a variety of media and
vehicles to convey the brand idea to its employees. In accordance with the marketing and
sales communication that largely takes place on the Internet, most of the intra-
organizational communication uses online channels. With exception of in-flight
crewmembers and technical ramp staff, each JetBlue employee is equipped with a laptop:
even the pilots use one in the cockpit. All employees are expected to check their email
every morning to read news or instructions (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). Other vehicles that
convey the brand to employees include:
- BluePrint (the mission statement of the company that functions as a
preamble in all publications (JetBlue employee, 2004)
- BlueBook, a comprehensive manual for in-flight crewmembers, including
information on guidelines, practices, work ethics, philosophy, benefits
and more. With the company’s expansion, the BlueBook is being
extended, too, and increasingly formalized. The company addresses that
blatantly: JetBlue’s philosophy has always been to hire and develop the
best people. When our airline was first launched, we believed that
selecting people who are committed to the Values was all that was
True Blue 23

needed and we steered away from a formalized Crewmember rule book


or policy manual. Near the time when we began final preparation for our
first aircraft delivery, we realized we needed to define our expectations
with just a little more detail and that gave rise to the 13 page BlueBook
that was distributed at orientations since 1999. Well, time marches on
and we’ve since grown from the several hundred Crewmembers […] to
over 6,000, with many more to come! (Crewmember Blue Book, 2004)
- BlueNotes, a regular newsletter from the executives to all employees,
including news, extra information materials, awards, event
announcements, and business literacy topics. The messages are signed by
“David & Dave,” which stands for David Neeleman, the CEO, and Dave
Barger, the President & COO of JetBlue.
Given the vast media coverage of JetBlue, it is essential for the company that
employees are always informed ahead of the public. JetBlue wants flight members who,
when for instance confronted with JetBlue’s decision to serve Sacramento, are prepared
to answer the passenger’s question (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). JetBlue wants to avoid an
“ivory tower,” which requires that employees are always “the first to know”
(Edmondson-Jones, 2004). The interviewed JetBlue employee confirms that s/he feels
“very well-informed” and that generally “each employee knows about company events at
least one day before the public” (JetBlue employee, 2004). This policy is proved by a
look at the internal correspondence: “Good day Crewmembers, This morning, as is
always our intention, we wanted you to be the first to know that JetBlue submitted
applications to the US department of Transportation seeking authority to serve
international destinations […]” (BlueNotes, 2004)
By both anticipating and echoing public issues to the employee base, JetBlue
practices the classic saying: ‘PR begins at home.’ It proves to be a positive side effect of
this approach that the company can not only use its internal branding efforts to utilize
employees for public contacts, it can also market the internal branding strategy itself as
an issue that is of public interest and an essential component of the airline’s public
positioning: A happy home is good PR. A content analysis of all press articles used for
this paper shows that the exceptional employee commitment to the brand is indeed
True Blue 24

positively mentioned in almost all texts (Donnelly, 2004: Flint, 2003: Gahilan, 2003;
Labetti, 2002). The fact that JetBlue is an ‘employer of choice’ makes JetBlue the ‘airline
of choice’ (BlueNotes, 2003).
JetBlue’s other major tool to enhance internal brand commitment (Vallaster & De
Chernatony, 2003) is interpersonal communication. On a monthly basis, the company
hosts open forums at New York’s JFK airport (the company is headquartered in Forrest
Hills, NY) with Q&A sessions for which no questions are submitted or edited ahead of
time. In fact, every topic of concern can be addressed, nothing is censored, and the
meeting is “off-limits,” as the vice president of corporate communications describes it
(Edmondson-Jones, 2004). Also, each of JetBlue’s three vice presidents (sales/ business
development, people, and corporate communications) has ‘adopted’ one of the carrier’s
major hubs (for instance Long Beach) and hosts an open forum at the airports with local
staff on a quarterly basis. Further, there is a company picnic every summer and a big
party for all JetBlue employees once a year (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). In addition to this,
David Neeleman, the CEO, is very active in the internal branding efforts. The employee
describes him as being “very visible,” a fact which s/he understands as “typical for
JetBlue” (JetBlue employee, 2004). It is common and happens at least once a month (in
fact, the JetBlue website says once a week) that the CEO boards a plane to experience the
crew’s performance in person and get in contact with employees (and customers). He
shakes hands, joins the crew, makes announcements, serves customers, hands out snacks,
and “afterwards takes the whole crew out to dinner” (JetBlue employee, 2004).
Evaluation
As for the measurement of the internal branding strategy’s success, JetBlue is one
of the few airlines in the aviation industry that actually conducts annual employee
surveys. Others would not dare, assumes Edmondson-Jones (2004), because of the harsh
results they would have to expect. In consequent congruence with the marketing wording,
the employee surveys are named the same as those for customers on the airline’s Internet
site -- Speak-up surveys. The surveys are used for benchmarking and want to identify
issues of employees’ concern, but also test to what extent employees feel “empowered to
live the five corporate values” (Edmondson-Jones, 2004). As an example, Edmondson-
Jones recalls the important role these surveys played in detecting misbehavior at the
True Blue 25

‘groundfloor,’ that is, the lower management levels. Because the company had quickly
promoted many newly hired people who in most cases lacked extensive team
management experience, it often happened that supervisors misinterpreted their role.
JetBlue heard about the complaints through the Speak-up surveys and introduced
“Principles of Leadership,” a two-day training program for managers, to hone employees’
managerial skills and solve the problem (Edmondson-Jones, 2004).
The Speak-up survey is conducted annually in cooperation with the market
research firm Market Metrix (BlueNotes, 2003). After the results are released to all
employees, department heads conduct meetings to share the results pertaining to the
employees’ specific area. They also review their preliminary action plans to address the
areas of opportunity identified through the survey response. Furthermore, the meetings
are designed to provoke additional feedback. The survey design is kept somewhat simple
and easy to understand: The scores indicate the percentage of crewmembers who
responded “Agree” to each question. The overall company score in 2003 was 78, the
score in 2002 was 77 (BlueNotes, 2003). According to JetBlue’s partner Market Metrix, a
comparable score in the hospitality industry is 70 and the world class index 81
(BlueNotes, 2003). The comparison with the hospitality industry is chosen because, as
mentioned before and JetBlue stresses, no other airline runs comparable surveys
(BlueNotes, 2003). More than 81% of all crewmembers responded to the survey in 2003,
from only 46% in 2002 (BlueNotes, 2003). The BlueNotes state on behalf of “David &
Dave” in the casual and frank style that is typical for both internal and external messages:
“[Still] it clearly means that so many of you care enough to take the time to provide us
with feedback although we remain perplexed why over 800 Crewmembers failed to
‘Speak Up’ “(BlueNotes, 2003). As in all messages, the executives consistently craft the
‘JetBlue vision’: “We believe our action plans, in response to your feedback, will
continue to help us create a world class work environment as our goal is to clearly be
considered the airline of choice for those in the airline industry” (BlueNotes, 2003).
JetBlue’s internal branding strategy and how it relates to the theoretical
framework shall be summarized in the following chart:
True Blue 26

Table: Internal Branding Framework

Conclusion

This paper sought to provide an overview of internal branding as a burgeoning strategic


corporate communications tool by measuring JetBlue’s coprorate practice against a
historically constructed theoretical background. Drawing on both primary and secondary
data, and further elaborating on all aspects of JetBlue’s internal branding practice through
in-depth interviews, the paper analyzed both to what extent public, managerial, and
employee perception and commitment to the corporate brand differ and if there is a gap
between the airline’s practice and theoretical suggestions.
True Blue 27

It is remarkable that all sources showed a strong consensus in describing the


JetBlue brand. The managerial and employee responses, even in their wording, were
almost exactly the same, which can be taken as either proof for succesful indoctrination
or simply a sign of an effective internal branding. Even if the company does more to
protect its brand than it would admit, the extent of individual freedom and elusive space
for ‘organizational citizenship behavior’ (Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1990) is enormous. Far
away from any rigid formalization or a phony family culture, JetBlue may be considered
as one out of the growing number of organizations that have come to utilize the trend of
‘new tribalism’ for their own needs and increasingly design their organization as a “social
network” (Guericke, 2004) their employees can connect with by sharing the values of its
brand promise. The ‘JetBlue experience’ offers much space for individually interpreted
roles, yet is always grounded upon a virtual idea of the brand that is ‘common sense’
among all ‘crewmembers’ and therefore does not need ‘brand plans’ to be filled with life.
The airline is a ‘value network’ rather than a formalized organization. This organizational
model seems to be well-chosen given both the company’s mission to “start an airline
from scratch” (as the website slogan states), the company’s desired image of being “the
lightest airline” in the country (Edmondson-Jones, 2004), and the volatility of the airline
business in general. Further research may deepen the understanding of this phenomenon
and examine to what extent the membership in ‘value networks’ such as JetBlue
determine the value system of individuals. It will also be interesting to see how this
‘small worldnetwork,’ which allows each of its nodes to be and feel central, will handle
the change that emerges because of expansion: The airline will have to deal with an
organizational periphery, and internal branding will have to reach people for whom the
motivation to link to the organization’s values is less intrinsic. The formalization of
communications and behavior might be inevitable, which also may endanger the informal
culture that has always been at the very heart of the ‘JetBlue experience.’
With respect to JetBlue, both the brand idealism versus materialism and the
internal versus external focus debates that were outlined in the introduction lose their
antagonism. The airline is an example for the integration of both. In a sophisticated
system of mutual feedbacks, the brand experience is hinged on the branding of
employees’ experience with customers. The brand ideal shifts to the employee level as an
True Blue 28

idealized brand conception that makes employees materialize the brand promise in their
very behavior. This enables JetBlue to run a brand whose ideal is maintained by its
materialization and whose materialization is driven by strong ideals. JetBlue is ‘true
blue’: What you get is what you see. The brand perception equals the brand value,
employee satisfaction equals customer satisfaction, and image and essence, promise and
delivery is one and the same, integrated vertically (across all organizational levels) and
laterally (across all service levels -- from reservation, check-in to flying -- towards the
customer). JetBlue seems to be both the same idea and experience for customers,
managers, and employees. Thus, the initial quote from Getrude Stein at the beginning of
this text can truly be applied as a ‘blue print’ for ‘sensemaking’ within this organization,
integrating all three audiences to make the brand the main performance driver: JetBlue is
JetBlue is JetBlue.
True Blue 29

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True Blue 35

Appendix (interview questionnaire)

1. Which sentence would best describe the brand for you?


2. What is the particular brand promise your company delivers?
3. What does it undertake to deliver it?
4. Is there a difference between the way the brand is perceived internally and the
way it is perceived externally?
5. How important is it for the company that the employees understand the brand?
6. 6. Does the notion of “Internal branding” appear in any corporate communications
document?
7. In your eyes, what is the difference between internal branding and corporate
identity?
8. Who is in charge of internal branding (or similar) efforts?
9. When was an internal branding (or similar) strategy implemented?
10. Who is managing this strategy?

11. How was it implemented?

12. Which media/vehicles are employed to communicate it?

13. Which is the most important medium?

14. How does the company measure the success of its internal branding efforts?

15. Which role do public relations and external media appearances play?

16. What would you consider the biggest threat to your brand, both internally and

externally?
17. As the company continues to grow -- do you think employees will still commit to

the brand and identify with its values?

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