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Mendenhall 1

The Lesser of Two Evils: Conflicts of Migration versus Sedentism in


Contemporary Central Asia

Phillip Mendenhall, M.A.

European University at St. Petersburg

IMARES

November 2010
Mendenhall 2

Introduction

Excluding colonization into unoccupied areas of the world, human migration has
more often than not, been met with conflict with the preexisting population. Documented
cases of such have been recorded for the last 4100 years beginning with Hyksos
migration into Ancient Egypt 1 and on into the present era. Recipient states are often met
with an undesired and unmanageable influx that has been managed in a variety of
ways, the consequences of which can lead to disastrous outcomes of the indigenous
population as well as the new emigrant demographic 2 . Central Asia in particular and
from its historical beginning, has been an area of constant population movement. To
evaluate the recent generational migration phenomenon and its associated sources of
conflict both within the original CIS block nations and their destination, it will be
necessary to first define the features that customarily encourage or deter migration.

Once the reasons for migration are established, this paper will then evaluate past
migrations in the Central Asian region and compare it then with contemporary
expressions of immigration to compare push factors. When possible, statistics are
provided to demonstrate the current volume of mobility, but the reader must keep in
mind the difficulty is in assessing such produced numbers and given the openness of
the borders under study. The intent of the historical section is to determine whether this
is indeed a new manifestation or an on-going event that is irrespective of the current
geo-/political situation. In addition, a brief section has been added to give a rare case of
‘return’ migrations in the region such as the Russian-speaking migration from the
Central Asian states and to evaluate the potential for conflict in their case.

Following the historical analysis, the current tone of migration will be examined
more in-depthly, by first auditing the major mass-actors, their sources and understood
determinate factors. Their decision to migrate, with a focus on the possibility or
existence of conflict, is to be compared with the decision not to emigrate and to weigh
the “cost vs. benefit” of each choice. This will in turn provide us with some possible
explanation as to why, despite the risks of violence and conflict, that migration and
emigration continue to occur in this region (see Figure 1).

Considering this long temporal frame work and the differing geographical regions
(the sending versus the recipient states) the definition of conflict for this discussion has
been left open. All acts of violence do concern the migrant or immigrant, yet the type of
conflict will change. In certain circumstances the violent act is against one individual
against another and it may be premeditated or unplanned. In other cases, the main
perpetrator may in fact be the state against the migrant population, or in some historical
cases, armed conflict was used to ‘protect’ the migrant population. The purpose of this
flexibility is to focus the attention on the decision to move based on the existence of
conflict and not the act itself. Again, this is best accomplished by the use of both
historical and contemporary sources, which will view the individual migrant in a
reactionary position to an ongoing or potential conflict.

Fundamental Push and Pull Factors in Migration

1
The Hyksos are believed to be the Egyptian name for the Palestinian population that migrated into Ancient Egypt
in the Eleventh Dynasty and were later forcibly settled in the Levant in the Twelfth (Josephus, Flavius, Against
Apion, 1:86–90).
2
See above example.
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For a migration to be labeled as such, it requires a certain catalyst, or push factor


in the source location, and attractors in the destination region or a pull factor, such as
the possibility of employment or political stability. General causal elements are required
to differentiate a migration from other such mass movements as: diffusion, invasion,
radiation, expansion, gene flow, dispersal, etc. Thus to be understood properly,
migration and its subsequent study of conflicts, is a subject that requires a strong
interdisciplinary approach. Research in such diverse fields as biology, geography,
anthropology, economics and the study of law can add valuable information to
departments in sociology, political science and demographics that regularly publish on
the subject.

Firstly, in a more basic biological generalization, migration is a density dependent


phenomenon (Diner: 2000: 28, Trinkaus: 1982: 301) and it requires; “a regular round-
trip within the life-span of the individual” which is different from emigration or; “a
directional one-way movement” (Sinclair: 1983: 241). In other words, the migrant, has at
least have the intent to return to their original location. The migration is thus a response
to a changing physical (e.g. political) environment whereas the individual, again, has to
have the desire to return once the location has been become constant. The emigration
can occur in a stable physical environment that is simply over populated with no intent
to return.

Geographic approaches refer to a migration as a; “long-distance movement of a


population over a short period of time” (Anthony: 1990: 899) and occur when push
factors increase and transportation costs decline enough to allow for a beneficial
movement. A geographical approach is relevant due to its adjoining focal and diffusal
attributes that are relative in developing economies. Focal economies (e.g. agricultural
based systems) are more likely to produce migrants that will migrate over long-
distances than are diffusal economies (e.g. non-agrarian economies such as a service-
based industry) (Cleland: 1976: 59-8). Focal-based economies, by their very nature,
must produce emigrants and migrants more often due to the fact that agricultural land in
arid conditions (such as Central Asia) deplete resources more rapidly, thereby leaving
only a few residents to maintain a sustained form of agriculture over an extended period
of time. Descendants and excess populations are thus required to seek alternative
forms of employment. If the local industrial centers are not “diffusive” enough to sustain
an expansion of workers from the surrounding provincial areas, this population’s only
alternative is to migrate or immigrate to regions further abroad.

Diffusive migration under a multiplicity of disciplines, have shown that migration


can manifest itself in five more complex forms: seasonal, temporary, non-seasonal,
recurrent, continuous and permanent (Brettell: 2000: 99) and Gonzalez has added
“conflict migration,” which is stimulated by violent conflict in the home society (see
below) (Gonzalez: 1992). Defining migration beyond the two- types; of one-way and
permanent, is a necessary step to understand its relationship with conflict in the sending
and receiving localities. Varying modes of mobility can help the individual involved in the
process, circumvent or cope with limited choices of employments and locations. In
addition, the frequency of “returning home” can aid in the establishment or renewal of
contact and family networks, which is yet another coping strategy to avoid violence.

Sociology and cultural anthropology can also move the discussion of casual
factors from the macro-level to the meso-level, which, as Caroline Brettell describes;
“operates to theorize about the maintenance or construction of kinship, ethnic, or
community ties among migrants” (Brettell and Hollifield: 2000: 9). This middle level will
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aid in the construction of some of the key agents that facilitate or receive violence
beyond the individual (micro-level) action and yet offers a more detailed analysis than at
the national or regional level of study.

Kinship relations in detail (or the social role of the clan), is a primary function in
Central Asian social life as well as an unofficial channel of political control. Kinship is an
often overlooked topic concerning migration and as a phenomenon of continuing social
networks which help to maintain cultural difference and integration (Brettell and
Hollifield: 2000: 3) across large distances. In Marcel Mauss’s classic essay The Gift,
Mauss suggests that social structures such as households, or greater, not individuals,
determine who is to be mobilized and who stays. Yet, Kathleen Collins is more explicit
when she says that; “Studies of conflict and transition have ignored the clan… and thus
the absence of identity-based conflict” (Collins: 2003: 171). By its very nature measuring
an informal identity as a political actor in migration and conflict is difficult. Yet, if seen as
a political actor within itself, its effects can be felt in the sociopolitical functions and living
patterns of a given culture.

Clan structure has more of an effect on rural areas where it takes on a number of
roles. The Kyrgyz, for example, refer to the word avlod which denotes a given bloodline
and the greater networks in relation to marriage. Uzbeks on the other hand, associate
the word klan or rod with the mafia and thus, are less likely to see its presence in more
favorable terms (Collins: 2003: 175). Conflict in the latter description is more like to take
the form of inter-klan violence and involve the conscription of youth to become involved
in the local melee (see Choice Two: Conflict at Home below) 3 . In Bukhara and
Samarkand clan structure is often determined geographically (which usually overlaps
bloodlines) among nomadic groups and remnants of collectivizing agriculture programs.
Conflicts on this scale usually manifest over boundary disputes and the procuring of
resources (Edgar: 2001). The push factor is this system comes into play when local
Kolkhozniki (peasants/kolkhoz workers) initiate a; “strategy to obtain financial
assistance” (Collins: 2003: 176, 184).

Financial assistance is first requested by local family members and then by the
bai-kormyator (the clan patron), then finally the qishloq or komiteti (the non-state village
committee) is contacted to request assistance (Collins: 2003: 176). When this system
has been exhausted or unsuccessful, family groups must seek assistance abroad. This
‘staged’ network ensures the survivability of the clan-based system as well as provides
a non-official means to procure funds in a region where only 23 percent have claimed to
have ever received state subsidies. 4 With the general development in the private sector
of Russia, the great need for labor has eased the excessive pool of workers in many
areas. The growth of construction projects encourages the demand for unskilled labor
from Central Asia which more or less has operated without a formal infrastructure such
as consultation services and employment agencies (Ivakhnyuk: 2006: 3). Thus the
transference of these workers has been made more spontaneous and responsive to
rapid and sudden growth in certain markets.

“Favorability” as a determinate factor then comes into play when ascertaining


plausible migrants as a standard position, which argues that migrants are more “self-
selected” (Chiswick: 2000: 61). This theory does not evaluate the risk of violence in the

3
A similar situation can be found in northern Albania and the formal ‘blood feud,’ which is a legal form of inter-
clan violence.
4
See Collins reference to Migrstsiya naseleniya 1995: [Population Migration: Statistical Handbook, Goskomstat].
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decision to move and instead gives the qualifying factor to move as an economic
incentive which is reasonably assessed by the individual and based in the hypothetical
models of human capital in developing countries versus the underdeveloped. It must
also be noted that others would argue that there are completely different factors in play
that initiate migration. Massey argues that the spread of consumerism and immigrant
success not only generates the necessary pull factor for 21st century migrants, but that it
also encourages a quantitative increase in the volume of migrants (Massey: 1994: 737,
Brettell and Hollifield: 2000: 16). These theories do not, I would argue, confront the
overt human desire to remain among one’s own in both linguistic and cultural terms as
long as necessary. Nor does it address the historical constant of the need to survive at
the basic level. While higher levels of consumer comfort are important to the modern
individual, so was the desire for easier hunting sources or nutrient-rich land (e.g.
another source of comfort) made lucrative to immigrants in the past. A causal factor,
such as relative conflict, must be strong enough to encourage this behavior.

Earlier Migrations: A Continuing Pattern?

As it was briefly mentioned above, migrational flux is not new in Central Asia, but
rather it has been a constant source of migration since the early Paleolithic Period when
migrating hunter-gather groups first colonized Siberia and the New World (Vasil’ev:
2009: 1-18). This is due to fact that the region is geographically vast and there are
limited sources of water and arable land. As a result the dense variety and highly mobile
population has made migration, in its many forms, a traditional way of life. Thus, while
we will resign to the realms of recent history, past examples become relevant in a
comparative frame of reference. Current events are not separate from history, they are
part of it. Actual history and socially conceptualized ideas of history play important roles
in deciding who immigrates and where. For example, ethnic Tatars living in Finland
might be more compelled to migrate to Kazan than to another region, given the
historical commonality with the recipient population. Furthermore, continuing trends or
conceptionalized myths on the historical demography of migration are often the basis for
organized violence against emigrants and migrants. As such, an anti-immigration group
might use the ‘constant’ influx of a certain ethnic group, based loosely on historical fact,
as the foundation for its propaganda.

The earliest recorded migrations in the region recorded the mass movement of
entire segments of a population as a single event such as the migration of Finno-Ugric
and Turkic tribes to the Middle Volga region which still manifests itself today in the
convergence and complexity of languages and cultures today (Johanson: 2000: 165).
Historical migrations in this form represented a mass movement of related peoples in a
short period of time. This form of emigration, no doubt led to various forms of organized
and unorganized forms of conflict. The results of which were often the complete
extinction of cultural complexes or the mass displacement of the original population to
yet another region. Cultural change in this matter rarely occurs in the modern era and
represents no real continuity in migrational conflict.

Peasant migration to Central Asia was the most significant form of mass
movement between 1550 and 1897. Following the movement of the Russian frontier to
the east and south, peasant farmers and free laborers immigrated into lands currently
occupied by Turkic and other native inhabitants (Moon: 1997: 872). Immigrants in this
occurrence were often accompanied by armed soldiers or Cossacks and thus presented
a significant counter-threat to any mounting resistance to the newcomer’s presence.
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Conflicts in these borderlands were more often directed at the recipient residents than
the immigrant population. Conflict in the long term settlement of the area was also
largely avoided due to sedentary nature and farming strategies of the immigrant
Russian population being different from the largely animal-husbandry practices of the
indigenous populations (Moon: 1997: 878). In addition, many areas of mutual settlement
in the Tatar regions were to remain relatively peaceful due to a relative level of religious
tolerance and market sharing practices (Iskhakov: 2007: 9-27).

The late 19th Century also included a little known migration of Dungans (Chinese
Muslims) into Russia and Central Asia which gives a rare historical example of
migration into the region to avoid conflict. The first group arrived between 1862 and
1878 as the direct outcome of the Muslim rebellions in northwest China in three
successive waves and settled in Osh, Karakunuz and Przheval'sk. The three groups
numbered about 1,000, 1,130 and 3,314 respectively. The second migration followed
the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg on February 12th 1881, which stipulated that
the Chinese Muslims and Uighurs living in the disputed Ili region had the right to either
stay and fall under Manchu rule or emigrate to Russia (Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer: 1992:
244). Most chose to move to Kyrgyzstan and disperse along the thousand-kilometer
route from Ili. After the initial group settled there were about 10,000 Dungans, in 1979
the estimated number was to be about 52,000 and in 1985 there were about 70,000
which indicates that the birth rate may have been supplemented with additional
immigrants from greater China later. Eighty percent of this population now currently
resides in the Ch'u Valley of Kirgizstan and the Kurdai region of Kazakhstan. Yet Dyer
tells us that; “the increase in their number is due to at least three factors: they tend to
have six to eight children per family; they are extremely hardworking people; and their
living conditions are exceptionally good” (Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer: 1992: 245-246). The
available sources on the subject remain unclear as to whether or not continual conflict
occurred after the resettlement; however Dyer does state that there were many cross-
ethnic marriages (pg. 248).

Beginning with the Soviet Period, a new form of immigration was to manifest in
Central Asia as well as well as the greater region as a whole. For a number of reasons
the ability to use forced relocation as a means of population control were enacted in the
Soviet Union leading up to the Second World War. One such reason was the attempt to
eliminate “tribalism” in the newly formed Central Asian states such as in Tajikistan
Uzbekistan (Edgar: 2001: Radnitz: 2006). This forced migration to other parts of the
Soviet Union surprisingly led an increase in voluntary migration in the opposite direction,
to Iran and Afghanistan until as late as 1933, with many of their descendants remaining
in the region today (Edgar: 2001: 286).

The second reason as Adrienne Edgar tells us;

“…was straightforwardly materialist, seeking to undermine the economic basis of descent group affiliation by
dismantling the existing system of collective land tenure and creating a class of poor peasants dependent on the
Soviet regime” (Edgar: 2001: 268-269).

However, what resulted was that the kinship system was able to adapt to the livestock
collective policies of the new regime and continue in its new environment. The clan
structure simply operated under similar conditions in which a mafia or gang continues in
a prison setting.

Forced migration largely came to an end (except for the establishment of


restricted territories for the military or Space Agency) after the post-war period in
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Central Asia, which opened the door for some to return home. Yet some of the
displaced populations such as the; Volga Germans (Waters: 1995), Crimean Tatars,
and Koreans, opted to stay in the places where they had been living for at least one
generation (Tishkov: 1999: 583).

When the Border Crosses Them

Not all recent migrations in Central Asia have been from the indigenous
populations of the Central Asian states to other republics. One unusual trend can be
found in the several Russian-speaking populations that were originally located within the
CIS have been displaced by political upheaval and unemployment as well. Mass ‘return’
migrations are extremely rare in the current era 5 . Such displacements and the following
demographic adjustment are often the result of short-term, but traumatic political
changes in power or the exchange (forced or voluntary) of sizable pieces of territory 6 .
Pål Kolstø suggests these types of exchanges have a long history and; “always entail a
high degree of unpredictability and potential turmoil… [such as] Western Europe has
[had] for centuries, a large number of national states without for that reason being
threatened by international instability in the postwar period 7 ” (Kolstø: 1993:197).
However, given the fact that some of the mentioned diaspora are either a majority of the
population (as in some of the larger cities), or close to it (as in Kazan) the situation
becomes much more complex than the resettlement of a few frontier villages.

Since 1993 Russia has had a positive migrational influx with the former Soviet
republics (Pilkington: 1998: 4) where it is ethnic Russians who make up the majority of
the net emigration to the Russian Federation with the majority coming from Belarus
(85%) to Tajikistan (62%) 8 and the highest total amount from Kazakhstan (234, 323 of a
total of 304, 499). This ethnic group faces a different sort of conflict where emigration to
Russia offers the only possible answer. As government control shifted from Moscow to
the local elite’s enclaves of ethnic Russians found themselves on the opposite side of
the fence and despite a long history of co-habitation in certain regions, these groups
became the targets of an ethnic backlash when they were associated with depravity of
Soviet rule. However the initial ‘return’ of Russians to the Russian Federation did not go
smoothly as Tishkov explains; “as soon as the Russians started to leave Kirgizia and
Kazakhstan in Central Asia, and Georgia and Chechnya in the Caucasus, cleavages
and rivalries based on regional, religious, kinship, and other markers emerged among
local groups,” (Tishkov: 1999: 586). Russians were marginalized or replaced from key
governmental positions to the everyday work place in ‘near-abroad’ localities such as
Estonia (Pilkington: 1998: 27-28) or formal legislation was passed in Soviet republics
such as Tatarstan to establish ethnic quotas (Graney: 1999: 611-612) 9 with similar
actions taking place in other Central Asian states.

5
One possible example can be the division of Germany following the end of World War II.
6
Past North American examples include; the forced migration of Native American Indian groups to other regions,
the forced exile of British loyalists following the American Revolution to the Caribbean and Canada and the
movement of Mexican loyalists after the succession of Texas from the Mexican Republic.
7
Here Kolstø is referring to the 65-year post-war period, which while significant, is not a long enough period to
suggest a permanent peace relative to Europe’s long history of warfare. The period of non-aggression after the 1066
invasion of England was twice as long.
8
Source: “Net Migration between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Republics,” Table 1.1, Goskomstat:
1995, pp.424.
9
Many of these educational reforms and employment quotas were later repealed under increasing federalism in the
next decade.
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According to an interesting statistic concerning the labeling of Russian migrants


by the Russian press according to Pilkington (pg. 26), only eight-percent were
generically labeled as “forced migrants” and another eleven-percent were labeled as
“refugees.” The overwhelming portion (46%) were labeled as “Russians/Russian-
speaking” and “compatriots” (8%) indicating that these were seen by both the recipient
and sending populations as being an “other” in their current position. In addition, some
right-wing political groups have discussed the option of intervening on behalf of the
diaspora, including the use of armed forces (Kolstø: 1993:197) and which may in fact
have occurred as recently as 2008 in Georgia. While compatriotism may have been the
intended use of these later terms by the press, the end result only served to isolate the
population more than it was, and thereby increasing the threat of retribution.

Further chances for conflict can occur upon arrival in the new region by the
displaced Russian-speaking population. Firstly, ethnic Russians do not regularly choose
their own place of resettlement. This increases the difficulty of transition as the regular
cushions of family support networks and acquaintances are not there. Second, the state
support channels are inadequate or are corrupted in providing accommodation,
employment and child-care. Unemployment and other difficulties in adapting to new
environments will often lead to higher rates in theft, murder and other forms of violence
include race-related counter assaults of ethnic groups believed to be at cause for the
resettlement (Pilkington: 2003: 116-140, 161).

Current Demographic Trends

Dr. Irina Ivakhnyuk of Moscow State Lomonosov University characterizes the


current migrational pattern in the greater CIS region under eight key points: historical
ties, geographical proximity (‘transparent’ borders), common transport infrastructure,
psychological easiness to move (language, former common territory), demographic
complementarily, mutual interest towards common labor market, large-scale irregular
migration and a regional cooperation aimed at coordinated migration management
(Ivakhnyuk: 2006: 1). Ivakhnyuk suggests that these factors surmount to a new form of
voluntary, economic migration which has replaced the forms of ‘forced migration’
described above. As a result, Russia has now returned 10 to the number 2 slot as a
recipient of immigrants (Ivakhnyuk: 2006).

According to The International Congress on Migration Paper’s statistics which is


based on; “an assessment by key informants,” (Krassinets: 1997: 15), 38 percent of the
immigrants that arrive from CIS countries are “Free Entry” or those that do not require
visas, 17 percent crossed the border without going through passport control or termed
as “Illegal Entry,” 20 percent are “Legal Entry” or crossed the border when travel does
not match their actual intent (tourist or guest visa holders), 5 percent were transit visa
holders that stayed, 12 percent were refugees, and 8 percent had counterfeit
documents (See Table 1). Considering that these numbers may not be entirely
accurate, as it is impossible to determine the exact number of counterfeit documents,
they probably represent a significantly correct ratio. It must be said that a majority of the
migrants that are received in Russia, regardless of actual origin, have the legal right to

10
Many historians believe that before the mass migration to the United States began in the 19th Century, Russia was
the number 1 recipient of migration during the Tsarist Period and before. See “The early Slav’s” by E. M. Bedford,
2004.
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stay such as those termed “Free Entry” or “Refugee.” Migrant labors, or gastarbeiter 11 ,
are however, believed to be the primary type of immigrant into the Russian Federation
as well as in for internal migrational movement (Krassinets: 1997). While several ethnic
groups, including Russian-speaking European ethnicities, relocate across Russia for
increased employment opportunities, this term has come to represent minority
populations from the Caucasus region, Central Asia Far East Asia.

This popular definition was confirmed in a brief 20-person qualitative survey in


three English-language classes by the author (Mendenhall: 2010: 1), which
hypothetically asked which type of ethnicity was considered a gastarbeiter. When an
example of a “Russian” from Perm which had moved to St. Petersburg was suggested,
the answer was “no,” although many considered it met the original definition of someone
migrating to in/to Russia for purposes of employment. And when asked if it was a Yakut
or Tajik moving to Moscow for work the answer was, “yes” by all 20 students. It should
also be noted here that for 10 of the students in the last scenario, the word “temporary”
was used for employment, and for the second group of 10, the word “permanent” was
used in front of “employment.” When this distinction was noted to the students, no
correction was given, as it was used as a descriptive term only. Finally, when asked;
“Then what do you call a Russian who moves for employment?” several students
suggested that the term “immigrant” only referred to those who move away from Russia.
This example, as suggested by the students, does not qualify as a “racist” term no more
that the word “foreigner” is meant to denote a despised visitor. Simply put, gastarbeiter
is a way of indicating difference. Derogatory connotations can be applied to the term,
but the word itself is not meant to cause offence.

The study of demographic trends in Central Asian migration has also been made
aware of by the groups most affected. Recently the BBC Uzbek radio program has
studied how Uzbeks are driven from their home to search for work in the diamond mines
of the Yakutia region where, despite the climatic and the risks for racial tension, Central
Asians are more likely to find work than in other parts of Russia (BBC Press Release:
2010). And William O'Connor of Euraisa.net brings the recent rise of female Central
Asian migrants to the Russian Federation where women coming from a traditional
society face a different set of choices concerning migration. Many women who choose
to either immigrate alone or with family members from Central Asia, come from a
traditional background that discourages the employment in women outside the home
(O’Connor: 2009). In their home regions seeking such employment may result in a
negative social stigma and result in domestic violence against the individual; however
the alternative may be of little improvement as the host country offers few employment
opportunities to ethnic workers of limited experience and education beyond low-skill
physical labor tasks. In the coming years it will be interesting to see how the awareness
of migrant trends by the sending populations affects this phenomenon.

Choice One: Conflict Abroad

Violence targeted specifically at immigrants and temporary migrations is not a


new phenomenon, nor is it understudied in many regions of the world. Central Asian
migrants are no exception and have been a specific target for a number of decades in

11
Originally this was a post-World War II German concept for Turkish migrants working in Germany (Brettell:
2000: 100). It is similar to the term bracero denoting migrant laborers in the US from Latin American countries.
Mendenhall 10

the Russian Federation and abroad as some examples by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick in a


recent article for Eurasianet.org can demonstrate;

“A sampling of some recent attacks shows that on June 30, a 32-year-old Uzbek man suffered lung injuries when
three men stabbed him in the Gatchina District of Leningrad Oblast as he was on his way to a work site, the news
website konkretno.ru reported. A Kyrgyz man was knifed in Moscow by students who shouted racist slogans,
according to a June 15 report by jewish.ru, and on May 26, two assailants stabbed a Tajik man to death on a bus in
Yaroslavl, Sova [Center in Moscow] reported (Fitzpatrick: 2009).

What is of concern is to whether or not there exists a new type of violence in our
current era against migrants in general, than there was in the past. Questions
concerning the differences in current and past migrations are not atypical. Concerning
the assimilation of immigrants to their new environment (a key factor for survivability
and the prevention of violence) as Brettell and Hollifield write;

“Essentially, given postindustrial economies and the diversity of places of origin of today’s immigrant populations, the
path to upward mobility will be much less favorable for the contemporary second generation than it was for the
second generation of the past.” (Brettell and Hollifield: 2000: 16).

This suggests that assimilation levels in general are lower than before, which increases
the possibility of violence directed at migrants as they are seen as an “other” which
refuses to become part of the greater society. Technological advancements in
communication and travel do aid in maintaining the link between the home field and
those abroad and it easier to acquire ‘comfort foods’ and other consumer products as
well. Prior aggression towards recently arrived newcomers was justified on the basis of
ethnicity, religion and increased economic competition as well as the general
vulnerability of persons new to a given region which may still be the case, but this
conception of “otherness” or “danger” from the immigrant can become elevated with
concern of the development of an enclave (Brettell: 2000: 113). The enclave, while
enacted through kinship ties and for familiarity, isolates the minority group from the
greater population. Sometimes the separation is apparent and formalized such as the
erection of a pagoda at the entrance to a “China town,” which in some cases provides
an added benefit such as tourism. In other instances, this stigma can only serve to
delineate cultural boundaries. Enclaves of Tajik or Uzbek neighborhoods rarely are
afforded such an esteemed status as a “China town,” and may in fact focus negative
attention in that area.

Additional justifications for violence against migrants can be found in the myth
that migrant workers from Central Asia (especially predominantly Muslim areas) are
more prone to radical or neotraditionalist forms of Islam. However, this presupposition is
largely unfounded as Malashenko and Yarlykapov write that; “substantial support
among the Tatars or among Muslim migrants from Central Asia who come to Russia to
earn money and not at all to participate in jihad” which is generally the case for most
Central Asian groups, rather than the contrary (Malashenko and Yarlykapov: 2009: 24),
which include such examples include the general shortage of labor in Siberia (Tishkov:
1999: 583).

Violence not only comes from a random act (such as an intoxicated patriot) or a
pre-planned attack from an anti-immigrant organization, but also from the Russian
militia and the media. Tishkov writes that; “Mass-media propaganda and grass- roots
rumors may provoke an exodus of people, especially where there is a large potential
pool of economic migrants,” (Tishkov: 1999: 583) and surprisingly, the LDPR (Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia) and its early parliamentary leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
according to Mikhail A. Alexseev; “made highly publicized calls for allowing only
Mendenhall 11

archetypal-looking blue-eyed and blond Slavs to serve as TV anchors; advocated the


military invasion into South Asia as a bulwark against the spread of Islam in Russia”
(Alexseev: 2006: 215). However the proportion of LDPR support should be mentioned in
this context. In 1993 (the largest electoral support) was only at 23% and since 1999,
voter turnout was only 6% (Alexseev: 2006: 215). While small in number, support for
this type xenophobic rhetoric can have a rippling effect throughout the larger population
and help to develop unsubstantiated fears in the general population.

As an extreme example, ethnic and nationalist rhetoric, when left unchecked,


was able to develop more substantially in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan ethnic conflicts
in the 1990’s. In the second case, xenophobic conflict developed to a point where the
average citizen was able to commit extreme acts of butchery against their neighbors in
the anti-ethnic fervor when calls for attacks were broadcast on the radio and by car
loudspeakers (Brubaker and Laitin: 1998: 423). And while this example does not directly
pertain to fears of migration related conflict, it does demonstrate the level of hatred in
related forms of conflict that can be achieved between two groups that differ in ethnic
complexion or religious beliefs. In sum, the potential for violence against a minority can
only be elevated when it is supported by the state or the national media. As a result, the
perception of “otherness” can also be projected by the majority, regardless of the
assimilation level, which may in turn help foster the protection the enclave which did not
exist before.

Further fear of radicalization has also been supported at the election polls in
what has been called ‘Xenophobic Voting’ by Alexseev whose research suggests that
there is a general fear of the decrease of the Russian ethnicity and which is sometimes
supported by misused statistics such as the; “broad comparison of the 1989 and 2002
census data indicates that during this time period Russia had become more ethnically
diverse and less ethnically Russian… whereas the number of ethnic Russians declined
by 3.3%, the number of ethnic Armenians increased by 112%, Azerbaijanis by 84.4%,
Avars by 39.2% and the Chinese by 573.1%” (Alexseev: 2006: 214). These numbers,
when presented alongside other news of terrorist activities (in Russia or not) give the
impression that the rise in terrorism, the increase of radical and vocal religious
neotraditionalists and the influx of migrants are somehow related. This guilt by
association can then manifest itself as a backlash against the visible representatives of
these ethnic groups in the workplace. Anti-discrimination groups that often bring this to
the public’s attention can, as a result, be made into the very victims in which they seek
to protect such as; “[the] St. Petersburg ethnographer Nikolai Girenko, who provided
testimony about extremist groups in court proceedings, [and] was shot to death in his
doorway” (Dziebel: 2006) and the death of the anti-fascist Ilya Dzhaparidze, who was
shot by a group of neo-Nazis in Moscow (Barnett: 2009). And recently, the potential for
violence can be enough to force an individual or a group to return home. Fitzpatrick has
stated that; “Even as a growing number of labor migrants from Central Asia and the
Caucasus are returning to their homelands due to the global economic downturn, hate
crimes against them are continuing unabated” (Fitzpatrick: 2009) which may be the
result of an association with the heightened sense of insecurity by increased
unemployment during the recent economic crisis coupled with the standing idea that
migrants steal jobs from local workers.

While this section has listed a few of the potential causes of violence against
migrants there are several others that deserve notation, such as the increase/decrease
of domestic violence against women migrants from Central Asia or the potential for
violence during transit. Personal violence can also manifest itself in a number of ways
Mendenhall 12

that stay with the individual regardless of location, including the concept of the blood
feud and the continuing use of forced child-marriage of young girls despite the change
in mores and laws of the host region (Collins: 2003: 187-190, Edgar: 2001: 267).
Regardless of the volume of potential sources, that fact remains that the potential for a
wide number of conflicts is a factor that must be considered and circumvented in some
fashion when an individual chooses to become a seasonal migrant or a permanent
resident in a new area.

Choice Two: Conflict at Home

If we were to leave the economic cost or benefit out of the decision for migration
for a moment, a closer examination of the potential for conflict in the sending sphere or
migration might be better understood. As mentioned above “conflict migration” has been
singled-out as a causal factor for displacement. And while conflict migration is not
always an independent variable from economic concerns, it may sometimes be the final
determinant for an individual to leave one’s home region.

One of the main reasons for possible conflict in the home regions of Central Asia
can be associated with the discussion of kinship and clan based systems described
above. Clan structures can serve to both prevent certain kinds of violence and to
enhance others. Clans can inhibit the formation of violence based along ethnic or
religious lines (as long as the clans themselves are not drawn along these lines) and
especially in regions where clans are based on geographical or other political
boundaries and cross-inhabit ethnic lines. However there is difficulty in the avoidance of
this form of conflict as it is easily replaced by inter-clan conflict, which is often inter-
generational or is seen as a permanent part of everyday life. Conflict of this sort may
well be considered a part of the natural course of life as many cultures in and out of
Central Asia consider certain forms of inter-clan/tribe violence a rite-of-passage for
young adults who must commit an act of aggression to be inducted into adulthood. Rival
clans may in fact sometimes develop a permanent understanding with one another to
ensure a permanent (yet a low level) of conflict to fulfill this cultural requirement.

While still in existence, this example is not the primary source for local conflict
and as the above historical references indicate, there has been a disruption or an
imbalance to the local sub-systems of informal political rule in the Soviet and post-
Soviet eras. Thus, Collins elaborates on yet a further source of regional imbalance:

“Central Asia’s economic transition, especially privatization of the kolkhozy, has explosive potential… the states have
replaced some traditional kolkhoz directors of other ethnonationalities with [others], typically of the cadre or clans of
the district or regional governors. The director also controls the livelihoods of several villages, perhaps 10,000 to
20,000 people. By thus upsetting traditional local power, the state may create ethnonational tension” (Collins: 2003:
184).

Favoritism at the national level can lead to disastrous conflicts in two ways. The first can
be because of the system as local elites struggle to maintain or grasp power. The
second can come from below against the change itself. In either case the local
economic system is disrupted forcing an already fragile system deeper into crisis which
may be further accelerated by a mass return of migrants who were unable to find work,
such as the recent return of migrant workers to Kyrgyzstan during the economic crisis.

Local and national authorities have often had to walk a thin line between rival
groups in tribal policy. In the 1920’s for example, Communist leaders were worried that;
Mendenhall 13

“entanglement in local conflicts could only discredit Soviet rule [and] the authorities
should treat rival Turkmen groups with complete even-handedness” (Edgar: 2001: 266).
Informal control of the population through violence, by tribal leaders did not go
unrecognized in the formative period of the Soviet Union. Central Asian kinship systems
are largely based on a system of reciprocity that the guarantees loyalty of its
subordinates. Job placement and family procurement are often the result of favors with
an expected return to the elite actors that provided them. Thus, lower ranking members
of a tribal group have little or no social capital to enact in the refusal to commit to
conflict. As this example showed, clan based systems or what Edgar refers to as ‘a
genealogical identity’ (Edgar: 2001: 268), can organize itself to the point that it can have
a profound impact on regional politics, despite the intentions behind the greater actions.
Edgar states that this was exactly the case when she writes; “The persistence of
genealogical identities inhibited the emergence of a broader sense of nationhood within
the Turkmen republic, which was created in the 1924 "national delimitation" of Central
Asia” (Edgar: 2001: 268). Yet despite several decades of forced displacement these
kinship patterns were able to survive until the present day.

When national governments do favor one group, whether it is an ethnic group or


a clan, the under-represented group will most certainly respond. “In Uzbekistan the Tajik
Cultural Organization has sought to mobilize ethnic Tajiks against the elimination of
Tajik language schools, the removal of collective farm directors and the expulsion of
Tajik refugees…” (Collins: 203: 184). In this case the Tajik minority, some may be
choose to enter into a conflict with the greater majority, while others face the possibility
of immigration to Tajikistan, Russia or another Central Asian republic. Other violent
clashes between Uzbek and Kirgiz groups in the cities of Osh and Uzgen in 1991 forced
some citizens to migrate to a ‘neutral’ region to avoid the blood shed (Tishkov: 1999:
579).

And not surprisingly the radicalization of Islam within the migrant’s home country
is another factor to consider. There are many forms of Islam in Central Asia, some of
which have become radicalized in recent decades and is affecting the relative stability of
some states such as Kyrgyzstan, which once; “enjoyed an enviable reputation as the
most democratic of all post-Soviet societies” and is now facing both international
pressure to become more ‘democratic’ while attempting to hand a rise of neo-
traditionalism within its own borders (Fletcher and Sergeyev: 2002: 251,255).

Concerning clan identity, religious affiliation beyond a general proclamation of


Islam, may or may not follow clan boundaries. In cases where they are in-line with each
other, religious difference or radicalization can become intertwined in internal conflict.
As an example, Steven Wagner writing for a public opinion poll in Tajikistan stated;
“Namanganliks, for instance, have typically perceived Khorzemliks 12 as ‘less Islamic”
which has become a point of contest as some groups seek a more neo-traditional
foundation (Wagner in Skoczylas: 1995: 13). Individuals in these cases may become
involved in conflicts with religious overtones yet actually just engaged in the violence
due to other affiliations. Regardless of the original motive, once a conflict is labeled as
being Islamic it is difficult to shed its associated stigma as a fundamentalist in one’s
home region.

So unlike what other historians and sociologists have said about migrant and
immigrant populations moving to Central Asia, where it was the weak and the elderly

12
The ending –ilks typically refers to a clan member after this name.
Mendenhall 14

that were left behind (Moon: 1997: 869, Brettell and Hollifield: 2000: 15), individuals that
choose to remain within the home system must choose between varying forms of
genealogical identity. This type of social strength is more of an adaptation than an
advantage over individuals who chose to migrate. Tishkov refers to the concept of
“death without weeping” (Tishkov: 1999: 582) which shows that some cultures have a
higher tolerance towards death than others, which should be taken into consideration
when determining the possibility of migration based on the potential for conflict. This,
along with a more primal desire of the procurement of consumer goods and a higher
status upon the return of the more prosperous migrant, has created a better incentive to
leave in some cases and not in others.

Conclusion

The choice of whether or not to migrate has never been an easy decision and is
often not made alone. The decision to seek work elsewhere can be decided upon at the
family level, the community or clan level and perhaps even in a larger social sub-
system. Massey again cites a difference in the; “distinction between individual decision
making, and household or family decision making… [which] new theorists argue send
workers abroad to not only improve income in absolute terms, but also to increase
income relative to other households and, hence to reduce their relative deprivation
compared with some reference group” (Massey et al: 1993: 438).” In short, individual
migrants may be compelled by alternative factors other than personal wealth, to
relocate. Factors in these cases may include personal or inter-clan violence (which may
be in association with other forms of social pressure) and the threat thereof to
encourage the collection of external resources for use at home.

The type of conflict that a migrant population either from or to Central Asia
encounters has changed over time. While not completely extinct, state sponsored
violence has been replaced by less informal means of brutality. In the preceding
centuries violence was often against the recipient population to make way for migrants
from the European portion of Russia, forced or otherwise. This was the case except for
few noted cases such as the German-Volga and Chinese migrants in the late 19th
century. Conflict undoubtedly did occur against the migrant population in the reverse
course, but it was not of any significance to the historians of the time.

Today’s immigrant is now the target of conflict. No army accompanies the


resettlement of large numbers of Central Asians to the Russian Federation. The cost
and benefits of whether or not to migrate must be weighed individually in each case. For
the recipient region the economic benefits versus the supposed communal costs of both
documented and undocumented labors and their families has been the subject of much
recent debate in Russia and elsewhere 13 . In Russia migration has been facilitated by
the previous regime’s political commonality and the common use of one language
among all the former Soviet republics. This in turn, allows for a greater return on the
influx of labor as well as easing integration (Ivakhnyuk: 2006: 12). However, the greater
economic benefit has little chance of becoming relevant to the individual immigrant or
migrant worker from Central Asia. Costs and benefits are weighed in relation to the
potential for a gain in financial prowess by the migrant’s own family. It is only when local

13
The most recent example in the US received international attention when the current governor of the State of
Arizona signed into law, the ability for law officers to check for legal documentation without probable cause.
Mendenhall 15

options for advancement and success have been exhausted that the semi-permanent
and permanent options of migration and immigration are weighed.

This decision in as much so, requires an investment and consideration in


personal safety. Personal involvement in conflict for a Central Asian migrant can in
some ways be considered a choice between a voluntary or an involuntary action, if a
given individual makes the decision to remain in the home region. The rise in radical
religious movements across the region can involve the local population either as a
target or as a participant increasing the risk of danger and the push to seek stability else
where. Inter-clan conflict may also involve lower ranking individuals against their will in
long inter-generational struggles or it may compel them to intercede on their own behalf
to increase their position.

Migrants are made subject to personal violence mostly due to perceived threats
of radical hostility (e.g. as a possible terrorist perpetrators) or as a perceived invasion
that will undermine the pristine nature of the host society. Thus, this choice by the
migrant must be weighed against the former situation (conflict at home) and the
unknown possibility of violence in the recipient region. Prosecution against attacks in
the Russian Federation as well as other states remains low. Fitzpatrick reports that;
“Rights activists point out that Russia has no central anti-discrimination agency, and
victims of racially-motivated crimes cannot file complaints themselves, but must rely on
a prosecutor's determination for a case to be opened and that Russian leaders have not
done enough to promote tolerance” (Fitzpatrick: 2009). In fact the few instances of
public discourse on the subject concern the establishment of migration quotas and not
the threat of violence itself. So despite the technological advancements that aid in
connection with the home region and the creation of the enclave, which provides an
artificial barrier against the unknown, the immigrant is still left with the age-old choice of
whether or not to migrate based upon economic stresses and the lottery of the greater
conflict of choice.

Table 1.
Mendenhall 16

The main categories of illegal immigrants according to Key Informants 14

Type of entry Percent

Free entry: Labor immigrants arriving from the countries of the former Soviet
Union (those who do not need visas) 38

Illegal entry: Labor immigrants arriving directly from the “far abroad” via the
“transparent” borders between Russia and the other countries of the former
Soviet Union 17

Legal entry: Labor immigrants arriving directly from the “far abroad” whose
declared purpose for travel does not match their actual intent (tourist or guest
visa holders) 20

Legal entry: Transit immigrants arriving from the “far abroad” and “near
abroad” (transit visa holders) 5

Legal entry: Refugees from the “far abroad” and “near abroad” 12

Illegal entry: Foreigners with counterfeit documents (refugees, labor, transit


migrants) 8

TOTAL 100

Source: Radnitz: 2006.

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