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Culture
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Culture (from the Latin cultura stemming from colere, meaning "to cultivate")[1] is a
term that has different meanings. For example, in 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of "culture" in Culture: A Critical Review
of Concepts and Definitions.[2] However, the word "culture" is most commonly used in
three basic senses:
• Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture
• An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends
upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning
• The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an
institution, organization or group
• 7 External links
In the nineteenth century, humanists such as English poet and essayist Matthew Arnold
(1822–1888) used the word "culture" to refer to an ideal of individual human refinement,
of "the best that has been thought and said in the world."[4] This concept of culture is
comparable to the German concept of bildung: "...culture being a pursuit of our total
perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the
best which has been thought and said in the world."[4]
British poet and critic Matthew Arnold viewed "culture" as the cultivation of the
humanist ideal.
In practice, culture referred to an élite ideal and was associated with such activities as art,
classical music, and haute cuisine.[5] As these forms were associated with urbane life,
"culture" was identified with "civilization" (from lat. civitas, city). Another facet of the
Romantic movement was an interest in folklore, which led to identifying a "culture"
among non-elites. This distinction is often characterized as that between "high culture",
namely that of the ruling social group, and "low culture." In other words, the idea of
"culture" that developed in Europe during the 18th and early 19th centuries reflected
inequalities within European societies.[6]
Other 19th century critics, following Rousseau, have accepted this differentiation
between higher and lower culture, but have seen the refinement and sophistication of high
culture as corrupting and unnatural developments that obscure and distort people's
essential nature. These critics considered folk music (as produced by working-class
people) to honestly express a natural way of life, while classical music seemed superficial
and decadent. Equally, this view often portrayed indigenous peoples as "noble savages"
living authentic and unblemished lives, uncomplicated and uncorrupted by the highly
stratified capitalist systems of the West.
In 1870 Edward Tylor (1832–1917) applied these ideas of higher versus lower culture to
propose a theory of the evolution of religion. According to this theory, religion evolves
from more polytheistic to more monotheistic forms.[7] In the process, he redefined culture
as a diverse set of activities characteristic of all human societies. This view paved the
way for the modern understanding of culture.
German Romanticism
In 1795, the great linguist and philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) called
for an anthropology that would synthesize Kant's and Herder's interests. During the
Romantic era, scholars in Germany, especially those concerned with nationalist
movements—such as the nationalist struggle to create a "Germany" out of diverse
principalities, and the nationalist struggles by ethnic minorities against the Austro-
Hungarian Empire—developed a more inclusive notion of culture as "worldview."
According to this school of thought, each ethnic group has a distinct worldview that is
incommensurable with the worldviews of other groups. Although more inclusive than
earlier views, this approach to culture still allowed for distinctions between "civilized"
and "primitive" or "tribal" cultures.
In 1860, Adolf Bastian (1826–1905) argued for "the psychic unity of mankind". He
proposed that a scientific comparison of all human societies would reveal that distinct
worldviews consisted of the same basic elements. According to Bastian, all human
societies share a set of "elementary ideas" (Elementargedanken); different cultures, or
different "folk ideas" (Volkergedanken), are local modifications of the elementary ideas.
[10]
This view paved the way for the modern understanding of culture. Franz Boas (1858–
1942) was trained in this tradition, and he brought it with him when he left Germany for
the United States.
Gerald Weiss noted that although Tylor's classic definition of culture was restricted to
humans, many anthropologists take this for granted and thus elide that important
qualification from later definitions, merely equating culture with any learned behavior.
This slippage is a problem because during the formative years of modern primatology,
some primatologists were trained in anthropology (and understood that culture refers to
learned behavior among humans), and others were not. Notable non-anthropologists, like
Robert Yerkes and Jane Goodall thus argued that since chimpanzees have learned
behaviors, they have culture.[12][13] Today, anthropological primatologists are divided,
several arguing that non-human primates have culture, others arguing that they do not.[14]
[15][16][17]
This scientific debate is complicated by ethical concerns. The subjects of primatology are
non-human primates, and whatever culture these primates have is threatened by human
activity. After reviewing the research on primate culture, W.C. McGrew concluded, "[a]
discipline requires subjects, and most species of nonhuman primates are endangered by
their human cousins. Ultimately, whatever its merit, cultural primatology must be
committed to cultural survival [i.e. to the survival of primate cultures]."[18]
McGrew suggests a definition of culture that he finds scientifically useful for studying
primate culture. He points out that scientists do not have access to the subjective thoughts
or knowledge of non-human primates. Thus, if culture is defined in terms of knowledge,
then scientists are severely limited in their attempts to study primate culture. Instead of
defining culture as a kind of knowledge, McGrew suggests that we view culture as a
process. He lists six steps in the process:
McGrew admits that all six criteria may be strict, given the difficulties in observing
primate behavior in the wild. But he also insists on the need to be as inclusive as possible,
on the need for a definition of culture that "casts the net widely":
One current view of the temporal and geographical distribution of hominid populations
Nevertheless, the term "culture" applies to non-human animals only if we define culture
as any or all learned behavior. Within mainstream physical anthropology, scholars tend to
think that a more restrictive definition is necessary. These researchers are concerned with
how human beings evolved to be different from other species. A more precise definition
of culture, which excludes non-human social behavior, would allow physical
anthropologists to study how humans evolved their unique capacity for "culture".
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) are humans' (Homo sapiens) closest
living relative; both are descended from a common ancestor which lived around five or
six million years ago. This is the same amount of time it took for horses and zebras, lions
and tigers, and rats and mice, to diverge from their respective common ancestors [22] The
evolution of modern humans is rapid: Australopithicenes evolved four million years ago
and modern humans in past several hundred thousand years.[23] During this time humanity
evolved three distinctive features:
(a) the creation and use of conventional symbols, including linguistic symbols and
their derivatives, such as written language and mathematical symbols and
notations; (b) the creation and use of complex tools and other instrumental
technologies; and (c) the creation and participation in complex social organization
and institutions.[24]
In a recent review of the major research on human and primate tool-use, communication,
and learning strategies, Tomasello argues that the key human advances over primates
(language, complex technologies, complex social organization) are all the results of
humans pooling cognitive resources. This is called "the ratchet effect:" innovations
spread and are shared by a group, and mastered "by youngsters, which enables them to
remain in their new and improved form within the group until something better comes
along." The key point is that children are born good at a particular kind of social learning;
this creates a favored environment for social innovations, making them more likely to be
maintained and transmitted to new generations than individual innovations.[25] For
Tomasello, human social learning—the kind of learning that distinguishes humans from
other primates and that played a decisive role in human evolution—is based on two
elements: first, what he calls "imitative learning," (as opposed to "emulative learning"
characteristic of other primates) and second, the fact that humans represent their
experiences symbolically (rather than iconically, as is characteristic of other primates).
Together, these elements enable humans to be both inventive, and to preserve useful
inventions. It is this combination that produces the ratchet effect.
Chimpanzee mother and baby
The kind of learning found among other primates is "emulation learning," which "focuses
on the environmental events involved – results or changes of state in the environment that
the other produced – rather than on the actions that produced those results."[26][27][28]
Tomasello emphasizes that emulation learning is a highly adaptive strategy for apes
because it focuses on the effects of an act. In laboratory experiments, chimpanzees were
shown two different ways for using a rake-like tool to obtain an out-of-reach-object. Both
methods were effective, but one was more efficient than the other. Chimpanzees
consistently emulated the more efficient method.[29]
Examples of emulation learning are well-documented among primates. Notable examples
include Japanese macaque potato washing, Chimpanzee tool use, and Chimpanzee
gestural communication. In 1953, an 18-month-old female macaque monkey was
observed taking sandy pieces of sweet potato (given to the monkeys by observers) to a
stream (and later, to the ocean) to wash off the sand. After three months, the same
behavior was observed in her mother and two playmates, and then the playmates'
mothers. Over the next two years seven other young macaques were observed washing
their potatoes, and by the end of the third year 40% of the troop had adopted the practice.
[30][31]
Although this story is popularly represented as a straightforward example of human-
like learning, evidence suggests that it is not. Many monkeys naturally brush sand off of
food; this behavior had been observed in the macaque troop prior to the first observed
washing. Moreover, potato washing was observed in four other separate macaque troops,
suggesting that at least four other individual monkeys had learned to wash off sand on
their own.[31] Other monkey species in captivity quickly learn to wash off their food.[32]
Finally, the spread of learning among the Japanese macaques was fairly slow, and the rate
at which new members of the troop learned did not keep pace with the growth of the
troop. If the form of learning were imitation, the rate of learning should have been
exponential. It is more likely that the monkeys' washing behavior is based on the
common behavior of cleaning off food, and that monkeys that spent time by the water
independently learned to wash, rather than wipe their food. This explains both why those
monkeys that kept company with the original washer, and who thus spent a good deal of
time by the water, also figured out how to wash their potatoes. It also explains why the
rate at which this behavior spread was slow.[33]
Children in Jerusalem
Children in Namibia
The development of skills in joint attention by the end of a human child's first year of life
provides the basis for the development of imitative learning in the second year. In one
study 14-month old children imitated an adult's over-complex method of turning on a
light, even when they could have used an easier and more natural motion to the same
effect.[40] In another study, 16-month old children interacted with adults who alternated
between a complex series of motions that appeared intentional and a comparable set of
motions that appeared accidental; they imitated only those motions that appeared
intentional.[41] Another study of 18-month old children revealed that children imitate
actions that adults intend , yet in some way fail, to perform.[42] Tomasello emphasizes that
this kind of imitative learning "relies fundamentally on infants' tendency to identify with
adults, and on their ability to distinguish in the actions of others the underlying goal and
the different means that might be used to achieve it."[43] He calls this kind of imitative
learning "cultural learning because the child is not just learning about things from other
persons, she is also learning things through them — in the sense that she must know
something of the adult's perspective on a situation to learn the active use of this same
intentional act."[44][45] He concludes that the key feature of cultural learning is that it
occurs only when an individual "understands others as intentional agents, like the self,
who have a perspective on the world that can be followed into, directed and shared."[46]
Emulation learning and imitative learning are two different adaptations that can only be
assessed in their larger environmental and evolutionary contexts. In one experiment,
chimpanzees and two-year-old children were separately presented with a rake-like-tool
and an out-of-reach object. Adult humans then demonstrated two different ways to use
the tool, one more efficient, one less efficient. Chimpanzees used the same efficient
method following both demonstrations. Most of the human children, however, imitated
whichever method the adult was demonstrating. Were chimps and humans to be
compared on the basis of these results, one might think that Chimpanzees are more
intelligent. From an evolutionary perspective they are equally intelligent, but with
different kinds of intelligence adapted to different environments.[29] Chimpanzee learning
strategies are well-suited to a stable physical environment that requires little social
cooperation (compared to humans). Human learning strategies are well-suited to a
complex social environment in which understanding the intentions of others may be more
important than success at a specific task. Tomasello argues that this strategy has made
possible the "ratchet effect" that enabled humans to evolve complex social systems that
have enabled humans to adapt to virtually every physical environment on the surface of
the earth.[47]
Tomasello further argues that cultural learning is essential for language-acquisition. Most
children in any society, and all children in some, do not learn all words through the direct
efforts of adults. "In general, for the vast majority of words in their language, children
must find a way to learn in the ongoing flow of social interaction, sometimes from speech
not even addressed to them."[48] This finding has been confirmed by a variety of
experiments in which children learned words even when the referent was not present,
multiple referents were possible, and the adult was not directly trying to teach the word to
the child.[49][50][51] Tomasello concludes that "a linguistic symbol is nothing other than a
marker for an intersubjectively shared understanding of a situation.[52]
Tomasello's 1999 review of the research contrasting human and non-human primate
learning strategies confirms biological anthropologist Ralph Holloway's 1969 argument
that a specific kind of sociality linked to symbolic cognition were the keys to human
evolution, and constitute the nature of culture. According to Holloway, the key issue in
the evolution of H. sapiens, and the key to understanding "culture," "is how man
organizes his experience." Culture is "the imposition of arbitrary form upon the
environment."[53] This fact, Holloway argued, is primary to and explains what is
distinctive about human learning strategies, tool-use, and language. Human tool-making
and language express "similar, if not identical, cognitive processes" and provide
important evidence for how humankind evolved.[54]
In other words, whereas McGrew argues that anthropologists must focus on behaviors
like communication and tool-use because they have no access to the mind, Holloway
argues that human language and tool-use, including the earliest stone tools in the fossil
record, are highly suggestive of cognitive differences between humans and non-humans,
and that such cognitive differences in turn explain human evolution. For Holloway, the
question is not whether other primates communicate, learn or make tools, but the way
they do these things. "Washing potatoes in the ocean … stripping branches of leaves to
get termites," and other examples of primate tool-use and learning "are iconic, and there
is no feedback from the environment to the animal ."[55] Human tools, however, express
an independence from natural form that manifests symbolic thinking. "In the preparation
of the stick for termite-eating, the relation between product and raw material is iconic. In
the making of a stone tool, in contrast, there is no necessary relation between the form of
the final product and the original material."[56]
In Holloway's view, our non-human ancestors, like those of modern chimpanzees and
other primates, shared motor and sensory skills, curiosity, memory, and intelligence, with
perhaps differences in degree. "It is when these are integrated with the unique attributes
of arbitrary production (symbolization) and imposition that man qua cultural man
appears."[57]
I have suggested above that whatever culture may be, it includes "the imposition
of arbitrary forms upon the environment." This phrase has two components. One
is a recognition that the relationship between the coding process and the
phenomenon (be it a tool, social network, or abstract principle) is non-iconic. The
other is an idea of man as a creature who can make delusional systems work—
who imposes his fantasies, his non-iconic constructs (and constructions) , upon
the environment. The altered environment shapes his perceptions, and these are
again forced back on the environment, are incorporated into the environment, and
press for further adaptation.[58]
This is comparable to the "ratcheting" aspect suggested by Tomasello and others that
enabled human evolution to accelerate. Holloway concludes that the first instance of
symbolic thought among humans provided a "kick-start" for brain development, tool
complexity, social structure, and language to evolve through a constant dynamic of
positive feedback. "This interaction between the propensity to structure the environment
arbitrarily and the feedback from the environment to the organism is an emergent
process, a process different in kind from anything that preceded it ."[59]
Arbitrariness
Chopping-tool
Unretouched biface
An individual language user looks at a tree and, before drawing the attention of
her interlocutor to that tree, must decide, based on her assessment of the listener's
current knowledge and expectations, whether to say "that tree over there," "it,"
"the oak," "that hundred-year-oak," "the tree," "the bagswing tree," "that thing in
the front yard," "the ornament," "the embarrassment," or any of a number of other
expressions. … And these decisions are not made on the basis of the speaker's
direct goal with respect to the object or activity involved, but rather that they are
made on the basis of her goal with respect to the listener's interest and attention to
that object or activity.
This is why symbolic cognition and communication and imitative learning go hand-in-
hand.[61]
Holloway argues that the stone-tools associated with genus Homo have the same features
of human language:
As Tomasello has demonstrated, symbolic thought can operate only in a particular social
environment:
Once some useful behavior spreads within a population and becomes more
important for subsistence, it will generate selection pressures on genetic traits that
support its propagation ... Stone and symbolic tools, which were initially acquired
with the aid of flexible ape-learning abilities, ultimately turned the tables on their
users and forced them to adapt to a new niche opened by these technologies.
Rather than being just useful tricks, these behavioral prostheses for obtaining food
and organizing social behaviors became indispensable elements in a new adaptive
complex. The origin of "humanness" can be defined as that point in our evolution
where these tools became the principle source of selection on our bodies and
brains. It is the diagnostic of Homo symbolicus.[66]
According to Deacon, this occurred between 2 and 2.5 million years ago, when we have
the first fossil evidence of stone tool use and the beginning of a trend in an increase in
brain size. But it is the evolution of symbolic language which is the cause—and not the
effect—of these trends.[67] More specifically, Deacon is suggesting that
Australopithecines, like contemporary apes, used tools; it is possible that over the
millions of years of Australopithecine history, many troops developed symbolic
communication systems. All that was necessary was that one of these groups so altered
their environment that "it introduced selection for very different learning abilities than
affected prior species."[68] This troop or population kick-started the Baldwinian process
(the "ratchet effect") that led to their evolution to genus Homo.
The question for Deacon is, what behavioral-environmental changes could have made the
development of symbolic thinking adaptive? Here he emphasizes the importance of
distinguishing humans from all other species, not in order to privilege human intelligence
but to problematize it. Given that the evolution of H. sapiens began with ancestors who
did not yet have "culture," what led them to move away from cognitive, learning,
communication, and tool-making strategies that were and continued to be adaptive for
most other primates (and, some have suggested, most other species of animals)? Learning
symbol systems is more time consuming than other forms of communication, so symbolic
thought made possible a different communication strategy, but not a more efficient one
than other primates. Nevertheless, it must have offered some selective advantage to H.
sapiens to have evolved. Deacon starts by looking at two key determinants in
evolutionary history: foraging behavior, and patterns of sexual relations. As he observes
competition for sexual access limits the possibilities for social cooperation in many
species; yet, Deacon observes, there are three consistent patterns in human reproduction
that distinguish them from other species:
1. Both males and females usually contribute effort towards the rearing of their
offspring, though often to differing extents and in very different ways.
2. In all societies, the great majority of adult males and females are bound by long-
term, exclusive sexual access rights and prohibitions to particular individuals of
the opposite sex.
3. They maintain these exclusive sexual relations while living in modest to large-
sized, multi-male, multi-female, cooperative social groups.[69]
Moreover, there is one feature common to all known human foraging societies (all
humans prior to ten or fifteen thousand years ago), and markedly different from other
primates: "the use of meat. . . . The appearance of the first stone tools nearly 2.5 million
years ago almost certainly correlates with a radical shift in foraging behavior in order to
gain access to meat."[70] Deacon does not believe that symbolic thought was necessary for
hunting or tool-making (although tool-making may be a reliable index of symbolic
thought); rather, it was necessary for the success of distinctive social relations.
The key is that while men and women are equally effective foragers, mothers carrying
dependent children are not effective hunters. They must thus depend on male hunters.
This favors a system in which males have exclusive sexual access to females, and
females can predict that their sexual partner will provide food for them and their children.
In most mammalian species the result is a system of rank or sexual competition that
results in either polygyny, or life-long pair-bonding between two individuals who live
relatively independent of other adults of their species; in both cases male aggression
plays an important role in maintaining sexual access to mate(s). What is unique about
humans?
Chimpanzees also, on occasion, hunt meat; in most cases, however, males consume the
meat immediately, and only on occasion share with females who happen to be nearby.
Among chimpanzees, hunting for meat increases when other sources of food become
scarce, but under these conditions, sharing decreases. The first forms of symbolic
thinking made stone-tools possible, which in turn made hunting for meat a more
dependable source of food for our nonhuman ancestors while making possible forms of
social communication that make sharing—between males and females, but also among
males, decreasing sexual competition:
Symbols and symbolic thinking thus make possible a central feature of social relations in
every human population: reciprocity. Evolutionary scientists have developed a model to
explain reciprocal altruism among closely related individuals. Symbolic thought makes
possible reciprocity between distantly related individuals.[74]
Mural of an aurochs, a deer, and humans from Çatalhöyük, sixth millennium BC;
Museum of Anatolian Civilizations, Ankara, Turkey
In the 19th century archeology was often a supplement to history, and the goal of
archeologists was to identify artifacts according to their typology and stratigraphy, thus
marking their location in time and space. Franz Boas established that archeology be one
of American anthropology's four fields, and debates among archeologists have often
paralleled debates among cultural anthropologists. In the 1920s and 1930s, Australian-
British archeologist V. Gordon Childe and American archeologist W. C. McKern
independently began moving from asking about the date of an artifact, to asking about the
people who produced it — when archeologists work alongside historians, historical
materials generally help answer these questions, but when historical materials are
unavailable, archeologists had to develop new methods. Childe and McKern focused on
analyzing the relationships among objects found together; their work established the
foundation for a three-tiered model:
1. An individual artifact, which has surface, shape, and technological attributes (e.g.
an arrowhead)
2. A sub-assemblage, consisting of artifacts that are found, and were likely used,
together (e.g. an arrowhead, bow and knife)
3. An assemblage of sub-assemblages that together constitute the archeological site
(e.g. the arrowhead, bow and knife; a pot and the remains of a hearth; a shelter)
In 1948 Walter Taylor systematized the methods and concepts that archeologists had
developed and proposed a general model for the archeological contribution to knowledge
of cultures. He began with the mainstream understanding of culture as the product of
human cognitive activity, and the Boasian emphasis on the subjective meanings of
objects as dependent on their cultural context. He defined culture as "a mental
phenomenon, consisting of the contents of minds, not of material objects or observable
behavior."[78] He then devised a three-tiered model linking cultural anthropology to
archeology, which he called conjunctive archeology:
That is, material artifacts were the material residue of culture, but not culture itself.[79]
Taylor's point was that the archeological record could contribute to anthropological
knowledge, but only if archeologists reconceived their work not just as digging up
artifacts and recording their location in time and space, but as inferring from material
remains the behaviors through which they were produced and used, and inferring from
these behaviors the mental activities of people. Although many archeologists agreed that
their research was integral to anthropology, Taylor's program was never fully
implemented. One reason was that his three-tier model of inferences required too much
fieldwork and laboratory analysis to be practical.[80] Moreover, his view that material
remains were not themselves cultural, and in fact twice-removed from culture, in fact left
archeology marginal to cultural anthropology.[81]
In 1962 Leslie White's former student Lewis Binford proposed a new model for
anthropological archeology, called "the New Archeology" or "Processual Archeology,"
based on White's definition of culture as "the extra-somatic means of adaptation for the
human organism."[82] This definition allowed Binford to establish archeology as a crucial
field for the pursuit of the methodology of Julian Steward's cultural ecology:
In other words, Binford proposed an archeology that would be central to the dominant
project of cultural anthropologists at the time (culture as non-genetic adaptations to the
environment); the "new archeology" was the cultural anthropology (in the form of
cultural ecology or ecological anthropology) of the past.
In the 1980s, there was a movement in the United Kingdom and Europe against the view
of archeology as a field of anthropology, echoing Radcliffe-Brown's earlier rejection of
cultural anthropology.[84] During this same period, then-Cambridge archeologist Ian
Hodder developed "post-processual archeology" as an alternative. Like Binford (and
unlike Taylor) Hodder views artifacts not as objectifications of culture but as culture
itself. Unlike Binford, however, Hodder does not view culture as an environmental
adaptation. Instead, he "is committed to a fluid semiotic version of the traditional culture
concept in which material items, artifacts, are full participants in the creation,
deployment, alteration, and fading away of symbolic complexes."[85] His 1982 book,
Symbols in Action, evokes the symbolic anthropology of Geertz, Schneider, with their
focus on the context dependent meanings of cultural things, as an alternative to White
and Steward's materialist view of culture.[86] In his 1991 textbook, Reading the Past:
Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology Hodder argued that archeology is
more closely aligned to history than to anthropology.[87]
The connection between culture and language has been noted as far back as the classical
period and probably long before. The ancient Greeks, for example, distinguished between
civilized peoples and bárbaros "those who babble", i.e. those who speak unintelligible
languages.[88] The fact that different groups speak different, unintelligible languages is
often considered more tangible evidence for cultural differences than other less obvious
cultural traits.
The German romanticists of the 19th century such as Herder, Wundt and Humbolt, often
saw language not just as one cultural trait among many but rather as the direct expression
of a people's national character, and as such as culture in a kind of condensed form.
Herder for example suggests, "Denn jedes Volk ist Volk; es hat seine National Bildung
wie seine Sprache" (Since every people is a People, it has its own national culture
expressed through its own language).[89]
Franz Boas, founder of American anthropology, like his German forerunners, maintained
that the shared language of a community is the most essential carrier of their common
culture. Boas was the first anthropologist who considered it unimaginable to study the
culture of a foreign people without also becoming acquainted with their language. For
Boas, the fact that the intellectual culture of a people was largely constructed, shared and
maintained through the use of language, meant that understanding the language of a
cultural group was the key to understanding its culture. At the same time, though, Boas
and his students were aware that culture and language are not directly dependent on one
another. That is, groups with widely different cultures may share a common language,
and speakers of completely unrelated languages may share the same fundamental cultural
traits.[90][91] Numerous other scholars have suggested that the form of language determines
specific cultural traits.[92] This is similar to the notion of Linguistic determinism, which
states that the form of language determines individual thought. While Boas himself
rejected a causal link between language and culture, some of his intellectual heirs
entertained the idea that habitual patterns of speaking and thinking in a particular
language may influence the culture of the linguistic group.[93] Such belief is related to the
theory of Linguistic relativity. Boas, like most modern anthropologists, however, was
more inclined to relate the interconnectedness between language and culture to the fact
that, as B.L. Whorf put it, "they have grown up together".[94]
Indeed, the origin of language, understood as the human capacity of complex symbolic
communication, and the origin of complex culture is often thought to stem from the same
evolutionary process in early man. Linguists[who?] and evolutionary anthropologists[citation
needed]
suppose that language evolved as early humans began to live in large communities
which required the use of complex communication to maintain social coherence.
Language and culture then both emerged as a means of using symbols to construct social
identity and maintain coherence within a social group too large to rely exclusively on pre-
human ways of building community such as for example grooming. Since language and
culture are both in essence symbolic systems, twentieth century cultural theorists have
applied the methods of analyzing language developed in the science of linguistics to also
analyze culture. Particularly the structural theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, which
describes symbolic systems as consisting of signs (a pairing of a particular form with a
particular meaning), has come to be applied widely in the study of culture. But also post-
structuralist theories, that nonetheless still rely on the parallel between language and
culture as systems of symbolic communication, have been applied in the field of
semiotics. The parallel between language and culture can then be understood as analog to
the parallel between a linguistic sign, consisting for example of the sound [kau] and the
meaning "cow", and a cultural sign, consisting for example of the cultural form of
"wearing a crown" and the cultural meaning of "being king". In this way it can be argued
that culture is itself a kind of language. Another parallel between cultural and linguistic
systems is that they are both systems of practice, that is they are a set of special ways of
doing things that is constructed and perpetuated through social interactions[95]. Children,
for example, acquire language in the same way as they acquire the basic cultural norms of
the society they grow up in - through interaction with older members of their cultural
group.
However, languages, now understood as the particular set of speech norms of a particular
community, are also a part of the larger culture of the community that speak them.
Humans use language as a way of signalling identity with one cultural group and
difference from others. Even among speakers of one language several different ways of
using the language exist, and each is used to signal affiliation with particular subgroups
within a larger culture. In linguistics such different ways of using the same language are
called "varieties". For example, the English language is spoken differently in the USA,
the UK and Australia, and even within English-speaking countries there are hundreds of
dialects of English that each signal a belonging to a particular region and/or subculture.
For example, in the UK the cockney dialect signals its speakers' belonging to the group of
lower class workers of east London. Differences between varieties of the same language
often consist in different pronunciations and vocabulary, but also sometimes of different
grammatical systems and very often in using different styles (e.g. cockney Rhyming
slang or Lawyers' jargon). Linguists and anthropologists, particularly sociolinguists,
ethnolinguists and linguistic anthropologists have specialized in studying how ways of
speaking vary between speech communities.
A community's ways of speaking or signing are a part of the community's culture, just as
other shared practices are. Language use is a way of establishing and displaying group
identity. Ways of speaking function not only to facilitate communication, but also to
identify the social position of the speaker. Linguists calls different ways of speaking
language varieties, a term that encompasses geographically or socioculturally defined
dialects as well as the jargons or styles of subcultures. Linguistic anthropologists and
sociologists of language define communicative style as the ways that language is used
and understood within a particular culture.[96]
The differences between languages does not consist only in differences in pronunciation,
vocabulary or grammar, but also in different "cultures of speaking". Some cultures for
example have elaborate systems of "social deixis", systems of signalling social distance
through linguistic means[97]. In English, social deixis is shown mostly though
distinguishing between addressing some people by first name and others by surname, but
also in titles such as "Mrs.", "boy", "Doctor" or "Your Honor", but in other languages
such systems may be highly complex and codified in the entire grammar and vocabulary
of the language. In several languages of east Asia, for example Thai, Burmese and
Javanese, different words are used according to whether a speaker is addressing someone
of higher or lower rank than one self in a ranking system with animals and children
ranking the lowest and gods and members of royalty as the highest[97]. Other languages
may use different forms of address when speaking to speakers of the opposite gender or
in-law relatives and many languages have special ways of speaking to infants and
children. Among other groups, the culture of speaking may entail not speaking to
particular people, for example many indigenous cultures of Australia have a taboo against
talking to one's in-law relatives, and in some cultures speech is not addressed directly to
children. Some languages also require different ways of speaking for different social
classes of speakers, and often such a system is based on gender differences as well as in
Japanese and Koasati[98].
Cultural anthropology
Ruth Benedict was instrumental in establishing the modern conception of distinct cultures
being patterned.
The modern anthropological understanding of culture has its origins in the 19th century
with German anthropologist Adolf Bastian's theory of the "psychic unity of mankind,"
which, influenced by Herder and von Humboldt, challenged the identification of "culture"
with the way of life of European elites, and British anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor's
attempt to define culture as inclusively as possible. Tylor in 1874 described culture in the
following way: "Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[99] Although Tylor was
not aiming to propose a general theory of culture (he explained his understanding of
culture in the course of a larger argument about the nature of religion), American
anthropologists have generally presented their various definitions of culture as
refinements of Tylor's. Franz Boas's student Alfred Kroeber (1876–1970) identified
culture with the "superorganic," that is, a domain with ordering principles and laws that
could not be explained by or reduced to biology.[100] In 1973, Gerald Weiss reviewed
various definitions of culture and debates as to their parsimony and power, and proposed
as the most scientifically useful definition that "culture" be defined "as our generic term
for all human nongenetic, or metabiological, phenomena" (italics in the original).[101]
Franz Boas, founded modern American anthropology with the establishment of the first
graduate program in anthropology at Columbia University in 1896. At the time the
dominant model of culture was that of cultural evolution, which posited that human
societies progressed through stages of savagery to barbarism to civilization; thus,
societies that for example are based on horticulture and Iroquois kinship terminology are
less evolved that societies based on agriculture and Eskimo kinship terminology. One of
Boas's greatest accomplishments was to demonstrate convincingly that this model is
fundamentally flawed, empirically, methodologically, and theoretically. Moreover, he felt
that our knowledge of different cultures was so incomplete, and often based on
unsystematic or unscientific research, that it was impossible to develop any scientifically
valid general model of human cultures. Instead, he established the principle of cultural
relativism and trained students to conduct rigorous participant observation field research
in different societies. Boas understood the capacity for culture to involve symbolic
thought and social learning, and considered the evolution of a capacity for culture to
coincide with the evolution of other, biological, features defining genus Homo.
Nevertheless, he argued that culture could not be reduced to biology or other expressions
of symbolic thought, such as language. Boas and his students understood culture
inclusively and resisted developing a general definition of culture. Indeed, they resisted
identifying "culture" as a thing, instead using culture as an adjective rather than a noun.
Boas argued that cultural "types" or "forms" are always in a state of flux.[102][103] His
student Alfred Kroeber argued that the "unlimited receptivity and assimilativeness of
culture" made it practically impossible to think of cultures as discrete things.[104]
Boas's students dominated cultural anthropology through World War II, and continued to
have great influence through the 1960s. They were especially interested in two
phenomena: the great variety of forms culture took around the world,[105] and the many
ways individuals were shaped by and acted creatively through their own cultures.[106][107]
This led his students to focus on the history of cultural traits: how they spread from one
society to another, and how their meanings changed over time[108][109]—and the life
histories of members of other societies.[110][111][112][113][114][115][116][117] Others, such as Ruth
Benedict (1887–1948) and Margaret Mead (1901–1978), produced monographs or
comparative studies analyzing the forms of creativity possible to individuals within
specific cultural configurations.[118][119][120] Essential to their research was the concept of
"context": culture provided a context that made the behavior of individuals
understandable; geography and history provided a context for understanding the
differences between cultures. Thus, although Boasians were committed to the belief in
the psychic unity of humankind and the universality of culture, their emphasis on local
context and cultural diversity led them away from proposing cultural universals or
universal theories of culture.
There is a tension in cultural anthropology between the claim that culture as a universal
(the fact that all human societies have culture), and that it is also particular (culture takes
a tremendous variety of forms around the world). Since Boas, two debates have
dominated cultural anthropology. The first has to do with ways of modeling particular
cultures. Specifically, anthropologists have argued as to whether "culture" can be thought
of as a bounded and integrated thing, or as a quality of a diverse collection of things, the
numbers and meanings of which are in constant flux. Boas's student Ruth Benedict
suggested that in any given society cultural traits may be more or less "integrated," that
is, constituting a pattern of action and thought that gives purpose to people's lives, and
provides them with a basis from which to evaluate new actions and thoughts, although
she implies that there are various degrees of integration; indeed, she observes that some
cultures fail to integrate.[121] Boas, however, argued that complete integration is rare and
that a given culture only appears to be integrated because of observer bias.[122] For Boas,
the appearance of such patterns—a national culture, for example—was the effect of a
particular point of view.[123]
The first debate was effectively suspended in 1934 when Ruth Benedict published
Patterns of Culture, which has continuously been in print. Although this book is well
known for popularizing the Boasian principle of cultural relativism, among
anthropologists it constituted both an important summary of the discoveries of Boasians,
and a decisive break from Boas's emphasis on the mobility of diverse cultural traits.
"Anthropological work has been overwhelmingly devoted to the analysis of cultural
traits," she wrote "rather than to the study of cultures as articulated wholes."[124]
Influenced by Polish-British social anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski, however, she
argued that "The first essential, so it seems today, is to study the living culture, to know
its habits of thought and the functions of its institutions" and that "the only way in which
we can know the significance of the selected detail of behavior is against the background
of the motives and emotions and values that are institutionalized in that culture."[125]
Influenced by German historians Wilhelm Dilthey and Oswald Spengler, as well as by
gestalt psychology, she argued that "the whole determines its parts, not only their relation
but their very nature,"[126] and that "cultures, likewise, are more than the sum of their
traits."[127] Just as each spoken language draws very selectively from an extensive, but
finite, set of sounds any human mouth (free from defect) can make, she concluded that in
each society people, over time and through both conscious and unconscious processes,
selected from an extensive but finite set of cultural traits which then combine to form a
unique and distinctive pattern."[128]
Although Benedict felt that virtually all cultures are patterned, she argued that these
patterns change over time as a consequence of human creativity, and therefore different
societies around the world had distinct characters. Patterns of Culture contrasts Zuňi,
Dobu and Kwakiutl cultures as a way of highlighting different ways of being human.
Benedict observed that many Westerners felt that this view forced them to abandon their
"dreams of permanence and ideality and with the individual's illusions of autonomy" and
that for many, this made existence "empty."[130] She argued however that once people
accepted the results of scientific research, people would "arrive then at a more realistic
social faith, accepting as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting
and equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the raw
materials of existence."[130]
This view of culture has had a tremendous impact outside of anthropology, and
dominated American anthropology until the Cold War, when anthropologists like Sidney
Mintz and Eric Wolf rejected the validity and value of approaching "each culture" as "a
world in itself" and "relatively stable.".[131] They felt that, too often, this approach ignored
the impact of imperialism, colonialism, and the world capitalist economy on the peoples
Benedict and her followers studied (and thus re-opened the debate on the relationship
between the universal and the particular, in the form of the relationship between the
global and the local). In the meantime, its emphasis on metamorphosing patterns
influenced French structuralism and made American anthropologists receptive to British
structural-functionalism.
The second debate has been over the ability to make universal claims about all cultures.
Although Boas argued that anthropologists had yet to collect enough solid evidence from
a diverse sample of societies to make any valid general or universal claims about culture,
by the 1940s some felt ready. Whereas Kroeber and Benedict had argued that "culture"—
which could refer to local, regional, or trans-regional scales—was in some way
"patterned" or "configured," some anthropologists now felt that enough data had been
collected to demonstrate that it often took highly structured forms. The question these
anthropologists debated was, were these structures statistical artifacts, or where they
expressions of mental models? This debate emerged full-fledged in 1949, with the
publication of George Murdock's Social Structure, and Claude Lévi-Strauss's Les
Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté.
Opposing Boas and his students, Yale anthropologist George Murdock, who compiled the
Human Relations Area Files. These files code cultural variables found in different
societies, so that anthropologists can use statistical methods to study correlations among
different variables.[132][133][134] The ultimate aim of this project is to develop generalizations
that apply to increasingly larger numbers of individual cultures. Later, Murdock and
Douglas R. White developed the standard cross-cultural sample as a way to refine this
method.
Murdock's HRAF and Lévi-Strauss's structuralism provide two ambitious ways to seek
the universal in the particular, and both approaches continue to appeal to different
anthropologists. However, the differences between them reveal a tension implicit in the
heritage of Tylor and Bastian. Is culture to be found in empirically observed behaviors
that may form the basis of generalizations? Or does it consist of universal mental
processes, which must be inferred and abstracted from observed behavior? This question
has driven debates among biological anthropologists and archeologists as well.
In the 1940s the Boasian understanding of culture was challenged by a new paradigm for
anthropological and social science research called Structural functionalism. This
paradigm developed independently but in parallel in both the United Kingdom and in the
United States (In both cases it is sui generis: it has no direct relationship to
"structuralism" except that both French structuralism and Anglo-American Structural-
Functionalism were all influenced by Durkheim. It is also analogous, but unrelated to,
other forms of "functionalism"). Whereas the Boasians viewed anthropology as that
natural science dedicated to the study of humankind, structural functionalists viewed
anthropology as one social science among many, dedicated to the study of one specific
facet of humanity. This led structural-functionalists to redefine and minimize the scope of
"culture."
According to this theory, the second system was the proper object of study for
psychologists; the third system for sociologists, and the fourth system for cultural
anthropologists.[142][143] Whereas the Boasians considered all of these systems to be objects
of study by anthropologists, and "personality" and "status and role" to be as much a part
of "culture" as "norms and values," Parsons envisioned a much narrower role for
anthropology and a much narrower definition of culture.
Although Boasian cultural anthropologists were interested in norms and values, among
many other things, it was only with the rise of structural functionalism that people came
to identify "culture" with "norms and values." Many American anthropologists rejected
this view of culture (and by implication, anthropology). In 1980, anthropologist Eric
Wolf wrote,
American kinship
A cockfight in India
Parsons' students Clifford Geertz and David M. Schneider, and Schneider's student Roy
Wagner, went on to important careers as cultural anthropologists and developed a school
within American cultural anthropology called "symbolic anthropology," the study of the
social construction and social effects of symbols.[151][152][153][154] Since symbolic
anthropology easily complemented social anthropologists' studies of social life and social
structure, many British structural-functionalists (who rejected or were uninterested in
Boasian cultural anthropology) accepted the Parsonian definition of "culture" and
"cultural anthropology." British anthropologist Victor Turner (who eventually left the
United Kingdom to teach in the United States) was an important bridge between
American and British symbolic anthropology.[155]
Attention to symbols, the meaning of which depended almost entirely on their historical
and social context, appealed to many Boasians. Leslie White asked of cultural things,
"What sort of objects are they? Are they physical objects? Mental objects? Both?
Metaphors? Symbols? Reifications?" In Science of Culture (1949), he concluded that
they are objects "sui generis"; that is, of their own kind. In trying to define that kind, he
hit upon a previously unrealized aspect of symbolization, which he called "the
symbolate"—an object created by the act of symbolization. He thus defined culture as
"symbolates understood in an extra-somatic context."[156]
Nevertheless, by the 1930s White began turning away from the Boasian approach.[157] He
wrote,
In order to live man, like all other species, must come to terms with the external
world.... Man employs his sense organs, nerves, glands, and muscles in adjusting
himself to the external world. But in addition to this he has another means of
adjustment and control.... This mechanism is culture.[158]
Although this view echoes that of Malinowski, the key concept for White was not
"function" but "adaptation." Whereas the Boasians were interested in the history of
specific traits, White was interested in the cultural history of the human species, which he
felt should be studied from an evolutionary perspective. Thus, the task of anthropology is
to study "not only how culture evolves, but why as well.... In the case of man ... the
power to invent and to discover, the ability to select and use the better of two tools or
ways of doing something- these are the factors of cultural evolution."[159] Unlike 19th
century evolutionists, who were concerned with how civilized societies rose above
primitive societies, White was interested in documenting how, over time, humankind as a
whole has through cultural means discovered more and more ways for capturing and
harnessing energy from the environment, in the process transforming culture.
At the same time that White was developing his theory of cultural evolution, Kroeber's
student Julian Steward was developing his theory of cultural ecology. In 1938 he
published Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Socio-Political Groups in which he argued that
diverse societies—for example the indigenous Shoshone or White farmers on the Great
Plains—were not less or more evolved; rather, they had adapted differently to different
environments.[160] Whereas Leslie White was interested in culture understood holistically
as a property of the human species, Julian Steward was interested in culture as the
property of distinct societies. Like White he viewed culture as a means of adapting to the
environment, but he criticized Whites "unilineal" (one direction) theory of cultural
evolution and instead proposed a model of "multilineal" evolution in which (in the
Boasian tradition) each society has its own cultural history.[161]
When Julian Steward left a teaching position at the University of Michigan to work in
Utah in 1930, Leslie White took his place; in 1946 Julian Steward was made Chair of the
Columbia University Anthropology Department. In the 1940s and 1950s their students,
most notably Marvin Harris, Sidney Mintz, Robert Murphy, Roy Rappaport, Marshall
Sahlins, Elman Service, Andrew P. Vayda and Eric Wolf dominated American
anthropology.[162][163][164][165][166][167][168][169][170] Most promoted materialist understandings of
culture in opposition to the symbolic approaches of Geertz and Schneider. Harris,
Rappaport, and Vayda were especially important for their contributions to cultural
materialism and ecological anthropology, both of which argued that "culture" constituted
an extra-somatic (or non-biological) means through which human beings could adapt to
life in drastically differing physical environments.
The debate between symbolic and materialist approaches to culture dominated American
Anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s. The Vietnam War and the publication of Dell
Hymes' Reinventing Anthropology, however, marked a growing dissatisfaction with the
then dominant approaches to culture. Hymes argued that fundamental elements of the
Boasian project such as holism and an interest in diversity were still worth pursuing:
"interest in other peoples and their ways of life, and concern to explain them within a
frame of reference that includes ourselves."[171] Moreover, he argued that cultural
anthropologists are singularly well-equipped to lead this study (with an indirect rebuke to
sociologists like Parsons who sought to subsume anthropology to their own project):
In the practice there is a traditional place for openness to phenomena in ways not
predefined by theory or design – attentiveness to complex phenomena, to
phenomena of interest, perhaps aesthetic, for their own sake, to the sensory as
well as intellectual, aspects of the subject. These comparative and practical
perspectives, though not unique to formal anthropology, are specially husbanded
there, and might well be impaired, if the study of man were to be united under the
guidance of others who lose touch with experience in concern for methodology,
who forget the ends of social knowledge in elaborating its means, or who are
unwittingly or unconcernedly culture-bound..[172]
It is these elements, Hymes argued, that justify a "general study of man," that is,
"anthropology".[173]
During this time notable anthropologists such as Mintz, Murphy, Sahlins, and Wolf
eventually broke away, experimenting with structuralist and Marxist approaches to
culture, they continued to promote cultural anthropology against structural functionalism.
[174][175][176][177][178]
Boas and Malinowski established ethnographic research as a highly localized method for
studying culture. Yet Boas emphasized that culture is dynamic, moving from one group
of people to another, and that specific cultural forms have to be analyzed in a larger
context. This has led anthropologists to explore different ways of understanding the
global dimensions of culture.
In the 1940s and 1950s, several key studies focused on how trade between indigenous
peoples and the Europeans who had conquered and colonized the Americas influenced
indigenous culture, either through change in the organization of labor, or change in
critical technologies. Bernard Mishkin studied the effect of the introduction of horses on
Kiowa political organization and warfare.[179] Oscar Lewis explored the influence of the
fur trade on Blackfoot culture (relying heavily on historical sources).[180] Joseph Jablow
documented how Cheyenne social organization and subsistence strategy between 1795
and 1840 were determined by their position in trade networks linking Whites and other
Indians.[181] Frank Secoy argued that Great Plains Indians' social organization and military
tactics changed as horses, introduced by the Spanish in the south, diffused north, and
guns, introduced by the British and French in the east, diffused west.[182]
In the 1950s Robert Redfield and students of Julian Steward pioneered "community
studies," namely, the study of distinct communities (whether identified by race, ethnicity,
or economic class) in Western or "Westernized" societies, especially cities. They thus
encountered the antagonisms 19th century critics described using the terms "high culture"
and "low culture." These 20th century anthropologists struggled to describe people who
were politically and economically inferior but not, they believed, culturally inferior.
Oscar Lewis proposed the concept of a "culture of poverty" to describe the cultural
mechanisms through which people adapted to a life of economic poverty. Other
anthropologists and sociologists began using the term "sub-culture" to describe culturally
distinct communities that were part of larger societies.
The way nation states treat immigrant cultures rarely falls neatly into one or another of
the above approaches. The degree of difference with the host culture (i.e., "foreignness"),
the number of immigrants, attitudes of the resident population, the type of government
policies that are enacted, and the effectiveness of those policies all make it difficult to
generalize about the effects. Similarly with other subcultures within a society, attitudes of
the mainstream population and communications between various cultural groups play a
major role in determining outcomes. The study of cultures within a society is complex
and research must take into account a myriad of variables.
Cultural studies
In the United Kingdom, sociologists and other scholars influenced by Marxism, such as
Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams, developed Cultural Studies. Following nineteenth
century Romantics, they identified "culture" with consumption goods and leisure
activities (such as art, music, film, food, sports, and clothing). Nevertheless, they
understood patterns of consumption and leisure to be determined by relations of
production, which led them to focus on class relations and the organization of production.
[183][184]
In the United States, "Cultural Studies" focuses largely on the study of popular
culture, that is, the social meanings of mass-produced consumer and leisure goods. The
term was coined by Richard Hoggart in 1964 when he founded the Birmingham Centre
for Contemporary Cultural Studies or CCCS. It has since become strongly associated
with Stuart Hall, who succeeded Hoggart as Director.
From the 1970s onward, Stuart Hall's pioneering work, along with his colleagues Paul
Willis, Dick Hebdige, Tony Jefferson, and Angela McRobbie, created an international
intellectual movement. As the field developed it began to combine political economy,
communication, sociology, social theory, literary theory, media theory, film/video
studies, cultural anthropology, philosophy, museum studies and art history in order to
study cultural phenomena or cultural texts. In this field researchers often concentrate on
how particular phenomena relate to matters of ideology, nationality, ethnicity, social
class, and/or gender.[citation needed] Cultural studies is concerned with the meaning and
practices of everyday life. These practices comprise the ways people do particular things
(such as watching television, or eating out) in a given culture. This field studies the
meanings and uses people attribute to various objects and practices. Recently, as
capitalism has spread throughout the world (a process called globalization), cultural
studies has begun to analyse local and global forms of resistance to Western hegemony.
[citation needed]
In the context of cultural studies, the idea of a text not only includes written language, but
also films, photographs, fashion or hairstyles: the texts of cultural studies comprise all the
meaningful artifacts of culture.[citation needed] Similarly, the discipline widens the concept of
"culture". "Culture" for a cultural studies researcher not only includes traditional high
culture (the culture of ruling social groups)[185] and popular culture, but also everyday
meanings and practices. The last two, in fact, have become the main focus of cultural
studies. A further and recent approach is comparative cultural studies, based on the
discipline of comparative literature and cultural studies.[citation needed]
Scholars in the United Kingdom and the United States developed somewhat different
versions of cultural studies after the field's inception in the late 1970s. The British version
of cultural studies was developed in the 1950s and 1960s mainly under the influence first
of Richard Hoggart, E. P. Thompson, and Raymond Williams, and later Stuart Hall and
others at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham.
This included overtly political, left-wing views, and criticisms of popular culture as
'capitalist' mass culture; it absorbed some of the ideas of the Frankfurt School critique of
the "culture industry" (i.e. mass culture). This emerges in the writings of early British
cultural-studies scholars and their influences: see the work of (for example) Raymond
Williams, Stuart Hall, Paul Willis, and Paul Gilroy.
Whereas in the United States Lindlof & Taylor say that "cultural studies was grounded in
a pragmatic, liberal-pluralist tradition".[186] The American version of cultural studies
initially concerned itself more with understanding the subjective and appropriative side of
audience reactions to, and uses of, mass culture; for example, American cultural-studies
advocates wrote about the liberatory aspects of fandom.[citation needed] The distinction
between American and British strands, however, has faded.[citation needed] Some researchers,
especially in early British cultural studies, apply a Marxist model to the field. This strain
of thinking has some influence from the Frankfurt School, but especially from the
structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser and others. The main focus of an orthodox
Marxist approach concentrates on the production of meaning. This model assumes a mass
production of culture and identifies power as residing with those producing cultural
artifacts. In a Marxist view, those who control the means of production (the economic
base) essentially control a culture.[citation needed] Other approaches to cultural studies, such as
feminist cultural studies and later American developments of the field, distance
themselves from this view. They criticize the Marxist assumption of a single, dominant
meaning, shared by all, for any cultural product. The non-Marxist approaches suggest
that different ways of consuming cultural artifacts affect the meaning of the product. This
view is best exemplified by the book Doing Cultural Studies: The Case of the Sony
Walkman (by Paul du Gay et al.), which seeks to challenge the notion that those who
produce commodities control the meanings that people attribute to them. Feminist
cultural analyst, theorist and art historian Griselda Pollock contributed to cultural studies
from viewpoints of art history and psychoanalysis. The writer Julia Kristeva is influential
voices in the turn of the century, contributing to cultural studies from the field of art and
psychoanalytical French feminism.[citation needed]
Cultural change
A 19th century engraving showing Australian "natives" opposing the arrival of Captain
James Cook in 1770
Cultural invention has come to mean any innovation that is new and found to be useful to
a group of people and expressed in their behavior but which does not exist as a physical
object. Humanity is in a global "accelerating culture change period", driven by the
expansion of international commerce, the mass media, and above all, the human
population explosion, among other factors.
Cultures are internally affected by both forces encouraging change and forces resisting
change. These forces are related to both social structures and natural events, and are
involved in the perpetuation of cultural ideas and practices within current structures,
which themselves are subject to change[187]. (See structuration.)
Social conflict and the development of technologies can produce changes within a society
by altering social dynamics and promoting new cultural models, and spurring or enabling
generative action. These social shifts may accompany ideological shifts and other types
of cultural change. For example, the U.S. feminist movement involved new practices that
produced a shift in gender relations, altering both gender and economic structures.
Environmental conditions may also enter as factors. Changes include following for the
film local hero. For example, after tropical forests returned at the end of the last ice age,
plants suitable for domestication were available, leading to the invention of agriculture,
which in turn brought about many cultural innovations and shifts in social dynamics[188].
Cultures are externally affected via contact between societies, which may also produce—
or inhibit—social shifts and changes in cultural practices. War or competition over
resources may impact technological development or social dynamics. Additionally,
cultural ideas may transfer from one society to another, through diffusion or
acculturation. In diffusion, the form of something (though not necessarily its meaning)
moves from one culture to another. For example, hamburgers, mundane in the United
States, seemed exotic when introduced into China. "Stimulus diffusion" (the sharing of
ideas) refers to an element of one culture leading to an invention or propagation in
another. "Direct Borrowing" on the other hand tends to refer to technological or tangible
diffusion from one culture to another. Diffusion of innovations theory presents a
research-based model of why and when individuals and cultures adopt new ideas,
practices, and products.
Acculturation has different meanings, but in this context refers to replacement of the
traits of one culture with those of another, such has happened to certain Native American
tribes and to many indigenous peoples across the globe during the process of
colonization. Related processes on an individual level include assimilation (adoption of a
different culture by an individual) and transculturation.
Traditionalism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
What is traditionalism?
Wed, 05/15/2002 - 10:47pm — Jim Kalb
That's not someone who believes that tradition is a good source of suggestions or an
acceptable guide when no better can be had. Nor is it someone who thinks that all
traditions must always be followed. It's someone who recognizes that tradition knows
more than any of us, and should be followed unless there are very good reasons to the
contrary. Rejecting tradition is like a novice rejecting the advice of a master. It might be a
good idea, and on occasion it might even be necessary, but it's not something to be done
lightly, especially in important matters. When you do it you're usually wrong.
Traditionalism is rational when we are dealing with things that cannot be demonstrated
and reduced to clear rules. Those include basic things like the attitudes, practices and
ideals that define our way of life. A way of life is too close to us and too comprehensive
to be reduced to rule or judged wholly by external standards. You have to live it to
understand it. As a result, every way of life is traditional.
We live not only by stated purposes but by unstated understandings and by symbols--
things done not because they are practical but because they make intangibles concrete
and so part of the daily pattern of life. For that reason tradition is especially concerned
with things that to antitraditionalists seem irrational or at least non-rational, and therefore
perhaps dispensible--manners, social forms, festivals, heroes, sacred symbols and
institutions, principles and practices that are accepted on faith.
Such things are not in fact dispensible. We need them because they embody the
intangible realities that we need and make them a present reality to us. We rightly prefer
the tradition that embodies those realities to our own reason and purposes because those
realities are basic to the world of habits and understandings within which our reason and
purposes can operate.
There are two challenges to traditionalism. One is that particular traditions are bad and
should be abandoned. Another is that the authority of tradition is unnecessary, that it
should be replaced by the authority of reason and of the experiences that formerly gave
rise to tradition. Traditional morality is to be replaced by some combination of
philosophy and the social sciences, traditional symbols by the artistic creations of the
day, traditional religion by free thought or charismatic inspiration.
The alternate authorities that have been proposed--science, reason, perception, passion,
will, inspiration, artistic creativity--may have their claims, but they contradict themselves
and each other, and none covers enough ground to support a way of life on its own. Only
tradition can weigh the opposing claims and give each a setting in which it can make its
contribution. Traditionalism is thus necessary for rationality and even sanit
The original founders of the arts we call "traditional" may very well have refrained from
calling their creations "traditional" because their arts were in the process of developing at
the time. We do not talk about traditional football or baseball players because no one
practices a form of these sports using older rules, uniforms, or other conventions as
separate from contemporary football or baseball. We call "traditional" those who keep
alive arts not in current use. A bow and arrow expert might be considered a traditional
warrior if he used his weapon in circumstances where others would use M-16's or AK-
47's. He would be a traditionalist because in contemporary times, bows and arrows are
not used, nor even practiced for use in war. In this sense, all Asian martial arts are
traditionalistic.
What passes either as traditionalism or modernism is the method of training. All methods
of training are shaped by the goals an adherent wishes to achieve. A tournamenteer who
trains for open tournament may be referred to as a Modernist, while a Traditionalist, it is
said, trains for closed tournaments, but both are using arts in a way which preserve at
least a vestige of combat (and are thus Traditionalists), while neither is preserving the art
as combat (thus both are Modernists.) Both are developing their arts, but in their own
milieu and at their own pace. Practitioners develop their art to improve and achieve
within their own goal-structures. The labels which they adhere to themselves do not label
their arts but their attitudes.
Traditionalists are in the unfortunate position of having labeled as a "traditional" art that
which is no longer in use for actual combat. Those traditionalists who wish to popularize
the martial arts, by expanding the influence of their style or the attendance of
tournaments, etc., seem to belie their own term for themselves because they wish to
popularize the practice of those arts which are no longer used in combat but which can be
practiced for many other reasons. Thus, they wish to put into use for other goals that
which is no longer used for the original goal. Traditionalists who wish to popularize also
wish to become Modernists in that they desire a new use for old practices. Of course,
there are those traditionalists who do not wish to apply their arts to modern needs at all
but to preserve them for the sake of historical accuracy. These are not really
traditionalists in my view but classicists, or perhaps preservationists.
Lee started with the traditional Wing Chun, at first modifying it only slightly to be able to
deal with longer-limbed and stronger Americans. From there he went on to develop the
more or less modernist Jeet Kune Do, but he always honored his tradition. He had the
utmost respect for both his instructor Man Yip, and his senior William Cheung. To this
degree he can be considered a traditionalist. To the extent that he wrote about traditional
training as bunk, he of course is not honoring tradition. But note that the arts he referred
to as the "classical mess" were not his own arts. Not having grown up in these traditions,
it was easy for him to poo-poo them, much as people in the Japanese arts which I grew up
in poo-pooed Chinese martial arts, much as some people in Korean circles belittle
Japanese arts or people in Chinese circles laugh at the simplicity of Korean styles. If one
does not understand a system nor develop within it, one can easily find fault with it. This
Bruce Lee did and because of it we consider him a rebel and a non-traditional Modernist.
In my opinion, had Bruce Lee withheld his judgment until a later date, he would have
recognized that some of those techniques which seemed useless in combat are often
simply misunderstood because exposure to in-depth instruction is lacking. Lee should be
credited with criticizing martial artists' wholesale belief that externally perceived
applications would work literally as taught, and with criticizing the slowness with which
Asian instruction revealed what really did work, but one should not assume that the
validity of these criticisms implies that all aspects of traditionalism are nonfunctional or
purposeless.
Lee's articles, and later his JKD, set a precedent for the development of modernist martial
arts. Traditional martial arts were becoming more eclectic due to tournament competition
but Lee blew them wide open with his articles in the 1960's. He then advocated a style
which was not a style and an art which was not an art. That is fine for the brave advanced
practitioner who is interested in the essence of the martial arts as combat arts and enters
into that essence without a blueprint. But, Bruce Lee was an experienced martial artist
who taught, by and large, experienced martial artists. He had fundamentals to draw on
and so did his students. Nowadays people with little experience immediately want to
jump into their own eclectic art because they want to be "free". They are simply jumping
into a less experienced format, using a blueprint which has not yet built buildings, one
which is, in fact, being adjusted as it is printed.
Even eclectic modernist arts have to have a form in order to be communicated. Bruce
Lee's "classical messes" were probably over-stringent in insisting that a certain form not
be varied and that variance from that certain form should equal stylistic excommunication
or damnation to the hell of supposed ineffectiveness. I contend that traditional martial arts
produced tested blueprints from which we may expand, grow, and adjust. I am a
traditionalist, for instance, because I find the traditional blueprint to have unexpected
depth and detail. Movements that I have been repeating for two decades hold new things
for me each year. This does not mean, however, that I shut off innovations from the
outside. But I contend that innovations, whether from outside a style or from within,
innovate from some tradition. Styles do not form from thin air. The question is how
extremely do new innovations vary from the tradition of origin? Did not baseball arise as
an innovation from cricket? Was not American football an innovation from rugby? Do
we not get checkers from chess, automobiles from carriages, calculators from abaci,
aerobics from calisthenics, and traditional budo itself from ancient battlefield bugei?
All innovations come from some tradition which has to be developing at some rate.
During the slow developmental periods, perhaps the innovations within the art of origin
went off on a tangent so that, to contemporary ways of thinking, there was no real
improvement. Then some single innovation or group of innovations opened the door to a
new, more rapid period of development in which more innovations flowed. Bruce Lee is
responsible, I think, for accelerating innovation in the martial arts and should be
applauded for it, however, one should not assume that the martial arts were not
developing and changing anyway, albeit at a slower rate.
The traditionalist should respect the innovator to the extent that he/she is contributing to
the martial arts. The modernist should respect those who wish to study more slowly and
in more depth that which is already established. Personally, I respect both. I consider
myself an "innovative traditionalist" because I do not believe in staying solely with one's
"inheritance", I believe in building on it. Most traditionalists, by in large, look to the
hallowed figures of the past. These are the great men of whom we are the feeble
descendants. Modernists, conversely, believe that those were the feeble men of whom we
are the great descendants. I respect both traditionalist and modernist but concur with
neither extreme. Rather, I choose to look toward the future by standing on the shoulders
of giants.
Modernism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Modernism rejected the lingering certainty of Enlightenment thinking, and also that of
the existence of a compassionate, all-powerful Creator.[2][3] This is not to say that all
modernists or modernist movements rejected either religion or all aspects of
Enlightenment thought, rather that modernism can be viewed as a questioning of the
axioms of the previous age.
Adorno would have us understand modernity as the rejection of the false rationality,
harmony, and coherence of Enlightenment thinking, art, and music. But the past proves
sticky. Pound's general imperative to make new, and Adorno's exhortation to challenge
false coherence and harmony, faces T. S. Eliot's emphasis on the relation of the artist to
tradition. Eliot wrote:
"[W]e shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of [a
poet's] work, may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their
immortality most vigorously."[6]
These oppositions are inherent to modernism: it is in its broadest cultural sense the
assessment of the past as different to the modern age, the recognition that the world was
becoming more complex, and that the old "final authorities" (God, government, science,
and reason) were subject to intense critical scrutiny.
Current interpretations of modernism vary. Some divide 20th century reaction into
modernism and postmodernism, whereas others see them as two aspects of the same
movement.
Contents
[hide]
• 1 Present-day perspectives
• 2 History of Modernism
o 2.1 Beginnings
o 2.2 Turn of the century
o 2.3 Explosion, 1910–1930
o 2.4 Second generation, 1930–1945
• 3 Modernism after World War II (The visual and performing arts)
o 3.1 Pollock and abstract influences
o 3.2 In the 1960s after abstract expressionism
o 3.3 Pop art
o 3.4 Minimalism
3.4.1 Postminimalism
o 3.5 Collage, assemblage, installations
o 3.6 Neo-Dada
o 3.7 Performance and happenings
o 3.8 Intermedia, Multi-media
o 3.9 Fluxus
o 3.10 Late period
• 4 Goals of the movement
• 5 Criticisms of modernism
• 6 Differences between modernism and postmodernism
• 7 See also
• 8 Notes and references
• 9 Further reading
• 10 External links
The first half of the nineteenth century for Europe was marked by a number of wars and
revolutions, which contributed to an aesthetic "turning away" from the realities of
political and social fragmentation, and so facilitated a trend towards Romanticism:
emphasis on individual subjective experience, the sublime, the supremacy of "Nature" as
a subject for art, revolutionary or radical extensions of expression, and individual liberty.
By mid-century, however, a synthesis of these ideas with stable governing forms had
emerged, partly in reaction to the failed Romantic and democratic Revolutions of 1848. It
was exemplified by Otto von Bismarck's Realpolitik and by "practical" philosophical
ideas such as positivism. Called by various names—in Great Britain it is designated the
"Victorian era"—this stabilizing synthesis was rooted in the idea that reality dominates
over subjective impressions.
Central to this synthesis were common assumptions and institutional frames of reference,
including the religious norms found in Christianity, scientific norms found in classical
physics and doctrines that asserted that the depiction of external reality from an objective
standpoint was not only possible but desirable. Cultural critics and historians label this set
of doctrines realism, though this term is not universal. In philosophy, the rationalist,
materialist and positivist movements established a primacy of reason and system.
Against the current ran a series of ideas, some of them direct continuations of Romantic
schools of thought. Notable were the agrarian and revivalist movements in plastic arts
and poetry (e.g. the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and the philosopher John Ruskin).
Rationalism also drew responses from the anti-rationalists in philosophy. In particular,
Hegel's dialectic view of civilization and history drew responses from Friedrich
Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, who were major influences on existentialism. All of
these separate reactions together began to be seen as offering a challenge to any
comfortable ideas of certainty derived by civilization, history, or pure reason.
From the 1870s onward, the ideas that history and civilization were inherently
progressive and that progress was always good came under increasing attack. Writers
Wagner and Ibsen had been reviled for their own critiques of contemporary civilization
and for their warnings that accelerating "progress" would lead to the creation of
individuals detached from social values and isolated from their fellow men. Arguments
arose that the values of the artist and those of society were not merely different, but that
Society was antithetical to Progress, and could not move forward in its present form.
Philosophers called into question the previous optimism. The work of Schopenhauer was
labelled "pessimistic" for its idea of the "negation of the will", an idea that would be both
rejected and incorporated by later thinkers such as Nietzsche.
Two of the most significant thinkers of the period were, in biology, Charles Darwin, and
in political science, Karl Marx. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection
undermined the religious certainty of the general public, and the sense of human
uniqueness of the intelligentsia. The notion that human beings were driven by the same
impulses as "lower animals" proved to be difficult to reconcile with the idea of an
ennobling spirituality. Karl Marx argued there were fundamental contradictions within
the capitalist system—and that the workers were anything but free. Both thinkers would
spawn defenders and schools of thought that would become decisive in establishing
modernism.[citation needed]
Historians have suggested various dates as starting points for modernism. William
Everdell has argued that modernism began with Richard Dedekind's division of the real
number line in 1872 and Boltzmann's statistical thermodynamics in 1874. Clement
Greenberg called Immanuel Kant "the first real Modernist",[10] but also wrote, "What can
be safely called Modernism emerged in the middle of the last century—and rather locally,
in France, with Baudelaire in literature and Manet in painting, and perhaps with Flaubert,
too, in prose fiction. (It was a while later, and not so locally, that Modernism appeared in
music and architecture)."[11] At first, modernism was called the "avant-garde", and the
term remained to describe movements which identify themselves as attempting to
overthrow some aspect of tradition or the status quo.[12]
Separately, in the arts and letters, two ideas originating in France would have particular
impact. The first was impressionism, a school of painting that initially focused on work
done, not in studios, but outdoors (en plein air). Impressionist paintings demonstrated
that human beings do not see objects, but instead see light itself. The school gathered
adherents despite internal divisions among its leading practitioners, and became
increasingly influential. Initially rejected from the most important commercial show of
the time, the government-sponsored Paris Salon, the Impressionists organized yearly
group exhibitions in commercial venues during the 1870s and 1880s, timing them to
coincide with the official Salon. A significant event of 1863 was the Salon des Refusés,
created by Emperor Napoleon III to display all of the paintings rejected by the Paris
Salon. While most were in standard styles, but by inferior artists, the work of Manet
attracted tremendous attention, and opened commercial doors to the movement.
Odilon Redon, Guardian Spirit of the Waters, 1878, charcoal on paper, The Art Institute
of Chicago.
The second school was symbolism, marked by a belief that language is expressly
symbolic in its nature and a portrayal of patriotism, and that poetry and writing should
follow connections that the sheer sound and texture of the words create. The poet
Stéphane Mallarmé would be of particular importance to what would occur afterwards.
At the same time social, political, and economic forces were at work that would become
the basis to argue for a radically different kind of art and thinking. Chief among these
was steam-powered industrialization, which produced buildings that combined art and
engineering in new industrial materials such as cast iron to produce railroad bridges and
glass-and-iron train sheds—or the Eiffel Tower, which broke all previous limitations on
how tall man-made objects could be—and at the same time offered a radically different
environment in urban life.
The miseries of industrial urbanism and the possibilities created by scientific examination
of subjects brought changes that would shake a European civilization which had, until
then, regarded itself as having a continuous and progressive line of development from the
Renaissance. With the telegraph's harnessing of a new power, offering instant
communication at a distance, the experience of time itself was altered.
Many modern disciplines (for example, physics, economics, and arts such as ballet and
architecture) denote their pre-twentieth century forms as "classical." This distinction
indicates the scope of the changes that occurred across a wide range of scientific and
cultural pursuits during the period.
In the 1890s a strand of thinking began to assert that it was necessary to push aside
previous norms entirely, instead of merely revising past knowledge in light of current
techniques. The growing movement in art paralleled such developments as the Theory of
Relativity in physics; the increasing integration of the internal combustion engine and
industrialization; and the increased role of the social sciences in public policy. It was
argued that, if the nature of reality itself was in question, and if restrictions which had
been in place around human activity were falling, then art, too, would have to radically
change. Thus, in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century a series of writers,
thinkers, and artists made the break with traditional means of organizing literature,
painting, and music.
Powerfully influential in this wave of modernity were the theories of Sigmund Freud and
Ernst Mach, who argued, beginning in the 1880s, that the mind had a fundamental
structure, and that subjective experience was based on the interplay of the parts of the
mind. All subjective reality was based, according to Freud's ideas, on the play of basic
drives and instincts, through which the outside world was perceived. Ernst Mach
developed a well-known philosophy of science, often called "positivism", according to
which the relations of objects in nature were not guaranteed but only known through a
sort of mental shorthand. This represented a break with the past, in that previously it was
believed that external and absolute reality could impress itself, as it was, on an individual,
as, for example, in John Locke's empiricism, with the mind beginning as a tabula rasa.
Freud's description of subjective states, involving an unconscious mind full of primal
impulses and counterbalancing self-imposed restrictions, was combined by Carl Jung
with a belief in natural essence to stipulate a collective unconscious that was full of basic
typologies that the conscious mind fought or embraced. Darwin's work had introduced
the concept of "man, the animal" to the public mind, and Jung's view suggested that
people's impulses toward breaking social norms were not the product of childishness or
ignorance, but derived from the essential nature of the human animal.[citation needed]Friedrich
Nietzsche championed a philosophy in which forces, specifically the 'Will to power',
were more important than facts or things. Similarly, the writings of Henri Bergson
championed the vital 'life force' over static conceptions of reality. All these writers were
united by a romantic distrust of Victorian positivism and certainty. Instead they
championed, or, in the case of Freud, attempted to explain, irrational thought processes
through the lens of rationality and holism. This was connected with the century-long
trend to thinking in holistic terms, which would include an increased interest in the
occult, and "the vital force".
Out of this collision of ideals derived from Romanticism, and an attempt to find a way for
knowledge to explain that which was as yet unknown, came the first wave of works,
which, while their authors considered them extensions of existing trends in art, broke the
implicit contract with the general public that artists were the interpreters and
representatives of bourgeois culture and ideas. These "modernist" landmarks include the
atonal ending of Arnold Schoenberg's Second String Quartet in 1908, the expressionist
paintings of Wassily Kandinsky starting in 1903 and culminating with his first abstract
painting and the founding of the Blue Rider group in Munich in 1911, and the rise of
fauvism and the inventions of cubism from the studios of Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso,
Georges Braque and others in the years between 1900 and 1910.
This wave of the modern movement broke with the past in the first decade of the
twentieth century, and tried to redefine various artforms in a radical manner. Leading
lights within the literary wing of this movement (or, rather, these movements) include:
• Rafael Alberti
• Gabriele D'Annunzio
• Guillaume Apollinaire
• Louis Aragon
• Djuna Barnes
• Bertolt Brecht
• Basil Bunting
• Ivan Cankar
• Mário de Sá-Carneiro
• Constantine P. Cavafy
• Blaise Cendrars
• Jean Cocteau
• Joseph Conrad
• T. S. Eliot
• Paul Éluard
• William Faulkner
• E. M. Forster
• H.D.
• Ernest Hemingway[13]
• Hugo von Hofmannsthal
• Max Jacob
• James Joyce[14]
• Franz Kafka
• D. H. Lawrence
• Wyndham Lewis
• Federico García Lorca
• Hugh MacDiarmid
• Marianne Moore
• Robert Musil
• Almada Negreiros
• Luigi Pirandello
• Ezra Pound
• Marcel Proust
• Pierre Reverdy
• Rainer Maria Rilke
• Gertrude Stein
• Wallace Stevens
• Italo Svevo
• Tristan Tzara
• Giuseppe Ungaretti
• Paul Valéry
• Robert Walser
• William Carlos Williams
• Virginia Woolf
• William Butler Yeats
On the eve of the First World War a growing tension and unease with the social order,
seen in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the agitation of "radical" parties, also
manifested itself in artistic works in every medium which radically simplified or rejected
previous practice. Young painters such as Pablo Picasso and Henri Matisse were causing
a shock with their rejection of traditional perspective as the means of structuring
paintings—a step that none of the impressionists, not even Cézanne, had taken. In 1907,
as Picasso was painting Demoiselles d'Avignon, Oskar Kokoschka was writing Mörder,
Hoffnung der Frauen (Murderer, Hope of Women), the first Expressionist play (produced
with scandal in 1909), and Arnold Schoenberg was composing his String Quartet #2 in
F-sharp minor, his first composition "without a tonal center." In 1911, Kandinsky painted
Bild mit Kreis (Picture With a Circle) which he later called the first abstract painting. In
1913—the year of Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Niels Bohr's quantized atom, Ezra Pound's
founding of imagism, the Armory Show in New York, and, in Saint Petersburg, the "first
futurist opera," Victory Over the Sun by Alexey Kruchenykh, Velimir Khlebnikov and
Kasimir Malevich—another Russian composer Igor Stravinsky, working in Paris for
Sergei Diaghilev and the Ballets Russes, composed The Rite of Spring for a ballet,
choreographed by Vaslav Nijinsky, that depicted human sacrifice.
These developments began to give a new meaning to what was termed 'modernism': It
embraced discontinuity, rejecting smooth change in everything from biology to fictional
character development and moviemaking. It approved disruption, rejecting or moving
beyond simple realism in literature and art, and rejecting or dramatically altering tonality
in music. This set modernists apart from 19th century artists, who had tended to believe
not only in smooth change ('evolutionary' rather than 'revolutionary') but also in the
progressiveness of such change—'progress.' Writers like Dickens and Tolstoy, painters
like Turner, and musicians like Brahms were not 'radicals' or 'Bohemians,' but were
instead valued members of society who produced art that added to society, even
sometimes while critiquing its less desirable aspects. Modernism, while still
"progressive," increasingly saw traditional forms and traditional social arrangements as
hindering progress, and therefore recast the artist as a revolutionary, overthrowing rather
than enlightening.
Futurism exemplifies this trend. In 1909, the Parisian newspaper Le Figaro published
F.T. Marinetti's first manifesto. Soon afterward a group of painters (Giacomo Balla,
Umberto Boccioni, Carlo Carrà, Luigi Russolo, and Gino Severini) co-signed the Futurist
Manifesto. Modeled on the famous "Communist Manifesto" of the previous century, such
manifestoes put forward ideas that were meant to provoke and to gather followers.
Strongly influenced by Bergson and Nietzsche, Futurism was part of the general trend of
Modernist rationalization of disruption.
Modernist philosophy and art were still viewed as only a part of the larger social
movement. Artists such as Klimt and Cézanne, and composers such as Mahler and
Richard Strauss were "the terrible moderns"—those farther to the avant-garde were more
heard of than heard. Polemics in favour of geometric or purely abstract painting were
largely confined to 'little magazines' (like The New Age in the UK) with tiny circulations.
Modernist primitivism and pessimism were controversial, but were not seen as
representative of the Edwardian mainstream, which was more inclined towards a
Victorian faith in progress and liberal optimism.
However, the Great War and its subsequent events were the cataclysmic upheavals that
late 19th century artists such as Brahms had worried about, and avant-gardists had
embraced. First, the failure of the previous status quo seemed self-evident to a generation
that had seen millions die fighting over scraps of earth—prior to the war, it had been
argued that no one would fight such a war, since the cost was too high. Second, the birth
of a machine age changed the conditions of life—machine warfare became a touchstone
of the ultimate reality. Finally, the immensely traumatic nature of the experience dashed
basic assumptions: realism seemed bankrupt when faced with the fundamentally fantastic
nature of trench warfare, as exemplified by books such as Erich Maria Remarque's All
Quiet on the Western Front. Moreover, the view that mankind was making slow and
steady moral progress came to seem ridiculous in the face of the senseless slaughter. The
First World War fused the harshly mechanical geometric rationality of technology with
the nightmarish irrationality of myth.
André Masson, Pedestal Table in the Studio 1922, early example of Surrealism
Thus modernism, which had been a minority taste before the war, came to define the
1920s. It appeared in Europe in such critical movements as Dada and then in constructive
movements such as surrealism, as well as in smaller movements such as the Bloomsbury
Group. Each of these "modernisms," as some observers labelled them at the time, stressed
new methods to produce new results. Again, impressionism was a precursor: breaking
with the idea of national schools, artists and writers adopted ideas of international
movements. Surrealism, cubism, Bauhaus, and Leninism are all examples of movements
that rapidly found adopters far beyond their geographic origins.
Exhibitions, theatre, cinema, books and buildings all served to cement in the public view
the perception that the world was changing. Hostile reaction often followed, as paintings
were spat upon, riots organized at the opening of works, and political figures denounced
modernism as unwholesome and immoral. At the same time, the 1920s were known as
the "Jazz Age", and the public showed considerable enthusiasm for cars, air travel, the
telephone and other technological advances.
By 1930, modernism had won a place in the establishment, including the political and
artistic establishment, although by this time modernism itself had changed. There was a
general reaction in the 1920s against the pre-1918 modernism, which emphasized its
continuity with a past while rebelling against it, and against the aspects of that period
which seemed excessively mannered, irrational, and emotionalistic. The post-World War
period, at first, veered either to systematization or nihilism and had, as perhaps its most
paradigmatic movement, Dada.
While some writers attacked the madness of the new modernism, others described it as
soulless and mechanistic. Among modernists there were disputes about the importance of
the public, the relationship of art to audience, and the role of art in society. Modernism
comprised a series of sometimes contradictory responses to the situation as it was
understood, and the attempt to wrestle universal principles from it. In the end science and
scientific rationality, often taking models from the 18th-century Enlightenment, came to
be seen as the source of logic and stability, while the basic primitive sexual and
unconscious drives, along with the seemingly counter-intuitive workings of the new
machine age, were taken as the basic emotional substance. From these two seemingly
incompatible poles, modernists began to fashion a complete weltanschauung that could
encompass every aspect of life.
By 1930, Modernism had entered popular culture. With the increasing urbanization of
populations, it was beginning to be looked to as the source for ideas to deal with the
challenges of the day. As modernism gained traction in academia, it was developing a
self-conscious theory of its own importance. Popular culture, which was not derived from
high culture but instead from its own realities (particularly mass production) fueled much
modernist innovation. By 1930 The New Yorker magazine began publishing new and
modern ideas by young writers and humorists like Dorothy Parker, Robert Benchley, E.B.
White, S.J. Perelman, and James Thurber, amongst others. Modern ideas in art appeared
in commercials and logos, the famous London Underground logo, designed by Edward
Johnston in 1919, being an early example of the need for clear, easily recognizable and
memorable visual symbols.
Another strong influence at this time was Marxism. After the generally
primitivistic/irrationalist aspect of pre-World War I Modernism, which for many
modernists precluded any attachment to merely political solutions, and the neoclassicism
of the 1920s, as represented most famously by T. S. Eliot and Igor Stravinsky—which
rejected popular solutions to modern problems—the rise of Fascism, the Great
Depression, and the march to war helped to radicalise a generation. The Russian
Revolution catalyzed the fusion of political radicalism and utopianism, with more
expressly political stances. Bertolt Brecht, W. H. Auden, André Breton, Louis Aragon
and the philosophers Antonio Gramsci and Walter Benjamin are perhaps the most famous
exemplars of this modernist Marxism. This move to the radical left, however, was neither
universal, nor definitional, and there is no particular reason to associate modernism,
fundamentally, with 'the left'. Modernists explicitly of 'the right' include Louis-Ferdinand
Céline, Salvador Dalí, Wyndham Lewis, William Butler Yeats, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound,
the Dutch author Menno ter Braak and many others.
Must be modern to keep up
One of the most visible changes of this period was the adoption of objects of modern
production into daily life. Electricity, the telephone, the automobile—and the need to
work with them, repair them and live with them—created the need for new forms of
manners and social life. The kind of disruptive moment that only a few knew in the 1880s
became a common occurrence. For example, the speed of communication reserved for the
stock brokers of 1890 became part of family life.
Modernism as leading to social organization would produce inquiries into sex and the
basic bondings of the nuclear, rather than extended, family. The Freudian tensions of
infantile sexuality and the raising of children became more intense, because people had
fewer children, and therefore a more specific relationship with each child: the theoretical,
again, became the practical and even popular.
The post-war period left the capitals of Europe in upheaval with an urgency to
economically and physically rebuild and to politically regroup. In Paris (the former center
of European culture and the former capital of the art world) the climate for art was a
disaster. Important collectors, dealers, and modernist artists, writers, and poets had fled
Europe for New York and America. The surrealists and modern artists from every
cultural center of Europe had fled the onslaught of the Nazis for safe haven in the United
States. Many of those who didn't flee perished. A few artists, notably Pablo Picasso,
Henri Matisse, and Pierre Bonnard, remained in France and survived.
The 1940s in New York City heralded the triumph of American abstract expressionism, a
modernist movement that combined lessons learned from Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso,
surrealism, Joan Miró, cubism, Fauvism, and early modernism via great teachers in
America like Hans Hofmann and John D. Graham. American artists benefited from the
presence of Piet Mondrian, Fernand Léger, Max Ernst and the André Breton group, Pierre
Matisse's gallery, and Peggy Guggenheim's gallery The Art of This Century, as well as
other factors.
During the late 1940s Jackson Pollock's radical approach to painting revolutionized the
potential for all contemporary art that followed him. To some extent Pollock realized that
the journey toward making a work of art was as important as the work of art itself. Like
Pablo Picasso's innovative reinventions of painting and sculpture near the turn of the
century via cubism and constructed sculpture, Pollock redefined the way art gets made.
His move away from easel painting and conventionality was a liberating signal to the
artists of his era and to all who came after. Artists realized that Jackson Pollock's process
—placing unstretched raw canvas on the floor where it could be attacked from all four
sides using artistic and industrial materials; dripping and throwing linear skeins of paint;
drawing, staining, and brushing; using imagery and non-imagery—essentially blasted
artmaking beyond any prior boundary. Abstract expressionism generally expanded and
developed the definitions and possibilities available to artists for the creation of new
works of art.
Barnett Newman, Who's Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue?, 1966. Typical of Newman's
later work, with the use of pure and vibrant color.
Main articles: Post-painterly abstraction, Color field painting, Lyrical abstraction, Arte
Povera, Process art, and Western painting
In abstract painting during the 1950s and 1960s several new directions like hard-edge
painting and other forms of geometric abstraction began to appear in artist studios and in
radical avant-garde circles as a reaction against the subjectivism of abstract
expressionism. Clement Greenberg became the voice of post-painterly abstraction when
he curated an influential exhibition of new painting that toured important art museums
throughout the United States in 1964. Color field painting, hard-edge painting and lyrical
abstraction[18] emerged as radical new directions.
By the late 1960s however, postminimalism, process art and Arte Povera[19] also emerged
as revolutionary concepts and movements that encompassed both painting and sculpture,
via lyrical abstraction and the postminimalist movement, and in early conceptual art.[19]
Process art as inspired by Pollock enabled artists to experiment with and make use of a
diverse encyclopedia of style, content, material, placement, sense of time, and plastic and
real space. Nancy Graves, Ronald Davis, Howard Hodgkin, Larry Poons, Jannis
Kounellis, Brice Marden, Bruce Nauman, Richard Tuttle, Alan Saret, Walter Darby
Bannard, Lynda Benglis, Dan Christensen, Larry Zox, Ronnie Landfield, Eva Hesse,
Keith Sonnier, Richard Serra, Sam Gilliam, Mario Merz and Peter Reginato were some of
the younger artists who emerged during the era of late modernism that spawned the
heyday of the art of the late 1960s.[20]
In 1962 the Sidney Janis Gallery mounted The New Realists, the first major pop art group
exhibition in an uptown art gallery in New York City. Janis mounted the exhibition in a
57th Street storefront near his gallery at 15 E. 57th Street. The show sent shockwaves
through the New York School and reverberated worldwide. Earlier in England in 1958
the term "Pop Art" was used by Lawrence Alloway to describe paintings that celebrated
consumerism of the post World War II era. This movement rejected abstract
expressionism and its focus on the hermeneutic and psychological interior in favor of art
that depicted and often celebrated material consumer culture, advertising, and
iconography of the mass production age. The early works of David Hockney and the
works of Richard Hamilton and Eduardo Paolozzi were considered seminal examples in
the movement. Meanwhile in the downtown scene in New York's East Village 10th Street
galleries artists were formulating an American version of pop art. Claes Oldenburg had
his storefront, and the Green Gallery on 57th Street began to show the works of Tom
Wesselmann and James Rosenquist. Later Leo Castelli exhibited the works of other
American artists, including those of Andy Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein for most of their
careers. There is a connection between the radical works of Marcel Duchamp and Man
Ray, the rebellious Dadaists with a sense of humor, and pop artists like Claes Oldenburg,
Andy Warhol, and Roy Lichtenstein, whose paintings reproduce the look of Benday dots,
a technique used in commercial reproduction.
[edit] Minimalism
By the early 1960s minimalism emerged as an abstract movement in art (with roots in
geometric abstraction of Kazimir Malevich, the Bauhaus and Piet Mondrian) that rejected
the idea of relational and subjective painting, the complexity of abstract expressionist
surfaces, and the emotional zeitgeist and polemics present in the arena of action painting.
Minimalism argued that extreme simplicity could capture all of the sublime
representation needed in art. Associated with painters such as Frank Stella, minimalism in
painting, as opposed to other areas, is a modernist movement. Minimalism is variously
construed either as a precursor to postmodernism, or as a postmodern movement itself. In
the latter perspective, early minimalism yielded advanced modernist works, but the
movement partially abandoned this direction when some artists like Robert Morris
changed direction in favor of the anti-form movement.
Hal Foster, in his essay The Crux of Minimalism, [21] examines the extent to which Donald
Judd and Robert Morris both acknowledge and exceed Greenbergian modernism in their
published definitions of minimalism.[22] He argues that minimalism is not a "dead end" of
modernism, but a "paradigm shift toward postmodern practices that continue to be
elaborated today." [23]
[edit] Postminimalism
Smithson's "Spiral Jetty" from atop Rozel Point, in mid-April 2005. It was created in
1970 and still exists although it has often been submerged by the fluctuating lake level. It
consists of some 6500 tons of basalt, earth and salt.
In the late 1960s Robert Pincus-Witten[19] coined the term postminimalism to describe
minimalist-derived art which had content and contextual overtones that minimalism
rejected. The term was applied by Pincus-Whitten to the work of Eva Hesse, Keith
Sonnier, Richard Serra and new work by former minimalists Robert Smithson, Robert
Morris, and Sol LeWitt, and Barry Le Va, and others. Other minimalists including
Donald Judd, Dan Flavin, Carl Andre, Agnes Martin, John McCracken and others
continued to produce late modernist paintings and sculpture for the remainders of their
careers.
In the 1960s the work of the avant-garde minimalist composers La Monte Young, Philip
Glass, Steve Reich, and Terry Riley also achieved prominence in the New York art
world.
Since then, many artists have embraced minimal or postminimal styles and the label
"postmodern" has been attached to them.
[edit] Neo-Dada
In the early 20th century Marcel Duchamp exhibited a urinal as a sculpture. His professed
his intent that people look at the urinal as if it were a work of art because he said it was a
work of art. He referred to his work as "readymades". Fountain was a urinal signed with
the pseudonym R. Mutt, the exhibition of which shocked the art world in 1917. This and
Duchamp's other works are generally labelled as Dada. Duchamp can be seen as a
precursor to conceptual art, other famous examples being John Cage's 4'33", which is
four minutes and thirty three seconds of silence, and Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning.
Many conceptual works take the position that art is the result of the viewer viewing an
object or act as art, not of the intrinsic qualites of the work itself. Thus, because Fountain
was exhibited, it was a sculpture.
Marcel Duchamp famously gave up "art" in favor of chess. Avant-garde composer David
Tudor created a piece, Reunion (1968), written jointly with Lowell Cross, that features a
chess game in which each move triggers a lighting effect or projection. Duchamp and
Cage played the game at the work's premier.[24]
Steven Best and Douglas Kellner identify Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns as part of the
transitional phase, influenced by Marcel Duchamp, between modernism and
postmodernism. Both used images of ordinary objects, or the objects themselves, in their
work, while retaining the abstraction and painterly gestures of high modernism.[25]
Another trend in art associated with neo-Dada is the use of a number of different media
together. Intermedia, a term coined by Dick Higgins and meant to convey new artforms
along the lines of Fluxus, concrete poetry, found objects, performance art, and computer
art. Higgins was publisher of the Something Else Press, a concrete poet, husband of artist
Alison Knowles and an admirer of Marcel Duchamp.
During the late 1950s and 1960s artists with a wide range of interests began to push the
boundaries of contemporary art. Yves Klein in France, and in New York City, Carolee
Schneemann, Yayoi Kusama, Charlotte Moorman and Yoko Ono were pioneers of
performance-based works of art. Groups like The Living Theater with Julian Beck and
Judith Malina collaborated with sculptors and painters creating environments, radically
changing the relationship between audience and performer especially in their piece
Paradise Now. The Judson Dance Theater, located at the Judson Memorial Church, New
York; and the Judson dancers, notably Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, Elaine Summers,
Sally Gross, Simonne Forti, Deborah Hay, Lucinda Childs, Steve Paxton and others;
collaborated with artists Robert Morris, Robert Whitman, John Cage, Robert
Rauschenberg, and engineers like Billy Klüver. Park Place Gallery was a center for
musical performances by electronic composers Steve Reich, Philip Glass and other
notable performance artists including Joan Jonas. These performances were intended as
works of a new art form combining sculpture, dance, and music or sound, often with
audience participation. They were characterized by the reductive philosophies of
minimalism and the spontaneous improvisation and expressivity of abstract
expressionism.
During the same period, various avant-garde artists created Happenings. Happenings
were mysterious and often spontaneous and unscripted gatherings of artists and their
friends and relatives in various specified locations, often incorporating exercises in
absurdity, physicality, costuming, spontaneous nudity, and various random or seemingly
disconnected acts. Notable creators of happenings included Allan Kaprow, Claes
Oldenburg, Jim Dine, Red Grooms, and Robert Whitman. [26]
Allan Kaprow's performance art attempted to integrate art and life. Through Happenings,
the separation between life, art, artist, and audience becomes blurred. The Happening
allows the artist to experiment with body motion, recorded sounds, written and spoken
texts, and even smells. One of Allan Kaprow's earliest Happenings was the "Happenings
in the New York Scene," written in 1961 as the form was developing. [27]
In 1958, Kaprow published the essay "The Legacy of Jackson Pollock". In it he demands
a "concrete art" made of everyday materials such as "paint, chairs, food, electric and neon
lights, smoke, water, old socks, a dog, movies." In this particular text, he uses the term
"happening" for the first time stating that craftsmanship and permanence should be
forgotten and perishable materials should be used in art.[28]
Another trend in art which has been associated with the term postmodern is the use of a
number of different media together. Intermedia, a term coined by Dick Higgins and
meant to convey new artforms along the lines of Fluxus, Concrete Poetry, Found objects,
Performance art, and Computer art. Higgins was the publisher of the Something Else
Press, a Concrete poet, married to artist Alison Knowles and an admirer of Marcel
Duchamp. Ihab Hassan includes, "Intermedia, the fusion of forms, the confusion of
realms," in his list of the characteristics of postmodern art.[29] One of the most common
forms of "multi-media art" is the use of video-tape and CRT monitors, termed Video art.
While the theory of combining multiple arts into one art is quite old, and has been
revived periodically, the postmodern manifestation is often in combination with
performance art, where the dramatic subtext is removed, and what is left is the specific
statements of the artist in question or the conceptual statement of their action.
[edit] Fluxus
Fluxus was named and loosely organized in 1962 by George Maciunas (1931–78), a
Lithuanian-born American artist. Fluxus traces its beginnings to John Cage's 1957 to
1959 Experimental Composition classes at the New School for Social Research in New
York City. Many of his students were artists working in other media with little or no
background in music. Cage's students included Fluxus founding members Jackson Mac
Low, Al Hansen, George Brecht and Dick Higgins.
Fluxus encouraged a do-it-yourself aesthetic and valued simplicity over complexity. Like
Dada before it, Fluxus included a strong current of anti-commercialism and an anti-art
sensibility, disparaging the conventional market-driven art world in favor of an artist-
centered creative practice. Fluxus artists preferred to work with whatever materials were
at hand, and either created their own work or collaborated in the creation process with
their colleagues.
Andreas Huyssen criticises attempts to claim Fluxus for postmodernism as, "either the
master-code of postmodernism or the ultimately unrepresentable art movement – as it
were, postmodernism's sublime." [30] Instead he sees Fluxus as a major Neo-Dadaist
phenomena within the avant-garde tradition. It did not represent a major advance in the
development of artistic strategies, though it did express a rebellion against, "the
administered culture of the 1950s, in which a moderate, domesticated modernism served
as ideological prop to the Cold War."[31]
Ronnie Landfield, Garden of Delight, 1971, lyrical abstraction from the early 1970s
Artists from many disciplines continue to work in modernist styles into the 21st century.
The continuation of abstract expressionism, color field painting, lyrical abstraction,
geometric abstraction, minimalism, abstract illusionism, process art, pop art,
postminimalism, and other late 20th century modernist movements in both painting and
sculpture continue through the first decade of the 21st century. [32] and constitute radical
new directions in those mediums.[33][34]
At the turn of the 21st century, well-established artists such as Sir Anthony Caro, Lucian
Freud, Cy Twombly, Robert Rauschenberg, Jasper Johns, Agnes Martin, Al Held,
Ellsworth Kelly, Helen Frankenthaler, Frank Stella, Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Claes
Oldenburg, Jim Dine, James Rosenquist, Alex Katz, Philip Pearlstein, and younger artists
including Brice Marden, Chuck Close, Sam Gilliam, Isaac Witkin, Sean Scully, Joseph
Nechvatal, Elizabeth Murray, Larry Poons, Richard Serra, Walter Darby Bannard, Larry
Zox, Ronnie Landfield, Ronald Davis, Dan Christensen, Joel Shapiro, Tom Otterness,
Joan Snyder, Ross Bleckner, Archie Rand, Susan Crile, and dozens of others continued to
produce vital and influential paintings and sculpture.
However, by the early 1980s the postmodern movement in art and architecture began to
establish its position through various conceptual and intermedia formats. Postmodernism
in music and literature began to take hold even earlier, some say by the 1950s. While
postmodernism implies an end to modernism, many theorists and scholars contend that
late modernism continues into the 21st century.
[edit] Goals of the movement
Many modernists believed that by rejecting tradition they could discover radically new
ways of making art. Arnold Schoenberg rejected traditional tonal harmony, the
hierarchical system of organizing works of music that had guided music making for at
least a century and a half. He believed he had discovered a wholly new way of organizing
sound, based in the use of twelve-note rows. Abstract artists, taking as their examples the
impressionists, as well as Paul Cézanne and Edvard Munch, began with the assumption
that color and shape, not the depiction of the natural world, formed the essential
characteristics of art. Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, and Kazimir Malevich all
believed in redefining art as the arrangement of pure color. The use of photography,
which had rendered much of the representational function of visual art obsolete, strongly
affected this aspect of modernism. However, these artists also believed that by rejecting
the depiction of material objects they helped art move from a materialist to a spiritualist
phase of development.
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's 330 North Wabash (formerly IBM Plaza) in Chicago
Main article: International style (architecture)
Other modernists, especially those involved in design, had more pragmatic views.
Modernist architects and designers believed that new technology rendered old styles of
building obsolete. Le Corbusier thought that buildings should function as "machines for
living in", analogous to cars, which he saw as machines for traveling in. Just as cars had
replaced the horse, so modernist design should reject the old styles and structures
inherited from Ancient Greece or from the Middle Ages. In some cases form superseded
function. Following this machine aesthetic, modernist designers typically rejected
decorative motifs in design, preferring to emphasize the materials used and pure
geometrical forms. The skyscraper, such as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's Seagram
Building in New York (1956–1958), became the archetypal modernist building.
Modernist design of houses and furniture also typically emphasized simplicity and clarity
of form, open-plan interiors, and the absence of clutter. Modernism reversed the 19th-
century relationship of public and private: in the 19th century, public buildings were
horizontally expansive for a variety of technical reasons, and private buildings
emphasized verticality—to fit more private space on increasingly limited land.
Conversely, in the 20th century, public buildings became vertically oriented and private
buildings became organized horizontally. Many aspects of modernist design still persist
within the mainstream of contemporary architecture today, though its previous
dogmatism has given way to a more playful use of decoration, historical quotation, and
spatial drama.
Wassily Chair
In other arts such pragmatic considerations were less important. In literature and visual
art some modernists sought to defy expectations mainly in order to make their art more
vivid, or to force the audience to take the trouble to question their own preconceptions.
This aspect of modernism has often seemed a reaction to consumer culture, which
developed in Europe and North America in the late 19th century. Whereas most
manufacturers try to make products that will be marketable by appealing to preferences
and prejudices, high modernists rejected such consumerist attitudes in order to undermine
conventional thinking. The art critic Clement Greenberg expounded this theory of
modernism in his essay Avant-Garde and Kitsch.[35] Greenberg labelled the products of
consumer culture "kitsch", because their design aimed simply to have maximum appeal,
with any difficult features removed. For Greenberg, modernism thus formed a reaction
against the development of such examples of modern consumer culture as commercial
popular music, Hollywood, and advertising. Greenberg associated this with the
revolutionary rejection of capitalism.
Some modernists did see themselves as part of a revolutionary culture—one that included
political revolution. Others rejected conventional politics as well as artistic conventions,
believing that a revolution of political consciousness had greater importance than a
change in political structures. Many modernists saw themselves as apolitical. Others,
such as T. S. Eliot, rejected mass popular culture from a conservative position. Some [35]
even argue that modernism in literature and art functioned to sustain an elite culture
which excluded the majority of the population.
The most controversial aspect of the modern movement was, and remains, its rejection of
tradition. Modernism's stress on freedom of expression, experimentation, radicalism, and
primitivism disregards conventional expectations. In many art forms this often meant
startling and alienating audiences with bizarre and unpredictable effects, as in the strange
and disturbing combinations of motifs in surrealism or the use of extreme dissonance and
atonality in modernist music. In literature this often involved the rejection of intelligible
plots or characterization in novels, or the creation of poetry that defied clear
interpretation.
After the rise of Stalin, the Soviet Communist government rejected modernism on the
grounds of alleged elitism, although it had previously endorsed futurism and
constructivism. The Nazi government of Germany deemed modernism narcissistic and
nonsensical, as well as "Jewish" and "Negro" (see Anti-semitism). The Nazis exhibited
modernist paintings alongside works by the mentally ill in an exhibition entitled
Degenerate Art. Accusations of "formalism" could lead to the end of a career, or worse.
For this reason many modernists of the post-war generation felt that they were the most
important bulwark against totalitarianism, the "canary in the coal mine", whose
repression by a government or other group with supposed authority represented a warning
that individual liberties were being threatened. Louis A. Sass compared madness,
specifically schizophrenia, and modernism in a less fascist manner by noting their shared
disjunctive narratives, surreal images, and incoherence.[36]
In fact, modernism flourished mainly in consumer/capitalist societies, despite the fact that
its proponents often rejected consumerism itself. However, high modernism began to
merge with consumer culture after World War II, especially during the 1960s. In Britain,
a youth sub-culture emerged calling itself "modernist" (usually shortened to Mod),
following such representative music groups as The Who and The Kinks. The likes of Bob
Dylan, Serge Gainsbourg and The Rolling Stones combined popular musical traditions
with modernist verse, adopting literary devices derived from James Joyce, Samuel
Beckett, James Thurber, T. S. Eliot, Guillaume Apollinaire, Allen Ginsberg, and others.
The Beatles developed along similar lines, creating various modernist musical effects on
several albums, while musicians such as Frank Zappa, Syd Barrett and Captain Beefheart
proved even more experimental. Modernist devices also started to appear in popular
cinema, and later on in music videos. Modernist design also began to enter the
mainstream of popular culture, as simplified and stylized forms became popular, often
associated with dreams of a space age high-tech future.
This merging of consumer and high versions of modernist culture led to a radical
transformation of the meaning of "modernism". First, it implied that a movement based
on the rejection of tradition had become a tradition of its own. Second, it demonstrated
that the distinction between elite modernist and mass consumerist culture had lost its
precision. Some writers[who?] declared that modernism had become so institutionalized that
it was now "post avant-garde", indicating that it had lost its power as a revolutionary
movement. Many have interpreted this transformation as the beginning of the phase that
became known as postmodernism. For others, such as art critic Robert Hughes,
postmodernism represents an extension of modernism.
In some fields the effects of modernism have remained stronger and more persistent than
in others. Visual art has made the most complete break with its past. Most major capital
cities have museums devoted to 'Modern Art' as distinct from post-Renaissance art (circa
1400 to circa 1900). Examples include the Museum of Modern Art in New York, the
Tate Modern in London, and the Centre Pompidou in Paris. These galleries make no
distinction between modernist and postmodernist phases, seeing both as developments
within 'Modern Art'.
Postmodern theory asserts that the attempt to canonise modernism "after the fact" is
doomed to undisambiguable contradictions.[40]
In a narrower sense, what was modernist was not necessarily also postmodern. Those
elements of modernism which accentuated the benefits of rationality and socio-
technological progress were only modernist.[41]
During the early years of the present century, especially about 1905 and 1906, the
tendency to innovation which troubled the Italian dioceses, and especially the ranks of the
young clergy, was taxed with modernism. Thus at Christmas, 1905, the bishops of the
ecclesiastical provinces of Turin and Vercelli, in a circular letter of that date, uttered
grave warnings against what they called "Modernismo nel clero" (Modernism among the
clergy). Several pastoral letters of the year 1906 made use of the same term; among
others we may mention the Lenten charge of Cardinal Nava, Archbishop of Catania, to
his clergy, a letter of Cardinal Bacilieri, Bishop of Verona, dated 22 July, 1906 and a
letter of Mgr Rossi, Archbishop of Acerenza and Matera. "Modernismo e Modernisti", a
work by Abbate Cavallanti which was published towards the end of 1906, gives long
extracts from these letters. The name "modernism" was not to the liking of thereformers.
The propriety of the new term was discussed even amongst good Catholics. When the
Decree "Lamentabili" appeared, Mgr Baudrillart expressed his pleasure at not finding the
word "modernism" mentioned in it (Revue pratique d'apologetique, IV, p. 578). He
considered the term "too vague". Besides it seemed to insinuate "that the Church
condemns everything modern". The Encyclical "Pascendi" (8 Sept., 1907) put an end to
the discussion. It bore the official title, "De Modernistarum doctrinis". The introduction
declared that the name commonly given to the upholders of the new errors was not inapt.
Since then the modernists themselves have acquiesced in the use of the name, though
they have not admitted its propriety (Loisy, "Simples réflexions sur le decret
'Lamentabili' et sur l'encyclique 'Pascendi' du 8 Sept., 1907", p. 14; "Il programma dei
modernisti": note at the beginning).
A full definition of modernism would be rather difficult. First it stands for certain
tendencies, and secondly for a body of doctrine which, if it has not given birth to these
tendencies (practice often precedes theory), serves at any rate as their explanation and
support. Such tendencies manifest themselves in different domains. They are not united
in eachindividual, nor are they always and everywhere found together. Modernist
doctrine, too, may be more or less radical, and it is swallowed in doses that vary with
each one's likes and dislikes. In the Encyclical "Pascendi", Pius X says that modernism
embraces every heresy. M. Loisy makes practically the same statement when he writes
that "in reality all Catholic theology, even in its fundamental principles the general
philosophy of religion, Divine law, and the laws that govern our knowledge of God,
come up for judgment before this new court of assize" (Simples réflexions, p. 24).
Modernism is a composite system: its assertions and claims lack that principle which
unites the natural faculties in a living being. The Encyclical "Pascendi" was the first
Catholic synthesis of the subject. Out of scattered materials it built up what looked like a
logical system. Indeed friends and foes alike could not but admire the patient skill that
must have been needed to fashion something like a coordinated whole. In their answer to
the Encyclical, "Il programma dei Modernisti", the Modernists tried to retouch this
synthesis. Previous to all this, some of the Italian bishops, in their pastoral letters, had
attempted such a synthesis. We would particularly mention that of Mgr Rossi, Bishop of
Acerenza and Matera. In this respect, too, Abbate Cavallanti's book, already referred to,
deserves mention. Even earlier still, German and French Protestants had done some
synthetical work in the same direction. Prominent among them are Kant, "Die Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft" (1803); Schleiermacher, "Der christliche
Glaube" (1821-1822); and A. Sabatier, "Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'aprè
la psychologie et l'histoire" (1897).
The general idea of modernism may be best expressed in the words of Abbate Cavallanti,
though even here there is a little vagueness: "Modernism is modern in a false sense of the
word; it is a morbid state of conscience among Catholics, and especially young Catholics,
that professes manifold ideals, opinions, and tendencies. From time to time these
tendencies work out into systems, that are to renew the basis and superstructure of
society, politics, philosophy, theology, of the Church herself and of the Christian
religion". A remodelling, a renewal according to the ideas of the twentieth century —
such is the longing that possesses the modernists. "The avowed modernists", says M.
Loisy, "form a fairly definite group of thinking men united in the common desire to adapt
Catholicism to the intellectual, moral and social needs of today" (op. cit., p. 13). "Our
religious attitude", as "Il programma dei modernisti" states (p. 5, note l), "is ruled by the
single wish to be one with Christians and Catholics who live in harmony with the spirit of
the age". The spirit of this plan of reform may be summarized under the following heads:
Such are the fundamental tendencies. As such, they seek to explain, justify, and
strengthen themselves in an error, to which therefore one might give the name of
"essential" modernism. What is this error? It is nothing less than the perversion of dogma.
Manifold are the degrees and shades of modernist doctrine on the question of our
relations with God. But no real modernist keeps the Catholic notions of dogma intact. Are
you doubtful as to whether a writer or a book is modernist in the formal sense of the
word? Verify every statement about dogma; examine his treatment of its origin, its
nature, its sense, its authority. You will know whether you are dealing with a veritable
modernist or not, according to the way in which the Catholic conception of dogma is
travestied or respected. Dogma and supernatural knowledge are correlative terms; one
implies the other as the action implies its object. In this way then we may define
modernism as "the critique of our supernatural knowledge according to the false
postulates of contemporary philosophy".
The attitude Christ adopted, reaching up to God as to a father and then returning to men
as to brothers — such is the meaning of the precept, "Love God and thy neighbour" —
brings full rest to the soul. It makes the religion of Christ the religion par excellence, the
true and definitive religion. The act by which the soul adopts this attitude and abandons
itself to God as a father and then to men as to brothers, constitutes the Christian Faith.
Plainly such an act is an act of the will rather than of the intellect. But religious sentiment
tries to express itself in intellectual concepts, which in their turn serve to preserve this
sentiment. Hence the origin of those formulae concerning God and Divine things, of
those theoretical propositions that are the outcome of the successive religious experiences
of souls gifted with the same faith. These formulae become dogmas, when religious
authority approves of them for the life of the community. For community life is a
spontaneous growth among persons of the same faith, and with it comes authority.
Dogmas promulgated in this way teach us nothing of the unknowable, but only symbolize
it. They contain no truth. Their usefulness in preserving the faith is their only raison
d'être. They survive as long as they exert their influence. Being the work of man in time,
and adapted to his varying needs, they are at best but contingent and transient. Religious
authority too, naturally conservative, may lag behind the times. It may mistake the best
methods of meeting needs of the community, and try to keep up worn-out formulae.
Through respect for the community, theindividual Christian who sees the mistake
continues in an attitude of outward submission. But he does not feel himself inwardly
bound by the decisions of higher powers; rather he makes praiseworthy efforts to bring
hisChurch into harmony with the times. He may confine himself, too, if he cares, to the
older and simpler religious forms; he may live his life in conformity with the dogmas
accepted from the beginning. Such is Tyrrell's advice in his letter to Fogazzaro, and such
was his own private practice.
The tradition of the Catholic Church, on the other hand, considers dogmas as in part
supernatural and mysterious, proposed to our faith by a Divinely instituted authority on
the ground that they are part of the general revelation which the Apostles preached in the
name of Jesus Christ. This faith is an act of the intellect made under the sway of the will.
By it we hold firmly what God has revealed and what the Church proposes to us to
believe. For believing is holding something firmly on the authority of God's word, when
such authority may be recognized by signs that are sufficient, at least with the help of
grace, to create certitude.
Comparing these notions, the Catholic and the modernist, we shall see that modernism
alters the source, the manner of promulgation, the object, the stability, and the truth of
dogma. For the modernist, the only and the necessary source is the private consciousness.
And logically so, since he rejects miracles and prophecy as signs of God's word (Il
programma, p. 96). For the Catholic, dogma is a free communication of God to the
believer made through the preaching of the Word. Of course the truth from without,
which is above and beyond any natural want, is preceded by a certain interior finality or
perfectibility which enables the believer to assimilate and live the truth revealed. It enters
a soul well-disposed to receive it, as a principle of happiness which, though an unmerited
gift to which we have no right, is still such as the soul can enjoy with unmeasured
gratitude. In the modernist conception, the Church can no longer define dogma in God's
name and with His infallible help; the ecclesiastical authority is now but a secondary
interpreter, subject to the collective consciousness which she has to express. To this
collective consciousness the individual need conform only externally; as for the rest he
may embark on any private religious adventures he cares for. The modernist proportions
dogma to his intellect or rather to his heart. Mysteries like the Trinity or the Incarnation
are either unthinkable (a modernist Kantian tendency), or are within the reach of the
unaided reason (a modernist Hegelian tendency). "The truth of religion is in him (man)
implicitly, as surely as the truth of the whole physical universe, is involved in every part
of it. Could he read the needs of his own spirit and conscience, he would need no teacher"
(Tyrrell, "Scylla and Charybdis", p. 277).
Assuredly Catholic truth is not a lifeless thing. Rather is it a living tree that breaks forth
into green leaves, flowers, and fruits. There is a development, orgradual unfolding, and a
clearer statement of its dogmas. Besides the primary truths, such as the Divinity of Christ
and His mission as Messias, there are others which, one by one, become better
understood and defined, e.g. the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and that of the
Infallibility of the Pope. Such unfolding takes place not only in the study of the tradition
of the dogma but also in showing its origin in Jesus Christ and the Apostles, in the
understanding of the terms expressing it and in the historical or rational proofs adduced in
support of it. Thus the historical proof of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception has
certainly been strengthened since the definition in 1854. The rational conception of the
dogma of Divine Providence is a continual object of study; the dogma of the Sacrifice of
the Mass allows the reason to inquire into the idea of sacrifice. It has always been
believed that there is no salvation outside the Church, but as this belief has gradually
come to be better understood, many are now considered within the soul of the Church
who would have been placed without, in a day when the distinction between the soul and
the body of the Church had not generally obtained. In another sense, too dogma is instinct
with life. For its truth is not sterile, but always serves to nourish devotion. But while
holding with life, progress and development, the Church rejects transitory dogmas that in
the modernist theory would be forgotten unless replaced by contrary formulae. She
cannot admit that "thought, hierarchy, cult, in a word, everything has changed in the
history of Christianity", nor can she be content with "the identity of religious spirit"
which is the only permanency that modernism admits (Il programma dei Modernisti).
Truth consists in the conformity of the idea with its object. Now, in the Catholic concept,
a dogmatic formula supplies us with at least an analogical knowledge of a given object.
For the modernist, the essential nature of dogma consists in its correspondence with and
its capacity to satisfy a certain momentary need of the religious feeling. It is an arbitrary
symbol that tells nothing of the object it represents. At most, as M. Leroy, one of the least
radical of modernists, suggests, it is a positive prescription of a practical order (Leroy,
"Dogme et critique", p. 25). Thus the dogma of the Real Presence in the Holy Eucharist
means: "Act as if Christ had the local presence, the idea of which is so familiar to you".
But, to avoid exaggeration, we add this other statement of the same writer (loc. cit.),
"This however does not mean that dogma bears no relation to thought; for (1) there are
duties concerning the action of thinking; (2) dogma itself implicitly affirms that reality
contains in one form or another the justification of such prescriptions as are either
reasonable or salutary".
Here, however, it is needful to speak a word of warning against unreasonable attacks. Not
every novelty is to be condemned, nor is every project of reform to be dubbed modernist
because it is untimely or exaggerated. In the same way, the attempt fully to understand
modernphilosophic thought so as to grasp what is true in such systems, and to discover
the points of contact with the old philosophy, is very far from being modernism. On the
contrary, that is the very best way to refute modernism. Every error contains an element
of truth. Isolate that element and accept it. The structure which it helps to support, having
lost its foundation, will soon crumble. The name modernist then will be appropriate only
when there is question of opposition to thecertain teaching of ecclesiastical authority
through a spirit of innovation. The words of Cardinal Ferrari. Archbishop of Milan, as
cited in "La Revue Pratique d'Apologétique" (VI, 1908, p. 134), will help to show the
point of our last remark. "We are deeply pained", he says, "to find that certain persons, in
public controversy against modernism, in brochures, newspapers and other periodicals,
go to the length of detecting the evil everywhere, or at any rate of imputing it to those
who are very far from being infected with it". In the same year, Cardinal Maffei had to
condemn "La Penta azurea", an anti-modernistorgan, on account of its exaggeration in
this respect. On the other hand, it is regrettable that certain avowed leaders of modernism,
carried away perhaps by the desire to remain within the Church at all costs — another
characteristic of modernism — have taken refuge in equivocation, reticence, or quibbles.
Such a line of action merits no sympathy; while it explains, if it does not altogether
justify, the distrust of sincere Catholics.
Proofs of the foregoing views
But does the principle and the quasi-essential error of modernism lie in its corruption of
dogma? Let us consult the Encyclical "Pascendi". The official Latin text calls the
modernist dogmatic system a leading chapter in their doctrine. The French translation,
which is also authentic, speaks thus: "Dogma, its origin and nature, such is the ground
principle of modernism." The fundamental principle of modernism is, according to M.
Loisy, "the possibility, thenecessity and the legitimacy of evolution in understanding the
dogmas of the Church, including that of papal infallibility and authority, as well as in the
manner of exercising this authority" (op. cit., p. 124). The character and leaning of our
epoch confirm our diagnosis. It likes to substitute leading and fundamental questions in
the place of side issues. The problem of natural knowledge is the burning question in
present-day metaphysics. It is not surprising therefore that the question of supernatural
knowledge is the main subject of discussion in religious polemics. Finally, Pius X has
said that modernism embraces all the heresies. (The same opinion is expressed in another
way in the encyclical "Editae" of 16 May, 1910.) And what error, we ask, more fully
justifies the pope's statement than that which alters dogma in its root and essence? It is
furthermore clear — to use a direct argument — that modernism fails in its attempt at
religious reform, if it makes no change in the Catholic notion of dogma. Moreover, does
not its own conception of dogma explain both a large number of its propositions and its
leanings towards independence, evolution, and conciliation?
• the Christ of faith is not the Christ of history. Faith portrays Christ according to
the religious needs of the faithful; history represents Him as He really was, that is,
in so far as His appearance on earth was a concrete phenomenon. In this way it is
easy to understand how a believer may, without contradiction, attributecertain
things to Christ, and at the same time deny them in the quality of historian. In the
"Hibbert Journal" for Jan., 1909, the Rev. Mr. Robert wished to call the Christ of
history "Jesus" and reserve "Christ" for the same person as idealized by faith;
• Christ's work in founding the Church and instituting the sacraments was mediate,
not immediate. The main point is to find supports for the faith. Now, as religious
experience succeeds so well in creating useful dogmas, why may it not do
likewise in the matter of institutions suited to the age?
• The sacraments act as eloquent formulae which touch the soul and carry it away.
Precisely; for if dogmas exist only in so far as they preserve religious sentiment,
what other service can one expect of the sacraments?
• The Sacred Books are in every religion a collection of religious experiences of an
extraordinary nature. For if there is no external revelation, the only substitute
possible is the subjective religious experience of men of particular gifts,
experiences such as are worthy of being preserved for the community.
Taking only the great lines of the modernist movement within the Church itself. we may
say that under Pius IX its tendency was politico-liberal, under Leo XIII and Pius X social;
later, under Pius X, its tendency became avowedly theological.
It is in France and Italy above all that modernism properly so-called, that is, the form
which attacks the very concept of religion and dogma, has spread its ravages among
Catholics. Indeed, some time after the publication of the Encyclical of 8th September,
1907 the German, English, and Belgian bishops congratulated themselves that their
respective countries had been spared the epidemic in its more contagious form. Of
course, individual upholders of the new error are to be found everywhere, and even
England as well as Germany has produced modernists of note. In Italy, on the contrary,
even before the Encyclical appeared, the bishops have raised the cry of alarm in their
pastoral letters of 1906 and 1907. Newspapers and reviews, openly modernist in their
opinions, bear witness to the gravity of the danger which the Sovereign Pontiff sought to
avert. After Italy it is France that has furnished the largest number of adherents to this
religious reform or ultra-progressive party. In spite of the notoriety of certain individuals,
comparatively few laymen have joined the movement; so far it has found adherents
chiefly among the ranks of the younger clergy. France possesses a modernist publishing
house (La librairie Nourry). A modernist review founded by the late Father Tyrrell,
"Nova et Vetera", is published at Rome. "La Revue Moderniste Internationale" was
started this year (1910) at Geneva. This monthly periodical calls itself "the organ of the
international modernist society". It is open to every shade of modernist opinions, and
claims to have co-workers and correspondents in France, Italy, Germany, England,
Austria, Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Russia, Rumania and America. The Encyclical
"Pascendi" notes and deplores the ardour of the modernist propaganda. A strong current
of modernism is running through the Russian Schismatic Church. The Anglican Church
has not escaped. And indeed liberal Protestantism is nothing but a radical form of
modernism that is winning the greater number of the theologians of the Reformed
Church. Others who oppose the innovation find refuge in the authority of the Catholic
Church.
Philosophy renders great service to the cause of truth; but error calls for its assistance too.
Many consider the philosophic groundwork of modernism to be Kantian. This is true, if
by Kantian philosophy is meant every system that has a root connection with the
philosophy of the Koenigsberg sage. In other words, the basis of modernist philosophy is
Kantian if, because Kant is its father and most illustrious moderate representative, all
agnosticism be called Kantism (by agnosticism is meant the philosophy which denies that
reason, used at any rate in a speculative and theoretical way, can gain true knowledge of
suprasensible things). It is not our business here to oppose the application of the name
Kantian to modernist philosophy. Indeed if we compare the two systems, we shall find
that they have two elements in common, the negative part of the "Critique of Pure
Reason" (which reduces pure or speculative knowledge to phenomenal or experiential
intuition), and a certain argumentative method in distinguishing dogma from the real
basis of religion. On the positive side, however, modernism differs from Kantism in some
essential points. For Kant, faith is a really rational adhesion of the mind to the postulates
of practical reason. The will is free to accept or reject the moral law; and it is on account
of this option that he calls its acceptance "belief". Once it is accepted, the reason cannot
but admit the existence of God, liberty, and immortality. Modernist faith, on the other
hand, is a matter of sentiment, a flinging of oneself towards the Unknowable, and cannot
be scientifically justified by reason. In Kant's system, dogmas and the whole positive
framework of religion are necessary only for the childhood of humanity or for the
common people. They are symbols that bear a certain analogy to images and
comparisons. They serve to inculcate those moral precepts that for Kant constitute
religion. Modernist symbols, though changeable and fleeting, correspond to a law of
human nature. Generally speaking, they help to excite and nourish the effective religious
sentiment which Kant (who knew it from his reading of the pietists) calls schwärmerei.
Kant, as a rationalist, rejects supernatural religion and prayer. The modernists consider
natural religion a useless abstraction; for them it is prayer rather that constitutes the very
essence of religion. It would be more correct to say that modernism is an offshoot of
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who though he owed something to Kant's philosophy,
nevertheless built up his own theological system. Ritschl called him the "legislator of
theology" (Rechtf. und Vers., III, p. 486). Schleiermacher conceives the modernist plan
of reforming religion with the view of conciliating it with science. Thus would he
establish an entente cordiale among the various cults, and even between religion and a
kind of religious sentimentality which, without recognizing God, yet tends towards the
Good and the Infinite. Like the modernists, he has dreams of new religious apologetics;
he wants to be a Christian; he declares himself independent of all philosophy; he rejects
natural religion as a pure abstraction, and derives dogma from religious experience. His
principal writings on this subject are "Ueber die Religion" (1799: note the difference
between the first and the later editions) and "Der Christliche Glaube" (1821-22). Ritschl,
one of Kant's disciples, recognizes the New Testament as the historical basis of religion.
He sees in Christ the consciousness of an intimate union with God, and considers the
institution of the Christian religion, which for him is inconceivable without faith in
Christ, as a special act of God's providence. Thus has he prepared the way for a form of
modernism more temperate than that of Schleiermacher. Though he predicted a continual
development of religion, Schleiermacher admitted a certain fixity of dogma. For this
reason it seems to us that modernists owe their radical evolutionary theory to Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903). It was through the writings of A. Sabatier (18391901), a French
Protestant of the Broad Church type) that the religious theories we have spoken of, spread
among the Latin races, in France and in Italy. It is in these countries, too, that modernism
has done greatest harm among the Catholics. Sabatier is a radical modernist. He has
especially drawn upon Schleiermacher for the composition of his two works on religious
synthesis ("Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'aprè la psychologie et l'histoire",
Paris, 1897; Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit", Paris, 1902).
The consequences
The fact that this radically intrinsic conception of the spiritual or religious activity of man
(this perfect autonomy of the reason vis-à-vis of what is exterior) is the fundamental
philosophical conception of the modernists, as the alteration of dogma is the essential
characteristic of their heresy, can be shown without difficulty by deducting from it their
entire system of philosophy. First of all, of their agnosticism: the vague nature which they
attribute to our faculties does not permit them, without scientific observation, to arrive at
any definite intellectual result. Next, of their evolutionism: there is no determined object
to assure to dogmatic formulae a permanent and essential meaning compatible with the
life of faith and progress. Now, from the moment that these formulae simply serve to
nourish the vague sentiment which for modernism is the only common and stable
foundation ofreligion, they must change indefinitely with the subjective needs of the
believer. It is a right and even a duty for the latter freely to interpret, as he sees fit,
religious facts and doctrines. We meet here with the a priorisms to which the Encyclical
"Pascendi" drew attention.
We wish to insist a little on the grave consequence that this Encyclical puts especially
before our eyes. In many ways, modernism seems to be on the swift incline which leads
to pantheism. It seems to be there on account of its symbolism. After all, is not the
affirmation of a personal God one of these dogmatic formulae which serve only as
symbolic expressions of the religious sentiment? Does not the Divine Personality then
become something uncertain? Hence radical modernism preaches union and friendship,
even with mystical atheism. Modernism is inclined to pantheism also by its doctrine of
Divine Immanence that is, of the intimate presence of God within us. Does this God
declare Himself as distinct from us? If so, one must not then oppose the position of
modernism to the Catholic position and reject exterior revelation. But if God declares
Himself as not distinct from us, the position of modernism becomes openly pantheistic.
Such is the dilemma proposed in the Encyclical. Modernism is pantheistic also by its
doctrine of science and faith. Faith having for object the Unknowable cannot make up for
the want of proportion that modernists put between the intellect and its object. Hence, for
the believer as well as for the philosopher, this object remains unknown. Why should not
this "Unknowable" be the very soul of the world? It is pantheistic also in its way of
reasoning. Independent of and superior to religious formulae, the religious sentiment on
the one hand originates them and gives them their entire value, and, on the other hand, it
cannot neglect them, it must express itself in them and by them; they are its reality. But
we have here theontology of pantheism, which teaches that the principle does not exist
outside of the expression that it gives itself. In the pantheist philosophy, Being or the
Idea, God, is before the world and superior to it, He creates it and yet He has no reality
outside the world; the world is the realization of God.
Then again they are moved by sentiments of liberalism and moderation, which reduce the
importance of formal religion, as they see in the various cults only private opinions which
change with time and place, and which merit an equal respect from all. In the West where
people are of a more practical turn, a non-intellectual interest explains the success of
heresies which win a certain popularity. Consider the countries in which modernism is
chiefly promulgated: France and Italy. In these two countries, and especially in Italy,
ecclesiastical authority has imposed social and political directions which call for the
sacrifice of humanitarian and patriotic ideas or dreams. That there are important reasons
for such commands does not prevent discontent. The majority of men have not enough
virtue or nobility to sacrifice for long, to higher duties, a cause which touches their
interest or which engages their sympathy. Hence it is that some Catholics, who are not
quite steady in their faith and religion, attempt to revolt, and count themselves fortunate
in having some doctrinal pretexts to cover their secession.
The founder of the periodical "La Foi Catholique", a review started for the purpose of
combating modernism, adds this explanation: "The insufficient cultivation of Catholic
philosophy and science is the second deep explanation of the origin of modernist errors.
Both have too long confined themselves to answers which, though fundamentally correct,
are but little suited to the mentality of our adversaries, and are formulated in a language
which they do not understand and which is no longer to the point. Instead of utilizing
what is quitelegitimate in their positive and critical tendencies, they have only considered
them as so many abnormal leanings that must be opposed . . ." (Gaudeau, "La Foi
Catholique", I, pp. 62-65). Another point is that the intrinsicnature of the movement of
contemporary philosophy has been too much despised or ignored in Catholic schools.
They have not given it that partial recognition which is quite consonant with the best
scholastic tradition: "In this way, we have failed to secure a real point of contact between
Catholic and modern thought" (Gaudeau, ibid.). For lack of professors who knew how to
mark out the actual path of religious science, many cultured minds, especially among the
young clergy, found themselves defenseless against an error which seduced them by its
speciousness and by any element of truth contained in its reproaches against the Catholic
schools. It is scholasticism ill-understood and calumniated that has incurred this disdain.
And for the pope, this is one of the immediate causes of modernism. "Modernism", he
says "is nothing but the union of the faith with false philosophy". Cardinal Mercier, on
the occasion of his first solemn visit to the Catholic University of Louvain (8 December,
1907), addressed the following compliment to the professors of theology: "Because, with
more good sense than others, you have vigorously kept to objective studies and the calm
examination of facts, you have both preserved our Alma Mater from the strayings of
modernism and have secured for her the advantages of modern scientific methods."
("Annuaire de l'Université Catholiquede Louvain", 1908, p. XXV, XXVI.) Saint
Augustine (De Genesi contra Manicheos, I, Bk. I, i) in a text that has passed into the
Corpus Juris Canonici (c. 40, c. xxiv, q. 3) had already spoken as follows: "Divine
Providence suffers many heretics of one kind or another, so that their challenges and their
questions on doctrines that we are ignorant of, may force us to arise from our indolence
and stir us with the desire to know Holy Scripture." From another point of view,
modernism marks a religious reaction against materialism and positivism, both of which
fail to satisfy the soul's longing. This reaction however, for reasons that have just been
given, strays from the right path.
The following are the principal decrees or documents expressly directed against
modernism.
• The pope's address on 17 April, 1907, to the newly-created cardinals. It is a
résumé which anticipates the Encyclical "Pascendi".
• A letter from the Congregation of the Index of 29 April, 1907, to the Cardinal
Archbishop of Milan with regard to the review "Il Rinnovamento". In it we find
more concrete notions of the tendencies which the popes condemn. The letter
even goes so far as to mention the names of Fogazzaro, Father Tyrrell, von Hügel
and the Abbate Murri.
• Letters from Pius X, 6 May, 1907, to the archbishops and bishops and to the
patrons of the Catholic Institute of Paris. It shows forth clearly the great and
twofold care of Pius X for the restoration of sacred studies and Scholastic
philosophy, and for the safeguarding of the clergy.
• The decree "Lamentabili" of the Holy Office, 3-4 July, 1907, condemning 65
distinct propositions.
• The injunction of the Holy Office, "Recentissimo", of 28 August, 1907, which
with a view to remedying the evil, enjoins certain prescriptions upon bishops and
superiors of religious orders.
• The Encyclical "Pascendi", of 8 September, 1907, of which we shall speak later
on.
• Three letters of the Cardinal Secretary of State, of 2 and 10 October, and of 5
November, 1907, on the attendance of the clergy at secular universities, urging
the execution of a general regulation of 1896 on this subject. The Encyclical had
extended this regulation to the whole Church.
• The condemnation by the Cardinal-Vicar of Rome of the pamphlet "Il programma
dei modernisti", and a decree of 29 October, 1907, declaring the
excommunication of its authors, with special reservations.
• The decree Motu Proprio of 18 November, 1907, on the value of the decisions of
the Biblical Commission, on the decree "Lamentabili", and on the Encyclical
"Pascendi". These two documents are again confirmed and upheld by
ecclesiastical penalties.
• The address at the (Consistory of 16 December, 1907.
• The decree of the Holy Office of 13 February, 1908, in condemnation of the two
newspapers, "La Justice sociale" and "La Vie Catholique". Since then several
condemnations of the books have appeared.
• The Encyclical "Editae" of 26 May, 1910, renewed the previous condemnations.
• Still stronger is the tone of the Motu Proprio "Sacrorum Antistitum", of 1
September, 1910, declared:
• by a decree of the Consistorial Congregations of 25 September, 1910. This Motu
Proprio inveighs against modernist obstinacy and specious cunning. After having
quoted the practical measures prescribed in the Encyclical "Pascendi", the pope
urges their execution, and, at the same time, makes new directions concerning the
formation of the clergy in the seminaries and religious houses. Candidates for
higher orders, newly appointed confessors, preachers, parish priests, canons, the
beneficed clergy, the bishop's staff, Lenten preachers, the officials of the Roman
congregations, or tribunals, superiors and professors in religious congregations,
all are obliged to swear according to a formula which reprobates the principal
modernist tenets.
• The pope's letter to Prof. Decurtins on literary modernism.
• These acts are for the most part of a disciplinary character (the Motu Proprio of
September, 1910, is clearly of the same nature); the decree "Lamentabili" is
entirely doctrinal; the Encyclical "Pascendi" and the Motu Proprio of 18 March,
1907, are both doctrinal and disciplinary in character. Writers do not agree as to
the authority of the two principal documents; the decree "Lamentabili" and the
Encyclical "Pascendi". In the present writer's opinion, since the new confirmation
accorded to these decrees by the Motu Proprio, they contain in their doctrinal
conclusions the infallible teaching of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. (For a more
moderate opinion cf. Choupin in "Etudes", Paris, CXIV, p. 119-120.) The decree
"Lamentabili" has been called the new Syllabus, because it contains the
proscription by the Holy Office of 65 propositions, which may be grouped under
the following heads: Prop. 1-8, errors concerning the teaching of the Church;
Prop. 9-19, errors concerning the inspiration, truth, and study of Holy Writ,
especially the Gospels; Prop. 20-36, errors concerning revelation and dogma;
Prop. 37-38, Christological errors; Prop. 39-51, errors relative to the sacraments;
Prop. 52-57, errors concerning the institution and organization of the Church;
Prop. 58-65, errors on doctrinal evolution. The Encyclical "Pascendi" in the
introduction laid bare the gravity of the danger, pointed out the necessity of firm
and decisive action, and approved of the title "Modernism" for the new errors. It
gives us first a very methodical exposition of modernism; next follows its general
condemnation with a word as to corollaries that may be drawn from the heresy.
The pope then goes on to examine the causes and the effects of modernism, and
finally seeks the necessary remedies. Their application he endeavors to put into
practice by a series of energetic measures. An urgent appeal to the bishops
fittingly closes this striking document. Home
Culture
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Budaya
Dari Wikipedia Bahasa Melayu, ensiklopedia bebas
penyair dan kritikus Inggris Matthew Arnold dilihat "budaya" sebagai budidaya ideal
humanis.
Dalam prakteknya, budaya disebut ideal elit dan dikaitkan dengan kegiatan seperti seni,
musik klasik, dan haute cuisine. [5] Sebagai bentuk ini berhubungan dengan kehidupan
sopan, "budaya" ini diidentifikasi dengan "peradaban" (dari lat. civitas, kota). Sisi lain
dari gerakan romantis minat dalam cerita rakyat, yang menyebabkan mengidentifikasi
budaya "" di kalangan non-elit. Perbedaan ini sering dicirikan sebagai bahwa antara
"budaya tinggi", yaitu bahwa kelompok berkuasa sosial, dan "budaya rendah." Dengan
kata lain, gagasan "budaya" yang berkembang di Eropa pada abad ke-19 ke-18 dan awal
ketidaksetaraan tercermin dalam masyarakat Eropa. [6]
Matthew Arnold kontras "budaya" dengan "anarki;" Eropa lainnya, berikut filsuf Thomas
Hobbes dan Jean-Jacques Rousseau, kontras "budaya" dengan "keadaan alam." Menurut
Hobbes dan Rousseau, orang Amerika asli yang sedang dikuasai oleh Eropa dari abad ke-
16 di tinggal dalam keadaan alam; oposisi ini diungkapkan melalui kontras antara
"beradab" dan "tidak beradab." Menurut cara berpikir seperti ini, kita dapat
mengklasifikasikan beberapa negara dan bangsa sebagai lebih beradab dari yang lain dan
beberapa orang sebagai lebih berbudaya daripada yang lain. Kontras ini menyebabkan
teori Herbert Spencer Sosial Darwinisme dan teori Lewis Henry Morgan tentang evolusi
kebudayaan. Sama seperti beberapa kritikus berpendapat bahwa perbedaan antara budaya
tinggi dan rendah benar-benar sebuah ekspresi dari konflik antara elite Eropa dan non-
elit, beberapa kritikus berpendapat bahwa perbedaan antara orang-orang beradab dan
tidak beradab benar-benar sebuah ekspresi dari konflik antara Eropa kekuasaan kolonial
dan subjek kolonial mereka.
Inggris antropolog Edward Tylor adalah salah satu ulama berbahasa Inggris pertama yang
menggunakan istilah kebudayaan dalam arti inklusif dan universal.
kritikus abad ke 19 lainnya, berikut Rousseau, telah menerima ini perbedaan antara
budaya tinggi dan rendah, namun telah melihat perbaikan dan kecanggihan budaya tinggi
dan merusak perkembangan alami yang tidak jelas dan mendistorsi sifat dasar manusia.
Kritikus ini dianggap musik rakyat (seperti yang dihasilkan oleh orang yang bekerja-
kelas) dengan jujur mengekspresikan cara alami untuk hidup, sementara musik klasik
tampak dangkal dan dekaden. Sama, pandangan ini sering digambarkan masyarakat adat
sebagai "orang liar yang mulia" menjalani kehidupan yang otentik dan tidak bercacat,
tidak rumit dan uncorrupted oleh sistem kapitalis yang sangat stratified Barat.
Pada tahun 1870 Edward Tylor (1832-1917) menerapkan ide-ide lebih tinggi versus
budaya rendah untuk mengajukan teori evolusi agama. Menurut teori ini, agama
berkembang dari bentuk-bentuk yang lebih politeistik monoteis lebih budaya [7] Dalam
prosesnya, ia didefinisikan ulang sebagai satu set beragam kegiatan karakteristik dari
semua masyarakat manusia.. Pandangan ini membuka jalan bagi pemahaman budaya
modern.
Taksonomi hubungan antara empat spesies yang masih hidup dari clade Hominoidea:
Hylobatidae, Gorillini, Homo, Pan dan Pongo
Diskusi tentang budaya antara pusat antropolog biologis sekitar dua perdebatan. Pertama,
adalah budaya khas manusia atau bersama dengan spesies lain (terutama, primata lain)?
Ini merupakan pertanyaan penting, sebagai teori evolusi menyatakan bahwa manusia
adalah keturunan dari (sekarang sudah punah) primata non-manusia. Kedua, bagaimana
budaya yang berkembang di antara manusia?
Gerald Weiss dicatat bahwa meskipun definisi klasik Tylor budaya dibatasi untuk
manusia, banyak antropolog menganggap ini diberikan dan dengan demikian
menghilangkan bunyi dlm percakapan bahwa kualifikasi penting dari definisi kemudian,
hanya menyamakan budaya dengan perilaku belajar. slip ini menjadi masalah karena
selama tahun-tahun formatif Primatologi modern, beberapa primatologists dilatih dalam
antropologi (dan dipahami bahwa budaya merujuk pada perilaku belajar antara manusia),
dan yang lain tidak. Non-antropolog terkenal, seperti Robert Yerkes dan Jane Goodall
sehingga berpendapat bahwa perilaku sejak simpanse telah belajar, mereka memiliki
budaya. [12] [13] Hari ini, primatologists antropologi dibagi, beberapa mengatakan
bahwa primata non-manusia memiliki budaya, yang lain berpendapat bahwa mereka
tidak. [14] [15] [16] [17]
Ini debat ilmiah rumit oleh kekhawatiran etis. Subyek Primatologi adalah primata non-
manusia, dan apa pun budaya ini telah primata terancam oleh aktivitas manusia. Setelah
meninjau penelitian tentang budaya primata, WC McGrew menyimpulkan, "[disiplin]
membutuhkan subjek, dan sebagian besar jenis satwa primata yang terancam punah oleh
sepupu manusia akhirnya,. Apa manfaatnya, Primatologi budaya harus berkomitmen
untuk kelangsungan hidup budaya [yaitu bagi kelangsungan hidup budaya primata]" [.
18]
McGrew menyarankan definisi budaya bahwa ia menemukan ilmiah berguna untuk
mempelajari budaya primata. Dia menunjukkan bahwa ilmuwan tidak memiliki akses ke
pikiran subjektif atau pengetahuan primata non-manusia. Jadi, jika budaya didefinisikan
dalam istilah pengetahuan, maka para ilmuwan sangat terbatas dalam upaya mereka
untuk belajar budaya primata. Daripada mendefinisikan budaya sebagai semacam
pengetahuan, McGrew menunjukkan bahwa kita melihat budaya sebagai suatu proses.
Dia daftar enam langkah dalam proses:
1. Sebuah pola baru perilaku diciptakan, atau yang sudah ada yang dimodifikasi.
2. inovator yang mengirimkan pola ini ke yang lain.
3. Bentuk pola konsisten di dalam dan di seluruh pemain, bahkan mungkin dalam hal
fitur gaya dikenali.
4. Orang yang memperoleh pola mempertahankan kemampuan untuk melakukan itu lama
setelah mendapatkannya.
5. Pola menyebar di seluruh unit sosial dalam populasi. Unit-unit sosial mungkin
keluarga, marga, tentara, atau band.
6. Berlangsungnya pola di seluruh generasi. [18]
McGrew mengakui bahwa semua enam kriteria mungkin ketat, mengingat kesulitan
dalam mengamati perilaku primata di alam. Tapi ia juga menekankan pada kebutuhan
untuk menjadi seperti inklusif mungkin, tentang perlunya definisi kebudayaan yang
"melemparkan jaring secara luas":
Budaya dianggap sebagai perilaku kelompok-spesifik yang diperoleh, setidaknya
sebagian, dari pengaruh sosial. Di sini, kelompok dianggap sebagai unit spesies-biasa,
apakah itu suatu pasukan, keturunan, subkelompok, atau sebagainya. Prima papan nama
bukti budaya berasal dari dalam-spesies tetapi variasi di-kelompok dalam perilaku,
seperti ketika sebuah pola yang terus-menerus dalam satu komunitas simpanse tetapi
tidak ada dari yang lain, atau ketika masyarakat melakukan berbagai versi yang berbeda
dari pola yang sama. Saran budaya dalam tindakan lebih kuat ketika perbedaan di
kelompok tidak dapat dijelaskan semata-mata oleh faktor-faktor ekologis ....[ 19]
Seperti Charles Frederick Voegelin menunjukkan, jika "budaya" direduksi menjadi
"perilaku yang dipelajari," maka semua hewan memiliki budaya [20]. Tentu saja semua
ahli setuju bahwa semua bukti keterampilan kognitif primata spesies umum: pengetahuan
tentang obyek-permanen, pemetaan kognitif, kemampuan untuk mengkategorikan objek,
dan pemecahan masalah secara kreatif [21]. Selain itu, segala jenis primata menunjukkan
bukti keterampilan sosial bersama: mereka mengenali anggota kelompok sosial mereka;
mereka membentuk hubungan langsung berdasarkan derajat kekerabatan dan peringkat,
mereka mengakui ketiga hubungan sosial partai; mereka memprediksi perilaku masa
depan, dan mereka bekerja sama dalam memecahkan masalah. [21]
Satu saat melihat dari distribusi geografis temporal dan populasi hominid
Namun demikian, istilah "budaya" berlaku untuk binatang non-manusia hanya jika kita
mendefinisikan budaya sebagai salah satu atau semua perilaku dipelajari. Dalam
antropologi mainstream fisik, sarjana cenderung berpikir bahwa definisi yang lebih ketat
perlu. Para peneliti yang peduli dengan bagaimana manusia berevolusi untuk berbeda dari
spesies lainnya. Definisi yang lebih tepat budaya, termasuk perilaku sosial non-manusia,
akan memungkinkan antropolog fisik untuk mempelajari bagaimana manusia berevolusi
kapasitas yang unik untuk "budaya".
Simpanse (Pan troglodytes dan paniscus Pan) adalah manusia '(Homo sapiens) relatif
paling dekat hidup; keduanya adalah keturunan dari satu nenek moyang yang tinggal
sekitar lima atau enam juta tahun yang lalu. Ini adalah jumlah yang sama waktu yang
dibutuhkan untuk kuda dan zebra, singa dan harimau, dan tikus dan tikus, untuk
menyimpang dari nenek moyang masing-masing umum [22] Evolusi manusia modern
adalah cepat: Australopithicenes berevolusi empat juta tahun yang lalu dan manusia
modern di masa beberapa ratus ribu tahun. [23] Selama ini manusia berevolusi waktu tiga
ciri khas:
(A) penciptaan dan penggunaan simbol-simbol konvensional, termasuk simbol linguistik
dan turunannya, seperti ditulis bahasa dan simbol matematika dan notasi; (b) penciptaan
dan penggunaan alat-alat yang kompleks dan teknologi instrumental lainnya, dan (c)
penciptaan dan partisipasi dalam organisasi sosial yang kompleks dan lembaga [24.]
Menurut psikolog perkembangan Michael Tomasello, "mana yang kompleks dan praktek
perilaku spesies-unik, dan keterampilan kognitif yang mendasari mereka, berasal dari"
adalah pertanyaan mendasar antropologi. Mengingat bahwa manusia kontemporer dan
simpanse jauh lebih berbeda dari kuda dan zebra, atau tikus dan tikus, dan bahwa evolusi
terjadi perbedaan besar dalam periode waktu yang singkat, "kita harus cari untuk
beberapa perbedaan kecil yang membuat besar perbedaan - beberapa adaptasi, atau set
kecil adaptasi, yang mengubah proses evolusi kognitif primata secara mendasar. "
Menurut Tomasello, jawaban atas pertanyaan ini harus membentuk dasar definisi ilmiah
tentang "kebudayaan manusia." [24]
Dalam ulasan terbaru dari penelitian besar tentang manusia dan primata-menggunakan
alat, komunikasi, dan strategi pembelajaran, Tomasello berpendapat bahwa kemajuan
manusia kunci atas primata (bahasa, teknologi yang kompleks, organisasi sosial yang
kompleks) adalah semua hasil penyatuan sumber daya kognitif manusia . Hal ini disebut
"efek ratchet:" inovasi tersebar dan dibagi oleh sebuah kelompok, dan menguasai "oleh
anak-anak, yang memungkinkan mereka untuk tetap dalam bentuk yang baru dan lebih
baik dalam kelompok sampai sesuatu yang lebih baik datang." Titik kuncinya adalah
bahwa anak-anak dilahirkan baik pada jenis pembelajaran sosial tertentu, ini menciptakan
lingkungan yang disukai untuk inovasi sosial, membuat mereka lebih mungkin untuk
dipertahankan dan diteruskan ke generasi-generasi baru dari inovasi individu [25] Untuk
Tomasello., Manusia sosial belajar-jenis pembelajaran yang membedakan manusia dari
primata lain dan yang memainkan peran yang menentukan dalam evolusi-manusia
didasarkan pada dua elemen: pertama, apa yang disebutnya "belajar meniru," (sebagai
lawan dari "belajar bersifat pertandingan" karakteristik primata lain ) dan kedua,
kenyataan bahwa manusia merupakan pengalaman mereka secara simbolis (bukan
iconically, seperti karakteristik primata lain). Bersama-sama, unsur-unsur memungkinkan
manusia untuk menjadi kreatif, dan melestarikan penemuan berguna. Ini adalah
kombinasi yang menghasilkan efek ratchet.
Inuit keluarga
Anak-anak di Yerusalem
Anak-anak di Namibia
Jenis karakteristik pembelajaran anak-anak manusia adalah "belajar meniru," yang
"berarti mereproduksi tindakan instrumental dipahami sengaja." [35] bayi Manusia mulai
menampilkan beberapa bukti bentuk pembelajaran antara usia sembilan dan dua belas
bulan, ketika bayi memusatkan perhatian mereka tidak hanya pada objek, tetapi pada
tatapan mata orang dewasa yang memungkinkan mereka untuk menggunakan orang
dewasa sebagai titik referensi dan dengan demikian "bertindak pada objek dalam cara
orang dewasa yang bekerja pada mereka." [36] dinamis ini didokumentasikan dengan
baik dan juga telah disebut "keterlibatan bersama" atau "perhatian bersama." [37] [38]
Penting untuk dinamis ini adalah bayi tumbuh kemampuan untuk mengenali orang lain
sebagai "agen disengaja:" orang " dengan kuasa untuk mengontrol perilaku mereka secara
spontan "dan yang" memiliki tujuan dan membuat pilihan yang aktif antara berarti
perilaku untuk mencapai tujuan-tujuan "[. 39]
Pengembangan keterampilan di perhatian bersama pada akhir tahun pertama anak
manusia hidup memberikan dasar untuk pengembangan pembelajaran tiruan pada tahun
kedua. Dalam sebuah penelitian anak-anak berusia 14 bulan meniru metode orang dewasa
lebih kompleks dari menyalakan lampu, bahkan ketika mereka bisa menggunakan yang
lebih mudah dan lebih alami gerak untuk efek yang sama. [40] Dalam studi lain, 16-bulan
tua anak-anak berinteraksi dengan orang dewasa yang bergantian antara serangkaian
kompleks gerakan yang muncul disengaja dan satu set dibandingkan gerakan yang
muncul tanpa disengaja, mereka hanya meniru gerakan yang muncul disengaja. [41]
Penelitian lain anak-anak berusia 18 bulan menunjukkan bahwa anak-anak meniru
tindakan yang bermaksud orang dewasa, namun dalam beberapa cara gagal, untuk
melakukan [42] Tomasello. menekankan bahwa bentuk pembelajaran meniru
"fundamental bergantung pada kecenderungan bayi untuk mengidentifikasi dengan orang
dewasa, dan kemampuan mereka untuk membedakan dalam tindakan orang lain yang
mendasari tujuan dan cara yang berbeda yang dapat digunakan untuk mencapainya. "[43]
Ia menyebut seperti ini meniru belajar" belajar budaya karena anak tidak hanya belajar
tentang hal-hal dari orang lain, dia juga belajar hal-hal melalui mereka - dalam arti bahwa
dia harus tahu sesuatu dari perspektif orang dewasa pada situasi untuk belajar
penggunaan aktif tindakan disengaja yang sama "[44] [45]. Dia menyimpulkan bahwa
fitur kunci dari pembelajaran budaya adalah bahwa hal itu hanya terjadi ketika
seseorang" memahami orang lain sebagai agen disengaja, seperti diri sendiri, yang
memiliki perspektif tentang dunia yang dapat diikuti dalam, terarah dan berbagi. "[46]
Emulasi belajar dan belajar meniru adalah dua adaptasi yang berbeda yang hanya dapat
dinilai dalam konteks yang lebih besar lingkungan dan evolusi. Dalam satu percobaan,
simpanse dan anak-anak dua tahun lalu itu secara terpisah disajikan dengan alat-menyapu
seperti-dan out-of-objek mencapai. Dewasa manusia kemudian menunjukkan dua cara
yang berbeda untuk menggunakan alat ini, satu lebih efisien, satu kurang efisien.
Simpanse menggunakan metode efisien yang sama berikut kedua demonstrasi. Sebagian
besar anak-anak manusia, bagaimanapun, meniru metode mana dewasa ini menunjukkan.
Apakah simpanse dan manusia akan dibandingkan berdasarkan hasil ini, orang mungkin
berpikir bahwa Simpanse lebih pintar. Dari perspektif evolusi yang mereka sama-sama
cerdas, tetapi dengan berbagai jenis kecerdasan disesuaikan dengan lingkungan yang
berbeda [29] Simpanse strategi belajar. Yang cocok untuk lingkungan fisik stabil yang
memerlukan sedikit kerjasama sosial (dibandingkan dengan manusia). Manusia strategi
pembelajaran cocok untuk lingkungan sosial yang kompleks di mana memahami maksud
orang lain mungkin lebih penting daripada keberhasilan pada tugas tertentu. Tomasello
berpendapat bahwa strategi ini telah memungkinkan para "ratchet efek" yang
memungkinkan manusia untuk berkembang sistem sosial yang kompleks yang
memungkinkan manusia untuk beradaptasi dengan hampir setiap lingkungan fisik di
permukaan bumi. [47]
Tomasello lebih lanjut menyatakan bahwa belajar budaya sangat penting bagi bahasa-
akuisisi. Sebagian besar anak dalam masyarakat mana pun, dan semua anak di beberapa,
tidak mempelajari semua kata melalui upaya langsung dari orang dewasa. "Secara umum,
untuk sebagian besar kata dalam bahasa mereka, anak-anak harus menemukan cara untuk
belajar dalam arus yang sedang berlangsung interaksi sosial, kadang-kadang dari pidato
yang bahkan tidak ditujukan kepada mereka." [48] Temuan ini telah dikonfirmasi oleh
varietas percobaan di mana anak-anak belajar kata-kata bahkan ketika rujukan itu tidak
hadir, beberapa referen itu mungkin, dan orang dewasa tidak langsung mencoba untuk
mengajar firman untuk anak [49] [50] [51] Tomasello menyimpulkan. bahwa "linguistik
simbol apa-apa selain penanda untuk intersubjectively pemahaman bersama tentang
situasi. [52]
1999 Tomasello review tentang penelitian kontras manusia dan primata non-manusia
menegaskan strategi belajar biologi 1969 argumen antropolog Ralph Holloway bahwa
jenis tertentu sosialitas terkait dengan kognisi simbolis adalah kunci evolusi manusia, dan
merupakan sifat budaya. Menurut Holloway, isu utama dalam evolusi H. sapiens, dan
kunci untuk memahami "budaya," "adalah bagaimana orang mengatur pengalamannya."
Budaya adalah "pengenaan bentuk sewenang-wenang terhadap lingkungan" [. 53] Fakta
ini, Holloway berpendapat, adalah yang utama dan menjelaskan apa yang khas tentang
strategi belajar manusia, alat-gunakan, dan bahasa. Manusia pembuatan alat dan
mengekspresikan bahasa "yang sama, jika tidak identik, proses kognitif" dan memberikan
bukti penting untuk bagaimana manusia berevolusi. [54]
Dengan kata lain, sedangkan McGrew berpendapat bahwa antropolog harus fokus pada
perilaku seperti komunikasi dan alat digunakan karena mereka tidak memiliki akses ke
pikiran, Holloway berpendapat bahwa bahasa manusia dan alat-digunakan, termasuk alat-
alat batu yang paling awal dalam catatan fosil, sangat sugestif perbedaan kognitif antara
manusia dan non-manusia, dan bahwa perbedaan kognitif tersebut pada gilirannya
menjelaskan evolusi manusia. Untuk Holloway, pertanyaannya adalah bukan apakah
primata lain berkomunikasi, belajar atau membuat alat, tetapi cara mereka melakukan
hal-hal. "Kentang Mencuci di laut ... pengupasan cabang daun untuk mendapatkan
rayap," dan contoh-contoh lain dari primata-menggunakan alat dan belajar "yang ikonik,
dan tidak ada umpan balik dari lingkungan dan hewan" [. 55] alat Manusia, namun ,
mengungkapkan kemerdekaan dari bentuk alam yang memanifestasikan berpikir
simbolik. "Dalam penyusunan tongkat untuk rayap-makan, hubungan antara produk dan
bahan baku adalah ikon. Dalam membuat alat batu, sebaliknya, tidak ada hubungan yang
diperlukan antara bentuk produk akhir dan bahan asli. "[56]
Dalam pandangan Holloway, nenek moyang kita non-manusia, seperti yang dari
simpanse modern dan primata lainnya, bersama motor dan keterampilan sensorik, rasa
ingin tahu, memori, dan kecerdasan, dengan mungkin perbedaan derajat. "Ini adalah saat
ini terintegrasi dengan atribut-atribut khas produksi sewenang-wenang (simbolisasi) dan
pemaksaan bahwa orang laki-laki qua budaya muncul." [57]
Saya sarankan di atas bahwa apa pun yang mungkin budaya, itu termasuk "pengenaan
bentuk sewenang-wenang terhadap lingkungan." frase ini memiliki dua komponen. Salah
satunya adalah pengakuan bahwa hubungan antara proses coding dan fenomena (baik itu
alat, jaringan sosial, atau prinsip abstrak) adalah non-ikon. Yang lain adalah ide manusia
sebagai makhluk yang bisa membuat sistem kerja-delusi yang memaksakan fantasinya,
non-Nya-ikonik konstruksi (dan konstruksi), pada lingkungan. Lingkungan diubah bentuk
persepsi, dan ini lagi terpaksa kembali ke lingkungan, dimasukkan ke dalam lingkungan,
dan tekan untuk adaptasi lebih lanjut. [58]
Hal ini sebanding dengan aspek "ratcheting" yang diusulkan oleh Tomasello dan lain-lain
yang memungkinkan untuk mempercepat evolusi manusia. Holloway menyimpulkan
bahwa contoh pertama berpikir simbolik antara manusia memberikan "kick-start" untuk
perkembangan otak, alat kompleksitas, struktur sosial, dan bahasa berkembang melalui
dinamis konstan umpan balik positif. "Ini interaksi antara kecenderungan untuk struktur
lingkungan sewenang-wenang dan umpan balik dari lingkungan dan organisme yang
muncul adalah proses, proses yang berbeda dalam jenis dari sesuatu yang
mendahuluinya." [59]
Kesewenang-wenangan
Magritte The Pengkhianatan dari Foto memberikan ilustrasi klasik dari kesewenang-
wenangan "tanda itu."
Memotong-alat
Unretouched biface
Ahli bahasa Charles Hockett dan R. Ascher telah mengidentifikasi tiga belas desain-fitur
bahasa, beberapa bersama oleh bentuk-bentuk lain dari connunication hewan. Salah satu
fitur yang membedakan bahasa manusia adalah produktivitas yang luar biasa, dalam kata
lain, penutur bahasa yang kompeten mampu menghasilkan jumlah tak terbatas ujaran asli.
produktivitas ini tampaknya dimungkinkan oleh beberapa fitur penting yang unik untuk
bahasa manusia. Salah satunya adalah "dualitas pola," yang berarti bahwa bahasa
manusia terdiri dari artikulasi beberapa proses yang berbeda, masing-masing dengan
menetapkan sendiri aturan: fonem mengkombinasikan untuk menghasilkan morfem,
morfem mengkombinasikan untuk menghasilkan kata, dan menggabungkan kata-kata
untuk menghasilkan kalimat. Ini berarti bahwa seseorang dapat menguasai sejumlah
sinyal relatif terbatas dan set aturan, untuk menciptakan kombinasi yang tak terbatas.
Unsur lain yang penting adalah bahasa manusia merupakan simbol: suara kata-kata (atau
bentuk mereka, ketika ditulis) tidak ada hubungannya dengan apa yang mereka wakili.
[60] Dengan kata lain, berarti mereka sewenang-wenang. Bahwa kata-kata memiliki
makna adalah masalah konvensi. Karena arti kata-kata yang sewenang-wenang, kata
apapun mungkin memiliki beberapa arti, dan objek apapun dapat disebut menggunakan
berbagai kata-kata, kata yang sebenarnya digunakan untuk menggambarkan objek
tertentu tergantung pada konteks, maksud pembicara, dan kemampuan pendengar untuk
menghakimi ini tepat. Sebagai catatan Tomasello,
Pengguna bahasa individu melihat pohon dan, sebelum menarik perhatian lawan bicara
untuk pohon itu, harus memutuskan, berdasarkan penilaian nya pengetahuan saat ini si
pendengar dan harapan, apakah akan mengatakan "bahwa pohon di sana," "itu," "pohon
tarbantin," "yang seratus tahun-ek," "pohon," "pohon bagswing," "hal di halaman depan,"
"ornamen," "malu," atau sejumlah lainnya ekspresi. ... Dan keputusan ini tidak dibuat atas
dasar tujuan langsung pembicara sehubungan dengan objek atau aktivitas yang terlibat,
melainkan bahwa mereka dibuat berdasarkan tujuannya berkaitan dengan kepentingan
pendengar dan perhatian ke objek atau kegiatan.
Inilah sebabnya kognisi simbolis dan komunikasi dan belajar meniru pergi tangan-di-
tangan. [61]
Holloway berpendapat bahwa batu-tools yang berhubungan dengan genus Homo
memiliki fitur yang sama dari bahasa manusia:
Kembali ke masalah sintaks, aturan, dan aktivitas concatenated disebutkan di atas, hampir
semua model yang menjelaskan proses bahasa juga dapat digunakan untuk
menggambarkan alat-keputusan. Hal ini tidak mengejutkan. Kedua kegiatan itu
merupakan concatenated, keduanya memiliki aturan yang kaku tentang serialisasi eh unit
kegiatan (tata bahasa, sintaksis), keduanya merupakan sistem hirarki kegiatan (seperti
kegiatan motor), dan keduanya menghasilkan konfigurasi yang sewenang-wenang sana
menjadi bagian dari lingkungan, baik sementara atau permanen [62.]
produktivitas dapat dilihat pada fakta bahwa tipe dasar yang mungkin digunakan untuk
beberapa tujuan, bahwa industri alat cenderung berkembang dengan waktu, dan bahwa
variasi kecil pada suatu pola dasar dapat dilakukan untuk bertemu dengan beberapa syarat
fungsional baru. Elemen dari sebuah kosa kata "dasar" motor-serpih operasi, detasemen,
rotasi, penyusunan platform mencolok, dll-digunakan dalam kombinasi berbeda untuk
menghasilkan alat berbeda, dengan bentuk yang berbeda, dan seharusnya, menggunakan
berbeda. . . . Mengambil setiap aktivitas motor sendirian, tidak ada tindakan yang
lengkap; setiap tindakan tergantung pada satu sebelum dan membutuhkan satu lagi, dan
masing-masing tergantung pada kapak lain pada rencana awal. Dengan kata lain, pada
setiap titik tindakan kecuali, terakhir bagian tidak "memuaskan" dalam struktur. Setiap
tindakan unit tidak berarti dengan sendirinya dalam arti penggunaan alat ini, itu berarti
hanya dalam konteks keseluruhan telah menyelesaikan serangkaian tindakan memuncak
dalam produk akhir. Ini persis paralel bahasa. [63]
Sebagai Tomasello telah menunjukkan, pikir simbolik dapat beroperasi hanya dalam
lingkungan sosial tertentu:
Sewenang-wenang menegakkan simbol konsensus dari persepsi, yang tidak hanya
memungkinkan anggota untuk berkomunikasi tentang obyek yang sama dalam hal ruang
dan waktu (seperti dalam hunting) tetapi juga memungkinkan hubungan sosial yang
dibakukan dan dimanipulasi melalui simbol. Ini berarti bahwa keanehan yang merapikan
dan dirasakan dalam kelas perilaku. Dengan menegakkan invarian persepsi, simbol juga
menegakkan keteguhan perilaku sosial, dan menegakkan kekonstanan perilaku sosial
merupakan prasyarat untuk sektor diferensial tugas-peran dalam kelompok beradaptasi
dibedakan sosial tidak hanya untuk lingkungan luar tetapi untuk keanggotaan sendiri.
[64]
Antropolog biologis Terrence Deacon, dalam sintesis lebih dari dua puluh tahun
penelitian pada evolusi manusia, neurologi manusia, dan Primatologi, menggambarkan
efek "ratcheting" sebagai bentuk "Evolusi Baldwinian." Dinamakan setelah psikolog
James Baldwin, ini menggambarkan situasi di mana perilaku hewan memiliki
konsekuensi evolusioner ketika perubahan lingkungan alam dan dengan demikian
kekuatan-kekuatan selektif yang bekerja pada hewan. [65]
Setelah beberapa menyebar perilaku yang berguna dalam suatu populasi dan menjadi
lebih penting untuk subsisten, akan menghasilkan tekanan seleksi pada sifat genetik yang
mendukung propagasi yang ... Batu dan alat simbolik, yang awalnya diperoleh dengan
bantuan fleksibel kera kemampuan belajar, akhirnya memutar meja di pengguna mereka
dan memaksa mereka untuk beradaptasi dengan niche baru dibuka oleh teknologi
tersebut. Bukannya hanya trik berguna, ini prostheses perilaku untuk mendapatkan
makanan dan mengatur perilaku sosial menjadi unsur yang sangat diperlukan dalam
kompleks adaptif yang baru. Asal "kemanusiaan" dapat didefinisikan sebagai titik dalam
evolusi kami di mana alat ini menjadi sumber prinsip seleksi pada tubuh kita dan otak. Ini
adalah diagnostik symbolicus Homo. [66]
Menurut Diakon, ini terjadi antara 2 dan 2,5 juta tahun yang lalu, saat kita memiliki bukti
fosil batu pertama pemakaian alat dan awal dari tren dalam peningkatan ukuran otak.
Tapi itu adalah evolusi bahasa simbolik yang merupakan penyebab-dan tidak efek-tren
ini. [67] Lebih khusus, Deacon yang menyatakan bahwa australopithecus, seperti kera
kontemporer, digunakan alat; adalah mungkin bahwa selama jutaan tahun sejarah
australopithecine, pasukan banyak dikembangkan sistem komunikasi simbolis. Semua
yang diperlukan adalah bahwa salah satu dari kelompok-kelompok sehingga mengubah
lingkungan mereka bahwa "itu diperkenalkan seleksi untuk kemampuan belajar yang
sangat berbeda dari spesies sebelumnya terpengaruh." [68] pasukan atau populasi ini
menendang-memulai proses Baldwinian (efek ratchet "") yang menyebabkan evolusi
mereka untuk genus Homo.
Pertanyaan untuk Diakon adalah, apa perubahan perilaku-lingkungan bisa membuat
perkembangan adaptif berpikir simbolis? Di sini dia menekankan pentingnya
membedakan manusia dari segala jenis lainnya, bukan untuk kecerdasan kehormatan
manusia tetapi untuk problematize itu. Mengingat bahwa evolusi H. sapiens dimulai
dengan leluhur yang belum memiliki "budaya," apa yang menyebabkan mereka pindah
dari kognitif, belajar, komunikasi, dan alat-strategi yang membuat dan terus menjadi
adaptif untuk primata lain sebagian besar ( dan, beberapa telah mengusulkan, sebagian
besar spesies hewan lainnya)? Belajar sistem simbol yang memakan waktu lebih dari
bentuk-bentuk komunikasi lainnya, jadi dimungkinkan simbolis pikir strategi komunikasi
yang berbeda, tapi tidak yang lebih efisien dibandingkan primata lain. Namun demikian,
harus telah menawarkan beberapa keuntungan selektif untuk H. sapiens telah berevolusi.
Diakon mulai dengan melihat dua faktor penentu kunci dalam sejarah evolusioner:
perilaku makan, dan pola-pola hubungan seksual. Saat ia mengamati persaingan untuk
akses seksual membatasi kemungkinan kerjasama sosial di banyak spesies, namun,
Deacon mengamati, ada tiga pola yang konsisten dalam reproduksi manusia yang
membedakannya dari spesies lain:
1. Baik laki-laki dan perempuan biasanya memberikan kontribusi terhadap upaya
membesarkan anak mereka, walaupun sering berbeda luasan dan dengan cara yang sangat
berbeda.
2. Dalam semua masyarakat, sebagian besar laki-laki dewasa dan wanita terikat oleh
jangka panjang, hak akses eksklusif seksual dan larangan kepada individu-individu
tertentu dari lawan jenis.
3. Mereka memelihara hubungan-hubungan seksual eksklusif sementara tinggal di
sederhana untuk berukuran besar, multi-laki-laki, kelompok-kelompok sosial yang multi-
wanita, koperasi. [69]
Selain itu, ada satu fitur umum bagi semua masyarakat mencari makan diketahui manusia
(semua manusia sebelum sepuluh atau lima belas ribu tahun yang lalu), dan sangat
berbeda dari primata lain: "penggunaan daging.... Munculnya alat-alat batu pertama
hampir 2,5 juta tahun yang lalu hampir pasti berkorelasi dengan perubahan radikal dalam
perilaku mencari makan untuk mendapatkan akses ke daging "[70] Diakon tidak percaya
bahwa pikiran simbolik yang diperlukan untuk berburu atau alat-keputusan (meskipun
pembuatan alat mungkin. yang handal indeks pemikiran simbolik), melainkan diperlukan
untuk keberhasilan hubungan sosial yang berbeda.
Kuncinya adalah bahwa sementara laki-laki dan perempuan sama-sama efektif pemburu,
ibu membawa anak tanggungan tidak efektif pemburu. Dengan demikian, mereka harus
bergantung pada laki-laki pemburu. Ini nikmat suatu sistem di mana laki-laki memiliki
akses seksual eksklusif untuk perempuan, dan perempuan bisa memprediksi bahwa
pasangan seksual mereka akan menyediakan makanan bagi mereka dan anak-anak
mereka. Dalam spesies mamalia yang paling hasilnya adalah sistem peringkat atau
persaingan seksual yang menghasilkan baik poligami, atau pasangan seumur hidup-ikatan
antara dua individu yang hidup relatif independen dari orang dewasa lain spesies mereka,
dalam kedua kasus agresi laki-laki memainkan peran penting dalam mempertahankan
akses seksual kepada pasangan (s). Yang unik tentang manusia?
ketergantungan pada sumber daya manusia yang relatif tidak tersedia untuk perempuan
dengan bayi memilih tidak hanya untuk kerja sama antara ayah seorang anak dan ibu
tetapi juga bagi kerjasama saudara lain dan teman-teman, termasuk orang tua dan remaja,
yang dapat diandalkan untuk bantuan. Tuntutan khusus memperoleh daging dan merawat
bayi dalam evolusi kita sendiri bersama-sama berkontribusi terhadap dorongan yang
mendasari untuk fitur karakteristik ketiga pola reproduksi manusia: hidup kelompok
koperasi. [71]
Apa yang unik khas masyarakat manusia adalah apa yang dibutuhkan kognisi simbolik,
yang akibatnya menyebabkan evolusi budaya: "koperasi, kelompok sosial dicampur-seks,
dengan hati-hati laki-laki yang signifikan dan pengadaan keturunan, dan pola yang relatif
stabil pengecualian reproduksi." Kombinasi ini relatif jarang terjadi pada spesies lain
karena "sangat rentan terhadap disintegrasi." Bahasa dan budaya menyediakan lem yang
memegang bersama-sama. [72]
Simpanse juga, pada kesempatan, berburu daging, dalam banyak kasus, bagaimanapun,
laki-laki segera mengkonsumsi daging, dan hanya pada kesempatan berbagi dengan
perempuan yang berada di dekatnya. Di antara simpanse, berburu daging meningkat
ketika sumber pangan lainnya menjadi langka, tetapi di bawah kondisi seperti ini,
menurun berbagi. Bentuk pertama dari pemikiran simbolis membuat batu-tools mungkin,
yang pada gilirannya membuat perburuan untuk daging lebih diandalkan sumber
makanan bagi nenek moyang kita bukan manusia sementara membuat kemungkinan
bentuk komunikasi sosial yang membuat berbagi-antara laki-laki dan perempuan, tetapi
juga antara laki-laki, penurunan kompetisi seksual:
Jadi masalah sosial-ekologis yang ditimbulkan oleh transisi ke strategi subsistensi daging
ditambah adalah bahwa hal itu tidak dapat digunakan tanpa suatu struktur sosial yang
menjamin kawin paksa dan eksklusif dan cukup egaliter untuk mempertahankan
kepentingan kerjasama melalui reproduksi bersama atau paralel. Masalah ini dapat
diselesaikan secara simbolis. [73]
Simbol dan berpikir simbolik sehingga memungkinkan fitur utama hubungan sosial
dalam setiap populasi manusia: timbal balik. ilmuwan evolusioner telah mengembangkan
sebuah model untuk menjelaskan altruisme timbal balik antara individu yang terkait erat.
Simbolik pikir mungkin membuat timbal balik antara individu yang terkait jauh. [74]
Arkeologi pendekatan budaya: masalah dan makna
Menggali tempat tinggal di Skara Brae, paling lengkap desa Neolitik Eropa
Bifacial poin, terukir oker dan alat-alat tulang dari c. 75,000-80,000 tahun fase M1 & M2
tua di Blombos gua
Monte Alban situs arkeologi
Mural dari aurochs, rusa, dan manusia dari Çatalhöyük, milenium keenam SM; Museum
Peradaban Anatolia, Ankara, Turki
Pada abad ke-19 arkeologi sering suplemen untuk sejarah, dan tujuan dari arkeolog
adalah untuk mengidentifikasi artefak sesuai dengan tipologi mereka dan stratigrafi,
sehingga menandai lokasi mereka dalam ruang dan waktu. Franz Boas menetapkan
bahwa arkeologi menjadi salah satu dari empat bidang antropologi Amerika, dan
perdebatan di antara arkeolog sering disejajarkan perdebatan di kalangan antropolog
budaya. Pada tahun 1920-an dan 1930-an, Australia-Inggris arkeolog V. Gordon Childe
dan Amerika arkeolog WC McKern independen mulai bergerak dari bertanya tentang
tanggal artefak, untuk bertanya tentang orang-orang yang dihasilkan itu - ketika arkeolog
bekerja bersama sejarawan, bahan-bahan sejarah umumnya membantu menjawab
pertanyaan ini, tetapi ketika bahan-bahan sejarah tidak tersedia, arkeolog harus
mengembangkan metode baru. Childe dan McKern berfokus pada analisis hubungan
antara objek-objek yang ditemukan bersama-sama; pekerjaan mereka mendirikan dasar
untuk model tiga tingkat:
1. Sebuah artefak individu, yang memiliki permukaan, bentuk, dan atribut teknologi
(misalnya sebuah mata panah)
2. Sebuah sub-himpunan, yang terdiri dari artefak yang ditemukan, dan mungkin
digunakan, bersama-sama (misalnya sebuah mata panah, busur dan pisau)
3. Sebuah himpunan dari sub-kumpulan yang bersama-sama merupakan situs arkeologi
(misalnya mata panah, busur dan pisau, panci dan sisa-sisa perapian; tempat
penampungan)
Childe berpendapat bahwa "terus berulang himpunan artefak" menjadi budaya
"arkeologi" [75] [76] Childe. Dan lain-lain dilihat "setiap budaya arkeologi ... manifestasi
dari segi materi dari orang-orang tertentu." [77]
Pada tahun 1948 Walter Taylor sistematis metode dan konsep yang arkeolog telah
mengembangkan dan mengusulkan sebuah model umum untuk kontribusi arkeologi
pengetahuan budaya. Dia mulai dengan pemahaman mainstream budaya sebagai produk
aktivitas kognitif manusia, dan penekanan pada arti Boasian subjektif dari obyek-obyek
yang tergantung pada konteks budaya mereka. Dia mendefinisikan budaya sebagai
"fenomena mental, yang terdiri dari isi pikiran, bukan dari benda-benda atau perilaku
yang dapat diamati" [78] Ia kemudian merancang model tiga tingkat menghubungkan
antropologi budaya arkeologi, yang disebutnya arkeologi penghubung.:
1. Budaya, yang tidak teramati dan nonmateri
2. Perilaku yang dihasilkan dari budaya, yang diamati dan nonmateri
3. Objectifications, seperti artefak dan arsitektur, yang adalah hasil dari perilaku dan
material
Artinya, artefak material adalah sisa bahan budaya, tapi bukan budaya itu sendiri. [79
poin] Taylor adalah bahwa catatan arkeologi bisa menambah pengetahuan antropologi,
tapi hanya jika arkeolog reconceived pekerjaan mereka bukan hanya sebagai menggali
artefak dan merekam lokasi dalam ruang dan waktu, tetapi sebagai bahan tetap
menyimpulkan dari perilaku melalui mana mereka diproduksi dan digunakan, dan
menyimpulkan dari perilaku yang mental aktivitas warga. Meskipun banyak arkeolog
setuju bahwa penelitian mereka merupakan bagian integral antropologi, program Taylor
tidak pernah sepenuhnya dilaksanakan. Salah satu alasannya adalah bahwa model tiga-
tingkat dari kesimpulan yang dibutuhkan terlalu banyak lapangan dan analisis
laboratorium untuk bersikap praktis [80]. Selain itu, pandangan bahwa materi tetap tidak
sendiri budaya, dan bahkan dua kali-dihapus dari budaya, bahkan meninggalkan
arkeologi marjinal ke antropologi budaya. [81]
Dalam mantan mahasiswa Lewis 1962 Leslie White Binford mengusulkan sebuah model
baru bagi arkeologi antropologi, disebut "Arkeologi Baru" atau "Processual Arkeologi,"
berdasarkan definisi White budaya sebagai "cara ekstra-somatik adaptasi untuk
organisme manusia" [. 82] Definisi ini memungkinkan Binford untuk mendirikan
arkeologi sebagai bidang penting untuk mengejar metodologi ekologi budaya Julian
Steward's:
Studi perbandingan sistem budaya dengan teknologi variabel dalam berbagai lingkungan
yang sama atau teknologi serupa di lingkungan yang berbeda adalah metodologi utama
dari apa yang Steward (1955: 36-42) telah disebut "ekologi budaya," dan tentu saja
adalah sarana yang berharga untuk meningkatkan kami pemahaman proses budaya.
Seperti metodologi juga bermanfaat dalam elucidating hubungan struktural antara
budaya-sistem besar seperti sub-sistem sosial dan ideologis sub. [83]
Dengan kata lain, Binford mengusulkan arkeologi yang akan menjadi pusat proyek
antropolog budaya yang dominan pada waktu (budaya sebagai adaptasi non-genetika
untuk lingkungan); arkeologi "baru" adalah antropologi budaya (dalam bentuk ekologi
budaya atau antropologi ekologi) di masa lalu.
Pada 1980-an, ada gerakan di Britania Raya dan Eropa terhadap pandangan arkeologi
sebagai bidang antropologi, bergema penolakan sebelumnya Radcliffe-Brown
antropologi budaya. [84] Selama periode yang sama, maka-Cambridge arkeolog Ian
Hodder dikembangkan "pasca-processual arkeologi" sebagai alternatif. Seperti Binford
(dan tidak seperti Taylor) Hodder dilihat bukan sebagai objectifications artefak
kebudayaan tetapi sebagai budaya itu sendiri. Tidak seperti Binford Namun, Hodder tidak
melihat budaya sebagai adaptasi lingkungan. Sebaliknya, ia "berkomitmen untuk versi
semiotik cairan dari konsep budaya tradisional di mana bahan item, artefak, peserta
penuh dalam penciptaan, penyebaran, perubahan, dan memudar kompleks simbolis" [85]
1982 buku-Nya, Simbol. dalam Aksi, membangkitkan antropologi simbolis Geertz,
Schneider, dengan fokus mereka pada konteks makna tergantung dari hal-hal budaya,
sebagai alternatif ke White dan melihat materialis Steward tentang budaya. [86] Pada
tahun 1991 buku teks-nya, Membaca Masa Lalu: Lancar Pendekatan untuk Interpretasi
dalam Arkeologi Hodder berpendapat arkeologi yang lebih erat selaras dengan sejarah
daripada antropologi. [87]
Bahasa dan budaya
Hubungan antara budaya dan bahasa telah dicatat sejauh periode klasik dan mungkin jauh
sebelumnya. Orang Yunani kuno, misalnya, dibedakan antara masyarakat beradab dan
bárbaros "orang-orang yang mengoceh", yaitu mereka yang berbicara bahasa dipahami.
[88] Fakta bahwa kelompok yang berbeda berbicara berbeda, bahasa dipahami seringkali
dianggap lebih banyak bukti nyata atas perbedaan budaya daripada lainnya kurang jelas
budaya sifat.
The romanticists Jerman abad ke-19 seperti Herder, Wundt dan Humbolt, sering melihat
bahasa tidak hanya sebagai salah satu sifat budaya di antara banyak tetapi lebih sebagai
ekspresi langsung dari karakter nasional rakyat, dan seperti budaya di semacam bentuk
kental. Herder misalnya menyarankan, "Denn Volk ist jedes Volk; es seine topi Bildung
Nasional Wie seine Sprache" (Karena setiap orang adalah People, ia memiliki budaya
nasionalnya sendiri diungkapkan melalui bahasanya sendiri). [89]
Franz Boas, pendiri antropologi Amerika, seperti pelopor Jerman itu, menyatakan bahwa
bahasa bersama komunitas adalah carrier yang paling penting dari budaya bersama
mereka. Boas adalah antropolog pertama yang menganggap hal itu tak terbayangkan
untuk mempelajari budaya orang asing tanpa juga menjadi berkenalan dengan bahasa
mereka. Untuk Boas, fakta bahwa budaya intelektual dari satu orang sebagian besar
dibangun, berbagi dan dipelihara melalui penggunaan bahasa, berarti bahwa pemahaman
bahasa dari kelompok budaya adalah kunci untuk memahami budaya. Pada saat yang
sama, meskipun, Boas dan murid-muridnya sadar bahwa budaya dan bahasa tidak
langsung tergantung pada satu sama lain. Yaitu, kelompok dengan budaya yang sangat
berbeda mungkin menggunakan bahasa yang sama, dan penutur bahasa sama sekali tidak
berhubungan dapat berbagi ciri-ciri yang sama budaya dasar [90] [91] Sejumlah ulama
lainnya. Menyarankan bahwa bentuk bahasa menentukan ciri-ciri budaya tertentu. [ 92]
Hal ini mirip dengan gagasan determinisme Linguistik, yang menyatakan bahwa bentuk
bahasa menentukan berpikir individu. Sementara Boas sendiri menolak hubungan sebab
akibat antara bahasa dan budaya, beberapa ahli waris intelektual dihibur gagasan bahwa
kebiasaan pola berbicara dan berpikir dalam bahasa tertentu dapat mempengaruhi budaya
kelompok linguistik. [93] keyakinan semacam ini terkait dengan teori Linguistik
relativitas. Boas, seperti antropolog paling modern, bagaimanapun, lebih cenderung
untuk menghubungkan keterkaitan antara bahasa dan budaya untuk fakta bahwa, sebagai
BL Whorf mengatakan, "mereka telah tumbuh besar bersama". [94]
Memang, asal usul bahasa, dipahami sebagai kapasitas manusia komunikasi simbolis
yang kompleks, dan asal kebudayaan kompleks sering dianggap berasal dari proses
evolusi yang sama dalam manusia awal. Ahli bahasa [yang] dan? Antropolog evolusioner
[sunting] beranggapan bahwa manusia berevolusi sebagai bahasa awal mulai hidup dalam
komunitas besar yang mengharuskan penggunaan komunikasi kompleks untuk
mempertahankan koherensi sosial. Bahasa dan budaya maka kedua muncul sebagai cara
menggunakan simbol untuk membangun identitas sosial dan memelihara koherensi dalam
suatu kelompok sosial yang terlalu besar untuk hanya mengandalkan pada cara-cara pra-
manusia masyarakat bangunan seperti untuk perawatan misalnya. Sejak bahasa dan
budaya yang baik pada dasarnya sistem simbolis, budaya abad kedua puluh teoretikus
telah menerapkan metode analisis bahasa yang dikembangkan dalam ilmu linguistik
untuk juga menganalisis budaya. Khususnya teori struktural Ferdinand de Saussure, yang
menjelaskan sistem simbolis, yang terdiri dari tanda-tanda (pasangan dari bentuk tertentu
dengan arti tertentu), telah datang untuk diterapkan secara luas dalam studi budaya. Tapi
juga pasca strukturalis teori, bahwa tetap masih mengandalkan pada paralel antara bahasa
dan budaya sebagai sistem komunikasi simbolik, telah diterapkan di bidang semiotika.
Sejajar antara bahasa dan budaya kemudian dapat dipahami sebagai analog ke paralel
antara tanda linguistik, misalnya terdiri dari] kau suara [dan makna "sapi", dan sebuah
tanda budaya, terdiri untuk contoh bentuk budaya " mengenakan mahkota "dan makna
budaya" sebagai raja ". Dengan cara ini dapat dikatakan bahwa budaya itu sendiri
merupakan jenis bahasa. Paralel lain antara sistem budaya dan bahasa adalah bahwa
mereka kedua sistem praktek, yaitu mereka adalah seperangkat cara khusus untuk
melakukan hal-hal yang dibangun dan diabadikan melalui interaksi sosial [95]. Anak-
anak, misalnya, mendapatkan bahasa dengan cara yang sama saat mereka memperoleh
norma-norma budaya dasar masyarakat yang mereka tumbuh dalam - melalui interaksi
dengan anggota kelompok budaya yang lebih tua dari mereka.
Namun, bahasa, sekarang dipahami sebagai seperangkat norma tertentu pidato dari
komunitas tertentu, yang juga merupakan bagian dari budaya yang lebih besar dari
masyarakat yang berbicara mereka. Manusia menggunakan bahasa sebagai cara sinyal
identitas dengan satu kelompok budaya dan perbedaan dari orang lain. Bahkan di antara
penutur satu bahasa beberapa cara yang berbeda menggunakan bahasa yang ada, dan
masing-masing digunakan untuk sinyal afiliasi dengan subkelompok tertentu dalam
budaya yang lebih besar. Dalam linguistik, cara-cara yang berbeda seperti menggunakan
bahasa yang sama disebut "varietas". Sebagai contoh, bahasa Inggris diucapkan berbeda
di Amerika Serikat, Inggris dan Australia, dan bahkan dalam negara-negara berbahasa
Inggris ada ratusan dialek bahasa Inggris yang masing-masing sinyal milik daerah
tertentu dan / atau subkultur. Sebagai contoh, di Inggris dialek Cockney sinyal pembicara
perusahaan milik kelompok pekerja kelas bawah dari London timur. Perbedaan antara
varietas dari bahasa yang sama sering terdiri dalam pengucapan yang berbeda dan kosa
kata, tetapi juga kadang-kadang sistem tata bahasa yang berbeda dan sangat sering dalam
menggunakan gaya yang berbeda (misalnya Cockney Rhyming slang atau jargon
Pengacara '). Ahli bahasa dan ahli antropologi, khususnya sociolinguists, ethnolinguists
dan antropolog linguistik memiliki spesialisasi dalam mempelajari bagaimana cara
berbicara bervariasi antara masyarakat pidato.
Sebuah cara masyarakat berbicara atau menandatangani adalah bagian dari budaya
masyarakat, seperti praktek bersama lainnya. menggunakan Bahasa adalah cara
membentuk dan menampilkan identitas kelompok. Cara berbicara fungsi tidak hanya
untuk memfasilitasi komunikasi, tetapi juga untuk mengetahui posisi sosial dari
pembicara. Ahli bahasa panggilan cara berbicara varietas yang berbeda bahasa, sebuah
istilah yang mencakup geografis atau dialek socioculturally didefinisikan serta jargon
atau gaya subkultur. Linguistic antropolog dan sosiolog mendefinisikan gaya bahasa
komunikatif sebagai cara bahwa bahasa yang digunakan dan dipahami dalam kebudayaan
tertentu. [96]
Perbedaan antara bahasa tidak terdiri hanya di perbedaan dalam lafal, kosa kata atau tata
bahasa, tetapi juga di berbagai "budaya berbicara". Beberapa budaya misalnya memiliki
sistem rumit "deixis sosial", sistem sinyal jarak sosial melalui cara-cara linguistik [97].
Dalam bahasa Inggris, deixis sosial akan ditampilkan sebagian besar meskipun
membedakan antara menangani beberapa orang dengan nama pertama dan orang lain
dengan nama, tetapi juga dalam judul seperti "Mrs", "Anak", "Dokter" atau "Yang
Mulia", tapi dalam bahasa lain sistem seperti ini mungkin sangat kompleks dan
dikodifikasi dalam tata bahasa dan kosa kata dari seluruh bahasa. Dalam beberapa bahasa
Asia timur, misalnya Thailand, Burma dan Jawa, kata-kata yang berbeda digunakan
sesuai dengan apakah pembicara adalah mengatasi seseorang dari peringkat lebih tinggi
atau lebih rendah dari satu diri dalam sistem penentuan peringkat dengan binatang dan
anak-anak peringkat terendah dan dewa dan anggota dari royalti sebagai [tertinggi 97].
Bahasa lain dapat menggunakan bentuk yang berbeda dari alamat ketika berbicara
dengan penutur bahasa dari lawan jenis atau kerabat di-hukum dan banyak bahasa punya
cara khusus berbicara kepada bayi dan anak-anak. Antara kelompok-kelompok lain,
budaya berbicara mungkin memerlukan tidak berbicara kepada orang-orang tertentu,
misalnya banyak budaya asli Australia tabu terhadap berbicara kepada sanak seseorang
di-hukum, dan dalam beberapa budaya berbicara tidak ditujukan langsung kepada anak-
anak. Beberapa bahasa juga membutuhkan cara yang berbeda untuk berbicara untuk kelas
sosial yang berbeda dari pembicara, dan sering sistem seperti itu didasarkan pada
perbedaan gender serta di Jepang dan Koasati [98].
Budaya antropologi
1899-1946: Universal versus tertentu
Franz Boas didirikan antropologi Amerika modern sebagai studi dari total jumlah
fenomena manusia.
Ruth Benedict berperan penting dalam membentuk konsepsi modern tentang budaya yang
berbeda yang berpola.
Pemahaman antropologi modern kebudayaan telah berasal dari abad 19 dengan teori
Jerman antropolog Adolf Bastian dari kesatuan "psikis manusia," yang dipengaruhi oleh
Herder dan von Humboldt, menantang identifikasi "budaya" dengan cara hidup elit
Eropa, dan Inggris berusaha antropolog Edward Burnett Tylor mendefinisikan
kebudayaan sebagai inklusif mungkin. Tylor pada tahun 1874 dijelaskan budaya dengan
cara berikut: "Budaya atau peradaban, yang diambil dalam arti luas etnografis, adalah
bahwa keseluruhan kompleks yang mencakup pengetahuan, kepercayaan, seni, moral,
hukum, adat, dan setiap kemampuan lain dan kebiasaan yang diperoleh manusia sebagai
anggota masyarakat. "[99] Meskipun Tylor tidak bertujuan untuk mengusulkan suatu
teori umum budaya (dia menjelaskan pemahamannya tentang budaya dalam sebuah
argumen yang lebih besar tentang sifat agama), antropolog Amerika umumnya disajikan
berbagai definisi mereka budaya sebagai penyempurnaan dari Tylor. Franz Boas itulah
siswa Alfred Kroeber (1876-1970) diidentifikasi dengan budaya "superorganic," yaitu,
sebuah domain dengan prinsip pemesanan dan undang-undang yang tidak dapat
dijelaskan oleh atau dikurangi menjadi biologi. [100] Pada tahun 1973, Gerald Weiss
dikaji berbagai definisi budaya dan perdebatan untuk penghematan mereka dan
kekuasaan, dan diusulkan sebagai definisi yang paling berguna secara ilmiah bahwa
"budaya" didefinisikan "sebagai istilah generik kami untuk semua nongenetic manusia,
atau metabiological, fenomena" (huruf miring dalam aslinya). [101]
Franz Boas, yang didirikan antropologi Amerika modern dengan pembentukan program
pascasarjana pertama di antropologi di Columbia University pada tahun 1896. Pada saat
model budaya yang dominan adalah bahwa evolusi budaya, yang mengandaikan bahwa
masyarakat manusia berkembang melalui tahap-tahap kekejaman untuk barbarisme
peradaban, dengan demikian, masyarakat yang misalnya berdasarkan terminologi
hortikultura dan Iroquois kekerabatan kurang berkembang bahwa masyarakat
berdasarkan Eskimo pertanian dan terminologi kekerabatan. Salah satu prestasi terbesar
Boas adalah untuk menunjukkan secara meyakinkan bahwa model ini pada dasarnya
cacat, secara empiris, metodologis, dan secara teoritis. Selain itu, ia merasa bahwa
pengetahuan kita tentang budaya yang berbeda begitu lengkap, dan sering berdasarkan
penelitian sistematis atau tidak ilmiah, bahwa tidak mungkin untuk mengembangkan
setiap model ilmiah berlaku umum budaya manusia. Sebaliknya, ia mendirikan prinsip
relativisme budaya dan siswa peserta dilatih untuk melakukan observasi penelitian
lapangan yang ketat dalam masyarakat yang berbeda. Boas memahami kemampuan
budaya untuk melibatkan pemikiran simbolis dan pembelajaran sosial, dan menganggap
evolusi kapasitas untuk budidaya bertepatan dengan evolusi lain, biologis, fitur
mendefinisikan genus Homo. Namun demikian, dia menegaskan budaya yang tidak dapat
dikurangi menjadi biologi atau ekspresi lain pemikiran simbolik, seperti bahasa. Boas dan
murid-muridnya memahami budaya inklusif dan menolak mengembangkan definisi
umum budaya. Memang, mereka menolak mengidentifikasi "budaya" sebagai sesuatu,
bukan menggunakan budaya sebagai kata sifat bukan kata benda. Boas mengatakan
bahwa "tipe budaya" atau "bentuk" selalu dalam keadaan fluks. [102] [103] Muridnya
Alfred Kroeber berpendapat bahwa penerimaan "yang tak terbatas dan assimilativeness
budaya" membuatnya hampir mustahil untuk memikirkan budaya sebagai diskrit hal.
[104]
Kuliner segitiga
Perdebatan kedua telah lebih dari kemampuan untuk melakukan klaim universal tentang
semua budaya. Meskipun para antropolog berpendapat bahwa Boas belum
mengumpulkan cukup bukti kuat dari sampel beragam masyarakat untuk membuat klaim
berlaku umum atau universal tentang budaya, oleh beberapa merasa siap tahun 1940-an.
Sedangkan Kroeber dan Benediktus telah menegaskan bahwa "budaya"-yang bisa
merujuk ke lokal, regional, atau trans-regional skala-sedang dalam beberapa cara
"berpola" atau "dikonfigurasi," beberapa antropolog sekarang merasa bahwa cukup data
telah dikumpulkan untuk menunjukkan bahwa sering mengambil bentuk yang sangat
terstruktur. Pertanyaan antropolog ini diperdebatkan adalah, orang-struktur artefak
statistik, atau di mana mereka ekspresi model mental? Perdebatan ini muncul penuh pada
tahun 1949, dengan penerbitan George Murdock Struktur Sosial, dan Claude Lévi-Strauss
Les Struktur Élémentaires de la Parente.
Menentang Boas dan murid-muridnya, Yale antropolog George Murdock, yang
menyusun Hubungan Manusia Area Files. Kode ini file variabel budaya yang ditemukan
dalam masyarakat yang berbeda, sehingga antropolog dapat menggunakan metode
statistik untuk mempelajari hubungan antar variabel yang berbeda [132] [133] [134]
Tujuan utama proyek ini. Adalah untuk mengembangkan generalisasi yang berlaku untuk
nomor yang semakin besar budaya individu. Kemudian, Murdock dan Douglas R. White
mengembangkan sampel lintas-budaya standar sebagai cara untuk menyempurnakan
metode ini.
antropologi strukturalis Perancis antropolog Claude Lévi-Strauss membawa bersama ide-
ide dari Boas (terutama keyakinan Boas dalam hal berubah-ubah dari bentuk-bentuk
budaya, dan keyakinan Bastian dalam kesatuan psikis manusia) dan Émile Durkheim
fokus sosiolog Perancis pada struktur sosial (dilembagakan hubungan antara orang-orang
dan kelompok orang). Alih-alih membuat generalisasi yang diterapkan ke sejumlah besar
masyarakat, Lévi-Strauss berusaha berasal dari kasus-kasus konkret model semakin
abstrak sifat manusia. Metode-Nya dimulai dengan anggapan bahwa budaya ada dalam
dua bentuk yang berbeda: struktur yang berbeda banyak yang bisa disimpulkan dari
mengamati anggota masyarakat yang sama berinteraksi (dan yang anggota masyarakat itu
sendiri sadar), dan struktur abstrak yang dikembangkan dengan menganalisis bersama
cara (seperti mitos dan ritual) anggota masyarakat merupakan kehidupan sosial mereka
(dan yang anggota masyarakat tidak hanya tidak menyadarinya, dan yang biasanya
berdiri di oposisi, atau meniadakan, struktur sosial dari mana orang-orang sadar ). Dia
kemudian berusaha mengembangkan satu struktur mental universal yang hanya bisa
disimpulkan melalui perbandingan sistematis struktur sosial dan budaya tertentu. Dia
berargumen bahwa seperti ada hukum melalui mana terbatas dan jumlah relatif kecil
unsur kimia dapat dikombinasikan untuk menciptakan berbagai hal yang tampaknya tak
terbatas, ada jumlah terbatas dan relatif kecil unsur-unsur budaya yang menggabungkan
orang-orang untuk membuat berbagai variasi budaya antropolog amati. Perbandingan
sistematis masyarakat akan memungkinkan seorang antropolog untuk mengembangkan
tabel "unsur budaya," dan sekali selesai, ini tabel unsur budaya akan memungkinkan
seorang antropolog untuk menganalisis kebudayaan tertentu dan mencapai wawasan
tersembunyi bagi orang-orang yang diproduksi dan hidup melalui budaya. [135] [136]
Strukturalisme mendominasi antropologi Perancis dan, di akhir 1960-an dan 1970-an,
datang untuk memiliki pengaruh besar pada antropologi Amerika dan Inggris.
Murdock's HRAF dan strukturalisme Lévi-Strauss menyediakan dua cara yang ambisius
untuk mencari universal dalam tertentu, dan kedua pendekatan terus menarik bagi ahli
antropologi yang berbeda. Namun, perbedaan antara mereka mengungkapkan ketegangan
yang tersirat dalam warisan Tylor dan Bastian. Apakah budaya yang bisa ditemukan
dalam mengamati perilaku empiris yang mungkin membentuk dasar dari generalisasi?
Atau apakah itu terdiri dari proses mental universal, yang harus disimpulkan dan
disarikan dari perilaku yang diamati? Pertanyaan ini telah mendorong perdebatan di
kalangan ahli antropologi biologis dan arkeolog juga.
Struktural-fungsionalis Tantangan: Masyarakat versus budaya
Pada tahun 1940-an pemahaman budaya Boasian ditantang oleh sebuah paradigma baru
untuk penelitian ilmu antropologi dan sosial yang disebut fungsionalisme Struktural.
Paradigma ini dikembangkan secara independen tapi secara paralel di kedua Britania
Raya dan di Amerika Serikat (Dalam kedua kasus itu sui generis: tidak memiliki
hubungan langsung ke "strukturalisme" kecuali yang baik strukturalisme Perancis dan
Anglo-Amerika Struktural-Fungsionalisme semua dipengaruhi oleh Durkheim. Hal ini
juga analog, tapi tidak terkait dengan, bentuk lain dari "fungsionalisme"). Sedangkan
dilihat Boasians antropologi sebagai ilmu alam yang didedikasikan untuk studi tentang
manusia, fungsionalis struktural antropologi dilihat sebagai salah satu dari sekian banyak
ilmu sosial, yang didedikasikan untuk studi satu segi tertentu dari kemanusiaan. Hal ini
menyebabkan struktural-fungsionalis untuk mendefinisikan kembali dan memperkecil
ruang lingkup "budaya."
Di Britania Raya, penciptaan fungsionalisme struktural diantisipasi oleh Raymond Firth's
(1901-2002) Kami yang Tikopia, diterbitkan pada tahun 1936, dan ditandai dengan
terbitnya Sistem Politik Afrika, diedit oleh Meyer Fortes (1906-1983) dan EE Evans
-Pritchard (1902-1973) pada tahun 1940. [137] [138] Dalam karya-karya antropolog ini
diteruskan sintesis dari ide-ide dari mentor mereka, Bronisław Malinowski (1884-1942),
dan saingannya, AR Radcliffe-Brown (1881 - 1955). Kedua Malinowski dan Radcliffe-
Brown dilihat antropologi-apa yang mereka sebut "antropologi sosial"-seperti yang
cabang sosiologi yang mempelajari masyarakat primitif yang disebut. Menurut teori
Malinowski tentang fungsionalisme, semua manusia memiliki kebutuhan biologis
tertentu, seperti kebutuhan untuk makanan dan tempat tinggal, dan manusia memiliki
kebutuhan biologis untuk mereproduksi. Setiap masyarakat mengembangkan lembaga
sendiri, yang berfungsi untuk memenuhi kebutuhan ini. Agar lembaga ini berfungsi,
individu mengambil peran sosial tertentu yang mengatur bagaimana mereka bertindak
dan berinteraksi. Meskipun anggota dari setiap masyarakat tertentu mungkin tidak
memahami fungsi utama dari peran mereka dan institusi, ahli etnografi itu dapat
mengembangkan model fungsi-fungsi ini melalui pengamatan seksama kehidupan sosial.
[139] Radcliffe-Brown menolak gagasan Malinowski tentang fungsi, dan percaya bahwa
teori umum tentang kehidupan sosial primitif hanya bisa dibangun melalui perbandingan
berbagai masyarakat hati-hati. Dipengaruhi oleh karya sosiolog Perancis Émile Durkheim
(1858-1917), yang berpendapat bahwa masyarakat primitif dan modern dibedakan oleh
struktur sosial yang berbeda, Radcliffe-Brown berpendapat bahwa antropolog pertama
harus memetakan struktur sosial setiap masyarakat diberikan sebelum membandingkan
struktur masyarakat yang berbeda [140] Firth, Fortes, dan Evans-Pritchard. merasa
mudah untuk menggabungkan perhatian Malinowski untuk peran-peran sosial dan
lembaga dengan perhatian Radcliffe-Brown dengan struktur sosial. Mereka dibedakan
antara "organisasi sosial" (interaksi sosial yang dapat diamati) dan "struktur sosial" (pola
aturan-diatur interaksi sosial), dan mengalihkan perhatian mereka dari fungsi biologis
untuk fungsi sosial. Sebagai contoh, bagaimana lembaga yang berbeda secara fungsional
terpadu, dan sejauh, dan cara-cara, yang berfungsi untuk mempromosikan lembaga-
lembaga solidaritas sosial dan stabilitas. Singkatnya, bukan budaya (dipahami sebagai
semua fenomena non-genetik atau ekstra-somatik manusia) mereka membuat "sosialitas"
(interaksi dan hubungan antara orang-orang dan kelompok masyarakat) objek studi
mereka. (Memang, Radcliffe-Brown pernah menulis "aku ingin meminta sebuah tabu
pada budaya kata"). [141]
Secara kebetulan, pada tahun 1946 sosiolog Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) mendirikan
Departemen Hubungan Sosial di Harvard University. Dipengaruhi oleh sosiolog Eropa
seperti Émile Durkheim dan Max Weber, Parsons mengembangkan teori aksi sosial yang
lebih dekat dengan antropologi sosial antropologi Inggris daripada Amerika Boas, dan
yang juga disebut "fungsionalisme struktural." niat Parson adalah untuk mengembangkan
teori total aksi sosial (mengapa orang bertindak seperti yang mereka lakukan), dan untuk
mengembangkan di Harvard dan program antar-disiplin yang akan langsung penelitian
menurut teori ini. model-Nya menjelaskan tindakan manusia sebagai hasil dari empat
sistem:
1. sistem "perilaku" kebutuhan biologis
2. dengan "kepribadian sistem" karakteristik individu yang mempengaruhi fungsi mereka
dalam dunia sosial
3. sistem "sosial" dari pola unit interaksi sosial, status dan peran sosial terutama
4. sistem "budaya" dari norma-norma dan nilai-nilai yang mengatur tindakan sosial
secara simbolis
Menurut teori ini, sistem kedua adalah objek studi yang tepat untuk psikolog; sistem
ketiga sosiolog, dan sistem keempat untuk antropolog budaya. [142] [143] Bahwa
Boasians mempertimbangkan semua sistem ini menjadi objek penelitian oleh antropolog,
dan "kepribadian" dan "status dan peran" untuk menjadi bagian dari "budaya" sebagai
"norma-norma dan nilai-nilai," membayangkan Parsons peran yang lebih sempit untuk
antropologi dan definisi yang jauh lebih sempit dari budaya.
Meskipun para antropolog budaya Boasian tertarik dalam norma-norma dan nilai-nilai,
antara lain banyak, hanya dengan munculnya fungsionalisme struktural bahwa orang-
orang datang untuk mengidentifikasi "budaya" dengan "norma-norma dan nilai-nilai."
Banyak ahli antropologi Amerika menolak pandangan budaya (dan implikasinya,
antropologi). Pada tahun 1980, antropolog Eric Wolf menulis,
Seperti ilmu-ilmu sosial mengubah diri menjadi "ilmu perilaku", penjelasan untuk
perilaku tidak lagi dilacak dengan budaya: perilaku itu harus dipahami dalam hal
pertemuan psikologis, strategi pilihan ekonomi, perjuangan untuk hadiah dalam
permainan kekuasaan. Budaya, sekali diperluas ke semua tindakan dan ide-ide yang
digunakan dalam kehidupan sosial, sekarang diturunkan ke margin sebagai "pandangan
dunia" atau "nilai" [144].
Namun demikian, beberapa mahasiswa Talcott Parsons 'muncul sebagai antropolog
Amerika terkemuka. Pada saat yang sama, antropolog Amerika banyak yang menjunjung
tinggi untuk penelitian yang dihasilkan oleh para ahli antropologi sosial di tahun 1940-an
dan 1950-an, dan menemukan struktural-fungsionalisme untuk menyediakan model yang
sangat berguna untuk melakukan penelitian etnografi.
Kombinasi dari teori antropologi budaya Amerika dengan British metode antropologi
sosial telah menyebabkan beberapa kebingungan antara konsep "masyarakat" dan
"budaya." Bagi sebagian besar antropolog, ini adalah konsep yang berbeda. Masyarakat
mengacu pada sekelompok orang, budaya mengacu pada kapasitas pan-manusia dan
totalitas fenomena manusia non-genetik. Masyarakat sering berpedoman; ciri-ciri budaya
sering mobile, dan batas-batas budaya, seperti mereka, dapat biasanya berpori,
permeabel, dan plural. 1950 [145] Selama dan 1960-an antropolog sering bekerja di
tempat-tempat di mana batas-batas sosial dan budaya bertepatan , sehingga menutupi
perbedaannya. Ketika disjunctures antara batas-batas tersebut menjadi sangat penting,
misalnya selama periode penjajahan Eropa-Afrika de pada 1960-an dan 1970-an, atau
selama penataan kembali Bretton Woods pasca-globalisasi, tetapi, perbedaan sering
menjadi pusat perdebatan antropologi. [ 146] [147] [148] [149] [150]
1946-1968: simbolik versus adaptif
Amerika kekerabatan
Dalam Hindu, sapi merupakan simbol kekayaan, kekuatan, dan memberi tanpa pamrih.
Harap memperbaiki artikel ini dengan memperkenalkan kutipan lebih tepat jika sesuai.
(Mei 2010)
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