Ordinary Egyptians Have Little to Show for U.S.

Military Aid to Egypt

By Ian Williams, February 13, 2011 FPIF

It was fairly clear that the military would act after Mubarakâ s and Suleimanâ s ineptly
rovocative speeches. The motives for forcing him out were almost certainly multi
-faceted - and indeed confused. Certainly the gnomic communiques from the Suprem
e Army Council could have been drafted by the Sphinx for their lack of content.
On the side of pragmatic self-interest, the senior commanders of the military ha
ve had a good deal out of the regime, with profits and jobs in all the military-
related and controlled industries, not to mention the prestige and other perquis
ites of power. The senior commanders seem to have calculated that their only cha
nce of keeping their position and privileges was to go with the flow and tell Mu
barak to leave.
If they had ordered the army against the protestors they faced a real problem. W
ould the conscripts and junior officers follow orders and move against their fel
low citizens? Mubarakâ s announcement of his departure by September and his other con
cessions profoundly reduced the chances of the military personnel risking their
lives, not to mention their honor, for a self-admitted lost cause.
So now the issue is one for delicate compromises. The opposition leaders and the
military have to negotiate the proportions of power sharing. The high command w
ill be trying to maintain its power, but their position is weakened: if they are
too greedy, then they have to think of the tens of millions who took to the str
eets and are now confirmed in their potential power. In addition, much of the mi
litary does indeed share the sentiments of the protestors, and so their commande
rs are playing with a weak hand.
The transition will be difficult. Washington has seen it in terms of a move from
one amenable strong leader to another more acceptable but equally amenable one.
The EU and US preference for Omar Suleiman, a secret policeman in cahoots with
what most Egyptians regard as inimical powers, demonstrates how out of touch the
y are. They have looked at opposition leaders such as Mohammed El-Baradei as pot
ential strongmen and found them wanting.
But that is precisely their attraction. El-Baradei, or retiring Arab League amba
ssador Amr ElMousa, should be considered as conveners, whose absence from domest
ic politics and wrangling could make them impartial and consensual spokesmen. El
-Baradei showed his integrity under pressure from the UN and others and gained s
tature, which is perhaps why some of the chattering classes in Washington, who h
ave never forgiven him for that, have been so eager to suggest his unpopularity.
The last thing Egypt wants is a presidential system concentrating power in one p
erson. To replace decades of autocracy will take a parliamentary consensual syst
em that reflects the views of the disparate masses and interests who rallied to
overthrow the President -- and as they showed the last two days -- the regime.
Anyone who knows Egyptians knows their deep interest in politics and internation
al affairs and the evidence of the last weeks certainly indicates they will not
revert to becoming passive subjects again.
What are the international repercussions? Washington and the West will now have
to take account of the wishes of the Egyptian people rather than rely upon a bri
bed autocracy. That certainly should reduce the perennial tendency to see the re
gion through Israeli eyes.
It is unlikely that anyone wants to rip up the peace treaty with Israel. There w
ill be no military assault on Israel. But a government in Cairo looking over its
shoulder at a newly enfranchised and staunchly patriotic people is unlikely to
enforce the blockade against Gaza, or to help Western efforts to frustrate Hamas
/Fateh reconciliation. That degree of security cooperation is almost certainly o
ver and the unpopular sales of Egyptian natural gas to Israel will likely be cal
led into question.
But even the US-Egyptian alliance will need much more work and attention than se
nding a large annual check to the army. Ordinary Egyptians have seen little prac
tical benefit from alleged American friendship, which has taken the form of supp
orting their oppressors and to some extent impinging on their patriotism by enfo
rcing cooperation with Israel.
In a situation of diminished American power, Washingtonâ s best bet is to sit on the
sidelines and applaud, unless it makes it clear that the money to the military s
tops immediately if it does not reflect the legitimacy established by the street
.
One significant and practical gesture would be cooperation in tracking down and
returning to the new government the money that Mubarak and his colleagues have l
ooted over the decades.
For the future, Obama needs some more public diplomacy. In the long term, the mi
litary aid has to be diverted to civilian uses, and even expanded. But an Obama
who does not stand up to Netanyahu over settlements is unlikely to have much sta
nding in front of the Arab street -- as will be reinforced in the other autocrat
ic dominoes that might topple.
Any suggestion that the US will only welcome a democratically elected regime if
it hews to American preconceptions about Israel, or that its welcome will be tem
pered if Islamic parties are represented in the new government, is guaranteed to
be counterproductive.