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name of the Vietnam Communist Party to Vietnam Labor Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet
Nam) and to change the name of the country from Socialist Republic of Vietnam to
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This indicates that communist ideology in its purest
sense has been diluted. If we take “communist regime” to mean the current political
system, it is likely to evolve and change gradually over several decades. During this
period the party is likely to be renamed to reflect changes in the economy. In this
scenario communism does not go out with a bang but with a whimper.
ANSWER 2: Vietnam suffers from the tyranny of geography. It is an immutable fact
that Vietnam borders China, and even with a population of 89 million it is only the
size of a middle Chinese province. China is now the second largest economy in the
world and is predicted to overtake the US economy in several decades. Vietnam –
like the rest of Asia – cannot break away from Chinese influence and control. It can
only manage the relationship. This can be done bilaterally through diplomacy,
multilaterally through regional institutions, and military through “self‐help” –
building up Vietnam’s own military strength.
I also disagree that Vietnam is under Chinese control. To be sure China exercises
influence on Vietnam because of the unequal economic relationship. But
Vietnamese of all stripes – both members of the communist party and non‐party
members – are nationalists when the question of the South China Sea (Bien Dong) is
raised. The bottom line is that China’s rise will require adjustments from all
countries, not only Vietnam.
Mr. Song Pham’s question to both:
Trong khoảng thời gian 5 năm tới, Trung quốc có thể lấn chiếm bằng mọi cách kể cả
vũ lực để đoạt toàn bộ Hoàng sa và Trường sa, tạo ra một sự đã rồi, dù sau đó sẽ có
hội hộp, đàm phán, bị lên án trên trường quốc tế?
Xin cảm ơn GS.
In the next 5 years, what is the possibility that China would invade Vietnam byall
means, including the use of force, to seize all of Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands,
creating a “fait accompli” situation, even if that action will be condemned in the
international arena?
ANSWER: China already occupies all of the Paracel Islands and will continue to do so
over the next five years and longer. The Spratly Islands are, with a few exceptions,
tiny rocks called features in international law. Each rock is incapable of supporting
sustained human habitation on its own or an independent economic function. China
is highly unlikely to use force to seize features from Vietnam because Chinese
occupation of the entire South China Sea would affect the interests of many external
countries dependent on sea lines of communication to trade and the transport of
vital energy supplies. What China seeks to secure is any hydrocarbon resources if
they are discovered.
The modern era has demonstrated that conventional invasions are costly. It is highly
improbable China would invade Vietnam. It would suffer a terrible price, including
the cost of protracted occupation. China’s actions would disrupt global trade. In
short, the costs of invasion and occupation would far exceed any possible gains.
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Mr. Paul Le’s question to both:
Chinese officials always say their military modernization is for defense purposes.
However, all Chinese new weapons are developed to target and destroy US aircraft
carriers and fleets while the US has no intention to attack China. Do Chinese
consider American as threats? Why? And as a Vietnamese American, what can I do if
Vietnam and China are at war? Will Vietnam be the second Tibet?
ANSWER: China, in Beijing’s eyes, also includes Taiwan. China’s military
modernization, at a minimum, is designed to avoid a repeat of the events of 1996. At
that time China fired ballistic missiles into the Taiwan Strait and conducted naval
exercises in order to intimidate the Taiwanese people during an election period.
China was making it clear it would oppose Taiwanese independence by use of force.
The US intervened with two carrier task force groups and China had to back down.
China also claims the right to regulate naval traffic in its 200 nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone. The US, on the other hand, insists it has the right under international
law, to send in military ships for survey and research purposes. Given these
dynamics, China’s military modernization can be viewed as defensive and designed
to push the reach of the US Navy further and further from its shores.
Chinese leaders seek a higher place in the global pecking order as their economy
grows. They do not want to be subordinate to the United States. They also seek to
be the dominant power in East Asia. The US alliance system with Japan, South Korea
and Australia plus the US Navy stands in the way of Chinese ambitions.
Both China and the United States are nuclear powers. The United States has a vast
arsenal. China does not seek to develop an equivalent nuclear force. Rather, China
seeks to develop a credible deterrent. If it is attacked by nuclear weapons it wants its
nuclear force to be able to survive and then retaliate. In this example, China views
the US a threat because of America’s large nuclear arsenal.
What to do if China and Vietnam go to war? My answer would have to depend on
what were the causes of the war and who was responsible. If China were the
aggressor, American citizens could urge their government to provide timely satellite
and other intelligence to Vietnam about Chinese military forces. The US could assist
by providing military equipment and weapons. And the US could exert pressure to
keep the conflict limited and urge a cessation of hostilities. The burden of defending
Vietnam falls on its leaders and their military in the first instance.
Mr. Nguyen Giao’s question to both:
1. What would the U.S. do if Vietnam coorperates with China in letting the latter
control its south China sea?
2. In what circumstances would the U.S. risk its GI's blood & lives in intervening a
Vietnam‐China fight over border disputes?
3. When (what years) would China's military strength in terms of soldiers, carriers,
and air forces is about the same as that of Japan before the end of the Second World
War?
ANSWER 1: The United States would probably applaud China‐Vietnam peaceful
collaboration in the South China Sea. The US might also encourage American oil
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companies to become involved in the exploitation on hydrocarbon resources. But if
Sino‐Vietnamese cooperation was aimed at controlling international trade routes
through the South China Sea the U.S. would oppose this attempt, using military force
if necessary. The Us would enlist the support of its allies and key trading nations.
ANSWER 2: The United States would not become directly involved in a Sino‐
Vietnamese confrontation along their border. The US would play a prominent
international role in bringing pressure to bear on the belligerents to cease hostilities.
ANSWER 3: The key here is aircraft carriers, which served to advance the Japanese
Imperial Navy across the Pacific. At present China is converting an old carrier into a
newer one and has plans to build at least a second carrier in the near term. Over the
longer term it is likely China will develop more aircraft carriers. The US has 11 carrier
task groups at present. We are probably looking at several decades before China has
the equivalent of Japanese carriers at the start of World War II.
Mr. Nguyen Văn Khoi’s question to both:
Kinh gui hai giao su ,trong sươt mot nam qua toi theo doi tinh hinh o bien dong qua
bao chi tren mang ,toi nhan thay rang NGƯƠI MY se khong de cho dang cong san
choi tro du day giua MY VA TRUNG QUOC ,khong som thi mươn the chien lươc moi
giua VIETNAM VA MY SE hinh thanh .THUA HAI GIAO SU CO NGHI VAY KHONG ?THOI
GIAN DO SE BAO LAU ,LIEU QUY VI CO THE PHONG DOAN DƯƠC KHONG !cươi cung
xin chuc hai giao su ven toan nhu y
Having followed the news about the conflicts in the South China Sea in the last year, I
believe that the US will not let Vietnam swing between China and US, and sooner or
later, a new strategy will be formed between US and Vietnam, is that true? Can you
two predict when this will be?
ANSWER: In 2009 the United States responded to Vietnamese concerns – and the
concerns of other regional states – about Chinese assertiveness in the South China
Sea. Both Vietnam and the United States had a convergence of interests. The most
substantial development was the inauguration of a high‐level defense dialogue. But
little of substance has emerged in terms of defense ties. Most of the activity has
been symbolic, such as Vietnamese visits to American aircraft carriers.
Vietnam does not seek to ally with the US against China. Vietnam seeks to develop
relations with both countries to serve its interests. The United States in the Defense
Department’s most recent Quadrennial Defense Review has already identified
Vietnam as a potential strategic partner. Vietnam will cooperate with the United
States but only as long as it retains freedom of action. I do not forsee a formal or
informal US‐Vietnam alliance or partnership directed against China.
Mr. Lý Bá’s questions to both:
1. Is Vietnam still independent? Why?
2. When will the Communist China collapse? How? Why? And When?
ANSWER 1: Independence is a matter of degree in an increasingly globalized world.
Vietnam is independent because it has the capacity to defend itself against outside
aggression. Vietnam sets its own economic course – the United States not China is
Vietnam’s largest market. But independence should not be confused with
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comprehensive national power. As an emerging middle power Vietnam must be
mindful of the interests of more powerful neighbors, as much as Canada and Mexico
have to take US comprehensive national power into account.
ANSWER 2: China’s collapse is only one of many possible future scenarios and is also
the least likely. Historically the Chinese empire experienced moments of unity
followed by disunity but historical trends have been to keep China unified. China will
likely evolve rather than collapse.
Mr. Đức Trần’s question to Professor Hung:
Noi den van de tinh hinh chinh tri o vung Dong Nam A, cung nhu nhung cang thang
hien nay giua Trung Quoc va cac nươc lang gieng.
Hoa Ky se lam gi ? Phan ung nhu the nao? Neu trong trương hop co mot su xung dot
bang quan su giua hai nươc VN va Trung Quoc. Thua GS.
In the event there is a war between China and Vietnam, what will the US do?
Mr. Nguyễn Nhất Anh’s question to both:
Xin nhi vi GS cho biet y kien ve mot nhan dinh kha pho bien noi CD Nguoi Viet tai hai
ngoai la : Su lon manh cua Trung Cong ngay nay la do chinh sach sai lam tu "cai bat
tay" giua TT Nixon & Mao vao nam 1972 ? (VNCH chung ta la mot con bai thi cho viec
nay ).
Would you each please comment on a common perception within the Vietnamese
community, that is, “the reason China has grown and become so powerful today is
because a strategic mistake stemmed from a “handshake” between Nixon and Mao
Tse‐tung in 1972”, in other words, VNCH was sacrificed because of this strategy.
ANSWER: The Republic of Vietnam was sacrificed when Nixon and Kissinger sought
to develop a relationship with China. This is clear from the Shanghai Communique.
But North Vietnam was also sold out. It is clear from the expression “decent interval”
that the 1973 Paris Peace Agreements were designed to extricate the US from South
Vietnam. The US got out and did not offer requisite assistance to the Nguyen Van
Thieu government to enable it to survive. China meanwhile counseled Hanoi to bide
its time over unification. But Hanoi’s leaders, with Soviet backing, chose the military
option and forcibly reunified Vietnam.
Mr. Thinh Nguyen’s question to Professor Hung:
Kinh thua GIAO SU NGUYEN MANH HUNG. Hien tai TRUNG QUOC da thuc hien thanh
cong dươc phi dan danh va diet dươc HANG KHONG MAU HAM cua HOA KY
TUKHOANG CACH 2900 km chua hay chi la nhung loi thoi phong trong hoan canh
cang thang trong luc doi dau nhu hien tai.Xin chan thanh cam on GIAO SU.Chuc GIAO
SU lươn khoe manh
Is it true that China is currently able to fight and destroy the US aircraft carriers from
a 2900km distance or that is just a rumor?
ANSWER [Thayer]: The estimated range of China’s anti‐ship ballistic missile is 1,500
km.
Mr. Unnamed NV Reader’s question to both:
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Có khi nào Cộng sản Trung quốc sẽ tự "giải thể" hoặc "sụp đổ" vì chiến tranh với Hoa
kỳ ?
Liệu các nước Cộng sản "anh em" vẫn "tồn tại" theo "đàn anh" cho đến ngày CS Trung
hoa có một "biến cố" như câu hỏi ở trên thì các nước chư hầu sẽ đổ theo ?
Is there a possibility that the Chinese Communist will voluntarily “dissolve” or
“collapse” because of being at war with the US? And do you think that the smaller
communist countries will continue to exist, and collapse only when the Chinese
communist collapse?
ANSWER: Any full‐scale war between China and the United States – however unlikely
– would involve the use of nuclear weapons and enormous damage to both
countries. China would suffer the most and its political system would disintegrate.
There are only four other so‐called communist countries besides China: Vietnam,
Cuba and arguably Laos and North Korea. Vietnam would be the most severely
affected if China collapsed because of Vietnam’s dependence for Chinese goods.
Vietnam would readjust. North Korea would loose an essential ally and its regime
would loose vital material support that China provided. The regime could either
collapse or seek reunification with the South. Laos would be impacted by the
collapse of China but the Lao economy economy is not really a socialist economy.
The Lao regime would weather the storm. Cuba would be unaffected.
Mr. Nam Cao’s question to both:
Gần đây, Người Việt dẫn tin của ngưồn "thạo tin Đông Nam Á," nói là đương kim Phó
Thủ Tướng Nguyễn Sinh Hùng sẽ lên Chủ Tịch Quốc Hội. Khá bất ngờ, phải không ạ?
Xin hỏi GS Carl Thayer và GS Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng: Các ông có "nghe ngóng" nào
không? Xin được nghe nhận định riêng. Thanks.
Recently, Nguoi Viet Daily News published an article saying that Mr. Nguyen Sinh
Hung will be the next Head of Congress [mistranslation this should read: Chairman of
the National Assembly], do you have any insightful information that you can share?
ANSWER: This is a good question and one that is difficult to answer. The
mathematics of leadership change make Sinh’s appointment as Chair of the National
Assembly (chu tich Quoc Hoi) one of two possibilities. There are currently 15
members of the Politburo. Five will retire on grounds of age: Nong Duc Manh,
Nguyen Minh Triet, Pham Gia Khiem, Truong Vinh Trong and Nguyen Van Chi.
Nguyen Phu Trong will be kept on as party secretary general despite his age.
That leaves 9 others remaining. Truong Tan Sang is tipped to become the next
president, Nguyen Tan Dung will remain as prime minister and To Huy Rua might
head the Secretariat. Four of the remaining places will remain with the incumbents:
party secretaries of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Pham Quang Nghi and Le Thanh Hai
respectively) and the ministers of National Defense and Public Security (Phung
Quang Thanh and Le Hong Anh respectively).
That leaves only two individuals – Nguyen Sinh Hung and Ho Duc Viet – available to
fill the post of chairman of the National Assembly. There are rumors that Viet will
retire from the Politburo. Therefore, by default, Hung would be the only candidate
available for chairman of the National Assembly.
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Hung’s appointment would be controversial because he is reportedly a difficult
personality to get along with. He has also been a thorn in the side of Prime Minister
Dung. The chair of the National Assembly needs to be self‐effacing and have the
ability to broker compromise and reach consensus. Both Nong Duc Manh and
Nguyen Phu Trong had that ability, Hung is less certain.
Mr. Nguoi Viet Nam’s question to both:
Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ, ai có quyền lựa chọn, và sự lựa chọn nhiều hơn, đối với Việt
Nam? Việt Nam có sự lựa chọn nào không, trong việc nên "đi" với Bắc Kinh hay/và
Washington? Hà Nội đã chọn lựa như thế nào trong thời gian qua?
Between China and the US, which country has the most influence and can exercise
more options with Vietnam? Does Vietnam has any choice between siding with the
US and China? And how do you think Ha Noi has “chosen” up to this point?
ANSWER: China has more political influence in Vietnam than the US because China
and Vietnam both have communist parties. This provides a special conduit for China
to influence Vietnam. Party leaders hold regular summit meetings, senior officials
hold theoretical seminars to share experience, and the General Political
Departments in both militaries interact. China puts no pressure on Vietnam with
respect to religious freedom and human rights. In fact their public security ministries
regularly interact to learn from each other. The United States probably has more
economic influence because Vietnam needs access to the US market and US
investment and technology transfer. This contrasts to low Chinese investment and
minimal technology transfer.
Vietnam pursues an “all‐directional” foreign policy and does not permanently side
with China or the United States. Since the normalization of Sino‐Vietnamese
relations in 1991, Vietnam has probably sided more with China. In fact, Vietnam’s
relations with China often put a break on developing ties with the United States. This
has been the case with defense relations particularly. But Chinese assertiveness in
the South China Sea, since late 2007, has changed all this. Vietnam is now pursuing
defense ties with the United States in order to encourage the US to remain engaged
in Southeast Asia. Hanoi views an American presence as a balance against China.
Vietnam’s conduct of its relations with China and the United States is a subject of
internal party debate. Conservatives look to China on matters of ideology and as a
model of economic development. But the South China Sea issue has made all
matters Chinese contentious. The elite in Vietnam is nationalist and therefore to a
certain extent anti‐China. For those in Vietnam pursuing international integration
and relations with the US, they have to surmount US criticism and pressure over
human rights and religious freedom. The conservatives argue that “hostile forces”
are trying to subvert Vietnam’s socialist regime through peaceful evolution. The
bottom line is that Vietnam pursues a straight zig‐zag line between Beijing and
Washington.
Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Nguoi Viet Online Questions
and Answers, Part 2
Carlyle A. Thayer
January 13, 2011
Nguoi Viet Online, questions and answers to Professor Nguyen Manh Hung and
Professor Carl Thayer. Replies by Professor Thayer:
Mr. Henry Nguyen’s question to both:
Ng Tấn Dũng đang "popular", chắc còn ngồi đủ 1 nhiệm kỳ Th/Tướng, rồi 2 nhiệm kỳ
Tồng BT nữa mới có cơ "diễn biến hoà bình" tại VN. Tổng cộng 15 năm. Hai vị có nghĩ
CSVN sẽ lùi vào bóng tối lịch sử trong 15 năm nữa không, hay là tôi bi quan quá
đáng?
Nguyen Tan Dung is still being” popular”, I think he will finish one more term of
being Prime Minister, and 2 terms of being General Secretary before there is a chance
for a “peaceful evolution” in Vietnam. That’s a total of 15 years. Do you both think
that we have to wait another 15 years for the Vietnamese Communist to be a thing
of the past, or am I being overly pessimistic?
ANSWER: Nguyen Tan Dung may well be re‐nominated for another five‐year term as
prime minister but he is unlikely to be made party secretary general at the end of
this period. Dung was born in 1949 and he will be 67 at the next congress. It is
possible the party could invoke the rule allowing exemptions for the party secretary
general to be over 65 but Dung could serve only one term. It is my assessment they
will go for someone younger.
In 15 years Vietnam will still be nominally communist.
Mr. Tho‐Tran’s question to both:
Khi Bộ‐Trưởng Quốc Phòng Mỹ đến Trung‐Quốc, họ có khoe máy bay tàng hình,
chuyện đó hư thực ra sao, xin cho ý kiến?
When US Minister of Defense visited Bejing, China boasted about their Stealth
Bomber, was there some truth in that story?
ANSWER: Photos of the Chinese stealth fighter the J‐20 appeared prior to Secretary
Gates’ visit. A fifteen minute test flight was conducted while he was meeting top
Chinese officials. Secretary Gates has confirmed that China is more advanced in
developing this plane than US intelligence first thought. But this is only one
prototype of a fifth generation aircraft; the US has already operationally deployed
the F‐22 Raptor Joint Strike Fighter to Hawaii.
2
Mr. Vui Hoàng’s question to both:
Ai cũng biết Trung Quốc giầu lên là nhờ Mỹ giúp. Khi giúp Trung Quốc như vậy, chắc
hẳn Mỹ nghĩ rằng mình có thể kiểm soát được sức mạnh và tính tham lam của Trung
Quốc. Nhưng liệu rồi đây, Mỹ có giữ được khả năng đó không? Thưa SG Nguyễn Mạnh
Hùng và GS Carl Thayer.
It’s common knowledge that the reason China has become so prosperous is because
of the help from the US. Apparently when helping China, the US believed that they
can control China’s growth and ambition. But, in reality, is that something that the
US can do?
ANSWER: I think the answer is more complex. Deng Hsiao‐ping launched China’s
reforms and modernization in the late 1970s. China deserves some credit for
opening up their economy. China is prosperous today because it has built up an
economy that relies on exports for growth. The United States consumer has abetted
China’s rise by borrowing credit and spending and spending. China’s has purchased
US treasury bonds and is now America’s creditor. If the US ever had ambitions to
control or influence China’s growth these were misplaced. China’s rise has been
decades in the making and it is clear that along with economic power comes political
ambition backed up by military muscle. The best the US can hope for is to work out a
way for China and the US to manage their differences and to cooperate when their
interests converge.
Mr. Nguyễn Thứ Điệp’s Question to Professor Hùng:
‐ Giáo sư có nghĩ rằng VN hiện nay đang đứng giữa hai lằn đạn ( Hoa Kỳ và Trung
Quốc), liệu sách lược VN hôm nay trong thế chiến quốc sẽ như thế nào để giữ vững
thế độc lập giữa hai đại cường? Thành thật cám ơn GS.
Between China and the US, do you think Vietnam is “between a rock and a hard
place” ? What should Vietnam’s strategy be in order to maintain its sovereignty
between 2 powerful nations?
Mr. Hùng’s question to both:
Các ông không cần đa đảng nhưng dân VN cần thì sao? Xin giáo sư cho ý kiến.
The US may not need a multi‐party regime, but Vietnam may need it. What do you
think?
ANSWER: The US two‐party system was not envisaged by the Founding Fathers but
evolved naturally. The important feature of the US system is that the citizens can
remove the party in power peacefully through the ballot box, and when a party is in
power the American system of checks and balances operates. Power is dispersed
between Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches. The US today would not be the
United States without its two party system.
Political pluralism will inevitably develop in Vietnam. And as the economy develops,
different groups in society will have different interests. The difficulty is how the
process of transition from a single party to a multi‐party regime will take place. An
opposition party could emerge with firm roots, or the Vietnam Communist Party
could develop separate wings, one progress the other conservative. Harvard
Professor Samuel Huntington, in his book The Third Wave, sets out three broad
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patterns of democratization: (1) elites in power take the lead; (2) the opposition
takes power; and (3) elements of the elite join with elements of the opposition to
bring about change. In my opinion 1 and 3 are the most likely scenarios for Vietnam.
Mr. Chan Nguyen’s question to both:
lie^u.su. xup do^? cua? che^' do^. co^ng san? la` co' the^? hay che^' do^. nay` se~
con` ca^m` quye^n` la^u dai`? cam' on giao' su chuc' giao' su nam moi' suc' khoe?
do^i` dao`
Will the collapse of communism in Vietnam be possible, or will this (communist)
regime be able to hold on to its power in the years to come?
ANSWER: The collapse of communism in Vietnam will take place when the regime
loses its legitimacy to govern. There are multiple sources of legitimacy: tradition,
charismatic leadership, nationalism, legal‐rational, performance and popular
sovereignty. At present the regime bases its legitimacy largely on performance –
delivering the economic goods. With a growth rate averaging 7% for the last decade
this has given Vietnam’s “new rich” a stake in preserving the regime. Economic
failure could trigger a change in regime. If the norm of popular sovereignty (liberal
democracy) spread among sufficient members of society this could precipitate
regime change over time.
The real question is not whether Vietnam will remain communist (because no one
knows what that means anymore) but whether it can continue to remain
authoritarian and repressive. My assessment is that Vietnam’s political regime will
change slowly over time.
Mr. Dzung Vu’s question to both:
Viet Nam se di day giua Trung Cong va My trong bao lau ? Chien tranh Viet‐Trung co
the xay ra trong vong 10 nam nua hay khong? co the tranh dươc dieu do khong ? va
neu khong thi co the nao chien thang cươcchien do khong ?
How long will Vietnam continue to “walk a line” between US and China? Will there be
a war between China and Vietnam in the next ten years? Is that something that can
be avoided, and if not, can Vietnam win that war?
ANSWER: As long as the United States and China are the most powerful countries in
Asia‐Pacific, if not globally, and as long as they are rivals, Vietnam will have no choice
but to “walk a line” between them. Vietnam is in a highly asymmetric relationship
with China and cannot alter the facts of geography. At the same time, the US is
Vietnam’s largest market. The US is one of the main investors and providers of
technology. It is not in Vietnam’s interest to align with one against the other.
A war between China and Vietnam in the next ten years is highly unlikely. Lower
military clashes, especially in the South China Sea, are possible. What would be the
reason for war? In 1979 China was smart enough to limit its “lesson” to Vietnam for
a month. If China attacked and invaded Vietnam it would face a protracted war of
resistance that it could not win. The costs to China would be prohibitive and would
set back its economic gains. Vietnam would “win” such a conflict only to the extent
that it was not defeated. The cost of war on Vietnam would be horrendous.
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Conflict is avoidable through diplomacy and confidence building measures. There is a
solid structure to China‐Vietnam bilateral relations. An increasingly modernized
Vietnamese military is a deterrent to China.
Mr. Daniel Ng’s question to both:
Hai Ông có nghĩ rằng sẽ có những "đi đêm, mà cả" về những đặc quyền, đặc lợi của 2
nước lớn về vấn đề Biển Đông mà họ sẽ tương nhượng nhau để cùng hưởng trong khi
những nước nhỏ như Vnam.....sẽ chỉ là những con chốt thí? (hai nước lớn: Trung Cộng
và Mỹ)
With regards to the South China Sea conflict, do you think that there will be “secret
negotiations” between US and China for their mutual interests, without regards to
the interests of Vietnam?
ANSWER: So far, at least in 2010, the secret discussions have been between China
and Vietnam. They did not resolve outstanding matters. The US takes no sides with
respect to territorial claims in the South China Sea, so the US does not support China
or Vietnam. The US has argued that it rejects the basis of Chinese territorial claims as
not being in conformity with international law. The US has a vital interest in keeping
the sea lines of communication through the South China Sea open and safe for
international navigation. Chin and the US differ over what kinds of activities can be
carried out in a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The US also opposes the use of
force to settle territorial disputes. It is not in the US interest to see China physically
occupy all the rocks and islands in the South China Sea and therefore try to claim
jurisdiction over the entire area. But it is possible the US would acquiesce to
creeping assertiveness by China in which China slowly displaces Vietnam from the
rocks and islands it currently occupies. This would be a long‐term development not a
short‐term one.
Mr. Daniel Nguyen’s question to Professor Hùng:
Thưa GS Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng,
Ông có nghĩ rằng Mỹ sẽ đánh đổi sự hỗ trợ Chính phủ CS Việt nam như họ đã và đang
hứa công khai hoặc bí mật về vấn đề Biển Đông một khi mà Mỹ nhận được những cam
kết và hứa hẹn về những đặc quyền, đặc lợi mà Trung Quốc sẽ dành cho Mỹ liên quan
đến vấn đề Biển Đông?
Dear professor Hung,
Do you think that the US will make deals with China and abandon its support of
Vietnam to trade of for the US benefits in the matter of South China Sea?
Mr. Triet Pham’s question to both:
Tại sao CSVN không nhân cơ hội Mỹ đã có ý định trở lại Asia, để cân bằng ảnh hưởng
đối với TQ??? Ngược lại CSVN vẫn bám víu TQ,cho dù có nguy cơ mất biển đảo V.V.?
Why doesn’t Vietnam take advantage of the US current”back to Asia” policy to
“balance” between China and US influence, but continue to lean toward China, even
at the risk of losing its territorial waters?
ANSWER: Vietnam, as the chair of ASEAN in 2010, did its best to encourage the US to
re‐engage in Southeast Asia. Vietnam also sought bilaterally to encourage the US to
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play a more assertive role. So I disagree with the premise of your question. Vietnam
must continue to interact with China because they are neighbors. They trade with
each other. This is not just a bilateral matter but a multilateral one because Vietnam
is a member of ASEAN and ASEAN has a free trade agreement with China. Southern
China and mainland Southeast Asia are being integrated through the development of
infrastructure as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion scheme. Vietnam’s normal
bilateral relationship with China should not be confused with “leaning towards
China”. Vietnamese public sentiment is very anti‐China at the moment because of
issues in the South China Sea. Chinese involvement in bauxite mining is highly
controversial. But Vietnam faces a dilemma, how should it overcome its $11 billion
trade deficit with China? Vietnam therefore encourages Chinese investment in
Vietnam. These economic realities do not make Vietnam any more pro‐China than
the United States which is also heavily in debt to China.
I assume by territorial waters you refer to the South China Sea and not the legal
meaning of territorial waters. Legally territorial waters refers to a 12 nautical mile
stretch of water from the straight baseline (low water mark) of a nation’s coast. All
littoral states have sovereignty over territorial waters.
Vietnam occupies many more features (rocks) in the South China Sea than China.
Unless China resorts to military action, Vietnam will continue to occupy these
features. What is at stake is the South China Sea north of twelve degrees north
latitude. This line runs above the Spratly archipelago and crosses into central
Vietnam above Cam Ranh Bay. Each year from May to August China imposes a
unilateral fishing ban. Vietnamese fishermen are chased away, some have their
boats rammed, others have their catches and equipment seized and some fishermen
have been arrested. Because China is physically present in the Paracel Islands it is
better based in international law and in practice to exercise control over this portion
of the South China Sea. China is more powerful and at the moment can effectively
impose its will.
Vietnam’s approach is summed up in two expressions adopted by the Vietnam
Communist Party in 2003: doi tac and doi tuong. That is Vietnam must cooperate and
struggle with China at the same time.