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Editors:
VOLUME 234
PATRICK SUPPES, 1994
(Photo taken by Winston Scott Boyer and printedhere withhis kind permission)
PATRICK SUPPES:
SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHER
Volume 2. Philosophy ofPhysics, Theory Structure,
andMeasurement Theory
Editedby
PAUL HUMPHREYS
CorcoranDepartment ofPhilosophy,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA, U.S.A.
KLUWER ACADEMICPUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON
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ISBN: 0-7923-2553-2
ISBN Set: 0-7923-2554-0
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© 1994 Kluwer AcademicPublishers
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vii
viii table of contents
3
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 3-28.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
4 BARRY LOEWER
ot 2m
3. Eigenstate-eigenvaluerule: thequantum state of asystem contains
a complete specification of its physical state andan observable A
has a value when and only when that state is an eigenstate of the
observable.
4. Born's rule: if S is in state $ then the probability that a perfect
measurementof Q on $ will yield theresult Q = 6 is |($ | Q = b)\ 2 .
In addition to these principles elementary quantum theory contains a
vast amount ofinformation concerning the connection between physical
quantities and operators and the quantumstates of realphysical systems.
The whole theory is enormously well confirmed within non-relativistic
domains.
Prior to formulating the measurement problem a few comments on
these principles are in order. First, it used to be, and to a lesser extent
still is, usual to try to understand quantum theory instrumentally as
-
merely an algorithm for predicting theresults of experiments. But like
Suppes I find 'classical realism' a more plausible philosophical view-
point. If the theory isunderstood realistically then it says that theentire
physical reality of an isolated system is characterized by its quantum
state. Second, Schrodinger's law is the sole dynamical law of this theory
6 BARRY LOEWER
The orthodox - that is, the usual text-book - way of dealing with the
measurement problem, which was given its canonical formulation by
yon Neumann13 replaces 2 with
holds for systems with fewer than n particles (or degrees of freedom or
whatever) while the collapse holds for systems with nor more particles.
Third, the collapse of state is a physically peculiar process since it
is non-local. Einstein, Podolsky, andRosen pointed this out long ago.
David Bohm's version of their thought experiment involves a pair of
electrons in the singlet state which are spatially separated. Orthodox
quantum theory predicts that if the 2>spin of one of the electrons is
measured the state collapses and instantaneously results inan eigenstate
of ;c-spin for both particles. In effect, this means that the physical
reality - whether ie-spin has a definite value or not - of one particle is
instantaneously affected by a measurementon the other particle. Much
ismade of the point that the non-locality involved in thecollapse of state
is empirically compatible with special relativity since it is not possible
to transmit messages or energy by the collapse process. This is correct
but still the collapse is a non-local process and it is no easy matter to
formulate it without supposing thata preferred reference frame exists.15
If it is so formulated in a preferred reference frame then that amounts
to treating special relativistic claims about the structure of space-time
(that there is no preferredreference frame) not completely realistically,
or it involves treating the collapse of state not complete realistically.
Fourth, as we have already noted, the orthodox theory allows for
states which are not eigenstates of ordinary physical quantities, like
position, momentum, energy, etc. and, in fact, does not allow for states
whichare eigenstates ofboth position and momentum. Inconsequence
particles fail to possess definite trajectories.
Fifth, the orthodox view's attempted resolution of the measurement
problem is ultimately unsatisfactory. There are situations in which no
measurements are being made (on any reasonable construal or 'mea-
surement') which therefore evolve linearly in such a way that,except in
rare circumstances, their quantum states are not eigenstates of ordinary
macro-properties. That is, the quantum states of cats (or systems of
which cats are parts) typically evolve so that itis not an eigenstate of the
cat's beingalive or dead. Immediately after a position measurementthe
wave function beings to spread out so that soonitis not an eigenstate of
position. It follows that the orthodox account fails to solve the reality
problem.16
12 BARRY LOEWER
BOHM'SHIDDEN VARIABLEVIEW
[SUMci|si(O))|/2),g5(O),0M(O)]
16 BARRY LOEWER
Department ofPhilosophy,
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick,NJ 08903, U.S.A.
NOTES
1 Suppes (1979),
p. 12.
2
Suppes (1962), p. 334.
3 Suppes (1966) and (1984).
4 Wigner (1932) andNelson (1967).
5
Gleason (1957), Kochenand Specker (1967), andBell(1989).
6
In Suppes (1966) he argues that every proposition or event should be assigned a
probability and concludes from the non-existence of joint probabilities that arbitrary
intersections of propositions are not propositions. Suppes does not endorse the argu-
ment and inlater writings seems quite skeptical of it.
7 Suppes
inBogdan (1979), pp. 210-211.
8
This is a necessary conditionfor a perfectmeasurement. Givinga sufficient condition
is a much trickiermatter.
9
1am assuming that alivenesscorrespondsto aQM observable.This seems reasonable
if we think that the cat is a physical system and its state of health supervenes on the
values of physical quantities ofits particles.
10
The same point is made by AlbertandLoewer (1991).
11 The habit of talking about probabilities prior to resolving the measurement prob-
lem
-
very misleading and has caused some writers e.g. Prosperi and Longeri
- to isthink that the measurement problem is not a genuine problem or is solved by
noting that the statisticalpredictions of a superposed state likeMEAS are forall prac-
tical purposes indistinguishable from the statisticalprediction of a mixture of its two
components (which allegedlyis non-problematic). But the problemis that given the
eigenstate-eigenvaluelink, states like MEAS areones in whichthe statisticaloutcomes
are non-existent.
12
This claim can be appreciatedby noting that linearity leads to the state MEAS and
the eigenstate-eigenvaluelink entails thatin this state the pointer observableis not well
defined.
13 YonNeumann (1955).
14 Thereis a
traditionof responding to the foundational problems of quantum theory by
arguing for a non-classical logic with a structure that mirrors the algebra of quantum
mechanical operators. Iknow of no such proposalthat actuallysucceeds in resolving
the measurement problem.
15
SeeMaudlin (1993).
16 Thereis another way of pursuing the strategy
of modifying linearity, which does a
20 BARRY LOEWER
much better job of dealing with the measurement problem, due to Ghirhradi, Rimini,
and Weber anddevelopedby PearleandBell. According to this strategy thereis a single
non-linear dynamic whichgoverns the evolutionof thequantum state. The basicidea is
thata system's wavefunction usually evolves in conformity withSchrodinger's lawbut
everyonce in a while, with aspecificprobabilitythatdepends onthenumber ofparticles
in the system, the wave function is multiplied by anarrow Gaussian. The probability
thattheGaussianis centeredat a point x depends on the amplitudeof the wavefunction
at x. Since the chance of a collapse (multiplicationby the Gaussian) is very small
for systems with few particles this theory is practicallyindistinguishablefromstandard
quantum theory for such systems. When a quantum system becomes correlated with
a macro-system the chance of a collapse is very large so states like MEAS are very
unstable and soonprobabilisticallyjump into states which (approximate)states which
are eigenstatesof pointer position. For discussions of GRW see JohnBell(1989) and
Albert and Loewer (1992).
17 Although,
as Bell observes, the title 'hidden variable' is not apt since the hidden
variables are usually whatis directly observed whilethe quantum state manifests itself
only in the statisticsof thehidden variables.
18
It receives no mention inRedhead (1987), Hughes (1989), or vanFraassen (1991).
Many ofthe claims foundin thesebooks arerefuted by the existenceof Bohm's theory.
See Albert andLoewer(1989).
19 Bell, J. (1989),
The Impossible Pilot Wave.
20
Bell(1989).
21
Bell(1989). The situationis a bit more complicated. First, it has becomepopular to
argue that the non-locality in orthodox quantum theory is not asbad as the non-locality
of hiddenvariabletheories. Sometimes it is claimedthat thelatterallows for superlu-
minal signalingand sois incompatible(or more incompatible?) withspecialrelativity.
But it can be shown that no theory which reproduces quantum mechanical statistics
can allow for superluminalsignalling and, for example, Bohm's theory does not. The
other complicationis that there is, in fact, one interpretationof quantum theory which
solves the measurement problem and is thoroughly local. This is the 'many minds
interpretation' due to David Albert and myself (Albert and Loewer, 1988). There is
no conflict with Bell's argument since this interpretation does not validate one of the
assumptions whichBell makes.
22
This claimis not exactly correct. Any collapse theory differs inprinciple from anon-
collapse theory likeBohm's, but in orthodox quantum theorycollapses are assumed to
occur only when systems involve many particles and for such systems it is not practi-
cally possibleto empiricallytest whether a collapsehas occurred. See Albert (1992).
23
Noticeableoverlap for many-particle systems is enormously difficult to bring about
experimentallyand probably seldom occurs for any length oftime. But in few particle
systems it is whatis responsible for characteristically strangequantum phenomena. For
example,in the famous two-slitexperiment the wave functionof a particle is literally
split, with components going through eachhole. The particle travels with one or the
other component. The apparatusis setup in such a way that the components overlapat
the screen. This overlap is what accounts for the interferenceeffects. SeeBohmand
Hiley (1992) for a detailedanalysis.
24 A
physical quantity is said to be 'contextual'iff theresultof measuring it depends not
only on its value, if any, buton othercontextual featuresof the measurement situation,
PROBABILITY AND QUANTUMTHEORY 21
REFERENCES
REFERENCES
0. PRELIMINARYREMARKS
29
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 29-43.
© 1994 Kluwer AcademicPublishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
30 ARTHUR FINE
For suppose that values satisfying thisrule are already assigned accord-
ing to some function val(-) from the spectrum of operators. Then
we can define a new assignment of values, VAL(-) by requiring that
VAL(X) = log2[val(2x )]. Since val(2x ) is in the spectrum of 2X by
assumption, log2 [val(2x )] will be in the spectrum of X as required.
Moreover, VAL(-) satisfies the sum rule since the val(-) function is
assumed to satisfy the product rule. Thus the inconsistency of the prod-
uct rule follows from the inconsistencyof the sumrule (Fine and Teller,
1978, Proposition5).
This simple demonstration of the inconsistency of the product rule
piggybacks on the considerably more complex proof of the Bell-
Kochen-Speckerresult.2 In aremarkable paper Asher Peres shows the
inconsistency of the productrule directly andmoreperspicuously (Peres,
1990). The starting point for Peres' proof is a Schrodinger version of
theBohm spin-^ realization of theEPR experiment schematized below,
where the crs are the spin-component operators (or, ambiguously, the
SCHRODINGER'S VERSIONOFEPR 33
spin observables) defined on the two subsystems (System 1 and Sys-
tem 2).
we have
val (<r x <rl)(crl - <rl)
"
= ~(f)(a\
a\)(a2y a2x) ■ ■
(Indeed, the singlet stateip is an eigenstateof (azl " <x 2) with eigenvalue
-1, so the only possible value for (cr* " cr 2 ) is -1.)
So from (3), LHS (2) = -1. Since -1 1 (!), it follows that we
cannot consistently assign values as above.
Anexamination of thecalculations shows that the principles weused
to assign values are just these:
(SPECTRUMRULE) The only possible values for an observable A of
a system in a state ip are the eigenvalues of A that have non-zero
probability in ip.
(PRODUCTRULE) If A andB commute, then val (A >B) = val (A) "
val (B).
Thus Peres provides a proof of the following no-go theorem for a
Schrodinger version ofEPR:
Thereis noassignment of exact values to the quantum observables that
satisfies the spectrum and theproduct rules.
3. DISCUSSION
4. BACK TO BASICS
Department ofPhilosophy,
Northwestern University,
Evanston,IL 60208, U.S.A.
NOTES
*
This essay was inspired by a comment of Patrick Suppes. In the spring of 1980 I
circulateda series of notes in one of whichIproved thatif there were a factorizable,
stochastichidden-variables theory, there wouldalsobea deterministicone. Responding
to that note, Suppes remarked that Iseemed to be a 'crypto-determinist'. Inever
understoodPat's comment, but Ithink thislittleessay is a reflectionon it.
1 Thereis amore detaileddiscussion ofthe Schrodinger-Einsteincorrespondenceover
EPRin (Fine, 1986, Ch. 5).
2 See (Peres, 1991)
for elegant and relativelysimple proofs of the Kochen-Specker
theorem. Inhis introductionPeres remarksthat theBell proof of this resultinvolves a
continuum of vector directions. While thisis true of Bell's exposition,his actual proof
only requires finitely many directions, as shown in(Fine and Teller, 1978).
3
Indeed(Fine, 1974) showshow to interpret theBell theoremas a direct proofof the
inconsistency of the product and spectrum rules.
REFERENCES
expect to find the full development of causalideas. This does not mean
that every aspect ofa trajectory is givena causal analysis. It just means
that changes in trajectories away from uniform motion are explained
directly by the impact of forces. I choose the word impact deliberately
for one radical version of causal analysis in physics, a Cartesian view,
is that the only forces that really exist are very short-range ones.
Arthur says at the end of his paper, in response to my remark about
non-Markovian stochastic mechanics beinga possible way of providing
a probabilistic causalanalysis of quantum phenomena, "these programs
run counter to the direction ofconventional wisdom, whichis the direc-
tion indicated by the no-go theorems. We will have to march the
opposite way if we insist on causality in the quantum theory." It is
evident enough, however,that the consideration just of no-go theorems
will not in any sense settle the issueof whether we can expect to havea
probabilistic causal analysis of quantum phenomena. As Arthur heads
the final section of his paper, it is indeed a question of back-to-basics.
The fundamental considerations here go much more to the heart of
quantumphenomena than the no-go theorems by themselves. What I
havein mind especially are the elaborate methods devised in quantum
electrodynamics for studying the interactions ofelectrons and photons.
Especially as conceptualized by Feynman, in general terms we have a
very natural probabilistic causal analysis. Even if the probabilities have
a somewhat strange feature, the causality has a relatively intuitively
straightforward feeling. This includes everything from path integrals
to the derivation of propagators which furnish a version of trajectory
analysis in quantum electrodynamics. I am not suggesting that all I
would like to see is to be found in quantum electrodynamics. For
example, there are no assumptions of definite trajectories for photons
or electrons but there are clearly assumptions about causal interactions
between photons andelectrons.
The point thatInow want to make in various detailed waysis thatthe
furtherrelativistic development of the interaction between electrons and
photons,a subject not handled in any satisfactory way at all by classical,
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics,inevitably and necessarily deals in
causal concepts. To say this is not to say that a clear classical concept
of trajectory is used, but rather that the classical, in fact preclassical,
concept of causal interaction between objects isused repeatedly.
To beginlet me quote some sentences from the abstract of a famous
1949 paperby Feynman.
SCHRODINGER'S VERSIONOFEPR 41
Electrodynamics is modifiedby alteringtheinteraction of electrons at shortdistances.
All matrix elements are now finite, with the exception of those relating to problems
of vacuumpolarization. The latter are evaluated in a manner suggested by Pauli and
...
Bethe, which gives finiteresults for thesematrices also. The results then agree with
those of Schwinger. A complete, unambiguous, and presumably consistent, methodis
thereforeavailablefor the calculationof allprocesses involving electrons and photons
(p. 769).
As another example that does not require a quotation because of its
widespread use in all detailed discussions of quantum electrodynamics,
consider the talk that photons are absorbedor emittedin a givenprocess
or in a given region. This talk of absorption or emission, and the
detailed analysis that accompanies it is inevitably causal in character
and is ordinarily recognized as such in informal discussions of the
formalism. But still to give one particular reference, note the way that
Kallen (1972) describes a propagator function.
...
In this way the function actually gives a 'causal' description of the collision. It is
oftenreferredto in the literatureas the 'causal propagatorof the photon',or simply as
the 'photonpropagator"(p. 106).
Again notethe use of theconceptof collision,acausal concept ifever
there was one in physics. Note this typical passage in the well-known
bookon non-relativistic mechanics by Landau andLifshitz (1958)
...
Born's formula can beappliednot only to collisionsof two elementaryparticles,but
alsoto an elasticcollisionbetween,say, an electronand an atom, ifthe potential energy
U(r) is suitably defined. The condition for the Born approximationto be applicable
to such a collision requires that the velocity of theincidentelectron should be large in
comparison with those of the atomic electrons(pp. 426-427).
This passage, asI have already mentioned, occurs in a famous text-
book on classicalquantum mechanics andis in the chapter on the theory
of elastic collisions, which contains also a discussion of the general
theory of scattering. Notice what is going on in this case and why
probabilistic causality is more fundamental in the analysis of physical
phenomena even than the existence of detailed trajectories. I in fact
lay down the challenge to Arthur that it is not even a part of anyone's
conventional wisdom to thinkin any other thancausal terms about these
collisions,collisions of the kind that dominate the theory of scattering.
Of course we can, as inclassical mechanics, distinguishbetween elastic
collisions andthose which are not. Here thatdifference is not important,
although the mathematical analyses are quite different. What is quite
important for my point is that the thinking about interacting particles
is inevitably causal in character. This does not mean that every aspect
42 ARTHUR FINE
45
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 45-57.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
46 JULES VUILLEMIN
Posidonius the Stoic testify that ancient physics had already recognized
the necessity of using two conflicting conceptualizations in order to
describe matter.
On the other hand reality is conceived as made of discontinuous,
localized, exclusive bits which move by transportation according to
well-defined trajectories. Physics has essentially to state the rules of
conservation that governthe collisions ofthe atoms and their aggregates.
Collisions require laws ofconservation relative to physicalmagnitudes
which may be locally defined. But the forces which finally yield their
collisions and secure unity for a world act at a distance. Newton showed
how to work with this hypothesis of separated centres of gravity. When
Newton's laws are rewritten in terms of gravitational fields, this intro-
duction of the field conceptualization means that the atomist uses a
formal trick rather than that he makes concessions.
On the other hand there are genuine phenomena of propagation
without transportation, where the magnitudes involved are continuous,
defined at every point of space, and, therefore, everywhere present,
and, moreover, intersect their respective paths without disturbing them.
Because it is continuous, this conceptualization is more akin than its
rival to the requisites of geometry. This is thereason why the followers
of Descartes and Huygens did not give ground despite the successes
of Newtonianism in mechanics until their apparently final victory with
Young and Fresnel. Compare, for example, the laws of impact of one
body against another one with the law of thebeat of two sound waves
in the air. In the first case, we deduce the laws from the principle of
conservation of the quantity of motion, without being able to describe
what happens at the instant of impact. By contrast, given two sound
sources with slightly different frequencies, we have only to make an
algebraic addition at each point in order to construct the figure of the
interference in time with allits particulars.
Geometry shows,however, that alot of surprises may be stored in a
completely intuitive construction. Letus review two of them under the
head of the categories of causality and substance.
When from a law of conservation a physicist predicts how two bil-
liard balls will rebound, he simply equates two accounts before and
after the impact. Thereis succession, there is not causality. Prediction
is still possible, but one should speak of global determinism rather than
of strict causal laws, since the balance of observable quantities before
and after an event does not imply that the event itself be subjected to
CLASSICAL FIELD MAGNITUDES 47
a detailed and continuous computation. Hume's doubt is to the point.
But add two waves. Each development is entirely determined once the
amplitude, the rate of temporal evolution (pulsation) and the rate of
spatialprogression (wave number) are fixed. And their superposition
obeys the same complete determination. We follow it as we follow
them. Causality is here the product of algebra. The surprise comes,
nevertheless,if we draw the physicalconsequences from the superpo-
sition, namely that two vibrations, when added, mutually reinforce or
extinguish themselves,according as the additionis made at two troughs
or at twocrests on the one hand, or at a trough and a crest on the other
hand. The astonishing phenomena of interference are thus explained
away without introducing Kant's so-callednegative magnitudes.1 With-
out forgetting that monochromatic waves belong to abstractphysics, not
to concretephysics, we mightsay, figuratively, that,putting together two
illuminations may produce obscurity. In the same way, it will be seen
that all the disturbances bound with a superposition of waves infinitely
extendedover space may be cancelled everywhere except over the tiny
extensionof a packet's centre.
As to the categoryof substance,thesurprise came off in two episodes.
First, in his Analytical Theory ofHeat, Fourier analyzed the diffusion
of heat without taking sides with the upholders either of the caloric
or of the kinetic theory. Whereas the physicists had to understand the
mechanisms according to which columns of air are displaced by the
propagation of soundin order to state and to solve the wave equation of
sound, the stationary distribution of the temperatures that results from
the diffusion of heat in a wall or in a ring is obtained though no mod-
el in terms of fluid or molecules is offered to support the distribution.
Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, well understood the impli-
cations of Fourier's method: physicalmagnitudes can be measured and
known, while the substances that they make manifest are kept in com-
plete ignorance. Therefore phenomenal magnitudes, not substances are
relevant to mathematical physics.
The second episode is more telling still. In Fourier's perspective,
physical magnitudes were abstracted from their substances, but their
substances, whatever they might be, were not denied a physical exis-
tence. On the contrary, when themechanical theory of light, asconstrued
by Fresnel (who assimilated the vibrations of light with the transverse
elastic vibrations of solids and gave the ether, which was supposed to
support them, the paradoxical properties of absolute incompressibility
48 JULES VUILLEMIN
associated with operators, the question arises: what operators are asso-
ciated with wave vectorsand positions, and what properties of operators
are responsible for the coupling of these magnitudes? Therelevant oper-
ators are shown, respectively, to involve a first derivative with respect
to space and a multiplication by the space coordinate. Each of them
is characterized by a spectrum of eigenfunctions and eigenvalues. The
basis afforded by the system of the eigenfunctions of one of themallows
the development of the other. But coupled operators do not admit the
same eigenvectors and do not commute. The magnitudes with which
they are associatedare therefore not simultaneously measurable with an
accuracy superior to a finite givenquantity.4
Analyzing the temporal form of the wave equation would produce
similar conclusions. A temporal spectral inequality should take the
place of its spatial counterpart. Insteadofarelation between the widths
of the waveand the position vectors, therelation wouldbe between the
widthof the pulsation spectrum and the widthof the temporal extension.
These limitations have nothing to do with quanta. They obtain with-
in thebounds ofclassical physics and even within thebounds of the part
ofclassicalphysics that precisely deals with continuous magnitudespar
excellence. Specific laws rulethe propagationofcollective phenomena,
the form of which may beconfined while the superposed waves fill the
whole space. The interferences act constructively only within a thin
volume around the centre of the wave packet and destructively every-
where else. As the group of waves runs towards either circle that limits
the perturbation caused by a stone thrown in a pond, this form may
get a proper velocity, different from the phase velocity. The velocity
of the maximum of the wave packet is not the mean phase veloci-
ty, since the component waves in a dispersive medium have different
velocities because of their different wavelengths and the interferences
slowly change the determination of thismaximum. This group velocity
depends on what spectral extensions the pulsation and the wave vector
of the wave packet have.5
Thereforeitis no wonder thatcommunication theory, which isentire-
ly grounded on classical principles, presents us with the new concept
of physical magnitudes associated with operators, when pulsations and
gains are measured by linear transmission of messages.6
The mutual relationbetween signal and transmission channels gives
rise to the concept of impedance, a physicalmagnitude whichis gener-
ally representedby an operator andis measurable when the signal isan
CLASSICAL FIELD MAGNITUDES 51
eigenfunction of this operator, the result of the measurement being the
associated eigenvalue.7
II
Both of the basic concepts of classical physics raise difficulties that are
bound up with conciliating discontinuity and continuity. A material
point means a finite quantity of matter, but without extensionand there-
fore infinitely concentrated. In so far as a wave is infinitely extended
and everywhere defined by finite magnitudes, it is not burdened with
a problem of singularity. The application of the laws of science is
nowhere prohibited. Huygens' light waves, which progress through
the void, or rather through the ether, with the same velocity may even
be said to be unproblematic. The paradoxes that affect the classical
concept of physicalmagnitudesbegin with Young's orFresnel's waves,
with dispersion.
Reading an equation - or rather into an equation - is not an easy
task. The solutions of the wave function are circular functions of the
difference between two products: of the wave vector into the space
coordinate, andof the pulsation into the time coordinate. At the begin-
ning the physicists supposedthat thepulsation whichis a function of the
wave vector always expresses the product of this vector with a constant
phase velocity. Abandoning this supposition led to important progress
in physical field theory during thenineteenth century.
This progress in a sense answers, or in another sense, questions
philosophicalpositions which go back to Descartes and Huygens on the
one hand, and to Kant on the other.
Eager to avoidNewton's singularities Kant introduced,besides ordi-
nary or extensive magnitudes corresponding to quantities and to the
axiomsof intuition,intended specific magnitudes, calledintensive mag-
nitudes and correspondingto qualities and to the anticipations of percep-
tion. What hehad in mindis explainedin abook by him which hasbeen
'undulyneglected'(exceptby Patrick Suppes8),theMetaphysicalFoun-
dations ofNatural Science, where, in the division of science of motion
between kinematics and mechanics, he inserts dynamics. Dynamics
relies on the opposition of two forces - attraction and repulsion - the
balance of which accounts for the size of the objects in the universe. Let
us remark that quantum mechanics will answer the same question by
52 JULES VUILLEMIN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I
thank YvanCuche and Vincent Voirol for their criticisms.
College de France,
11, PlaceMarcelin Berthelot,
F-75231 Paris Cedexos, France
NOTES
1
Versuch denBegriffder negativenGrbfien in die Weltweisheiteinzufuhren, by Johann
JacobKanter, Konigsberg, 1763.
2 See,
for example,Margenau, H. and Murphy, G. M.: 1956, The Mathematics of
Physics and Chemistry, 2ndcd.,Princeton: Van Nostrand, Ch. 7-8.
3 Cohen-Tannoudji, C, Div, 8., and Laloe,
F: 1973, Mecanique quantique, Paris:
Hermann,I, pp. 24-27; 11, AppendiceI, pp. 1446-1454.
4
Inradio-electricity the inequality relationis written:
r " Ay
~1
where r is the time interval separating two successive annulments of the signal, and
Ai/ is the extension of the signal's spectrum (Blaquiere, A.: 1960, Calcul matriciel,
Paris: Hachette,11, pp. 123, 124). It is rare, in classical physics, that a magnitudeis
representedby an operator. See, however, for the impedance of a circuit: Blaquiere
(1960, p. 104).
5 Feynman, R.,
Leighton,R. H., and Sands, M.H.: 1963, The Feynman Lectures on
Physics, Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, I, pp. 48^14.
6
Blaquiere (1960, 11, pp. 102-124). When a signal is linearly transmitted, let us call
gain theratiobetweenthe amplitudesof theinput and output ofFourier's terms having
the same impulse. For imperfect filters the gainis a function of the impulse. For a
(theoretical) filterthat should let only three impulses pass, if the operatoris the second
derivative with respect to time, it applies to the input function
we have
—-
d
t n =— n2 v2an cos nut —n 2v 2?bn smnut =—n 2v 2to-
at1
With n = 3
(2 x 3) + 1terms
fa(t) =oxao — v (aicosut —b\ sinut —4u (a2 cos 2ut
—
+62 sin2ut) 9u 2(ai
cos 2>ut +63 sin 3ut).
7 Blaquiere (1960,
pp. 135-138); Feynman,Leighton, andSands (1963, 11, pp.22-21.
8 Suppes, P.: 1970, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Amsterdam: North-Holland,
pp. 86-89.
9 Vuillemin, J.: unpublished, Die Mbglichkeit der Erfahrung imLicht der zeitgenos-
sischen Physik, Trier (lecture).
10 Vuillemin, J.: 1990, 'Physique pantheiste et d&erministe: Spinoza et Huygens',
Studia Spinozana, 6, 231-250.
11 Feynman, Leighton, andSands (1963, 1, 49^15).
For many years I have benefitted from conversations with Jules Vuille-
min about the history of philosophy and the history of science. The
points about which he has instructed and corrected me are many and
large in number. He is equally at home in discussing the physics of
the Stoics or Aristotle, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
great developments ofmathematical physics from the seventeenth to the
nineteenth centuries. The present article lays out in some considerable
detailthe wayin whichthebasic conceptualandmathematical apparatus
of quantum mechanics was first developed in the classical theory of
optics and electromagnetic fields, these developments in themselves
dependingupon the theory of waves developedbyHuygens andothers.
Without knowledge of this earlier history of classical physics it is too
easy to think that muchofclassical quantummechanics ismore original
in formulation than it is.
56 JULES VUILLEMIN
REFERENCES
QUANTITY,REPRESENTATION ANDGEOMETRY
.
1 THEORY OFPHYSICAL QUANTITY
59
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 59-102.
© 1994Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
60 BRENT MUNDY
2. REPRESENTATIONALTHEORY OF MEASUREMENT
3. INTRINSICFORMALIZATIONOFPHYSICALTHEORIES
4. AXIOMATICGEOMETRY
.
5 MATERIALISM,SPATIALISM AND RELATIONISM
(a) TheProblem
The work in synthetic STGmentioned so far concerns only flat STGs,
whoseuniform underlying vector-space structure plays anessentialrole
in the axiomatic developments. The next natural case, apparently not
yetpursued, wouldbeSTGsof constantcurvature(used in cosmology),
presumably axiomatizable by analogy to the classical hyperbolic and
elliptic geometries. However,much greaterphysical interest attaches to
inhomogeneous differential geometries (DGs), suchas the Riemannian
STGsof general relativity (GR).
Axiomatizationof DGis a technicalproblem quite different in char-
acter from those hitherto treated with the RTM tradition. On the one
hand DGtheories are not categorical like theclassical geometries treated
in FM-2. Instead they comprise many differentmodels of very different
geometrical structure, and we seek only to axiomatize thebasic geomet-
rical properties (e.g. Riemannian structure) common to allof them. On
the other hand these different models are not allembeddable in a single
fixed Cartesian numerical geometry as with the non-categorical scalar
embedding theories of FM-1 .
In standard RTM the intended representing numerical- space M is
given in advance, and its known structure plays an important role in
the formulation of axioms. Every universal proposition true inMholds
in any S embeddable in it, so these necessary axioms must certainly
be included as axioms or theorems (FM-1,pp. 21-23). More deeply,
the associated uniqueness result constraining the range of alternative
representations is linked to the symmetries of the fixed representing
structure M. If no such structure exists, therefore, it becomes unclear
how toproceed. Indeed,Teller (1987) assumesthe task tobe impossible.
("If the curvature of space-time varies sufficiently irregularly, then no
representation theorem can be brought to bear. Such cases lack the
symmetries needed to characterize the family of representations ..."
p. 435.)
Such a conclusion is naturally suggested by the RTM literature.
Indeed, the extension of the RTM theories of representation, unique-
ness and meaningfulness to situations involving few automorphisms is
acknowledged at the end of FM-3 (p. 333) as an important openprob-
lem. ("Thereprobably are important connections between the problem
of defining meaningfulness and that of formulating satisfactory theo-
82 BRENTMUNDY
Here weassume that Lcontains a term (here written simply as '#') des-
ignating the element g of G, and in the sentence g(p) of L we prefix
88 BRENT MUNDY
(SC) p[f] <-» k(p)[k o /], for all kin Xand / satisfying G.
The condition (SC) is opposite from (SC), because the tensor analysis
rules for 'transforming components' in sentences p of L are designed
—
to preserve the semantic content of an interpreted sentence p[f] under
a coordinate transformation / * ko /. That is, thenew sentence k(p)
—
will say the same thingunder the new interpretationkof thatp didunder
the interpretation /, so the syntactic action p ► k(p) of k counteracts
—
('contra- varies from') its semantic action / > k o /. This is expressed
in (SC).
However, either covariance or contravariance does equally wellfor
our purposes, since in either case (M2') can be applied to p or k(p) to
yield:
.
8 AXIOMATIC SPACE-TIME GEOMETRY (B)
These axiom systems only yield the desired results if they are read
as primitively postulating certain elements of differentiable structure on
individual particles. However, a differentiable structure is itself only
definable usingnumerical representation,sothese formulations ineffect
presuppose part of the standard apparatus of numerical representation
which a true geometric axiomatization should derivein its representation
theorem. Therefore theyreally only succeedin reducing one part of that
apparatus to another part, not in reducing the whole to something truly
intrinsic.
However, it is in fact possible to present intrinsic axioms in at least
theRiemannian case. The possibility ofdoing sois shown by aZeeman-
type invariance proof given in the Appendix of my (1992). The qual-
itative primitives involved are natural Riemannian generalizations of
theclassical primitives of geodesic betweenness B(p,q,r) andmetrical
congruence C(p,q,r,s). These are true finitary primitives, relations
of degree three and four, respectively, over the points of the space
S, and the theorem says that any two Riemannian spaces which are
isomorphic as structures (S,B,C) are related by a standard smooth
Riemannian isometry. In terms of if-uniqueness, this means that the
(5,B, C) structure of a Riemannian space S determines its coordinate
representation as a numerical Riemannian geometryM, uniquely up to
Riemannian isometry.
We cannow alsofinally state explicitly the representationalcondition
G on the maps /, for the Riemannian case, which is of course simply
that the qualitative relations B and G in S be carried under / to the
correspondingrelations numerically definable in therepresentingspaces
M using the given coefficient functions: that triples s, t, v in S bearing
therelation B lie alonggeodesiesinMas defined using the gpq function
of M,and so on.
This invariance result is analogous to Zeeman's proof thatthe quali-
tative causal structure ofMinkowski STGdetermines its coordinate rep-
resentation uniquely up to aLorentz transformation, except that Zeeman
considered onlyrepresentations in one numericalMinkowski space M,
and hence stated only the conclusion of Lorentz G-uniqueness rather
than general if-uniqueness for a category K. Just as Zeeman's result
implies the sufficiency of the causal primitive for an axiomatization of
Minkowski STG, so this result implies the sufficiency of the two prim-
itives B and C for a synthetic axiomatization ofRiemannian geometry
(of any dimension and signature, hence including the STGs of GR). I
QUANTITY,REPRESENTATION AND GEOMETRY 93
also have some explicit axiom systems using these two primitives, but
they are too complex to state here.
Ishould stress that the problem of axiomatization ofDG is different
for each different type or level ofDG structure: thereis no way to know
in advance what if any set of finitary primitives will provide a sufficient
basis for the axiomatization of a givenlevel of DG structure. An invari-
ance proof like that of my (1992) shows that a sufficient basis for affine
manifolds is provided by the geodesic betweenness relation B(p,q,r)
together with an affine congruence relation C(p,q,r,s), which gives
congruence relations along each geodesic rather than across different
geodesieslike the Riemannian congruence relation. For this case too I
alsohave explicit axioms.
At the other extreme, it is easy to prove that no basis of finitary
relations suffices for the axiomatization of any level of differentiable
structure alone, without additional geometrical structure. This follows
from the richness of the set of transformations relating these spaces,
which prevents any non-trivial finitary relations from beingpreserved
by all such transformations, as the basis relations for a geometry must
be.
This last result shows how unphysicalis the procedure, common in
GR,of first postulating an underlyingdifferentiable manifold as ifit were
something independent and self-subsistent,over which some additional
geometrical structure may then be imposed as an afterthought. If one
believes that a physical theory shouldbe expressibleusing finitary rela-
tions, this result implies that the differentiable structure of space-time
must be determined by its higher levels of geometrical structure, and
could not exist physically without that. (This conclusion hasinterest-
ing connections to Mach's principle.) Conversely, the axiomatizatility
results quoted above show that the metric or affine structure definable
in terms of the primitives B and G is sufficient to yield that underlying
differentiable structure as well, just as in the classical geometries. (Of
course in classical geometry no one ever would have thought it neces-
sary to postulate an underlyingmanifold before proceeding to describe
affine or metric geometry. This odd and unphysical way of thinking
entered STGfrom modern differential geometry.)
Finally, to illustrate once more the philosophical and physical sig-
nificance of intrinsic axiomatization in the RTM tradition,I will briefly
mention thataxiomatic STGin this sense provides aclear and simple res-
olution ofa paradox which originally troubled Einstein and was recently
94 BRENTMUNDY
9. CONCLUSION
This paper ought to contain one more section, combining the various
RTM-based relationist ideas of Section 5 with the intrinsic approach to
curved spatialist STGofSection 8 to explorethe prospects for relationist
theories ofcurvedSTG.On this important topic I canhere only refer to
thebrief hints of my (1989b, pp. 595-596) for the case of second-order
scalar relationism, and the observationof my (1983,p. 226) that such a
theory will have to incorporate elements of GR itself in order to have
any non-trivial content.
By way of generalconclusionI wish to stress that all of the preced-
ing material is rooted essentially in one idea and one technique, both
originating mainly with Suppes, though in my view not yet pushed far
enough. The ideais thatof informal theory ofphysicalquantity(mislead-
ingly called a theory of 'measurement'), including physical geometry
as a special case. The technique is the theory of representation: intrin-
sic axioms, representation theorems, uniqueness and meaningfulness.
Development and application of that technique in pursuit of that goal
leads to intrinsic axiomatization of quantitative theories, unified theory
of scalarand vectorquantities,relationist geometrical theories, axiomat-
ic differential geometry, and soon.
Department ofPhilosophy,
Syracuse University,
Syracuse, NY 13244, U.S.A.
NOTES
1
TheprecedingidealizedcharacterizationofRTMandits accomplishments is developed
anddefendedin my (1986b), whereIalsoundertake to fill an important gap inthe RTM
literature by showing in a substantive and non-circular way that a representational
propositionp[f] is meaningful ifit isinvariantunder the actionof theuniqueness group
QUANTITYREPRESENTATION AND GEOMETRY 95
G. Istand by this claim, whichis not addressed in the discussionof meaningfulness in
FM-3.
The argument depends essentiallyon treating meaningfulness as a property of indi-
vidual representationalpropositionsp[f], as was done long ago in Suppes (1959b). In
contrast, RTM takes meaningfulness as a property of the relations occurring as pred-
icates in such propositions (FM-3, Ch. 22). My approach is more general because
a relation is meaningfuliff each instance of it is, whilenot every meaningfulpropo-
sition is an instance of a meaningful relation, since a predicate may be meaningful
for some instances but not others. This difference in approach may have hampered
communicationwhenIpresented thematerialofmy (1986b) at an RTM conference on
meaningfulnessin 1984; certainlyIdidnot then see its full significance, or theinherent
limitationsof the RTM approach. We willsee later that this differenceof approach is
crucial for the extension of the theory of meaningfulness to differential geometry and
other cases wherenouniqueness groupexists. These two successes of thepropositional
approach to meaningfulness illustrateits advantages over the RTM relational approach.
REFERENCES
Moulines, C.-U.and Sneed, J.: 1979, 'Suppes' Philosophy of Physics', in: R. Bogdan
(Ed.), Patrick Suppes, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 59-91.
Mundy, B.: 1983, 'RelationalTheories of Euclidean Space and Minkowski Space-
Time',Philosophy of Science,50, 205-226.
Mundy, B.: 1986a, 'Embedding and Uniqueness in Relational Theories of Space',
Synthese, 67, 383-390.
Mundy, B.: 1986b, 'On the GeneralTheory of Meaningful Representation',Synthese,
67, 391-437.
Mundy, B.: 1986c, 'The Physical Content of Minkowski Geometry', British Journal
for thePhilosophy of Science,37, 25-54.
Mundy, B.: 1986d, 'Optical Axiomatizationof Minkowski Space-Time Geometry',
Philosophy of Science,53, 1-30.
Mundy, B.: 1987a, 'Faithful Representation,Physical Extensive Measurement Theory
and ArchimedeanAxioms', Synthese, 70, 373^-00.
Mundy, B.: 1987b, 'The Metaphysics of Quantity',PhilosophicalStudies,51, 29-54.
Mundy, B.: 1989a, 'Elementary CategorialLogic, Predicatesof Variable Degree, and
Theory of Quantity', Journal of PhilosophicalLogic, 18, 115-140.
Mundy,B.: 1989b, 'On Quantitative Relationist Theories', Philosophy ofScience, 56,
582-600.
Mundy, B.: 1990, 'Mathematical Physics and Elementary Logic', in: A. Fine, M.
Forbes, and L. Wessels (Eds.), PSA 1990, Vol. 1, East Lansing,MI:Philosophy of
Science Association, pp. 289-301.
Mundy, B.: 1991, 'Discussion: Embedding and Uniqueness inRelationist Theories',
Philosophy ofScience,58, 102-124.
Mundy, B.: 1992, 'Space-Time and Isomorphism', in: D. Hull, M. Forbes, and K.
Okruhlik (Eds.), PSA 1992, Vol. 1, East Lansing,MI: PhilosophyofScience Asso-
ciation, pp. 515-527.
Reichenbach,H.: 1924, Axiomatizationof the Theory ofRelativity(in German),English
translationUniversity of California Press, Berkeley andLos Angeles, 1969.
Reichenbach, H.: 1928, The Philosophy of Space and Time (in German), English
translationDover,New York, 1957.
Robb, A. A.:1911, OpticalGeometry ofMotion: ANew Viewofthe Theory ofRelativity,
London: Heffer.
Robb, A. A.: 1936, Geometry of Time and Space, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Stevens, S. S.: 1946, 'On the Theory of Scales of Measurement', Science, 103, 677-
-680. Reprinted in: A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser(Eds.),Philosophy of Sciences,
New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1960, pp. 141-149.
Suppes, P.: 1959a, 'Axioms for RelativisticKinematics with or without Parity',in:
L. Henkin, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski (Eds.), The AxiomaticMethod with Special
Reference to Geometry and Physics, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 291-307.
Reprintedin Suppes (1969, pp. 194-211).
Suppes,P.: 1959b, 'Measurement, EmpiricalMeaningfulness, andThree-Valued Log-
ic', in: C. W. Churchmanand P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and
Theories, New York: Wiley, pp. 129-143. Reprinted in Suppes, P., Studies in the
Methodology andFoundationsof Science, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969, pp. 65-80.
QUANTITY,REPRESENTATION AND GEOMETRY 97
Suppes,P.: 1972, 'SomeOpenProblemsinthePhilosophyof SpaceandTime',Synthese,
24, 298-316. Reprintedin Suppes (1973a), pp. 383-401. Suppes,P. (Ed.): 1973a,
Space, Time and Geometry, Dordrecht: D.Reidel.
Suppes, P.: 1973b, 'Introduction', in Suppes (1973a), pp. ix-xi.
Suppes,P.: 1974, 'The EssentialbutImplicitRoleofModalConceptsin Science',in: K.
F. Schaffner andR. S.Cohen (Eds.), PSA 1972, Dordrecht: D.Reidel, pp. 305-314.
Suppes, P., Krantz, D. H.,Luce, R. D., and Tversky, A.: 1989, Foundationsof Mea-
surement, Volume II:Geometrical, Thresholdand Probabilistic Representations,
London andNew York: Academic Press.
Suppes,P.: 1979, 'Replies',in: R. Bogdan(Ed.), Patrick Suppes, Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
pp.207-232.
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(Eds.), TheoreticalPhysics in the 100 Years Since Kelvin's Baltimore Lectures,
Boston: MITPress.
Winnie, J. A.: 1977, 'TheCausal Theory of Space-Time',in: J. Earman, C. Gylmour,
and Stachel, J. (Eds.), Foundations of Space-Time Theories, MinnesotaStudies in
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Woodhouse, N.: 1973, 'On the Differentiable and Causal Structure of Spacetime',
Journal of MathematicalPhysics, 14, 495.
Zeeman, E. C: 1964, 'CausalityImplies the Lorentz Group', Journal ofMathematical
Physics, 5, 490^193.
too dogmatic and sharply drawn for my taste. In his characteristic way
I am sure he would reply that this is just an expression on my part of
my piecemeal and pluralistic approach to philosophy, which too often
avoidsthe big issues. I have respondedto thisbroad sort of viewpoint in
various other commentsin these three volumes. What Mundy does not
discuss as an alternative to thekindof foundationalist view he advocates
is the instrumentalist and problem-solving approach that has its lineage
in Peirce and Dewey as an alternative fundamental way of thinking
about philosophical matters.
Inow turn to some detailed remarks on Mundy's paper. I list them
in their approximate order of occurrence in his exposition, not in terms
of their relative importance.
REFERENCES
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTATION
103
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 103-121.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printedin the Netherlands.
104 PAUL HUMPHREYS
analogue devices that are used for computational purposes and not just
as physical models). Humans are one special kind of computational
device, but the kind of novel philosophical issues that Iwant to dis-
cuss here occur only when we move beyond the category of human
computers. Moreover, it is important that the computation is actually
carried out on a concrete device, for mere abstract representations of
computations do not count as falling within the realm of computational
science. To be counted as part of computational science proper, the
computations must have a dynamic physical implementation. (I do,
however,include computations run on virtualmachines in the class of
concretecomputations.)
This working definition is simple, but it already subsumes such pro-
cedures as applied finite difference methods, Monte Carlo methods,
molecular dynamics, Brownian dynamics, semi-empirical methods of
computational chemistry, and a wholehost of other, less familiar meth-
ods. For those of us who are interested in how theories are applied
to nature, the most important immediate effect of using thesemethods
of computational science is that a vastly increased number of models
can be brought into significant contact with real systems, primarily by
circumventing the serious limitations that our present restricted set of
analytical mathematical technique imposes on us. These constraints
should not be underestimated, for once we move past the realm of
highly idealized systems, the number of mathematical theories that are
applicable using only analytic techniques devoid of approximations is
very small. I shall not dwell on this aspect here, but refer the reader to
Humphreys(1991) for examples of this analytic unsolvability.
Many of the other features of computational science have no real
interest for philosophy, important though they are to the working sci-
entist. But some aspects of this methodology give rise to questions
that have clear philosophical content. Amongst these Ishall focus
on two specific issues. First, it is often claimed that computational
science provides us with a new kind of scientific method, one that is
complementary tothe existing methods of theory and (empirical) exper-
imentation. Such claims are often rather vague about just what is new
in these methods,ranging through a variety of claims such as: (1) that
computational science allows a reduction of the degree of idealization
needed in the models as well as a check on those remaining idealiza-
tions that are made; (2) that they allow far more flexibility and scope
for changing boundary and initial conditions than do real experiments;
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTATION 105
(3) that they are precisely replicable; (4) that many parameters can be
varied that could not be altered by real experiments, perhaps because
such a change would violate a law of nature, perhaps because as in the
case of astrophysical systems the very idea of large scale experiments
is absurd; and soon.
Ishall argue here that at least one specific aspect of computational
science does indeed introduce a genuinely novel kind of method into
science. That method is numerical experimentation, andIshall argue
for this claim with reference to a particular class of mathematical models
- thelattice models of statistical physics;using a particular type ofcom-
putational method - the Monte Carlo -
method; and applying a specific
solution procedure to that method the Metropolisalgorithm. Because
of the wide applicability of MonteCarlo methods within computational
science, this example constitutes a lesser degree of special pleading
than might appear at first sight. Fritz Rohrlich (1991),followingNaylor
(1966) and others, has similarly argued for the importance of comput-
er simulations as a kind of 'theoretical model experimentation. The
examples used here reinforce his perspective while exhibiting a some-
what different aspect of computational experimentation, and they have
the additional advantage that they tie together two topics of perennial
philosophical concern, probability and empiricism, in a rather unusual
way.
The secondfeature of philosophical interest involves aparallel that is
sometimes drawn between the useof computational science and the use
of scientific instruments. Whereas the latter enable us to transcend the
limitations ofour unaided sensory capacities,the former, so itis claimed,
enable us toextend ourlimitedmathematical abilities,especiallyincases
where computational processes play an important role. The degree to
which this parallel holds, if at all, is important at least because the
instrument sideof the parallel has hadprofound and well-known effects
on the development of contemporary scientific empiricism. We are all
familiar with the arguments that were developed in the middle third
of this century which produced serious difficulties for certain kinds
of foundationally inspired empiricisms. Many things too small or too
far away to be seen with the naked eye and things emitting radiation
outside the realm of the visible are now routinely considered to be
observable. For example, observing a cold virus under an electron
microscope seems to many of us to be not only a perfectly legitimate
part of scientific practice, but one that ought to be acceptable to a liberal
106 PAULHUMPHREYS
II
"^Heisenberg
—— J 2_^(§i ' Sj) - pHz S?
ij i
where
NUMERICALEXPERIMENTATION 107
(Sf)2 + (Sf)2 + (Sf)2 = l.
Here, as opposed to the Ising model in which the spins have values
+1 or -1 along the preferred axis,in the Heisenbergmodel the spins can
take on continuously many orientation values. Among the simplifying
assumptions used in these models are: (a) the kinetic energy of the
particles associated with the lattice site is neglected; (b) only nearest
neighbour interactions are considered (although this can be relaxed to
include nth neighbour interactions); (c) spins have only two discrete
values;(d) J, Hare considered to be uniform (this can also be modified
to allow random exchange constants J{j and different magnetic fields at
each point in the lattice).
Contact with empirical data comes through the calculation of aver-
age values for macroscopically accessible quantities, such as the mean
magnetization. In order to calculate these averages, the model is sup-
plementedby achoice of thermodynamical ensemble withits associated
probability distribution over states of the system. A common choice
here is the canonical ensemble, i.e. an ensemble of closed systems in
thermal equilibrium with a heat reservoir. Then for a (macroscopic)
observable A and a system with continuously many degrees of free-
dom, the thermal average is givenby
11l
t=l t=l
(A)
Z&-^expl-HM/kBT]
reduces to
M
=
I=l
-
amove in the random walk, choose anew point in configuration space,
Xj. Compute the transition probability w(Xi —► Xj) = r,for which
one common choice is the Metropolis function:
w(Xi Xj) = mm{l,exp(-[H(Xi) -H(Xj)]/kBT}}.
Next, generate a uniformly distributed random number md, and if
.
r > md let Xn+\ =V, otherwise let Xn+\ = Xn Iterate the pro-
cess for sufficiently many steps until equilibrium occurs. Then repeat
therandom walk choosing a different initial starting point. Iterate until
a frequency distribution of equilibrium states hasbeen generatedby the
equilibrium end states of the repeated random walk. (For a proof that
~
Peq(Xi) w(Xi), see Metropolis etal. (1953)).
Coupled with the transition probability is a physically interpretable
dynamics in configuration space that generatesnew states fromold. Two
common choices for the Ising model are the single spin flip dynam-
ics, within which the spin at the selected point is reversed, and the
spin exchange dynamics, within which the spin at the selected point
is exchanged with a neighbour. Putting this in the concrete case of
spin flip dynamics for the Ising model, an initial configuration for the
lattice is chosen, and then a random lattice site is picked and the spin
there is flipped. If this results in a decrease in total energy, then the
Metropolis transition probability (which in that case willbe unity) will
choose the new configuration and thenext step in the random walk will
be generated. If,in contrast, the spin flip results in an increase in total
energy, then the Metropolis transition probability is compared to the
uniformly distributed random number, and if the transition probability
is greater, the new configuration is accepted. If not, the process retains
the old configuration. What the Metropolis algorithm does, then, is
112 PAUL HUMPHREYS
IV
VI
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Iam grateful to Fritz Rohrlich for comments that helped improve this
paper. The preliminary work for the paper was done under NSF grant
# DIR 8911393, and an earlier version was read in June 1992 at the
Venice conference onProbability and Empiricismin theWork of Patrick
Suppes.
Department ofPhilosophy,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA 22903, U.S.A.
NOTES
1
Those uninterested in the technical details of these models can move directly to
Section IV, referring back as necessary. It is not possible to fully understand why
numerical experimentationis forced on us without a grasp of the physical models,
however.
2
The expositionof the formalaspects of latticemodels givenhererelies heavilyon the
treatment in(Binder andHeerman, 1988).
3 See e.g. (Rumelhart andMcClelland, 1986, Ch. 7).
REFERENCES
Will Theories Change? But more than questions of nostalgia are in-
volved. Itis easy to trace the decay of geometrical methods used stillin
suchbeautiful form by Newton, as the power of the calculus took over.
The samemay be true of the differential equations and integralequations
that have been the mainstay of mathematical methods in the physical
sciences since the eighteenth century. If the actual solutions are really
going to be computed in terms of discrete models or by probabilistic
approximations of a similar sort, then it would be a natural prediction
thatas thesemethods take over, increasingly the old ways offormulating
theories will disappear. New ways more congenial to the modern style
of computing rendered necessary by the complexity of the problems,
will change the shape of theory itself. As I have already remarked
in discussion of the future of theories of measurement, the continuum
may disappear as an object of great interest, and the same may be true
for the use of the continuum of real numbers in the theory of physical
phenomena.
But I do not mean to suggest that the useofcontinuous mathematics
will vanish. The interplay will surely be more subtle than that. Let
me just give one simple example, the approximation of the binomial
NUMERICALEXPERIMENTATION 121
distribution by the normal distribution for n of any size. The asymp-
totic correctness of this approximation for p = 0.5 was proved at the
beginning of the eighteenth century by DeMoivre andhas been extraor-
dinarily useful ever since. Even though the normal density is itself
not integrable, it is most convenient to compute the normal deviates
rather than to compute the binomial distribution for large n, which is
technically unfeasible. In similar ways the host of special functions in
mathematical physics will have acontinued active use. What has real-
ly changed is thekind of philosophical or ontological commitment to
naturereally beingnot only continuous but almost everywheredifferen-
tiable. Therole of the continuum of realnumbers andall the associated
mathematics will continue to be of great importance in various special
ways, but only for computational purposes. This is a conjecture that
goes against the grain for many people, but it is at least reasonable to
makein view of the massive changes in the way scientific theories are
actually applied to empirical data.
One addendum to this story. Of course the applications ofmathemat-
ically formulated theories to data have always been more complicated
than philosophers of science would like to recognize. This is easily ver-
ified from close examination of much scientific work in the nineteenth
century. Letme givejust one example. The reallycomplicatedcharacter
of computations, both analytic and numerical,required to solve any real
problems in the classical theory of wave optics was alreadyrecognized
and studied carefully in the last century. LaPlace's massive calculations
in his great work CelestialMechanics provide a muchearlier example.
This list is easily extendedin many different directions.
REFERENCE
THEORIES ANDTHEORETICALMODELS
ABSTRACT. The central question discussed in this paperis how empirical theories
are related to the empirical phenomena for which they are supposed to account. I
argue that each applicationof a theory to an empirical event or an empiricalstate of
affairsrequires forming a theoretical(mathematical)modelforthe problemsought tobe
solved. Different problems may require formingdifferentmodelsrelevant to the same
phenomenon. The wayin whichtheoreticalmodelscan berelated to semantic models
is examined.
In the context of the above ideas Isurvey some of Suppes' views on theories,
set-theoreticalmodels, and theroleof both in empirical science.
.
1 RULES OFCORRESPONDENCE
125
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 125-149.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
126 RYSZARD WOJCICKI
'
2. PATRICK SUPPES SET-THEORETICAL APPROACH
Even though some of the analyses carried out by the logical empiricists
can be viewed as semantical, the predominant orientation of logical
empiricism was syntactical. The investigations were carried out in
terms of sentences and deductive relations among them. For a logical
empiricist, the selection of the syntactical option was a matter of both
doctrine andhis theoretical possibilities. Modern semantics begins with
Alfred Tarski'scelebrated treatise on the notion of truth.2 But although
the semantic approach gained momentum rather quickly, it became a
viable alternative to the syntactical one only after a series of further
investigations which eventually resulted in transforming general ideas
of logical semantics in a full-fledged mathematical discipline the
-
theory ofmodels. This remark applies both to metamathematics and
philosophy of science. Suppes' research program for philosophy of
science based on ideas drawn from the theory of models was the first
fully mature and viable alternative to the received view.3
THEORIES AND THEORETICAL MODELS 127
Unlikehis predecessors who defined theories to be deductive systems
formalized within the idiom of first order logic, Suppes argues that an
empirical theory, in fact any theories whatsoever, should be viewed
as being determined by the class of its realizations rather than that of
its valid sentences. Thus,if for the logicalempiricists the right way to
define an empirical theory T was to define a set of axioms from whichall
the other sentences valid in T are logically derivable, Suppes suggests
that to define T is to define a set-theoretical predicate that denotes all the
set-theoretical structures of which T is true in the Tarski sense. Recall
that a realization (also referred to as a semantic model or justmodel) of
a theory is just a structure of which the theory is true.
The question of whether theories are classes of semantic models
(non-statement view) or sets of sentences attracted much attention and
hasbeenboth widely and vividly discussed.4 Foran outsider,theessence
of this discussion may not be clear. After all, according to an old but
still robust doctrine, theories are neither sets of sentencesnor classes of
set-theoretic structures. They are sets of propositions which one may
represent either by the sentences applied to communicate them, or by
classes of possible worlds (thus semantic models) of which they are
true. If one deals with formalized theories, i.e., ones for which both
the notion of truth and that of logical derivation are well defined, one
can equally well define a theory either to be the set of all sentences
derivable from a set of some initial principles (axioms), or to be the
class of all the realizations determined by exactly the same principles.
As Suppes himself states clearly (cf., Suppes, 1967, Ch. 2, p. 24) the
essence of his set-theoretical approach "is to add axioms of set theory
to the framework of elementary logic, and then to axiomatize scientific
theories within this set theoretical framework." This by no means
presupposes that the axiomatization should result in a non-statement
reconstruction of the theory. One who sticks to the traditional linguistic
option can use exactly the same axioms by which the set-theoretical
predicate has been defined to define the corresponding class of valid
sentences. What matters is the set-theoretical framework not the choice
of either 'statement' or 'non-statement' option.
All these points granted, Suppes' set-theoretical approach was a
radical turn in philosophy of science. To think ofa theory as anetwork
of sentenceslinked by therelation of deducibility or to thinkof it as a set
ofclaims that concern a specific class of structures is to chosebetween
two dramatically different perspectives. The semantic shift originated
128 RYSZARD WOJCICKI
In what follows the idea of a model of a theory which has some real
objects as its parts, andhence can be a domain of a factual application
of the theory, will be our special interest. The following passage from
Suppes (1960, p. 291-292) can serve as both a concise and instructive
introduction to the topic.
To define a model formally as a set-theoretical entity, which is of a certain kind of
ordered tuple consisting of a set of objects andrelationsand operations onthese objects
is not to rule out the kindof physical model whichis appealing to physicists, for the
130 RYSZARD WOJCICKI
physical model may be simply taken to define the set of objects in the set-theoretical
..
model. .We may axiomatizeclassical particle mechanics in terms of five primitive
notionsof a set P of particles, an interval T of realnumbers correspondingto elapsed
times, a position function s defined on theCartesianproduct of the set of particles and
the time interval, amass function m defined onthe set of particles, and a force function
f defined on theCartesian product ofthe set of particles, the time interval, and the set
of positiveintegers (the set of positive integers enters into the definition of the forces
function simply in order to provide a methodof naming forces). A possible realization
of the axiomsof classical particle mechanics, that is, of classicalparticle mechanics, is
then an orderedquintupleP= (P, T, S, m, f). Amodelofclassicalparticle mechanics
is such an orderedquintuple. For example,in the caseofthe solarsystem wesimply can
take the set of particles to bethe set of planetarybodies. Another slightly more abstract
possibility is to take the set of particles to be the set of centers of mass of planetary
bodies. This generally exemplifies the situation. The set-theoreticalmodelof a theory
will have amongits parts a basicset which willconsists of theobjects originallythought
to constitute the physical model.
one has some rational reason to believe may affect the movementof the
planet. The proviso 'of which one has some rational reason to believe'
cannot be dropped out. We neither see the point of examining, nor
we are able to examine, all the adhoc hypotheses one can put forward
seeking to account for the movementof the planet.
Suppose our knowledge of the matters relevant to Qt is roughly the
same as that of the nineteenth-century philosophers of nature. Thus,
we have some fairly sophisticated, even though inadequate,idea of the
nature of space andtime. We are aware of various physical propertiesof
celestialbodiesand wehave someideaof their spatialconfiguration. We
have gathered a large quantity of evidence concerning their movements,
especially those of some planets in our solar system. And on top of that
wehave some powerful theories: Euclidean Geometry, EG, meantto be
the theory of physical space, Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation,
LG, and Newton's Particle Mechanics, NM. This fairly large body of
beliefs, combined with some ontological ideas on the structure of the
universe,form the world view within whichour search for the solution
to Qt must be carried out. Still, the discussion which follows will be
ahistoricalin various respects. Most importantly, I shall presupposethat
the construction of the theoretical model for Qt involves a fairly large
amount of statistical considerations based on some notions unfamiliar
to the nineteenth-century scientists.
To begin, we note that weare bound to accept the default hypothesis
to the effect that the only source of Mercury's movements is the set of
gravitational forces. This is not to say that we are not able to figure
out that besides gravitational forces there are other factors which are
relevant to the planet's motion, but we have no evidence which could
allow us to conjecture their nature and then state the conjecture in the
form of a reasonable hypothesis.
Bya similar default argument wearrive at the conclusion that only the
bodies in the solar system can influence the movement of Mercury in a
detectable way;the gravitational effects of allthe remaining ones are too
small for the solution of Qt to dependon them. Moreover, the effects of
gravitational interaction between Mercury and various elements of the
solar system, say planetoids, satellites of Mars, and even most remote
planets, can also be negligible small. Thus, we eventually arrive at the
conclusion that in order to solve Qt, it suffices to take into account the
gravitational interactions among a few bodies of the solar system which
are the most massive and nearest to Mercury. Which of such bodies
THEORIES AND THEORETICAL MODELS 135
have actually to be taken into account depends on how accurate and
how reliable the solution is postulated to be.
The two requirements cannotbe separated from one another. The
more accurate the solution is postulated to be, the narrower is thelimit
of error we admit for the solution and the lessreliable is the solution we
are able to find out, i.e., thelower the probability that the actualposition
of Mercury is within the admitted limit of error.7 Clearly, one is able
neither to experimentally find out the recent position of Mercury, nor to
theoretically predict any future one with unlimited accuracy; the idea of
unlimited accuracy is justempirically senseless.
It has to be noticedthat the two requirements are formal in the sense
that an evaluation of whether the solution satisfies them or not is a
matter of statistical analysis of all the steps of the procedureby means
of which the solution has beenachieved. From the actual point of view
the solution iseither factually adequate(thus true) or not.
Suppose, after defining the postulated parameters of accuracy and
reliability for the solution to Qt, and after examining how strongly the
movement of Mercury is affected by the bodies of the solar system,
we have eventually arrived at the conclusion that the model for Qt
can be fairly simple: it can be defined to involve only the Sun a and
Mercury p, both being treated as 'particles' or, as we prefer to say
today, 'mass points'. Since the gravitational interaction between the
two bodies is assumed to fully determine the movementof Mercury, the
motion equations should be derivable from the union N = NM + LG
of the principles of Newtonian particle mechanics, NM, and the law of
universal gravitation, LG.
Let NM denote the equations of Mercury's motion derived from N.
Observe that the formulas in N^ differ from those in N in that they refer
to two specific 'mass points', the Sun and Mercury, while the principles
of N are statedin the form ofa general schemaof equationsapplicable to
any set of mass points whatsoever.In order for the equations NM to have
a unique solution, the values of some of the parameters the equations
involve should be either established experimentally or deduced from
the available experimental data with the help of the hypotheses we
consider to be well confirmed, the laws of N included. Let E be the
set ofconditions one has to add to N^ in order to assure the uniqueness
of the solution; let us call them factual conditions. As will be clear
somewhat later, only a part of E states the initial conditions, those
whichcharacterize the state of the two bodies at a given initial time to.
136 RYSZARD WOJCICKI
{{a,p.] : EAt )
to stand for this defined system. The fact that formation ofa theoretical
model presupposes formation of a model of the data as well as the
fact that formation of a model of the data can be controlled by the
requirement of consistencyof the model with the corresponding theory
areof keysignificance for properunderstanding of theinterplay between
the data and the theories, and thus for proper accounting for both the
138 RYSZARD WOJCICKI
NOTES
1
For a discussion of theseissues see e.g., Woodward(1989).
2 version,
The original Tarski (1933) was publishedin Polish. For an English version
of it, see Tarski (1956).
3
Somealternativeideas wereput forwardbyEverthBeth (1949) (see also vanFraassen,
1970) and RomanSuszko (1957, 1968).
4
For an account of this discussion thereaderis referred to Pearce (1987).
51
allude here to the titleof the most recent monograph (Balzer,Moulines, and Sneed,
THEORIES AND THEORETICAL MODELS 145
1987) on the structuralist approachin philosophy of science.
6 Cf. Wojcicki (1979).
7
It goes without saying that this paper is not the right place to discuss fairly sophisti-
catedtechnical counterparts ofthe ideaof accuracy and thatof reliability.
8 For
a discussion of methodological aspects of various hypotheses concerning Mer-
cury's movement see Griinbaum (1971).
9
The first publicationin whichIhaverevisedmy earlierviews was Wojcicki (1990).
REFERENCES
Tarski, A.: 1933, Poj§cie prawdy wjezykachnauk dedukcyjnych ('The Notionof Truth
in the Languages of Deductive Sciences', in Polish), Warszawa: Towarzystwo
Naukowe Warszawskie.
Tarski, A.: 1956, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics; Papers from 1923 to 1938,
Oxford: ClarendonPress.
VanFraassen, B.C: 1970, 'On theExtensionofBeth'sSemanticsofPhysicalTheories',
Philosophy of Science,37, 325-339.
Van Fraassen,B.C: 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford: ClarendonPress.
Wojcicki, R.: 1979, Topics in the FormalMethodologyofEmpirical Sciences, Dor-
drecht: D. Reidel and Wroclaw: Ossolineum.
Wojcicki, R.: 1990, Teorie w Nauce ('Theories inScience', inPolish), InstytutFilozofii
iSociologii,PAN, Warszawa.
Woodward, J.: 1989, 'Data andPhenomena', Synthese, 79, 393^172.
1. INTRODUCTION
151
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 151-193.
@ 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printedin theNetherlands.
152 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
among its consequences two examples that are discussedin the present
paper: a result onone of Arnolds problems concerning algorithms for
properties of polynomial dynamical systems over the integers (Arnold,
1976a) and theproof of the incompleteness of the theory of finite games
with Nash equilibria (da Costa, 1992d).
Our main theorems depend in an essential way on a lemma of
Richardson (Richardson,1968);noncomputability inaxiomatized phys-
ical theories was anticipated by Scarpellini (Scarpellini, 1963) and by
Kreisel (Kreisel, 1976). Also, we wish to emphasize that no forcing is
needed for our independence results.
We obtain here a whole plethora of new intractable questions in
Suppes-axiomatizedtheories. The present results are new in thefollow-
ing sense: all our previousexamples for undecidability and incomplete-
ness withinaxiomatized physics canbe formally reduced to elementary
arithmetic problems. However, that reduction cannot always be made
in the present case, as some of our new examples are not elementary
number-theoretic problems in disguise; they stand beyond the pale of
arithmetic.
There are even weirder situations: we obtain formal expressions
that describe physical systems such that nothing but trivialities can be
provedabout them. For wecan explicitly construct undecidable families
of objects within a classical first-order language Lt such that:
No nontrivial properties of those families can be algorithmically
decided.
No assertion about the system can be reduced to an arithmetic
assertion, thatis to say, the systemlies fully outside thearithmetical
hierarchy and belongs to the nonarithmetical portion of set theory
(if weare working, say, within Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory).
Those results are consequences of general incompleteness theo-
rems that apply to any nontrivial propertyP in the theory T; those
theorems extend a previous one (Proposition 3.28 in (da Costa,
1991a) that originated in a suggestedbySuppes.
Again wehavea correspondingincompleteness theorem as thereare
formal expressions for systems all of whose nontrivial properties must
be formulated as undecidable sentences. (Again no property of those
systems canbereduced to an arithmetic property.) Thoseundecidability
and incompleteness results are to be found below in Propositions and
Corollaries 3.28, 3.30, 3.37, 3.41, 3.47, 3.49, 4.1.
SUPPESPREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLEPROBLEMS 153
Section 2 of this paper reviews the theory of Suppes predicates for
empirical theories in the da Costa-Chuaqui version (da Costa, 1988,
1990b, 1992a). Section 3 deals with the undecidability and incom-
pleteness of classical analysis in its several aspects; the main points
are the explicit construction of expressions for characteristic functions
of any complete degree in the arithmetical hierarchy, and the gener-
al incompleteness theorems about expressions of elementary functions.
Section 4discusses our examples, whileSection 5 comments on possible
implications of our results.
2. SUPPES PREDICATES
within ZFC, w is thus a ZFC set. The xs and the ys are called thebase
setsofw; the xs are the principalbase sets, while the ysare the auxiliary
base sets.
The auxiliary base sets can be seen as previously defined structures,
while the principal base sets are 'bare' sets; for example, if we are
describing a real vector space, the set of vectors is the only principal
base set, while the set of scalars, R, is the auxiliary base set.
A Suppespredicate or a speciesof structuresin the senseofBourbaki
isa formula of set theory whose only free variables are those explicitly
shown:
P(W, Xi,X 2,
"" " , m,2/1,2/2,---, 2/n)-
Km,X
Deduced andDerivedStructures
Given a structure wof species P(w, x\,... ,x ,2/1 ,... ,y ), let
m n 21,
... , z ,be p(p> 0) sets of finite rank over the union of ranges of the
p
sequences
5
""" ,%mi y\i - - " yn,
also let v\ , ...,v q (q
> 0) be q arbitrary sets. If the Suppes predicate
P*{w*,zi,...,zp,vi,...,vq)
defines w* as a structure on the principal base sets z\, ...
with the v\,
...as auxiliary base sets, we say that the structure w* of species P* is
deducedfrom the structure w of species P.
We can obtain new structures out of (sets of) already defined struc-
tures by the means of two basic procedures:
.
1 With the help of set-theoretic operations, such as Cartesian prod-
ucts, passages to the quotient, and the above-described operation
of deduction of structures;
2. Through the imposition of new axioms to already existing set-
theoretic structures.
Therefore we can introduce the notion of derived structure. When
we define anew structure w from a set s ofother structures with the help
of the two procedures described above, we say that w is derived from
the structures s. The Suppes predicate of w can be expressedin terms
of the Suppespredicates of the elements of s. The conceptof deduction
of structures is a particular case of derivation of structures.
The set s is the set of ground structures for w.
Finally, let w and w1 be twostructures of species P and P', respec-
tively. We suppose that P and P' differ only in connection with their
sets of axioms, but that the conjunction of the axioms of P' implies
each axiom of P, with quantifiers restricted to sets of finite rank over
theunion of the ranges of the base sets for w. If that is the case, we say
that the P'-structure is richer than the P-structure (or that P' is richer
than P). For instance, the species of commutative groups is richer than
the species of groups.
The Q'-structure g' is then derived from the Q-structure g if Q' is
richer than Q, or Q' canbe obtained from Q in the way we have already
described above. The above ideas can also be extended to the concept
ofpartial structures introduced by (da Costa, 1990a).
SUPPES PREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS 157
TheAxiomatics ofEmpirical Theories
As a first approximation we see empirical theories as triples
A=(M,A,p),
where (i) Mis a Suppes-Bourbaki species of mathematical structures;
(ii) A is the theory's 'domain of definition',and (iii) p gives the 'inter-
pretation rules' or 'characteristic examples' that relate Mand A. We
can be more specific about (ii) and (iii), however, as we did elsewhere
(da Costa, 1992c); in any case we consider A to be a set-theoretic
construct. (In that case p in general contains nonrecursive aspects (da
Costa, 1991a, to appear, 1992a).)
K./G.
<v^=r,
V(/? = L,
where
tp
= (1/2)^7^,
and
t
- Jul ,
,fi
V = yp dp,
(where the {7^ : p — 0, 1,2, 3} are the Dirac gamma matrices with
respect to 77). Those equation systems are to be understood together
with boundary conditions that specify a particular field tensorF^ 'out
of the source jv (Doria, 1977).
The symmetry group of theMaxwell field equations is theLorentz-
Poincare group that acts onMinkowski space Mand in an induced way
onobjects defined over M. However,since weare interestedin complex
solutions for the Maxwell system, we must find a reasonable way of
introducingcomplex objects inour formulation. One may formalize the
Maxwellian system as a gauge field. We sketch the usual formulation:
again we start from M = (R4,rj), and construct the trivial circlebundle
P — M x Sl over M, since Maxwell's field is the gauge field of the
circle group 51(usually writtenin that respect as U( 1)). We form the set
£ of bundles associated to P whose fibers are finite-dimensional vector
spaces. The set of physical fields in our theory is obtained out of some
160 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
{M,SI,P,T,A,g,X,B,V<p = i)
V<£> = L
should be seen as an axiomatic restriction on our objects; the boundary
conditions B are (i) a set of derived species of structures from Mand
S\ since, as we are dealing with Cauchy conditions, we must specify
a local or global spacelike hypersurface C in M to which (ii) we add
sentencesof the form Vx G Cf(x) = /o(x), where /o is a set of (fixed)
functions and the / are adequate restrictions of the field functions and
equations to C.
SUPPES PREDICATESAND UNSOLVABLEPROBLEMS 161
HamiltonianMechanics
Hamiltonian mechanics is the dynamics of the 'Hamiltonian fluid'
(Arnold, 1976b). Our groundspecies of structures are a2n-dimensional
real smooth manifold, and the real symplectic group Sp(2n,R). Phase
spaces in Hamiltonian mechanics are symplectic manifolds: even-
dimensionalmanifolds like Mendowed with a symplectic form, that is,
a nondegenerateclosed 2-form Q, on M. The imposition of that form
can be seen as the choice of a reduction of the linear bundle L(M)
to a fixed principal bundle P(M,Sp(2n,R)); however given one such
reduction it does not automatically follow that the induced 2-form on
Mis a closed form.
All other objects are constructed in about the same way as in the
preceding example. However, we must show that we still have here a
Dirac-like equation as the dynamical axiomfor the species of structures
of mechanics. Hamilton's equations are
ix&
— —dh,
where %x denotes theinterior product with respect to the vector field X
over M, andhis theHamiltonian function. That equationis (locally, at
least) equivalent to:
LxSl = 0,
or
d{ixQ) = 0,
.
3 UNDECIDABILITY AND INCOMPLETENESS
i=l
We now define:
h(x) = xsinx,
g(x) — xsinx3 .
Given a set ofreal variables x\, . xn,we define the following maps:
= h(x),
xi
x2 = hog(x),
X3
= hogog(x),
Xn_i
= ho go ... og(x),
(whereg is composed n
— 2 times), and
xn = gogo ... og(x).
164 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
DEFINITION 3.4. The maps i' : -+ \T] and i" : \V] -+ \T],
\V\
givenby:
(1) pm(xi,...,x n) i-> i\prn{x\,...,x n)]{x)
= apm(h(x),hog(x),..
gogo ...og(x)),
where a is Richardson's First Map; and
(2) Pm(xi,...,X n) t"[pm(xu... ,X„)](x)
»->
= t /[pm(xi,...,X„)](x) - ,
\
areRichardson 'sSecondMap of the first (i1) and second {i") kinds. ■
COROLLARY 3.5. Given a polynomial expression pm G Lt, there
is an algorithm that allows us to obtain expressions t!p m £Lt and
i"Pm €Lt for the images ofpm under Richardson 'sSecond Map.
Proof. Immediate, from the definition of i' and i" .
We assert:
Jm \X\, X 2, .."
,Xn) — Q!Pm \Xli X 2,
, ,
"" " Xn)
fm €£, such that fm =0ifand only iffm <1ifand only ifthere are
...
positive integers x\,x 2 , xn such thatpm(x\ , ,xn) =0. ... —
Moreover, thereare algorithmic proceduresi',i" :P * T such that
we can obtain out of an expressionpm two other expressionsfor one-
..
variable functions, gm(x) = i'pm(x\, .) and hm(x) = i"pm(x\, .) ..
...
such that there are positive integers x\, with pm(x\ , .) =0ifand
only ifgm{x) = 0andhm(x) < 1, for all real-valued x.
..
SUPPES PREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS 165
(i) m={-*:*<2:
166 N. C. A. DA COSTA ANDF. A. DORIA
fl,a; > 0,
(2)
/-n
"M
/ \
"
-10,< 0.
—
x — >
(3)
/ox
v J x-y=
y { f x yy,' x
r,
y ~ 0,
<n
[0, x—2/ 0.
( +1, x > 0
(4) a{x) = < 0, x=0
[ -1, x<o
...
Let pn,q(xi,X2, ,x n) be a universal polynomial (Jones, 1982).
Since \T*~\ has an expression for |x| (informally one might have
|x| = +Vr),ithas an expression for the sign function a(x). Therefore
we can algorithmically build within the language of analysis (where we
can express quotients and integrations) an expression for the halting
function 6{n,q):
o(n,q) = a(Gnjq),
G"'"
a -
+00
"Jf
~ 2
Cn.i(x>ce x dx
1 + Cn,,(i)
"*'
SUPPESPREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS 167
)
— ,...,Xr ).
Proof See (da Costa,1991a).
There follows:
the single natural number r((y, dy,A)) into its components before
proceeding to the computation.
.
Let w be the index for that last machine; we noteit <j> w
If x is the index for 4>£, we note w = p{x), where pis the effective
1-1 procedure described above that maps indices for oracle machines
into indices for Turingmachines. Therefore,
Incompleteness Theorems
We now state and prove several incompleteness results about N andits
extension T; they will be needed when we consider our main examples.
'— '
Werecall that is a primitive recursive operation on uj.
170 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F A. DORIA
Then:
Then
172 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
m
LEMMA 3.26. IfT^n+l^ is arithmetically consistent, then 4>x (x) J.
ifand only if
T(m+l) |_ 3xU ...,Xn eUJ
p(p(z),(z,dy0(m) ),xi,...,x n) =0
Proof. Similar to the proofin thenonrelativized case; see (Machtey,
1979, pp. 126ff). ■
m
Therefore wehave that the oracle machines (f>x (x) [ ifand only if
T(m+l) |_ 3xU ...,Xn eUJ
...,x
p(p(z), (Z, dy>o(m)), xi, n ) =0.
M (= Vxi,...,xn[p(m0,xi,...,xn)]2 > 0,
+ -
while it cannotbe provednor disproved within J'(m 1) it is therefore
demonstrably equivalent to a nm+i assertion. ■
(m) (m) 2
Now let g(mo(0 ), xi..)= p(rao(0 ), xv " -)) ■be asin Pro-
position 3.25. Then:
SUPPES PREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLEPROBLEMS 173
T {n) y. _,^(m+l)
_
M |= /3(m+l) = 0 but for alln < m + 1, T^ V flm+^
o).
= 0 and
■
Then,
.
where p{. .) is as in Proposition 3.25.
Remark 3.29. Rogers discusses the rank within the arithmetical hierar-
chy of well-known open mathematical problems (Rogers, 1967,p.322),
suchas Fermat's Conjecture - whichin its usual formulation is demon-
strablyequivalent toa ni problem,or Riemann'sHypothesis,alsostated
as a111 problem. Rogersconjectures that our mathematical imagination
cannot handle more than four or five alternations of quantifiers. How-
ever the precedingresult shows that any arithmetical nontrivial property
within Tcan give rise to intractable problems of arbitrarily high rank.
We obviously need the extensionT D N, since otherwise we would
not be able to find an expression for the characteristic function of a set
174 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
with a high rank in the arithmetical hierarchy within our formal lan-
guage. ■
An extension of the preceding result is:
COROLLARY 3.30. IfT is arithmetically consistent then, for any
nontrivial property P there is a £ G Lt such that the assertion P(()
is arithmetically expressible, M |= P(Q but it is only demonstrably
equivalent to a Tln+\ assertion andnot to a lower one in the hierarchy.
Proof. Put
C=
where oneuses Corollary 3.27.
DEFINITION 3.31.
0^ = {(x,t/) :xG0(y) },
for x,y G uj.
Then:
DEFINITION 3.32.
#H(m) = C0 (w)(m),
where c^{u)(m) is obtained as in Proposition 3.12.
Still,
DEFINITION 3.33.
o(w+i)
_ (oHy_
SUPPES PREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS 175
il+ C(ra„(oH),z)^
C(mo (0^) ),x) = A,(m0(0^) ),xi,...,x r ),
We can state:
Pi = v(Gi),
fci(s)e
/
Then,
PROPOSITION3.47. IfT is arithmetically consistent, then for every
recursively enumerable extension of the axioms ofT there is a Hamil-
tonian C all whose nontrivial properties cannot be proved within that
extension.
Proof. The expression we require is:
C = Ci[(l/2)/(tI) + (1/2) £*/(t,.) + ---] +
2
Then:
4. TWO APPLICATIONS
.
PROPOSITION4.1. If Tis arithmetically consistent, then:
(1) There is an expressionfor a vectorfield v over Rn in T such that
M\='v is-> a smooth vectorfield on Rn, n> 2 with property P ',
and T V 'v is a smooth vectorfield on Rn with property P
(2) There is an expression for a vector field v in T such that the
sentence 'v is a smooth vector field on Rn, n> 2 with property
P'is T-arithmetically expressible as a nn+i sentence, m>\,but
such thatfor no m it willbe equivalent to a Tim sentence.
182 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A.DORIA
—-
if rG R, then for s(x,y) = u(x,y) —r, R27 s _1 (0,0) is open
- .
in R27 ,where vis taken as areal-valued function on R2j (See on
v aboveDefinition 3.2.)
The first lemma we require is:
(3) yi
— sin7TXi, wi = cos7TXj,
SUPPESPREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS 183
is the unique solution of the following polynomial dynamical system
with coefficients in Z over R3j+l endowed with the usual Cartesian
coordinates and the correspondingEuclidean metric tensor:
dxi dv
dt dxi
for i=l,2, 3,...,j,plus the boundary condition u(0,0) =p(0) (with
an obvious abuse oflanguage);
dyi = idu
,«
(5) W Z '
Id dx~-
dwi i dv
dt dxi
whereagain i= 1, ...,j, withboundary conditions 7/i(0) =0, Wi(0) —
1. Andfinally,
" t=°
with boundary condition z(0) = 7r.
Proof. Equations (4) are immediately integrated (since they are
gradientequations) to Equation (2). Equation(4.2) trivially implies that
z = 7r, and therefore (also from Equations (4)) we have:
—dyi = irwi,
dxi
dwi = -*yi,
-T-
dxi
(no sumon i). That systemhas the solutions yi = sin7TXi,Wi = cos7TXf.
Since the du/dxi are polynomials over Z whichare not identically zero,
the lemma is proved. ■
We need a secondlemma: here we allow v to range over R — {I}.
Therefore for each xi andfor each yi at most a countably infinitenumber
of points are to be deletedfrom thecorrespondingdomains, those points
—
that are solutions of the (fixed) equation v 1 = 0 over the reals. We
184 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F. A. DORIA
then state:
(8) v = l-v
is the unique solution to the polynomial equations on R — {I},
(9)
dc
Tt
=°'
where c=—l, v G (— oo, 1) and c=o, v G (1, +oo); and
Tt= c *
dTj dv
(10)
Let M'be the manifold where the expression for $ is defined. Then
SUPPES PREDICATES AND UNSOLVABLEPROBLEMS 185
SCHOLIUM 4.5. // Tis arithmetically consistent, then T h 'The
dimensions ofMl,m<2k + 3(j + 1) '.
'
■
SCHOLIUM 4.6. IfT is arithmetically consistent, then M |= The
dimension ofMl,m = k', while
TV 'The dimension ofM',m = k\
and
TV -> 'Thedimension ofM',m = k '.
Then:
5. CONCLUSION
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
N.C. A. da Costa,
Research Group on Logic and Foundations,
Institute for Advanced Studies,
University of Sao Paulo,
05655-010 SaoPaulo SP, Brazil
F.A. Doria,
Research Center on Mathematical Theories of Communication,
School of Communications,
Federal University at Rio de Janeiro,
22295-900 Rio RJ, Brazil
REFERENCES
For over half a century since Godel's famous results, the incompleteness
of any axiomatization of classical analysis has been known, but in the
past several decades other results have stressed how far we are from
having anything like a real algorithmic approach to any significant
class of mathematical problems. One example is the realization that
Tarski's decision procedure for elementary algebra is not feasible, in
the technical sense that the computations grow exponentially in the
length n of any formula whose truth is to be decided. So even positive
results on decision procedures themselves do not guarantee practical
applicability. Itused tobe thought ofas partof the folklore,but ofcourse
not in any sense proved, that 'most' problems in mechanics that were
not too complicated to formulate wouldhave relatively straightforward
solutions. Therecent discoveryofchaotic systems inallsorts of domains
has shownhow the problems that fill the textbooks of mechanics are a
carefully selected group. That such difficulties were lurking about has
really beenknown since theintensivework on the three-body problem in
the nineteenth century and the culminating negative results ofPoincare.
One way to put it is that any undergraduate in physics can derive the
differential equations governing familiar cases of the restricted three-
body problem- therestricted problem is when the massof the third body
is negligible and therefore does not influence the regular motion of the
other two bodies. But the problem of finding mathematical solutions of
the differential equations is whollyunmanageable for most cases.
Da Costa and Doria have embarked on a program, as indicated by
the many additional references in their paper, to show how widespread
the presence of unsolvable problems is in physics andother sciences.
192 N. C. A. DA COSTA AND F A. DORIA
I do not mean to suggest that the system that Rolando and I have
been working on gets around all the problems uncoveredby Newton and
Chico. What it does show is that weak constructive systems, demon-
strably consistent,are sufficient for a great deal of the work.
REFERENCES
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION
195
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 195-216.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
196 JOSEPH D. SNEED
2. SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
3. EXPLANATION AS ARGUMENT
(1) c Content^).
I
-
It is also reasonably clear that A the set of intended applications
-
used in the model theoretic explanation plays a role' corresponding
roughly to that of the collateral information in the deductive model.
A bit more precisely, what remains of the set-theoretic structures in A
- —
when the explanandum Xis deleted this A{ }X' is the collateral
l
trivially true. Non-trivialis the claim (15) that the total context A is an
intended application of T.
What is now the appropriate conclusion to this argument? I suggest
that we would like to be able to conclude from (1), (7), and (8) that:
(9) X is part of A.
That is, we would like to conclude from the truth of the theory's claim;
the fact that the theory applies to the total context A and the fact that
the added context A{—}X is a part of A that X is a part of A.
Thus,I suggest that themost natural way to convert amodel theoretic
explanationinto a deductive argument yields the following argument:
(8) [collateralinformation]
The problem with this argument form is thatit is not generally valid.
Whether it is valid depends on the nature of the theory T used in the
explanation and upon the nature of the application A of the theory.
The reason is roughly this. For applications A in Content(K), parts
of A having the structure characteristic of yl{-}X will not always be
associated with unique parts of A having the structure characteristic
of the part X. Thus simply knowing how the part is
instantiated does not generally tellushow theX-like part is instantiated.
Tomake this clearer, consider the special casein which X contains
no theoretical concepts and trivialconstraints. That is,
Inthis case,
Content^) = Pot(M)
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION 205
Content(if) = M.
Suppose that theexplanandum £is a substructure of some mp inMp .
.
That is, xis obtained from mp bydeleting someparts of mp Intuitively,
we may think of systematically going through all of Mp removing from
eachmember parts isomorphic to those we removed from mp to obtain
x. Call the set of structures we obtain in this way '5X [MP]\ Providing
a precise definition of '5X[MP]' is somewhat tedious so I omit it here.
Intuitively, SX [MP] is the set of all x-type data structures. The structure
x is just one 'value' or 'instantiation' of this datatype.
To explain x is simply to add the remaining structure required to
make it an a in Mp which is also a model for T, i.e. a in M. This
remaining structure is a{-}x. As before, we may considerSa{_} x [Mp]
- intuitively the set of all a{ — }x-type data structures.
Now, starting with
Fig. 1.
Ii c Content(if)
not (Ij c Content(K))
and
P(li C I) ± 0.
But there is no reason at this point to rule out otherkinds ofevidence.
5. EVALUATING EXPLANATIONS
i" € Content^).
However, in the case of theories with lots of evidence of this sort, the
contribution of the evidence from specific putative explanationmay be
negligible. So theproduct form may be acceptable as an approximation.
This would most likely be the case when the theories were wellestab-
lished and supportedby substantial amounts of evidence apart from the
explanatory contextin question.
The product form (12) has the nice intuitive feature of clearly sepa-
ratingjudgements about themerits of the theory invokedin explanation
from judgements about whether the theory explains the phenomenonin
question. Focusing on thelatter judgement,some additional simplifica-
tion is possible. Considering(6) again, one might most naturally view
(6-i), (6— ii), and (6— iii) as purely formal conditions so the probability
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION 209
of each (and the conjunction) will always be either 1 or 0. We could
complicate things here by considering non-trivial probabilities for the
formal conditions, as for example when we are uncertain about our
mathematical or calculational results. But this complication would add
little to the present discussion. Thus in the case the formal conditions
are satisfied (P(6-i) & 6— ii) & 6— iii)) = 1), the probability that we have
an explanation at all is just the probability that the empirical condition
(6-iv) is met. Thus, the probability that (X,/, A) explains X is:
(14) If (X, I,A) and (X', /', A') are putative explanations for X then:
iff
P(I £ Content^) | E) x P(X part of A \ E)
> P(l' G Content^') | E) x P(X part of A' \ E)
210 JOSEPHD. SNEED
Content^) C Content^')
whether the 'if in (15) should be 'if and only if is not entirely clear.
More explicitly, it is not evident how we should compare the strength
of theories with identical classes of non-theoretical structures whose
contents intersect partly or fail to intersect at all. For present purposes,
it appears that little is lost by simply taking (15) to be necessary,as well
as a sufficient, condition. We may, somewhat arbitrarily, say T and T'
are equally strong (equipotent) in allother cases. Thus:
(16-i) T = (X,I) is stronger than T' = (X',I)
iff
Content^) C Content^')
(16— ii) Tis equipotent with T
iff
T is stronger than T' and T' is not stronger than T.
Having a way of comparing the strength of theories allows us to address
the question of how probability trades off against strength in evaluating
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION 211
theories. Isuggest that the trade off is made lexicographically with
probability dominating strength. That is,strictly more probable theories
are alwayspreferred to strictly less probable. Only in thecase of equally
probable theories does strength play role. Then, stronger theories are
preferred to weaker. Thus:
(17) T = (X,I) is better than T' = (X',I)
iff
P(I G Content^) |E) > P(I G Content(A") | E)
or
iff
{X,I) strictly better than (K1,1)
or
and
P(Xpa.rtofA) > P(X part of A').
This 'better than' ordering for explanations clearly emphasizes thequal-
ity of the theory rather than the probability that the theory explains. Is
this plausible? The main argument for its plausibility is this. The pur-
pose of explainingXis to show that Xcanbe integrated intoour existing
body of knowledge - without substantially revising that body. Explana-
tion is reducing theprima facie unfamiliar to the familiar. Among other
things, this makes us more comfortable with the already -
familiar. We
feel comfortable that existing knowledge is adequate weneed not take
the trouble to learn something new. But, some things are more familiar
thanothers. Integrating Xinto theframework ofa moreprobable theory
is just 'more satisfying.
NOTE
1
Iam indebted to Mr. Michael Pierce for calling my attention to these problems and
discussing them with me.
REFERENCES
general notion of part, as he uses it, can do the work he would like to
have it do.
For those raised in traditional philosophy or even traditional phi-
losophy of science, with the search for generality and universality of
conceptual schemes so dominant, it is not easy to accept or even be
sympathetic with a view that is skeptical of the success of any of the
general schemes aimed atproviding a traditional philosophy of science.
The picture of scientific activity Iincreasingly favor myself is clos-
er to that of apprenticeship than to the propositional organization of
knowledge. Perhaps only in mathematics do we have the generality of
structure and generality ofresult that would satisfy the hearts as well as
theminds of philosophers. Even physics, the most sophisticated of the
empirical sciences, has only a pretense at great generality. Individual
problems must be tackled by individual methods. The methods that
areused to attack a particular problem dependupon the experienceand
insight of the investigator, not upon the sharp and exact codification
of theory and its range of application. It is only a myth engendered
by philosophers - even in the past to some extent by myself - that
the deductive organization of physics in nice set-theoretical form is an
achievable goal. A look at the chaos in the current literature in any
part of physics is enough to quickly dispel that illusion. This does not
mean that set-theoretical work cannot be done, it is just that its severe
limitations must be recognized.
There are many ways of expanding upon the views Ihave just
expressed. A central one is the current realization of how few even
simple physical systemscan be thoroughly understood,in the sense that
detailed and precise predictions about the behavior of the system can
be successfully verified. In a way, this is a lesson that was ready for
understanding already in the nineteenth century in terms just alone of
the massive andunsuccessfuleffort to master the three-bodyproblem in
classical mechanics. But the modern developments of chaos havemade
the facts much more salient and very much increased the awareness of
how difficult it is to make successful predictions. But once the rarity of
systems or structures whose behavior can be successfully predicted is
recognized then much of the older talk about general schemes of expla-
nation seems unsatisfactory for dealing with the rich details of actual
science. This is not the place for a full-scale exposition of my views,
but let me try to give one or two examples.
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION 215
Iwant to contrast our attitude toward various cases of failure of
prediction in classical mechanics. Let us begin with a case already
mentioned, that of the three-bodyproblem. Our inability to solve the
differential equations, even in principle, in a satisfactory analytical
form has been recognized for over 100 years. On the other hand, the
derivation of the differential equations governing the motion of three
bodies acted uponby the force of gravitation alone is an easy exercise.
There is a very general belief that the differential equations accurately
reflect many real situations to an extraordinarily highdegreeof accuracy.
There is no need to say 'with complete accuracy' for no real systems
are sufficiently isolated, just to mention one central reason. What is
important is thebelief that the equations hold to a very high degree of
accuracy. But they are unmanageable from the standpoint of solutions.
A closely related example is that of a single body sliding or rolling
down an inclined surface of variable degrees of roughness. We can
write a differential equation including friction that also, because of the
complicated nature of the surface, we cannot solve except numerically.
But in this case the status of the equation is quite different. We do not
think that it is possible to write down, to the same degree of precision
at all,a differential equation governing the complicated physical phe-
nomena that reflect theinteraction between the surface and the moving
body. Because our feelings of definiteness about these two cases seem
so strong, a theory of structural explanation should provide a very com-
pelling account of their difference. But to provide this requires entering
into the details in a way that is not a feature of the current work.
Let us continue the same line of examples. A favorite one of many,
also used by Sneed, is the way in which we accept the explanation of
the motion of billiard balls on a table based upon the mechanical laws
of collision. However, if we consider a somewhat more complicated
billiard ball - 1have in mind thekind studied by Ornstein et al, Sinai,
-
and others we enter an entirely new realm. The most striking theo-
rems are that when the obstacles onour new and wonderfully different
billiard table are convex in their shape then we cannot distinguish no
-
-
matter how many observations we take between the motion of the
billiard balls following the usual laws of mechanical collision,and the
motion of theball being described by a probabilistic Markov process. It
is one of the great insights of modern mechanics, whose philosophical
importance I have tried to stress in several publications over the years,
that the separation between deterministic mechanical systems and ran-
216 JOSEPHD. SNEED
dom probabilistic ones is not at all what it was once thought to be.
Structuralist views of this kind of example are as yet missing from the
literature.
The examplesjust cited are in a way too mathematical in character.
The analysis ofa physicalproblem we hope to solve, think wecan solve
and are willing to tackle,is more open-ended,less honed down to a few
sets of variables than thekinds of examples I have just given. Here the
apprenticeship of the physicist seems to me of the greatestimportance.
Toknow what to countand what to discard as unimportant in analyzing
the givenphysical situation is not something wherein no endof training
inmathematics andin the solution of differential equations willbe much
of help. As wemove from applications of theory to anew situation and
the organization of experiments, what I have to say is even more true.
Moreover,in complicatedhigh-technology experiments involvinglarge
numbers ofindividuals itis fair to say that noone commands any longer
all the details of the experiments. It is not just apprenticeship, but
a collection of mature apprenticeships, that are required to organize,
prepare and execute the experiments planned. Individual papers with
more than 100 authors are now not uncommon in high-energy physics,
yet the obviously social natureof these experimentsandthe complicated
sets of skillsrequired toexecutethemhaveas yetreceivedlittle attention
in the analysis of physics by philosophers of science. In making these
remarks about the collective enterprise of runningexperiments in high-
energyphysics, I am not interested as such in the sociology of science
but more in the bewildering variety of patches of theory and patches
of skills required to put the whole thing together. Itis that it would be
wonderful to have a detailed structural analysis of. Perhaps Sneed and
his energetic collaborators canbe persuaded to enlightenus allon some
of these detailed matters.
PART V
MEASUREMENT THEORY
R. DUNCAN LUCE AND LOUISNARENS
1. INTRODUCTION
.
2.1 Historical Background
Mathematicians and scientists, among them Helmholtz (1887), Holder
(1901) and yon Neumann (in yon Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947),
219
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 219-249.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
220 R. DUNCAN LUCE AND LOUIS NARENS
.
wherekis such that s\ <x < s|+1 Continuing in this way,a sequence
of approximations (f)m is constructed, andfor many measurementaxiom
systems it canbe shown that as m— > 00, the limit of </>m exists and is
the desired homomorphism 0 of X into Af.
Beginning with a different standard sequence will usually yield a
different homomorphism.
The accuracy of measurement, inpractice, iscontrolled by how many
terms in this approximation are used.
The ancient geometerEudoxesused standard sequencesin much the
same way as in RTM.They also played a critical role in the approaches
taken by Helmholtz (1887) and Holder (1901). Later Luce and Tukey
REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OFMEASUREMENT 223
(1964) used related kinds of standard sequences to obtain their repre-
sentation and uniqueness results for additive conjoint measurement.3
Krantz (1964) and, in a moreuseful way, Holman (1971) recognized
that the standard sequence approach of Luce and Tukey closely related
to the algebraic structure describedby Holder for physical measurement
-an Archimedean,4 totally ordered group. Basically, Krantz and Hol-
man defined an operation on one component that captured completely
the trade-off structure between the components. Under the axioms, the
operation was shown to be associative and so the problem wasreduced
to an application of Holder's theory.
Mostof FMI is devoted to recastingvarious measurementsituations,
often using the ideas inherent in Krantz andHolman's approach, so that
Archimedean ordered groups (or large semigroup portions of them)
come into play. It has been remarked, with some justice, that the
theory of measurement is largely an application of Holder's theorem,
i.e.,of standard sequences in the guise of Archimedean ordered groups.
Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4.2, this continues to be the case
even for non-additive structures.
7. The representational theory offers an abstract theory of the kinds
of well-behaved scales that one encountersin science.
This theory is based on a concept of homogeneity that abstractly is
much like the geometric one mentioned above and provides qualita-
tive and empirical criteria for empirical structures to be homogeneous.
(Issues involving homogeneity are discussed more fully in Sections 4
and 5.)
Until the 1980s, the major emphasis of RTM has been on produc-
ing existence and uniqueness theorems for various kinds of empirical
situations. Scott and Suppes (1958) remarked:
A primary aim of measurement is to provide a means of convenient computation.
Practical control or prediction of empirical phenomenarequires that unified, widely
applicablemethods of analyzingthe importantrelationshipsbetweenthe phenomenabe
developed.Imbedding the discoveredrelationsin variousnumerical relational systems
is the most important such unifying methodthathas yet beenfound (pp. 116-117).
224 R. DUNCAN LUCE AND LOUIS NARENS
.
3 PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE FORMULATION OFTHE
REPRESENTATION THEORY
.
PROBLEM 1 Justify in a philosophicallyprincipledfashion RTM(or
a largepart of it) as a generaltheory of measurement without severely
restricting itspositive uses.5
Efforts in this direction shouldbe carried out soas to produce either new
kinds ofresults -not just translations ofknown random variable repre-
sentation results - or new insights into measurement through concepts
not available in the standard approaches to random variables. Some
progress hasbeen made by Heyer andNiederee (1989), but much more
research on the topic is needed.7
3.3. Meaningfulness
The meaningfulness part of RTMhas not received as much attention as
the existence and uniqueness parts and so it is less fully developed. In
particular, as with the definition of a measurement scale, the criterion
for meaningfulness invokedin RTMhas not been adequately justified.
Although FM3 describes methods for linking qualitative correlates to
meaningful quantitative relations, no justification is provided for why
these qualitative correlates are indeed empirical.
Narens (1988) showed that these qualitative correlates are definable
in terms of the primitives through a very powerfulhigher-orderlogical
language that includes individual constant symbols for purely mathe-
matical entities. Because empirical definitions requireonly much weak-
er logical languages, Narens' results establish that the qualitative corre-
lates of non-meaningful qualitative relations cannot be defined empir-
ically in terms of the primitives of the empirical structure. Thus, the
correlates of non-meaningful relations are non-empirical with respect
to the primitives. These results can also be used to show that there
exist qualitative correlates of meaningful quantitative relations that are
necessarilynon-empirical. The conclusion to be drawn from thisis that
theRTM conceptof meaningfulnessgives a necessary but not sufficient
condition for empirical significance. It should be remarked that most
of the applications of the meaningfulness concept, such as dimensional
analysis (Bridgman, 1922, 1931; Luce, 1971, 1978), use it only as a
necessary condition for empirical significance, i.e.,use itas acondition
for eliminating from consideration non-meaningfulrelationships.
230 R. DUNCANLUCE AND LOUIS NARENS
It may well be the case that the solutions to Problems 1 and 5 are
.
intimately connected.
prove directly that minN < 2 (Luce and Narens, 1985). Little is
known in general about the automorphism groups in this case, except,
as was noted above, when the operation is also positive, solvable, and
Archimedean, one can prove, without assuming homogeneity, that the
automorphism group is Archimedean ordered. We do not know of
comparable results in the remaining homogeneous case in which the
operation is necessarily idempotent.12 In particular, we do not know
of conditions that result in the translations forming an Archimedean
ordered group.
more restricted tack, but one that seems highly relevant to some mea-
surement applications. He defined a point in a structure to be singular
if it remains fixed (or invariant) under every automorphism of the struc-
ture. The concept ofa translationis generalizedtobe either the identity
or any automorphism whose only fixed points are singular ones. Clearly,
if the structure is finitely unique, then ithas only finitely many singular
points and soitis meaningful to speak of such astructure as being trans-
lational homogeneousbetween adjacent singularpoints. For a class of
structures that he calls generalizedconcatenation structures whichhave
a monotonic 13 n-ary operation,he gave a fairly complete description of
the possibilities when the structure isboth finitely unique andtranslation
homogeneous between adjacent singular points. What makes matters
simple is that such structures can have at most three singular points:
a maximum, a minimum, and an interior one. An example of such a
structure is the multiplicative, positive real numbers augmented by 0
and oo with translations x— ► xr, where r> 0. The singular points are
the two extremeones, 0 and 00, andone interior one,1 .
If, in addition, the group of translations commute,14 thenan interior
singular point, call it c, acts like a generalized zero15 in the follow-
... ...
ing sense: if F denotes the operation, then F(e, ,c, Xi, c, ,c) ==
6i(xi), where oneither sideof c the function 6i agrees with a translation
of the structure. Moreover, if any singular point is a generalized zero,
then any other singular point, c', acts like an infinity in the sense that
.
if c' is an argument of the function, then the value of Fis c! Finally,
for structures on a continuum, Alper's results can be used to derive a
numerical representation in which translations on each side of the inte-
rior singularity are multiplication by a constant, the two constantsbeing
simply related by a power relation. As we shall seein Section 6.3, these
and relatedresults have been applied effectively in devising a theory of
certainty equivalents for gambles (Luce, 1992b).
PROBLEM 11. What structures are there that are usefulfor applied
measurement, beyond those based on a general operation, for which
homogeneity fails at selected points? And what structures, although
failing homogeneity more globally, still have a fairly rich automor-
phism group, such as x— > k nx, where k>o is a fixed constant and n
rangesover the integers?
REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OFMEASUREMENT 237
Important non-homogeneous structures lie outside this framework.
The most notable examples are qualitative probability structures. They
are non-homogeneous not only because of their extreme points the
-
-
null anduniversal events butbecause two events that are qualitatively
equally probable need not exhibit the same relational patterns to other
events. Also, the only automorphisms of such a structure are ones, like
the identity, that take an event into an equallyprobable one. Obviously,
the previous tacks we have taken in structures that are more or less
homogeneous are completely useless in such contexts. Yet, clearly the
probability case exhibits a great deal of regularity.
PROBLEM 15. Given that we gain some results about structures with
variousforms of non-homogeneity (see Problems11 and12) including
ones withinterior singularpoints, are there applications that up to now
have been overlookedbecausepreviously we didnot know how to deal
with suchsituations?
REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF MEASUREMENT 241
7. CONCLUSIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
NOTES
1Krantz,Luce, Suppes,
and Tversky (1971) willbereferred to as FMI;Suppes,Krantz,
Luce, and Tversky (1989) as FM2; and Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and Tversky (1990) as
FM3.
2
Some of the subtletiesinvolved in formulating uniqueness results are dealt withby
Roberts andFranke (1976).
3
A conjoint structure is a weakorderingof a Cartesianproduct;it is additiveif it admits
an additiverepresentationover its components.
242 R. DUNCAN LUCE AND LOUIS NARENS
4
Archimedeaness simply means that any bounded standard sequence is finite. Put
another way, no positive element is infinitesimal relative to another element of the
structure. In practice, the impact of Archimedeanessis to permit homomorphisms into
the realnumbers rather than ordered extensions of the realnumbers such as the non-
standard reals.
5 Among
the positiveuses weinclude the testingof mathematically formulatedtheories
relating several variables,although we recognize that othersmay not want to takesuch
a consideration into account in finding a solution to this problem. Subjective expected
utility,mentionedlater,is one example;three more are given inSection6.
6 The primary exceptions are purely ordinal cases including variants such as interval
ordersand semiorders.
7 See Heyer and
Mausfeld (1987) for a discussion of some conceptual problems con-
nected withBoolean-valued approaches.
8 A structure is Dedekind complete if every subset of elements thatis bounded from
above has a least upperbound in the domain. A structure that can be embeddedin a
Dedekind complete one of the same algebraic formis said to have a Dedekindcomple-
tion.
9
For automorphismsa,(3, a <' (3 if andonlyifforeveryelement x of X, a(x) P(x).
<
10
Forany two translationsone of whichis greater than the identity, finitely many appli-
cationsof the positive one willexceedthe other.
11
If x < y, there exists z in X such that x < z < y.
12
Homogeneityimplies, for allelements x, either weak positivity, x o x > x, idem-
potence, x o x
~ x, or weak negativity, x o x < x. The first and third are formally
identical if > is replacedby <.
13 The definitionofmonotonicis theusualoneexcept that somecareis neededindealing
with extreme points,if such exist.
14
This is true if theycan berepresentedin the multiplicativerealnumbers. The assump-
tionmay be redundant,butLuce failed to deriveit fromthe other assumptions.
15
—
The term 'zero'is appropriatewhen one thinks of homomorphisms to the realnum-
bers where0 is the interior singularpointand thetranslations are x » rx.
16
Let C = (A x X, >) be the conjoint structure withA a relational structure on A
whoseorder is thatinduced fromC. For fixed x, y € X, let a be the functiondefined
by allsolutions to (a,x) ~ (a(a),y). Then, A distributes in C if every such a is an
automorphism of A.
17 This is closely related to the prospect theory of Kahneman andTversky (1979) and to
such extensionsof it as Luce andFishburn (1991) and Tversky andKahneman(1992).
REFERENCES
Adams, E.: 1966, 'On the Nature andPurposeofMeasurement', Synthese, 16, 125-169.
Alper, T.M.: 1987, 'A Classificationof All Order-Preserving HomeomorphismGroups
of the RealsThat Satisfy Finite Uniqueness',JournalofMathematicalPsychology,
31, 135-154.
Bridgman, P.: 1922, 1931, Dimensional Analysis, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OFMEASUREMENT 243
Cameron, P.J.: 1989, 'Groups ofOrder-Automorphisms oftheßationals withPrescribed
Scale Type', Journalof MathematicalPsychology, 33, 163-171.
Campbell, N. R.: 1920/1957, Physics: The Elements, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. Reprinted as Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and
Experiment, New York: Dover, 1957.
Campbell, N. R.: 1928, AnAccount of the Principles ofMeasurementand Calculation,
London: Longmans, Green.
Cohen, M.andFalmagne,J.-C: 1990, 'RandomUtilityRepresentationofBinary Choice
Probabilities: A NewClass of Conditions', Journal ofMathematicalPsychology,
34, 88-94.
Cohen, M. and Narens, L.: 1979, 'FundamentalUnit Structures: A Theory of Ratio
Scalability', Journal ofMathematicalPsychology, 20, 193-232.
Cohen, M.R. and Nagel,E.: 1934, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,
New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Droste, M.: 1987, 'Ordinal Scales in the Theory of Measurement', Journal ofMathe-
maticalPsychology, 31, 60-81.
Ellis, B.: 1966, Basic Concepts of Measurements, London: Cambridge University
Press.
Falmagne,J.-C: 1979, 'On a Class of ProbabilisticConjoint Measurement Models:
Some Diagnostic Properties',JournalofMathematicalPsychology, 19, 73-88.
Falmagne,J.-C: 1980, 'AProbabilisticTheory ofExtensiveMeasurement', Philosophy
of Science, 47, 277-296.
Falmagne,J.-C.andIverson,G: 1979, 'Conjoint WeberLawsand Additivity',Journal
ofMathematicalPsychology, 86, 25^43.
Helmholtz,H. yon: 1868, 'Über die Thatsachen, dieder Geometriczu Grunde liegen',
GottingenNachrichten, 9, 193-221.
Helmholtz, H. yon: 1887, 'Zahlen und Messen erkenntnis-theoretisch betrachtet',
Philosophische Aufsatze EdwardSeller gewidmet, Leipzig.Reprinted in Gesam-
melte Abhandl, Vol. 3, 1895, pp. 356-391. English translation by C. L. Bryan:
1930, Counting and Measuring, Princeton,NJ: VanNostrand.
Heyer, D. andMausfeld,R.: 1987, 'On Errors, ProbabilisticMeasurement andBoolean
ValuedLogic', Methodika,1, 113-138.
Heyer, D. and Niederee, R.: 1989, 'Elements of a Model-TheoreticFramework for
ProbabilisticMeasurement', in: E.E.Roskam (Ed.), MathematicalPsychology in
Progress, Berlin: Springer, pp. 99-112.
Heyer, D. and Niederee, R.: 1992, 'Generalizingthe Concept of Binary Choice Sys-
tems Induced byRankings: One Way of ProbabilizingDeterministicMeasurement
Structures', MathematicalSocial Sciences, 23, 31-44.
Hilbert, D.: 1899, Grundlagen derGeometric(Bth cd., with revisions and supplements
by P. Bernays, 1956), Stuttgart: Teubner.
Holder, O.: 1901, 'Die Axiomeder Quantitat und dieLehre vomMass',Berichte über
die Verhandlungen der Koniglich Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
Leipzig, Mathematisch-Physische Klasse,53, 1-64.
Holman,E.: 1971, 'A Note on AdditiveConjoint Measurement', JournalofMathemat-
icalPsychology, 8, 489-494.
Iverson,G. and Falmagne, J.-C: 1985, 'StatisticalIssues inMeasurement',Mathemat-
icalSocial Sciences, 10, 131-153.
244 R.DUNCAN LUCE AND LOUIS NARENS
Luce and Narens givea substantiallist of problems that are central to the
representationaltheory of measurement, a topic on whichDuncan and I
have worked together with other colleagues for more than a quarter of a
century. Duncan andLouis bring out nicely the range of philosophical
and scientific problems still to be faced in the theory of measurement.
Unfortunately, most of these problems as well as the ones that have
been solved in the past have not attracted the interest of philosophers
of science in the way one might have thought they would. Ithas turned
out that in spite of the philosophical roots of much of the work in the
theory of measurement, the current developmentshave mainly beendue
to scientists and mathematicians.
The problems of measurementin thebehavioral and social sciences
present foundational and conceptual issues of considerable subtlety
which now have a large literature, especially those surrounding the
measurementof subjective probability and utility. Without question the
problems formulated by Luce andNarens alldeserve attention, although
of course some are of more generalinterest than others. It isareflection
of the generalnature of the theory of measurement that my own list of
problems would overlap but still be rather different from that presented
by them. Sayingsomething about my own list is notmeant to be a crit-
icism of theirs, but is a way of emphasizing the range of philosophical
issues still open in the theory of measurement. The two large topics that
I would organize problems around and that are not directly mentioned
by Luce and Narens are geometricalproblems of measurement - what
are alsocalled multidimensional scalingproblems -and secondly,com-
putationproblems.
1. INTRODUCTION
251
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 251-274.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
252 FRED S. ROBERTS AND ZANGWILL SAMUEL ROSENBAUM
—
We shall sometimes interchange the terms scale and homomorphism.
We shall also speak of the representation (A,R) ► (B,S) and the
problem of finding a homomorphism from (A,R) into (B,S) as the
—
representationproblem. Anadmissible transformation of / isa function
<p : f(A) ► B so that cp o f is again a homomorphism. A statement
involving scales of measurement is called meaningful if its truth or
falsity is unchanged if admissible transformations are applied to all
of the scales or homomorphisms in the statement. This concept goes
back to Suppes (1959) and to Suppes and Zinnes (1963). In some
cases of relations (A,R) and (B,S), not every homomorphism from
(A,R) to (jB,S) can beobtainedfrom every other homomorphismby an
admissible transformation. In this case, Roberts andFranke (1976) call
the representation problem (A,R) into (B,S) irregular and introduce
the following more general concept: a statement involving scales of
measurement is called meaningful if its truth or falsity is unchanged
if all of the scales or homomorphisms in the statement are replaced
by other scales or homomorphisms. This definition is reasonably well
accepted, at least as a necessary condition for 'meaningfulness',and we
shall adopt it here. However, thereare special situations whereit might
not be appropriate. See Falmagne and Narens (1983) for a discussion
and see Roberts (1985, 1989, 1994) and Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and
Tversky (1990) for surveys and general results about the concept of
meaningfulness.
Suppose / is a homomorphism from (A,R) into (E, S), where E
is the set of real numbers. Many assertions can be made using the
scale /. We shall be specifically interested in the simple assertion that
f(a) > f(b). When is it meaningful? We say that / is of ordinal scale
type if the representation (A,R) into (E,S) is regular (not irregular)
THEMEANINGFULNESS OFORDINAL COMPARISONS 253
and the collection of admissible transformations of / is exactly the
collection of order preservingmaps from f(A) into E, transformations
(p so that
X\
> X2 ip(xi) > <p(x2).
<-►
s=7vlur,r2 u...ur7rp
254 FRED S. ROBERTS AND ZANGWILL SAMUEL ROSENBAUM
...,
for rankings tt\,7r2, ir
p .
of M,for some p > 1 We will let 11(5) =
n = {7ri,...,7TP}. If all 7r G n happen to be strict rankings, we will
say that S is a strict generalorderrelation or SGOR.For example, with
m = 2, some common binary relations on the reals qualify as GORs.
For instance, Tj)2 is >, T2)i is <, Ti_ 2 is =,ThU Ti_ 2 is >, Th
2 2U T2)l
is Ti_ 2 U T2)i is <. Of these, >,<, and are SGORs. With'm =3,
UT3)2 i yields theusual 'betweenness' relation onthereals. Thus,
many of therelations of interest in measurement theory arise as GORs.
The GORs arose from the concept of m-point homogeneity which
plays a central role in the theory of scale type and meaningfulness. A
relation S onE is called m-point homogeneousif whene-ver
. ...
LEMMA 1 Suppose ir is a ranking of { 1,2, ,m], fis a function
from A into E, |/(A)| > ht(7r) > 2, and a,b are elements of —A with
...
f(a) f(b). Then there are a\% ,am in A with as =a,at b for
...
some 5, t € {1, ,m} such that
\{au ...,am}\ =ht(7r)
and
(/(a1 ),...,/(am))GT7r .
Proof Assume without loss of generality that f(a) > f(b). There
are b u ..., b ht{n) so that (*) /(&i) > ... > f(b ht{7r)). If /(a) is
any f(bi), replace bi by a. If not, let ibe the largest index such that
f{bi) > f(a) or, if there is no such index,let ibe 1. Replace bi by a.
We still have (*). Similarly, we can replace some bj by b and preserve
(*). A complication arises if bj is a. Then replace bj+\ by b, unless
j = ht(ir). In that case, drop b\, lower every index by one and let
b = b ht^y Again, (*) holds. Lastly, permute the bi appropriately and,
at components where 7r declares a tie, throw in a repeat of the corre-
sponding f(bj). This defines a\, ...,a m with the desired properties. ■
(2) \{a1,...,am }\ = k
...
and (h(a\), ,h(am)) G5. Since /iis a homomorphism, this implies
that (ai,...,am) G i?, which, because gis a homomorphism, in
...
turn implies that (g(a\), ,g(am)) GS. By definition of k, G =
...
{g(ai), ,g(am)} has cardinality at least k. However, by (2), it has
cardinality at most k. Hence, it has cardinality k and, in particular,
g{a) 7^ g{b). This is a contradiction.
Case 2. c G n. The proof proceeds much as in Case 1,but now
we let k = min{ht(7r) : it G" n}. Note that k exists because IIdoes
...
not contain all possible rankings of M. Otherwise, for any a\, ,am
...
in A, we would have (h(ai), ,h(am )) G S, which would in turn
imply that (ai,...,am ) GR. This would contradict our assump-
tion that R/ Am (since (^4, R) is nontrivial). Since we are assum-
ing that c G n, we know that k > 2. It is important to note that
\h(A)\ > k. Otherwise, for any ai,...,am GA, we would have
... ...
(/i(ai), ,/i(am)) G5,so (ai, ,am) G#, and we wouldbe forced
to conclude that R = A
m
.
Because \h(A)\ >k> 2, Lemma 1
implies that there are a\, ...
,am in A with as = a, at = bso that
...
(2) holds and (h(ai), ,h(am )) 0 5. Since h is a homomorphism,
...
this implies that [a\, ,am) G" J? and so, since pis a homomorphism,
...
(p(ai), ,g(am)) &S. Since everym-tuple onEis insome T^ on M,
...
by definition of k, G = {<?(ai), ,j(am)} has cardinality at least k.
However, by (2), it has cardinality at most k. Hence, it has cardinality
k and, in particular, g(a) g(b). This is again a contradiction. ■
—
LEMMA 2. Suppose f : (A,R) > (E, 5) isanonsingularm-ary GOR
homomorphism. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) /(a) > /(&) w meaningless for some a, 6 G A.
—
(b) 77z£re w a homomorphism g : (A,i?) > (E, S) and there are
...
a\ , ,am G A such that
.
a= ar and b = as Part (a) follows.
—
THEOREM3. Suppose f : (A,R) ► (E,S) is a nonsingular m-ary
GOR homomorphism and \U\ =1. Then f(a) > f(b) is meaningfulfor
all a, b G A.
Proof. Since n contains only a single ranking, it cannot contain
co-rankings. ■
—
THEOREM 4. Suppose f : (A,R) * (E,S) is a nonsingular m-ary
GOR homomorphism andno two distinct iri and ttj in Hhave the same
signature. Then f(a) > f(b) is meaningfulfor all a,b G A.
Proof By Lemma 3, there areno co-rankings. Hence, theconclusion
follows by Lemma 2. ■
THE MEANINGFULNESS OFORDINAL COMPARISONS 261
Lemma 3 can actually be used to yield an even stronger result. We
begin by partitioning n according to signature. Let n be partitioned
into disjoint, nonempty sets Hi,...,n„ where all 7Tj, itj G Ilk have the
same signature and whenever tt, and -Kj have the same signature, they
...
are in the same n^. For all iG {1, ,n}, let
Sz = U{2V : 7T G Ui}.
For example,suppose that
(8) S — Ti,2-4,3-5 U25,2,1-3-4 U22,5,1-3-4 UT2_4,3_5,i
U 22_5,i,3,4 U T2_5,i,4,3 U 22-5,3,4,1
= T^UT„
2 UT^U2V4 U2V5 U2V6 U2V7
.
Then there are three different signatures here, a partition of n is
lii= {7Ti,7r4 }, n2 = {7r2,7r3 }, n3 = {7r5,7r 6,7r 7},
and
(9) S\ = 21,2-4,3-5 U 22-4,3-5,1 >
(10) 52 = 25,2,1-3-4 U 22,5,1-3-4 >
(11) 53 = 22_5,1,3,4 U T2-5,1,4,3 U T2_5,3,4,l .
The partition of n together with the homomorphism / induces a
...
correspondingpartition {R{, ,R^} of R, where
—
(a) Ifg : {A, R) * (E,5) is another homomorphism, then g is also
a homomorphism from (A, ) into (E, Si ) for alii G { 1, ,n}
RJ ...
and, moreover, R^ — Rf.
...
(b) Suppose there is j G {1, ,n} so that whenever h\, h2 are
homomorphisms from {A,R?) into (E, Sj), thenfor all a,b G A,
5. REDUCTION TO SGORs
— ...
(E, S) and since {a\, , am) G 22, we have (/(ai), ,/(am)) G S
~ ...
and so f{ai) f{af) whenever i j. By part (a), / is a homomor-
phism from (A, 22*) into (E, S* ). Applying Theorem Ito / and g, we
~
conclude that g(ai) = g{aj) whenever i /, as needed. (To apply
Theorem 1, we need to show that R* / 0 and 22* .
Aq The former
follows since 22 / 0. To see the latter, note that since q > 1, there is an
~
iso that 1 idoes not hold. Pick ias small as possible. Then {a\, , ...
...
am) G22 implies a\ ai and so (ai,ai, ,a\) is not in 22*.)
Tocomplete theproof of part (b),suppose that {g{a\),...,g(am)) G
...
S. Then (g(cn), ..., g(am))* GS* and so (a\ , ,am)* G 22* since g
is a homomorphism from (A,22*) into (E, S* ). Since {a\ , ,am )* G ...
... ...
22*, there is {bu ,6m) G22 such that (&i, ,bm)* = (ai,... ,am)*.
...
Note that (/(&i), ,f(bm)) G S since / is a homomorphism from
(A, 22) into (E,S). We next show that
(20) (/(&i),...,/(6m )) = (/(ai),...,/(am)).
To see why,note that since (bi, ...,b m )* = (ai, ...,am )*, we have
(21) (/(61);...,/(6m)r = (/(0,),...,/(om))*.
Also,
...
Tosee why (25) holds,let (yu ,ym)= {xa-i{l),..., (m) ). We
wish to show the following: for all k,
(26) vis kthin 7Ti and x v is fcth highest among x\, ...,x m
holds. Note that o~j = Oji. Suppose that (26) holds. Thus, 7Ti(A;) =
v. Suppose v = 7Tj(k). Then cr~j l(v) = crji('u) = Oji(7Tj(k)) =
7Ti(7r~ (7Tj(A;))) = 7Ti(A;) = v, y v is x v and is kth highest among
=
2/b " "" > 2/mI (27) follows. Conversely,suppose (27) and suppose v
l
TTi(k). Then, again as above, cr~j iv) =v,and so y v is xv and xv is kth
...
highest among x\, ,xm\ (26) follows. Hence, wehave (25).
Itis straightforward to seethat ifaisa permutation of { 1, ,m] and...
for some (x v ...,xm) G T^, wehave (vi(i)v,V(m)i € 2V,-,
then cr must be cty.
The next few results demonstrate the importance of the &ij and the
Sj in the analysis of SGORs.
—
LEMMA 4. Iff: (A,R) »" (E,S) isan m-ary SGOR homomorphism,
...
7Ti w m 11/ S, a«J (f{a\), ,f(am)) G T^, ?/ze«
or
a G Si <-► (a -i(!),...,a -i( )) G 22.
a CT m
Proof. If a G £j, then there is j G {1,... ,p} such that 7Tj GII for
S and cr= c^-. But then, by (25),
(/(aa-i(l))'--''/( a^-i(m)))
,/(^-'(m)))
Hence, (/(ao-i(i)), "" " an^ since / is a homomor-
phism, (aa-i(1) ... aa-ifm)) G 22.
, ,
...
Conversely,if cr 0 Ei, then for all j G {1, ,p},by theobservation
right after the verification of (25), we must have
021 is given by
0-21(1) =3, (7
2l(2) =l, (7
2i(3) =2.
270 FRED S. ROBERTS AND ZANGWILL SAMUELROSENBAUM
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
/ : (A, 22) —♥ (E, S). We have given necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for meaningfulness in many situations, though in a few situations
wehave just given sufficient conditions.
Tosummarize the situation,Theorem 2 settlesall the situations where
/ a singular homomorphism. Theorem 4 settles all the situations
is
where / is nonsingular and all the 7Ti have different signatures.
In Theorem 5 (Corollary 5.1), we consider the case of / with some
signatures allowed to be the same and partition n into sets of rankings
of the same signature and, correspondingly, let Sj be the union of TlTi
for the rankings 7Ti of the jth signature. We study meaningfulness
of ordinal comparisons for homomorphisms into (E, Sj ) and note that
meaningfulness in one of these cases implies meaningfulness for the
whole case. However, the converse of this statement is false, and
exactly how to handle the situation when meaningfulness fails in all of
the homomorphisms into (E, Sj ) is still an open question. The question
of determining meaningfulness in each suchcase (E, Sj ), i.e., where all
the rankings in S = Sj have the same signature, is handled by reducing
to SGORs.
Theorem 6 gives a reduction to the SGOR situation. Theorem 7
gives a sufficient condition for meaningfulness if the homomorphism
is into an SGOR. However, the converse of this Theorem is false. We
are left with the problem of handling meaningfulness if there is no ifor
which Si Sj for all j i.
As we have noted, the m-ary GORs correspond to m-point homoge-
neous m-ary relations. The theory of the meaningfulness of the ordinal
comparisons /(a) > fib) remains to be systematically developed for
homomorphisms into other kinds of relations or relational systems.
Some special cases of interest with which to start wouldbe homomor-
phisms into m-point homogeneous n-ary relations where m n; and
...
homomorphisms into relational systems (E, 5i, ,S&) where each Si
is an rrii-ary GOR.
DEDICATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Fred S. Roberts,
DepartmentofMathematics andCenter for Operations Research,
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick,NJ 08903, U.S.A.
Zangwill Samuel Rosenbaum,
Department ofMathematics and Computer Science,
Wilkes University,
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18766, U.S.A.
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Falmagne, J.-C. and Narens, L.: 1983, 'Scales and Meaningfulness of Quantitative
Laws', Synthese, 55, 287-325.
Harvey, L. H. and Roberts,F. S.: 1989, 'On the Theory of Meaningfulness of Ordinal
Comparisons inMeasurement ll',Annals N.Y. Acad ofSci., 555, 220-229.
Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P, and Tversky, A.: 1971, Foundations ofMea-
surement, Vol. I,New York: AcademicPress.
Luce, R. D., Krantz,D. H., Suppes, P., and Tversky, A.: 1990, Foundations of Mea-
surement, Vol. 111, New York: AcademicPress.
Luce,R. D. and Narens, L.: 1986, 'Measurement: The Theory of Numerical Assign-
ments', Psychol. Bull.,99, 166-180.
Luce, R. D. and Narens, L.: 1987, 'MeasurementScales on the Continuum', Science
236, 1527-1532.
Roberts,F S.: 1979, Measurement Theory, withApplications toDecisionmaking, Utility,
and theSocial Sciences, Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.
Roberts, F. S.: 1984, 'On the Theory of Meaningfulness of Ordinal Comparisons in
Measurement', Measurement, 2, 35-38.
Roberts,F S.: 1985, 'Applicationsof the Theory of Meaningfulness to Psychology', J.
Math. Psychol., 29, 311-332.
Roberts, F S.: 1989, 'Meaningless Statements, MatchingExperiments, and Colored
Digraphs (Applicationsof GraphTheory andCombinatorics to the Theory of Mea-
surement), in: F S. Roberts (Ed.), Applications of Combinatorics and Graph
Theory in the Biological andSocial Sciences, IMA Volumes inMathematics and
Its Applications, Vol. 17, New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 277-294.
THE MEANINGFULNESS OFORDINAL COMPARISONS 273
Roberts, F S.: 1994, 'Limitationson Conclusions Using Scales of Measurement', in:
A. Barnett, S. M. Pollock, andM.H. Rothkopf (Eds.), Operations Researchand
Public Systems, Amsterdam: Elsevier,pp. 621-671, inpress.
Roberts,F. S. and Franke, C. H.: 1976, 'On theTheory ofUniquenessin Measurement',
J. Math. Psychol., 14, 211-218.
Scott,D. and Suppes,P.: 1958, 'FoundationalAspects ofTheories of Measurement', J.
SymbolicLogic, 23, 113-128.
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REFERENCES
ABSTRACT. The firstpart ofthis essay deals with the generalproblem of identifying
empiricaltheories; an identity criterionfor theories as nets ofmodelclassesis proposed
whichmaybe seenas an expansionof Suppesianideas onthisissue. In the secondpart,
the criterionproposed is applied to the particular case of combinatorialmeasurement
theory. This theory is represented as a tree-like net of eighteen so-called model-
elements. Some of them are only implicitly (or not at all) containedin the literature
on measurement, especially in Foundations of Measurement. The corresponding set-
theoretical predicates are precisely defined for each case and some new results are
proven. A particular innovationof the presentreconstructionof measurement theory is
the systematic treatment ofso-callednull and limit elements.
275
P. Humphreys (cd.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. 2, 275-299.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
276 C. ULISES MOULINES AND JOSEA. DIEZ
o o o
o o o o
o o o o
Fie8.1.
means that the class of structures Mi[T] satisfying any of these special
laws fulfils the condition: Mi[T] C Mo[T]. The specializations may
go in different directions,i.e. they may be branched out. Therefore, a
theory's identity is not just givenby the class of structures determined
by thebasic axiomsbut by an open array ofclasses and subclasses. The
picture of the structure of a theory T we get accordingly is that of a
ramified tree with a basic common element - for example, something
-
of the sort shown in Figure 1 where Mj C Mfj for all i, j,and the
superindex indicates thelevel of specialization, so that, for any i> 1,
~
and for any j, there is a ft such that iMj C Mkl l).
Now the assertion that any theory can be brought into this form is a
theoretical claim about theoretical science, or if you wish,a metatheo-
retical claim. Such a claim, as in any other theoretical endeavour,has
to be not only made as precise as possible but also checked against the
empirical data. Now, the data here is somewhat different from what
we usually think of when we speak about the empirical data of a the-
ory. It does not consist of natural items like particles, gases, genes or
mental states; itrather consists ofcultural products, namely the theories
themselves that deal with particles, gases, and so on. These prod-
ucts are typically found in standard scientific literature like textbooks,
encyclopedias, and so forth. Leaving this ontological difference aside,
280 C. ULISESMOULINES AND JOSE A. DIEZ
~
THEOREM 2. (1) N(a) & a b -> N(b)
~
(2) L(a) & a b -> L(b)
(3) Nia) & Nib) -* a b
~
(4) L(a) & Lib) -» a b
~
~
Proof. (1) Assume Nia) and a b. Then,by Definition l-(4), for
~ ~ ~
any c, a o c b o c. Since Nia), a o c c. Thus, for any c, c 6 o c.
Therefore, N(b). The proof of (2) is entirely analogous. (3) From
~ ~
Nia) it follows that a o b b and from Af (6) it follows that a o b a.
~
Therefore a b. Similarly for (4).
THEOREM4. N(a) -* (ao& £ aoc *-* b y c) & (fcoa y coa <-► b y c).
Proof. Assuming Nia), we get 6~ao6^aoc~c, i.e. by
Definition l-(2), 6 >3 c. Similarly for the rest of the theorem.
Wenow introduce the first specialization of TCM which is, in turn, the
basic model-element of one of the two main 'branches' of the combi-
natorial 'tree.
EXTERNALCOMBINATORIAL METRICS
DEFINITION 3. EC{x) iff there are D, fc, o such that x = {D, fc, o)
and Cix) and
(1) a o b £ a, b V a, 6 £ a o b
~
(2) a o 6 a -* £(a) V JV(6)
one, which historically was the first one to be studied and which has
found very wide application in physics.
LINEAR COMBINATORIALMETRICS
DEFINITION 4. LECix) iff there are D, y,o such that x = {D, fc, o)
and ECix) and
(1) Va, b(a o b y a, b) V Va, 6(a,b fc a o b)
(2) (a) iayb*-+ao C yboc)
(b) ->L(c) a ycob)
The most important specialization on this branch of the tree are the
extensive metrics, i.e. combinatorial metrics with additive represen-
tation. They are those metrics everybody thinks of when considering
positive linear combinatorial measurement, though they are possibly
not the only specialization of this kind relevant for empirical science.
In order to get this important specialization with the correspondingrep-
resentation theorem, we need to add the requirements of commutativity,
associativity, and archimedianity to the conditions already set forth.
EXTENSIVEPOSITIVELINEARCOMBINATORIAL METRICS
DEFINITION 6. EPLECix) iff there are £>, £, ° such that x = {D, fc,
o) and PLECix) and
MEASUREMENTTHEORY AS A THEORYNET 287
~
(1) a o b b o a1
~
(2) (a o b) o c a o (6 o c)
(3) Any sequence (a;);eN of combinable objects for which it is true
that: ->N(ai) & Va^i >2-*a{ = a<_i o aj) & 36(-iL(6) &
Vai(6 >- Oi)), is finite.
NEGATIVE METRICS
that:
-
(3) Any sequence (a2 )ieN of combinable objects for which it is true
&Vai{i > 2 -» a{ a;_i o ai) & 36(^L(6) &
Maiiai y b)),is finite.
Now, extensivity in the case of negative metrics doesnot entail additivity
in the numerical representation on the positive real numbers. The
representation theorem we get in this case is rather different. To state
it, let us first introduce a numerical operation, call it '*', such that, for
any r,s G [0, oo]:
(a) r *s = -£&, if r,s G E+
(b) r * 5 = r,if s = oo
(c) r * s = s, if r = oo
(d) r * 5 = 0, if r = 0 or 5 = 0
The representation theorem thenruns as follows
Proof (sketch). The first thing to notice is therather trivial fact that,
if (D, y,o) isa negative metric, then (D, o) (where is theconverse
of y) is a positive one. This entails,in turn, that (by Theorem 5) there
willbe a homomorphism from (£>, ;<, °) into ([O, oo], > +). Then, take
the isomorphism
F:([o,oo],>,+)^<[o,oo],<,*)
as defined by the condition:
Fir) = 1/r.
Itis easily seen that the functional composition / o Fis itself a homo-
morphism from (D, o) into ([O, oo], <, *), which,in turn, entails that
itis also a homomorphism from (D, y,o) into ([O, oo], >, *).
The composition / oFis thus a homomorphism from {D,£,o) into
([O, oo], <, *), whichis equivalent to saying that itis itself a homomor-
phism from (D, y,o) into ([O, oo], >, *).
CYCLIC METRICS
Thereare two kinds of cyclic metrics: inferior and superior ones. The
former {ECEC) are characterized by the fact that null objects are those
that correspond to no cycle at all (minimal objects), whereas, in the
latter (SCEC), the null objectscorrespond to acomplete cycle (maximal
objects). Correspondingly, we shall have two different set-theoretical
predicates:
MEASUREMENTTHEORY AS A THEORY NET 291
DEFINITION10. ICECix) iff thereare D, y, o such that z = (£>,£ o)
and CECix) and
o^6+-+aoc^6octcVc)-aocHocV6oc^c>-aoc.
r\j r\j r^*j rsj rsj
.
DEFINITION11 SCECix) iff thereare D, y,o suchthat x = (Z>, £, o)
and CEC{x) and
a^&^aocHoc^cVc^aocHocV&oc^c^aoc.
Ininferior cyclic metrics, nulls are minimal, while they are maximal in
superior cyclic metrics.
If we add therequirements of commutativity, associativity, andarchi-
medianity to the conditions of Definition 10, respectively Definition 11,
we get the extensive version of inferior cyclic metrics, respectively
superior cyclic metrics.
INTERNALMETRICS
DEFINITION 15. PlC{x) iff there are D, y,o such that x = (D, £, o)
and IC{x) and
(1) ayb<r->aocyboc
~
(2) (a o b) o {c o d) (a o c) o b o d)
since f{a) = f{b), we havek " f{a) + / " f{a) + m = f{a). Since this
—
is true for any a, it must be m = 0. Therefore {k + l l)-f{a) = 0, i.e.
k + l-\ =o,i.e. k = \-l. By (A), /(ao6) = (1 -/) -/(a) + /"/(&).
This is Theorem 9-(lb). Theorem 9-(2b) is immediate.
fin « M =
/( a ) + /W
/(a°o) 5 '
FPIC
BFPIC
Fig. 2.
CONCLUSION
C. Ulises Moulines,
Institutfur Philosophic, Logik
und Wissenschaftstheorie,
Munich, Germany
Jose A.Diez,
Departamento de Filosofia,
Universidadde Barcelona,
Tarragona, Spain
MEASUREMENT THEORY AS A THEORY NET 297
NOTES
1
We owe to Professor R. Duncan Luce some helpful remarks on a previous version of
this paper. They contributed to an improvedpresentation.
2 To
simplifythe formalization we agree that open formulae are to be interpreted as
universallyquantifiedover the domainof objects. We make explicituse oftheuniversal
quantifier only in somecases whereconfusion might arise.
3 ~
In (4a) (and correspondinglyin (4b)) we do not require that a o c b o c implies
a
~ 6. The reason is that the possible existenceof so-called 'limit objects' (see below)
would violate this requirement.
4
Fromnowon, we implicitly assume in each theorem that the domainof objects is the
domain of a modelof TCM.
5
For the sake of perspicuity, we have slightlysimplifiedthe followingdefinitions. A
thorough treatment ofthesenotions wouldrequire some formalcomplicationsbut this
wouldaddnothing essential to the argument.
6
When thispaper was already finished, Professor Luce kindly sent usa copy of a recent
research report of his, where he introduces the notions of 'infinite point' and 'zero
point', which are quite similar to our 'limits' and 'nulls' (see Luce, 1990, especially
p. 8).
7
Actually,it can be proved that commutativity follows from the rest of conditions of
EPLEC, under the assumption that o is closed. However, for the sake of perspicuity
and to allowfor an immediategeneralizationto thecase whereo isnot closed, we state
commutativity explicitly as a conditionforEPLEC.
REFERENCES
Krantz, D., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P., and Tversky, A.: 1971-1990, Foundations of
Measurement, Vol. 1(1971), Vol. 2 (1989), Vol. 3 (1990), San Diego: Academic
Press.
Luce, R. D.: 1990, 'GeneralizedConcatenationStructures That Are TranslationHomo-
geneous betweenSingular Points', MathematicalBehavioral Sciences, Technical
Report Series, Irvine: University of California.
Moulines, C. U. and Sneed, J. D.: 1979, 'Patrick Suppes' Philosophyof Physics', in:
R. J. Bogdan(Ed.), Patrick Suppes, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp.59-91.
Suppes, P.: 1970, Set-TheoreticalStructures in Science, Typescript, Stanford: Stanford
University.
Suppes,P.: 1979, 'Replies to Moulines and Sneed', in: R. J. Bogdan (Ed.), Patrick
Suppes, Dordrecht: D. Reidel,pp. 207-211.
Ican hardly disagree with the general things that Moulines and Diez
say at the beginning of their essay about my approach to the philosophy
298 C. ULISESMOULINES AND JOSE A. DIEZ
REFERENCE
301
302 NAMEINDEX
Heisenberg, W. 52, 56 Luce, R.D. 59, 95, 97, 190, 219-249, 251
Helmholtz, yon, H. 102,219, 220, 222, 243 252, 254, 272, 274,276, 297
Hempel, C.G. 198, 205,212
Heyer, D.227, 229, 241,243 Machtey, M. 172, 188, 190
Hilbert, D. 243 Malebranche53
Hiley, D. 21 Manders, K. 74, 95
Hirsch, M. 189 Margenau, H. 54
Holder, O. 102, 219, 222,223, 232, 243, 223 Marley, A.A.J. 241
Holman, E. 243 Maudlin,T. 19, 21
Horwich, P. 72,95 Mausfeld, R. 243
Howson, C. 213 Maxwell, J.C. 42, 48
Hughes, R.I.G. 20, 21 McClelland, J. 118
Hume, D.47 McKinsey, J.C. 213
Humphreys, P. 103 Metropolis,N. 111,117
Huygens, C.46,51,53, 55, 60 Michell, J. 226, 244
Minkowski 77
Inagaki, V 190 Moivre, de, A. 102, 121
Iverson, G. 243 Moler, N. 70, 95
Morgenstern, O. 219, 239, 245
Jones, J.P 190 Moulines, CU. 63, 65, 96, 144, 145, 212
275-299
Kahneman, D. 242, 244, 245 Mundici, D. 189
Kallen, G. 41,43 Mundy, B. 59-102
Kant, I. 27,47, 51,52 Murphy, G.M. 54
Kanter, J.J. 54
Keller, E. 117 Nagel, E. 220
Kelvin, Lord60 Narens, L. 190, 219-249, 252, 272
Kepler, J. 60 Naylor, T.H. 105, 117
Klein, F. 68, 244 Nelson, E. 19,21,25,28
Kobayashi, S. 162, 190 Neumann, yon,J., 7, 8, 12, 19, 22, 31 32.
Kochen, S. 19,21,32,38 39,118,219,239,245
Kolmogorov, A.N. 119 Newton, I. 41,46, 60, 120
Krantz, D. 59,95, 97, 190, 223, 244, 251, Niederee, R. 225,226, 227, 229, 241, 243
252, 254, 272, 274,276, 297 245
Krause, D. 189 Nomizu, K.190
Kreisel, G. 152, 190 Norton, J. 94, 95
Kuhn, T.S. 79, 95,143, 145
Kyburg, H.E., Jr. 224, 244 Parijs, van, P. 213
Pasch, M.102
Lagrange 45,60 Pauli, W. 41
Lakatos, I. 143, 145 Pearce, D.145
Laloe,F. 54 Pearle, P. 6, 21
Landau, L.D. 41,43 Peirce, C.S. 98, 131
Laplace 60, 61, 112, 121 Peres, A. 29, 32,35, 37,38, 39
Laudan, L. 143, 145 Pierce, M.212
Leibniz, yon, G.F.W. 53, 60 Pirani,FA. 91,95
Leighton, R.H. 54,55 Planck, M.53
Leverrier 138 Podolsky,B. 11,21,38
Lewis, A.A. 151, 190 Poincare, de, H. 191
Lie,S. 220, 244 Popper,K. 30, 39
Lifshitz, E.M.41,43 Posidonius, Stoic 46
Loewer, B. 3-28 Prosperi, G.M. 21
Longer,A. 21 Pythagoras 49
NAMEINDEX 303
305
306 SUBJECT INDEX
PART I:PROBABILITY
311
312 table of contentsTO VOLUME 1
PART II:PROBABILISTICCAUSALITY
313
314 TABLE OFCONTENTS TO VOLUME 3
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106. K. Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete. A Study on Problems of Man and World.
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