The Vocal Cadre to the Silent Elite: the transmission of ethnic policy in post-Soviet Eurasia

by Phillip Mendenhall

24 May 2010

Politics in post-Soviet Eurasia

Dr. V. Gel’man

The European University at St. Petersburg, Russia

IMARES Program

Introduction

The role of ethnicity in the shaping of political policy in the post-Soviet Period has been

polymorphic, to say the very least. Throughout the earlier Soviet Period the mobilization of local

ethnic groups was both fostered and stifled by political actors stemming from the core in

Moscow or the regional elite. The idea of a locally derived cadre was originally to serve as a tool

of inclusion in the larger Soviet government. Opportunities of upward mobility, monetary and

political rewards, and the encouragement of affirmative action measures for the local population

all served to bring outlying ethnic groups under the umbrella of universal socialism while

quieting schemes of unrest or sovereignty. Yet, as the Soviet Period was drawing to its close,

these same roots of ethnic equality became the stump of speeches for separation and unrest

among those groups marginalized by local ethnic preference. Local ethnic leaders during the

transitional period were faced with the possibility of social unrest between the indigenous

populations and exclave populations if these policies of preference continued to be publicly

endorsed and thus were forced to satisfy local ideologies through quiet enforcement. Under the

cloud of the economic advantages brought on by increased independence and democratization,

local governors quietly amended existing laws to promote ethnic concerns. This cloud quickly

evaporated as Moscow tightened centralization and local leaders were forced to promote ethic

identity and sovereignty through new non-governmental channels such as religion and public

awareness. This discussion seeks to examine the roads in which this current form of political

expression has taken, including its bumps and U-turns, as well as what may lay ahead.

Ethnic Federalism

Ethnic federalism is the process of regulating social mobilization to maintain interethnic

peace during the period of Soviet industrialization. Speaking from the cusp of another great

social transition in January of 1991, this style of Soviet policy is what Philip Roeder describes

as; “a strategy [that] delayed the political reckoning with the age of nationalism to a much later

stage of industrialization (Roeder: 1991: 196). The demographic make-up of the USSR

throughout its history was seen as a possible source of conflict and social instability which

therefore required unconventional methods of suppression as seen by its contemporary

counterparts in the West. One key element of this policy was to incorporate any potential source

of counter-elitism by ensuring that the Communist Party was the only means of upward mobility.

After a period in which the state was against any interest group during the 1920’s and 1930’s, the

policies of Khrushchev and Brezhnev created a new period of ethnofederalism ready-made for

local loyal clientele. The reason, Roeder states, is that; “political entrepreneurs play a critical role

in the mobilization of protest, the politicization of ethnicity, and in many cases even the creation

of ethnic identities” (Roeder: 1991: 202). In other words, it was assumed that ‘diploma-holders’

in the realm of politics would need a mechanism in which to satisfy their career ambitions. If

this ambition was not absorbed by the state, it would soon fall into other, potentially counter

causations. These two options of mobilization are referred to by Roeder as the primordial and

the instrumental, the former focuses on the idea of natural “ethnic revival” and the latter;
“focuses on the pursuit of social and economic interests” through governmental channels

(Roeder: 1991: 203).

Another characteristic of ethnofederalism was the regulation of language. During the

Soviet Period the most powerful language levers were controlled by Moscow and included the

actual conversion of the meaning of certain words (Fierman: 2009: 1207-1208). Words such as

international, which originally referred to the world beyond the former borders of the Russian

Empire, came to refer to the realm within the USSR. Other words such as Islam and Turk also

were intentionally altered in the ‘identity’ related to the word to, “deter individuals away from

the material world and [towards] secular sources of authority” (Fierman: 2009: 1209). Large

quantities of social resources were put into reversing this trend in later periods (see below).

It should be noted than not all scholars agree in the degree of ethnofederalism by Soviet

planners. Summarizing the last few decades of Soviet rule, Martha Olcott states that; “ethnicity

was something the regime was on guard to restrict” and “territorial divisions were drawn to

impede the exercise of statehood rather than encourage it” (Olcott: 1994: 209-211). Ethnic

revival and nationalism, according to some, came as either a surprise or a form of ‘forced

freedom’ in which Central Asian states were obliged to leave the Soviet Union. This argument

underscores the lack (or avoidance of) available ethnic and indigenous sources available at the

time and which became more transparent as some of these policies became public after 1991.

Olcott’s description of the Central Asian region as an: “undistinguished mass of various self-

identifying tribes or city-states which were differentiated from one another, first…[as to]

whether the populations were nomadic or sedentary, and second [by] whether their primary

language was Turkic or Persian in origin (Olcott: 1994: 211-212) highlights the ignorance of

some at the complexity of the situation.

In summary, the results of this policy varied from region to region, but there are a few

commonalities. The first of which was that the local cadre brought through this system of
affirmative action became well entrenched and were difficult to take out, such as the removal of

the first secretary of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Kunaev. This removal brought two days of riots

to the SSR by the local elite and the sanctioned mobilization of mass protests (Moses: 1985: 11).

This mobilization of public outrage became the second tool of the ethnofederalism policy. The

local leadership, who stood at the tier of their respective districts, were able to activate their

ethnic constituencies at will when the affairs of the ethnic community (i.e. their position) came

under fire from Moscow, or as a threat of instability if demanded resources from the core were

not forthcoming.

The ironic twist of this methodology was that where this policy was most successful in

implementing local ethnic cadre into the greater Soviet system, it also became the source of

greatest instability in the later years of the Soviet Union. In effect, the system created its own

means of demise. A crisis developed when there were too many professionals for far too little

positions within the governmental hierarchy (Roeder: 1991: 214). As a result, some elite were

left on the fringes of the political system with no means of upward mobility. However, this did

not yet create the situation of local instability that one might expect from this situation. As a

result of good timing, outsider elites and loyal cadres had reason for common cause. The Soviet

Union was on the verge of collapse and the popular fronts originally established by outside elites

became a source of continuity for the status quo. Of course, this support varied from region to

region. The Latvian Popular Front, for example was attended by the republic’s Communist Party

leadership, but in the Ukraine the Party leadership took a harder line and slowed the surge of

nationalism (Roeder: 1991: 210-211). The end result was a ready-made theater for secession and

a revival of primordial ethnic identity.

Regional Separatism

During the Transnational Period of the Soviet breakup, interim regional elites were faced

with many decisions on how to implement or impede a revived sense of nationalism and ethnic
‘rediscovery.’ As mentioned before, the mechanisms were already in place to tap the resources

and concepts of ethnic mobilization. Yet many of the newly independent republics such as

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and those that remained within the Russian borders such as

Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and others, found themselves in complex social situations. Several

exclaves of Russian and other nationalities found themselves on a border that crossed them or in

a district of Russia that could possibly exercise a new form of blatant bias towards the cultural

transplants. These populations were already accustomed to policies that sought a type of ethnic

equilibrium (etnopoliticheskaya) by elevating the preferred status of locally derived populations

to positions of high authority including the republics First Secretary. However, Russians were

not without status in the republic, as Moscow sought to keep a close eye on the local governing

body (such as placing a Russian as Second Secretary).

Left with a governing body of varied ethnicity, Dmitry Gorenburg writes; “leaders of

ethnic republics of the Russian Federation…tended to de-emphasize the ethnic revival aspects of

their programme, instead focusing on the economic advantages of sovereignty and on the

benefits of federalism and decentralization” (Gorenburg: 1999: 246). Regional leaders sought to

avoid ethnic clashes such as the instances of June 1989 when Meskhet Turks were attacked by

Uzbek nationals in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley. When interviewed by the author or other

reporting sources, all leaders of the Russian republics in question (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and

Chuvashia) except Khakassia were adamant on their policies of inclusiveness and emphasized a

philosophy focused on an independent relationship with Moscow for all citizens of their regions.

In 1994, legislative policy in Tatarstan officially focused on establishing a treaty-based

relationship with Moscow and pushed forward such sovereign concepts such as the supremacy of

local laws over laws of the Federation (Gorenburg: 1999: 252), or by the establishment of the

Commonwealth of Independent States by the newly formed Southern Republics (Olcott: 1994:

211). Public statements of ethnic concerns were limited to mild appeals in the change of the
Tatar language status and voiced notions of independence were placed in an economic

framework such as obtaining local control over heavy industries.

Bashkortostan took an even more restrained approach in mentioning ethnic policies as the

native Bash population was only third in size behind Tatars and Russians. Bashkortostan did not

push for a local language first law and instead focused on issues concerning property rights and

treat-based relations with Moscow (Gorenburg: 1999: 253). One exception was the Bashkir

World Conference held in 1995, at which several regional governmental leaders expressed a

desire to reverse the declining statues of the Bashkir culture on the world stage. Gorenburg notes

that after the conference was over, the regional elites returned to a policy of toeing-the-line with

the larger nationalities in the district.

Chuvashia, under the then new president Nikolai Fedorov (Russian born), originally took

a soft-hand with Moscow, allowing other regional powers to take the heat for suggesting

separatist-based policies and only occasionally mentioning language recognition. However, this

rhetoric change in tempo when the President became one of the most voiced opponents to the

war in Chechnya. At the Chuvash National Congress the parliament’s chairman called for;

“measures to enforce the republic’s language law, to develop Chuvash culture and to foster

national consciousness…including the resurrection of ethnic village administration that had

existed in the 1920’s” (Gorenburg: 1999: 255). Despite this tone, the speech is still considered to

be guarded from being labeled as anti-Russian as it was delivered at an event solely for the

promotion of ethnic rights. Chuvashia’s cautious approach still paid off, as it was able to receive

many of the benefits handed out en masse by Moscow to the regional powers, while retaining

good relations by not demanding its own policy.

Khakassia, due to its lower statues as a Krai within and Oblast and not an autonomous

republic, was one of the more vocal districts. The ethnic Khakass elite focused their attention

until a republic statues was achieved in 1992 and then directed their attention on state-building
for a number of years afterward. Again, the reason for independence was designed to increase

economic development and not to address ethnic concerns. After this period Vladimir

Shtygashev future chairman of the Khakass parliament, along with other local leaders, began to

argue that drastic measures were needed to avoid the disappearance of the culture. He also

focused attention on the large number of recent immigrants that were hostile to indigenous

groups (Gorenburg: 1999: 257). More relatively radical measures were taken by elites even of

Russian ethnicity such as Former Supreme Soviet deputy Mikhail Mityukov, who called for the

establishment of ethnic language schools and increased native language publishing. Some of the

ethnic cadre later on insisted on a two-chamber parliament with one having a guaranteed 50%

representation of ethnic Khakass. Gorenburg writes that; “Shtygashev insisted that the Khakass

people were not looking for special privileges but wanted to be equal among equals and to

preserve their language and culture” (Gorenburg: 1999: 258).

The Russian population began to turn against the movement once Khakassia leaders

began to toy with the idea of sovereignty after the break-up in August 1991. Former Russian

supporters such as Mityukov now spoke against such actions, stating the idea would lead to a

minority dictatorship. Shtygashev also denied the possibility of secession, and eventually the

movement died. In his conclusion of the ‘official’ policies of the republics which remained

within the Federation, Gorenburg writes; “most of the republics preferred to focus on economic

and state-building aspects of sovereignisation…this allowed them to maintain their support

among non-titular ethnic groups, preserve peace in the republic, and avoid excessively alienating

the central government in Moscow (Gorenburg: 1999: 25-259).

Despite the outward appearance of ethnic equality, many of the laws passed provided for

loopholes in indigenous promotion to be enacted throughout the 1990’s. These policies can be

divided into five methods of implementation: privileges in basic laws, promotion of ethnic

culture and language, expansion of native-language schooling, promotion of ethnic symbols and
preferences for members of the titular ethnic group in top positions (Gorenburg: 1999: 259).

Many of these policies, such as preference in administrative positions, can be seen as a

continuation of past Soviet affirmative actions, but the more symbolic changes are entirely new.

Tatarstan and other republics within the Federation adopted new state symbols such as

official state flags that emphasized a connection with the new international environment (the

world outside the former USSR frontier). The green background on the republic’s flag, for

example, highlights a connection with the greater Muslim world and the winged white panther,

which reminds the Moscow core of its state-like status, has been a symbol of the Tatar state since

the 15th century. Besides this direct propaganda, the Tatar government has been very public in its

promotion of the Tatar language and culture to the outside public (such as the Tatar outreach

program by Kazan State University to foreign university students such as the author of this

paper).

For residents of the Republic, benefits and requirements extend from the President down

in implementation. Article 108 in the Republic’s constitution require the President to know both

the Russian and Tater languages and a 15% salary bonus is given to all government employees

that know both languages (Gorenburg: 1999: 261). The Tatar language has also been introduced

at the kindergarten level, broadening the Tatar language education. In all, by 1999 1,645

language clubs, 100 folklore ensembles and 1,063 Tatar libraries have been established due to

the requirement in Section 108 outlining the ‘Plan for the development of Tatar education.’

Bashkortostan, due to its marginal 22% of the districts population passed fewer laws, but

it was enabled to enact many of the policies mentioned above for Tatarstan due to similar minor

clauses in the new constitution. In addition to the president being require to know the Bashkort

language, native language testing and learning became available and a native language university

was established in the southeast portion of the republic where the language is the most widely

used. An attempt to push the Bashkort language on equal status as a state requirement ended in a
stalemate in 1992 and the result was a program that allowed for 2 hours of volunteer-based study

per week.

Chuvashia had an easier time implementing additional ethnic policies due to its status as

a majority culture in the named Republic. The protection of the language and culture was

actually mentioned in the preamble of the constitution and sovereignty was actually declared in

the name of the Chuvash nation. In December of 1990 under the Plan for national state symbols

of the Chuvash Republic, the state flag was changed to purple and yellow, the two symbolic

colors of the Chuvash people (Gorenburg: 1999: 266). Incentives like those mentioned above for

learning the language were implemented as well as quotas for native language radio and

television stations. But what was striking different for Chuvashia is the speed in which these

programs came about. A commission for enforcing the new language laws was set up as early as

April of 1991, and to speed the process even further; “the government decided to create a fund

for the revival of Chuvash schools” (Gorenburg: 1999: 266). One other reason for the quick

implementation is that many of the programs were already started during the Soviet Period.

Khakassia’s small population needed the support of the larger Russian and other non-

titular groups for implementation. The president of this region did not need to know both

languages to be considered eligible to run for office and the laws passed in favor of ethnic

revival stayed within the realm of ‘promotion’ of the culture including language development,

‘cultural’ development and “the development of the Khakass ethnic group” (Gorenburg: 1999:

268). As a result, only 7% of Khakass ethnicity study in their native language and there are no

programs for on either history or language for non-Khakass students. In fact, Gorenburg feels

that the entire program is largely ignored by the public as a whole (Gorenburg: 1999: 269).
Beyond Nationalism

Current policies from the administration of the Russian Federation have put the fires of

nationalism and ethnic revival on the back burner. Governors of districts are now appointed

directly from Moscow which negates any previous requirements of nationality and language. As

a result, advocates of favorable indigenous policies have lost their voice in local law design and

enforcement. So the question that remains is what, if anything, are those concerned doing to give

their region a voice and a surer sense of survivability?

This question can be answered if we return to the point of intentional creation of the

ethnic cadre during the Soviet Period. As it was mentioned, the standing Soviet policy was to

incorporate the local elite into governmental positions to avoid dissidence. In turn, this

methodology created a governmentally educated elite turned counter-elite once full capacity

within the governmental apparatus had been achieved. One such case-in-point can be found in

the story of Muhammad Salih of Uzbekistan who assisted in founding the first opposition

political party in 1988 (The Uzbek Popular Front Birlik, see below) and later the more moderate

ERK Democratic Party in 1990 when he was elected to the Supreme Assembly that same year.

After a failed attempt to be elected to the presidency he fell in poor favor with the new

government, was imprisoned and later released under international pressure. After being accused

of being part of the Tashkent bombings he fled in exile to Norway where he resides today. Now

the Birlik party, according to the BBC and other sources, has an estimated 1.5 million members

(UNHCR: 2010). Although it was allowed to register as a party in 1991, it was not able to field a

candidate as, “President Karimov was afraid that Abdurakhim Pulatov, a Birlik candidate and

chairman, would pose too much of a threat” (Brown: 1992).

The biography mentioned above is a case in-point of the situation that now exists for the

conventional ethnic cadre brought up by the State and then later removed by that same system.

What remains is a situation in which the people themselves have to take a grass-roots approach
to instill cultural survivability. Indigenous and ethnic groups the world over have tried to

establish rights and recognition via the established governmental channels for centuries with

little more success than what we have seen in Central Asia. The sabotaged contracts and treaties

brokered between recognized governments and ethnic groups in Africa, Australia, and the

Americas could fill countless warehouses and underscore the fact that governments are only

willing to grant concessions if there are continuing advantages for both parties. Once the sobriety

of this situation has been realized, advocacy groups often turn to other established social outlets

for mobility such as social orders/fraternities and religious organizations. Where there is not such

an organization, a new or ‘revived’ order often appears in its stead.

While it is not possible in the duration of this discussion to look at each of the regions

discussed at length, it is reasonable to look at a few key examples in detail. Tengrism (cult of the

god Tengri) is an indigenous religion that predates Islam and Christianity in Central Asia and is

practiced in various forms from Tatarstan to Mongolia. Recently, the movement has moved from

the realm of marginal enthusiasts to the mainstream. This movement into more popular circles

has been accompanied by a politicalization of certain factions which Marlene Laruelle describes

as; “trying to influence the political elite with the hope of gaining official status for the new

religion and…to spread their conceptions within governing bodies” (Laruelle: 2007: 205).

Politicalization of Tengrism has two main agendas, the first of which is the recognition of the

religion by political entities. In Kazakhstan, for example, spiritual leaders of Tengrism are

attempting a “syncretic blend” of Islam and Tengrism to assert a new kind of “Kazakh Islam”

(Laruelle: 2007: 206) which is largely rejected by the majority of the hadj, but which is gaining

support among the official Spiritual Board of the country. The second agenda is influence in

such areas as national heritage which can be described as the first stage of institutionalization.

Dastan Sarygulov, a former secretary of regional party leadership, founded the Tengir-Ordo

Association for the Preservation of National Heritage after being dismissed from his office in

parliament in 1999 for the illegal trafficking of gold out of the country. After accusing President
Askar Akev of having ruined him, he quickly joined one of the few oppositional movements

available to him.

The reason for the first agenda’s mobilization is the growing trend for the search of new

state identities. Laruelle writes; “Tengrism is part of today’s culturological trends, which seek to

claim the originality of a people, its existence on the same territory for millennia, its ethnic

continuity since Ancient times and its specific religious intentions” (Laruelle: 2007: 209). It is

here that nationalism, ethnicity and religion can intermingle. This blend of ideals and religious

ideology can often lead to a “radicalization of the movement” perpetuated by “the compact

settlement of minorities” as places of insurrection (Otybra: 1994: 282). Such an instance was

described by Gueorgui Otybra in the Abkhazian Region of Georgia in 1994 in which he correctly

anticipated it as a region of potential ethnic conflict. While Tengrism has not yet turned a

militant wing, it does now provide a platform in which institutional elites can take a new counter

position to the status quo. Using religion and other ideologies as a political platform is not a new

idea nor is it unique to this region of the world, but the old concept is gaining a new momentum

as the only visible option of opposition to disenfranchised portions of a population and to elites

without a viable form of upward mobility within a governmental system.

However, there are more peaceful systems of political action that are just beginning to be

understood in Central Asia. The Totem Peoples Preservation Project of the Tofa people of

Irkutsk, and the Soyot of Buryatia to assist in reindeer herd regeneration, health care, language

revival and other needs, serves as a small example of how ethnic agendas can be accomplished

by seeking outside support and cooperation with other ethnic groups. The establishment of

international ethnic organizations for the common goal of recognition and autonomy will

probably replace most of the mobilization strategies for ethnic agendas in the near future.
Conclusion

What the analysis of the ethnopolitical timeline has clearly shown is that the system that

was designed during the Soviet Period to stem ethnic and regional strife eventually aided in the

undoing of the polity itself. By offering incentives and controlling promotion, regional

intelligentsias were brought under the state wing of the Communist Party cadre in an attempt to

eliminate counter-elitist enclaves and to create a one-column power apparatus. Once the system

was past operational capacity and it could no longer gainfully employ the steady stream of new

cadre, up-and-coming political actors were left with little choice to counter the system that had

disenfranchised them. By the time of the post-Soviet Period, local ethnic leaders were already in

a position of authority and many were able to transition to the new economic and political

structures unhindered. This required a delicate balance of heeding the needs of their own

demographic population while appeasing fears of a “minority” dictatorship by exclave

populations from Russia and other regions. Many of these leaders were able to avoid ethnic strife

while quietly stuffing policies of cultural revival in the loopholes of various constitutional and

other legal documents. Eventually new Moscow authorities caught up with and stifled

regionalism in the area and as a result many that will seek upward political mobility will be

forced to seek an audience in other social institutions such as religion or international activism.

The choice between radicalization and peaceful international awareness is the forked path that

many ethnic organizations will have to decide upon if governmental agencies continue to remain

deaf to the voice of cultural activism.

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