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(i) material or extensional equivalence: p ≡ q (p and q have the same truthvalue—i.e. in the
actual world)
(ii) natural or naturalistic equivalence: p ↔ q (p and q have the same truthvalue in all
naturalistically possible worlds, i.e. in all worlds with the same laws as the actual world)
(iii) essential equivalence: p ⇔ q, i.e. (p ≡ q) (p and q have the same truthvalue in all possible
worlds)
(iv) intensional equivalence: p =syn q (p and q have the same meaning)
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(α) The Ascription Project (no takers) to describe the locutionary purpose and
content of truth ascriptions
(β) The Deep Structure Project (Ramsey, White, Williams, Grover et al.)
(ii) The Metaphysical Project what truth consists in—to find necessary and sufficient
conditions for being true
(i) the Assertion Project (ib), a division of the Speech Act project, is introduced (p. 9) in the
middle of a discussion of the different senses of ‘iff’ which eventually distinguish subclasses
of the Metaphysical project (iia-c). How does (ibα) differ from (iic)?
(ii) necessary and sufficient conditions may identify only the actual extension, or the possible
extension (p. 24): “‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ is ambiguous in a way that parallels
the ambiguity of ‘if and only if’.”
(iii) how does the naturalistic project, as described by Kirkham (p. 20) relate to naturalism as
normally conceived: that everything is composed of natural entities, those studied in science,
and that the best methods of enquiry are those of natural science; and to physicalism? (pp.
196 ff.): “all intellectually respectable concepts can be defined ultimately and entirely in
terms of the concepts of logic, mathematics and physical science.”