Reus-Smit Constitutional Structure of IR

Cambridge University Press
International Organization Foundation
The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental

Institutions
Author(s): Christian Reus-Smit
Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 555-589
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703499
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The ConstitutionalStructureof
InternationalSocietyand theNature
ofFundamentalInstitutions
Reus-Smit
Christian
Modemstateshaveconstructed a multiplicityof issue-specific regimesto facilitate

collectiveaction.Themajority oftheseinstitutions arespecific ofthedeeper
instances
practicesthatstructure
institutional modeminternational society,notablythefunda-
mentalinstitutionsofcontractualinternationallaw andmultilateralism. Twoobserva-
tionscanbe madeaboutfundamental First,theyare "generic"structural
institutions.
elementsofinternational societies.'Thatis, theirpracticetranscends changesin the
balanceofpowerandtheconfiguration ofinterests,eveniftheirdensity andefficacy
vary.Themodern practicesofcontractual internationallaw andmultilateralism inten-
sifiedafter1945,butpostwardevelopments builton institutionalprinciplesthatwere
firstendorsedby statesduringthenineteenth century and structuredinternational
relationslongbeforetheadventofAmericanhegemony. Second,fundamental insti-
tutionsdifferfromone societyofstatesto another. Whilethegovernance ofmodern
internationalsocietyrestson theinstitutions of contractual internationallaw and
multilateralism,no such institutions evolvedin ancientGreece.Instead,thecity-
statesdevelopeda sophisticated and successfulsystemof third-party arbitration to
orderedinterstate
facilitate relations.Thisinstitution,whichoperatedin theabsence
of a body of codifiedinterstate law, is best characterized as "authoritative tri-
lateralism."
Theimportance offundamental has longbeenacknowledged
institutions byinter-
nationalrelationsscholars.2Yet existingperspectives on internationalinstitutions
I wishto thankthefollowingpeoplefortheirthoughtful comments on earlierversionsof thisarticle:

RobynEckersley, JamesGoldgeier, AmyGurowitz,MichaelJanover, PeterKatzenstein, Audie Klotz,
MargaretNash,RichardPrice,HeatherRae, GillianRobinson,HenryShue,David Strang,Alexander
Wendt,members oftheMelbourneInternational RelationsTheoryGroup,seminarparticipants atCornell
and theanonymous
andYale Universities, at International
referees Organization. I also thankMargaret
Nashforherextensiveresearchassistance,andgratefullyacknowledgethefinancial support providedby
an SSRC-MacArthur FoundationFellowshipon Peace and Securityin a ChangingWorld,and by the
FacultyofArtsatMonashUniversity.
1. See Ruggie1993a,10; Bull 1979,68-73; andWight1977.
2. See Morgenthau1949,279; Bull 1977;Keohane1989,162-66;andYoung1986,120.
51, 4, Autumn1997,pp. 555-89

Organization
International
andtheMassachusetts
? 1997byThe 10 Foundation Institute
ofTechnology
556 International
Organization
havedifficulty accounting foreitherthegenericnatureofbasicinstitutional practices

orinstitutional differencesbetweensocietiesofstates.Neorealistsarguethatinstitu-
tionsreflect theprevailing distribution ofpowerandtheinterests ofdominant states.
Theseareambiguousindicators, however, ofbasic institutional forms;fundamental
institutionspersistdespiteshiftsin thebalanceofpower,andunderthesamestruc-
turalconditions, modernand ancientGreekstatesengagedin different institutional
practices.Neoliberalsclaimthatstatescreateinstitutions to reducethecontractual
uncertainty thatinhibitscooperation underanarchy, arguing thatthenatureandscope
of institutionalcooperation reflectthe strategic incentivesand constraints posedby
different
cooperation problems. a
Yet,becausestatescanchoosefrom range equally of
institutional
efficient solutions,neoliberalshave to introduce structural conditions,
suchas hegemony andbipolarity, to explainthebasic institutional practicesof par-
ticularhistoricalperiods.Like neorealism, thisapproachfailstoexplaininstitutional
forms thatendureshifts inthebalanceofpowerandis contradicted bytheemergence
ofdifferent fundamental institutionsundersimilarstructural conditions. Constructiv-
istsarguethatthefoundational principle ofsovereignty definesthesocialidentity of
the stateand,in turn,constitutes thebasic institutional practicesof international
society.Sovereignstatesare said to facecertainpracticalimperatives, of whichthe
stabilization ofterritorial
property rightsis paramount. The institution of multilater-
alism,theyclaim,evolvedto servethispurpose. While this line of reasoning is
suggestive, itfailstoexplaininstitutional differences betweensocietiesofsovereign
states.The ancientGreekcity-states also facedtheproblemof stabilizing territorial
property rights, yettheyinstituted a systemofarbitration, notmultilateralism.
Thisarticledrawson theinsights ofcommunicative actiontheory andtheinstitu-
tionalhistories ofdifferent societiesofstatestodevelopa newconstructivist account
offundamental institutions.Like otherconstructivists, I groundfundamental institu-
tionsin theunderlying normative foundations of internationalsociety.Constructiv-
istshaveso farfailedtorecognizethefullcomplexity ofthosefoundations, however,
attaching too muchexplanatory weightto theorganizing principleof sovereignty.
Sovereignty hasneverbeenan independent, value;ithas alwaysbeen
self-referential
in
embedded largercomplexes of constitutive metavalues that together structure in-
ternational societies.To facilitatesystematic comparisons acrosshistorical societies
ofstates,I conceptualize thesecomplexesas constitutional structures, ensemblesof
threedeepconstitutive values:a sharedbeliefaboutthemoralpurposeofcentralized
politicalorganization, an organizing principleof sovereignty, and a normof pure
procedural justice.The moralpurposeofthestaterepresents thecoreofthisnorma-
tivecomplexandprovidesthefoundations forboththeprinciple of sovereignty and
thenormof pureprocedural justice,thusdetermining standards of legitimate state-
hoodandrightful stateaction.Theprevailing normofpureprocedural justiceconsti-
tutesand constrains institutional designand action,leadingstatesto adoptcertain
basic institutionalpractices.Because societiesof statesdevelopdifferent constitu-
tionalstructures, theyevolve different fundamental institutions. The second halfof
Structure
Constitutional Society 557
ofInternational
thistheory
thearticleillustrates through a comparison ofancientGreekandmodem
practices.3
institutional
To fullyunderstand theinstitutionaldimensionof international politicswe must
addresstwointerrelated questions:Whydo statescreatecertainsortsofinstitutions,
andhowdo theseinstitutions affectstatebehavior? The first
questionconcernsform,
thesecondefficacy. Mostresearchon international institutionsconcentrates on the
latterquestion,withneoliberalsmarshaling a powerfulargument thatinternational
regimesmatter, and thatwithoutsuchinstitutions contemporary relationsbetween
stateswouldbe verydifferent.4 By comparison, thequestionofinstitutional formhas
receivedlittlesustained Thismeansthatthebasicinstitutional
attention.5 practicesof
internationalsocietieshave gone unexplained, and we have fewinsightsintothe
sourcesofinstitutionalinnovationandthelimitsofinstitutional adaptation inparticu-
larhistoricalcontexts.Beginning fromtheassumption thatinternational institutions
exertan important influenceon relationsbetweenstates,thisarticletakesup the
neglected form.Itseekstoexplainthenatureoffundamental
questionofinstitutional
andwhytheyvaryfromone societyofstatesto another.
institutions In theprocessit
clarifies
thenormative foundations ofinternationalsocieties,sovereignty, andlegiti-
matestatehood, anditemphasizestheculturalandhistorical contingency ofinstitu-
tionalrationality.
Defined
FundamentalInstitutions
Whenseekingto definefundamental institutions,thechallengeof achievingand

sustaining orderrepresents
international anappropriate point.FollowingHed-
starting
orderas "a pattern
leyBull,I defineinternational ofactivitythatsustainstheelemen-
taryorprimary goals ofthesocietyof states,or internationalsociety."6Bull identi-
thesanctity
fiesthesegoalsas security, ofagreements, andtheprotection ofterritorial
property order,statesfacetwobasic typesof
rights.In thepursuitof international
cooperation problems:problemsof collaboration, wheretheyhave to cooperateto
achievecommoninterests; andproblemsofcoordination, wherecollectiveactionis
neededtoavoidparticular outcomes.7To dealwiththeseproblems, societiesofstates
evolvefundamental institutions. in general,are commonlydefinedas
Institutions,
"persistentsetsof rules(formaland informal) thatprescribe behavioralroles,con-
andshapeexpectations."8
strainactivity, Fundamental are thoseelemen-
institutions
taryrulesofpracticethatstatesformulate to solvethecoordination and collabora-
tionproblemsassociatedwithcoexistenceunderanarchy.Fundamental institutions
3. Thisarticledrawson arguments andmaterialpresentedinmyforthcoming bookTheMoralPurpose

Action,tobe publishedbyPrinceton
and Institutional
oftheState:Social Identity Press.
University
4. See Krasner1983;Keohane1984,1989;andStein1990.
5. An exceptionis JohnGerardRuggie'srecentworkon multilateralism;Ruggie1993a,1996.
6. Bull 1977,8.
7. Stein1990,39-44.
8. Keohane1989,3.
Organization
558 International
are producedand reproduced practices,and themeaningof

by basic institutional
suchpracticesis definedby thefundamental rulestheyembody.9
institutional Be-
cause of thismutuallyconstitutive relationship,thetermsfundamental institution
andbasic institutionalpracticearefrequently usedinterchangeably, a practicemain-
tainedthroughout thisarticle.
Societiesofstatesusuallyexhibita variety ofbasicinstitutional practices.In mod-
erninternational societyscholarshaveidentified bilateralism, inter-
multilateralism,
nationallaw,diplomacy, and management by greatpowers.Similarlydiverselists
could be made of basic institutions in othersocietiesof states,includingthatof
ancientGreece.This havingbeen said, societiesof statestendto privilegecertain
fundamental albeitdifferent
institutions, ones.Forinstance, although Athensbriefly
experimented withmultilateralism in thefourth century B.C.E., arbitrationendured
forcenturiesas thedominant fundamental of ancientGreece.Although
institution
occurredin thenineteenth
cases of arbitration century,contractual internationallaw
andmultilateralism havebecomethedominant institutional
practices governing mod-
erninternational society.Thisarticleis concerned withthesedominant fundamental
andthetheoretical
institutions, framework advancedhereis designedtoexplainwhy
differentsocietiesofstatesprivilegedifferent basicinstitutional practices.
Fromtheperspective advancedhere,institutions operateatthreelevelsofmodern
internationalsociety.As Figure1 illustrates,
constitutionalstructures arethefounda-
tionalinstitutions,
comprising theconstitutive valuesthatdefinelegitimate statehood
andrightful stateaction;fundamental institutionsencapsulate thebasicrulesofprac-
ticethatstructure howstatessolvecooperation problems;andissue-specific regimes
enactbasic institutionalpracticesin particular realmsof interstate relations.These
threetiersofinstitutionsare "hierarchically ordered,"withconstitutional structures
constitutingfundamental institutions,and basic institutionalpracticesconditioning
issue-specificregimes.
Existing Explanations
Neorealism
have minimalinfluence
believethat"institutions
Since neorealists on statebehav-
ior;"10theyhavedevotedlittlesystematicattention basic institutional
to explaining
Theysimplyarguethatthepossibility
practices. andnatureofinstitutional coopera-
tionbetweenstatesareheavilyconditioned by theprevailing distribution
of power
and configurationof interests. cooperationis consideredmostlikely
Institutional
underconditionsof hegemony, whena dominant statecan createand enforcethe
system,and dominant
rulesof theinternational statestendto createand maintain
thatfurther
institutions andmaximizetheirpower.
theirinterests 11As an explanation
9. Rawls 1955.
10. Mearsheimer 7.
1994/95,
11. See ibid.,13; andGilpin1981.
Structure
ofInternational
regimes
Issue-specific
e.g.,GAYT,NPT
Fundamentalinstitutions
e.g.,multilateralism,
law
international
structures
Constitutional
metavalues legitimate
defining
statehood stateaction
andrightful
FIGURE 1. Theconstitutive institutions

ofmoderninternational
hierarchy
forthenatureof fundamental thisperspective

institutions, is problematic in three
respects.
Evenifhegemonic powersdo helpto createandenforcetherulesofinternational
society,neorealists
have difficulty explainingtheinstitutionalpracticesthatdomi-
nantstateshavehistorically employedto achievethisgoal. The logicof neorealist
theorysuggeststhathegemonswill prefer bilateralformsof interstate
cooperation,
whichbetter enablethemtoexploittheirrelativepoweroverotherstates,in orderto
maximizetheflexibility andminimizethetransparency of theiractions,andto pre-
ventweakerstatesfromincreasing theirpowerthrough collectiveaction.Yet this
expectationis contradictedbytheUnitedStates'enthusiastic promotion ofmultilat-
eralismafter1945. As Steve Weberhas shownin thecase of NATO, and Judith
Goldsteinin thecase of GATT,poweralone cannotexplainWashington's institu-
tionalpreferences.12
Ifneorealists betweenthedistribution
couldestablisha clearrelationship ofpower,
theinstitutional
preferencesofhegemons, andthenatureoffundamental institutions,
theywouldstillhavetroubleaccounting forthegenericnatureofbasicinstitutional
practices.As I explainlater,theprincipleof multilateralism was firstendorsedby
statesduringthenineteenth century, andthedensityandefficacy ofmultilateral insti-
tutionsincreasedsteadilythereafter. Americanhegemonycertainly intensified and
acceleratedthisprocess,butinstitutional developments afterWorldWarII builton
normative laiddownwellbeforePaxAmericana,
principles notablyatthetwoHague
12. See Weber1993,267; andGoldstein1993,202.

560 International
Organization
Conferences andatVersailles. Thedevelopment hasthusexhibited

ofmultilateralism
an evolutionarydynamicand an enduring qualitythatevensophisticated neorealist
arguments, whichinvoke"institutional lags" and "punctuatedequilibria"toexplain
persistence,
institutional havedifficultyaccommodating.13
Neorealistattempts to linkthebalanceof powerto institutional preferences and
outcomesare further frustrated by thefactthatancientGreekand modernstates
engagedin different institutionalpracticesunderthesamestructural conditions. As
havefrequently
neorealists observed,Athenswas a hegemonoperating in a bipolar
system,yetunliketheUnitedStatesit neverpromotedmultilateral to
institutions
manageinterstate relations.14ForcenturiestheGreekcity-statespracticedthird-party
as theprincipal
arbitration institutional
mechanism forsolvingcooperationproblems
coexistence,
andfacilitating anditremained thekeyfundamental institution
through-
out,andlongafter, theperiodofAthenian hegemony.
Neoliberalism
In contrast neoliberalsholdthatinternational
to neorealists, exerta sig-
institutions
nificantinfluenceon international relations,enablingstates,as rationalactors,to
solve cooperationproblemsand realizegoals thatautonomyand self-helpcannot
provide.15Withoutdenyingthe anarchicalnatureof theinternational system,the
self-interestednatureof states,or theimportance of power,theyarguethatinstitu-
tions"facilitateagreements byraisinganticipated costsofviolatingothers'property
rights,by alteringtransaction coststhrough clustering of issues,and by providing
reliableinformation to members." 16The natureof particular theycon-
institutions,
tend,is determined bytheconfiguration ofstateinterests andthestrategic dilemmas
posed by cooperationin different issue areas.17Whileneoliberalsconcentrate on
or "regimes,"severalscholarshaverecently
institutions,
issue-specific usedrational-
istinsightsto explainthenatureanddevelopment of fundamental institutions,
with
Lisa Martin'sworkon multilateralism beingemblematic.18
Martinassumes"thatstatesareself-interested andturntomultilateralism onlyifit
servestheirpurposes,whateverthesemightbe."19Afteridentifying fourtypesof
cooperation problemsencountered by states-collaboration, coordination,suasion,
and assurance-she examineswhenit is rationalforstatesto choose multilateral
solutionsto each problem.Herinquiryreveals,however, that"at thisabstractlevel
of analysistheoutcomesremainindeterminate. Multiplefeasiblesolutionsexistfor
each problem."20 In short,rationalchoicetheoryalone cannotpredictwhenstates
will constructmultilateralinstitutionsto solvecooperation problems.To overcome
13. See Krasner1976;andKrasner1988.

14. See Fliess 1966;Gilpin1988;andGilpin1991.
15. See AxelrodandKeohane1985;Keohane1984,1989;andStein1983,1990.
16. AxelrodandKeohane1985,97.
17. Stein1983,140.
18. Martin1993.See also Morrow1994;andWeingast1995.
19. Martin1993,92.
20. Ibid.
Constitutional
Structure
ofInternational
Society 561
thislimitation, Martininvokestwostructural features ofthepost-1945international

system-American hegemonyand bipolarity-toexplainwhymultilateral institu-
tionsproliferated. She arguesthatitis rationalforfar-sightedhegemonstopromote
multilateral formsof governance, and that"one of themostimportant impactsof
bipolarity is toencouragefarsightedbehavioronthehegemon'spart."'21By combin-
ing theneoliberalemphasison rationalinstitutional selectionwiththeneorealist
stresson structural determinants,Martinclaimsto overcometheindeterminance of
abstractrationalism and,inturn,explainpost-1945multilateralism.
Thisperspective on fundamental institutions
is problematicin severalrespects.As
Martinsuccessfully demonstrates,
abstractrationalist
theorycannotexplainwhystates
adoptone institutional formoveranother. Appealsto structural determinants areno
solution, becausetheyexposeneoliberalslikeMartinto thesamecriticisms as neo-
realists.To beginwith,Americanpolicymakers advancedmultilateral principlesfor
structuring thepost-1945international orderbeforetheemergence ofbipolarity.As
JohnRuggieobserves,itis "morethana littleawkwardtoretroject as incentivesfor
actorbehaviorstructural conditionsthathad notyetclearlyemerged,and werenot
yetfullyunderstood, and thatin some measureonlythe subsequentbehaviorof
actorshelpedto produce."22 Second,moderninternational societyhas experienced
onlyoneperiodofhegemony underconditions ofbipolarity,andalthough multilater-
alismreceiveda majorboostduringthatperiod,itsignificantly predatesPax Ameri-
cana, in bothprincipleand practice,as I laterexplain.Third,attempts to deduce
institutional preferencesandoutcomesfromstructural conditions suchas hegemony
and bipolarity are confounded by thefactthatundersuchconditionsmodernand
ancientGreekstatesengagedindifferent practices.
Constructivism
Constructivists
arguethatsocialinstitutionsexerta deepconstitutive influenceonthe
identities
and,in turn,interestsof actors."Cultural-institutional contexts,"Peter
Katzenstein writes,"do notmerelyconstrain actorsbychangingtheincentives that
shapebehavior.Theydo notsimplyregulatebehavior.Theyalso helpto constitute
theveryactorswhoseconducttheyseekto regulate."23 International it
institutions,
follows,definetheidentities
of sovereignstates.24 Understanding howinternational
institutions is crucial,constructivists
shapestateidentity hold,becausesocialidenti-
tiesinform theinterests
thatmotivate stateaction."Actorsdo nothavea 'portfolio'
ofintereststhattheycarryaroundindependent ofsocialcontext;insteadtheydefine
in theprocessof defining
interests situations. . .. Sometimessituations are unprec-
edentedin ourexperience.... Moreoftentheyhaveroutinequalitiesin whichwe
assignmeaningson thebasis of institutionally 25 Employingthese
definedroles."
21. Ibid.,112.
22. Ruggie1993a,29.
23. Katzenstein1996,22.
24. WendtandDuvall 1989,60.
25. Wendt1992,398.
Organization
562 International
insights,constructivists havesoughttoexplaina widerangeofinternational phenom-

ena, includingthepracticeof self-help, theinternational movement againstapart-
heid,theendoftheCold War,and,importantly forourpurposes,thenatureofbasic
institutionalpractices.26
Whentheyturntheirattention to fundamental constructivists
institutions, drawa
constitutive linkbetweentheorganizing principleofsovereignty, theidentityofthe
state,andbasicinstitutional practices.Sovereignty is considered theprimaryinstitu-
tionofinternational society.27Themeanings thatdefinesovereignty "notonlyconsti-
tutea particular kindof state-the 'sovereign'state-butalso a particular formof
community, since identities are relational."28Constructivistsarguethatsovereign
stateshave "certainpracticaldispositions" thatshapethefundamental institutions
theyconstruct coexistence.29
to facilitate "The classicalgameofsovereignty," Rob-
ertJacksonclaims,"existsto ordertherelationsof states,preventdamagingcolli-
sions betweenthem,and-when theyoccur-regulatethe conflictsand restore
peace.''30 Thisgamegenerates certainfundamental institutions."Forexample,tradi-
tionalpublicinternational law belongstotheconstitutive partofthegameinthatitis
significantly concernedwithmoderating andcivilizingtherelationsof independent
governments."'31 Likewise,diplomacy"also belongsinsofaras itaimsatreconciling
andharmonizing divergent nationalinterests through dialogue."32
international
Therelationship betweentheinstitution ofsovereignty andbasicinstitutionalprac-
ticeshas beenclarified somewhat byRuggie'sworkon multilateralism. Ruggieem-
phasizestheinextricable connection betweensovereignty arguing
andterritoriality,
thatthe"distinctive featureofthemodernsystemofruleis thatithas differentiated
its subjectcollectivity intoterritorially defined,fixed,and mutuallyexclusiveen-
clavesoflegitimate dominion."33 The state'sclaimtoexclusivejurisdiction withina
giventerritory is essentiallya claimtoprivateproperty.34 Whenthesystemofsover-
eignstatesfirst emerged, someongoingmeanshadtobe foundto stabilizeterritorial
property rights,becauseconflicting claimspromised
jurisdictional perpetualconflict
andinstability. Ruggiearguesthatmultilateralism-with itsprinciplesofindivisibil-
ity,generalized rulesofconduct, anddiffuse reciprocity-was the"inevitable"solu-
tionto thisproblem.35 He thusdrawsa clearconnection betweenthefoundational
principle ofsovereignty, thesocialidentity ofthestate,andthenatureoffundamental
1996;Katzenstein
26. See ibid;Finnemore 1995;and
1996;Klotz1995a,b;KoslowskiandKratochwil
Ruggie1993a.
andWeber1996;Jackson1990;Onuf1991;Ruggie
27. See Ashley1988;Bartelson1995;Biersteker
1983;Ruggie1993b;Weber1995;Wendt1992;WendtandDuvall 1989.
28. Wendt1992,412.
29. WendtandDuvall 1989,61.
30. Jackson1990,36.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.,35.
33. Ruggie1993b,151.
34. Ruggie1983,275.
35. Ruggie1993a,21.
Constitutional
Structure Society 563
ofInternational
concludingthatmultilateralism
institutions, "is a genericinstitutional formin the
modemstatesystem."36
To explaintheincreaseddensityof multilateral after1945, several
institutions
have advanceda "secondimage" argument
constructivists abouttheinstitutional
impactof Americanhegemony.37 TheyarguethattheUnitedStates'identity as a
liberaldemocracy directlyinfluenced thepoliciesWashington employedto structure
thepostwarinternational order.AccordingtoAnne-Marie Burley, Americanpolicy-
makersbelievedthatthedomesticreforms of theNew Deal wouldonlysucceedif
compatibleregulatory institutionsexistedat theinternational level. Consequently,
theysetaboutconstructing multilateralinstitutionsthatembodiedthesamearchitec-
as thoseoftheNewDeal regulatory
turalprinciples state.38Theidentity oftheworld's
mostpowerful stateis thusconsidered a crucialfactor intheproliferation ofmultilat-
after1945.In Ruggie'swords,itwas "American
eralinstitutions hegemony thatwas
decisiveafterWorldWarII, notmerely Americanhegemony."39
Theseconstructivist arguments suffer fromtwoweaknesses.First,theconnection
Ruggiedrawsbetweenterritoriality, property rights,andmultilateralism sitsuncom-
fortablywiththeinstitutional historiesof boththemodemand ancientGreeksys-
tems.In thefirst150 yearsafterWestphalia-theso-calledage of absolutism-the
Europeanstatesystemdevelopedrelatively fewgenuinemultilateral institutions.As
I laterexplain,multilateralism "took off"duringthe nineteenth century, notthe
seventeenth.Ruggie'sargument is furthercontradicted bythepreviously statedfact
thatthecity-states of ancientGreecepracticedarbitration, notmultilateralism, to
stabilizeterritorial
property rights.Second,althoughBurleyprovidesa compelling
explanation forwhyAmericanpolicymakers were "ideologically"inclinedtoward
multilateralformsof international governance, and whytheUnitedStatesplayed
sucha catalyticrolein theirpost-1945proliferation, herargument impliesthatthe
architectural
principles advancedbytheUnitedStateswerenewtothecommunity of
states.American policymakers, however, elaborated institutional
principles thatwere
firstembracedandimplemented bythegreatpowersalmosta century earlier.
Toward a New ConstructivistTheory
Constructivists
correctlyfocuson how primary shapestateiden-
social institutions
in
tity, turn basic
influencing institutional They
practices. have paid atten-
insufficient
to thediscursive
tion,however, mechanisms thatlinkintersubjectiveideasoflegiti-
36. Ibid.,24.
37. Burley1993.Burley'sargument is echoedinRuggie1993a,andfurtherdevelopedinRuggie1996.
followBurleyandRuggieinintegrating
Notall constructivists domesticsourcesofstateidentity
intotheir
explanatoryframeworks.Mostnotably, inhiscommitment tosystemic Wendtexplicitly
theorizing, brackets
domestic,or "corporate," sourcesof stateidentity, on theconstitutive
focusingentirely roleof interna-
Wendt1994,385.
tionalsocialinteraction;
38. Burley1993,125.
39. Ruggie1993a,31.
Organization
564 International
matestatehoodandrightful offundamental
stateactiontotheconstitution institutions.
Drawingon theinsightsof communicative actiontheory, theworkof
particularly
Habermas,andreflecting
Juirgen on thediscursivepracticessurroundinginstitutional
productionandreproduction intheancientGreekandmodernsocietiesofstates,the
following accountoffundamental
constructivist
sectionoutlinesan alternative insti-
tutions.
Construction
Actionand Institutional
Communicative
Whenstatesformulate, maintain,and redefinetheinstitutional norms,rules,and
principles cooperation
international
thatfacilitate theyengageina processofcommu-
nicativeaction.Thatis, theydebatehowlegitimate statesshould,or shouldnot,act.
Theorists ofcommunicative actionofferthreeinsights relevanttounderstanding the
practicaldiscoursethatsurrounds internationalinstitutionalconstruction.Thesein-
sights,Habermasinsists,are "notconcerned withwhatrational, reasonable,or cor-
rectargumentation is, butwithhow people,dumbas theyare,actuallyargue."40
First,"a communicatively achievedagreement mustbe based in theend on rea-
sons."41 Partieshave to justifytheparticular principlestheyadvocate,debatere-
volvesaroundthemeritsof particular reasons,and stableagreements, resultingin
legitimate rulesofconduct, reston thosereasonsdeemedtocarrythemost
ultimately
weight.Second,notall reasonshave equal standing;onlythosethatresonatewith
preexisting,mutually recognizedhigherordervaluesare consideredvalid. "In the
contextof communicative action,"Habermasargues,"onlythosepersonscountas
responsible who,as membersof a communicative community, can orienttheirac-
tionsto intersubjectivelyrecognizedvalidityclaims."42Third,thereasonsthatcarry
thegreatest weightinpracticaldiscoursearethosethatappealtodeep-rooted, collec-
tivelysharedideas thatdefinewhatconstitutes a legitimatesocial agent.43
Identity
valuesrepresent thecoreof the"lifeworld," the "storehouseof unquestioned cul-
turalgivensfromwhichthoseparticipating in communication drawagreed-upon
patterns foruse intheirinterpretive
ofinterpretation Theseinsights
efforts."44 under-
girdthediscussionthatfollows,informing myargument aboutthesocialidentity of
thestate,thedeep metavaluesthatstructure international societies,andthemecha-
nismsbywhichtheseconstitute basicinstitutionalpractices.
StateIdentity, and PoliticalAction

Sovereignty,
All humanactors-bothindividual andcollective-havesocialidentities thatenable
themto operatein a worldof complexsocial processesand practices.Following
as "sets of meaningsthatan actor
I definesocial identities
otherconstructivists,
to itselfwhiletakingintoaccounttheperspective
attributes of others,thatis, as a
40. Habermas1984,27.
41. Ibid.,17.
42. Ibid.,14.
43. Connolly1993,190-91.
44. Habermas1991,136.
Structure
ofInternational
socialobject."45Social identities aredefined byintersubjective, sociallysanctioned,

andinstitutionalizedmeanings thatdefinethenature andpurposeofagentsandagency
ina givensocialcontext.Suchidentities fulfilla variety ofsocial-psychological purposes.
Mostimportantly, theyprovideactorswithprimary reasonsforaction.In a purposive
sense,as GeorgeT. McCall andJ.L. Simmonsargue,socialidentities provide"the
primary sourceofplansforaction,"informing an actor'sgoals as wellas thestrate-
gies theyformulate to achievethem.46 In a justificatory sense,socialidentities pro-
videthebasison whichactioncanbe rationalized, providing actorswitha reasonfor
beingand acting,a raisond'etre.For instance,a doctor'ssocial identity implies
certainformsof action,suchas prescribing drugsanddoingsurgery, butalso gives
meaningtothoseactions:"I am a doctor, that'swhyI do suchthings."
As we haveseen,constructivists assumethatthefoundational principle of sover-
eignty definesthesocialidentity ofthestate.In David Strang'swords,sovereignty is
understood "as a socialstatusthatenablesstatesas participants withina community
ofmutualrecognition."47 Thisassumption is bothlogicallyandhistorically problem-
atic.Unlessembeddedwithin a largercomplexofvalues,theprinciple ofsovereignty
cannotalone providethestatewitha coherentsocial identity, norhas it done so
Sovereignty,
historically. likeindividual liberty, is nota self-referential valuecapable
ofindependently providing actorswithsubstantive reasonsforaction.To beginwith,
sovereigntyhasno purposive content. Without reference to somehigherordervalues
it cannotindependently informplans of actionor the strategies to achievethem.
Furthermore, itprovidesan inadequate justificatory basisforaction.IfI behavein a
waythatannoys,frustrates, ormerelyaffects thosearoundme,theyareentitled toask
whyI actedin sucha fashion. Asserting myindependence cannotprovidean
or liberty
adequateresponse,as theycan immediately askwhyI amentitled to suchfreedoms.
AtthispointI mustgroundmyclaimstoindependence insomehigherorder,socially
recognized values.Takentoan extreme, thiswouldinvolveappealingtointersubjec-
tivevaluesthatdefinewhatitmeansto be a fullyrealizedhumanbeing.Similarly,
whenstatesare forcedinternationally to justifytheiractionstherecomes a point
whentheymustreachbeyondmereassertions of sovereignty to moreprimary and
substantivevaluesthatwarrant theirstatusas centralized, autonomous politicalorga-
nizations.This is a necessaryfeatureof international communicative action,and
ithas entaileda commonmoraldiscoursethatgroundssovereign
historically rights
in deepervaluesthatdefinethesocialidentity ofthestate:"We areentitled to pos-
sess andexercisesovereign rightsbecausewe areancientpolises,absolutist monar-
chies,ormoderndemocracies."
Recognizing thattheidentity ofthestateis grounded ina largercomplexofvalues
thansimplytheorganizing principle of sovereignty is thefirst stepin formulating a
moresatisfactory constructivist accountof basic institutional practices.For these
valuesnotonlydefinethetermsoflegitimate statehood, theyalso providestateswith
45. Wendt1994,385.
46. McCall andSimmons1966,69.
47. Strang1996,22.
566 International
Organization
substantivereasonsforaction,whichin turnexerta profound on institu-

influence
tionaldesignand action.Furthermore, havevar-
thevaluesthatgroundsovereignty
ied fromone societyof statesto another,
generating rationalesforstate
contrasting
actionanddifferent practices.
basicinstitutional
Structures
Constitutional
To facilitatesystematic comparison acrosshistorical societiesofstates,I conceptual-
ize thecomplexesof values thatdefinestateidentity as constitutional structures.
Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective prin-
beliefs,
ciples,andnorms thatperform two functions inordering international societies:they
definewhat constitutes a legitimateactor, entitledto all therights and privileges of
statehood;and theydefinethebasic parametersof rightful stateaction.Theyare
"constitutional" becausetheyare systemsof basic principles thatdefineand shape
international polities,andtheyare "structures" becausethey"limitandmoldagents
andagenciesandpointtheminwaysthattendtowarda commonqualityofoutcomes
eventhoughtheefforts and aimsof agentsand agenciesvary."48 As Figure2 illus-
constitutional
trates, structures can be saidtoincorporate threeintersubjective norma-
tiveelements:a hegemonicbeliefaboutthemoralpurposeof centralized, autono-
mouspoliticalorganization; an organizing principleof sovereignty; and a normof
pureprocedural justice.
Hegemonicbeliefsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestaterepresent thecoreofthis
normative complex,providing thejustificatoryfoundations fortheprinciple ofsover-
eigntyand theprevailing normof pureprocedural justice.The termpurposerefers
heretothereasonsthathistorical agentsholdforconstructing andmaintaining autono-
mouspoliticalunits.Suchpurposesare"moral"becausetheyalwaysentaila concep-
tionoftheindividual orsocial"good" servedbyautonomous politicalorganizations.
Werefertothemoralpurposeofthe"state"becausesuchrationales areofa different
category to themoralpurposesof suzerainorheteronomous formsofpoliticalorga-
nization.Finally,thesebeliefsarehegemonic, notbecausetheyaretheonlyconcep-
tionsof themoralpurposeof thestatepropagated in a givenculturalandhistorical
context, butbecause,in a narrowsense,theyareembraced bythedominant coalition
of statesand,in a broadersense,theyconstitute theprevailing, sociallysanctioned
forsovereign
justification Againstthesehegemonic
rights. beliefs,alternativeconcep-
tionsof themoralpurposeof thestatehave historically assumedan oppositional
quality,theirproponents oftendecrying thewayinwhichprevailing beliefscondition
admissiontointernational societyandshapeitsbasicinstitutional practices.49
48. Waltz1979,74.
49. Notehow therevolutionary statesof Franceand theUnitedStateschallengedthedynasticprin-
ciplesofabsolutist societyin theeighteenth
international century;howthemajorAsianstateschallenged,
"standard
thenaccepted,theliberal-constitutionalist ofcivilization" earlymoderninterna-
thatstructured
tionalsocietyin thelatenineteenth
century; how theSovietUnionand SouthAfricabuckedagainstthe
sameduringtheCold War,subsequently embracing theyopposedfordecadesto gain
theveryprinciples
effectiveentryto contemporary internationalsociety.See Gilbert1951; Gong 1984; Klotz 1995; and
KoslowskiandKratochwil 1995.
Constitutional
ofInternational
Moral purpose
ofthestate
Organizing Normofprocedural
of
principle justice
sovereignty
FIGURE 2. Theconstitutive
structure society
ofinternational
Societiesof sovereign states,suzerainsystems, andheteronomous systems areall

structured by organizing principles. These principles, Ruggie argues, establishthe
basison "whichtheconstituent unitsareseparated fromoneanother."'50 Thatis,they
definethemodeof differentiation. In societiesof states,theorganizing principleof
sovereignty politicalunitson thebasisofparticularity
differentiates andexclusivity,
creating a system ofterritorially
demarcated, autonomous centersofpoliticalauthor-
ity.Constructivists arguethattheprecisemeaningandbehavioral implications ofthis
principle varyfromonehistorical context to another. As JaniceThompsonobserves,
"whilesovereignty fromheteronomy
differs intheoretical andempirical ways,there
canbe muchvariation intheauthority claimswithin Theactorsdeemed
sovereignty."51
worthy ofsovereign thenatureoftherights
rights, theygainandtheobligations they
assume,theconditions underwhichthoserightscan be legitimately exercised,and
thesituations inwhichinternational societyis licensedtointervene tocompromise or
removethoserights havevariedgreatly, particularly acrosssocietiesofstates.Hege-
monicbeliefsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestateprovidethejustificatory basisfor
sovereign rights,andindoingso definethemeaningofsovereignty ina givenhistori-
cal context, as wellas itsbehavioral implications.
Constitutional structuresalso incorporate a thirdelement:a normofpureproce-
duraljustice.Normsof pureprocedural justicespecifythecorrectprocedures that
"legitimate" or "good" statesemploycollectively to formulatebasicrulesofinter-
stateconduct.These normsdo notprescribesubstantive principlesof international
justice,theysimplydictate"a corrector fairproceduresuchthattheoutcomeis
likewisecorrector fair,whateverit is, providing theprocedurehas been properly
followed."'52 Theexistenceofa generally acceptednormofpureprocedural justiceis
50. Ruggie1983,274.
51. Thomson1994,151.
52. Rawls 1972,86.
Organization
568 International
a prerequisite fororderedsocialrelations, domestically andinternationally. Unlessa

minimal,base-lineagreement existsamongsociety'smembersabouthow rulesof
coexistenceandcooperation shouldbe formulated, no basisexistsforcollectiveac-
tionortheresolution ofconflict, letalonetheformulation ofsubstantive principles of
justice.This is trueof international societiesas well as domesticsocieties,butas
followingsectionsdemonstrate, different conceptions of themoralpurposeof the
statehavegenerated different systemic normsofpureprocedural justice.As we shall
see, theraisond'etreundergirding thesovereignty of ancientGreekcity-states in-
volveda "discursive"normofjustice,whereasthemoralpurposesustaining the
sovereignty ofmodernstateshas involveda "legislative"conception ofjustice.
Beforeproceeding, threeobservations remain.First,thesenormative elementsare
mutuallyinterconnected and dependent, a single,coherentnormative
constituting
system.One cannotarguein defenseoftheprinciple ofsovereignty without appeal-
ingto the"good" servedbya systemofrulebasedon territorially demarcated cen-
tersofpoliticalauthority, andsince,inJohnRawls'words,"justiceis thefirst virtue
it is difficult
of social institutions," to definethatgood without reference to some
conception of procedural justice.53Second,thevaluesthatconstitutional structures
compriseoriginatewithinthedomesticpoliticalculturesof dominantstates,and
coalitionsofsuchstatesgenerally exerta disproportionate influenceon theirinterna-
tionalinstitutionalization.Once embeddedin thepracticesof states,however,the
valuesthatmakeup constitutional structuresconditionthebehaviorof strongand
weak statesalike,facilitating bothdomination and resistance. Third,constitutional
structures arehegemonic, nottotalizing. The normative principlestheyembodyde-
finethemembership of international societyand theboundsof legitimate stateac-
tion,butthisdoes notmeanthattheygo uncontested. It is notuncommon forstate
andnonstate actorstoopposethedominant ofwhatconstitutes
interpretation a legiti-
matestateor appropriate statebehavior.In fact,thisrepresents one of themore
interesting axesoftensionin contemporary worldpolitics.
Structures
Constitutional DesignandAction
and Institutional
societiesofsovereign
Historically, stateshaveevolveddifferent struc-
constitutional
tures,andthishasled themtodevelopdistinctive fundamental As domi-
institutions.
nantconceptions ofthemoralpurposeofthestatehavevaried,so toohavesystemic
normsofprocedural justice.Animatedbydifferent norms,stateshaveadopteddiffer-
practices.The ancientGreekinstitution
entinstitutional ofarbitrationservedessen-
tiallythesamefunction as themoderninstitutionofmultilateralism,
withbothbeing
employedto solve collaboration as well as coordination
problemsbetweenstates.
ofancientGreecewereconcerned
Thisis notto saythatthecity-states withthesame
substantiveissuesas modernstates,onlythattheyfacedthesamespectrum ofcoop-
erationproblems, weredesignedtoaddresstheseproblems.
andthattheirinstitutions
The crucialdifference betweenthetwo societiesof stateslay in theircontrasting
53. Ibid.,3.
Constitutional ofInternational
normsofprocedural justice,normsthatencouraged statestochoosedifferent institu-

tionalsolutions.It matters littlewhether, in an abstractrationalsense,arbitration or
multilateralismconstitute a moreefficient responsetocoordination andcollaboration
problems;whatmatters is thatat particular historicalmomentsstateshave deemed
themtherightresponses.
Systemic normsofpureprocedural justiceinfluence institutionaldesignandaction
through threeconstitutive mechanisms. First,theydefinethecognitivehorizonsof
institutionalarchitects. Thatis, theyshapetheinstitutional imaginations of those
politicalactorsengagedinproducing andreproducing fundamental mak-
institutions,
ingsomepractices appearmandatory andothersunimaginable. Animated bya discur-
siveconception ofprocedural justice,thecity-statesofancientGreeceimaginedand
constructed the institution of interstate arbitration-not multilateralism-and im-
buedwitha legislativeconception of proceduraljustice,modeminstitutional archi-
tectsconceivedand established contractual-legaland multilateral formsof interna-
tionalgovernance. Inbothcases,institutional practiceswereproducedandreproduced
partlybecause,in Paul DiMaggio and WalterPowell's words,"individualsoften
cannotevenconceiveofappropriate alternatives(orbecausetheyregardas unrealis-
ticthealternatives theycanimagine)."54
Second,normsof pureprocedural justiceare themetanorms thatstructure the
processof communicative actionthatsurrounds theproduction andreproduction of
fundamental institutions. Fundamental institutionsare sets of prescriptivenorms,
rules,andprinciples thatspecifyhowstates"ought"to resolvetheirconflicts, coor-
dinatetheirrelations, and facilitate coexistence.The construction and maintenance
of such institutions necessarilyentailsan ongoingmoraldialoguebetweenstates
aboutwhatthesenorms,rules,andprinciples shouldbe. As theorists ofcommunica-
tiveactionobserve,suchdialoguesare structured by a "higherorderconsensus"
abouttheprimary socialvaluesthatsuchinstitutions areintended to embody.55 Sys-
temicnormsofpureprocedural justicerepresent thesalient"higherordervalues"in
themoraldialoguesthatproduceandreproduce thefundamental ofinter-
institutions
nationalsocieties.The architects ofmoderninternational institutionsappealedtothe
procedural normoflegislative justicewhenjustifying multilateral solu-
institutional
tions,andthenormofdiscursive justiceprovidedthejustificatory foundation forthe
ancientGreekpracticeofarbitration.
Thesetwoconstitutive mechanisms shapebasicinstitutional practicesbecausean
ideologicalconsensusexistsamongthemajority of statesabouttheprimacyof the
prevailing systemic normofpureprocedural justice.Once sucha consensusexists,
however, normsofprocedural justicealso constrain theinstitutional actionsofthose
statesthatdo nothave a deep cognitiveor moralattachment to them.Whensuch
stateswishtoportray theirinteractions withotherstatesas legitimate, theyareunder
significantcompulsion tojustify theiractionsintermsofthesystem'sprimary norms
of coexistence.It is a generalfeatureof humansocial action,QuentinSkinnerob-
54. DiMaggioandPowell1991,11.
55. Heller1987,239.
Organization
570 International
serves,that"suchan agentmaybe saidtohavea strong motiveforseekingtoensure

that hisbehavior can plausiblybe describedin terms of a vocabulary alreadynorma-
tivewithin hissociety,a vocabulary whichis capableoflegitimating atthesametime
as describing whathe has done."56Contrary tocommonassumptions, thislegitimat-
ingimperative forcesstatesto adjustmorethantheirlanguage.Claimingthatone's
relations withotherstatesareconsistent withprevailing normsofprocedural justice
is a successfullegitimating strategyonlyifthereis a minimalcoincidencebetween
rhetoric and actions,at leastin thelongerterm."Thustheproblemfacingan agent
who wishesto legitimate whathe is doingat the same timeas gainingwhathe
wants,"Skinnerargues,"cannotsimplybe theinstrumental problemoftailoring his
normative languagein orderto fithis projects.It mustin partbe theproblemof
tailoringhisprojectsinordertofittheavailablenormative language."57Thisis notto
say,ofcourse,thatall statescloselyobservetheirsystem'snormsofpureprocedural
justiceall thetime.Rather,it is to suggestthatsuch normsexerta constraining
influence on theinstitutionalactionsofeventhosestatesthatdo notsubscribeto the
ideologicalconsensusoftheirsystem.
By thesethreemechanisms, systemic normsof pureprocedural justiceshapethe
fundamental thatstatescreateto solvecooperation
institutions problemsandfacili-
tatecoexistence. Thesemechanisms arehierarchicallyordered, withthefirst exerting
deeperconstitutive andconstraining influencethanthesecond,andtheseconddeeper
thanthethird.Systemicnormsof procedural justiceshapethebehaviorof states
through all threemechanisms simultaneously, although theprecisebalancebetween
thesemechanisms variesfromone setting to another.The netresultis thatthecon-
trasting behavioralpreceptsof themodernand ancientGreeknormsof pureproce-
duraljusticehavebeencloselyreflected in thearchitectural principlesembodiedin
theirrespective fundamental institutions.
ComparingtheAncientGreekand
ModernSocietiesofStates
TheancientGreekandmodernsocietiesofstatesexhibita basicsimilarity: bothhave

to of
beenorganizedaccording theprinciple sovereignty. Thatis, notonly havetheir
constituentunitsclaimedsupremeauthority within certainterritorial
limits,these
claimshavebeenrecognizedas legitimate bytheirrespective
communities ofstates.
As MartinWightobserves,inmodern international
society"thishas been formulated
ofthelegalequalityof states.The ancientGreekpoleis andtheHel-
in thedoctrine
lenic Kingdoms,in a similarway,bothclaimedsovereignty and recognizedone
another's." In both therefore,
contexts, thesovereigntyofthe statehasbeeninstitu-
tionallygrounded.Yet this
despite likeness,theancient Greek and modern societies
56. Skinner1978,xii.
57. Ibid.,xii-xiii.
58. Wight1977,23.
Constitutional
ofInternational
of stateshaveproducedverydifferent fundamental institutions coexist-

to facilitate
encebetweensovereign states.I explainthisinstitutional variationthrough reference
tothecontrasting constitutionalstructures thatdefined legitimate statehoodandright-
fulstateactioninthesetwosystems.
In brief,theargument proceedsas follows.AttheheartsoftheancientGreekand
modemconstitutional structures lie radicallydifferent conceptions ofthemoralpur-
pose ofthestate.FortheancientGreeks,city-states existedfortheprimary purpose
ofcultivating a particularformofcommunal life-whatAristotle callsbiospolitikos,
thepoliticallife.Thepoliswas thesitein whichcitizens,freedfrommaterial labors,
couldparticipate-through actionand speech,notforceand violence-in thedeci-
sionsaffecting theircommonlife.Throughsuchparticipation, citizensescapedwhat
HannahArendtcalls "the futility of individuallife."'59 The moralpurposeof the
modemstate,in contrast, involvesno suchidealizedconception of communallife.
Instead,itsraisond'etreis individualist, resting on theaugmentation ofindividuals'
purposesand potentialities, especiallyin theeconomicrealm.Since thelate eigh-
teenthcentury, the sovereignstate'slegitimacyhas been increasingly tied to the
cultivation of an environment in whichindividualscan freelypursuetheir"inter-
ests,"a freedom protectedbystate-sanctioned "rights."
Informed bythesecontrasting moralpurposesof thestate,theancientGreekand
modemconstitutional structures embodydifferent normsof procedural justice.The
ancientGreeknormofprocedural justiceprescribed a discursive modeofruledeter-
mination. ThepoliticallifeoftheGreekcity-state revolvedaroundpublicspeechand
debate,theprincipalaim of whichwas therationalpursuitofjustice.Cooperation
problemsbetweenindividualswereresolvedthrough a processof publicpolitical
discourse,whichcenteredon the adjudicationof particular disputesbeforelarge
publicassembliesandjurycourts,andtherulingsofthesebodiesappliedonlytothe
disputing partiesin a particular realmoftheirinteraction. In thisprocedure, codified
law playedlittleroleinthedecisionsofadjudicating bodies,norwas theirpurposeto
inscribegeneralizable rulesof conduct.Instead,assembliesandcourtsexercisedan
Aristotelian "sense of justice,"involvingthehighlysubjectiveevaluationof the
moralstandingof thedisputants, thecircumstances of thecase at hand,consider-
ationsofequity,andtheneedsofthepolis.Generalrulesofsocialconductaroseout
ofthisprocessonlyindirectly, withdiscursive practices gradually generating custom-
arynormsofbehavior.
In contrast, themodemnormof procedural justicelicensesa legislativemodeof
ruledetermination. Once thelegitimacy of thestatehad beentiedto theaugmenta-
tionofindividuals'purposesandpotentialities, theabsolutist principlethatrulefor-
mulation was thesole preserve ofthemonarchlostall credence.AftertheAmerican
andFrenchRevolutions, rightful law was deemedtohavetwocharacteristics: ithad
to be authored by thosesubjectto thelaw,or theirrepresentatives; andithad to be
equallybindingon all citizens,in all likecases. The previousauthoritative modeof
rule determination was thussupplantedby thelegislativecodification of formal,
59. Arendt1958,56.
572 International
Organization
reciprocallybindingaccords.Courtsexistin sucha systemto interpret codifiedlaw

andto determine whether, case,thatlaw hasbeenbroken.
in a particular
The modernlegislativenormofprocedural justicehas informed thepairedevolu-
tionofthetwoprincipal fundamental institutions
ofcontemporary internationalsoci-
ety:contractual internationallaw,andmultilateralism. As explainedlater,thetransla-
tionofthemodernconception oflaw as reciprocalaccordintotheinternational arena
afterthelateeighteenth century spurred notonlythebroadening and deepeningof
internationallaw as an institutionfirmlygrounded in thepracticesof states,butthe
development ofmultilateralism. Formultilateralism,Ruggieobserves,is an institu-
tionthat"coordinates behavioramongthreeor morestateson thebasis of general-
izedprinciples ofconduct:thatis,principles whichspecifyappropriate conductfora
class of actions,withoutregardto theparticularistic interestsof thepartiesor the
strategicexigenciesthatmayexistin anyspecificoccurrence."60
The ancientGreekpracticeofinterstate embodiedthesamediscursive
arbitration
normofprocedural justicethatinformed domesticlegalprocesses.As
thecity-states'
we shallsee,disputesbetweenstateswereadjudicatedin publicfora,beforearbitra-
torschargedwithexercising a senseofjusticeandequity,as wellas an awarenessof
theparticularityofeachcase. Thissystem involvedneither theformalcodification of
general,reciprocally bindinglaws, northeinterpretation of such laws. Normsof
interstateconductcertainly evolved,buttheywereaccretions, customsbornofcase-
specificdiscourse,notcollectivelegislation.
The AncientGreekSocietyofStates
Structure
TheAncientGreekConstitutional
Aristotle'sethicalandpoliticalwritings providea usefulstarting pointfora discus-
sionofancientGreekviewsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestate.Aristotle holdsthat
idealhumanagents-whohe insistsarealwaysmale-combinereasonwithaction.61
The politicalimplications of thisbecomeclear onlyif we recognizethatforthe
ancientGreeksthegreatest expressionof reasonwas the "perception of good and
The rationalpursuitofjusticethrough
evil,just and unjust."62 actionwas deemed
possibleonlywithina particular sortof politicalcommunity-the polis. To begin
with,justicewas considered aninherently becauseonecannotactjustly
socialvirtue,
without treatingtheneedsandinterests ofothersequallyandfairly. Furthermore, the
pursuit ofjusticewas inextricably linkedto speech,thearticulationofmoralclaims
withina widerpublicpoliticaldiscourse.63 The questforjusticewas thusthought to
be an inherently andmeninherently
politicalactivity, politicalbeings.Thepoliswas
in turnconsideredthepreeminent formof humanorganization, because,Aristotle
claims,"in thestate,thegood aimedat is justice;and thatmeanswhatis forthe
60. Ruggie1993a,14.
61. 1962,17.
Aristotle
62. Aristotle
1981,60.
63. Ibid.
Constitutional
ofInternational
benefitof thewholecommunity."64 The moralpurposeof theancientGreekstate

thuslayinthecultivation ofbiospolitikos, a formofcommunallifecharacterized by
therationalpursuit ofjusticethrough actionandspeech.
Thismoralpurposeentaileda discursive normofpureprocedural justice,one that
licensedcase-by-case determination ofrightandwrongconductthrough a processof
publicmoraldebateand deliberation.65 This is notto say thattheancientGreeks
neverpromulgated codifiedlaws;thehistory ofthecity-statesis punctuated bygreat
moments of constitutional law making.Theselaws,however,werelargely, though
notexclusively, procedural. DennisMaio has shown,forinstance, thatAthenian law
of thefourth century B.C.E. "was not so mucha systemof commandsforextra-
judicial activityas it was a systemof regulations fortheconductofjudicial pro-
cess,"66whichis significant sincethisis preciselythetimewhenAthenians aresaid
to have embraced"theruleof law."67Withinthisproceduralframework, ancient
Greekjurycourtsand assemblies-frequently consistingof hundredsof jurors-
exercisedconsiderabledeliberative discretion,adjudicating disputeswithoutstrict
reference to codifiedsubstantive laws. Insteadof objectivelyapplyingtheletterof
thelaw,jurorswereexpectedtoexercisea "senseofjustice,"subjectively weighing
themoralrectitude of thedisputants, thepeculiaritiesof thecase, theneedsof the
community, andprinciples of equity.As SallyHumphreys observes,theywere"in-
vitedto behaveas if theyweremembersof thelocal community, decidingon the
fairestsolutionforeach particular case, ratherthanspecialistsin applyinglaw to
cases."68Speechwriters strovenottointerpret thelaw,buttoestablishtherighteous-
nessofdefendants' positions,69 andwitnesseswerecallednotto determine thefacts
ofa case,buttotestify todefendants' In sucha system,
respectability.70 generalrules
of social conductwere less theproductof legislationthancustom,withiterated
discursivepracticesgradually generating normsofsocialbehavior.
The discursive normofpureprocedural justicereacheditsinstitutionalapogeein
classicalAthens,butthebeliefthatpublicmoraldiscoursewas theappropriate way
forcivilizedpolitiestodecidequestionsofrightandwrongshapedpoliticalandlegal
practicesacrossthecity-states. By thetimeofPlatoandAristotle, democracy was the
mostcommonformofpoliticalorganization, withAthenian principlesandpractices
influencingtheconstitutions, if notall theinstitutions,of manycity-states.71More
though,thediscursiveconceptionofjusticealso structured
interestingly, theprac-
ticesofoligarchicstates,evenSparta.TheGreatRhetra-theraftoflawssupposedly
bequeathed totheSpartansbyLycurgus, thelegendary lawgiver-waslargelyproce-
dural,and beyondthisthereis littleevidencethattheSpartanseverdevelopedan
64. Ibid.,207.
65. See Humphreys 1983; Humphreys 1988;Maio 1983;Garner1987; Ober 1989;
1985;Humphreys
andOsborne1985.
66. Maio 1983,40.
67. Ostwald1986;andSealey 1987.
68. Humphreys 1983,248.
69. Ibid.
70. Humphreys 1985,313.
71. Hansen1992,16.
Organization
574 International
extensivebodyof codifiedsubstantive althoughit was once be-

law. Furthermore,
lievedthatdecision-makingpowerwas concentratedin thehandsofthefiveEphors
andtheGerousia,orCouncilofElders,itappearsthatthepublicassembly, opentoall
"hadtheultimate
adultmaleSpartans, onmatters
decision oflegislation The
andpolicy."72
importance ofpublicdiscourse,andthepoweroftheassembly, areclearlyapparent
inThucydides' accountofthefamousDebateatSparta,wherethecongregated Spar-
tansheardanddebatedthemoralclaimsoftheirdisgruntled alliesandthedefensive
Athenians, decidingtolaunchthePeloponnesian
ultimately War.73
Arbitration
Interstate
The city-statespracticed interstate forwelloverfivehundred
arbitration years,with
documented cases stretching fromthesixthtothefirst centuriesB.C.E..7 Literaryand
historicalmaterials, in additionto extantinscriptions, recordthe detailsof some
eightycases,themajority ofwhichoccurredaftertheriseofthenewcivicideology
inthefifthcentury.75 brought
The institution together two,occasionallythree, parties
andan arbitrator, thelatterchargedwithadjudicating thecase anddetermining repa-
rations,whereappropriate. Two examplestestify to boththehistorical longevityof
thepracticeand therangeof issuesit encompassed.Herodotusdescribesan early
fifth
century B.C.E. disputebetweenAthensandMytileneoverthecolonyofSigeum,
whichtheformer hadseizedfromthelatterandrecolonized. He writesthatthe"war
betweenMytileneandAthenswas brought to an endbyPeriander, whowas invited
bybothpartiesto actas arbitrator; thecondition thathe proposedwas thateach side
shouldretainwhatit at themomentpossessed.In thisway Sigeumpassedintothe
powerofAthens."76 The secondcase, datedaround220 B.C.E., involvedtheregula-
tionof a varietyof relationsbetweenCnossosandTylissus.The decisionbyArgos
establishedrulesgoverning calendars,sacrifices,
property, and even "breachesof
Thepracticeofarbitration
hospitality."77 thusbridgedthetraumas ofthePeloponne-
sianWar,providing a mechanism forthesuccessful settlement ofa widespectrum of
issuesbetweenstrong andweakstatesalike.
The institution was structured
of arbitration bythesamediscursive normof pure
procedural justicethatinformed legal practiceswithinthe city-states. Arbitrators
ruledwithout reference toa bodyofcodifiedinterstate law,theabsenceofwhichhas
longbeennoted.78 The city-states
certainlyconcludeda largenumber oftreaties,
but
theseseldomenshrined generalprinciplesof international conduct.79 The systemof
72. Sealey 1976,71. See also Andrews1966.

73. Thucydides1972,72-87.
74. The mostimportant arePhillipson1911;Raeder1912;Ralston
workson ancientGreekarbitration
1929;NiebuhrTod 1913;andWestermann 1907.
75. Fora listofcases,see NiebuhrTod 1913,1-52.
76. Herodotus1972,378.
77. NiebuhrTod 1913,33-34.
78. See AdcockandMosley1975,182; andBauslaugh1989,36.
79. AdcockandMosley1975,203.
Constitutional
ofInternational
arbitration thusrestedon the arbitrator's abilityto arriveat a fairand equitable

decisionthrough thedeliberative assessment of competing moralclaims.This was
reflected intheoaththatjudgeswererequired torecitebeforecommencing delibera-
tions.In a characteristiccase betweenCalymmaand Cos, thearbitrator swore"by
Jupiter, byLucianApollo,andbytheearththatI willjudgethecase joinedbetween
thepartiesunderoathas willappeartomemostjust."80Notsurprisingly, a reputation
formoralexcellencewas theprimary criterion in theselectionofindividuals, tribu-
nals,orcity-states As in domesticcourts,arbitrators
as arbitrators.81 werenotsolely,
orevenprimarily, concerned withthe"facts"ofthecase,admitting a broadrangeof
testimony, fromthemoralrectitude ofthepartiestoconsiderations ofequity. A "skill-
fulpleader,"NiebuhrTod observes,"mightinfluencea popularcourtby appeals
whichwouldbe regarded atthepresent dayas whollyirrelevant."82
AncientGreekarbitration is bestcharacterized, therefore,as authoritativetrilater-
alism.It was authoritative becausethepowerofdecisionlay solelywiththearbitra-
tor;itwas trilateralbecausethearbitrator ruledwithina dynamicnormative environ-
ment,activelymoldedbythecompeting moralclaimsofthedisputing parties.While
itis difficulttogeneralizefromtheavailableevidence,anda systematic evaluationis
beyondthescopeandpurposeofthisarticle, itseemsthatthisformofextraterritorial
governance was remarkably successful.First,interstatearbitrationattained"norma-
tiveuniversality," toborrowa termcoinedbyJackDonnelly.83 Thisis notto saythat
itwas usedbyall statesto solveall theircooperation problemsall ofthetime,as the
onsetof thePeloponnesian Wartestifies. It seems,however,thatcity-states felta
powerful compulsionto provethelegitimacy of theirclaimsby submitting themto
arbitration, and strongand weak statesfrequently employedthepracticein prefer-
enceto otherformsof settlement, including war.Second,theancientGreeksplaced
no apparentlimiton thetypesof problemstheywerewillingto submitto arbitra-
tion.84 Whatis more,a greatnumberof recordedcases involvedthesettlement of
territorialdisputes.Third,thecity-states notonlyfeltobligedto submit theirdisputes
to arbitration, theyalmostalwaysabidedby arbitral decisions.85
The overwhelming
majority ofcases weresettledbyinitialarbitration, andthosethatdefiedsuchresolu-
tionwerealmostalwaysreturned fora secondround,notsettledon thebattlefield.86
Finally,thepracticeofarbitration didnotsimplyreflect thedistribution andexercise
of powerbetweencity-states. Even in the "era of hegemonicleagues" (479-379
B.C.E. ), whena largenumber oftherecorded cases involvedconflicts betweenmem-
bersofthesameleague,arbitration was notreducedtoinstrument ofimperialpower.
Hegemonswereseldomarbitrators; beyondcontributing to theinternal of
stability
80. Raeder1912,264.
81. The mostpowerfulstates,includingSpartaand Athens,wereseldomcalled on to arbitrate;
see
NiebuhrTod 1913,96.
82. Ibid.,132.
83. Donnelly1989,1.
84. Westermann 1907,199
85. Ibid.,208-209.
86. NiebuhrTod1913,186.
Organization
576 International
leagues,littleevidencesuggeststhatdecisionsconsistently favoredtheirinterests;
andarbitration was stillpracticedacrossleagues.87
Thucydides'History ofthePeloponnesianWartestifies tothenormative universal-
ityofthediscursive normofpureprocedural justiceandthepracticeofarbitration in
theancientGreeksocietyof states.Arbitration clearlyfailedto prevent theonsetof
thewarin431 B.C.E., butthroughout theHistory thepracticeappearsas an important
leitmotif,withstatesmeasuring therighteousness of theirpositions,and themoral
bankruptcy oftheiropponents', accordingto theirwillingness, or reluctance, to en-
Nowhereis thismoreapparentthanin theAthenians'frequent
gage in arbitration.
attempts to defendthemorality oftheirstand.In concluding thecity'sdefenseinthe
crucialDebateat Sparta,theydeclaretheirwillingness to settleoutstanding disputes
through aligningthemselves
arbitration, withthenormative principles ofthesociety
ofstates.88
Acknowledging theveracityofAthenian appeals,theSpartanking,Archi-
damus,respondsthatitis "therightthingto do sincetheAthenians themselves are
preparedto submitto arbitration, andwhenone partyoffers thisitis quiteillegalto
attackhimfirst, as thoughhe was definitely in thewrong."89Sadly,Sthenelaidis
successfully swaystheassembly, claimingthattheAthenians deservetobe punished
twofold, for"thoughtheywereoncegood,theyhavenowturned bad." 90Sometime
later,on theeve of thewar,Periclesseeksto bolsterAthenianunityandjustifythe
city'sstand.Again,thecity'swillingness to submititsclaimstoarbitration is usedto
assertitsrighteousness. Periclesdeclaresthatthe"Spartanshave neveronce asked
forarbitration,norhave theyacceptedour offersto submitto it. .. . Whenone's
equals,beforeresorting makeclaimson theirneighbors
to arbitration, andputthose
claimsintheformofcommands, itwouldbe slavishtogiveintothem,howeverbig
orhoweversmallsuchclaimsmaybe."91 Further references toarbitration as theway
civilizedstatessettletheirdisputesdottheremainder ofThucydides' History, andit
is notsurprisingthatthepracticewas reinstituted afterthewar,persisting longafter
thecity-statesyieldedtheirindependence toPhillipofMacedonandlatertheRoman
Senate.92
ModernInternationalSociety
TheModernConstitutional
Structure
Duringtheeighteenth a profound
century, ideologicalrevolutionerodedthenorma-
societyofstates.93
oftheabsolutist
tivefoundations economic,andpoliti-
Scientific,
87. Phillipson1911,90.
88. Thucydides1972,82.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.,86.
91. Ibid.,119.
92. Ralston1929,167-68.
themoralpurposeof theabsolutiststateare discussedin Bodin 1967;
93. The ideas thatconstituted
practicesof theabsolutist
Collins1989; and Kantorowicz1957.On theinstitutional societyof statessee
De Callieres1983;andHamiltonandLanghorne1995.
Constitutional
ofInternational
cal theoristsall abandonedtraditional holisticways of conceivingthenaturaland

socialorder, callingforthedissolution ofnaturalandsocialentities intotheirprimary
components. Thekeytoscientific knowledge, arguedphilosophers ofsciencesuchas
David Hume,was theidentification ofthenaturalworld'sprimary components and
theempiricalobservation of their"constantconjunction" by studying relationsof
"cause andeffect."94 AdamSmithandothersengagedina two-step processofdisag-
gregation, reducingsocietyto atomistic individuals anddividingproduction accord-
ingto a systematic divisionoflabor.Humanswereportrayed acquisitive,
as restless,
and competitive, pursuingsocial positionscommensurate withtheirambitionsand
capacities,andforming socialrelationships forthesakeofefficiency andproductiv-
These same assumptions
ity.95 transformed ideas aboutpoliticalcommunity, with
politicaltheorists,suchas Rousseau,defining thepolityas a notionallyequal,contrac-
tuallybasedcollectivity offreeindividuals, a movebegunbyJohnLocke a century
earlier.
Reinforced bythesimultaneous transformation ofeconomicandsociallifewrought
bytheindustrial revolution, thisideologicalrevolution profoundly alteredthenature
andtermsofintraterritorial governance, generating distinctivelymodemstandards of
legitimate statehood andrightful stateaction.After theAmericanandFrenchRevolu-
tions,itbecameincreasingly to legitimizestatepowerand authority
difficult effec-
tivelyin termsof preserving a rigidlyhierarchical, dynasticsocial order.As the
nineteenth century progressed, thestate'smoralpurposewas increasingly identified
withaugmenting individuals'purposesandpotentialities. This,in turn,generated a
newlegislative normofprocedural justice.Theauthoritative modeofruledetermina-
tionthatprevailedunderabsolutism was supplanted bythelegislative codification of
formal, reciprocally bindingsocialrules.Thisnewmodeofdetermining rulesspeci-
fied,first,thatonlythosesubjectto thelaw have therightto legislate-because
reciprocally bindingagreements betweensociety'smembers"remainthebasisofall
legitimate authority amongmen"-and, second,thattherulesofsocietymustapply
equallytoall citizens,in all likecases.96Bothofthesecharacteristics wereenshrined
intheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofMan andCitizen,whichdeclaresthat"law
is theexpression ofthegeneralwill;all citizenshavetherightto concurpersonally,
orthrough theirrepresentatives, in itsformation; itmustbe thesameforall,whether
itprotects orpunishes.97
These institutional principlestookrootslowly,graduallytransforming national
systems ofrulethrough thenineteenth century andintothetwentieth. somecases
In
thisprocesswas relatively in
peaceful,as Britainwherethemajorreform bills of
1832, 1867,and 1884 progressively expandedtheelectorate fromone-fifth two-
to
thirdsof theadultmale population.98 Elsewhereit tooka moreviolentturn.Holsti
calculatesthatthe"principles ofliberalism andnationalism werethemajorcausesof
94. Hume1978,1-90.
95. Smith1976,8,477.
96. Rousseau1988,88.
97. LaqueurandRubin1979,119.
98. Cook andStevenson1983,62.
Organization
578 International
bothcivilandinternational warsbetween1815 and 1914."99By thesecondhalfof

thenineteenth century, thestate'snewraisond'etreand associatedlegislativenorm
of procedural justicehad becometheprinciplemeasureof politicallegitimacy and
rightful stateaction.Thisis notto saythatinstitutional practiceschangedas quickly
as rhetoric,buttheprogressive movetowardconstitutional andrepresentative forms
of governance remainsone of themoreremarkable features of thelate nineteenth
century. One byone,theEuropeanstatesembracedconstitutionalism andtheruleof
law,withevenRussiaadoptingreforms in 1905.As David Thomsonobserves,"in
almostthewholeof westernand centralEurope,parliamentary institutionsdevel-
opedbetween1871and 1914,"andduringthesameperiodwe see thegradualmove-
menttowarduniversalsuffrage. 100
The legislativenormofprocedural justicefiltered intointernational legalandpo-
liticalthought in thelate eighteenthcentury, finding expressionin thewritings of
early"positivist" andin callsbypoliticaltheorists
legaltheorists,101 andrevolution-
arystatesfora newdiplomatic 102 It was notuntil
order. themiddleofthenineteenth
century, however, thatthenewprinciple ofruledetermination beganstructuring the
actualpracticesof states,establishing a newinternational institutionalarchitecture.
The principle thatsocialrulesshouldbe authored bythosesubjectto themcameto
licensemultilateral formsof ruledetermination, whilethepreceptthatrulesshould
be equallyapplicableto all subjects,in all likecases,warranted theformalcodifica-
tionof contractual internationallaw, to ensuretheuniversality and reciprocity of
international regulations. The netresultwas theproliferation ofmultilateral treaties,
institutions,and organizations, leadingChristopher Hill to characterize develop-
mentsaftertheCongressofViennaas "themoststriking lineofevolutionin diplo-
macy."103
To illuminate howthevaluesofthenewconstitutional structureshapedthefunda-
mentalinstitutions ofmodern international I tracetwokeyinstitutional
society, devel-
opments ofthelatenineteenth andearlytwentieth centuries. The firstdevelopment is
thegrowingcommitment duringthisperiodto regular,thenpermanent, universal
conferences of states.Once it was acceptedthattherulesgoverning international
societyshouldbe authored bythosesubjecttothemandequallybindingon all,some
meanshadtobe foundto enablethecollectivelegislation ofinternational law.From
1850onward, peacetimeconferences ofstatesemerged tofulfillthisrole.The second
development is thecreationof thePermanent CourtofArbitration, whichlaterbe-
came theInternational Courtof Justice.Initiatedat theFirstHague Conference of
99. Holsti1991,145.
100. Thomson1962, 323. The powerand representative natureof theseparliamentaryinstitutions
variedfromone statetoanother,butas David Kaiserargues,"by 1914everyEuropeangovernment hadto
maintain a workingmajority inordertocarryon theessentialbusinessofthe
withinan electedparliament
state";Kaiser1990,275-76.
101. See Ward1795;andvonMartens1795.
102. Gilbert1951.
103. By one count,between1648 and 1814 Europeanstatesconcludedonly127 multilateral treaties,
less thanone per year.In theperiodbetween1814 and 1914,however,thefigure jumpedto 817; see
Mostecky1965.See also Murphy1994;andHill 1991,90.
Structure
ofInternational
1899,thecourt'sevolutionprovidesa windowon thenormative ascendancyofcon-

law and its development
tractualinternational practiceof
as a basic institutional
moderninternational society.The importanceof thisconceptof law in thecourt's
constitution
also highlights betweenancientGreekandmodern
theradicaldifference
Thesetwoinstitutional
practicesofarbitration. developments evolvedthroughthree
stages:foundation, andrenovation.
construction, ThefirststagecenteredontheHague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907,thesecondon theVersaillesPeace Conference of
1919,andthethirdon theSan FranciscoConference of 1945.
Foundation.TheHague
The Hague Conferences werea crucialwatershed in theinfluence ofthelegislative
normof pureprocedural justiceon thebasic institutional practicesof international
society,forthereEuropeanstatesfirstcollectively endorsedthebasic institutional
practicesofmultilateralismandcontractual internationallaw.TheConcertofEurope
regular
hadinstitutionalized meetings ofthegreatpowers,butthesegatherings lacked
theuniversalistandlegislativeidealsthatinspiredtheHague Conferences. Initially
convenedtostemtheeconomically debilitatingandmilitarilydestabilizingarmsrace
betweentheEuropeanpowers,theywereexplicitly intendedto enabletherelatively
smallcommunity of recognizedsovereignstatesto formulate general,reciprocally
of
bindingrules international conduct.Diplomacy, assertedthepresident oftheFirst
Hague Conference, "is no longer merely an art in which personal abilityplaysan
exclusivepart;itstendency is to becomea sciencewhichshallhave fixedrulesfor
settlingdisputes... and it cannotbe disputedthatgreatprogresswill have been
madeifdiplomacysucceedsin establishing in thisConference someoftherulesof
whichI havejust spoken."104 In openingtheSecondHague Conference, theDutch
ministerofforeign affairsdeclaredthatsuchconferences were"convokedtodiscuss
rulesofinternationallaw andtogivethemprecision." 105To thisend,delegatesatthe
twoconferences formulated an extensivenewbodyofinternational laws governing
theconductofwarandthenatureanduse ofarmaments.
Theyalso movedto establisha judicialinstitution to interpretinternationallaw
and to adjudicatedisputesbetweenstates.The FirstHague Conference established
thePermanent CourtofArbitration, a bodythenconsisting oflittlemorethana listof
nominated arbitratorsfromwhichdisputing partiescould selecta tribunal to settle
Accordingto theconference's
theirdifferences. ThirdCommission, responsible for
draftingtheConvention forthePacificSettlement ofInternational Disputes,the"far-
therlaw progresses, and themoreit entersintothe societyof nations,themore
appearswovenintothestructure
clearlyarbitration ofthatsociety."106Reflecting the
canonsappliedto domesticcourts,thenewcourt'srolewas explicitly
jurisdictional
restricted
to theinterpretation of law,understood principallyas codified,reciprocal
104. Scott1917,9.
105. Ibid.,195.
106. Ibid.,55.
580 International
Organization
accords.Delegatesinsistedthata judicial body-nationalor international-could

not,and shouldnot,deal withnonlegalquestions.The new court'sjurisdiction, re-
portedtheThirdCommission, limitedto "questionsofa legalnatureand
was strictly
questionsof theinterpretation
principally or applicationof treaties.... Differences
wheretheopposingclaimsof thepartiescannotbe statedas legal propositions are
thus... outsidethejurisdictionofan institutioncalleduponto 'speakthelaw.'"107
As we haveseen,confining withinsuchboundswouldhavebeenincom-
arbitration
prehensibleto theancientGreeks,whosesystemreliedon thejudge's senseofjus-
tice-the abilitytoarriveatan equitableandfairdecisionintheabsenceofa bodyof
law.As AddaBozemanobserves,"Modernarbitration,
codifiedinterstate whencom-
paredwithGreekarbitration, assumesthecharacter oflitigation."108
Versailles
Construction:
In 1919,afterfouryearsofunprecedented violenceandsuffering, theworld'sleaders
convenedat thePalace ofVersailles to constructa new, more peaceful international
order.109The basic institutionalframework established under the Covenant of the
on
League of Nationsbuilt the institutional pursued
initiatives at The Hague and
reflecteda consensusonbasicarchitectural principlesamong the key members ofthe
winning coalition-Britain, France, and theUnited States-not the hegemony of a
singlepower. The earliest drafts of the Covenant-Britain's Phillimore Report of
March 1918, and theJuly1918 draftby theAmericandiplomatColonel Edward
House-envisageda generalconference ofstatesandaninternational court,thesame
structurelateradvocatedbytheFrenchatVersailles. I Thisbasicinstitutional
10 frame-
workwas eventuallyaugmented by theadditionof an executivecouncilof great
powers.Firstadvocatedin a December1918 draftby GeneralJanSmuts,thestruc-
tureof a conference,a council,and a judicialsystemfoundexpression in all subse-
quentBritishandAmericandrafts.111 Thesedrafts differed,however, overthenature
ofthejudicialinstitution to be created,withtheBritishfavoring a permanent court,
andWoodrowWilsonproposing a loosersystemoftribunals. 112Immediately priorto
theopeningoftheParisConference, theBritishandAmericandelegations agreedon
a singledraftcovenant-theHurst-Miller draft-which incorporated London'svision
ofa permanent judicialcourtandprovidedthebasisforall future negotiations. 113
Holdingregularconferences of stateshadbeenon theagendasincetheendofthe
SecondHagueConference. In 1907,ElihuRoot,theU.S. secretary of state,toldthe
107. Ibid.,55.
108. Bozeman1960,84.
are Miller1928; Marburg1932; Baker1923;
109. The classic workson theParisPeace Conference
Lloyd George 1938; House and Seymour1921; Nicolson 1919; Duggan 1919; and Schwarzenberger
1936.
110. Baker1923,67-88, 152-62.
111. Ibid.,94-99.
112. Ibid.,117-43.
113. Ibid.,144-51.
Structure
ofInternational
Senatethatthe"achievements ofthetwo[Hague]conferences justifythebeliefthat

theworldhasentered uponan orderly processthrough which,stepbystep,in succes-
siveConferences ... theremaybe continual progress towardmakingthepracticeof
civilizednationsconform to theirpeacefulprofessions." 114 The upheavalofWorld
WarI beliedRoot'soptimism, butitalso transformed theidea ofregularconferences
intocallsfora permanent conference ofstates,callsthatwererealizedinthecreation
oftheLeagueofNations'Assembly. Fromtheoutset,theassemblywas envisagedas
body,tobe chargedwiththepromulgation
a quasi-legislative ofreciprocally binding
rulesof international conduct.In a letteraccompanying his draftcovenantof July
1918,House explainedto Wilsonthatfor"all intents and purposestherepresenta-
tivesofthecontracting powers[will]becomeautomatically an International Parlia-
ment, andI amsureitwillbe necessary forthemtobe inalmostcontinuous 115
session."
In theend,however,theassemblyfellwell shortof thisideal. Its decision-making
rolewas largelyreactive, inmostcases requiring thegreatpower-dominated council
torefertoitmatters forconsideration. The onlyavenueithadtoinitiate debatelayin
Article19 oftheCovenant, whichalloweditto "advisethereconsideration byMem-
bersoftheLeague oftreaties whichhadbecomeinapplicableandtheconsideration
of internationalconditionswhose continuancemightendangerthe peace of the
world."116Yetwithinthishighlycircumscribed realmoflegitimate thefact
activity,
thatassemblyresolutions hadto be unanimous suggeststhattheLeague's architects
assumedthatsuchdecreeswouldcarrysomeweight.Of course,theunanimity rule
also paralyzedtheassembly, as well as thecouncil,preventing thecollectiveaction
neededto sustaininternational order.
Attempts weremadeat theSecondHague Conference to createa moreeffective
thanthePermanent
judicialinstitution CourtofArbitration. Becausethecourt'stribu-
nalswereselectedbydisputing partiestohearspecificcases,itlackedthecontinuity
neededto developa consistent set of judicial interpretations law.
of international
Delegatesthusmovedto establisha permanent JudicialArbitration Court,butdis-
agreements overtheselectionofjudgesmeantthata newcourtwas notcreateduntil
theVersaillesConference.117Whenfinallyestablished, therole of thePermanent
Courtof International Justicewas againrestricted to theinterpretation of narrowly
definedcontractual international law,or evidencethereof. Britain'sPhillimore Re-
portset thetoneforall subsequentstatements on theCourt'slegitimate sphereof
operation,licensing judgesto adjudicatedisputesbetweenstates"as to theinterpre-
as to anyquestionof international
tationof a treaty, law,as to theexistenceof any
factwhichifestablished wouldconstitute a breachofanyinternational obligation,or
as to thenatureand extentof thereparation to be madeforanybreach."118 As this
conceptionof thecourt'srole was echoedin theAmericanand Frenchdraftcov-
enants,itis notsurprising thatthefinalCovenantoftheLeagueofNationsdefinesits
114. U.S. Senate1907.

115. Baker1923,80.
116. Ibid.,183.
117. Choate1913,81.
118. Baker1923,75.
582 International
Organization
thesamewords.Finally,thecourt'srolein interpreting
invirtually
jurisdiction codi-
law was madeabundantly
fiedinternational clearinitsstatute,
whichdirected judges
to applyinternational
conventions, internationalcustom"as evidenceof a general
practiceacceptedas law," "generalprinciplesof law recognizedby civilizedna-
tions,"andthe"judicialdecisionsandteachings ofthemosthighlyqualifiedpubli-
cistsof thevariousnations,as a subsidiary
meansforthedetermination of rulesof
law."119Each ofthesesourceswas thought toprovideevidenceofreciprocal accords
betweenstates,theessenceofmoderncontractual international
law.
Renovation:
San Francisco
Despiteclaimsthatidealisticfaithin multilateralism and international law contrib-
utedto theoutbreakof WorldWarII, thearchitects of thepost-1945international
orderdid notabandontheseinstitutional commitments. The new orderwas again
constructed aroundthebasic andbynowfamiliar architecturalprinciples laid down
atThe Hague:thatthereshouldbe a regularorpermanent conference ofstatesbased
on theprinciple ofmultilateralism, andthatthereshouldbe an international judicial
bodyto interpret contractual internationallaw. Upheldby theAtlanticCharter, the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, andtheYaltaAgreements, theseprinciples weregiven
newlifethrough a substantialprocessofrenovation.
Negotiators attheSan FranciscoConference substantially
strengthened theperma-
nentconference of states,a move explicitlydesignedto facilitateand encourage
peace through international law. In comparisonto thelargelyreactiverole of the
League's assembly, theCharter oftheUnitedNationsgrantstheGeneralAssemblya
quasi-legislative role.In fulfillingtheorganization'sprimary purposeof solvingin-
ternationaldisputes"in conformity withtheprinciplesofjusticeand international
law (Article1)," theGeneralAssemblyis authorized to "initiatestudiesand make
recommendations forthepurposesof ... promoting international cooperation in the
politicalfieldandencouraging theprogressive development ofinternational law and
"120 It does thisin two ways.First,accordingto NagendraSingh,
its codification.
former president oftheInternational CourtofJustice, theGeneralAssemblyis em-
poweredtoadoptgenerallegalconventions, conveneinternationalconferences which
thenproducesuchconventions, The lastof these,Rosalyn
and pass resolutions.121
Higginsargues,arenotnecessarily binding, butwhentheyembodygeneralrulesof
conducttheybecomean important sourceofcustomary internationallaw.122 Second,
in 1947 the GeneralAssemblyestablishedtheInternational Law Commissionto
prepare"draftconventions on subjectswhichhave notyetbeenregulatedinterna-
tionallaw orinregardtowhichthelaw hasnotyetbeensufficiently developed,"and
to codify"international law in fieldswheretherealreadyhas been extensivestate
119. Wheeler-BennettandFanshawe1929,53.
120. Brownlie1983,2, 5.
121. Singh1993,392-93.
122. Higgins1963,5.
Constitutional
Structure
ofInternational
Society 583
practice,precedent,anddoctrine." 123 Iftherecommendations ofthecommission are

adoptedbytheGeneralAssembly, theyfurther thedevelopment ofcontractual inter-
nationallaw.
Thecompetence ofthejudicialbodycreatedatSan Franciscoonceagainprovides
a usefulindicatorof theprevailing conceptionof international law. Althoughdel-
egatesdecidedto replacetheLeague's courtwiththeInternational CourtofJustice,
thenewinstitution's statutewas littlemorethana revisionofitspredecessor's. Ittoo
limitsthecourt'sjurisdiction to theadjudication of narrowly definedlegal disputes
involving"theinterpretation of a treaty," "anyquestionofinternational law," "the
existenceof anyfactwhich,ifestablished, wouldconstitute a breachof an interna-
tionalobligation,"and "thenatureor extentof thereparation to be made forthe
breachof an international obligation." 124 In rulingon suchdisputes, judgesareex-
pectedto base theirdecisionssolelyon thetermsofrelevantagreements or on evi-
denceof reciprocally bindingnormsandprinciples embracedbythecommunity of
states.Sincetheidea oflaw as reciprocal accordwas bythistimefundamental tothe
domesticlegitimacy of theleadingstates,and was alreadyinstitutionalized at the
internationallevelbytheHague andVersaillesConferences, itwas unlikely thatthe
newcourt'sjurisdiction woulddepartveryfarfrompastpractices.
Post-1945initiatives thusreasserted andreconstructed institutional
principlesand
structuresthatwerefirst endorsedandinitiated byleadingEuropeanstatesinthelate
nineteenth century.The proliferation ofthesebasic institutionalpractices, andtheir
applicationto an everwideningrealmof interstate was of coursegreatly
relations,
accelerated byAmericanattempts to transplant theprinciples oftheNew Deal regu-
latorystateintotheinternational arena.In thehistory ofmoderninternational society,
however, thisseemsless a periodof architectural innovation thanone ofmasscon-
struction.
Conclusion
Because societiesof statesemergein differentculturalandhistorical contexts,they

evolvedifferentconstitutionalstructures characterizedby differentconceptions of
themoralpurposeof thestateand different ideas aboutprocedural justice.This in
turnleadsthemtoconstruct differentfundamental institutions.
Culturally andhistori-
cally contingentbeliefsaboutwhatconstitutes a "civilized"state,and how such
statesoughtto solve cooperation problems,exerta fargreaterinfluence on basic
institutional
practicesthando material structural
conditions,thestrategicimperatives
ofparticularcooperation problems, ofterritorial
or thestabilization property rights.
By conceivingthenormative foundations societiesintermsofconsti-
ofinternational
tutionalstructures,
andbyunderstanding howprevailing ideas aboutthemoralpur-
pose of the stateundergird the organizingprincipleof sovereignty and inform
123. Sohn 1956,33.

124. Brownlie1983,396.
584 International
Organization
notionsof pureprocedural justice,we can betterexplainwhythe ancientGreek

city-states
practiced interstate arbitration whilemodemstateshaveconstructed insti-
tutionsofcontractual international law andmultilateralism.
By grounding basic institutional practicesin constitutional structures,thecoreof
whichareintersubjective beliefsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestate,thetheoretical
framework advancedherecontrasts withTerryNardin'smuchcitedconceptionof
international societyas a "practicalassociation."Accordingto Nardin,a "practical
associationis a relationship amongthoseengagedin thepursuitof different and
possiblyincompatible purposes,and who are associatedwithone another, if at all,
onlyinrespecting certainrestrictions onhoweachmaypursuehisownpurposes."125
International society,he contends, is just suchan association.Statespursuediverse
ends,boundtogether onlybythe"authoritative practices"thatfacilitate coexistence,
notablythefundamental institutions of international law and diplomacy.126While
Nardin'sconception ofinternational societyis intuitively resonating
persuasive, with
prevailingrationalist conceptions ofsocietyandtheveryrealdiversity ofthecontem-
poraryworld,itis historically ill-founded andconceptually misleading.
Practicalassociation, forNardin,is morefundamental thanpurposiveassociation;
gesellschaft precedesgemeinschaft. In reality, however,all historicalsocietiesof
stateshavebegunas gemeinschaft societies,as communities ofstateslinkedbycom-
monsentiment, experience, andidentity. 127 Thisis truebothoftheancientGreekand
of themodernsocietiesof states.This is notto suggestthatmoderninternational
societyis a gemeinschaft community or to denytheimmensepracticalimperatives
thatsustainit."Presentdayinternational society,"as BarryBuzanastutely observes,
"is a hybrid." 128 On theone hand,it grewout of theculturally unifiedsystemof
nineteenth century Europe,andan expanding community ofliberal-constitutionalist
stateshas remainedat itscore,prevailing as thewinningcoalitionaftereach ofthis
century's majorconflicts, mostrecently theCold War.Contemporary fundamental
institutionswerespawnedin thatearliersystem;corestateshavebeentheprincipal
agentsin theproduction and reproduction of thesepractices,and theirvalues of
legitimate statehoodand rightful stateactionhave becomehegemonic, shapingthe
modernconstitutional structure, and,inturn, defining thediscursive terrain in which
institutionalconstruction has takenplace. On theotherhand,moderninternational
societyis multicultural, extending beyondtheliberal-constitutionalist coretoencom-
pass a widevarietyof states.The practicalimperatives ofcoexistenceundercondi-
tionsof highinterdependence have,however,encouragedthesestatesto employ,
even further, existing"Western"institutional practices.A "striking featureof the
globalinternational societyof today,"Bull and Watsonobserve,"is theextentto
whichthestatesofAsia andAfricahaveembracedsuchbasicelementsofEuropean
international societyas thesovereignstate,therulesofinternational law,theproce-
125. Nardin1983,9.
126. Ibid.,19.
127. Wight1977,33.
128. Buzan 1993,349.
Structure
ofInternational
duresandconventions ofdiplomacy, andinternational organization." 129 In one sense,
therefore,moderninternational society is indeed a practicalassociation, butin an

equallyimportant, deeply structural sense, it is informed by the institutional and
organizational valuesof the constitutively prior European (now Western) gemein-
schaftsociety.
Nardin'sfailuretograspthepurposivefoundations ofpracticalinternational soci-
ety,particularlythe intersubjectivevalues that inform the social identity of the state
and standards of rightfulstate action, greatly undermines the heuristic power of his
theoreticalperspective. Although he gives primacy to authoritative practices such as
internationallaw and diplomacy in his account of international society, he cannot
explaintheformthesepracticestakeor whytheyvaryfromone societyof statesto
another.International law is presented as thecodification of customary stateprac-
tices,butthismerely begs the question of why certain practices become the favored,
routinized methods of interstate
facilitating cooperation.130 In a passing observation,
Nardinwritesthatpractices"alwaysreflect an idealconception oftheactivities out
of which they grow and ofthe agents engaged in them: thevirtuoso performance, the
just war,theresponsible parent, the 'perfect ambassador.' 131 Yethis own perspec-
tiveon international societyforecloses anysystematic analysisofthesedeeperinter-
subjectivevaluesthatdefinelegitimate agencyandaction.The constructivist theory
outlinedin thisarticleplacesthesevaluesat thefore,acknowledging thehistorical
andculturalparticularity of different societiesof states,enablingus to explaintheir
divergent institutionalpractices.
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Reus-Smit Constitutional Structure of IR

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Cambridge University Press

International Organization Foundation

The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental

Modemstateshaveconstructed a multiplicityof issue-specific regimesto facilitate

I wishto thankthefollowingpeoplefortheirthoughtful comments on earlierversionsof thisarticle:

51, 4, Autumn1997,pp. 555-89

havedifficulty accounting foreitherthegenericnatureofbasicinstitutional practices

Whenseekingto definefundamental institutions,thechallengeof achievingand

3. Thisarticledrawson arguments andmaterialpresentedinmyforthcoming bookTheMoralPurpose

are producedand reproduced practices,and themeaningof

FIGURE 1. Theconstitutive institutions

forthenatureof fundamental thisperspective

12. See Weber1993,267; andGoldstein1993,202.

Conferences andatVersailles. Thedevelopment hasthusexhibited

13. See Krasner1976;andKrasner1988.

thislimitation, Martininvokestwostructural features ofthepost-1945international

insights,constructivists havesoughttoexplaina widerangeofinternational phenom-

Toward a New ConstructivistTheory

StateIdentity, and PoliticalAction

socialobject."45Social identities aredefined byintersubjective, sociallysanctioned,

substantivereasonsforaction,whichin turnexerta profound on institu-

Societiesof sovereign states,suzerainsystems, andheteronomous systems areall

a prerequisite fororderedsocialrelations, domestically andinternationally. Unlessa

normsofprocedural justice,normsthatencouraged statestochoosedifferent institu-

serves,that"suchan agentmaybe saidtohavea strong motiveforseekingtoensure

TheancientGreekandmodernsocietiesofstatesexhibita basicsimilarity: bothhave

of stateshaveproducedverydifferent fundamental institutions coexist-

reciprocallybindingaccords.Courtsexistin sucha systemto interpret codifiedlaw

benefitof thewholecommunity."64 The moralpurposeof theancientGreekstate

extensivebodyof codifiedsubstantive althoughit was once be-

72. Sealey 1976,71. See also Andrews1966.

arbitration thusrestedon the arbitrator's abilityto arriveat a fairand equitable

cal theoristsall abandonedtraditional holisticways of conceivingthenaturaland

bothcivilandinternational warsbetween1815 and 1914."99By thesecondhalfof

1899,thecourt'sevolutionprovidesa windowon thenormative ascendancyofcon-

accords.Delegatesinsistedthata judicial body-nationalor international-could

Senatethatthe"achievements ofthetwo[Hague]conferences justifythebeliefthat

114. U.S. Senate1907.

practice,precedent,anddoctrine." 123 Iftherecommendations ofthecommission are

Because societiesof statesemergein differentculturalandhistorical contexts,they

123. Sohn 1956,33.

notionsof pureprocedural justice,we can betterexplainwhythe ancientGreek

duresandconventions ofdiplomacy, andinternational organization." 129 In one sense,

therefore,moderninternational society is indeed a practicalassociation, butin an

Arendt, Hannah.1958.TheHumanCondition. Chicago:ChicagoUniversity Press.

129. Bull andWatson1984,433.

Bozeman,Adda. 1960.Politicsand CultureinInternational History.Princeton,

Hume,David. 1978.A TreatiseonHumanNature.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

Ostwald,Martin.1986.Law,Society, and PoliticsinFifthCentury Athens.Berkeley:University ofCali-

Weber,Steven.1993. ShapingthePostwarBalance of Power:Multilateralism in NATO. In Multilater-

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