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The
title
of
Chapter
7
of
Bernard
William’s
Truth
and
Truthfulness
asks
“What
was
wrong
with
Minos?”.
Minos
precipitated
a
crisis
in
historiography.
Herodotus
could
not
count
a
demigod
amongst
the
first
naval
powers,
together
with
mundane
human
historical
figures,
but
neither
could
he
explicitly
say
that
Minos
was
a
myth.
Herodotus’
type
of
history
included
gods
and
mortals,
but
separated
them
in
explanatory
terms
from
the
world
of
the
audience
by
relegating
the
gods
to
an
unspecified
distant
past.
Putting
Minos
in
the
same
context
as
human
historical
figures
disrupted
this
dichotomy
of
worlds
–
the
gods
did
not
mingle
with
the
normal
people
of
the
present
–
so
how
to
explain
Minos
mingling
with
the
great
grandfathers
of
the
audience?
Thucydides
replaced
Herodotus’
destabilised
history
by
writing
a
new
type
of
history,
where
the
world
of
the
past
is
the
same
world,
with
the
same
explanatory
laws,
as
the
world
of
the
present,
and
events
are
located
in
an
orderly
fashion
on
the
timeline
of
history.
Williams
views
this
movement
from
a
local
history,
exemplified
by
Herodotus,
to
an
objective
history
in
temporal
time,
exemplified
by
Thucydides,
not
as
a
correction
of
error,
but
rather
like
the
invention
of
a
new
mental
tool.
I
shall
attempt
to
demonstrate
the
merit
of
this
position,
as
opposed
to
either
an
absolutist
or
a
relativistic
interpretation
of
the
change.
History,
as
we
know
it
today,
with
an
objective
view
of
the
past
as
having
been
some
other
person’s
present,
and
our
present
being
some
future
person’s
past
(Williams,
163),
was
first
written
by
Thucydides.
This
linked
together
historical
time
with
historical
truth:
for
an
event
to
have
really
happened,
to
be
a
historical
fact,
it
must
be
definitely
located
in
historical
time.
Of
course,
we
might
not
know
when
a
particular
event
happened,
but
this
is
not
the
same
as
saying
that
the
question
of
when
does
not
make
sense.
For
example,
trying
to
identify
the
time
and
place
where
the
event
occurred
that
Ovid
described,
of
Zeus
in
swan
form
impregnating
Leda,
is
fool’s
errand
in
the
strongest
sense.
We
cannot
know
(and
it
does
not
make
sense
to
ask)
where
in
history
these
mythical
events
occurred.
There
is
no
determinate
answer,
as
the
event
in
question
did
not
happen
in
historical
time
(Williams,
2002:162).
However,
it
is
notable
that
someone
who
2
Kathleen
Louw
LWXKAT006
says
“the
being
whom
Leda
was
impregnated
by
was
Zeus
in
the
guise
of
a
swan”
would
not
be
asserting
something
false
(Williams,
2002:169).
Herodotus’
local
history
was
quite
different
to
the
(objective)
history
practised
today
–
in
this
paradigm,
gods
as
well
as
mortals
walked
the
earth,
and
there
was
no
distinct
separation
between
the
fictional/mythical,
and
the
factual/historical.
Events
were
not
located
in
a
strict
order
as
“before”
or
“after”
one
another,
and
not
every
event
had
a
fixed
place
in
time.
Of
course,
the
arrow
of
time
flowed
from
yesterday
to
today
into
tomorrow;
it’s
just
that
this
framework
wasn’t
used
to
locate
events.
Rather,
audiences
(I
say
audiences,
rather
than
readers,
to
reflect
the
prevalence
of
oral
tradition)
conceived
of
the
past
as
a
profoundly
different
world,
like
the
fairy-‐tale
land
located
“once
upon
a
time,
far
far
away”
so
familiar
to
children
today.
This
is
why
the
“Minos
question”
was
so
destabilising
to
Herodotus’
type
of
history
-‐
“Was
Minos
the
demi-‐god
real
like
me
or
my
neighbour?”
is
essentially
the
same
question
as
“When,
in
relation
to
today,
did
the
gods
walk
the
earth?”.
This
question
invites
a
direct
comparison
of
mythical
past
and
mundane
present
that
Herodotus’
paradigm
of
the
past
as
qualitatively
different
to
the
present
cannot
accommodate.
According
to
Williams,
Herodotus’
local
history
(which
for
brevity
I
will
call
H1)
only
became
unstable
once
questions
framing
the
time
of
Minos
as
somebody’s
today
arose.
Once
this
happens,
it
must
be
admitted
that
separation
in
time
does
not
merit
separation
in
thought
or
explanation:
on
reflection,
the
world
of
Minos’
future
must
be
the
same
world
that
makes
up
our
present
(Williams,
2002:161).
We
can
agree
with
Williams
that
the
situation
regarding
historical
truth
was
stable
before
Herodotus’s
time
in
that
no
awkward
questions
arose,
and
was
destabilised
and
finally
abandoned
in
favour
of
Thucydides
objective
account
(henceforth
H2).
However,
this
still
leaves
the
question
open
of
whether
H1
and
H2
were
equally
rational
and
true
to
the
facts.
It
is
tempting
to
say
that
H1
was
inadequate
and
that
H2
now
gives
us
the
right
picture
of
how
things
are.
H1’s
local
conception
of
the
past
as
being
subject
to
different
explanatory
rules
than
today,
invites
the
idea
that
it
is
a
confused
muddle
of
myth
and
history
which
3
Kathleen
Louw
LWXKAT006
4
Kathleen
Louw
LWXKAT006
does
seem
to
make
H1
less
accurate
and
precise,
compared
to
H2.
However,
to
miss
a
distinction
does
not
necessarily
mean
the
H1
framework
is
irrational
or
confused
–
I
think
in
this
case
it
is
better
described
as
suboptimal.
It
is
more
precise
to
say
“It
is
true
that
in
Ovid’s
Metamorphoses,
Leda
is
impregnated
by
Zeus,
who
took
the
form
of
a
swan”
rather
than
“It
is
true
that
Zeus
took
the
form
of
a
swan
and
impregnated
Leda”.
However,
the
latter
is
not
false
–
it
is
the
truth
of
a
simpler
time,
where
the
distinction
between
the
world
of
today
and
its
determinate
past,
and
the
worlds
of
the
distant
past
and
of
myth,
is
missed
rather
than
denied
(Williams,
2002:170).
The
idea
of
some
assertions
being
more
true,
or
less
true,
than
others,
paints
a
misleading
picture
of
truth
as
a
gradient
from
the
absolutely
false,
through
varying
degrees
of
correctness
to
the
absolutely
true
–
rather
like
how
one
colour
might
fade
into
another.
But
truth
is
a
binary
–
saying
“P
is
not
true”
is
equivalent
(in
most
logic
systems,
although
admittedly
not
all)
to
saying
“p
is
false”.
So
then
surely
to
say
“H1
contains
less
truth
than
H2”
amounts
to
a
refutation
of
H1
as
inadequate,
and
containing
more
falsehoods,
in
favour
of
H2?
This
is
too
quick.
It’s
not
the
case
that
H1
contains
fewer
truths,
or
more
falsehoods
than
H2.
The
difference
is
better
understood
as
H1
having
a
more
limited
explanatory
power
than
H2,
which
is
more
useful.
Analogously,
a
modern
laptop
computer
is
more
useful
than
a
typewriter
–
we
can
do
more
things
more
easily
now
–
but
this
is
not
to
say
that
typewriters
have
been
refuted,
or
that
there
was
something
fundamentally
wrong
with
typewriters.
Just
so,
H1
was
fine
–
it
was
adequate
for
the
purposes
of
the
people
who
used
it.
But
this
does
commit
us
to
saying
that
H2
is
no
better.
It
makes
perfect
sense
to
claim
that
H2
is
an
improvement,
and
that
rational
people
ought
to
prefer
H2,
and
yet
not
denounce
H1
as
false.
This
is
not
a
relativistic
position:
Williams
is
making
a
normative
judgement
of
H2
as
explanatorily
superior
to
H1.
What
Williams
denies
is
that
denouncing
relativism
means
embracing
an
absolutist
outlook,
where
H2
amounts
to
a
refutation
of
(the
incorrect)
H1.
Williams’
position
that
H2
is
better
than,
but
does
not
refute,
5
Kathleen
Louw
LWXKAT006
H1
is
both
coherent
and
sensible,
and
offers
a
far
more
subtle
and
nuanced
way
of
viewing
the
evolution
of
what
it
is
to
be
truthful
than
either
extreme
does.
6
Kathleen
Louw
LWXKAT006
Works
Cited
Williams, Bernard. “What was wrong with Minos?” In Truth and Truthfulness: an essay in genealogy.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002.
7