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1. INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Transportation System
(STS) more commonly known as space shuttle orbiter, presents exceptionally demanding
thermal protection requirements. The space Shuttle is a rocket launched , reusable space
vehicle that carries a wide variety of cargo, form scientific experiments to commercial
satellites. At the end of an orbiters mission, the space craft reenters the atmosphere and
experiences enormous frictional heating. The space Shuttle eventually lands in a manner
similar to a normal aircraft.
The successful development of a reusable outer skin to serve as a thermal protection system
(TPS) was a major part of the overall Space Shuttle design. High performance thermal
insulating materials previously available in the aerospace industry proved inadequate for the
Space Shuttle’s design specifications because they were either not reusable or were too dense.
The system must also provide an aerodynamically smooth outer surface, resist severe
thermomechanical loads, and resist moisture and other atmosphere contaminants between
missions. Finally, the TPS must be attached to an aluminium-alloy airframe.
The thermal protection system consists of various materials applied externally to the
outer structural skin of the orbiter to maintain the skin within acceptable temperatures,
primarily during the entry phase of the mission. The orbiter's outer structural skin is
constructed primarily of aluminum and graphite epoxy.
Orbiter interior temperatures also are controlled by internal insulation, heaters and
purging techniques in the various phases of the mission.
The shuttle TPS has three key characteristics that distinguish it from the TPS used on
previous spacecraft:
• Reusable. Previous spacecraft generally used ablative heat shields which burned off
during reentry and so couldn't be reused. This insulation was robust and reliable, and
the single-use nature was appropriate for a single-use vehicle. By contrast, the
reusable shuttle required a reusable thermal protection system.
• Lightweight. Previous ablative heat shields were very heavy. For example the ablative
heat shield on the Apollo Command Module comprised about 1/3 of the vehicle
• weight. The winged shuttle had much more surface area than previous spacecraft, so a
lightweight TPS was crucial.
• Fragile. The only known technology in the early 1970s with the required thermal and
weight characteristics was also so fragile, due to the very low density, that one could
easily crush a TPS tile by hand.
1.2.ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY
Reentry heating is different from normal atmospheric heating associated with jet
aircraft, and this governs TPS design and characteristics. The skin of high speed jet aircraft
can become hot from atmospheric friction, but this is frictional heat—similar to rubbing your
hands together. The Orbiter reenters the atmosphere as a blunt body by having a very high (40
degrees) angle of attack, with its broad lower surface facing the direction of flight. The vast
majority of the heating the Orbiter experiences during reentry—over 80 percent—is caused
by compression of the air ahead of the ultrasonic vehicle, in accordance with the basic
thermodynamic relation between pressure and temperature. A hot shock wave is created in
front of the vehicle, which deflects most of the heat and prevents the orbiter's surface from
directly contacting the peak heat. Therefore reentry heating is largely convective heat transfer
between the shock wave and the orbiter's skin through superheated plasma.[1] The key to a
reusable shield against this type of heating is very low density material, similar to how a
thermos bottle inhibits convective heat transfer.
Some high temperature metal alloys can withstand reentry heat; they simply get hot
and re-radiate the absorbed heat. This technique, called "heat sink" thermal protection, was
planned for the X-20 Dyna-Soar winged space vehicle.[1] However, the amount of high
temperature metal required to protect a large vehicle like the Space Shuttle Orbiter would
have been very heavy and entailed a severe penalty to the vehicle's performance.
FIGURE 2. (Callister 5th ed.) Approximate maximum outer surface temperature profiles for the
Space Shuttle Orbiter during reentry: (a) upper and lower views; (b) side view.
changes.
temperature changes.
aluminum alloy.
3.8 Miscellaneous Materials (for tile identification code , flags and letter paint )
To provide oxidation resistance for reuse capability, the outer layers of the RCC are converted
to silicon carbide. The RCC is packed in a retort with a dry pack material made up of a
mixture of alumina, silicon and silicon carbide. The retort is placed in a furnace, and the
coating conversion process takes place in argon with a stepped-time-temperature cycle up to
3,200 F. A diffusion reaction occurs between the dry pack and carbon-carbon in which the
outer layers of the carbon-carbon are converted to silicon carbide (whitish-gray color) with no
thickness increase. It is this silicon-carbide coating that protects the carbon-carbon from
oxidation. The silicon-carbide coating develops surface cracks caused by differential thermal
expansion mismatch, requiring further oxidation resistance. That is provided by impregnation
of a coated RCC part with tetraethyl orthosilicate. The part is then sealed with a glossy
overcoat. The RCC laminate is superior to a sandwich design because it is light in weight and
rugged; and it promotes internal cross-radiation from the hot stagnation region to cooler areas,
thus reducing stagnation temperatures and thermal gradients around the leading edge. The
operating range of RCC is from minus 250 F to about 3,000 F. The RCC is highly resistant to
fatigue loading that is experienced during ascent and entry.
The RCC panels are mechanically attached to the wing with a series of floating joints to
reduce loading on the panels caused by wing deflections. The seal between each wing leading
edge panel is referred to as a T-seal. The T-seals allow for lateral motion and thermal
expansion differences between the RCC and the orbiter wing. In addition, they prevent the
direct flow of hot boundary layer gases into the wing leading edge cavity during entry. The T-
seals are constructed of RCC.
Since carbon is a good thermal conductor, the adjacent aluminum and the metallic
attachments must be protected from exceeding temperature limits by internal insulation.
Inconel 718 and A-286 fittings are bolted to flanges on the RCC components and are attached
to the aluminum wing spars and nose bulkhead. Inconel-covered cerachrome insulation
protects the metallic attach fittings and spar from the heat radiated from the inside surface of
the RCC wing panels. The nose cap thermal insulation ues a blanket made from ceramic
fibers and filled with silica fibers. HRSI or FRCI tiles are used to protect the forward fuselage
from the heat radiated from the hot inside surface of the RCC. During flight operations,
damage has occurred in the area between the RCC nose cap and the nose landing gear doors
from impact during ascent and excess heat during entry. The HRSI tiles in this area are to be
replaced with RCC. In the immediate area surrounding the forward orbiter/ET attach point, an
AB312 ceramic cloth blanket is placed on the forward fuselage. RCC is placed over the
blanket and is attached by metal standoffs for additional protection from the forward
orbiter/ET attach point pyrotechnics.
HRSI tiles vary in thickness from 1 inch to 5 inches. The variable thickness is determined by
the heat load encountered during entry. Generally, the HRSI tiles are thicker at the forward
areas of the orbiter and thinner toward the aft end. Except for closeout areas, the HRSI tiles
are nominally 6- by 6-inch squares. The HRSI tiles vary in sizes and shapes in the closeout
areas on the orbiter. The HRSI tiles withstand on-orbit cold soak conditions, repeated heating
and cooling thermal shock and extreme acoustic environments (165 decibels) at launch.
The HRSI tiles are coated on the top and sides with a mixture of powdered tetrasilicide and
borosilicate glass with a liquid carrier. This material is sprayed on the tile to coating
thicknesses of 16 to 18 mils. The coated tiles then are placed in an oven and heated to a
temperature of 2,300 F. This results in a black, waterproof glossy coating that has a surface
emittance of 0.85 and a solar absorptance of about 0.85. After the ceramic coating heating
process, the remaining silica fibers are treated with a silicon resin to provide bulk
waterproofing.
Note that the tiles cannot withstand airframe load deformation; therefore, stress isolation is
necessary between the tiles and the orbiter structure. This isolation is provided by a strain
isolation pad. SIPs isolate the tiles from the orbiter's structural deflections, expansions and
acoustic excitation, thereby preventing stress failure in the tiles. The SIPs are thermal
isolators made of Nomex felt material supplied in thicknesses of 0.090, 0.115 or 0.160 inch.
SIPs are bonded to the tiles, and the SIP and tile assembly is bonded to the orbiter structure by
an RTV process.
Fig. 5. Excellent thermal insulator: white hot 1260 °C LI-900 silica tile material is safely
hand held 10 seconds after removal from high temperature oven
Nomex felt is a basic aramid fiber. The fibers are 2 deniers in fineness, 3 inches long and
crimped. They are loaded into a carding machine that untangles the clumps of fibers and
combs them to make a tenuous mass of lengthwise-oriented, relatively parallel fibers called a
web. The cross-lapped web is fed into a loom, where it is lightly needled into a batt.
Generally, two such batts are placed face-to-face and needled together to form felt. The felt
then is subjected to a multineedle pass process until the desired strength is reached. The
needled felt is calendered to stabilize at a thickness of 0.16 inch to 0.40 inch by passing
through heated rollers at selected pressures. The calendered material is heat-set at
approximately 500 F to thermally stabilize the felt.
The RTV silicon adhesive is applied to the orbiter surface in a layer approximately 0.008 inch
thick. The very thin bond line reduces weight and minimizes the thermal expansion at
temperatures of 500 F during entry and temperatures below minus 170 F on orbit. The tile/SIP
bond is cured at room temperature under pressure applied by vacuum bags.
Since the tiles thermally expand or contract very little compared to the orbiter structure, it is
necessary to leave gaps of 25 to 65 mils between them to prevent tile-to-tile contact. Nomex
felt material insulation is required in the bottom of the gap between tiles. It is referred to as a
filler bar. The material, supplied in thicknesses corresponding to the SIPs', is cut into strips
0.75 inch wide and is bonded to the structure. The filler bar is waterproof and temperature-
resistant up to approximately 800 F, topside exposure.
Fig .6. Discovery’s under wing surfaces are protected by thousands of High - Temperature
Reusable Insulation tiles.
SIP introduces stress concentrations at the needled fiber bundles. This results in localized
failure in the tile just above the RTV bond line. To solve this problem, the inner surface of the
tile is densified to distribute the load more uniformly. The densification process was
developed from a Ludox ammonia-stabilized binder. When mixed with silica slip particles, it
becomes a cement. When mixed with water, it dries to a finished hard surface. A silica-
tetraboride coloring agent is mixed with the compound for penetration identification. Several
coats of the pigmented Ludox slip slurry are brush-painted on the SIP/tile bond interface and
allowed to air-dry for 24 hours. A heat treatment and other processing are done before
installation. The densification coating penetrates the tile to a depth of 0.125 inch, and the
strength and stiffness of the tile and SIP system are increased by a factor of two.
There are two different densities of HRSI tiles. The first weighs 22 pounds per cubic foot and
is used in all areas around the nose and main landing gears, nose cap interface, wing leading
edge, RCC/HRSI interface, external tank/orbiter umbilical doors, vent doors and vertical
stabilizer leading edge. The remaining areas use tiles that weigh 9 pounds per cubic foot.
The FRCI-12 HRSI tiles are a higher strength tile derived by adding AB312 (alumina-
borosilicate fiber), called Nextel, to the pure silica tile slurry. Developed by the 3M Company
of St. Paul, Minn., Nextel activates boron fusion and, figuratively, welds the micron-sized
fibers of pure silica into a rigid structure during sintering in a high-temperature furnace. The
resulting composite fiber refractory material composed of 20-percent Nextel and 80-percent
silica fiber has entirely different physical properties from the original 99.8-percent-pure silica
tiles. Nextel, with an expansion coefficient 10 times that of the 99.8-percent-pure silica, acts
like a preshrunk concrete reinforcing bar in the fiber matrix.
The reaction-cured glass (black) coating of the FRCI-12 tiles is compressed as it is cured to
reduce the coating's sensitivity to cracking during handling and operations. In addition to the
improved coating, the FRCI-12 tiles are about 10 percent lighter than the HRSI tiles. The
FRCI-12 HRSI tiles also have demonstrated a tensile strength at least three times greater than
that of the HRSI tiles and a use temperature approximately 100 F higher than that of HRSI
tiles.
The FRCI-12 HRSI tile manufacturing process is essentially the same as that for the 99.8-
percent-pure silica HRSI tiles, the only change being in the wet-end prebinding of the slurry
before it is cast. It also requires a higher sintering temperature. When the material is dried, a
rigid block is produced. These blocks are cut into quarters and then machined to the precise
dimensions required for each tile. The FRCI-12 tiles are the same 6- by 6-inch size as HRSI
tiles and vary in thickness from 1 inch to 5 inches. They vary also in size and shape at the
closeout areas and are bonded to the orbiter in essentially the same way as the HRSI tiles.
The FRCI-12 tiles are used to replace the HRSI 22-pound-per-cubic-foot tiles. The FRCI-12
tiles have a density of 12 pounds per cubic foot and provide improved strength, durability,
resistance to coating cracking and weight reduction.
Fig.7. A closer view of the tiles under the forward fuselage and the front end of the left wing.
The corner of the nose-gear door can be seen at the lower left. The dark solid black tiles are new
ones which have never been through a reentry yet. (At top, the white object is the open left cargo
bay door.)
with shiny aluminum oxide to obtain optical properties. The coated 99.8-percent-pure silica
LRSI tiles are treated with bulk waterproofing similar to the HRSI tiles. LRSI tiles are
installed on the orbiter in the same manner as the HRSI tiles. The LRSI tile has a surface
emittance of 0.8 and a solar absorptance of 0.32.
Because of evidence of plasma flow on the lower wing trailing edge and elevon leading edge
tiles (wing/elevon cove) at the outboard elevon tip and inboard elevon, the LRSI tiles are
replaced with FRCI-12 and HRSI 22 tiles along with gap fillers on Discovery (OV-103) and
Atlantis (OV-104). On Columbia (OV-102), only gap fillers are being installed in this area.
The very thin glue line reduces weight and minimizes the thermal expansion during
temperature changes. The sewn quilted fabric blanket is manufactured by Rockwell in 3- by
3-foot squares of the proper thickness. The direct application of the blankets to the orbiter
results in weight reduction, improved producibility and durability, reduced fabrication and
installation cost, and reduced installation schedule time.
made from Inconel 750 wire with silica fibers within the tube, alumina mat, quartz thread and
Macor machinable ceramic.
Where surface pressure gradients would cause cross flow of boundary layer air within the
intertile gaps, tile gap fillers are provided to minimize heating. The tile gap filler materials
consist of white AB312 fibers or a black-pigmented AB312 cloth cover containing alumina
fibers. These materials are used around the leading edge of the forward fuselage nose cap,
windshields and side hatch, wing, trailing edge of elevons, vertical stabilizer, rudder/speed
brake, body flap and heat shield of the shuttle's main engines. Fused silica threaded inserts
and plugs are used in the tiles to provide access for door removal or panel attachment.
TILE IDENTIFICATION
Each TPS tile has an identification code that is painted in yellow. The paint does not burn off
during entry and can be obtained commercially under the name Spearex.
REWATERPROOFING
After each flight, the orbiter thermal protection system is rewaterproofed.
Dimethylethoxysilane is injected into each tile through an existing hole in the surface coating
with a needleless gun, and the AFRSI blankets are injected with DMES from a needle gun.
FIG.9. Locations of the various components of the thermal protection system on the Space
Shuttle Orbiter.
Weight considerations
While RCC has the best heat protection characteristics, it is also much heavier than the silica
tiles and FIB blankets, so it is limited to relatively small areas. In general the goal is to use the
lightest weight insulation consistent with the required thermal protection. Weight per unit
volume of each TPS type
The tile TPS was an area of concern during shuttle development, mainly concerning
adhesion reliability. Some engineers thought a failure mode could exist whereby one
tile could detach, and resulting aerodynamic pressure would create a "zipper effect"
stripping off other tiles. Whether during ascent or reentry, the result would be
disastrous.
Another problem was ice or other debris impacting the tiles during ascent. This has
never been fully and thoroughly solved, as the debris has not been eliminated, and the
tiles remain susceptible to damage from it. NASA's current strategy for mitigating this
problem, which so far seems successful, is to aggressively inspect for, assess, and
address any damage that may occur, while on orbit and before reentry, in addition to
on the ground between flights.
These concerns were sufficiently great that NASA did significant work developing an
emergency-use tile repair kit which the first shuttle crew STS-1 could use before
deorbiting. By December 1979 prototypes and early procedures were completed, most
envisioning astronauts equipped with a special in-space repair kit and a jet pack called
the Manned Maneuvering Unit, or MMU, developed by Martin Marietta. Another
element was a maneuverable work platform which would secure an MMU-propelled
spacewalking astronaut to the fragile tiles beneath the orbiter. The concept used
electrically-controlled adhesive cups which would lock the work platform into
position on the featureless tile surface. About one year before the 1981 STS-1 launch,
NASA decided the repair capability was not worth the additional risk and training, so
discontinued development.[2] There were unresolved problems with the repair tools
and techniques; also further tests indicated the tiles were unlikely to come off. The
first shuttle mission did suffer several tile losses, but they were fortunately in non-
critical areas, and no "zipper effect" occurred.
Still now failure in TPS of a Space Shuttle can be Fatal for the scientists going
for a Space Mission.
On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was destroyed on reentry due to a failure of
the TPS. The investigation team found and reported that the probable cause of the accident
was that a piece of foam debris punctured an RCC panel on the left wing leading edge and
allowed hot gases from the reentry to enter the wing and disintegrate the wing from within,
leading to eventual loss of control and breakup of the shuttle.
On 2005's STS-114 mission, in which Discovery made the first flight to follow the Columbia
accident, NASA took a number of steps to verify that the TPS was undamaged.
The 15.2 m-(50-foot)-long Orbiter Boom Sensor System, a new extension to the
Remote Manipulator System, was used to perform laser imaging of the TPS to inspect
for damage.
Prior to docking with the International Space Station, Discovery performed a
Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver, simply a 360° backflip rotation, allowing all areas of the
vehicle to be photographed from ISS. Two gap fillers were protruding from the
orbiter's underside more than the nominally allowed distance, and the agency
cautiously decided it would be best to attempt to remove the fillers or cut them flush
rather than risk the increased heating they would cause. Even though each one
protruded less than 3 cm (1.18 inch), it is believed that leaving them in that state could
cause heating increases of 25% upon reentry.
Because the orbiter doesn't have any handholds on its underside (as they would cause
much more trouble with reentry heating than the protruding gap fillers of concern),
astronaut Stephen K. Robinson worked from the ISS's robotic arm, Canadarm2.
Because the TPS tiles are quite fragile, there had been concern that anyone working
under the vehicle could cause more damage to the vehicle than was already there, but
NASA officials felt that leaving the gap fillers alone was a greater risk. In the event,
Robinson was able to pull the gap fillers free by hand, and caused no damage to the
TPS on Discovery.
7. CONCLUSION
With the recent advancement in space technologies scientists are coming up with new
and advanced materials for TPS and the days are not too far when we can have a
manned space mission to any of the planet in our solar system and TPS won't be a
problem in that.
However reliable the technology becomes a slight inadvertence can cause a mishap
like Columbia so there is always a need to look for a updation in technology.
8. REFERENCES
[1] “When the Space Shuttle finally flies”, article written by Rick Gore. National Geographic
(pp. 316–347. Vol. 159, No. 3. March 1981).
[2] Space Shuttle Operator's Manual, by Kerry Mark Joels and Greg Kennedy (Ballantine
Books, 1982).
[3] Regan, Frank J. (1984). Re-Entry Vehicle Dynamics (AIAA Education Series). New York:
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.. ISBN 0-915928-78-7
[4] A Space Shuttle Chronology, by John F. Guilmartin and John Maurer (NASA Johnson
Space Center, 2003).
[5] Space Shuttle: The Quest Continues, by George Forres (Ian Allen, 1989).
[6] Information Summaries: Countdown! NASA Launch Vehicles and Facilities, (NASA PMS
018-B (KSC), October 1999).
[7] Space Shuttle: The History of Developing the National Space Transportation System, by
Dennis Jenkins (Walsworth Publishing Company, 1996).
[9] http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts-tps.html#sts-hrsi
[10] http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/caib_details_030826.html
[11] http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=634944&id=7