Jurgen Habermans on the Legacy of Jean-Paul Sartre

Author(s): Richard Wolin and Jurgen Habermans

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 496-501
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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INTERVIEW

JURGEN HABERMAS ON THE

LEGACY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
Conducted by Richard Wolin

T HE ENSUING INTERVIEWwith JiirgenHabermaswas conductedin

Frankfurtam Main in October1990. It was originallycommissionedby Les
TempsModernesfor a special issue commemoratingthe tenthanniversaryof
Sartre'sdeath. However, due to difficulties in preparingthe Frenchtransla-
tion, the interviewdid not appearin Les TempsModernesuntilAugust 1991.
The interviewwas originallyconductedin German.The translationand
notes are the interviewer's.It appearshere in English for the first time.

Wolin:In what ways, if any, has thephilosophyof Sartreplayed a role in

the course of your own intellectualdevelopment?
Habermas:As a studentin the years following the Second WorldWar,I
encounteredSartrethe playwright.This was in the periodbefore my Abitur
(1949). It was at this time, for example, that I saw the fabulousGriindgens
productionof The Flies, with Flickenschildin the main role. In Germany,
this play gave rise to profoundmetaphysicalinterpretations.But the other
plays, for example,No Exit,enabledus even then to become acquaintedwith
the politicalSartre.At thattime, Sartrewas trulyin vogue: his ideas,buteven
more,the pathosof his ideas,were virtuallyomnipresent[drangendurchalle
Ritzen].As a young studentaround1950, I became familiarwith Sartrethe
philosopheralong with Simone de Beauvoir's TheSecond Sex, which in our
limited academiccircles provokedheateddiscussions.
My readingof Being and Nothmgnesswas very importantfor my under-
standingof Being and Time.Sartrehelped us to readthe early Heidegger-
which was the only Heideggerwe knew at the time - as a work of transcen-
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 20 No. 3, August 1992 496-501
C 1992 Sage Publications,Inc.
496
 Wolin/ INTERVIEWWITH HABERMAS ON SARTRE 497

dental philosophy.One could readthis work, following Sartre,as a human-

istic philosophyof freedom.I foundHeidegger's attemptto distancehimself
from Sartrein the "Letteron Humanism"to be rathersurprising.I did find it
interesting,though, that existential ontology wanted to be somethingother
than anthropology.Already at that time I viewed Heidegger's attemptto
distancehimself from modem humanisticthinking,which followed fromthe
"Letter,"as a continuationof themesof precisely thatGermanideology from
which the younger generationwanted to free itself. For this reason, Sartre
was important,at least in the case of my own intellectualbiography.

Wolin: In your own philosophy there has been a distinct breakwith the
traditional,monological "philosophyof consciousness" infavor ofa philos-
ophy of intersubjectivityor communicativereason.Prunafacie, thereoccurs
a similar move in Sartre'sphilosophy away from the egological framework
of Being and Nothingnessand towarda theoryof groups, socialization, and
history in Critiqueof Dialectical Reason.Do you consider Sartre's move m
this direction to be fruitful?
Habermas:In retrospect,Sartrewas as little able to solve the problemof
intersubjectivityin the thirdpartof Being and Nothingness as was Husserl
in the CartestanMeditationsor Heideggerin Being and Time.With Sartre,
in the last analysis, all interactionsremainsomething akin to the attemptsof
world-projectingsubjects to objectivate one another, that is, to mutually
overpower one another.If one begins with the premises of transcendental
philosophy,one cannotcomprehendmutualunderstanding,the commonali-
ties of an intersubjectivelysharedlanguage,tradition,or life-world.The later
Sartreinterestedme chiefly as a theoristof literatureand as a great literary
psychologist, whereas the Critiqueof Dialectical Reason came too late for
those of us who were alreadyfamiliarfor some time with critical theory in
order to exert a profound influence. I also do not believe that Sartre's
appropriationof Marx along essentially transcendentalphenomenological
lines would have changed things for us. Even later, "intersubjectivity"
remainedsomething, if not entirelyforeign, secondaryfor Sartre.

Wolin:In recentyears, the role of the traditional "universalintellectual,"

of which Sartre was perhaps the ideal incarnation in our century, has
increasingly come under attack,for example, by Foucault, who proposed a
theory of the "specific intellectual" in its stead. Wheredo you stand with
reference to this debate on the role of the intellectual in contemporary
society?
498 POLITICALTHEORY/ August 1992

Habermas:Certainly,FoucaultsharplycriticizedSartre'sself-understanding
as a political intellectual;however,retrospectively,one mustsay thatthe two
perceived an entirely similar role for intellectuals. Foucaultcorrectly fur-
thered the demystificationof the intellectual;he made it clear that today
philosophersandliteratisharethis rolewith otherexpertswho step forthinto
the public sphere:all havebecome "specificintellectuals"who set forththeir
professionalexpertisein theirsparetime in public debates.Thus no one can
understandhim- or herself as a privileged spokesman. In Germany,con-
versely,we have the problemof counteringa deeply rootedhostilityto intel-
lectuals;thus today,the dismal heritageof a culturalconservativemandarin
traditionmerely hides behindthe justifiableskepticismvis-a-vis the type of
sectarian intellectuals who take their bearings from the certaintiesof the
philosophyof history.The FrankfurterAllgemelne Zeitungis conductinga
campaignagainstghosts, as one sees in the case of ChristaWolf.1In point of
fact, today there are no longer any intellectuals who are not guided by a
fallibilistic consciousness.

Wolin:Althoughinterestin Sartre'sworkaroundthe worldremainskeen,

in France such mterestseems to have abated as a result of the success of
other intellectualparadigms: structuralism,poststructuralism,philosophi-
cal anarchism,etc. Do you believe that this move "beyond"Sartreand the
fusion of Marxismand existentialismhe sought to effectuatehas gone too
far? If so, whichin your estimationare the aspects of Sartre'sphilosophythat
are worthpreserving?
Habermas:Duringthe first threepostwardecades, the intellectualclocks
were turningin differentdirections.In Germany,structuralismhad a rather
late and relatively minor influence. Adorno's critical social theory was
viewed as an alternativeto phenomenologicalanthropologyand lateras an
alternativeto Sartre'sphenomenologicalMarxism.Consequently,for us the
returnto Nietzsche and to the later Heidegger,which since the mid-1970s
has been consummated as a radical critique of reason, takes place in a
differentconstellation.In this regard,Dialectic of Enlightenmentcontained
a hardcore of philosophicalpessimism upon which "postmodern"readings
could base themselves-which allows one to assimilateAdomo to Heidegger
and Derrida.Sartre'swork does not allow itself to be adaptedto deconstruc-
tionist tendencies. For this discourse,he representsan adversarywho is not
easily assimilable. His writings contain ideas that have not only not been
surpassedbut that also point beyond the historicist and contextualistap-
proachesthatare so widespreadtoday.This is trueespecially for the existen-
tialist understandingof freedom,which - following a trajectoryfromFichte
 Wolin / INTERVIEWWITH HABERMASON SARTRE 499

and Kierkegaard- expresses in a pregnantandradicalversion an undeniable

component of the modern self-understanding.I admirethe fact that Sartre
resistedin an exemplaryway the temptationto fall backbehindtheconditions
of postmetaphysicalthinking.He resistedthe obscure gesturesof a rhetoric
that, in the form of a philosophically disguised negative theology, always
suggested a privilegedaccess to truth.

Wolin:As you know,since the appearance in France threeyears ago of

VictorFartas'sbook, HeideggerandNationalSocialism, therehas been much
lively speculation concerning the philosophical bases of Heidegger 'sNaz-
ism. But doesn't thefact thatpersons such as Sartreand Marcuse-to name
only two-received their philosophical inspirationfrom Heidegger's great
workof1927, Being andTime, lead one to concludethatthereis no necessary
relationship between Heidegger's brand of Existenzphilosophieand Na-
tional Socialism? After all, Sartrewas able to take these samephilosophical
premises and makethemserviceablefor an extremelydifferentset ofpolitical
ends.
Habermas:I am of the opinion thatthe substanceof Being and Timeis not
yet affectedby the ideological standpointwhich, since 1929, imprinteditself
more forcefully on Heidegger's work. Of course, one also finds in this book
traces of an approachto culturalcriticism that was at the time widespread
among the Germanmandarins-for example, in the analysis of the "they,"
of "publicity,"of "authenticexistence," and so forth. Thus Marcuse and
Sartre(who was at the time an entirelyunpoliticalintellectual)were able to
learnwhat all of us can still learnfrom this remarkablework. Perhapsat the
time, Sartredidn'tknow Germanwell enoughin orderto detectthe question-
able political overtones in Heidegger's expressionistic style. After 1933,
Marcuseenergeticallydistancedhimself from his formerteacher;he was the
one who, among the older generationof the FrankfurtSchool, stood closest
to Sartre.Following thewar,Sartrewas ableto exerta greatinfluencebecause
his versionof HeideggerianExistenzphilosophiestood in anentirelydifferent
context, and because it remainedentirelyunaffectedby the intellectualtrope
of the "setting-to-work-of-truth," in terms of which Heidegger, after 1933,
stylized the "Fiihrer"and the "Duce"as demigods of the "historyof Being"
and comparedwith the great poets and thinkers.2

Wolin: Yourteacher and colleague, TheodorAdorno, once polemicized

againstSartre'snotionof "engagement. " Yetit seems ratherdoubtfulwhether
Adorno'sownposture of intellectualaloofness, his "resignation"(a charge,
to be sure,he once triedto refute),representsan inherentlydesirable alterna-
500 POLITICALTHEORY/ August 1992

tive. Is it your view, too, that in Sartre'sworkthe necessary tension between

"theoryandpractice" became overly slack?
Habermas:In Adorno'scase, therewas in fact a greattensionbetween his
theory and the tenor of his many radio commentaries,public lectures, and
discussions. These well-nigh popular-pedagogicalefforts were thoroughly
reformist.Sartre'spolitical engagement,which involved him in many errors
suchas his supportfor the [Baader-Meinhof]terroristsin Stammheimprison3
must be explainedin a Frenchcontext-for example, the strong role of the
CommunistParty.Given the proximityof the GermanDemocraticRepublic,
in Germanyas a committedleftist one could, conversely,have few illusions
about Soviet communism.Perhapsthe intellectualrole thatSartreassumed
has not been sufficientlydemystified:thatis, not yet clearly enough marked
by the consciousnessof a division of laboranddifferentiationbetweenwhat
one defends professionally in scholarshipand the basis upon which one
intervenesin the public spherewithoutbeing able to claim special authority
for one's subversiveopinions. As I have alreadyindicated,the demystified
intellectualis an entirelynormalcitizen who makespublic use of his or her
specialized knowledge. Towardthe end of his life, Foucaultreturnedwith
good reasonto Kant'stext, "WhatIs Enlightenment?"He therebyremained
more faithful to the spirit of Sartre than to that of an unpolitical and
noncommitalpostmodernism.

Wolin:In his introductionto the Critiqueof Dialectical Reason, "Ques-

tions of Method,"Sartrerefersto Marxismas the "unsurpassablephilosophy
of our time." Elsewhere, he once opined, "It is not my fault if reality is
Marxist!"Afterthecollapse inEasternEuropeof "reallyexistingsocialism,"
can one still arguefor the methodologicalvalidityof Marxismas a philoso-
phy or as an analytic tool?
Habermas:What really needs to be explained instead is the "infinite
conversation"about the crisis of Marxismthat has been going on for two
decades. This type of navel gazing is only the mirrorimage of an as yet
unsurmounteddogmatism.As far as Marxismas a theoryis concerned,we
should relateto it as we would to a theory is concerned,we should relate to
it as we would to a normalresearchtradition:thatis, as one thatcan be kept
alive only by way of criticalappropriationandconstantrevision.Forthe most
part, it is the type of questions posed and not the answers that turn a past
authorinto a classic, that is, into someone who still has somethingto say to
us. Now, as before, sociologists can learnsomethingfrom Marx if they see
how he was able to relate historicalevents and systematicprocesses to one
another.The concept of the reification of social relations, which Marx
 Wolin/ INTERVIEWWITHHABERMASON SARTRE 501

conceptualizedthroughthe category of "realabstraction,"is, now as before,

instructive.These are only two examples.

Wolin: It is striking that in the postwar period, there was so little intel-
lectual contact between the leading representativesof "WesternMarxism"
in Germany and France: for example, between the Frankfurt School
(Horkheimer,Adorno, etc.) and Sartre.How can one accountfor this missed
opportunity?
Habermas:I've already referredto the uneven characterof intellectual
development in Franceand Germany.If I am correct,only since the end of
the 1970s does thereoccur a significantoverlappingof contexts in which the
discussions take place in the two countries.Today,it is even easier to know
and identify the same themes when one is discussingthe same thing. Never-
theless, the rhetoricaltraditionsremaindifferentenough;capitalandpolitics,
even the tradeunions,have an easier time crossingculturalboundaries- and
considering the same things to be relevant-than we do. One sees this with
referenceto the fate of Europeanjournals- for example, "Liber."4

NOTES

1. ChrlstaWolf is a prominentEast Germanwriterand feministwho, in the fall of 1990, was

criticized by certain figures of the Germanconservativepress for not being radicalenough in
her criticismsof the GermanDemocraticRepublic.
2. The "setting-to-work-of-truth" is a prominenttheme in Heidegger'swritingsof the early
1930s thatfirstappearsin his pro-Nazi 1933 rectoraladdress,"TheSelf-Assertionof the German
University."For a discussion of Heldegger's theoryof a new arstocracy of "leadercreators,"in
termsof which his belief in fascism is grounded,see RichardWolin, The Politics of Betng: The
Political ThoughtofMartinHeidegger (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1990), pp. 123ff.
3. In 1977, Sartre made a highly controversialvisit to members of the Baader-Melnhof
terroristgroupin Stammhelmprison.See Annie Cohen-Solal,Sartre:A Biography(New York:
Pantheon,1988).
4. A European-widereview of books that ceased publicationearly in 1991. It began again
six monthslater underthe directionof PierreBourdieu.