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Philosophia Vol. 4 No.

4 Pp 449-467 October 1974

WHAT THEODICIES MUST, BUT DO NOT, DO

JEROME A. WEINSTOCK*

Traditional theists I have exhibited much ingenuity in


arguing that there is no incompatibility between the existence
of God and the existence of evil. However, no traditional
theist ought to be satisfied with such a position, since a
demonstration that the existence of God is compatible with
the existence of evil would constitute only a partial defense
against objections grounded on the existence o f evil. For in
addition to showing that belief in God is not incompatible
with the belief in evil, a theist must also show that it is
reasonable to believe that He exists, the existence of evil
notwithstanding.
However, for the purposes of this paper the soundness of
the second claim as well as the first will be conceded. What
will be argued is that these concessions are not as great as
they may seem, since a satisfactory theodicy must also show
that the existence of God is compatible with the existence of
a world that contains not just some insignificant quantity of
evil, but with the existence of this world, a world containing

*Jerome A. Weinstock died prematurely of a heart attack on June 6, 1974, at the


age of 30. He was regarded by all who knew him as a young philosopher of very
substantial promise. Professor Weinstock was Assistant Professor of philosophy at
Lehman College and the Graduate Center, both of the City University of New York.
He received his A.B., magna cum laude from Columbia University and his Ph.D.
from The John Hopkins University. Professor Weinstock was the author of several
articles in philosophical journals.

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JEROME A. WEINSTOCK

a significant quantity of evil that readily appears excessive in


its scope and extent. Indeed, even assuming (as I shall) that
the theist can demonstrate such compatibility, his task will
still not have been completed. For a satisfactory theodicy
must not only show that it is possible (or not logically
absurd) to believe that God exists given the amount of evil
that exists. It must also show that it is reasonable to believe
that He exists given the amount of evil that exists. And, in
order to show this I maintain that the theist must also show
that it is reasonable to believe what I call the Perfect Balance
Thesis, namely, that
(PBT) There is a perfect balance between that amount
of evil that is necessary for the execution or achievement
o f God's purposes in allowing for evil and the amount of
evil that exists.
Moreover, as I further contend that belief in (PBT) is not
reasonable, it follows, if I am right, that belief in traditional
theism is not reasonable and thus that no theodicy succeeds
in doing what it must.
In order to show that an adequate theodicy must exhibit
the reasonableness of (PBT), I shall consider John Hick's
recent and plausible attempt at theodicy and show that it fails
in precisely this way. 2 My choice of Hick's theodicy,
however, should not only be understood in terms of its
intrinsic, though ample merits. It is also suggested by the fact
that Hick offers an argument that, if sound, could be
construed as showing that (PBT) is reasonable to believe, and
if unsound highlights what is lacking in many other the-
odicies. The argument that Hick offers also has the virtue of
forcing an elaboration and defense o f the notion of a perfect
balance, defense of my claim that reasonable belief in (PBT)
is required for a satisfactory theodicy, and defense of the
claim that (PBT) is not reasonable to believe.

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The emphasis in Hick's theodicy is on the idea of "soul


building" and the claim that a requisite of a world with "soul
building" is that there be some evil. 3 In considering the
possibility that God might have created a world without evil,
Hick alleges that
We can at least imagine a world custom-made for
the avoidance of all suffering . . . . [But in such a
world] there would no longer be any such thing as
morally wrong action. And for the same reason
there would no longer be any such thing as morally
right action. Not only would there be no way in
which anyone could injure anyone else, but there
would be no way in which anyone could benefit
anyone else, since there would be no possibility o f
any lack or danger. It would be a world without
need for the virtues of self-sacrifice, devotion to the
public good, courage, skill or h o n e s t y . . . ;these all
presuppose for their development something like the
world in which we live . . . . And therefore, if the
purpose for which the world exists (so far as this
purpose concerns mankind) is to be a sphere within
which such personal qualities are born, to purge it
of all suffering would be a sterile reform (360-62).

Though this sort o f theodicy raises a wide variety of


questions, e.g., the reasonableness of valuing "soul making"
more highly than the suffering that is urged as its requisite
and the nature of the presupposition in the claim that soul
making presupposes something like our world, these questions
need not be pressed. For even if it is granted that a world
with soul making and suffering should be more highly valued
than one lacking both and that soul making is a logical
impossibility without suffering, why, one wonders, should
there be as much suffering as there actually is?

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Note that in t h e passage quoted Hick talks of how it


would be a sterile reform to "purge [the world] of all
suffering," of "a world custom-made for the avoidance of all
suffering," and the like. However, the alternatives of a world
with as much suffering as this one and one with no suffering at
all are far from exhaustive. Even if it is granted that some
suffering is necessary for soul building, surely Hick has done
little to show that as much suffering as this world fias is
necessary. So even if it is reasonable to believe both that God
exists and that some evil exists, this hardly shows that belief
in Him is reasonable given the actual extent of evil. For the
latter, it must also be shown that it is reasonable to believe
that there is no "excess evil" or "evil that ought not to exist,"
understanding by such evil, evil that God could eliminate
without hindering the achievement of His purposes in allowing
for evil. For I take it that it is not reasonable to believe that
God, as an all perfect Being, would allow a world He created
to have any such "excess evils." Thus, unless it is reasonable
to believe that there are no such excess evils it is not reasonable
to believe that God exists. Accordingly, we may pose the
problem for Hick (and other theists) as showing that what
appears to be excessive evil is not, after all, really excessive,
that contrary to appearances belief in (PBT) is reasonable.
Now posing the problem in terms of the apparently
excessive quantity of evil is by no means new. For example,
Hume argued that just a few discrete interventions by God
would considerably reduce the quantity of evil without either
radically disturbing the course of nature or purging it of all
evils. 4 And, more recently Edward H. Madden has maintained
that, "The formal way of presenting the problem of evil is
this: If God is all powerful and all good [and all knowing],
why is there so much prima facie gratuitous and unnecessary
evil in the world? ''s
In response to Hume's " t o o much evil" objection, how-
ever, Hick suggests (363) an argument which may be con-
strued as follows: What is wrong with the objections that

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allege that this or that evil is unnecessary, is that they can be


repeated for every evil. And because they are iterable for
every evil, they cannot be used to exclude any evil without at
the same time being capable of being used to exclude all. I f
the " t o o much evil" objection works against yesterday's
murder, it can also be levelled against that of the day before
and that of the day before that . . . . If it can be used to show
that tiitler was eliminable it can also be used to show that
Mussolini was eliminable and Stalin and . . . . Since, however,
the objection is not, by hypothesis, an attempt to show that
all evils are eliminable or unnecessary, it cannot be used to
show that any are. If the objection is advanced within a
framework that acknowledged the need for some evil, being
iterable for every evil it cannot be used for any. For were
God to eliminate those evils that seem excessive, then as Hick
puts it, "there would be nowhere to stop, short of a divinely
arranged paradise" (363).
An examination of this "iterability" response will reveal
not only its shortcomings, but also some points of general
philosophical and theological interest. First, however, it
should be established that this response does have short-
comings. And this point, I think, can be most incisively
shown by means of an analogy.
Let us suppose that a group of people are stranded on an
island where the only source of food suitable for human
consumption is a rather large indigenous population of rats.
Now it is conceded that the existence Of rats is an evil, as
they carry disease and filth and, let us suppose, have on
occasion even attacked infant members of the community.
But as they represent the only food supply their existence is
necessary for the preservation of life, so their existence is a
necessary or justified evil, i.e., something that is evil but
necessary for the promotion of an overall (greater) good.
Unfortunately for the islanders, the rat population far exceeds
what appears to be necessary for the food needs o f the
people. Clearly, it seems rational in such a case for the

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islanders to control the rat population by keeping alive only


those needed for food or for the reproduction o f those
needed for food and eliminating all the others.
However, amidst the people there is one who reasons as
follows: On what grounds can we single out some rats for
extermination while keeping others alive? Whatever reason can
be given for killing any particular rat can be given for killing
any other. Once we begin killing rats, there would be nowhere
to stop short of making the island free of rats. And while this
step would admittedly have certain beneficial effects (it would
remove an evil), these benefits would be outweighed by the
losses.
I hope it is clear that something must be wrong with this
argument. Surely what is reasonable for the people to do is to
tolerate that number which represents a "perfect balance,"
namely, that quantity of rats arrived at by balancing the need
for food against the evils caused by the rats' continued exist-
ence. And any argument to the contrary must be fallacious.
But such, I submit, is the status of the iterability response to
the claim that there is too much evil in the world and to the
claim that the belief in (PBT) is not reasonable.

II

Now it is possible to object to the conclusions of Section


I on several planes. For example, a rather superficial objection
might be brought against the appropriateness of the analogy
on the grounds that it tacitly appeals to a picture in which
the rats are thought of as living in a totally controlled en-
vironment and so are really no (longer any) evil at all. How-
ever, all that this objection requires is a slight complication o f
the case wherein it is assumed that the rats cannot survive in
a totally controlled environment (e.g., they commit suicide on
capture as some species of squid supposedly do) so that they
must be allowed to exist in a situation in which they continue
to create some evil.

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Perhaps, however, it is somewhat premature to speak o f any


objection, except that which alleges that the conclusions o f
Section I are too cryptic and premature or unclear. And this
objection must be well taken. For considerable work is re-
quired to indicate the reasons for the inadequacy o f the
iterability response, to more fully elucidate the notion of a
perfect balance, and to indicate that belief in (PBT) and thus
in traditional'theism is not reasonable. With these ends in
mind. I turn first to a closer look at the iterability response.
An interesting and, as we shall see, important character-
istic of the iterability response is that it is itself iterable. If it
were sound, it could be used not only to show that this
world is perfectly balanced, but that any world similar to ours
in all respects except in containing a greater number o f evils is
perfectly balanced. A world with two or three times as much
suffering as ours (which is no better suited for soul building
or whatever might justify the existence of evil in our world) is
also one in which the iterability response can be used exactly
as Hick uses it against Hume. The iterability response is, so to
speak, indifferent as between the worlds in which it is used
and so is inadequate to show that this world is perfectly
balanced. If, returning to our analogy, the critic of rat control
can use the iterability response for an island with (say) 2,000
rats the response would also work for an island identical in all
respects save its having 20,000 rats.
One way of putting this is, of course, as the claim that
were the iterability response sound it could be used to prove
too much, and so is unsound. More precisely, the inadequacy
of the iterability response can be seen by noting that if (as I
shall assume throughout) everything else is equal and
(1) A certain quantity of evil yields a perfect balance, it
follows (given the notion o f a perfect balance) that
(2) No quantity of evil greater than that quantity that
yields a perfect balance yields a perfect balance.
Since, on the iterability response it is alleged that

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(3) This world is perfectly balanced,


i.e., that
(4) That quantity of evil found in this world yields a
perfect balance
it follows from (2) and (4) that
(5) No quantity of evil greater than that quantity found
in this world yields a perfect balance.
Yet, as the iterability response is iterable for worlds with
more evil than this one (but alike in all other ways), it can
also be used to show that
(6) A world with a greater quantity of evil than that
found in this world is perfectly balanced,
and so that
(7) A quantity of evil greater than that quantity found in
this world yields a perfect balance.
But (5) and (7) are contradictories; and so the iterability of
the iterability response is indicative of a genuine problem. For
the fact that it is iterable indicates that it can be used to
prove contradictory assertions.
However, the iterability response itself, as an attempt to
exhibit a perfect balance, is simply a seriously flawed argu-
ment which trades on the fact that "some" is often used to
mean "some or other." Thus, the iterability response, con-
strued as showing that (PBT), alleged that the "too much
evil" objection was unsound, since it granted that
(8) Some particular evils are necessary,
but could also be used to show that
(9) No particular evils are necessary,
and (8) and (9) are contradictory. But while the " t o o much
evil" objection did acknowledge that
(10) Some evils are necessary

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it did so only in the sense of acknowledging that


(I 1) Some particular evils or other are necessary
and not in the sense of acknowledging that (8). However, to
derive a contradiction between (9) and (10) it is necessary to
construe (10) as (8) and not as (11). Yet all that the " t o o
much evil" objection granted was (1 1). That some evil in the
sense of "some or other" is necessary does not entail that we
can say of any particular evil that it is necessary. Granting
that for there to be a perfect balance of evil in the world
there must be some evil (i.e., some or other), it does not
follow that there need be anything such that it is an evil and
a necessary or ineliminable evil. In the case of the rats, there
is no problem in maintaining that some rats (= some rats or
other) are necessary and also maintaining that no particular
rat is necessary or ineliminable.
The reason why the iterability response itself is in-
adequate and thus harmless on the one hand, and its iterabil-
ity so damaging on the other, may also be put as follows:
What is overlooked in the case of the iterability response as a
way of replying to the " t o o much evil" objection is that there
is a way by means of which one can distinguish between a
quantity of evil that is excessive and one yielding a perfect
balance. In fact, in offering a rationale for evil, the theist
provides us with the beginnings of just such a method. For if
the evils of the world are to be justified in terms of their
being requisites of (say) soul building, then there is a way by
means of which we can see whether there are excessive evils
or whether the world is perfectly balanced, namely, by seeing
whether there are more evils than are required for soul build-
ing.
Note how I said that the theistic rationales for evil, such
as soul building, provide us with the beginnings of a method
of distinguishing between that amount of evil which is exces-
sive and that which is not. My point was to emphasize that
justifications such as soul building provide at most a neces-

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sary condition of something's being a necessary evil. If, that


is, there is more evil than is required for soul building and
soul building is that (and only that) which justifies evil, then
any quantity of evil that is greater than that required for
soul building would be excessive. But that does not mean that
any quantity of evil would be justified if its diminution would
diminish the amount o f soul building. (Compare: any quantity
of rats would be justified if its diminution would diminish the
quantity of food.) In general, in talking of God's purpose(s)
in allowing for evil (as in (PBT)), one is not saying that
whatever is so cited, can, by itself, warrant any quantity of
evil at all. What I mean by all this is that in talking of God's
purpose(s) in allowing for evil one is talking of God's pur-
pose(s) in allowing for evil. And even if it were the case that
soul building was that purpose, not every world in which each
of the evils contributed to soul building would be a world
that was perfectly balanced. For in talking of soul building as
"God's purpose" for structuring the world as He did, one
does not rule out His having had other purposes. And it is
against these presumed other purposes and concerns, which
include at least some interest in the absence of suffering, that
the quantity of evil requisite for its value in soul building
must be balanced.
Now in ascertaining just what quantity of evil as a re-
quisite of soul building is to be allowed consistent with God's
also placing value on the absence of suffering, one can, in a
word, appeal to the "reasonableness" of having or approxi-
mating to just so much of each. In short, contrary to what
the iterability response alleges, there is a way one can, at a
certain point, stop the elimination of evils, namely, where it is
reasonable to do so. On the other hand, however, were the
iterability response itself adequate to establish the existence
of a perfect balance, then there would be no external stand-
ard (such as reasonableness) by means of which one could
prevent its iterability. For were the iterability response sound
(its iterability would indicate that) any world, no matter how

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awful, no matter how great the suffering, could be shown to


be "perfectly balanced" (or as "perfectly balanced" as any
other world) so long as it contained enough evils for souls to
be built or for whatever else is urged as rendering evil
necessary.

III

I think it not unlikely that a theologian might object that


all this is directed at the understanding of the iterability
response in which it is construed as an attempt to show that
there is a perfect balance. But if one views the defense of
theism based on the iterability response as a way of challeng-
ing the claim that a reasonable belief in (PBT) is a requisite of
a satisfactory theodicy, then the theologian may claim that
the criticism is misdirected. And one can easily construct a
variant of the iterability response that is to be understood in
this way. For example, one can understand it as showing that
the same sorts of doubts the " t o o much evil" objection
levelled against this world could be raised in any world, even
in a perfectly balanced one. This response, elaborated more
fully, might run as follows. Suppose our world were to
become one in which a perfect balance existed. How might
this come about? One such way would be for there to be
fewer (or no) people of the ilk of Eichmann or Beria, or for
there to be a much smaller percentage of successflfi murder
attempts. Were these sorts of changes to spread, so to speak,
across the board, then we would presumably have (at least
more) reason to believe, and thus to assert confidently, that
we are in such a world.
But would we? Would it not, a theologian might con-
tinue, be the case that in this newly described world we
would have no way of telling that a perfect balance had been
achieved? Is not talk of " t o o much evil" so imprecise that we
could raise exactly the same objections about " t o o much evil"
even in this newly described world? For that matter, might

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we not, for all we know, already be living in a perfectly


balanced world? To say the least, would not our having
difficulty with showing the reasonableness of (PBT) even in a
perfectly balanced world indicate something fundamentally
wrong with the claim that this world lacks a perfect balance
and with the thesis that the establishment of a reasonable
belief in (PBT) is required for a satisfactory theodicy? F o r
surely if it is impossible to amass evidence in favor of (PBT),
the conclusion that a reasonable belief in (PBT) must be
established is itself improper.
But, .the theologian will continue, even supposing that
sense can be made of the notion of a perfect balance and that
we do have grounds for believing that this world is not
perfectly balanced, how could God achieve a perfect balance
without acting arbitrarily? Here such issues as what criteria
God might possibly use in staying the hand of some murderer
and not staying the hand of some other may be raised. And if
God could not effect a perfect balance without acting arbi-
trarily, would it not be contrary to His very nattare to effect
such a balance?
While having considerable initial plausibility, this response
seems to me to have four main parts, all of which can be
shown to be faulty. The first is that talk of a perfect balance
(or its opposite, " t o o much evil") is just so loose and vague as
to be useless. But even aside from the irony in what seems to
be a demand from the theist for something approaching
operationally necessary and stffficient conditions for its appli-
cability for the notion of a perfect balance to be legitimized,
the demand itself is surely much too stringent. Need our
islanders have an operational definition of a perfect balance to
know that such a balance is lacking on their island? That they
would not can readily be seen by considering how they might
arrive at such a conclusion or how they might go about
considering whether they had a perfect balance. There would,
to be sure, be a certain amount of reasonable disagreement as
to just what would constitute a perfect balance. Some island-

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ers might wish to minimize the risk of rat-caused disease at


the price of risking occasional (mild) hunger, while others
might prefer things differently. These are things that could be
argued about. But this does not at all show that the notion of
a perfect balance is unusable, unworkable, or in some other
way objectionable for them. Nor should it be for us.
To the second part of this objection, that we " m i g h t " be
living in a perfectly balanced world, it must be admitted that
indeed we might, i.e., it is logically possible that we live in
such a world. But to concede this is to concede next to
nothing. For it is probably trivially true that we do not know
that the world we ltve in is imperfectly balanced, if by
" k n o w " we mean a state that logically excludes the possibility
of error. O f course it is logically possible that we live in such
a world. But the problem for the theologian was not to show
that God's existence was possible (that was granted at the
outset); it was to show that such a belief was reasonable. And
granting (or showing) the possibility that this world is perfect-
ly balanced is a far cry from granting (or showing) that the
belief that this world is perfectly balanced is reasonable. To
return once again to the rat analogy, it is of course possible
that the apparently excessive number of rats is in fact not
excessive. But is it reasonable to believe that they are all
necessary just because it is logically possible that it turn out
that they are all necessary? The logic of the situation is such
that one can always tell some story that "there is no
evidence against it" on which it will turn out that no rats are
excessive, n E.g., one's story might be that due to an as yet
undetected (or better, undetectable) rat disease, the rat
population will be diminished by 90%, so that all the rats are
as a matter of fact necessary. But this hardly shows that it is
reasonable to believe it.
Here, however, the third prong of the objection might be
brought into play. This is the claim that since it is impossible
to gather evidence for (PBT), the demand that (PBT) be
shown to be reasonable is itself not a reasonable demand. This

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claim, however, seems to me to be simply false (and singularly


unpersuasive in light of Section II). One could make a reason-
able case for (PBT) by showing that there is reason for seeing
most evils as producing an offsetting gain in terms of soul
building or whatever else is alleged as rendering evil necessary,
by pointing to the infrequency of apparently excessive evils,
by arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a
world where the amount of evil is significantly lower than our
world yet is equally well suited for the execution o f God's
purposes in allowing for evil. In short, the defender of (PBT)
seems to me to be in no worse shape than a defender of the
claim that the island has a perfect balance of rats. Neither can
provide evidence that entails the desired conclusion; but this
surely does not render them impotent at adducing evidence.
To be sure, given that the islanders cannot totally control
the rats, there may be occasional cases of rat-induced evil that
appear excessive even though there is a perfect balance. And,
given that (to allow for soul building) God will not totally
control the human situation, there may be an occasional case
of evil that appears excessive even though there is in fact a
perfect balance. However, this hardly shows that there is no
way of telling that a belief in (PBT) is reasonable. In the case
of the island, there are differences between an island that is
reasonably regarded as having a perfect balance, and an island in
which case after case of apparently excessive rat-induced evil
is reported. And though it must be admitted than on occasion
an apparently excessive evil might crop up in a world where
(PBT) is true, the problems of a theodicy would be quelled
by showing that such cases are rare, and perhaps by even
showing how a bit of apparently excessive evil may be
necessary. 7 But unless he wishes to dissociate completely
God's goodness from what actually goes on in the world, it is
difficult to see how the theist can avoid trying to show that it
is at least reasonable to believe that (PBT).
Finally, as to the fourth component of the objection,
that effecting a perfect balance would involve an arbitrariness

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on God's part, 8 it should be remarked that in a sense (PBT) is


by itself a rejoinder to this objection. For what (PBT) tells us
is that there is a nonarbitrary place to stop -- where a perfect
balance is reached. But this can go but little way towards
satisfying the theist. For his contention would be not just
that there would be nowhere to stop but that there would be
nowhere to s t a r t . God, on his view, would have no reason for
singling out any evil for elimination without having the same
reason for eliminating any other. Indeed, in this connection it
might be claimed that the analogy with the islanders can be
seen to break down: Unlike the islanders who might use a
criterion of convenience in eliminating some evils and not
others, God could surely not use such a criterion, and thus He
would have to act arbitrarily.
Now it seems to me that this objection makes several
large, and implausible, assumptions. It assumes that all evils
are both equally useful for soul building and equally harmful.
It assumes that God, if barred from using convenience as a
criterion in the same sense that the islanders might employ
such a criterion, is also barred from using any criteria (includ-
ing aesthetic ones, ones the use of which minimized the
disruption of natural laws, etc.). And it assumes that it
would be more "arbitrary" to allow two equal evils to exist
when only one is necessary than to remove one and leave the
other. Though there might be some sense of "arbitrary" in
which this is so, it does not seem to follow that it is not
reasonable to act "arbitrarily" in this way, but the contrary.
Furthermore, though the theologian is correct in main-
taining that there is a disanalogy between the islanders
removing rats and God removing evils, the disanalogy is
readily turned against him. When Hick talks of there being
nowhere for God to stop, he is talking as if God were
suddenly confronted by an imbalanced situation that He
might set about rectifying. But this is grossly misleading, for
God is the c r e a t o r of that situation so the problem could only
arise if He had created or allowed the imbalance in the first

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place. When it is remembered that God is the creator, then


the claim that He would be immobilized by arbitrariness and
thus unable to rectify a situation calling for the removal of
one of two equal evils seems especially implausible. For it is
difficult to see how whatever arbitrariness might prevent God
from removing one of two equal evils would not also deter
Him from creating or allowing their existence at all. It is no
accident that Leibniz, who is perhaps the philosopher most
likely to concur with the claim that the removal of one of
two exactly alike evils would be arbitrary and thus contrary
to God's nature, would have also maintained that the situation
is impossible or one which God would not have allowed to
exist. 9 And thus this last part of the objection no more saves
the theologian than did the previous ones.

IV

Might not a theist refuse to accept a posteriori evidence


against (PBT) and thus against theism or claim that though in
some sense admissible a posteriori considerations are evident-
ially immaterial in considering the reasonableness of belief in
God? To the objection that a theist might refuse to consider a
posteriori evidence against (PBT) or God, my answer is that
indeed he might. It is logically possible for him to do so, just
as it is not logically incoherent for him to deny totally the
existence of evil. But the point is that he cannot reasonably
do so. Should this be doubted even after the arguments of this
paper, we may ask the doubter why it is not unreasonable to re-
fuse to consider a posteriori evidence against (PBT) or God, and
whether he believes that God's goodness makes any difference
to the world. And we may also ask him for some explanation
of the enormous lengths to which theologians have gone and
the tortuous ways by means of which they have attempted to
respond to just such challenges based on a posteriori evidence,
when if he is right, such "evidence" is not really evidence at
all. To the less extreme (but not much more plausible) claim

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THEODICIES

that a posteriori considerations are admissible but unimpor-


tant, my response is again to acknowledge this possiblity.
Perhaps a posteriori considerations are always outweighed by
those of an a priori nature. As before, however, the theist
must show, and not just assert, this claim. He must not, as
Leibniz sometimes does when faced with unfavorable a
posteriori evidence, simply contend that we should always
defer to a priori considerations without showing why we
should always do so. 1~
In the end then it seems to me that the case for (PBT) as
a reasonable (and not just as a possible or logically coherent)
belief must be made if traditional theism is to be regarded as
reasonable, and that such a case has not been made, at least
not in Hick's version of the soul building theodicy. To the
inevitable objection that even if Hick's attempt fails surely it
has not been shown that no theodicy is satisfactory, I of
course admit the objection but point out the following: First,
I have chosen Hick's theodicy not for its weakness but for its
strength. Second, consideration of every theodicy is an im-
possibility if for no other reasons than practical ones. Third,
it seems to me that in rendering (PBT) explicit and in con-
sidering the iterability response I have in a general way more
sharply highlighted the task of a theodicy, thereby aiding in the
evaluation (and I think rejection) of various other attempts at
theodicy.
To be sure, I have not shown that a satisfactory theodicy
is an impossibility, but then again I do not believe that such a
thcodicy is an impossibility. However, and here I repeat, to
concede this is to concede next to nothing. For given that
such a theodicy must show a belief in (PBT) to be reasonable,
I think that no more hesitancy need be felt about the claim
that traditional theism is not reasonable than the islanders
need feel about the existence of a perfect balance of rats on
their island when it appears to be swamped with excessive
rats. Must they consider every possible story someone has
told. may have told or might tell before they are warranted in

465
JEROME A. WEINSTOCK

concluding that it is not reasonable to believe that their island


has a perfect balance of rats? 11

HERBERT H. LEHMAN COLLEGE OF


THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
BEDFORD PARK BLVD. WEST
BRONX, N.Y. 10468
USA
RECEIVED: 30 March 1973

NOTES

!
By a traditional theist I understand someone who believes that God exists and is
the omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good creator of the world. I sometimes
refer to the traditional theist simply as a theist or a theologian, and for the
purposes of this paper these terms are interchangeable. I do not concern myself
with the distinction between natural and moral evils, though 1 do confine my
discussion to evils related to human suffering.
2 Hick's views are briefly sketched in his Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 40-47, and more fully given in his Evil and the God
of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 19661 esp. Pt. IV, pp. 279-400. Subsequent
references to Hick are to the latter work and cite only page number.
3 I do not mean to suggest that this is the whole of Hick's theodicy (he does, for
example, also bring in "eschatological dimension"), though it is clearly the domi-
nant theme and the only one I shall discuss.
4 "A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair
wind. Good princes enjoy sound health and long life: Persons born to power and
authority be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions." Hume, D/a-
Iogues Concerning Natural Religion, Pt. X! (quoted by Hick [363] ).
S Edward H. Madden, "The Many Faces of Evil," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, XXIV (1963/4), p. 481.
6 Cf. Alvin Plantinga's claim (in God and Other Minds [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 19671, p. 155) that because there is no evidence against the
hypothesis that natural evils are caused by devils (using their free wills), one ought
consequently regard the claim that the quantity of natural evils in our world
provides evidence against God's existence as unclear or inconclusive.
7 Hick suggests something along these lines when he claims that the systematic and
immediate "elimination of unjust suffering, and the consequent apportionment of

466
THEODICIES

suffering to desert, would entail that there would be no doing of the right simply
because it is right and without any expectation of reward" (371). Though I think
this sort of Kantian claim needs more justification than Hick provides, it may be
plausible to claim that were there no apparently excessive suffering there would
be no need for virtuous acts. But other difficulties aside, this move can hardly be
used to cover all cases of apparently excessive evil. A similar method of attempt-
ing to show the need for apparently excessive evil is more fully developed by
Clement Dore, "An Examination of the 'Soul-Making' Theodicy," American
Philosophical Quarterly, VII, 2 (1970), 119-30. Dore argues that were all evils to
which we did not respond virtuously immediately rectified by God then the
"stringency" of our obligations would be reduced or eliminated. Interestingly
enough, however, to the objection that this does not suffice to account for all the
apparently useless suffering (for "plainly the loss of stringency which would result
from the loss of one or a few instances of apparently useless suffering would never
be more than imperceptibly s m a l l . . " [p. 127] ), Dore's answer is a version of the
iterability response: "But the trouble with this argument is that, if it is sound, it
proves that it is clearly true that God, if He exists, is morally obliged to abolish
each instance of apparently useless suffering which exists in our world and, hence,
a/! of the stringency which attaches to our obligations regarding suffering"
(p. 127).
8 This objection is suggested by Hick's remark that were God to begin eliminating
evils, "There would be nowhere to stop, short of a divinely arranged paradise"
(363, also quoted above).
9 I think it clear that Leibniz would have regarded such a situation as one which,
like the existence of two exactly alike bodies, is "contrary to the divine wisdom,
and which [consequently] does not exist." "Leibniz's Fifth Paper," par. 25, in
The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H.G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1956), p. 62.
10 Thus, in his essay, "On the ultimate Origin of Things," Leibniz first offers Some a
priori considerations for believing his extremely optimistic version of (PBT). He
then considers the inevitable objection: "But, you will say, we experience the
contrary in this world, for often good people are very unhappy . . . . This may
appear so at first glance, I confess, but if you examine the thing more closely it
evidently follows a priori from the things which have been adduced, that the
contrary should be affirmed..." (in Leibniz selections, ed. P.P. Wiener [New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951], p. 351). To be sure, Leibniz does go on to
offer grounds for thinking that this might be the case, even given what we ex-
perience. But that this is what he does is exactly my point. That we might affirm
(PBT) or theism in spite of the a posteriori evidence is one thing; but that we
should always do so quite another.
11 I would like to thank Richard Mendelsohn and Lewis Schwartz for their helpful
comments, and I am especially grateful to David M. Rosenthal for his invaluable
assistance.

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