Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The separation of Church and State occasions might arise when the state will use the
shall be inviolable. church, and the church the state, as a weapon
in the furtherance of their respective ends and
Art III sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an aims.”
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free This principle was recognized in the Malolos
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in
religious profession and worship, without the instructions of McKinley to the Phil.
discrimination or preference, shall forever be Commission… and finally embodied in the
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the Constitution as the supreme expression of the
exercise of civil or political rights. Filipino people.
Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom
Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall
guaranteed in the Consti
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
o What is guaranteed by our Constitution
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or is religious liberty, not merely religious
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, toleration.
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, Religious Freedom:
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate
any penal institution, or government orphanage or is not inhibition of profound reverence for
leprosarium. religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs.
Establishment Clause o Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a gov’t that shall
embody their ideals…” in the preamble
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ of the Constitution.
Batch 2008A. 2
RATIO claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The
barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, determine who should have custody thereof.
was notified of the sessions of the barangay council
to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the
able to attend those sessions because he was image to the Catholic church, that action would not
working with a construction company based at Ipil, violate the Constitution because the image was acquired
Ormoc City. Mañago's absence from the sessions of with private funds and is its private property.
the barangay council did not render the said
resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said
resolutions were passed. The council has the right to take measures to recover
possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10
2) WON the resolutions contravene the and 12.
constitutional provisions that "no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of Not every governmental activity which involves the
religion" and that "no public money or expenditure of public funds and which has some
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, worship and banning the use of public money or
denomination, sectarian institution, or property.
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or (Lower Court’s decision affirmed)
other religious teacher or dignitary as such.
except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
LEMON vs. KURTZMAN
or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO
(1971)
Ratio
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early
v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The
The wooden image was purchased in connection
cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint
elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to
had to be placed in the church when the mass was
"church-related educational institutions."
celebrated.
Question Presented
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition state financial aid available to "church-related
and display of his image) cannot be branded as educational institutions"?
illegal.
Conclusion
The barangay council designated a layman as the
custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with
A more practical reason for that arrangement would religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute
be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have
could easily be made available to any family desiring principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit
to borrow the image in connection with prayers and religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government
novenas. entanglement with religion." The Court found that the
subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state
saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions
parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in
Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an
contributions to be solicited from his own unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning
parishioners for the purchase of another image of legislation which appropriates support to religious
San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. schools.
FACTS:
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña
Batch 2008A. 3
This case is actually 2 cases involving two States, 2) financial support
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, laws 3) active involvement
were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools
and teachers. In both cases, the statutes were It also stated 3 tests:
challenged for being violitive of the first amendment
for creating an entanglement between church and 1) Statute must have a secular legislative
state. purpose
2) Principal or primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion
RHODE ISLAND STATUTE: 3) Statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion
Purpose: Keeping the quality of nonpublic
elementary schools. Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as
the legislative intent/purpose is most definitely secular.
Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salary to However, the court states that “the cumulative impact of
nonpublic school teachers. the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each
State involves excessive entanglement between
Qualifications: Teaching in a nonpublic school government and religion”.
where average per-pupil expenditure on secular
education is less than the average in the public As the schools taken into are church schools, they are
schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjects seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic
and must not teach religion else lose the benefits faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives
accorded by the statute. rise to entangling church-state relationships. Also
adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though
Background of schools: the case doesn’t really say why). Also taken into
Nonpublic schools: 25% of the State’s consideration is the teachers’ means of teaching. There
pupils. 95% went to RC schools. is no way of ascertaining if the teachers will inject a
Teachers who applied: all come from these religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that
RC schools. the schools and their teachers are subject to religious
authority, and teachers are even told (in the “Handbook
of School Regulations”) to stimulate interest in religious
PENNSYLVANIA: vocations and missionary work.
Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actual
costs. entanglement that will be caused through the
implementation of the laws. Due to the need for
Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools on surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must
expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and run through applications to see who qualifies), there is
instructional materials. created the entanglement that the Clause protects
against. “...the very restrictions and surveillance
Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught in necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly
public schools. Also limited to secular subjects. nonideological role gives rise to entanglements...”
Textbooks must be approved.
The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as it
Background of schools: provides direct financial aid to these schools.
Nonpublic schools: 20% of State’s pupils.
96% attended RC schools. Another consideration is the divisive political potential of
the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance
will entail considerable political activity. This refers to
ISSUE: the division that will occur between those for and against
WON the statutes enacted violated the first state aid, thereby making it a political struggle. Here the
amendment re: separation of Church and State, and state says that while political debate and division are
are therefore unconstitutional. normal, those predicated on religious lines are what the
First Amendment sought to protect the country from.
HELD:
Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption
struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded). challenge fell to over 200 years of universal practice,
state aid has no such support. Also, these statutes
create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be
RATIO: avoided. The constitution deems religion to be a private
matter, so the government must exclude itself from such
What is held to have been violated is the Religion an area.
Clauses of the First Amendment. In this, the court
stated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was
to protect against:
DECISION:
The law is not in violation of the
Constitution.
RATIO:
Batch 2008A. 5
• The first, a crèche depicting the Christian display, located in a private park w/n downtown
shopping district.
Nativity scene, was placed on the Grand
• By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of the
Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c
is the main, most beautiful, and most public crèche in the display, holding that it didn’t have
part of the courthouse. The crèche was the effect of advancing or promoting religion.
donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman • J. O’CONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides
Catholic group, and bore a sign to that framework for evaluating govt’l use of religious
effect. symbols: 1) O’Connor recognizes any
• The second was an 18-foot Chanukah endorsement of religion as invalid because it
menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed sends a message to nonadherents that they are
just outside the City County building next to outsiders, not full members of the political
the city’s 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot community, and an accompanying message to
of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor’s adherents that they are insiders, favored
name & containing text declaring the city’s members of the political community; 2) She
salute to liberty. The menorah is owned by provides a method for determining whether the
Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, govt’s use of an object with religious meaning
erected, and removed each year by the city. has the effect of endorsing religion. The effect of
the display depends upon the message that the
• Respondents (the Greater Pittsburgh govt’s practice communicates: the question is
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties what viewers may fairly understand to be the
Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking purpose of the display. That inquiry turns upon
permanently to enjoin the county from the context in which the contested object
displaying the menorah on the ground that appears.
the displays violated the Establishment
Clause of the 1st Amendment.
• The concurrence concluded that both because
the crèche is a “traditional symbol” of
• The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each Christmas, a holiday with strong secular
display violates the Establishment Clause elements, and because the crèche was
because each has the impermissible effect of “displayed along with purely secular symbols”
endorsing religion. (i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santa
distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/
ISSUE: “Season’s Greetings”, etc), the creche’s setting
1. WON display of crèche violates changes what viewers may fairly understand to
Establishment clause. YES be the purpose of the display and negates any
2. WON display of menorah violates message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs
Establishment clause. NO represented by the crèche.
RATIO:
• The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agree
that: 1) govt’s use of religious symbolism is
The Establishment Clause unconstitutional if it has the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs; 2) effect of the
• The Establishment Clause: “Congress shall
govt’s use of religious symbolism depends
make no law respecting an establishment of
upon its context.
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof..”
1. ON CRECHE
• Lemon v Kurtzman provides 3 tests for • There is no doubt that the crèche itself is
determining whether a gov’t practice violates capable of communicating a religious message.
the Clause. A statute or practice w/c The angel in the crèche endorses a patently
touches upon religion, if it is to be Christian message: “Glory to God in the
permissible under the Clause must 1) have a Highest”
secular purpose; 2) neither advance nor
inhibit religion in its principal or primary
• Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crèche
effect; 3) not foster an excessive display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in
entanglement with religion. Lynch, nothing in the context of the display
detracts from the creche’s religious message.
• The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt The Lynch display comprised a series of figures
from appearing to take a position on and objects, each group of which had its own
questions of religious belief or from focal point. Here, in contrast, the crèche stands
“making adherence to a religion relevant alone: it is the single element of the display
in any way to a person’s standing in the on the Grand Staircase.
political community.” • Further, by permitting the display of the crèche
in the main & most beautiful part of the
building, the county sends an unmistakable
LYNCH V DONNELLY message that it supports and promotes the
• ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had Christian praise to God.
violated the Establishment Clause by • The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing
including a creche in its annual Christmas its ownership by a Roman Catholic group
demonstrates that the govt is endorsing the
Batch 2008A. 6
religious message of that organization, the fundamental premise of the Establishment
rather than communicating a message of its Clause itself. In contrast, confining the
own. The Clause prohibits what occurred government's own Christmas celebration to the
here: the govt’s lending its support to the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the
communication of a religious’ organization’s religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of
religious message. Christians, but simply permits the government
• Govt may acknowledge Christmas as a to acknowledge the holiday without expressing
an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs.
cultural phenomenon, but under the 1st
Amendment, it may not observe it as a
2. ON MENORAH
Christian holy day by suggesting that people
• The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol.
praise God for the birth of Jesus.
But its message is not exclusively religious. It is
• Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate Xmas the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like
in some manner and form, but not in a way Christmas, has both religious and secular
that endorses Christian doctrine as the dimensions.
Allegheny County did in displaying the
crèche.
• Its display doesn’t have the prohibited effect of
endorsing religion given its particular physical
On Justice Kennedy’s opinion upholding the setting. Its combined display with a Christmas
display of the crèche as permissible under the tree & a sign saluting liberty does not
Clause impermissibly endorse both the Christian and
Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally
• Kennedy says the display of the crèche is infirm than the endorsement of Christianity
consistent with the Establishment Clause. alone), but simply recognizes that both
He argues that this follows from the Marsh v Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same
Chambers decision, which sustained the winter-holiday season, which has attained a
constitutionality of a legislative prayer. He secular status in our society. The widely
also asserts that the crèche, even in this accepted view of the Christmas tree as the
setting, poses no realistic risk of preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas
representing an effort to proselytize, having season emphasizes this point.
repudiated the Court’s endorsement • The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant
inquiry in favor of a proselytization element in the city’s display by virtue of its size
approach. Court’s analysis of the crèche and central position. The placement of the
reflects an unjustified hostility toward menorah beside it is readily understood as a
religion. recognition that Christmas is not the only
• Court answered that history cannot traditional way of celebrating the season.
legitimate practices like the crèche display • Similarly, the presence of the mayor’s sign
that demonstrate the govt’s allegiance to a confirms that in the particular context the govt’s
particular sect or creed. association with a religious symbol does not
represent sponsorship of religious beliefs but
• The proselytization test preferred by
simply a recognition of cultural diversity.
Kennedy is much the same as the
endorsement inquiry except to the extent
that the former requires an obvious LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY
allegiance between the government and the
favored sect.
• *Endorsement inquiry: WON the practice FACTS:
demonstrates the govt’s support, promotion
or endorsement of the particular creed of a The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas
particular sect display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and
• *Proselytization test: WON the practice located in the heart of the city's shopping district. The
would place the govt’s weight behind an display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa
obvious effort to proselytize for a particular Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads
religion "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene,
• Court said that Kennedy misperceived a which has been part of this annual display for 40 years
respect for religious pluralism as hostility or or more. Respondents brought an action in Federal
indifference to religion. District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche in
• The Constitution mandates that the the display on the ground that it violated the
government remain secular, rather than Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made
affiliating itself with religious beliefs or applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
institutions, precisely in order to avoid The District Court upheld the challenge and
discriminating against citizens on the basis permanently enjoined the city from including the creche
of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim that in the display. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
prohibiting government from celebrating
Christmas as a religious holiday ISSUE:
discriminates against Christians in favor of WON display of crèche violates Establishment Clause.
nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts HELD:
Batch 2008A. 7
Notwithstanding the religious significance of the purposes. Whatever benefit to one faith or
creche, Pawtucket has not violated the religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche
Establishment Clause in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and
incidental, and is no more an advancement or
RATIO: endorsement of religion than the congressional
• The concept of a "wall" of separation and executive recognition of the origins of
Christmas, or the exhibition of religious
between church and state is a useful
paintings in governmentally supported
metaphor but is not an accurate description
museums.
of the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists. The Constitution does not • As to administrative entanglement, there is no
require complete separation of church and evidence of contact with church authorities
state; it affirmatively mandates concerning the content or design of the
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all exhibition prior to or since the city's purchase of
religions, and forbids hostility toward any. the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of
• This Court's interpretation of the the creche have been necessary, and, since the
city owns the crèche (worth $200), the tangible
Establishment Clause comports with the
material it contributes is de minimis. Political
contemporaneous understanding of the
divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate
Framers' intent. That neither the draftsmen
otherwise permissible conduct, and, in any
of the Constitution, nor the First Congress
event, apart from the instant litigation, there is
itself, saw any establishment problem in
no evidence of political friction or divisiveness
employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in
over the creche in the 40-year history of the
the Congress is a striking example of the
city's Christmas celebration.
accommodation of religious beliefs intended
by the Framers. • It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche
in the display, as part of a celebration of an
• Our history is pervaded by official
event acknowledged in the Western World for 20
acknowledgment of the role of religion in
centuries, and in this country by the people, the
American life, and equally pervasive is
Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for
evidence of accommodation of all faiths and
2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibition as to
all forms of religious expression and hostility
render it violative of the Establishment Clause.
toward none.
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol
• Rather than taking an absolutist approach while hymns and carols are sung and played in
in applying the Establishment Clause and public places including schools, and while
mechanically invalidating all governmental Congress and state legislatures open public
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction
give special recognition to religion in general contrary to this Nation's history and this Court's
or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized holdings.
challenged conduct or legislation to
determine whether, in reality, it establishes a
religion or religious faith or tends to do so. In
the line-drawing process called for in each EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS
case, it has often been found useful to
inquire whether the challenged law or J.Fortas
conduct has a secular purpose, whether its
principal or primary effect is to advance or FACTS:
inhibit religion, and whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with
Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rock school
religion. But this Court has been unwilling
system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at
to be confined to any single test or criterion
Central High School. Until 1964 the official textbook
in this sensitive area.
furnished for the high school biology course did not have
• Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on
a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the
the creche in the context of the Christmas
academic year 1965--1966, the school administration,
season. Focus exclusively on the religious
on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the
component of any activity would inevitably
school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which
lead to its invalidation under the
contained a chapter setting forth 'the theory about the
Establishment Clause.
origin * * * of man from a lower form of animal.'
• Based on the record in this case, the city
has a secular purpose for including the The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any
creche in its Christmas display and has not state-supported school or university 'to teach the theory
impermissibly advanced religion or or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a
created an excessive entanglement lower order of animals,' or 'to adopt or use in any such
between religion and government. The institution a textbook that teaches' this theory. Violation
display is sponsored by the city to celebrate is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal
the Holiday recognized by Congress and from his position. The Arkansas statute was an adaption
national tradition and to depict the origins of of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law' which that State
that Holiday; these are legitimate secular adopted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee
Batch 2008A. 8
law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the mandate of the First, and in violation of the
the celebrated Scopes case in 1927. Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.
Batch 2008A. 9
- The court rejected the defense’s argument that The former forestalls compulsion by law of the
the children were allowed to excuse themselves acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom to
via their parents’ request, saying that it did not choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The
mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony. latter protects the freedom to exercise the
This was still in violation of the establishment chosen form of religion. This it embraces two
clause in that it threatens religious liberty by concepts: Freedom to believe and Freedom to
putting a premium upon belief as opposed to Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut)
non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect
the beliefs, ideals, and even morality of the - Public Schools are organized on the premise
petitioners. that secular education can be isolated from all
ISSUE: religious teaching so that the school can
WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and
is unconstitutional under the violation of the also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to
Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth religion.
Amendment. - McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendment
did not simply bar a congressional enactment
HELD: establishing a church; it forbade all laws
Yes. respecting an establishment of religion.
- Engel v. Vitale: The establishment and free
RATIO: exercise clauses in certain instances overlap.
The former does not depend upon any showing
I. It is true that religion has been closely of direct governmental compulsion and is
identified with American history and violated by the enactment of laws which
government. This background is evidence establish an official religion whether those
today in our public life through the laws directly operate to coerce non-observing
continuance in our oaths of office from the individuals or not. The former works also on
Presidency to the Alderman of the final the belief that a union of government and
supplication, “So held me God.” Indeed, only religion tends to destroy government and
last year, an official survey of the country degrade religion.
indicated that 64% of our people have
church membership while 3% profess no IV. The neutrality of which the Court’s cases
faith at all. This is not to say, however that speak thus stem from the recognition from
religion has been so identified with our history of the tendency of religious sects to
history and government that religious fuse governmental and religious functions or
freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded cause a concert of dependence of one upon the
in out public and private life. Nothing but other placing State support behind the tenets
the most telling of personal experiences in of one or all orthodoxies.
religious persecution could have implanted
such belief. Test for Establishment Clause:
1. Existence of a secular legislative purpose
II. Minor v. Board of Education of 2. The primary effect that neither advances nor
Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the inhibits religion.
court has decisively settled the First
Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of Test for Free Exercise Clause:
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactment
thereof’ has been made wholly applicable to as it operates against anyone in the practice
the States under the 14th amendment. of religion.
Second, this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the - We agree with the trial court’ finding as to the
Establishment Clause forbids only religious character of the exercises and are
governmental preference of one religion over thus in violation of the establishment clause.
the other. - It is also insisted that unless religious
exercises are permitted a ‘religion of
Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson secularism’ is established in schools. We agree
and Burton: The First that a religion of secularism cannot be
Amendment’s purpose was to established in the sense of affirmatively
create a complete and opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus
permanent separation of the preferring belief over non-belief.
spheres of religious activity and - While the Free Exercise clause clearly
civil authority by prohibits the use of state action to deny the
comprehensively forbidding any rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never
form of public aid or support for meant that a majority could use the
religion. machinery of the state to practice beliefs.
III. Interrelationship between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses:
Batch 2008A. 10
there was a state religion, many people who held
contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the
ENGEL vs. VITALE time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history
shows that there was a widespread awareness among
04/03/62 many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church
Black, J. and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter
personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to
FACTS: the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way
Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School lay in the Government's placing its official stamp of
District 9, acting under New York State law, approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one
composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start particular form of religious services.
of each class that went: "Almighty God, we The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg danger by leaving the government of this country in the
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers hands of the people rather than in the hands of any
and our Country." monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our
The program was supported by the NY State Board Founders were no more willing to let the content of their
of Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they
action in a New York State Court insisting that use pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to
of this official prayer in the public schools was let these vital matters of personal conscience depend
contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment
practices of both themselves and their children. NY was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee
CA sustained an order of the lower state courts that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
which had upheld the power of New York to use the Government would be used to control, support or
Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of influence the kinds of prayer the American people can
its public schools so long as the schools did not say -- that the people's religions must not be subjected
compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his to the pressures of government for change each time a
parents' objection. petitioners appealed. new political administration is elected to office. Under
that Amendment's prohibition against governmental
petitoners: prayer violates the non-establishment of establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions
religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the State's use of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this
of the Regents' prayer in its public school system country, be it state or federal, is without power to
breaches the constitutional wall of separation prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is
between Church and State.) to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any
program of governmentally sponsored religious activity.
respondents: prayer is "non-denominational"; the The history of governmentally established religion, both
program, as modified and approved by state courts, in England and in this country, showed that whenever
does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but government had allied itself with one particular form of
permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or religion, the inevitable result had been that it had
be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the
establishment of religious services in public schools Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the
is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward historical fact that governmentally established religions
prayer. and religious persecutions go hand in hand.
re: respondents first argument
ISSUE: Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally
WON the prayer is a religious exercise, the neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
establishment of which is prohibited by the 1st students is voluntary can serve to free it from the
amendment limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from
the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both
HELD: of which are operative against the States by virtue of the
YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is a Fourteenth Amendment.
religious exercise; the State of New York has adopted re: respondents second argument
a practice wholly inconsistent with the Non- It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that
Establishment Clause. the constitutional prohibition each separate government in this country should stay
against laws respecting an establishment of religion out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
must at least mean that in this country it is no part prayers and leave that purely religious function to the
of the business of government to compose official people themselves and to those the people choose to look
prayers for any group of the American people to to for religious guidance.
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government. In an effort to explain the clause, the Reversed and remanded.
court looked at the history of the separation of
church and state saying that " it is a matter of
history that this very practice of establishing
governmentally composed prayers for religious
services was one of the reasons which caused many
of our early colonists to leave England and seek
religious freedom in America" In England where
Batch 2008A. 11
ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS undertaking to provide educational opportunities to
children in a failed school district. It confers educational
FACTS: assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined
without reference to religion and permits participation of
all district schools--religious or nonreligious--and
Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program gives adjacent public schools. The only preference in the
educational choices to families in any Ohio school program is for low-income families, who receive greater
district that is under state control pursuant to a assistance and have priority for admission. Rather than
federal-court order. The program provides tuition aid creating financial incentives that skew it towards
for certain students in the Cleveland City School religious schools, the program creates financial
District, the only covered district, to attend disincentives: Private schools receive only half the
participating public or private schools of their government assistance given to community schools and
parent's choosing and tutorial aid for students who one-third that given to magnet schools, and adjacent
choose to remain enrolled in public school. Both public schools would receive two to three times that
religious and nonreligious schools in the district may given to private schools. Families too have a financial
participate, as may public schools in adjacent school disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private
districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parents school tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet,
according to financial need, and where the aid is or traditional public school. No reasonable observer
spent depends solely upon where parents choose to would think that such a neutral private choice program
enroll their children. The number of tutorial carries with it the imprimatur of government
assistance grants provided to students remaining in endorsement. Nor is there evidence that the program
public school must equal the number of tuition aid fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland
scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of parents to select secular educational options: Their
the participating private schools had a religious children may remain in public school as before, remain
affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools in public school with funded tutoring aid, obtain a
participated, and 96% of the students participating scholarship and choose to attend a religious school,
in the scholarship program were enrolled in obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a nonreligious
religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in
students were from families at or below the poverty a magnet school. The Establishment Clause question
line. Cleveland schoolchildren also have the option of whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their
enrolling in community schools, which are funded children to religious schools must be answered by
under state law but run by their own school boards evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland
and receive twice the per-student funding as schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a
participating private schools, or magnet schools, scholarship and then choose a religious school.
which are public schools emphasizing a particular Cleveland's preponderance of religiously affiliated
subject area, teaching method, or service, and for schools did not result from the program, but is a
which the school district receives the same amount phenomenon common to many American cities. Eighty-
per student as it does for a student enrolled at a two percent of Cleveland's private schools are religious,
traditional public school. Respondents, Ohio as are 81% of Ohio's private schools. To attribute
taxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on the constitutional significance to the 82% figure would lead
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice
The Federal District Court granted them summary program might be permissible in parts of Ohio where the
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. percentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where Ohio
has deemed such programs most sorely needed.
ISSUE: WON the program offends the Establishment Likewise, an identical private choice program might be
Clause. NO. constitutional only in States with a lower percentage of
religious private schools.
RATIO:
(b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, and "any facility used or to be used for sectarian
is part of Ohio's general and multifaceted instruction or as a place for religious worship, or
Batch 2008A. 12
. . . any facility which . . . is used or to be religious activity." Every analysis must begin
used primarily in connection with any part with the candid acknowledgment that there is no
of the program of a school or department of single constitutional caliper that can be used to
divinity . . . ." measure the precise degree to which these three
• no part of the project may be used for factors are present or absent. There is only a
sectarian instruction, religious worship, or cumulative criteria which is this:
the programs of a divinity school.
• If, during this period (a period of 20 years), Against this background we consider four questions:
the recipient violates the statutory
conditions, the United States is entitled to a) does the Act reflect a secular legislative
recover an amount equal to the proportion of purpose? Yes
its present value that the federal grant bore
to the original cost of the facility.
• Four church-related colleges and ~> United States require that the youth be assured
universities in Connecticut receiving federal ample opportunity for the fullest development of their
construction grants under Title I were intellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimate
named as defendants. Federal funds were secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental
used for five projects at these four action. The crucial question is not whether some benefit
institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the
Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and legislative program, but whether its principal or primary
arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a effect advances religion. The Act itself was carefully
science building at Fairfield University; (4) a drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities
library building at Fairfield; and (5) a would be devoted to the secular and not the religious
language laboratory at Albertus Magnus function of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants
College. and loans only for academic facilities that will be used
for defined secular purposes and expressly prohibits
• Appellants attempted to show that the four
their use for religious instruction, training, or worship.
recipient institutions were "sectarian" by
None of the four church-related institutions in this case
introducing evidence of their relations with
has violated the statutory restrictions. There had been
religious authorities, the content of their
no religious services or worship in the federally financed
curricula, and other indicia of their religious
facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them;
character.
used solely for nonreligious purposes. There is no
• Appellee colleges introduced testimony that
evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these
they had fully complied with the statutory facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of
conditions and that their religious affiliation academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination.
in no way interfered with the performance of
their secular educational functions.
b) is the primary effect of the Act to
advance or inhibit religion? Yes, in effect
ISSUES/HELD: will help advance religion. This part held
unconstitutional.
1. WON Act authorized grants to church-
related schools yes ~> We note that an institution applying for a federal
2. WON religion clauses of the consti have been grant is only required to provide assurances that the
impaired in part, yes but the entire act is facility will not be used for sectarian instruction or
not unconsti religious worship "during at least the period of the
Federal interest therein(20 years). This obviously opens
the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that
* Vacated and remanded. period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for
example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to
RATIO: promote religious interests, the original federal grant will
in part have the effect of advancing religion. So this part
1. We are satisfied that Congress intended the was held unconstitutional.
Act to include all colleges and universities
regardless of any affiliation with or c) does the administration of the Act foster
sponsorship by a religious body. The Act an excessive government entanglement
makes no reference to religious affiliation or with religion? No. the entanglement is
nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances very much lessened for three reasons.
"institutions of higher education" must be (application of strict scrutiny)
taken to include church-related colleges and
universities. ~> these four schools subscribe to a well-established set
2. Court have noted the internal tension in the of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this
First Amendment between the record shows that these principles are not in fact
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with
Clause. the Establishment Clause sought to admittedly religious functions but whose predominant
protect: "sponsorship, financial support, and higher education mission is to provide their students
active involvement of the sovereign in with a secular education. Their purpose is not religious
Batch 2008A. 13
indoctrination so there is less likelihood than in ISSUES:
primary and secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education. This reduces 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
the risk that government aid will in fact serve to justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action?
support religious activities. Did respondent have any legal standing to file the
Petition for Declaratory Relief?
~> The entanglement between church and state is 2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and
also lessened here by the nonideological character of substance required by the Constitution, the law and
the aid that the Government provides. Neutral, or the Rules of Court?
non-ideological services, facilities, or materials are 3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike
supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for
of the school that they attend. Facilities are public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from
religiously neutral. campaigning against said candidates?"
Batch 2008A. 14
2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear
shall be rendered by any court without expressing violation of the Constitution, because it made no
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void
on which it is based. No petition for review or motion and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even
refused due course or denied without stating the just modify.
basis therefor." Elementary due process demands
that the parties to a litigation be given information Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take
on how the case was decided, as well as an up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that
to the conclusions of the court. The significance of "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed
factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate concerned."
court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of
law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning.
MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS
Essential Parts of a Good decision:
HELD: *It may be true that in the case at bar the price
*The only essential difference that We find asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
between these two provisions that may have any in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost
bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was
(m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that
subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so
in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
does not contain any limitation as to the amount of dissemination of religious beliefs.
tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per *Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But
the authorities above referred to that maintain that as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as
"all rights and liabilities which have accrued under amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
the original statute are preserved and may be defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated
repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
interruption", We hold that the questioned exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
effect. beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of
*The constitutional guaranty of the free the plaintiff.
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate Reversed and Remanded
religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION
State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
(1959)
I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee
Montemayor J
herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
FACTS:
literature.
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony
*The constitutional guaranty of the free
compulsory for schools. The implementing rules
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
(Department Order 8)says that the anthem must be
worship carries with it the right to disseminate
played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone
religious information. Any restraint of such right can
must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
recite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan).
present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and
Petitioners children attending the Buenavista
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute
I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee
the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did
herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
Witnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not
literature.
make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth
*(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one
beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They
thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.
from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The
tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license
tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise
Batch 2008A. 16
Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special
children be exempt from the law and just be allowed circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the
to remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd students although attendance in schools is mandatory
denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories.
petitioned and issued. Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment
here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and
ISSUE: exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't
attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to
WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional attend school.
Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand Petitioners do not question the right of the school to
during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the
during boy scout activities. Their objection then attempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the
rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and
pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely demoralize the greater student population.
secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag
or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an
talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting understanding that anti-war religious believers will not
to force, military service, or duty to defend the be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat
country. ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the
courts.
There was no compulsion involved in the
enforcement of the flag salute. They were not DISPOSITION:
criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they
chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary
lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave injunction dissolved. No costs.
it.
Batch 2008A. 18
Yes. Case remanded for further proceedings - Similarly, the school district policy also fails the
consistent with our holding. Plaintiff to recover costs Lemon test. Although it survives the first prong
on his appeal. of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes,
the school district had the secular purpose of
RATIO: Court used three tests to determine the fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the
validity of the added words. policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon
prong asks whether the challenged government
Lemon test action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
- To survive the "Lemon test," the government adherents of the controlling denominations as
conduct in question (1) must have a secular an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a
purpose, (2) must have a principal or disapproval, of their individual religious
primary effect that neither advances nor choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Given the
inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as
excessive government entanglement with discussed above, particularly within the
religion. confined environment of the classroom, the
- Historically, the primary purpose of the policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible
1954 Act was to advance religion, in conflict message of endorsement to some and
with the first prong of the Lemon test. The disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding
federal defendants "do not dispute that the the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore
words 'under God' were intended" "to the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and
recognize a Supreme Being," at a time when fails the Lemon test
the government was publicly inveighing
against atheistic communism. Justice O’ Connor’s “endorsement test”
o the federal defendants argue that - In the context of the Pledge, the statement that
the Pledge must be considered as a the United States is a nation "under God" is an
whole when assessing whether it endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a
has a secular purpose. They claim religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. .
that the Pledge has the secular To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United
purpose of "solemnizing public States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the
occasions, expressing confidence in values for which the flag stands: unity,
the future, and encouraging the indivisibility, liberty, justice, and -- since 1954 --
recognition of what is worthy of monotheism. The text of the official Pledge,
appreciation in society." codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a
o Court said: As was the case with the position with respect to the purely religious
amendment to the Alabama statute question of the existence and identity of God.
in Wallace, the legislative history of - Furthermore, the school district's practice of
the 1954 Act reveals that the Act's teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aims to
sole purpose was to advance inculcate in students a respect for the ideals set
religion, in order to differentiate the forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state
United States from nations under endorsement of these ideals. Although students
communist rule. "The First cannot be forced to participate in recitation of
Amendment requires that a statute the Pledge, the school district is nonetheless
must be invalidated if it is entirely conveying a message of state endorsement of a
motivated by a purpose to advance religious belief when it requires public school
religion." teachers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the
current form of the Pledge.
- Defendants: The phrase 'under God'
recognizes only the guidance of God in our “Coercion test”
national affairs. Court: This alleged - on the principle that "at a minimum, the
distinction is irrelevant for constitutional Constitution guarantees that government may
purposes. The Act's affirmation of "a belief in not coerce anyone to support or participate in
the sovereignty of God" and its recognition of religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a
"the guidance of God" are endorsements by way which establishes a state religion or
the government of religious beliefs. The religious faith, or tends to do so."
Establishment Clause is not limited to
"religion as an institution"; this is clear from - Although the defendants argue that the religious
cases such as Santa Fe, where the Court content of "one nation under God" is minimal, to
struck down student-initiated and student- an atheist or a believer in certain non-Judeo-
led prayer at high school football games.. Christian religions or philosophies, it may
The Establishment Clause guards not only reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a
against the establishment of "religion as an "religious orthodoxy" of monotheism, and is
institution," but also against the therefore impermissible. The coercive effect of
endorsement of religious ideology by the this policy is particularly pronounced in the
government. Because the Act fails the school setting given the age and
purpose prong of Lemon, we need not impressionability of schoolchildren, and their
examine the other prongs. understanding that they are required to adhere
to the norms set by their school, their teacher
and their fellow students.
Batch 2008A. 19
2) The constitutionality of RA 3350 was
(Reversed and Remanded) attacked the Union and struck down by the
Court of Industrial Relations on the
following grounds:
ANUCENSION vs. NLU A) it abridges the freedom of workers to
form associations
FACTS: B) it impairs the obligation of contracts
C) it discriminates in favor of the
In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between religious sect Inglesia ni Cristo in
Hacienda Luisita and the United Luisita Workers’ violation of the constitutional
Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for provision prohibiting legislation for
those who were members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the the support of any religious sect
time of the agreement, all employees would be D) it denies equal protection
required to join the Union and must stay in the
Union to be able to retain employment in the
Hacienda. A) On the first claim, the Court said
that both the Consti and RA 875
In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni (the original Industrial Peace Act,
Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant later amended by RA 3350)
to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting recognized freedom of association.
any of their members from joining any outside RA 875 provides for the forming,
association or organization. Members of Inglesia joining or assisting of labor
were told that they would not lose their jobs organizations for the purpose of
pursuant to RA 3350, that says that members of collective bargaining. The court also
religious sects that prohibit affiliation may not be said that this right to join also
laid off simply on grounds of their non-affiliation includes the right not to join or to
with any worker’s union. abstain from joining any union. The
court explains, however, the idea of
Later this number went down to 115 due to 2 of a closed shop, wherein an
them having already been deceased and 27 not agreement of this nature binds
having been in the Union to begin with. The Union employees to the union bargained
then infomed the Hacienda that the 115 members with. “Hence, the right of said
have resigned and demanded for their immediate employee not to join the labor union
lay-off due to the stipulations of the CBA. The Union is curtailed and withdrawn”.
even proceeded to go on strike until the 115 workers However, RA 3350 included the
were laid off. exception with regards to religious
sects that prohibit affiliation. Here,
Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of the members are not being
RA 3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations prohibited as they may still join,
struck down the statute. Petitioners here have neither are they being coerced to
appealed to the Supreme Court. join. Therefore, there is no
curtailment of the freedom of
ISSUES: association.
B) With regards to impairing the
1) WON the Court of Industrial Relations had obligation of contracts, the Court
jurisdiction. said that legislation impairing the
2) WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional. obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the
HELD: people, and when the means
adopted to secure that end are
1) No it did not. The Court of Agricultural reasonable. Here the purpose is to
Relations had jurisdiction. insure freedom of religion, prevent
2) No, RA 3350 is not unconstitutional. discrimination, and protect the
members of those religious sects.
RATIO: Also stated by the Court is that the
free exercise of religious profession
1) Petitioners claim that the Court of or belief is superior to contract
Agricultural Relations should have had rights.
jurisdiction as the Hacienda is of an C) The Court cited Aglipay v. Ruiz
agricultural nature, not an industrial where they stated that the
one. Here the Court says that the government should not be precluded
agricultural nature of the Hacienda is from pursuing valid objectives
unquestionable. As such it is clear that secular in character even if the
the Court of Agricultural Relations incidental result would be favorable
should have had jurisdiction. to a religion or sect. The purpose of
RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and
Batch 2008A. 20
temporal, not spiritual or the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2)
religious or holy and eternal. It the respondent Board did not act with grave
was intended to serve the abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
secular purpose of advancing exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang
the constitutional right to the Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the
free exercise of religion. materials constitute an attack against another
D) The Court here discussed on religion. It also found the series “indecent,
equal protection, not being a contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
guaranty of equality. It allows
classification. Here we see that
the classification is based on
real and important differences, ISSUES:
as religious beliefs are not mere
beliefs or ideas, bit are motives 1. WoN the Board has the power to review
of certain rules of human petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
conduct. Such classification is Cristo,”
therefore valid.
2. Assuming it has the power, whether or not
the Board gravely abused its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and
IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA 121, for the reason that they constitute an
attack against other religions and that they
1996 are indecent, contrary to law and good
Ponente: Puno customs.
FACTS: DECISION:
The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of
1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) has a television the Board to review the TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia
program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired ni Cristo,” is AFFIRMED.
on 2 TV channels. The program presents
and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, Its decision sustaining the action of the Board x-
doctrines and practices often times in rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and
comparative studies with other religions. 121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Batch 2008A. 21
belief is translated into external acts that “attacks against another religion” in x-rating the
affect the public welfare. Where the
individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986
to do so becomes subject to the authority of will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify
the State (Isagani Cruz) an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program. The ground “attack against
• (Cruz) It is error to think that the mere another religion” was merely added by the
invocation of religious freedom will respondent Board in its Rules.iThis rule is void for it
stalemate the State and render it impotent runs smack against the doctrine that administrative
in protecting the general welfare. The rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and
inherent police power can be exercised to spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover,
prevent religious practices inimical to society. Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code
And this is true even if such practices are should be invoked to justify the subsequent
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and punishment of a show which offends any religion. It
not merely for the purpose of evading the cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the speech.
law.
Issue No. 2 • Respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. The records show that the decision of
• The evidence shows that the Board x-rated the Board is completely bereft of findings of facts
to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
petitioners TV series for “attacking” other
constitute impermissible attacks against another
religions, especially the Catholic church. An
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
examination of the evidence will show that the
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of
Prior restraint on speech, including religious
other religions. The videotapes were not
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
viewed by the CA as they were not presented
but only by the showing of a substantive and
as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
imminent evil which has taken the life of a
CA as indecent, contrary to law and good
reality already on ground.
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom
• It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the
of speech and interferes with its right to free clear and present danger test to the case at bar
exercise of religion. because the issue involves the content of speech
and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal
• The respondent Board may disagree with the connection between the speech and the evil
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that apprehended cannot be established. The contention
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
however, unclean they may be. Under our videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the speech content is known and not an X quantity.
State to favor any religion by protecting it Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
against an attack by another religion. Religious unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board,
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur
preserve peace among their followers, will bring about the substantive evil feared by the
especially the fanatics, the establishment law. vs. TELERON
PAMIL
clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State
from leaning towards any religion
After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee
reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the restriction on ministers is that if elected to public office
disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence
"religious belief" and restricted "religious action . . . to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the
[only] in the lawmaking process of government - interests of another, thus pitting one against the others,
where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its
establishment clause . . . ."The state interests in command of neutrality. However widely that view may
preventing the establishment of religion and in have been held in the 18th century by many, including
avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel enlightened statesmen of that day, the American
political activity along religious lines, resulting from experience provides no persuasive support for the fear
clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-
by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of
disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of civil office than their unordained counterparts.
the Free Exercise Clause.
The challenged provision violates appellant's First
ISSUE/HELD: Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion
because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his
W/O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of religion on the surrender of his right to seek office.
the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever Though justification is asserted under the Establishment
from serving as delegates to the State's limited Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that if
constitutional convention deprived appellant of the elected to public office members of the clergy will
right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart
the First Amendment. YES those of another contrary to the anti-establishment
principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to
demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy
RATIO: participation in the political process have not lost
whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.
The disqualification of ministers from legislative
office was a practice carried from England by seven
of the original States; later six new States similarly
excluded clergymen from some political offices. The
purpose of the several States in providing for
disqualification was primarily to assure the success GERMAN vs. BARANGAN
of a new political experiment, the separation of
church and state. Prior to 1776, most of the 13 (March 27, 1985)
Colonies had some form of an established, or Ponente: J. Escolin
Batch 2008A. 23
admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his
FACTS: rights and in the performance of his duties… observe
honesty and good faith."
On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees and Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise
who were members of the August Twenty-One of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents
Movement (ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street, reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be
Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. characterized as violative of the freedom of religious
Jude Chapel, which adjoins the Malacañang worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators
grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow t- crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its
shirts, they marched down said street with raised perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel
clenched fists and shouts of anti-government Street and the streets approaching it have been
invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred restricted. While travel to and from the affected
by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited,
his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago passers-by have been subjected to courteous,
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is
Malacañang security area. When their efforts to considered that the same is designed to protect the lives
enter the church became apparently futile, they of the President and his family, as well as other
opted to stay outside, kneeling on the sidewalk in government officials, diplomats and foreign guests
front of the barricades and prayed the Holy Rosary. transacting business with Malacañang. The restriction is
Afterwards, they sang Bayan ko with clenched fists also intended to secure the several executive offices
of protest against the violation of their rights and within the Malacañang grounds from possible external
thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because of the attacks and disturbances. These offices include
alleged warning given them by respondent Major communications facilities that link the central
Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to government to all places in the land. Unquestionably,
enter the church in the future would likewise be the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the
prevented, petitioners took this present recourse. smooth functioning of the executive branch of the
government, which petitioners' mass action would
ISSUE HELD: certainly disrupt.
1. WON petitioners’ constitutionally protected
freedom to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the Cantwell v Connecticut: The constitutional inhibition on
legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
1973 Consti) was violated NO
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of
2. WON petitioners’ freedom of locomotion was the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
violated (Sec 5, Art IV of the 1973 Consti) NO form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
RATIO: as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
1. law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment
Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude embraces two concepts –freedom to believe and freedom
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
assured petitioners and the Court that they have the second cannot be.
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person
or persons from entering and worshipping at said In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or
church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
intention was not really to perform an act of religion, but only in the manner by which they had
religious worship, but to conduct an anti- attempted to translate the same into action. This
government demonstration at a place close to curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this
the very residence and offices of the President of Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus:
the Republic. Respondents further lament
petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow t- is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
clenched fists, and chants of anti-government most anything, however strange, bizarre and
slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
allegation. heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious religious belief clashes with the established
worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate institutions of society and with the law, then the
that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable former must yield and give way to the latter. The
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and government steps in and either restrains said
of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
done in good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code
Batch 2008A. 24
2. Respondents themselves in the Solicitor General's
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the comment admit that "true, there were only about 80
use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and persons in petitioners' group on October 2 and this
reasonableness of which have already been number could hardly pose the danger feared," but
discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, expressed the fear that petitioners' ranks could within
the same having been established in the interest of hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful
national security. dispersal becomes impossible as in recent
demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full
Petition dismissed. control and there is no question as to the capability
of the security forces to ward off and stop any
Teehankee, dissenting: untoward move. They had placed an advance
I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and
right of free worship and movement is a preferred could stop the flow of people in the church if they
right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear
subject to prior restraint except where there exists and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or
the clear and present danger of a substantive evil the security of Malacañang.
sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly
no such danger in this case.
Batch 2008A. 25
ISSUES: physical, educational or moral care and
guidance shall be punished." The STP was
WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to added in 1971.
provide medical services to a child. - YES • Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1
• The duty to provide sufficient support for a child any reference to willful failure to provide
is legally enforceable in a civil proceeding necessary and proper physical care and
against a parent. A breach of that duty is a limited any violation to matters of failure to
misdemeanor. Where necessary to protect a support. Nevertheless, the STP was
child's well-being, the Commonwealth may retained. Because of the 1986 amendment,
intervene, over the parents' objections, to assure the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside
that needed services are provided. Parental duty of sec. 1 that it did not have before.
of care has been recognized in the common law • The STP refers to neglect and willful failure to
of homicide in this Commonwealth. There is provide proper physical care as bases for
also a common law duty to provide medical punishment. These concepts do not underlie
services for a child, the breach of which can be involuntary manslaughter. Wanton or reckless
the basis, in the appropriate circumstances, for conduct is not a form of negligence. Wanton or
the conviction of a parent for involuntary reckless conduct does not involve a willful intention
manslaughter. to cause the resulting harm. Involuntary
manslaughter does not require willfulness. Thus,
WON the STP bars any involuntary manslaughter the STP in sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary
charge against a parent who relies on spiritual manslaughter.
treatment, and who does not seek medical attention
for his or her child (even if the parent's failure to WON the failure to extend the protection of the STP to
seek such care would otherwise be wanton or them would be a denial of due process because they
reckless conduct). - NO lacked "fair warning" because they were officially misled
• STP provides no complete protection to a parent by an opinion of the Attorney General of the
against a charge of involuntary manslaughter Commonwealth. - YES
that is based on the parent's wanton or reckless • Atty Gen, who is statutorily empowered to give his
failure to provide medical services to a child. opinion upon questions of law, gave an opinion
Sec.1 concerns child support and care in a which answers a general question "whether parents
chapter that deals with the Commonwealth's who fail to provide medical services to children on
interest that persons within its territory should the basis of religious beliefs will be subject to
not be killed by the wanton and reckless prosecution for such failure." An average person
conduct of others. It is unlikely that the might read the Atty Gen’s comments as being a
Legislature placed the STP in Sec. 1 to provide a negative answer. It is true that the answer comes to
defense to common law homicide. The act that focus on negligent failures of parents, and we know
added the STP was entitled "An Act defining the that wanton or reckless failures are different.
term 'proper physical care' under the law relative • Atty Gen: “The Massachusetts child abuse reporting
to care of children by a parent." The law does not specifically address itself to the
amendment's concern seems focused on the relationship between the religious beliefs of the
subject matter of sec.1 and certainly not parent and failure to provide medical care. Sec. 1 is
directed toward changing the common law of a criminal statute and it expressly precludes
homicide. imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent
• Sec.1 reads: for failure to provide medical care because of
"xxxx any parent of a minor child xxxxx who religious beliefs. However, the intent of Chap 119 is
willfully fails to provide necessary and proper to require that children of such parents be provided
physical, educational or moral care and services whenever the need arises. Under Chapter
guidance xxxxx or who fails to provide proper 119, children may receive services notwithstanding
attention for said child, shall be punished the inability to prosecute the parents.”
xxxx.
• Although the Twitchells read a CS publication called
A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or
lack proper physical care for the sole reason "Legal Rights and Obligations of CS in Mass" which
that he is being provided remedial treatment relied on the above opinion. That opinion was
by spiritual means alone in accordance with arguably misleading because of what it did not say
the tenets and practice of a recognized concerning criminal liability for manslaughter
church or religious denomination by a duly • Although it has long been held that "ignorance of the
accredited practitioner thereof." law is no defense", there is justification for treating
• A predecessor of sec. 1, enacted in 1882, as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation
provided that "whoever unreasonably of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an
neglects to provide for the support of his official statement in an official interpretation of the
minor child shall be punished by fine or public official who is charged with the responsibility
by imprisonment." Statute was for the interpretation or enforcement of the law. (
rewritten in 1909 to impose a duty of aka "entrapment by estoppel." )
physical care of children on parents. In • There is special merit to such a rule if
1954, sec. 1 was amended to state that religious beliefs are involved and if the
"any parent of a minor child who wilfully defendant was attempting to comply with
fails to provide necessary and proper
Batch 2008A. 26
the law while adhering to his religious community, physically and emotionally. During
beliefs and practices. this period, the children must acquire skills
needed to perform the adult role of an Amish
CASE REMANDED because some ‘Questions farmer or housewife. And, at this time in life, the
of Fact’ need be answered: Amish child must also grow in his faith and his
o Whether a person would reasonably relationship to the Amish community.
conclude that the Attorney General had
ruled that sec. 1 provided protection against (eto US SC ratio na)
a manslaughter charge. 1. The State's interest in universal education is
o Whether the defendants reasonably relied on not totally free from a balancing process when it
the church's publication and on the advice impinges on other fundamental rights, such as
of the Committee on Publication. those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
In applying strict scrutiny, it was not shown that
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause. Fundamental
right to religion is protected, sometimes even at
WISCONSIN vs. YODER the expense of other interests of admittedly high
social importance. Only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
FACTS: of religion.
2. Respondents have amply supported their
Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal
religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite education requirement after the eighth grade
Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a exercise of their religious beliefs. It was
child's school attendance until age 16) by declining necessary for the court to determine whether the
to send their children to public or private school Amish religious faith and their mode of life are,
after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The as they claim, inseparable and interdependent
evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing not merely philosophical nor personal. In this
informal vocational education to their children case, the Old Order Amish daily life and
designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish religious practice stem from their faith is shown
community (children ages 14 and 15). The evidence by the fact that it is in response to their literal
also showed that respondents sincerely believed that interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the
high school attendance was contrary to the Amish Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not
religion and way of life and that they would conformed to this world . . . ." This command is
endanger their own salvation and that of their fundamental to the Amish faith. This virtually
children by complying with the law. determines their entire way of life. Values and
programs of the modern secondary school are in
ISSUE: sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life
WON the compulsory-attendance law violated their mandated by the Amish religion. Wisconsin law
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. contravenes the basic religious tenets and
practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent
HELD: Yes. and the child. Furthermore, Wisconsin law
affirmatively compels them, under threat of
RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
upheld their decision naman) odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
• their children's attendance at high school, beliefs. The compulsory-attendance law carries
public or private, was contrary to the Amish with it precisely the kind of objective danger to
religion and way of life. It poses danger of the free exercise of religion that the First
the censure of the church community and Amendment was designed to prevent.
endanger their own salvation and that of 3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an
their children. These religious belief were identifiable religious sect and a long history as a
held to be sincere. Expert witnesses successful and self-sufficient segment of
(scholars on religion) testified that this American society, the Amish have demonstrated
concept of life aloof from the world and its the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
values is central to their faith. Amish interrelationship of belief with their mode of life,
objection to formal education beyond the the vital role that belief and daily conduct play
eighth grade is firmly grounded in these in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish
central religious concepts. communities, and the hazards presented by the
• Formal high school education beyond the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the
because it takes them away from their difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy
Batch 2008A. 27
of their alternative mode of continuing up-bringing of their children which may be
informal vocational education in terms of the subject to limitation ] if it appears that parental
overall interests that the State relies on in decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
support of its program of compulsory high the child, or have a potential for significant
school education. In light of this showing, social burdens. But in this case, the Amish have
and weighing the minimal difference introduced persuasive evidence undermining the
between what the State would require and arguments the State has advanced to support its
what the Amish already accept, it was claims in terms of the welfare of the child and
incumbent on the State to show with more society as a whole. we cannot accept a parens
particularity how its admittedly strong patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope
interest in compulsory education would be and with such sweeping potential for broad and
adversely affected by granting an exemption unforeseeable application as that urged by the
to the Amish. State. (overinclusive)
It is true that activities of individuals, even
when religiously based, are often subject to affirmed.
regulation by the States in the exercise of U.S. vs. BALLARD
police power but religiously grounded
conduct is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the 1st Amendment. FACTS:
Re discrimination: A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless
- Respondents, Edna W. Ballard and Donald
Ballard were convicted of using and conspiring
offend the constitutional requirement for
to use the mails to defraud.
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.
Some degree of education is necessary to - The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged
prepare citizens to participate effectively and a scheme to defraud by organizing and
intelligently in our open political system if promoting the I Am movement through the use
we are to preserve freedom and of the mails. The charge was that certain
independence. However, the evidence designated corporations were formed, literature
adduced by the Amish in this case is distributed and sold, funds solicited, and
persuasively to the effect that an additional memberships in the I Am movement sought 'by
one or two years of formal high school for means of false and fraudulent representations,
Amish children in place of their long- pretenses and promises'
established program of informal vocational
education would do little to serve those - Misrepresentations:
interests. Separated agrarian community is
the keystone of the Amish faith. That they o That the words of 'ascended masters'
would become burden to society should they and the words of the alleged divine
leave the community and join the entity, Saint Germain, would be
mainstream world with educational transmitted to mankind through the
shortcomings is highly speculative. medium of the said Guy W. Ballard,
4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard
parens patriae, to extend the benefit of through their high spiritual attainment
secondary education to children regardless and righteous conduct.
of the wishes of their parents cannot be o That the respondent were able to cure
sustained against a free exercise claim of the hundreds of people of diseases classified
nature revealed by this record, for the Amish either curable or incurable.
have introduced convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious objections by
forgoing one or two additional years of
- Each of them, well knew that all of said
aforementioned representations were false and
compulsory education will not impair the
untrue and were made with the intention on the
physical or mental health of the child, or
part of the defendants, and each of them, to
result in an inability to be self-supporting or
cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to
to discharge the duties and responsibilities
be defrauded, and to obtain from persons
of citizenship, or in any other way materially
intended to be defrauded by the defendants,
detract from the welfare of society.
money, property, and other things of value and
The dissent argues that a child who
to convert the same to the use and the benefit of
expresses a desire to attend public high
the defendants, and each of them.
school in conflict with the wishes of his
parents should not be prevented from doing
so. There is no reason for the Court to - Defense: There was a demurrer and a motion to
consider that point since it is not an issue in quash each of which asserted among other
the case. The State has at no point tried this things that the indictment attacked the religious
case on the theory that respondents were beliefs of respondents and sought to restrict the
preventing their children from attending free exercise of their religion in violation of the
school against their expressed desires. Constitution of the United States.
Parents have a right to direct the religious
Batch 2008A. 28
- Lower Court: Did not want to rule on the o (3) The part of the scheme concerning
truth or validity of the religious claims made phonograph records sold by respondents
by the respondents but rather limited the on representations that they would
scope of the case to this issue: “WON these bestow on purchasers 'great blessings
defendants honestly and in good faith and rewards in their aim to achieve
believe those things? If they did, they salvation' whereas respondents 'well
should be acquitted. I cannot make it any knew that said * * * records were
clearer than that” manmade and had no ability to aid in
achieving salvation.'
o 'If these defendants did not believe
those things, they did not believe - The United States contends that respondents
that Jesus came down and dictated, acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of
the jury should find them guilty. the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs
and that their consent bars them from insisting
on a different course once that one turned out to
- The Lower court convicted the respondents.
be unsuccessful
The latter, initially acquiesced to the verdict
but soon filed for a motion for retrial since
the withdrawal of the issue of truth and o Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
verity would run contrary to the nature of 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. That case
the indictment itself. “'it was necessary to stands for the proposition that, apart
prove that they schemed to make some, from situations involving an unfair trial,
at least, of the (eighteen) representations an appellate court will not grant a new
* * * and that some, at least, of the trial to a defendant on the ground of
representations which they schemed to improper introduction of evidence or
make were false” improper comment by the prosecutor,
where the defendant acquiesced in that
course and made no objection to it. In
- Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
fairness to respondents that principle
granted a new trial, with one judge
cannot be applied here
dissenting.
Batch 2008A. 29
o The First Amendment does not submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form
select any one group or any one type he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or
of religion for preferred treatment. It organization; he failed to execute section VII of the
puts them all in that position. questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing
opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred
In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in
a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the
definition and he appended a statement that he felt it a
violation of his moral code to take human life and that
he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the
state.
Conscientious Objector
U.S. vs. SEEGER 'personal scruples against war'
Individual belief--rather than membership in a church or
sect--determined the duties that God imposed upon a
FACTS: person in his everyday conduct; and that 'there is a
higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to
Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the God.' Thus, while shifting the test from membership in
Southern District of New York of having refused to such a church to one's individual belief the Congress
submit to induction in the armed forces. nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing
He first claimed exemption as a conscientious from armed service those who believed that they owed an
objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of obligation, superior to that due the state, of not
his student classification. Although he did not adopt participating in war in any form.
verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, ”religious training and belief”
he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
participation in war in any form by reason of his superior to those arising from any human relation.' In
'religious' belief; that he preferred to leave the assigning meaning to this statutory language we may
question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples
'rather than answer 'yes' or 'no"; that his 'skepticism expressly excepted from the definition. The section
or disbelief in the existence of God' did 'not excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief,
necessarily mean lack of faith in anything decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or
whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion to economic considerations that war is wrong and that they
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a will have no part of it. These judgments have historically
religious faith in a purely ethical creed. been reserved for the Government, and in matters which
He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed, can be said to fall within these areas the conviction of
holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the the individual has never been permitted to override that
section distinguished 'between internally derived and of the state.
externally compelled beliefs' and was, therefore, an 'The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
'impermissible classification' under the Due Process involving duties superior to those arising from any
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. human relation.'
By comparing the statutory definition with those words,
however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress
Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase
District of New York on a charge of refusing to 'Supreme Being' for the appellation 'God.' And in so
submit to induction. On his appeal the Court of doing it is also significant that Congress did not
Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority
claim may have rested on the factual finding, which it chose to designate as 'Supreme Being.' By so
erroneously made, that he did not believe in a refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of
Supreme Being as required the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that
He explained that his religious *168 and social even the word 'God' had myriad meanings for men of
thinking had developed after much meditation and faith:
thought. He had concluded that man must be 'partly '(P)utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions
spiritual' and, therefore, 'partly akin to the Supreme of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for
Reality'; and that his 'most important religious law' an innate conviction of paramount duty.
was that 'no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
another man's life as a means to any other end meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
came within the requirements of s 6(j). Because it admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the
could not determine whether the Appeal Board had statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to
found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs,
the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord
that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the with the well-established congressional policy of equal
indictment. treatment for those whose opposition to service is
grounded in their religious tenets.
Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern
District of California on a charge of refusing to
Batch 2008A. 30
The test is simple of application. It is essentially (1971)
an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief Per curiam
occupy the same place in the life of the objector
as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of FACTS:
one clearly qualified for exemption?
Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War.
To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a
‘conscientious objector’. The local draft board turned
down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still
ISSUES: classified him as eligible for unrestricted service then
W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them passed it on to Justice Dep’t. FBI made an inquiry.
from induction in U.S military training? Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a
conscientious objector because of testimony from
‘inquiry’ of petitioner, parents, attorney and religious
HELD: minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless
Seager Justice Dep’t advised denial of request. Appeal Board
Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.' denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim.
He did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted.
Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic
order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.' ISSUE:
He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man
must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. HELD:
In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity
with which he held them, we think the Board, had it RATIONALE:
applied the test we propose today, would have
granted him the exemption. We think it clear that In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a
the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show
same place in his life as the belief in a traditional 1) that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form;
deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. 2) that this opposition is based upon religious training
We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts: and belief;
3) and that this objection is sincere.
'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for
you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, In applying the test, the Selective Service System must
of the source of your being, or your ultimate be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not
concern, of what you take seriously without any with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must sect, if any, to which he may belong.
forget everything traditional that you have learned
about God * * *'. Tillich, The Shaking of the Justice Dep’t believed that Clay did not satisfy any
Foundations. requirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any
It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces.
what his beliefs were with regard to the usual He objects to certain types of war in certain
understanding of the term 'Supreme Being.' But as circumstances, rather than a general scruple against
we have said Congress did not intend that to be the participation in war in any form. 2) Clays religion did not
test. We therefore affirm the judgment. preclude fighting for the US because of political and
racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to
Peter participate in war in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious
It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged 'some objector only surfaced when drafting was imminent. He
power manifest in nature * * * the supreme has not shown ‘overt manifestation’ of his opposition.
expression' that helps man in ordering his life. As to
whether he would call that belief in a Supreme However, in this Court, the gov’t has conceded that
Being, he replied, 'you could call that a belief in the petitioners belief are based on religious training. His
Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on
be the words I use.' We think that under the test we the tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands
establish here the Board would grant the exemption them. The gov’t also conceded that it no longer questions
to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer who
No. 29 decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from
FBI inquiry was convinced of his sincerity and
Jakobson recommended his classification as a conscientious
The Court of Appeals found that the registrant objector. Justice dep’t was wrong to disregard such a
demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war finding.
was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm
that judgment. Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying
Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not
pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is
clear that the dep’t was wrong.
CASSIUS CLAY (MUHAMMAD ALI) vs. U.S
Batch 2008A. 31
This case then falls in Sicurella vs US. There, the
Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice
letter prepared by the Justice Dep’t did not require
reversal of a criminal conviction because there was a
ground on which the Appeal Board might properly
have denied a conscientious objector classification.
This Court refused because in cases where it is BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL
CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT
impossible to determine exactly which grounds the
Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the Selective
Service System demands, at least, that the gov’t not J. Peter Byrne
recommend illegal grounds. (in other words: the
grounds must be clearly legitimate from the first and I. INTRODUCTION
finding a clearly legitimate ground afterwards won’t
work.) The First Amendment protects academic freedom but
there has been no adequate analysis of what academic
DISPOSITION: freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it.
Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine
Judgment reversed. Ali is free! floats in the law.
Three significant oddities about the plurality and The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role to
concurring opinions in Sweezy: excluding non-academics from imposing ideological
criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to
1) never before had the Court suggested that impose substantive limits on academic administrators
academic freedom was protected by the 1st who in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech
Amendment.
2) Frankfurter’s decision looks solely to non- V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
legal sources to describe the contents of AND THE PROTECTION OF
acad. freedom INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
3) Although the content of acad. freedom was
drawn from non-legal sources, they praised While the right to institutional academic freedom has
acad freedom by stressing the social utility arisen at the time in our history when universities have
of free universities. been most subject to federal regulation, no federal
regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in
Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic
academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in
rhetoric but also with an ambiguous description of holdings and rules
the relationship between academic custom and
positive legal right. The Court's decision not to A. The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic
ground its ruling on a positive right of academic Freedom
freedom, moreover, presaged the Court's refusal to
give this right the practical force that its rhetorical
enthusiasms promised. Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a
limitation on the grounds or procedures by which
academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of
Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, the governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a
Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of university."
academic freedom increases the ambiguity already
created by basing the case's holding upon
vagueness. However, despite their analytical Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v.
shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgment
substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts that universities must and should distinguish among
by non-academic government officials to prescribe speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and
political orthodoxy in university teaching and a pioneering inquiry into which university administrative
research. decisions the First Amendment should protect.
Constitutional Academic Freedom and the Thus, core academic administrative decisions--
State Action Doctrine: An Aside determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study--
Faculty and students at state universities enjoy cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without
extensive substantive and procedural constitutional impairing the unique virtues of academic speech.
rights against their institutions while faculty and
students at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, When judges are asked to review the substance of a
the state action doctrine mandates judicial genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they
enforcement of constitutional liberties against should show great respect for the faculty's professional
institutional infringements for half the nation's judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is
academics and denies it to the other half for such a substantial departure from accepted academic
reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
removed from the realities of academic life responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.
Batch 2008A. 34
Who are do be protected by constitutional academic
Academic Abstention freedom?
It describes the traditional refusal of courts to Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of
extend common law rules of liability to colleges professors (understood as the core of the doctrine
where doing so would interfere with the college developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual
administration's good faith performance of its core freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought
functions. The recognition of authority over internal not to be afforded institutional autonomy.
affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go
hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree VI. CONCLUSION
of common law autonomy.
Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy
Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as has come to be understood as the four freedoms offered
academic abstention raised to constitutional status, by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on
so that judges can consider whether statutes or academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
special needs or prerogatives of the academic study. The four freedoms adequately express the degree
community. of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal
studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they
recognize that liberal studies involve more than the
State Constitutional Law simple act of speaking--that they require "'that
atmosphere which is most *340 conducive to
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state speculation, experiment and creation. This requires
universities seems to have contributed to the security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the
development of the federal right of institutional hiring of competent people, and the reward of excellence.
academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility
persistence of the view, inherent in academic that academics might attain the goals of learning and
abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.
special needs and values of universities, even when
erected and supported by the state.
Batch 2008A. 35
and a lecture he delivered on March 22, overthrow of the Government, never knowingly
1954 for a humanities course at the associated with Communists in the State, but
university. was a socialist believer in peaceful change…
Batch 2008A. 36
76, Respondent told her about the letter he had admit and/or to continue admitting in the said
written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to school any particular student, considering not
bar her from re-admission in their school; only academic or intellectual standards but also
reason in the letter: Pet.’s frequent questions other considerations such as personality traits and
and difficulties had the effect of slowing character orientation in relation with other
down the progress of the class although she students as well as considering the nature of
ahd the requisite intellectual capability Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May
19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for
expulsion, for they neither present any violation of - technical aspect of admissions:
any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative
of gross misconduct;
4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much the Chairman of the Faculty Admission
time and effort in said school for the purpose of Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which
arriving at a compromise that would not duly is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights,
inconvenience the professors and still allow her to Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo
enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the de Manila University, the Loyola School of
school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact Theology allows some lay students to attend its
told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School
the compromises she was offering were of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de
were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Manila University and not by the Loyola School of
Graduate School; Theology; For the reason above given, lay students
5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take
said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing up courses for credit therein have to be officially
her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate
she was informed that she could enroll at the UST School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to for them to be considered as admitted to a degree
fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in program
Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology — which would entail about four to five Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was
years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola admitted by respondent to take some courses for
School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully credit but said admission was not an admission to
refused readmission, it would entail only about two a degree program because only the Assistant Dean
years more; of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can
6. Considering that time was of the essence in her make such admission; That in the case of
case, and not wanting to be deprived of an petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of
opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given,
life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST so that she was not accepted to a degree program
Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not but was merely allowed to take some courses for
thereby be credited with any academic units for the credit during the summer of 1975;
subject she would take;
7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the Being admitted to the school is a privilege and
President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with not a right.
the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor
with the Secretary of Education, since this is his
busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the -There are standards that must be met. There are
last day for registration; ... " policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of
8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current what a student in the position of petitioner
semester possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She
cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had indispensable requisite of a mandamus
authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty
studying or not? imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a
rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner,
Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution who unfortunately did not have counsel, an
(seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit attempt was made to dispute the contention of
respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain
Ratio: her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It
is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay
1. Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to person rather than a practitioner that was evident.
admit her into further studies since the While she pressed her points with vigor, she was
respondent had no clear duty to admit the pet. unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear
-That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, legal right that must exist to justify the grant of
S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology this writ.
thru its Faculty Admission Committee,
necessarily has discretion as to whether to
Batch 2008A. 37
2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions There was on the part of respondent due
of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for
reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was
-It is more often identified with the right of a deemed best, considering the interest of the school as
faculty member to pursue his studies in his well as of the other students and her own welfare, that
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances
retribution would be visited on him in the event that deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature
his conclusions are found distasteful or reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer
objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the to some other institution would redound to the benefit of
political, economic, or academic establishments all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the
legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this
decision.
- For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher
and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions are ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP
unacceptable to some constituted authority within
or beyond the institution J. Vitug
- Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the * Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS
University of Dijon, France, "It is a well-established Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S.
fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom,
that the collective liberty of an organization is by no * No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology
means the same thing as the freedom of the course;
individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds
of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In * Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
considering the problems of academic freedom one
must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy * Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and
of the university, as a corporate body, and the 22) which are docketed in the registration card.
freedom of the individual university teacher." (2
types) Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent
a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued
Order No. 9 which stated:
- "the four essential freedoms" of a
university — to determine for itself on academic
. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending
resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students
4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way to continue attending their classes to protect their
reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined.
Batch 2008A. 38
However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile
In this connection, it is hereby directed that the cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its
above-named students be re-admitted to classes and meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year
be allowed to take all examinations that they have 1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med
missed pending final resolution of this case/issue. students, the BOR in its 996th resolution reverted to the
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile.
PHCR did not comply with the directive.
The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
being admitted was due to his being against the prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus
increase on tuition payments. Respondent school with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
invokes academic freedom in the expulsion of injunction for their admission.
Isabelo.
FACTS:
The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the
admission of the students in the interest of justice and
Respondent-students as then applicants to the equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
University of the Philippines College of Medicine
(UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in
The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the
the NMAT which was the cutoff score prescribed for
CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to
academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in
follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President
its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the
issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.
them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive
Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the
Batch 2008A. 39
petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before categorical admission of the absence of a legal
the SC. right. Considering such antagonistic conditions,
We can empathize with the students' mental
ISSUE: anxiety and emotional strain in their three years
in college in the company of some professors
who looked down on them as academic
WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the pretenders. Furthermore, the students were
petitioners. – pressed for time as they have only one more year
before graduation. These circumstances
NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to combined with the advice of the U.P. President
admit the students to the college of medicine. unduly influenced the students to write this
reconciling letter.
RATIO:
Batch 2008A. 40
2. defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the finally resolved in a previous one. UP was not an original
Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory party-defendant in the original suit, but it intervened
and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in
publicity-seeking persons, thereby besmirching alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to
their reputation and causing them serious hold inviolate academic freedom, both individual and
anxiety institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial
3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny identity of parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and
plaintiff Tasadays' personality and their Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the
existence as a distinct ethnic community within same interests in the two petitions.
the forest area reserved under the Proclamation
(No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the
their rights thereunder two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the
4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss
to vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be
"false and perjured 'evidence' to debase and noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same
malign" them, caused them to incur attorney's complaint were filed in this case and they were
fees and expenses of litigation. separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen
The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and and Salazar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by
pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it
at the "amount equivalent to defendants' combined off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to
salaries for two (2) months, estimated at herein facts would be stretching to its limits the
P32,000.00." requirement of identity of subject matter.
Batch 2008A. 41
Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby RTC declared the Order invalid because it
forfeited their right to notice of subsequent deprived San Diego’s of his right to pursue a medical
proceedings and to participate in the trial, education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge
in determining whether issues have been joined. ‘Angles’ of the Case :
With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
"judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a
distinct ethnic community within the territory 1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the ‘three-flunk rule’
defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" is a valid exercise of police power.
the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to - In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the
a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine constitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admission
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition to medical schools to those that initially proved their
for declaratory relief. competence and preparation for a medical school,
Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point:
The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed on
plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they - The test is the reasonable relation between the lawful
maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR
present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors as condition for admission to medical schools, and the
collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with lawful subject – the securing of the health and safety of
and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not the general community.
within the province of the court to make
pronouncements on for these are matters beyond its - The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
expertise. branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] - Test for the valid exercise police power involves the
Order No. 12, Series of 1972: concurrence between:
‘A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to a. the interest of the of public generally, as
take the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, a distinguished from those of a particular class,
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for require the interference of the State;
the fourth time.’ b. the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be
San Diego went to the RTC to compel his accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
admission to the test. Through a petition for individuals.
mandamus, he invoked his rights to academic
freedom and quality education. He also raised the
issues of due process and equal protection. By 2. Right to quality education is not absolute
agreement of the parties, he was allowed to take the - While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor,
NMAT. he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor… A
person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients. If one who want to be a lawyer
Batch 2008A. 42
may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised standardization and regulation of the medical
and advised. education. It created the Board of Medical Education
composed by representatives from education
- San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that government institutions, private medical specialty
there are other people who are more prepared than societies, association of medical schools and dean of
him, considering the crowded medical schools that the UP College of Medicine. The one of the
we have today. administrative functions of the Board is to prescribe
requirements for admission with necessary rules and
regulations for proper implementation.
The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the
minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility
3. The order does not violate the equal given by the Board.
protection clause
- A law does not have to operate with equal force on b. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
all persons or things. There are substantial condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
distinctions between medical students and other admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985
students who are not required to take the NMAT and provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT
not subjected to the three-flunk rule. The medical as an additional requirement for the issuance of
profession have a delicate responsibility towards the certificate of eligibility.
society that warrants a different treatment towards c. proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
them. NMA, and
d. administering the NMAT.
Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of The petition was denied by the RTC and the
police power. Court said that San Diego’s intellectual NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted
capacity is not ‘depreciated’, rather, he may be that the petitioners were not able to present a case of
meant for another calling. The rule is intended to unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome the
avoid a nation of misfits – square pegs trying to fit presumption of constitutionality.
into round holds.
‘Angles’ of the case:
The decision of the RTC declaring MECS
Order No. 12 invalid is reversed. 1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as
amended [Medical Act of 1959], and MECS Order No.
52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the
1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners.
TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ - The petitioners cited ‘State Policies’ which include
Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human
person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the
J. Feliciano vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II,
Section 17 on the priority to education. They also cited
FACTS: Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase
‘right of ALL citizens to quality education.’ Furthermore,
the NMAT requirement is challenged as a violation of the
Teresita Tablarin and other students, in ‘fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
their behalf and in behalf of other applicants for requirements’ stated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3).
admission into the Medical Colleges who have not
taken or taken but failed the NMAT during 1987-88
and for the future years to come, wants to be - Court said that the petitioners did not demonstrated
admitted into schools of medicine for the school year how the measures provided by the Board collide with
1987-1988. However, Tablarin and company either these relatively specific State policies. In short, they
did not take or failed the NMAT which is required by were not able to present a prima facie case with regards
the Board of Medical Education (Board) and to the State Policies angle.
conducted by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). - About the ‘right of all citizens to quality education’, this
phrase should not be construed as compelling to State to
The petitioners sought to enjoin the make quality education available across the board.
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so
Board of Medical Education and the CEM from: far that the citizens were able to quality under ‘fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.’
a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
4224 and 5946, known as the ‘Medical Act of
1959’ provides that one of its objectives the
Batch 2008A. 43
2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass
as amended [Medical Act of 1959], is not an successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical
undue delegation of legislative power. schools are not unconstitutional impositions.
- The general principle of non-delegation of Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for a
powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.
potestas non potest delegare – a delegated power may
not be further delegated by the person to whom such
power is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule
of the separation of and allocation of powers among
the three great departments of government.
However, this rule was made to adapt to the NON vs. JUDGE DAMES
complexities of the modern government referred
to by Justice Laurel in Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service FACTS:
Commission. This is known as the principle of • Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not
subordinate legislation. allowed to re-enroll because they participated in
student mass actions against their school the
- Standards for subordinate legislation may be preceding sem
expressed or implied. The body of the statute and • On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of
the goal to standardize and regulate the medical classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued
profession satisfy the necessary standards required. their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not
to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
3. The NMAT is not an “unfair, unreasonable and scheduled classes and depriving a great majority
inequitable requirement” which results in a of students of their right to be present in their
denial of due process. classes
• Together with the abovementioned fact, the
- The petitioners did not specify what factors in the lower court considered that in signing their
NMAT support their claim. If they are questioning enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be
the burden imposed by the NMAT, which would re-enrolled. “The Mabini College reserves the
pertain to the utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then right to deny admission of students xxx whose
these are matters that should be addressed by the activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the
administrative and legislative bodies – not by the efficient operation of the college xxx”
Court. • In addition the students signed pledges saying
they respect their alma matter, that they will
4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid conduct themselves in a manner that would not
exercise of the police power of the State. put the college in a bad light.
• Judge Dames’ decision considering these facts
- Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable said that what the students assert is a mere
power of the sovereign to promote the important privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini
interests and needs – the general order of the College is free to admit or not to admit the
general community. petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
- The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of
ISSUE/HELD:
police power: concurrence test between lawful
subject and lawful method.
WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it
allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment
5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed of students on the ground of termination of contract
by the Board after consultation with the should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges does students on the ground of termination of contract should
not violate the equal protection clause. be reversed. YES
Batch 2008A. 44
• This is a case that focuses on the right to them re-enrollment because of failing grades was
speech and assembly as exercised by a mere afterthought.
students vis-à-vis the right of school officials • Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be
to discipline them. commensurate to the offense committed with
• The student does not shed his constitutionally due process.
protected rights at the schoolgate. In • But penalty, if any is deserved should not
protesting grievances disorder is more or anymore be enforced. Moot and academic.
less expected because emotions run high. They’ve already suffered enough.
That the protection to the cognate rights of
speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Consti is similarly available to students is
well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
discipline cannot override constitutional
safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the Justice Paras:
court reiterated that the exercise of the
freedom of assembly could not be a basis for FACTS:
barring students from enrolling. Under • Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and
academic freedom, students my be barred barricaded the school because they wanted to
from re-enrollment based on academic admin to hear their grievances with regards to
deficiencies. “not being able to participate in the policy-
• Permissible limitations on student exercise of making of the school”, despite the regulations
constitutional rights within the school. set by the admin with regards to protest actions
Constitutional freedom of free speech and • During the regular enrollment period, petitioners
assembly also not absolute. However, and other students similarly situated were allegedly
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires blacklisted and denied admission for the second
observance of procedural due process and semester of school year 1986-1987.
penalty imposed must be proportionate to • court ordered the school authorities to create a
the offense committed. (procedural due special investigating committee to conduct an
process: right to be informed in writing, investigation, who made recommendations which
right to ans the charges, right to be informed the school adopted
of the charges against them, right to adduce • a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents
evidence, and for this evidence to be duly filing and answering the complaints
considered) • petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due
• The nature of contract between a school and process when they were barred from re-enrollment
its students is not an ordinary contract but is and for intervenors teachers whose services have
imbued with public interest. The Consti been terminated as faculty members, on account of
allows the State supervisory and regulatory their participation in the demonstration or protest
powers over all educational institutions. [see charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a
art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 violation of their constitutional rights of expression
and 137 of the respondent school’s manual, and assembly.
a student is enrolled not just for one sem • Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of
but for the entire period necessary for the procedural due process which requires that there be
student to complete his/her course. BP blg due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due
232 gives the students the right to continue process which requires that the person or body to
their course up to graduation. conduct the investigation be competent to act and
decide free from bias or prejudice.
• Academic freedom not a ground for denying
students’ rights. In Villar, the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic ISSUE:
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of
constitutional rights to speech and due process ?
assembly, for otherwise there will be a B. WON there was contempt of Court by the
violation of their right to equal protection. respondents
• School said most of them had failing grades
anyway. In answer students say they are HELD:
graduating students and if there are any
deficiencies these do not warrant non-
A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.
readmission. Also there are more students
with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted.
And some of the petitioners had no failing 1. There is no existing contract between the two parties.
marks. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
• The court held that the students were states that when a college student registers in a school,
denied due process in that there was no due it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
investigation. In fact it would appear from semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the
the pleadings that the decision to refuse "written contracts" required for college teachers are for
Batch 2008A. 45
'one semester. after the close of the first semester, 2. petitioners involved were found to be
the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract academically deficient & the teachers are found
either with the students or with the intervening to have committed various acts of misconduct.
teachers. It is a time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the 5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
contracting parties The contract having been students for academic delinquency and violation of
terminated, there is no more contract to speak disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by
of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's
another contract with said students and refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
or the appellate court, have no power to make delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs
contracts for the parties." as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students.
The opposite view would do violence to the academic
2. The Court has stressed, that due process in freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
disciplinary cases involving students does not Constitution.
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
of justice. findings of administrative tribunals, unless :
Standards of procedural due process are: 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
a. the students must be informed in writing of the collusion;
nature and cause of any accusation against them; 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings
b. they shall have the right to answer the charges is irregular;
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if 4. when palpable errors are committed; or
desired: 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against capriciousness is manifest.
them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive
their own behalf and and adequate.
e.the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case. .B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors
to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise
untenable.
3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C.
were distributed at the beginning of each school
1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz
respondent school explained that the intervenors were
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in actually reinstated as such faculty members after the
nature and upon admission to the School, the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.
Student is deemed to have agreed to bind
himself to all rules/regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Education, Culture and 2. respondent school has fully complied with its
Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be duties under the temporary mandatory injunction
required to withdraw from the School at any The school manifested that while the investigation was
time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching
by the School Administration. and it was only after the investigation, that the
recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the
school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the for having become moot and academic
school with regard to the protest actions. Necessary
action was taken by the school when the court
issued a temporary mandatory injunction to accept
the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an
investigating body.
A. Non- impairment of Obligations
4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both of Contracts
to the students and teachers on the one hand and
the school on the other, ordered an investigation to
be conducted by the school authorities, in the
resolution of November 12, 1986. Art III sec 10. No law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
Findings of the investigating committee:
Civil Code Art 1306 The contracting parties
1. students disrupted classes may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem
Batch 2008A. 46
convenient, provided they are not contrary HOME BUILDERS & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL
to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. 01/08/34
Hughes, C.J.
ISSUE-HELD:
Batch 2008A. 47
terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect
WON the moratorium law is constitutional-YES its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement.
Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the
RATIO: means of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy
are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation,
At the outset the court made it very clear that except which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
for the time factor, no other aspect of the mortgage invasion.Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. But there is a
relation was altered. The indebtness remains; in distinction betwwen an obligation & a remedy as pointed
fact, the mortgagor still has the right to the rentals out in Sturges: The distinction between the obligation of
for the time when the period is suspended. a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to
enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and
The court then discussed the historical backgorund exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the
of the contracts clause vis-a-vis the concept of obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be
emergency powers. Emergency does not create modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. It is
power. Emergency does not increase granted power competent for the States to change the form of the
or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit,
power granted or reserved. The Constitution was provided no substantial right secured by the contract is
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix
power to the Federal Government and its limitations definitely the line between alterations of the remedy,
of the power of the States were determined in the which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which,
light of emergency, and they are not altered by under the form of modifying the remedy, impair
emergency. While emergency does not create power, substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon
emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise its own circumstances.
of power.
The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be
Although an emergency may not call into life a power thus stated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may the contract, the legislature has the control, and may
afford a reason for the exertion of a living power enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a
already enjoyed. In Wilson v. New, the constitutional remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions
question presented in the light of an emergency is as seriously to impair the value of the right. Not only are
whether the power possessed embraces the existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
particular exercise of it in response to particular obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
conditions. In other words, there must be a essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
compelling state interest coupled with a narrowly- contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
tailored means to achieve it. protecting contracts against impairment presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
The "non-impairment of contracts" clause came to contractual relations are worthwhile — a government
life because at the time the Constitution was being which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
drafted, the drafters were mindful of the fact that and good order of society. Into all contracts, whether
there have been an ignoble array of legislative made between States and individuals, or between
schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not
of contractual obligations. Legislative interferences out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are
had been so numerous and extreme that the superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of
confidence essential to prosperous trade had been the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to
undermined and the utter destruction of credit was which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and
threatened.But as J. Johnson wrote in Ogden v must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all,
Saunders, to give such a sweeping protection to the are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be
sanctity of contracts could not have been the intent carried into express stipulation, for this could add
of the Constitution, given the fact that law has over nothing to their force. Every contract is made in
a hundred examples wherein a contract may be subordination to them, and must yield to their control,
vioded.Societies exercise a positive control as well as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a
over the inception, construction and fulfillment of necessity for their execution shall occur. Thus, the
contracts as over the form and measure of the economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of
remedy to enforce them. its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. The
Therefore there is a need to determine: what is a interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of
contract? What are the obligations of contracts? contracts does not prevent the State from exercising
What constitutes impairment of these obligations? such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
What residuum of power is there still in the States in common weal, or are necessary for the general good of
relation to the operation of contracts, to protect the the public, though contracts previously entered into
vital interests of the community? The obligation of a between individuals may thereby be affected. Sa
contract is "the law which binds the parties to madaling sabi, police power measure ang nasabing
perform their agreement." Sturges v. Crowninshield. batas.
The laws which subsist at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be Taking all of this into account, the court concludes:
performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they 1)that there was an "emergency" in Minnesota that
were expressly referred to or incorporated in its warranted the enactment of the moratorium law; 2)the
Batch 2008A. 48
statute addressed a legitimate need, the protection of provisions of EO 25 dated November 18, 1944, as
a basic interest of society (here the protection of the amended by EO 32, dated March 10, 1945, shall
economic system and the justness of giving debtors continue to be in force and effect
time; 3)the conditions are not unreasonable; 4)the Moratorium (def’n) - is postponement of fulfillment of
legislation is temporary in operation. obligations decreed by the state through the medium of
the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
Petition dismissed, judgment of Minn SC application of the sovereign power"
affirmed. The test of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute: It is required that the period of a suspension of
the remedy be definite and reasonable.
Impairs the obligation of contracts?
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN Yes, but it is justified as a valid exercise of police power.
Chief Justice Hughes says:
Bautista Angelo, j.: Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
FACTS: the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts. The policy of
August 20, 1941 Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of protecting contracts against impairment
land situated in the city of Manila for P9,600. P4,800 presupposes the maintenance of a government to
paid outright, P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, secure the peace and good order of society. State
and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with power must be consistent with the fair intent of the
interest at the rate of 7%. constitutional limitation of that power. The
constitutional prohibition should not be construed
To secure the payment of the balance of P4,800, a as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions
1st mortgage over the parcels of land has been with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made
constituted in favor of the plaintiff. New title was necessary by great public calamity.
issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage
duly annotated on the back thereof. Blaisdell case has its limitations:
o impairment should only refer to the remedy and not
Esteban failed to pay. On Aug 2, 1949, Rutter to a substantive right. The State may postpone the
instituted this action in the CFI to recover the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it
balance, interest, and the attorney's fees. The by making the remedy futile.
complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the o propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the
properties mortgaged. alteration or change that the new legislation desires
to write into an existing contract must not be
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, burdened with restrictions and conditions that
but set up a defense the moratorium clause would make the remedy hardly pursuing
embodied in RA 342. He claims that this is a prewar
obligation contracted on Aug 20, 1941; that he is a Blaisdell summary: Police power may only be invoked
war sufferer, having filed his claim with the and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and
Philippine War Damage Commission [PWDC] for the can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in
losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last order that it may not infringe the constitutional
war; and that under sec 2 of RA 342, payment of his provision against impairment of contracts
obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of
8 years from the settlement of his claim by the SUB-ISSUE:
PWDC, and this period has not yet expired.
WON the period of 8 years which RA 342 grants to
ISSUE: debtors is unreasonable under the present
circumstances. YES
WON RA 342, approved by Congress on July 26,
1948, if declared applicable to the present case is RATIO:
unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
of contracts YES, unreasonable period (see sub- opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
issue). reasonable time within which to pay their prewar.
Batch 2008A. 50
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877,
obligations as between the parties, but the which had come into effect on June 12, 1985.
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of Petitioner:
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the BP 877 should not be given retroactive application
maintenance of a government by virtue of which because it would violate the impairment clause and the
contractual relations are worthwhile – a prohibition against ex post facto laws. Relying on Art.
government which retains adequate authority to 16501, she also claims that sublease was not prohibited
secure the peace and good order of society. when it was concluded in 1976 and since it was valid at
that time, it should continue to be valid even now. Also,
Dolan vs. Brown - "A grantor may lawfully she says her mom is the proper party defendant since
insert in his deed conditions or restrictions her mom was the one who inherited the leasehold right
which are not against public policy and do not from Servillano, the original lessee.
materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the
estate. ISSUE:
Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part WON the ejectment of lessee Virginia Suarez be allowed?
of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of HELD:
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power
to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, Yes. Petitioner can no longer retain the leased lot since
good order and general welfare of the people in the she is making a profitable business of subleasing it w/o
locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the the written consent of the landlord.
conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the
place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs RATIO
through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of According to Art.16872, if the period for lease has not
traffic and the resulting activity, noise and been fixed, it is understood to be from month to month if
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, the rent agreed is from month to month. As the original
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. contract of lease didn’t prescribe a fixed period and the
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt rentals were paid monthly, the same should be
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, considered renewable from month to month. When the
the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its sublease was renewed by Capuchino in July 1985, it
Municipal council, was reasonably justified under became invalid under BP877, w/c already became
the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. effective. The law then, operated prospectively upon the
new or renewed contract of sublease, w/c to be valid
needed the written consent of the lessor. Moreover,
BP877 provides that “all residential units (The Lot comes
JUAREZ vs. CA under this) the total monthly rental of w/c doesn’t
exceed P480.00 as of the effectivity of this Act shall be
CRUZ, J.: covered.”
In February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro Later, the Governor General issued a decree in 1881,
adopted Resolution No. 25 which was presented by saying that it is the ‘duty to conscience and humanity for
Provincial Governor of Mindoro Juan Morente Jr. all governments to civilize those backward races’.
The resolution presents that since several attempts Provincial authorities should help the priests in their
and schemes of the past for the advancement of the mission to civilize. To attain their mission, the Spaniards
‘non-Christian’ people of Mindoro have failed, it is adopted the policy of ‘bringing under the bell’
‘deemed necessary’ to oblige the Manguianes to live [establish homes of Indios within the reach of the sound
in one place in order to make a permanent of the bell]. Incentives in terms of tax and labor
settlement. The reasons for the resolution are: reductions were offered.
[1] failure of former attempts for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro B. After the Acquisition of the Philipines by the
[2] the only successful method is to oblige them to United States
live in a permanent settlement
[3] protection of the Manguianes President MacKinley’s Instructions was ratified by the
[2] protection of public forests Philippine Bill and the Act of Congress of 1902. In
[3] introduce civilized customs essence, these laws provide that the reservation
approach was the same course used by US Congress in
Governor Morente Jr. chose the sitio of Tigbao on dealing with ‘tribes of North American Indians’. The
Lake Naujan, containing 800 hectares of public land approach was deemed a wise and firm regulation to
for approximately 15,000 Manguianes. The ‘prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
resolution was approved by the Secretary of the customs’.
Interior.
Jones Law was later passed empowering the Philippine
Executive Order No. 2 was then issued by the Legislature. The law established the Bureau of non-
governor directing all the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola, Christian Tribes that recognized the dividing line
Dulangan and Calapan [Rubi’s place] to take their between the territory occupied by Christians and that of
habitation in the site not later than December 31, non-Christians. The distinction is latter recognized by
1917. Section 2759¸Revised Administrative Code special laws.
provides for an imprisonment not exceeding 60 days
for those who refuse to obey the order. C.D. Terminology and Meaning
Rubi and his companions did not fix their dwelling ‘Non-Christian tribes’ was common term used. Religious
within the reservation and they were punished with signification of the term was removed. The whole intent
imprisonment. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos of the term is to denote the civilization or lack of
was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro because he civilization of the inhabitants. It relates to degree of
escaped from the reservation. civilization rather than religious denomination.
Rubi and the rest of the Manguianes sued out a writ In United States v. Tubban, the term was used for an
of habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived of ‘uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence,
their liberty. They are also questioning the validity of uncultured and uneducated’. It was held that mere
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. baptism in the Christian faith will not changed one’s
degree of civilization.
Exposition of the Court (Baka magtanong si
Dean) E. Manguianes
II. History [Court wants to say that the They are placed in the ‘third class’ in the ‘four-stage’
‘reservation approach’ is not new and in fact classification approaching civilization used by the
‘accepted’ in the past. In short, Court is saying Philippine census. In local dialect, “Manguianes’ means
that they deserve it.] ‘ancient’, ‘savage’ etc.
A. Before acquisition of the Philippines by the III. Comparative – The American Indians [Court is
United States saying that the ‘reservation approach’ was used also
for the American Indians – which was perfectly ok.]
During the Spanish period, the ‘Indios” were already
‘reduced’ [‘reducciones’] into ‘poblaciones’ The treatment for the Manguianes is no different form
[communities]. The purpose is to instruct them in the methods used by the US Government in dealing with
the Catholic faith so that the Indios will forget the the Indian tribes. Their relationship is one ‘in a state of
‘blunders’ of their ancient rights and ceremonies – pupilage’ – between a guardian and a ward. Congress
eventually allowing them to live in a ‘civilized had plenary authority in this guardianship.
Batch 2008A. 53
The Indians were not treated as having a state or - Due process means that:
nation. They are treated as a ‘separate people’. [1] there is a law prescribed in harmony with the general
Thus, the US Government is there to protect the powers of the legislature
Indians form the people of the State that harbor ill- [2] that law is reasonable in its application
feelings against them. [3] it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure
These laws were deemed political in nature not [4] it is applicable to all the citizens of the state or to all
subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. of a class
In United States v. Crook, a group of Indians led by - Liberty as understood in democracies, is not
Standing Bear who fled from their reservation to license; it is liberty regulated by law. It is not
avoid disease and starvation were issued habeas unrestricted license. It is only freedom from restraint. It
corpus after they were detained. is not an absolute right. However, it is not limited to
freedom from physical restraint.
Using this case, Rubi was then declared as a citizen
of the Philippines, a ‘person’ within the Habeas - Chief elements of the civil liberty are right to
Corpus Act. contract, right to chose one’s employment, right to labor
and right of locomotion.
ISSUES:
4. WON bringing the Manguianes into the
1. WON there was Section 2145 involved an reservation amounts to slavery and involuntary
undue delegation of legislative power to the servitude.
provincial board of Mindoro. - NO. Slavery and involuntary servitude denote a
- NO. Judge Ranney declared that “the true condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
distinction therefore is between the [1] delegation of another. In the reservation, the Manguianes are working
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a for no other but for themselves.
discretion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be - If the Manguianes are not in the reservation, there
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The are vulnerable subjects to involuntary servitude of
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection civilized communities who may take advantage of their
can be made.’ Section 2145 was issued under the ignorance. They are being protection from involuntary
second mode of delegation. servitude and abuse. They are, through Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes, slowly ‘fused’ with the civilized world –
- Section 2145 falls under the exception to the ‘bringing them under the bells’.
general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The
central legislative body is permitted to delegate 5. WON Section 2145 is a valid exercise of police
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine power.
Legislature conferred authority upon the Province of - YES. Without attempting to define police power, it
Mindoro. is the power co-extensive with self-protection. It is the
inherent and plenary power to prohibit all things hurtful
- The reason is that provincial officers are better to the welfare of society. Thus, the law protects the
fitted to select sites for reservations. forests from the illegal caingins [slash and burn
agriculture in forested areas]. They are restrained for
2. WON there was religions discrimination their own good and the general good of the
against ‘non-Christian tribes’ under Section Philippines.
2145.
- NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that - The ‘whole tendency’ therefore of the Court is
‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to ‘natives’ of ‘low grade toward ‘non-interference’ on the political ideas of the
of civilization’ and does not discriminate on account legislature.
of religious differences.
- In fact, the Manguianes ‘liked the plan’. There were
3. WON the protection afforded by President ‘encouraging reactions’ from the children who attended
MacKinley’s Instructions, the Philippine Bill and the schools. They were ‘eager’ to be receiving benefits of
the Jones Law providing that no person ‘shall be civilization in the reservations.
deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law’ extends to members of non- HOLDING:
Christian tribes. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is valid. Their
- NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that confinement in the reservation does not amount to
measure of freedom which may be enjoyed ‘in a slavery and involuntary servitude. Habeas corpus cannot
civilized community.’ It is a legal and refined idea, issue.
the offspring of high civilization. Considering the
that the Manguianes do not have a civilized Carson, J. concurring:
conception of liberty, they cannot claim the they - I agree that ‘non-Christian tribes’ denote a ‘low grade of
were deprived of it. Furthermore, Section 2145 is civilization’. The test for civilizations has been:
applicable to all of a class. The classification based [1] mode of life
on degree of civilization is not arbitrary. [2] degree of advancement in civilization
Batch 2008A. 54
[3] connection or lack of connection with some determination of the case. Court issued the compromise
civilized community in their return to work order together with injunction
- Degree of civilization can only increase by 'company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss
withdrawal of permanent allegiance or adherence to any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor
non-Christian tribes. suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and
the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or
Johnson, J., dissenting: strike during the pendency of the hearing.'
- They were deprived of their liberty without a Afterwards gotamco filed another case w/ CIR because
hearing. All persons in the Philippines are entitled to Kaisahan resumed the strike. Kaisahan filed a counter-
a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their petition saying that gotamco violated the terms first by
liberty. certain discriminations, by not hearing grievances, by
employing four new chinese laborers w/o authority of
Moir., with Araullo and Street, dissenting: the court and in violation of sec 19 of Commonwealth
- The case of the Indian nations in the US cannot Act 103 and by firing a certain Naximino Millan.
apply to this case because the Indian nations were
considered a separate nations where the US dealt CIR held that there was a violation of the court order by
with them using treaties. Also, the reservations kaisahan, that there was no clear proof that gotamco
given to them were very large – about thousand of employed 4 new chinese laborers and that Millan was a
square miles. troublemaker and his petition for reinstatement was
- In this case, the Manguianes are not a separate denied.
state. There are not treaties. They are Filipinos,
legally speaking. They are entitled to all the rights Petitioner now contends that court order and sec 19 CA
and privileges of any other citizen of this country. 103 is unconstitutional because it amounts to
- The caingin argument will not lie because the fires involuntary servitude.
never spread to the tropical undergrowth. These
burnings are isolated – these are not great abuses ISSUE:
meriting their ‘incarceration’. WON sec 19 CA 103 creates involuntary servitude
- The Manguianes have never been a burden to the
State. They have not committed any crimes. In fact, HELD:
they were described as ‘peaceful, timid, primitive, It can't be involuntary servitude if a person voluntarily
semi-nomadic’. When there are in reservations, there contracts employment and impliedly voluntarily puts
are more vulnerable to involuntary servitude. The himself under the province of sec 19 CA 103.
needs for survival in an enclosed community like
food and clothing would be tempting incentives for RATIONALE:
the Manguianes, who do not have the means to CIR: This section is presumed to be constitutional.
produce these things, to trade their freedom to Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the
involuntary servitude. human rights of individuals were "subjected to
- The majority claim that Section 2145 is regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its
substantially the same as Act, No. 547 of the paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103
Philippine Commission. However, the were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it
constitutionality of this earlier Act was not passed the concern of the State to promote social justice to
upon by the Court. insure the well being and economic security of all the
- If the rationale of the Court is applied, then people. ...
decapitation en masse will result. It will be an Section 19 complements the power of the Court to settle
open air jail for all natives – even those who have industrial disputes and renders effective such powers
proven their progress measured against standards of which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of
the civilized world like the Ifugaos and Tinguianes. the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1
- Like the case of Standing Bear in the US, I think and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the
that the Court should rule that the Manguianes were Court to enable it to settle all questions matters,
deprived of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of controversies or disputes arising between, and/or
happiness. affecting employers and employees", "to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes"
KAISAHAN vs. GOTAMCO Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine
(1948) Labor Union: the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is
to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power
ponente: Hilado J to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power
to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
FACTS: proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the
Kaisahan staged a strike which paralyzed Gotamco. Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
The two parties were brought to the Court of incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
Industrial Relations. A compromise was made: acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the
kaisahan returns to work if Gotamco raises wages by power to execute its orders under section 19 is also
P2 w/o meal plus the right to bring back little pieces the same power that it possesses under section 4.
of firewood front gotamco, until the final
Batch 2008A. 55
Sec 19 CA 103 does not offend against the FACTS:
constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. Whenever an employee enters into a • The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing
contract of employment, under the said law he also Checks Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979,
voluntarily accepts those comditions prescribed in is the sole issue presented by the petitions for
sec 19, among which is the "implied condition that decision.
when any dispute between the employer or landlord o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is
and the employee, tenant or laborer has been knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It
of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the creates a prima facie presumption of such
employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk knowledge when the check is dishonored by the
out of his employment when so joined by the court bank if presented within 90 days from the date on
after hearing and when public interest so requires, the check.
and if he has already done so, that he shall • BP 22 is aimed at stopping or curbing the practice of
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which issuing worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
shall be issued only after rejected or dishonored for payment.
Hearing when public interest so requires or when • Before the enactment of said statute, issueing
the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly worthless checks was punished under the provisions
decided or settled ...". The employee has a free on estafa in the RPC but because of the reliance by
choice between entering into a contract of the Court on the concept underlying the felony of
employment or not. Such an implied condition, estafa through false pretenses or deceit (i.e. the
negates the possibility of involuntary servitude deceit or false pretense must be prior to or
ensuing. The court is satisfied that there were formal simultaneous with the commission of the
hearings before the order was issued. As to public fraud),checks as payments for pre-existing debts
interest requiring that the court return the striking were not covered.
laborers, the economic and social rehabilitation of o Statistics have shown that a greater bulk of
the country urgently demands reconstruction work
dishonored checks consisted of those issued in
from the late war that the government is striving to
payment of pre-existing debts.
accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
o BP 22 addressed the problem frontally and directly
The court construes the provision to mean that the making the act of issuing a worthless check
very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of malum prohibitum.
the dispute confers upon the court the power to
issue the order for the reason that the public has an Constitutional Challenges to B.P. 22:
interest in preventing undue stoppage or 1. offends the constitutional provision forbidding
paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well imprisonment for debt;
stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, 2. impairs freedom of contract;
this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement 3. contravenes equal protection clause
was a fact which was borne out by the entire record 4. unduly delegates legislative and executive
of the case and did not need express statement in powers
the order. 5. enactment is flawed since Interim Batasan
violated consti provision prohibiting
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the amendments on third reading.
findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial
Relations RATIO:
Most serious of these challenges is that the statute runs
DISPOSITION: counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights saying, “No
Affirm CIR decision. Kaisahan in contempt of court person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
with costs. poll tax.”
• Petitioners claim that the statute is nothing more
than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt
under the threat of penal sanction.
C. Imprisonment for Non- • Prohibition in the Bill of Rights was intended to
Payment of Debt prevent commitment of debtors to prison for
liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was
never meant to include damages arising in actions
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned ex delicto.
for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. • In answering whether BP 22 violates the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt, it is necessary to examine what the statute
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ prohibits and punishes as an offense.
• The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is
December 18, 1986 the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
Yap, J: check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
Batch 2008A. 56
which the law punishes. The law is not with the crime of illegal detention. The said defendants,
intended to coerce a debtor to pay his debt together with other persons unknown armed with
but is to prohibit under pain penal sanction revolvers and daggers, went one night about the middle
the making of worthless checks and putting of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan,
them into circulation because of the situated in Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo,
deleterious effects it has on the public Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence took the
interest. said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this
o An act may not be considered by society as information, having given any information as to his
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but whereabouts or having proven that they set him at
because of the harm that inflicts on the liberty.
community, it can be outlawed and criminally The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise The court below rendered judgment condemning each
of the state’s police power. one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
o The harmful practice of putting valueless Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied imprisonment and payment of the costs of prosecution.
a thousandfold, can very well pollute the Against this judgment the defendants appealed.
channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private
welfare of society and the public interest. person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any
• It is not for the judiciary to question the wisdom way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the
penalty of prision mayor.
behind the statute. It is sufficient that there
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one
exists a nexus between means and ends.
who illegally detains another and fails to give
HELD: information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with
We find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life
of police power and is not repugnant to the imprisonment.
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt.
Regarding violation of freedom to contract: ISSUE:
freedom to contract which is protected is freedom to
enter into lawful contracts. Besides, checks are WON article 143 has the effect of forcing a defendant to
commercial instruments and cannot be categorized become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much
as mere contracts. severer punishment ?
Regarding violation of equal protection:
contended that is just as responsible for the crime HELD:
as the drawer of the check and should also be
punished since without his indispensable Yes. Judgment reversed. Defendants are found guilty of
participation there is not crime. Unacceptable since the crime defined and punished in by article 482 of the
it is tantamount to saying that swindled should be Penal Code, with AC of nocturnity with legal accessory
punished alongside the swindler. penalties and payment of costs.
Regarding undue delegation: What cannot be
delegated is the power to make laws which is the RATIO:
power to define the offense sough to be punished -This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a
and to prescribe the penalty, it does not cover the defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to
contention that the offense is not completed by the take a much severer punishment. The burden is put
sole act of the drawer but depends on the will of the upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the
payee in presenting the check to the bank for penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for
payment. the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or
Regarding violation of prohibition against the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts
amendments in 3rd reading: text approved by the to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained
body is the text approved on second reading. the person.
Batch 2008A. 57
together all the date possible for the purpose (b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the
of proving that an act falling within the summary investigation that this person had
sanction of the penal law has been recovered his liberty.
committed by such and such persons. In the (c) A failure on the part of the accused in the
plenary stage the purpose is a contradictory course of the summary proceeding to prove that
discussion of the question of the guilt or he had liberated the person detained, or to give
innocence of the defendant, and the information at that time of his whereabouts, or a
rendition of a judgment of conviction or refusal to give any evidence at all which left him
acquittal. It may well be that although it in the same position as would an unsuccessful
appears in the summary stage of the attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and
proceeding that the act has been performed which were necessary to overcome the prima
by the accused, still in the plenary stage it facie case made out by the proof of the first two
may be shown that the act was not really elements
criminal or that there was a lawful excuse
for its commission. Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must
The record of the summary proceeding exists before an information can be filed for a
should contain evidence of the commission prosecution under this article. The real trial was the
of a punishable act, all possible data tending plenary and was very similar to out regular trial after
to point out the delinquent, a record of all arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and
proceedings connected with his arrest and inquisitorial methods, was vastly different from our
imprisonment, the answers of the accused to preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken
the interrogatories put to him as to any other away to question the accused and compel him to testify,
witness to obtain from him a statement of all then element (c) above indicated, would have always
he knows concerning the crime and those been lacking. And that right has been taken from the
guilty of it. prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and by the
guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the
Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be
the case in question, supposing that the crime had committed, because the possibility of adding to the
been committed prior to the passage of the element (a) arising from the act of the accused the other
Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58. The two elements equally essential to the offense has been
judicial authorities having reason to believe that forever swept away by the extension to these Islands of
someone has been illegally detained or kidnapped the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial
proceed to make a secret investigation of the case, investigation of crime.
arrest the suspected culprit, and demand of him
that he give any information he may have concerning - this case the prosecuting attorney charges the
the act under investigation and to state whatever accused with kidnapping some person and with
may have been his own participation therein. The not having given any information of the
evidence shows that someone has been taken away whereabouts of that person, of having proved
from home and has not been heard of again, and the that he — the accused — has set him at liberty.
facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive To make out a case the Government must show
criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the that the prisoner has been guilty of every act or
matter. If he does so, and proves that the person omission necessary to constitute the crime of
detained was liberated by him, or that such person which he is charged, and it will not be disputed
is living in such and such a place, then the that the exercise of an absolute right can not
prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a form part of a crime. In this case the
charge under the first or following sections of article Government has proved that the defendant was
481, according to whether the facts elicited by the guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the
preliminary or summary investigation show only a rights of others by showing that he, with others,
detention in general, or for the specific periods of carried a certain individual away from his house
time indicated in the latter part of the section. But if against his will, the accused not being vested
the prisoner fails to prove the whereabouts of the with authority to restrain his fellow-citizens of
person whom he is accused of making away with, or liberty. It is impossible for the Government to
that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney prove the other elements of the crime, because
has a case falling within the last paragraph of article the acts necessary to constitute them must be
483. anterior in point of time to the trial, and must
constitute some breach of duty under an
It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old existing law. It has been demonstrated that the
law that no prosecution under this article would omission which, under the former law
have ever been possible without a concomitant constituted the two remaining elements, is no
provision of the procedural law which made it the longer penalized but is nothing more than the
duty of the accused to testify and permitted the exercise of one of the most essential rights
prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from pertaining to an accused person.
his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483
was composed of three elements: - The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself
(a) The illegal detention of a person by the is older than the Government of the United States. At an
accused. early day it became a part of the common law of
England.
Batch 2008A. 58
- It was established on the grounds of public policy ISSUE:
and humanity — of policy, because if the party were
required to testify, it would place the witness under WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
the strongest temptation to commit the crime of examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of
perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent Criminal Procedure.
the extorting of confessions by duress.
HELD:
- It had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for is
person, which had long obtained in the continental denied.
system. (Jones's Law of Evidence, sec. 887; Black's
Constitutional Law, 575.) RATIO:
Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar.
If the defendant does not do certain things, if he The court here acknowledged that there are a number of
does not make certain statements or proofs, he is authorities that deal with the subject, though many are
severely punished. conflicting.
It may be said that the defendant is only required to Cited was the case of People v. McCoy, a case dealing in
speak on one point in the case, that the prosecution infanticide, where the court deemed it a violation of the
must prove the illegal detention, and that the Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body
burden of showing the whereabouts only is put upon to examination, being a violation of the right against self-
the defendant. incrimination.
- it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to
testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that, the In State v. Height, J. McClain recommended that the
illegal detention only being proved by the general rule should be that “a defendant can be
prosecution, if he does not make certain proof, if he compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which
remains mute, then not only the presumption but are not usually covered”.
the fact of guilt follows as a consequence of his
silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted The court in this case, however, looks to more
under American law. progressive decisions.
- It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict Cited was the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where
one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt he said “based upon what he termed "an extravagant
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
be called upon either by express words or acts to prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
assist in the production of such evidence; nor should a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
right to rely on the presumption of innocence until from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when
the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of it may be material."
the crime with which he is charged.
The Philippine SC also seemed to limit the protection,
-In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd stating that the limitation was to be "simply a
case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting the prohibition against legal process to extract from the
party's oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of
contrary to the principles of free government; it is his guilt.
abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may While the court agrees with the latter two
suit the purposes to despotic power but it can not interpretations, it does not attempt to draw any dividing
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and line, as this would be too difficult to determine. This
personal freedom." case, however, is seen as one of the most extreme cases
which could be imagined.
Batch 2008A. 59
a 9 year-old girl. The RTC convicted him and
Under the due process of law, every person has a sentenced him with the penalty of death.
natural and inherent right to the possession and
control of his own body. However, superior to the 2. Vallejo questions the validity of the oral and
complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the written confessions presented as evidence
inherent which the public has in the orderly against him. He alleges that the oral confessions
administration of justice. Between a sacrifice of the were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay,
ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined through force and intimidation.
notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
3. According to him, the police forced him to admit
that he had raped and killed the girl and that he
ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL (in admitted having committed the crime to stop
case he wants to discuss this) them from beating him up. He also claimed the
police even burned his penis with a lighted
The object of having criminal laws is to purge the cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
community of persons who violate the laws to the
great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal 4. He further claims that, although he admitted to
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission
provisions, are then provided, not to protect the of the crime, this was because the police had
guilty but to protect the innocent. No evidence of maltreated him. He did not tell the mayor or
physical facts can for any substantial reason be held Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because
to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the policemen were around and he was afraid of
the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty them. Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not
person. also present when he gave his confession to the
police and signed the same. He claims that
although the extrajudicial confession was in his
own handwriting, he merely copied the contents
PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.
Batch 2008A. 61
RATIO: Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and
other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must
testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain be understood to have waived their constitutional
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on privilege, as they could certainly do.
cross-examination but compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury may be able to compare "The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence,
his handwriting with the one in question. It was so while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one
held in the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse entitled to invoke it."
vs. Com. However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com.,
the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case CABAL vs. KAPUNAN
particularly because the court there gave
prominence to the defendant's right to decline to
FACTS:
write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In
this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for
Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint
it does not appear that any information was filed
charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with
against the petitioner for the supposed falsification,
“graft and corrupt practices, unexplained wealth,
and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial
conduct unbecoming…dictatorial tendencies, giving false
testifying and under cross-examination. This is only
statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the
an investigation prior to the information and with a
President created a committee (3 former justices, 2
view to filing it.
generals) to investigate the administrative charge and
submit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal
Writing is something more than moving the body, or
was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right
mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar
against self-incriminatn.
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions.
Except that it is more serious, we believe the present
Cabal still refused. Committee referred matter to City
case is similar to that of producing documents of
Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal
chattels in one's possession. For the purposes of the
of contempt under section 580 of RAC. Respondent
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause.
one who is compelled to produce a document, and
Instead petitioner tried to have charges against him
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
quashed.
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself.
Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to
answer incriminatory ?s and take the witness stand.
And we say that the present case is more serious
Thus, the issue is:
than that of compelling the production of documents
or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to
ISSUE:
write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may
WON the proceedings before the committee is civil or
identify him as the falsifier.
criminal, determining won Cabal may invoke right
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
against self-incrimination
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
HELD
unpunished.
Yes. Although technically a civil proceeding, as a
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a
municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it
penalty, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
deemed criminal in substance and effect. Hence,
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be
even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen
witnesses against himself is proper.
or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of herein, that is not reason for
RATIO:
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases
The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
property of a public officer or employee which is out of
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
proportion of his salary and other lawful income. Such
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a
innocent persons.
divestiture of property w/o compensation, imposed by
way of punishment by the lawmaking power to insure a
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court
prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the
and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
commission of an offense, the effect of which is to
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48
Batch 2008A. 62
transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to 4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due
the sovereign power. process. NO.
Batch 2008A. 64
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag,
the right against self-incrimination. This the Court Mencias, Jimenez
said is contrary to due process, as they were not
appraised of their rights and also because such a FACTS:
"confession/testimony" is inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti. Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several
In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality, judges issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants
the Court held that in view of the potent sanction against petitioners and/or the corporations of which
found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the they were officers to search the persons above-named
compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
5 of the same. residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing
all business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of
Petition dismissed. the offense in violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.”
Makasiar, C.J. concurring: There can be no implied
waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also, Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null &
because of the nature of the proceedings, the void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court
invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board (ROC) because:
are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature 1. they do not describe w/ particularity the
of a criminal proceeding. the respondents were documents, books, and things to be seized
under the impression it was not, thus they were not 2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were
fully appraised of their rights. actually seized
(Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a 3. they were issued to fish evidence against the
similar view) petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them
Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used 4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal
in any subsequent proceeding. manner
(Plana holds a similar view) 5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally accordance with the law
and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh Respondents-prosecutors alleged:
private respondents. The right against self- 1. the search warrants are valid & issued in
incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is accordance with the law
considered an option of refusal to answer, not a 2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners’
prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at consent
the proper time (according to him, the proper time 3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence
was during the testimony to the board); a person against herein petitioners regardless of the
summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor alleged illegality of the searches and seizures
can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for a The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for.
criminating answer is asked. Gonzales v Sec of However, it was partially lifted insofar as the papers,
Labor. Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, documents, and things seized from the offices of the
they were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was
before the Board could not invoke the right to silence maintained as regards those seized in the residences of
and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right & petitioners herein.
privilege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso
jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntary or by Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be
subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the
answer as and when a question calling for an offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the
incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to residences of petitioners.
invoke this personal privilege automatically results
in loss ipso facto. ON FIRST GROUP
Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason
E. Unlawful Search & Seizure that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
PARTIES: and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may
Brooks, Karl Beck not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
of Justice), Jose Lukban (Acting Director, NBI), and premises of the corporations, since the right to
Special Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal, and object to the admission of said papers in evidence
Asst. Fiscal Maneses Reyes belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
Batch 2008A. 65
corporate officers in proceedings against them in things to be seized be particularly described – as well as
their individual capacity. tending to defeat its major objective, the elimination of
general warrants.
(Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…)
ISSUE #2
ISSUES: The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by
1. WON the search warrants in question, and respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers
the searches and seizures are valid. NO and things are admissible in evidence must be
2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and abandoned. This ruling is in line with American
things may be used in evidence against common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed
petitioners. NO to go free just “because the constable has blundered”
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
RATIO: against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected
by means other than the exclusion of evidence
Art III, Sec 1, par 3: unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, searching officer).
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
be determined by the judge after examination under rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
describing the place to be searched, and the persons and seizures.
or things to be seized.
Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and
ISSUE #1 seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same
Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue authority, inadmissible.
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has
None of these has been complied with in the competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
contested warrants. They were issued upon commission of a given crime by the party against whom
applications stating that the natural and juridical the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
persons named had committed a “violation of CB applicant should not comply with the requirements of
Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
Code, and RPC.” In other words, no specific offense such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
had been alleged in said applications. The averments Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of
who issued the warrants to have found the existence fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
introduction of competent proof that the party of evidence to establish a probable cause.
against who it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
A. Citizenship & Alienage
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most Art IV– CITIZENSHIP
fundamental Const’l rights, for it would place the Section 1. The following are citizens of the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of Philippines:
communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
warrants. [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are
The grave violation of the Consti made in the
application for the search warrants was
citizens of the Philippines;
compounded by the description made of the effects [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of
to be searched for and seized. The warrants Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
authorized the search for and seizure of records citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, and
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance
records of the petitioners and the corporations, with law.
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the
Batch 2008A. 66
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
who are citizens of the Philippines from Commissioners to review all cases where entry was
allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine
birth without having to perform any act to citizen. Among those cases was that of William and
acquire or perfect their Philippine others.
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after
a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the
natural-born citizens. latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of
lost or reacquired in the manner provided Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory.”
by law.
Sometime in 1973: respondent Gatchalian, as well as the
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
unless by their act or omission, they are assigned.
deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it. March 14, 1973: the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
inimical to the national interest and shall warrants of arrest issued therein.
be dealt with by law.
March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him.
FACTS:
July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investigation wrote
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
following the citizenship of his natural mother, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged
Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that as the Immigration Act of 1940.
he has 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee,
namely: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
Benjamin. recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, then a twelve-
year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued
had with them Certificates of Registration and a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00
and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria cash bond.
and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and Johnson are the sons of Francisco. and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of
Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa.
July 6, 1961: After investigation, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting September 4, 1990: petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino the case, alleging that respondent judge has no
citizens. As a consequence thereof, William jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge
16135 by the immigration authorities. dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7,
1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
January 24, 1962: the then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all September 6, 1990: respondent Gatchalian's wife and
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela,
Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review presided by respondent judge Capulong for injunction
motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint
Batch 2008A. 67
alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to
or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of the same level or rank of the RTC except those
deportation proceedings against William. On the specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As
same day, respondent Capulong issued the the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
petitioners from continuing with the deportation reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by,
proceedings against William Gatchalian. the RTC.
Batch 2008A. 68
Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. The Board of Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the
Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
then Acting Commissioner recommending the Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
then Board of Commissioners which reversed the the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special after the cause of deportation arises." The petitioners'
Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of
inferred that the "very basis of the Board of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after.
Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly
. ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate enforced by petitioners against respondent William
in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated
led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
which took the place of a passport for their Nituda. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant
if the applicants could have entered illegally, the of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
entitles them to remain in the country.” On March prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss
15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after
an Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the
No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a
citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest certain time. Thus, in the case at bar, it took petitioners
and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6,
order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion
the last official act of the government on the basis of proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in
which respondent William Gatchalian continually 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive
present. Consequently, the presumption of and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be
citizenship lies in favor of respondent William instituted after ten (10) years.
Gatchalian..
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive)
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (procedural) Respondent’s arguments on his citizenship: he has
Supreme Court: There should be no question that continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4)
Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, minor children. The marriage contract shows that said
in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports and earlier
reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an passports as a Filipino. He is a registered voter of
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
In said order it was found that the applicants therein exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in
have not satisfactorily proven that they are the the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer.
Filipino was reiterated where advertence is made to Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
the "applicants being the descendants of one which he has a controlling investment provides
Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino.” In the sworn livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of
Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961, he Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the such until petitioners initiated the deportation
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana proceedings against him.
Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was
born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was Petitioner’s arguments on respondents alienage:
issued Philippine Passport by the Department of Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
23, Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for were not supported by any evidence other than their own
cancellation of his alien registry which was granted self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what
on February 18, 1960; and that on July 20, 1960, he the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123. country, it should have been shown that they were valid
by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
Batch 2008A. 69
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born On Appellate Jurisdiction
outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts
the Francisco's marriage not having been in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the
Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary, process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the
to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of
the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter
of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon
not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion
been content with the testimony of Santiago that the that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the
Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the
Japanese occupation of China. Neither was case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these
Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch
same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine or circumstance exists to justify the application of the
consular and immigration authorities regarding their exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the
not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. On Respondent’s forum shopping
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-
where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see Art. 26 of petition, he is now before this Court in an active
the Family Code). Thus, he who asserts that the offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation
of proof to present the foreign law. Having declared and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction
the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court,
latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards,
the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the which they accomplished when the two judges separately
latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau or continuing with any of the proceedings which would
of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case
No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation
Moreover, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to charges against William Gatchalian.
the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: On respondent’s citizenship
“Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even
of the adoption of this Constitution…” This show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William
forecloses any further question about the Philippine Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian. serious doubts surround such a claim from the
beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines was
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as
for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then
declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners
permanently enjoined from continuing with the promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-
deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90- 2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena,
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and
Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the
before respondent judges are likewise decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July
DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs. 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian
and the others as aliens not properly documented.
Batch 2008A. 70
Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they
July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino
commanding the deportation officer to exclude citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and
William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda
removal from the country on the first available of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid
transportation in accordance with law to the port of ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Neither can
the country of which they were nationals. such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that
tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision.
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his On prescription
reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that
that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion
reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in because it is already barred by prescription considering
which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the after the cause of deportation arises. Note that the five-
indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11
legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. Mr. Gatchalian is
are among the presumptions which the ponencia covered by clause (2), which reads: “Any alien who enters
precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners' the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who
claim that Santiago failed to establish his claimed was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.”
marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of Moreover, the warrant for his exclusion was issued
William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of within a period of five years following his entry.
which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find
any valid justification why these presumptions IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT
should be liberally applied in favor of claimed the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the
marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela
purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines. Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having
been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the
Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the
not mention him in his testimony before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION
was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume
that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
principally for the benefit of his alleged children and
grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, 1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August
intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts,
into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of
months after he obtained a favorable decision from arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded,
the Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo
children and grandchildren entered the country. On for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid
25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena, Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William
Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.
Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his
alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his 2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of
alleged children William and Johnson also arrived Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion
from Hongkong. remain valid and effective and enforceable against
respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961
since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held
1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to
passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any
and exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for
business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any
director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
that the companies he runs and in which he has a Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he 3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, 1 the Supreme Court
is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962
status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not
responsibility as such until petitioning Boards only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian
initiated the deportation proceedings against him, who was taken into custody by immigration authorities
Batch 2008A. 71
in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants, • Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation
which include respondent William Gatchalian. The by the president to the Deportation Board of his
validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by power to conduct investigations for the purpose
Pedro Gatchalian, as a supposed descendant of of determining whether the stay of an alien in
Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen this country would be injurious to the security,
of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the welfare and interest of the State.
1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, • Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held
and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in to be essential to and complement the power to
Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin
legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the code
Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their
claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ISSUE (PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD:
ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not • WON the President has the power to deport
Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398
might be. of Pres Quirino which authorized the
Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once aliens during investigation (on the ground that
more the claim to Philippine citizenship of such power is vested in the legislature and that
respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed there must be a legislation authorizing the same)
examination of the facts, including the supposed ~> The Pres has the power to carry out order of
status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born deportation but may not order arrest during
Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to investigation. And no, power may not be delegated.
Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven by
respondent William Gatchalian and his co- RATIO:
applicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian • Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not claim to have been naturalized as a
Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign
a Philippine citizen. power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to
to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies his own country by the President of the
not with this Court which is charged with the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
application of the law as it is in fact written, but with conducted by said Executive or his authorized
the political branches of the Government. It is those agent, of the ground upon which Such action is
departments of Government which must consider contemplated. In such case the person
the desirability and wisdom of enacting legislation concerned shall be informed of the charge or
providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of charges against him and he shall be allowed not
aliens who may be in the same situation as less than these days for the preparation of his
respondent William Gatchalian and his co- defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
applicants. by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for opposing witnesses."
Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23,
and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary • While it did not expressly confer on the
Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 President the authority to deport undesirable
issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the
Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of fact that such a procedure was provided for
respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September before the President can deport an alien is a
1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to RE- clear indication of the recognition, and
AFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of
not a Philippine citizen. the existence of such power in the Executive.
• Under the present and existing laws, therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: by order of the President,
QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD
after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the
FACTS: Commissioner of Immigration, upon
• In May 1952 petitioners were charged before recommendation by the Board of
the Deportation Board with having Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No.
purchased US Dollars in the total sum of 613.
$130, 000 without the necessary license
from the Central Bank of the Philippines and SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and
having remitted the money to Hong Kong supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry
and to themselves. of aliens into the Philippines, and their
• Warrants were issued but upon filing for a exclusion, deportation, and repatriation
surety and cash bond they were released.
Batch 2008A. 72
therefrom, with the exception of section serve the curtailment or limitation on the
sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven fundamental right of a person, such as his
hundred and eleven which shall continue in security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). caution.
• The guarantees of human rights and freedom
• Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to can not be made to rest precariously on such a
investigate- does it include authority to shaky foundation.
arrest? May it be delegated? Here’s the
history… WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951,
• Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue
for filing of a bond to secure appearance of warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges
alien under investigation against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe
• Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
reorganized the deportation board to issue declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest
the warrant of arrest of the alien complained issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
of and to hold him under detention during null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order
the investigation unless he files a bond for of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing
his provisional release <this is incompatible modification, the decision appealed from is hereby
with….> affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
Batch 2008A. 73
Administrative Code, which legally clothes the cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
detain petitioners pending determination of the • Those articles were seized as an incident to a
existence of a probable cause leading to an lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
administrative investigation. evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on
2. Repondent violated Sevtion 2, Article III of the Criminal Procedure).
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures since the CID agents were not
• But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
seizure as required by the said provision. records show that formal deportation charges have
3. Mere confidential information made to the COD been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on
agents and their suspicion of the activities of March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with against them on March 7, 1988 “for violation of
their association with other suspected pedophiles, Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. The
detention unless they are caught in the act. They restraint against their persons, therefore, has
further alleged that being a pedophile is not become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The
punishable by any Philippines Law nor is it a crime process of the law is being followed.
to be a pedophile. 3. The petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John
HELD: Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the
1. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576, COID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defines as
warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of “psycho-sexual perversion involving children”.
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and “Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children
before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts are the preferred sexual object”.
with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the • While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it
COnstistution” (referring to the 1935 Constituion) is is behavior offensive to public morals and violative
not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner’s of the declared policy of the State to promote and
warrant of Arrest is issued on 7 March 1988 did not protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social
order petitioners to appear and show cause why they well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
should not be deported. They were issued Constitution).
specifically “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of • Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it
Administrative Cede.” Before that, deportation may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
proceedings had been commenced against them as interest The power to deport aliens is an act of
undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest State, an act done by or under the authority of the
was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. sovereign power. It is a police measureaginst
• The denial be respondent Commisioner of undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
petitioner’s release on bail, also challenged by the country is found to be injurious to the public
them, was in order because in deportation good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter
of right but a matter of discretion on thepart of
the Commissioner of Immigration and
YU vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO
Deportation.
• The use of the word “may” in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely 1989
permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the Commissioner. The exercise of the power FACTS
is wholly discretionary
In 1971 Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport,
• Section 37 (a) is not constitutionally valid for 5yrs. He renewed it for the same period upon
proscribed . The specific constraints in both presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are officer. On Feb 19, 1978, he was naturalized as a Phil.
substantially identical, contemplate Citizen. On July 21, 1981 applied for and was issued a
prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Portuguese passport by the Portuguese Embassy in
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, Tokyo. Sometime in April 1980, he declared his
are administrative in character. An order of nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
deportation is never construed as a signed like the Companies Registry in Hongkong.
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal
process. It need not be conducted strictly in Commission on Immigration and Deportation are holding
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. him and are about to deport him. He petitions for habeas
2. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on corpus, seeking release from detention.
probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their ISSUE:
activities were monitored. The existence of probable
Batch 2008A. 74
WON he should still be considered a citizen of the Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on
Philippines despite acquisition and use of a January 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed
Portuguese passport by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on January
26, 1988 seeking to disqualify the petitioner on the
HELD: ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee
No was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
RATIO: proclamation.
The foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner’s Phil citizenship The petitioner says that he allegation that he is a
acquired through naturalization. In Board of foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that any inquiry into this matter, considering that the
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on
to interference or implication. time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon
payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten
Yu, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after day reglementary period provided for under Section 253
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon of the Omnibus Election Code.
naturalization as a Phil citizen 1) resumed and
reacquired his prior status as Portuguese citizen, 2)
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out
3) represented himself as such in official documents of time since when he first filed his petition for quo
after he had become a naturalized citizen of the warranto it was treated as a pre-proclamation
Phils. Such is grossly inconsistent with his controversy and it was only on February 8, 1988 decided
maintenance of Phil citizenship. to treat his case as solely for quo warranto. The Court
has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time.
given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil
citizenship and has failed. As such, while normally Considering that the sole issue raised by the petitioner is
the ? of WON a person has renounced his Phil the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of him, this matter should normally end here. However, as
law in adversary proceedings, this has become his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
unnecessary as the SC, no less, upon insistence of considering the necessity for an early resolution of
petitioner, looked into the facts and satisfied itself on that more important question clearly and urgently
WON petitioner’s claim to continued Phil citizenship affecting the public interest, we shall address it now
is meritorious. in the same action.
Phil citizenship is not a commodity or were to be There are two administrative decisions on the question of
displayed when required and suppressed when the petitioner’s citizenship:
convenient.
Batch 2008A. 75
renunciation of "all other requirements of the Local Government Code and the
allegiance. Constitution.
The petitioner also categorically declared that he was The fact that petitioner has been disqualified does not by
a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn default make private respondent, the person who
statements voluntarily made by him and. even obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor
sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay of Baguio City. The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos
court on the ground that he was a foreigner. The states that, “…The fact that the candidate who
COMELEC in 1982 said that these mistakes did not obtained the highest number of votes is later
divest the petitioner of his citizenship. This is declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
rejected by the Court. He became a citizen of office to which he was elected does not necessarily
Australia because he was naturalized as such entitle the candidate who obtained the second
through a formal and positive process, simplified highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
in his case because he was married to an the elective office…”
Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of On the importance of Phil. Citizenship:
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can
be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as restored only after the returning renegade makes a
an Australian citizen maed him only a dual national formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured
and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
Such an argument cannot stand against the clear exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
provisions of CA no. 63 which enumerates the may not be accomplished by election to public office.
modes by which Phil. Citizenship may be lost: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of
AZNAR vs. COMELEC
which are applicable to the petitioner.
Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990
The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to an FACTS:
Australian was bigamous does not concern us here
since that is a matter him and his adopted country. On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
The possibility that he may have been Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
does not mean that he has been automatically Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired America. On January 27, he submitted a Certificate by
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that
Osmeña is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
voter under the Constitution itself because of his
alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu
candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section Provincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the
42 of the Local Government Code providing in votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc
material part as follows: ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation.
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Petitioner’s evidence to show Osmeña is a US
Philippines, at least twenty-three citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of
years of age on election day… the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of
The petitioner claims that a mere technicality like Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
citizenship should not be allowed to frustrate the will respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter
of the electorate. In any event, even unanimously, the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration
the people of that locality cannot change the Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
Batch 2008A. 76
Osmeña: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."
D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who are
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered
on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously as an American under US laws do not concern us here.
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not
gone out of the country for more than six months;
and that he has been a registered voter in the By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
Philippines since 1965. presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) citizenship.
directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest
number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both
the Provincial Governor of Cebu. cases the evidence, as well as by their own admissions,
shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian
citizens respectively and therefre no longer owe any
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First allegiance to the Philippines.
Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of In the instant case, private respondent vehemently
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
Filipino citizen. States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the
ISSUE: W/N Osmeña is a US citizen. NO electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus,
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy on Nov. 19, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
1987 and that the petitioner filed for his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
disqualification only on Jan. 22, 1988 which was
beyond the 25 day period as required under Sec. 78 In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
of the Omnibus Election Code. However, it is a stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained
matter of public interest to ascertain the Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,
respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the
public office to which he has been proclaimed second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as
elected. There is enough basis for us (SC) to rule having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To
directly on the merits of the case. Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
• There is lack of substantial and convincing has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
evidence to support the assertion that mean that he is not still a Filipino.
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen
and therefore is disqualified from running. Also the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
petitioner failed to present direct proof that private retroactive effect. In any case it shall be dealt with by a
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of future law which has not yet been enacted.
the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
B. Juridical Persons
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra)
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE
citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
FACTS:
Philippine citizenship.
1. the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization,
Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the
In concluding that private respondent had been
Organization — is a registered non-stock
naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
corporation, the main purpose of which,
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated
private respondent was issued alien certificate of
February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and
registration and was given clearance and permit to
implement savings and thrift among its
re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
members, and to extend financial assistance in
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed
the form of loans," to them. The Organization
that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an
has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a)
American and "being an American", private
founder members — who originally joined the
Batch 2008A. 77
organization and have signed the pre- 6. Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409
incorporation papers — with the exclusive of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an
right to vote and be voted for ; (b) original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with
participating members — with "no right to writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
vote or be voted for" — to which category all preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
other members belong; except (c) honorary municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the
members, so made by the board of trustees, Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to
— "at the exclusive discretion" thereof — due annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon
to "assistance, honor, prestige or help the ground that, in issuing the same, the
extended in the propagation" of the municipal court had acted "with GADALEJ"
objectives of the Organization — without any because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving
pecuniary expenses on the part of said commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the
honorary members. use of the word 'and others' in the search
2. On February 14, 1962, the legal department warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search
of the Central Bank of the Philippines — and seizure of documents which have no relation
hereinafter referred to as the Bank — whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and
rendered an opinion to the effect that the (c) "no court in the Philippines has any
Organization and others of similar nature jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a
are banking institutions, falling within the corporation . . ."
purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on - pending hearing of the case on the
April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be merits, a writ of preliminary injunction
published in the newspapers the following: be issued ex parte restraining the
aforementioned search and seizure, or,
Announcement: xxx operations similar in nature to in the alternative, if the acts complained
said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN of have been partially performed, that a
AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE writ of preliminary mandatory
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT injunction be forthwith issued ex parte,
DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ordering the preservation of the status
ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO quo of the parties, as well as the
PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION immediate return to the Organization of
IN THE PHILIPPINES. the documents and papers so far seized
under, the search warrant in question.
After due hearing, Judge Morfe issued.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General 7. Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which
Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they was denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the
engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the
public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of present action, against Judge Morfe and the
bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without Organization, alleging that respondent Judge
authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities had acted with GADALEJ in issuing the order in
and operations are not supervised by the question.
Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing with
such institutions do so at their risk. ISSUE:
WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it
unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ?
3. April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank
directed the coordination of "the HELD:
investigation and gathering of evidence on No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
the activities of the savings and loan Judge Morfe annulled. Writ of preliminary injunction
associations which are operating contrary to issued by the SC made permanent with costs against
law the organization.
4. on May 18, 1962, a member of the
intelligence division of the Bank filed with RATIO:
the Municipal Court of Manila a verified - it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional
application for a search warrant against the injunction against unreasonable searches and
Organization seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or
5. Upon the filing of said application, on May imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
the said municipal court, issued the warrant of things, a condition dependent upon the
commanding the search of the aforesaid circumstances surrounding each case, in much
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, the same way as the question whether or not
and the seizure of the foregoing articles, "probable cause" exists is one which must be
there being "good and sufficient reasons to decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
believe" upon examination, under oath, of a in given situations.
detective of the Manila Police Department
and said intelligence officer of the Bank - Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not
clear from the order complained of whether
respondent Judge opined that the above
Batch 2008A. 78
mentioned statement of the deponent — to - It is true, that such funds are referred to — in
the effect that the Organization was engaged the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws —
in the transactions mentioned in his as their "savings." and that the depositors
deposition — deserved of credence or not. thereof are designated as "members," but, even a
Obviously, however, a mere disagreement cursory examination of said documents will
with Judge Cancino, who issued the readily show that anybody can be a depositor
warrant, on the credibility of said statement, and thus be a "participating member." In other
would not justify the conclusion that said words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the
municipal Judge had committed a grave "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of raised may be lent by the Organization.
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds
is placed under the exclusive authority of the
- Again, the aforementioned order would seem "founder members," and "participating members"
to assume that an illegal banking are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted
transaction, of the kind contemplated in the for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being
contested action of the officers of the Bank, limited to those which the board of trustees
must always connote the existence of a may, in its discretion, determine from time to
"victim." If this term is used to denote a time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the
party whose interests have been actually "participating members" is purely nominal in
injured, then the assumption is not nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with
necessarily justified. The law requiring the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No.
compliance with certain requirements before 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance
anybody can engage in banking obviously with the requirements of said Act, before the
seeks to protect the public against actual, as transactions in question could be undertaken.
well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not
aware of any rule limiting the use of - It is interesting to note, also, that the
warrants to papers or effects which cannot Organization does not seriously contest the main
be secured otherwise. facts, upon which the action of the Bank is
based. The principal issue raised by the
- The deposition of a member of the Organization is predicated upon the theory that
Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, the aforementioned transactions of the
that after close observation and Organization do not amount to " banking," as
investigation, the office of a savings and loan the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are
association, illegally engaged in banking satisfied, however, in the light of the
activities, is being unlawfully used, is circumstance obtaining in this case, that the
sufficient for the issuance of a search Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse
warrant. The failure of the deponent to of discretion in finding that there was probable
mention particular individuals does not cause that the Organization had violated
necessarily prove that the had no personal Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in
knowledge of specific illegal transactions of issuing the warrant in question, and that,
the savings and loans association, for the accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of
witness might be acquainted with specific First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and
transactions even if the names of the seizure complained of have not been proven to
individuals are unknown to him. be unreasonable.
Batch 2008A. 80
"organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's of the conference organizer since these contained
columns. In a subsequent letter to The only an enumeration of names where Wenceslao was
Philippine Star, he refuted the matters contained described as Executive Director and Spokesman and
in Borjal's columns. not as a conference organizer.
3. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National 3. It is also not sufficient that the offended party
Press Club (NPC) Borjal for unethical conduct. recognized himself as the person attacked or
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column defamed. It must be shown that at least a third
as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his person could identify him as the object of the
public relations firm. In turn, Borjal published a libelous publication. Wenceslao himself entertained
rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's
not only to protect his name and honor but also columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal
to refute the claim that he was using his column to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to
for character assassination. in the subject articles. Identification is grossly
inadequate when even the alleged offended party is
4. Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal
against petitioners Borjal and Soliven attack.
(publisher). The Prosecutor handling the case
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of 4. Publications which are privileged for reasons of
evidence. He instituted against petitioners a public policy are protected by the constitutional
civil action for damages based on libel subject guaranty of freedom of speech. A privileged
of the instant case. The RTC decided in favor communication may be either absolutely privileged
of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify communications are those which are not actionable
private respondent P1M for actual and even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly
compensatory damages, in addition to P200K privileged communications containing defamatory
for moral damages, P100K for exemplary imputations are not actionable unless found to have
damages, P200K for attorney's fees, and to pay been made without good intention justifiable motive.
the costs of suit.
5. Borjal's questioned writings are not within the
5. The CA affirmed the decision but reduced the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for
amount of the monetary award. The CA ruled they are neither private communications nor fair and
that private respondent was sufficiently true report without any comments or remarks.
identifiable, although not named, in the However this does not necessarily mean that they
questioned articles; that private respondent are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354
was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed communications since fair commentaries on matters
hero," "a conference organizer associated with of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked privileged communications had its genesis not in the
inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
with dubious ways;" that petitioner's claim of Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
privilege communication was unavailing since the press. The concept of privileged communications
the privileged character of the articles was lost is implicit in the freedom of the press.
by their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. 6. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
6. The petitioners brought the action to the SC. for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable
ISSUE: imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
guilty of libel. – NO. judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
RATIO: discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
1. In action for libel, the victim shall be identifiable actionable.
although it is not necessary that he be named.
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not 7. The SC applied the Sullivan v NY Ties doctrine in
identify Wenceslao as the organizer of the considering the respondent as a public figure. The
conference. There were millions of "heroes" of the FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public
EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the
"self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars government and the private sector, and organized by
and conferences. top government officials and prominent
businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media
2. Borjal wrote about the so-called First National mileage and drew public attention not only to the
Conference on Land Transportation whose conference itself but to the personalities behind as
principal organizers are not specified. Neither well. As its Executive Director and spokesman,
did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity
Batch 2008A. 81
Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a
public figure.
Batch 2008A. 82
i