Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (2005) 26: 175–194 Ó Springer 2005

DOI: 10.1007/s11017-005-3976-x

STEPHEN BUCKLE

PETER SINGER’S ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM

ABSTRACT. The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical
tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the Ôdefault
setting’ of ethical thought. It argues that Singer’s argument depends on a hierarchy
of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation – an
extension – of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails
because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his con-
ception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the
immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian
conception of reason as universal and authoritative.

KEY WORDS: moral point of view, self-interest, universalizability, utilitarianism

Peter Singer’s Practical Ethics has been a global best-seller. The

reasons for its success are not hard to find: the book is clearly written
and argued, and defends strikingly distinct views on a wide range of
subjects – from the taking of life in a variety of forms to the obli-
gations of the rich for the poor and of all for the planet. It is sur-
prising, however, that Singer’s underlying argument for these
sometimes startling conclusions has received rather little attention.
That he defends a form of utilitarianism, and that his conclusions
reflect this broad commitment, is well known and frequently con-
tested. But Singer’s own argument for that view, set out briefly in the
opening chapter of Practical Ethics, has received rather less atten-
tion.1 Thus a recent collection of critical articles on Singer’s ethics
offers no sustained assessment of his basic argument.2 One reason for
this neglect is, presumably, because Singer’s argument has been
treated as an abbreviated version of R.M. Hare’s argument for util-
itarianism.3 Singer has often acknowledged his debts to Hare, and his
argument is undoubtedly a version of Hare’s; so the assimilation is
not unreasonable.4 Nevertheless, it is also not unreasonable to ask
Singer’s argument to stand on its own two feet, especially since he
does distinguish his version of the argument from Hare’s.5 To make it
so stand, and to assess it accordingly, is the aim of this paper.
176 STEPHEN BUCKLE

The opening chapter of Practical Ethics, entitled ÔAbout ethics’, is

divided into two parts: ÔWhat ethics is not’ and ÔWhat ethics is: One
view’. The latter section presents Singer’s argument. The former
simply runs through a series of non-starters for serious consideration,
and so does not demand much attention. It is not much more – not
intended to be much more – than a quick tour through some familiar
inadequacies in ethical theorizing. It does, nonetheless, perform one
important task: it sets up the problem that the constructive suc-
ceeding part is intended to solve. So it is worth attending briefly to
that framing of the problem.
The problem Singer aims to solve is set within the history of
twentieth-century meta-ethics. After dispensing with cultural rela-
tivism, he turns to subjectivism. He notes subjectivism’s failure to
account for ethical disagreement, and sketches in how C.L. Steven-
son’s emotivist theory – ethical judgments as the expression, rather
than, as in simple subjectivism, the description, of my subjective
attitudes – offered a resolution of this problem. R.M. Hare’s view of
ethical judgments as prescriptions is then introduced, and also argued
to meet the objection. Singer concludes that both Stevenson’s and
Hare’s views – supported by J.L. Mackie’s account of moral language
as erroneously building in reference to objective properties – can,
because they avoid the problem of simple subjectivism, be accepted as
Ôplausible accounts of ethics’.6 They are all plausible because they
make no reference to Ôa mysterious realm of objective ethical facts’,
but succeed, despite this, in giving a coherent account of the role of
reason in ethics. Since, however, these three all differ on the nature of
that role, and because understanding how reason works in ethics is
important both theoretically (in order to understand what we are
doing when we engage in ethical reasoning) and practically (in order
to guard against going too easily astray), Singer proposes to Ôsay
something about how we can reason in ethics’. So it is with an eye on
this problem that Singer introduces his discussion of Ôwhat ethics is’.
This framing of the issue shows, first, Singer’s focus of attention,
and so explains why other issues that might have been thought rel-
evant to the hunt for ethical foundations are not considered. It also
shows that Singer’s approach, despite its sometimes radical conclu-
sions, lies firmly within the mainstream of twentieth-century
academic ethical theorizing. He faithfully follows in the essentially
non-cognitivist footsteps of his predecessors, to the extent that his
account of ethics could be just another chapter in a standard text of
twentieth-century British ethical thought, such as Warnock’s
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 177

Contemporary Moral Philosophy.7 And it is this mainstream character

that explains Singer’s focus, since it is precisely this non-cognitivist
background that leads him to the thought that the problem in con-
structing an adequate ethical theory is to find a way to fit reason into
it. So the Kantian elements which Singer, following Hare, admits into
his account owe their prominent place in his exposition to the fact
that they are not foundational, but have to be fitted into the essen-
tially non-cognitive framework. For Singer, the place of reason needs
explaining precisely because that role is undeniable – but is not, ex
hypothesi, the very marrow of ethical judgment itself.

SINGER’S ARGUMENT

Singer begins by asking what it is to live by ethical standards. He

distinguishes two ways in which this question could be answered. In
the first sense, to live by ethical standards is to do the right thing (as
judged by another). But this rules out the possibility of genuine ethical
disagreement – the possibility that one can live by ethical standards
that are not shared by some other. So a more neutral characterization
is needed. The second sense provides this. On its terms, to live by
ethical standards is to live according to, not right standards, but
standards themselves – and thus to live this way rather than that
because one believes that this way of living is right. So one lives
according to ethical standards if one can give reasons for one’s chosen
way of living. ÔThe notion of living according to ethical standards is
tied up with the notion of defending the way one is living, of giving a
reason for it, of justifying it’.8 To live ethically is to live according to
standards one can defend – whether or not others share those stan-
dards. It is best contrasted, then, not with living badly, but with living
according to no standards at all.9
There is a further requirement to be made. Singer claims that some
kinds of reason-giving do not add up to living according to ethical
standards: Ôa justification in terms of self-interest alone will not do ...
for the notion of ethics carries with it something bigger than the
individual’. Justifications fail to be ethical if they point only to the
ways they benefit me: ÔI must address myself to a larger audience’.10
Moreover, I must do that not merely by addressing myself to such an
audience, but by including myself within it: I must formulate my
standards as universal judgments that apply to me because they apply
equally to all. There are many formulations of this type of thought in
178 STEPHEN BUCKLE

the history of ethical theorizing, but they all agree that Ôan ethical
principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional
group. Ethics takes a universal point of view’.11
Singer now argues that this universal characteristic of ethics is
the clue to filling in some basic ethical content. He argues that it
shows that being ethical requires me to go beyond my Ônatural’ point
of view: Ômy very natural concern that my own interests be looked
after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the interests of
others’.12 Singer next identifies interests with desires in order, he
says, to give the broadest possible scope to the argument: Ôif we
define ‘‘interests’’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people
desire as in their interests ... then it would seem that at this pre-
ethical stage, only one’s interests can be relevant to the decision’
about how to act.13 Therefore, when seeking to act ethically, I will
go beyond my own interests, and so recognize that the interests of
others must count equally with my own. Acting ethically thus
Ôrequires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of
action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected ... I
must choose the course of action that has the best consequences, on
balance, for all affected’.14
Plainly, this is a form of utilitarianism – it is, in fact, preference
utilitarianism – so Singer concludes that the onus of proof falls on
those who wish to go Ôbeyond’ utilitarianism. The utilitarian view Ôis a
minimal one, a first base that we reach by universalizing self-inter-
ested decision-making’. Therefore, Ôwe cannot, if we are to think
ethically, refuse to take this step’.15 The basic sequence of the argu-
ment is thus as follows: we begin with a natural attitude of self-
interest; we universalize across all the individual self-interests in a
population, thereby extending our narrow regard for our own
interests into an equal regard for the interests of all. Our natural
desire to get what we desire is thus transformed into the desire to
bring about (as much as possible of) what everyone desires – what-
ever they happen to desire, since all desires are equal. This is utili-
tarianism – specifically, preference utilitarianism – and so Ôthe
utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base’ for ethical thinking.
Universalizing is necessary for ethics, and universalizing brings us to
preference-utilitarianism. So it is a position that must be arrived at,
and also a position deviations from which must be justified.16 Singer’s
view can be summed up, then, by describing utilitarianism as the
Ôdefault setting’ of ethical thinking.
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 179

ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT

Singer’s argument presents itself as an attempt to argue from the form

of ethical judgment to its content. For this reason, it has an air of a
magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat – by saying things in the right
way, one finds oneself in possession of the real thing. This is itself
sufficient reason to be suspicious that there is some sleight-of-hand
involved; and so objections to such styles of argumentation are not
uncommon. Nevertheless, the objection to be raised here is not
focused on this feature of Singer’s argument; rather I will argue that
his argument is flawed, first, because of its starting-point in self-
interest, and, more deeply, because it relies on an unstable and
unconvincing combination of empiricist and rationalist commitments.
The argument’s central problem is contained, in microcosm as it
were, in Singer’s concluding remarks: that utilitarianism is a neces-
sary minimum because it is Ôa first base that we reach by universal-
izing self-interested decision-making’, that Ôwe cannot, if we are to
think ethically, refuse to take this step’. But it should be plain that
these are not equivalent claims. It is one thing to argue that utili-
tarianism arises if we universalize self-interested decision-making. It
is, however, quite another to argue that ethical thinking requires us to
take this step – for this is to claim that ethical thinking can arise in no
other way than by universalizing self-interested decision-making.
Singer has provided no argument for believing this to be true. He
has simply given us some examples of self-interested thinking and
shown that these can be fitted to the shape of ethical judgments by
extending their scope to include others as well. So it seems that his
argument would be more accurately put by saying that some ethical
judgments – those that arise from universalizing self-interested deci-
sion-making – must have a preference utilitarian shape, and therefore
that preference utilitarian thinking has a necessary place within eth-
ics. This conclusion may well be true and useful; but it is a long way
from the view that such utilitarianism is the ethical Ôdefault setting’
from which other kinds of ethical judgment can deviate only because
of special additional reasons.
Is there any reason why we should accept that ethical judgments can
arise only by way of universalizing self-interested decision-making?
One very good reason why we should not think so is that it renders
ethics entirely unmotivated. If self-interestedness is our starting-point,
what possible reason can there be to start universalizing? As Singer is
at pains to point out, to universalize is to demote my own interests to
180 STEPHEN BUCKLE

the level of the interests of others. (This is why self-interested Ôjusti-

fications’ are ruled out.) But, if my natural attitude is self-interest, it
follows that one thing that is not in my interests is to start univer-
salizing! To universalize is, then, for the self-interested, simply to lapse
into irrationality. It seems, then, that Singer’s starting-point leads not
to utilitarianism but to a farewell to ethics.
This problem will not go away even if we suppose that ethical
practices have, for some reason, already established themselves. The
very same shortcoming would repeat itself. If I am a natural person
motivated by the natural attitude of self-interest, and I want to do
one thing, but the established ethical – universalizing – thing to do is
something else, then I have no reason to prefer the ethical course to
my own actual preference. Even if everyone else wanted to do the
ethical, and wanted me also to do the same, then the reasons I would
have to be ethical would not be ethical reasons. I would instead have
every reason to hold, with Thrasymachus, that the ethical is simply
the interest of the stronger.17 Being in the minority, and so the weaker
party, self-interest would compel me to adopt the approved course;
but I could in no sense be under any obligation that I could recognize
as binding me. My conformity would spring entirely from self-
interest, not from universalized equality of interests. As such, it might
mimic utilitarianism, but would not affirm it. In such a world, for-
mally universal judgments could only ever be a cover for sheer power.
So not only is Singer’s argument unable to establish any kind of
ethical world; it also cannot sustain one already in existence.
Of course, the problems uncovered here arise because self-interest
has been treated as the fundamental outlook. So it might be objected
that, although Singer does argue as if it is, he does not explicitly
defend it; so perhaps charity demands that the two aspects on which
he relies – self-interest and an impulse to universalize – be treated as
equal forces within the human breast. Then the argument would not
collapse before it starts. True enough; but a new problem arises in its
stead. If the tendency to universalize is an equal force alongside self-
interest, there is no good reason for arguing in Singer’s order: that is,
for adding universalizing tendencies to pre-established self-interest.
This is to treat self-interest as primary and universalizing as sec-
ondary. So why not the other way round? Then we would have an
argument that begins with a (not-yet-defined) natural tendency to
universal judgments, to which we add another human tendency, to
pursue self-interest. Such an argument would arrive not at an outlook
of universalization extending self-interest, but of a universalism con-
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 181

strained by self-interest. Just what such a Ôuniversalism’ might be has

not been specified, of course; but it is not hard to think of candidates
that would fit the bill. A doctrine of fundamental human duties with
some self-interest-based excusing clauses (e.g., a right of necessity) is
one obvious example. So a charitable amendment to Singer’s argu-
ment – an amendment necessary to get his argument off the ground –
reveals his conclusion to be arbitrary, since his two premises equally
readily give rise to utterly opposed views.
Another way to put the problem is that Singer’s argument does
not simply depend on two premises – one concerning self-interest,
another concerning universal judgments – but on the order of reasons.
The second premise is not of equal stature to the first, but merely
imposes a limit on its operation. The ordering is, in other words, also
a hierarchy of reasons. So what explains this ordering? Here the
answer is simple – and it also explains why we have encountered
the problems we have. Singer’s order of reasons reflects the under-
lying non-cognitivist commitments of the contemporary British
meta-ethical tradition.

THE META-ETHICAL BACKGROUND: HUME AND KANT

The British tradition is, in its pure form, emotivist, built on Hume’s
subordination of reason to passion. Singer’s version is not simply
reducible to emotivism, since on his account reason is not the
unqualified servant of passion; it is not a mere tool deployed by
passion-based interests for their own better advantage. As has been
noted above, the effect of rational universalization is to limit the
extent to which passion-based (individual) interests are served. This
feature of his argument reflects the background influence of Hare’s
prescriptivism, with its explicit claim to have reconciled Hume with
Kant. This reconciliation, however, does not go deep. In fact, it
cannot, since central to Kant’s project is the requirement that reason
be authoritative for us: that it establish laws for us by determining the
ends of (imperfectly) rational beings, and thereby judge the desires
and goals we happen to have. This requirement simply cannot be
reconciled with the Humean dictum that reason does not rule, but
serves – and so must accept desires as prescribing our natural ends.
So the universality of Kantian rational law-giving bears only super-
ficial similarity with the formal universalization in Hare’s prescrip-
tivism, and its role in Singer’s argument is enough to show it. To add
182 STEPHEN BUCKLE

on a requirement of universality to a simply given natural attitude of

self-interest is, certainly, to limit the free exercise of that interest; but
it is not to judge it. This is evident from the fact that, if it were to
judge it, then what I have called the order of reasons in Singer’s
argument (the priority of the natural attitude premise over the uni-
versalizing premise) would be of no account: to introduce reason as a
second premise would not be to introduce it as a subordinate premise.
But a subordinate premise it plainly is, as the effect of reversing the
order has shown.
So, in the end, the role of reason in Singer’s argument shows its
basic outlook to be only a variation on the emotivist theme. Reason is
introduced, and under the banner of a universally-commanding fac-
ulty – only to fail to command. Its role is rather like that of a dip-
lomatic peace mission. The mission has no power to force compliance
with any given peace plan; all it can do is offer an even-handed
solution, and hope that the long-term benefits of giving up on conflict
serve to persuade the various parties that co-operation will not turn
out to be loss. That is, self-interest is universalized, thus arriving at a
scheme of equal consideration of interests. This far but no farther is
reason allowed to Ôprescribe’. The fairness of the scheme is not itself a
reason for adopting it; it must, presumably, persuade through the
perception of the mutual benefits of peaceful coexistence. That is to
say, the mission’s prescriptions do not command respect; they can
only be accorded Ôrespect’ where the relevant passions allow – and this
is, of course, only a simulacrum of genuine respect.
So Kant’s reason – the authoritative tribunal before which any
interested desire may be judged and found wanting – here makes no
appearance. The crucial role of the order of reasons reveals that the
conception of ethical reasoning (if not of the human being) remains,
as Singer acknowledges,18 fundamentally Humean. This is why the
introduction of the universality requirement in the argument is so
arbitrary: we are simply told that ethics means justification means
universality, without there being any explanation of why the set of
concerns implicit in these connections can present themselves as
authoritative for the natural attitude of self-interest. (Or, to put it
another way, of how these conceptions of the ethical and of the
natural attitudes can be fitted together into a coherent psychology.)
Kant’s theory does not suffer from this problem, since it is built on
the foundation that we are (imperfectly) rational beings. Our natural
attitude is therefore a form of (imperfect) rationality, the mutual
possession of which is (imperfectly) recognized by each and all,
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 183

therefore giving rise (however dimly recognized) to mutual respect as

a fundamental datum of human relations. Take that foundation away
– propose self-interest as the fundamental orientation of the human
being – and the grounds for respecting reason’s requirements just
disappear. The reduction of reason’s role in the theory – from
authoritative judge to mere formal limitation – is itself best regarded
as evidence of the problem. It is certainly not a solution.
To show that the prescriptivist style of ethical reasoning is not a
reconciliation of Hume and Kant, but a basically Humean picture
with a Kantian-derived add-on, explains several things. It explains
why the order of reasons is a crucial feature of the argument. And it
also explains why the add-on is (and must be) both arbitrary and
entirely devoid of authority for anyone possessing the posited natural
attitude of self-interest. But, since, for the prescriptivist, this add-on is
the ethical point of view itself, the problem here is absolutely funda-
mental: Singer’s argument cannot explain not only why we should be
moral when it doesn’t suit us, but why we should be moral at all. The
Hume–Kant Ôreconciliation’ leaves him, foundationally-speaking, in
the worst of all possible worlds.
At bottom, the issue is this: the Humean approach to ethics cannot
but result in an account of morality in which obligations can only
ever be hypothetical. In Hume’s account, the fact of reason’s sub-
ordination to passion is not itself the problem, since he grounds ethics
not in reason but in the operations of a disinterested, sympathetic
passion. This passion, however, lacks necessary authority over our
other, self-interested passions, so whether we are moved by moral
concerns or not is always a contingent matter. So, on Hume’s
account, the answer to the question ÔWhy be moral’? is: because you
want to be moral – when you want to be moral (and this is at least
some of the time). In other words, the obligation to be moral arises
from the natural attitude of disinterestedness; but this obligation is
only hypothetical (or conditional) because it is always in competition
with another natural attitude, that of self-interestedness. These two
attitudes are equally natural – neither can exert any stable authority
over the other – and so, for Hume, moral obligations cannot be
categorically authoritative. (Hume’s discussion of Ôthe sensible knave’
is his – somewhat uncomfortable – admission of the point.19)
The prescriptivist outlook can be considered an attempt to over-
come this shortcoming in the Humean view. It is the so-called Ômoral
ought’ of categorical obligation that the prescriptivist hopes to deliver
in his theory, and the focus on universalizability is a means to that
184 STEPHEN BUCKLE

end: to hold that ethical judgments are universal in scope is a way of

requiring moral obligation to be undeflectable, and therefore to be
categorical. This is no doubt a worthy goal; but it is completely
undermined by the position’s relict Humeanism. The problem is, first,
that prescriptivism rejects Hume’s conception of ethics as arising
from a distinctive disinterested passion. It implicitly reduces all pas-
sions to self-interest, and then attempts to build ethics from the
imposition of a rational limitation on those self-interested passions.20
But, secondly, all these dreams of limitation must fail because pre-
scriptivism retains Hume’s dictum that reason serves passion (as the
order of reasons in the argument shows). So the theory attempts to
establish the ethical point of view by introducing a form of rational
authority over our self-interested natural attitude – despite all the
while denying that such authority is possible. The mixing together of
Humean and Kantian elements has not produced a new synthesis in
which their differences are overcome, but a thoroughly jumbled
ethical position.

WHY BE MORAL?

The problem shows up plainly in Singer’s view when we ask for the
reason why, on his account, we should be moral. Hume admits to the
problem, but also points out the advantages of choosing the moral
life. He also explains the social force of morality, since, on his
account, the disinterested passions, although weaker in each indi-
vidual than the self-interested ones, have a cumulative force across a
population, whereas the self-interested ones, being mutually opposed
in their aims tend to cancel each other out. Thus my concern for fair
treatment of all, and your concern for the same, are mutually rein-
forcing, and explain a strong social concern for fair treatment. But
my desire to use you for my advantage, and your desire to use me for
your advantage, cannot both be satisfied, and so cancel each other
out. Across the society as a whole, then, disinterested passions
dominate, despite being weaker in each individual breast.21
So Hume’s answer is that, although morals are founded only on
our desire to act from a disinterested motive – and so only when we
happen to have the desire – the social reality established by this
process is more powerful than the mechanism itself, because its very
disinterestedness means that it is magnified across a population.
Moral obligation is merely hypothetical; but from a practical point of
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 185

view – from the point of view of social enforcement – hypothetical

obligations are, most of the time, just as effective as are categorical
obligations. The absence of strict (logical) foundations for morals
does not mean the absence of firm (pragmatic) foundations.22 The
Ômoral ought’ – the sense of a categorical imperative – is an inevitable
social fact.23
Hume’s sociological resolution cannot suffice for Singer. In the
first place, as already noted, he recognizes no natural moral moti-
vation comparable to the other-regarding Ômoral sense’ of Hume and
his fellow-sentimentalists. He thus cannot avail himself of Hume’s
sociological story. He does admit that ethically-indefensible behav-
iour will always be with us, and so Ôwill probably always need the
sanctions of the law and social pressure’ if they are to be contained.24
However, Singer cannot appeal to a shared moral psychology to
explain why such laws and social pressure will themselves flow from
ethically admirable foundations – and so cannot explain why such a
situation is a solution, rather than another form of bad, or at least
mixed, news. The rich who combine to construct a social order to
protect their interests, and so develop a system in which persons and
property enjoy legal protection, undoubtedly do some social good;
but at the same time they entrench inequalities and so also the con-
ditions that make attacks on persons and property inevitable. In
short, unless the laws and social pressures themselves pass moral
muster it is difficult to see why their undeniably coercive effects can
be regarded with ethical equanimity. In fact, given that Singer is a
moral radical who considers our ordinary moral practices to be
seriously deficient, it is difficult to see why his introduction of the
laws and pressures that derive from them does not, in this context,
actually amount to a counsel of despair.
This point can be generalized to bring out the basic difference
between Singer and Hume on this issue. Singer is a moral cam-
paigner, who seeks to change our ordinary moral beliefs and
behaviour, both as individuals and as a society. In contrast, Hume’s
account is essentially descriptive, and accepts that whatever is, is
(roughly) right. The argument of the Treatise aims to show how
moral and political beliefs develop, and that of the second Enquiry
aims to reveal the underlying determinants of the moral values we
actually have. He does allow that bad metaphysics can have a
corrupting effect, as his remarks about the religious saint – the
Ôgloomy hair-brained enthusiast’25 – show. But his project is to
show us that, in general terms, we already agree on what is good
186 STEPHEN BUCKLE

and what not, and that anomalies are recognizable as such. Obvi-
ously, Singer cannot settle for such a strongly descriptive project.
His aim is moral reform, to convince us that our ordinary everyday
valuations are corrupt – speciesist, etc. – and so to be overcome.
For him, the (relevantly defined) saint is not a figure of scorn, a
buffoon, but an ideal by which (he hopes) we will be inspired. Thus
it is no accident that in the pages of his works we are introduced to
various inspiring figures, and even to letters and the like from
readers who have themselves learnt to transform their lives along
the recommended lines.26
The contrast could not be greater. For Hume, morality is what we
naturally practise, and the merely hypothetical foundation, although
less than we might desire, is shown to be sufficient for most tasks by
the fact that morality has the social force it has. For Singer, however,
true morality is what we have never fully understood and should now
embrace: so we must be persuaded. But at this point, the merely
hypothetical foundation cannot but be felt. Why should we abandon
our old ways and adopt the new standard? Singer can have no better
answer than that we should, if we want to. But what if we do not want
to change? Well, perhaps we can be brought to want the moral life on
the Singer plan, be persuaded to change our ways by coming to see
that the alternative life would be better for us, given what we already
care about. Hence the introduction of the exemplary stories already
mentioned: their job is, like Hume’s reflections in response to the
sensible knave, to bring us to see the often-hidden benefits of the
moral life.
These benefits need not be scorned, of course – but how are such
stories to work? If we are to assess them in the light cast by Singer’s
basic argument for utilitarianism, with its starting-point in natural
self-interest, we must take them to be appeals to that natural attitude:
that life will go better for us if we liberate ourselves from our stan-
dard interpretations of the requirement of our natural attitudes. The
path to personal happiness – to getting what we want out of life – is
not the path of self-interested calculation, but its opposite, the life
devoted to the good of all. Happiness is achieved by overcoming
one’s natural inclination to seek it directly: it is Ôa by-product of
aiming at something else, and not to be obtained by setting our sights
on happiness alone’.27 So self-interest teaches us not to be concerned
only with ourselves, but to discover satisfaction through our
engagement with goals that go beyond ourselves.
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 187

This is, again, a plausible story; but the important question is how
it squares with Singer’s account of the nature of ethical thinking.
There is no doubt that there is a distinct shift in the wind here. We
were led to believe that we needed to overcome our natural attitude in
order to be ethical; now we are told, in effect, that the justification for
the moral life lies in enlightened self-interest, which teaches that
personal happiness can be sought only indirectly. It seems, then, that
the difference between the natural and the ethical points of view is not
a bedrock difference after all – rather the difference between naivety
and sophistication. And this throws a light on the ethical life quite
different from what we have come to expect. Most notably, it implies
that the fundamental reason why we should be ethical – in Singer’s
terms, why we should consider others’ interests as equal to our own –
is not because they are equal to our own, but because, in the long run,
it pays off for us to do so. The sharp contrast Singer presents, in his
argument for utilitarianism, between natural self-interest and ethical
thinking is thus dissolved: ethics does not require us to extend our
concern beyond ourselves after all; all it requires is that we recognize
the need to realize that concern indirectly, by acting as if the interests
of others mattered equally with our own. It seems, in other words,
that, for Singer, ethics must rest on a foundation of carefully-calcu-
lated (or as he calls it, Ôprudent’) egoism.
It is therefore striking indeed that Singer rejects this conclusion.
Perhaps his reasons include the thought that regard for others based
on self-interest is a mere simulacrum of the genuinely ethical point of
view; but, whatever his precise reasons, there is no doubt that he
recognizes its inadequacy. He observes, in the closing pages of
Practical Ethics, that the justification for ethics must ultimately lie in
a plausible account of the meaning of life, and that, for that purpose,
Ôprudent egoism’ is not enough.28 Meeting the demand for mean-
ingfulness requires us Ôto go beyond a personal point of view to the
standpoint of an impartial spectator ... looking at things ethically is a
way of transcending our inward-looking concerns and identifying
ourselves with the most objective point of view possible – with, as
Sidgwick put it, ‘‘the point of view of the universe’’ ’.29
This is, as he says, a Ôlofty standpoint’. It is especially so if we insist
on his preferred, Sidgwickian, formulation, rather than the poten-
tially less-demanding idea of the impartial spectator. The problem
with adopting it, however, is that it plays havoc with his utilitarian
argument. This is plain enough with the impartial spectator version.
The spectator is impartial precisely because not self-interested; but
188 STEPHEN BUCKLE

this feature alone is not enough to give the spectator a constructive

role. An additional mechanism is needed. For actual impartial
spectator theorists like Hume (and, to a lesser degree, Adam Smith),
it is our sympathetic psychology that connects up the viewpoint of the
spectator with a broadly utilitarian outlook: my concern for others
depends on the immediate pleasure I take in their happiness, and so I
am naturally led to approve the happiness of all. Lacking this psy-
chology, Singer has no available means for connecting the two; and,
worse, his own argument from the extension of natural self-interest is
directly undercut by it. For neither the impartial spectator nor the
Ôpoint of view of the universe’ is an extension of natural self-interest:
each is an alternative – or replacement – for it. ÔPrudent egoism’ must
be left behind – not Ôextended’ – if we are to reach the lofty summit he
has in mind. So, even for Singer himself, the ethical point of view is
not adequately characterized by the extending – universalizing – of
our natural self-interest; but, as argued above, it is only by conceiving
of it as originating in such extension that the utilitarian Ôdefault
setting’ is established. Singer’s exalted sense of the ethical standpoint
is thus itself sufficient to bring down his utilitarian argument.
Why does he fail to see this? The answer would seem to lie in his
Humean assumption of the subordination of reason. It was,
remember, that assumption that explained the significance of the
Ôorder of reasons’ in his argument, and he does explicitly affirm his
commitment to it. So perhaps it is an inability seriously to question
that assumption that blinds him to just how far his conclusion takes
him from his official starting-point in the Ônatural attitude’. At least,
some such story seems necessary to explain why he does not see the
deep tension between the adoption of the Ôpoint of view of the uni-
verse’ and the Humean account of reasons for moral action. The
problem can be put in terms of the ends of human life: the Humean
account, as he observes, restricts reason’s role to means and not ends;
but the Ôpoint of view of the universe’ cannot, if it is to be taken at
anywhere near face value, be so restricted. To sum up, in such a way,
the meaning of human existence cannot but be to identify, and even
to judge, the ends of human existence – and therefore to allow reason
a role that goes beyond mere service to the passions.30 It seems, then,
that, however unintentionally, Singer presents us with a dilemma:
Humeanism about reason – or ethics?
So, why be Humean about reason? Singer himself offers no
independent argument, settling for pointing out that it Ôhas stood up
to criticism remarkably well’.31 This may perhaps be so – it is beyond
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 189

the scope of this paper to pursue the issue – but Singer’s own troubles
here are themselves reason to think it more specious than true. If
ethics, understood in terms of judgements made from a universalistic
point of view, is to be defensible, it seems that the choices are stark.
Humeanism about reason cannot approach that point of view with-
out further psychological commitments of a broadly Humean cast;
and even then it still falls short of Ôthe point of view of the universe’ if
that point of view is thought to impose categorical obligations. If,
then, ethics is to have the status that Singer hopes it to have, it would
seem that he needs to provide a more positive account of human
rationality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Singer cannot bridge the two ends of his theory. On the one hand, his
Humeanism about reason (but not about human nature) leads him to
his initial narrow characterization of the natural attitude as mere self-
interest. These commitments also explain the role of the order of
reasons in his argument, and the attendant thought that ethics arises
by extending regard for interests from ourselves to all – from which
the utilitarian conclusion arises. This would be all very well – it would
be consistent – if he were also to accept that the reason for living the
moral life is that, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, it pays
off to do so. Then ethics would be the point of view that the prudent
egoist adopts on the basis of experience and reflection: that the path
to happiness is and must be indirect. It would be the discovery that
we must act as if the interests of others matter to us equally with our
own, the better thereby to achieve our own goals.
Singer does not, however, accept this consistent view. He holds
that the genuinely ethical viewpoint is not some form of prudent
egoism, but depends on getting outside one’s interests altogether. It is
Ôthe point of view of the universe’: the viewpoint from which all
interests are judged for their worth, irrespective of who it is who
possesses them. It is thus a viewpoint quite beyond the reach of
prudent egoism. To recognize this is to explain both why Singer
insists on the universality of ethical judgments, and why he under-
stands that universality to impose a constraint (and not mere indi-
rection) on self-interested behaviour. But it is also to explain why no
amount of extending of the viewpoint of natural self-interest can
arrive at the genuine universality of the ethical point of view, and so
190 STEPHEN BUCKLE

why the naturally self-interested individual has no good reason to live

the moral life.
If, then, morality is to be justified, it is plain what is needed.
Singer’s lofty conception of the ethical point of view must be con-
ceived to lie within the grasp of ordinary human beings. Some
capacity for universality – for stepping outside one’s interests and
evaluating things for what they are – must be recognized in human
nature, and so built into the natural attitude itself. Candidates are
available. One is the ÔHumeanism’ Singer ignores: the moral sense
tradition’s conception of a primitive sympathetic regard for the good
of others. This allows reasoning to proceed in the light of pre-existing
other-regarding concerns, and so removes the obstacle to thinking
beyond oneself that stymies the natural attitude as presented by
Singer. The problems with this route are twofold. First, it is not
obvious that natural sympathies will deliver the universality Singer
seeks: as Hume emphasizes, the benevolence built into human nature
is only of limited extent. Secondly, this approach delivers only
hypothetical obligations; and obligations of this kind, although per-
haps sufficient for explaining actual human moral beliefs and
behaviour, cannot generate the conviction that our ordinary moral
practices are (categorically) wrong – and so cannot found the moral
revolution Singer seeks.
The second major candidate for filling out the natural attitude is
embarrassingly familiar. It is the ancient idea that the human being
is the rational animal, and thus the animal whose natural desires
can be placed under the authority of reason. On this conception of
human nature, reason is not simply added to self-interest, whether
as instrument or merely formal limiting device. Rather, reason and
its natural concern with truth and knowledge – and with acting in
their light – must be recognized to be integral to the natural attitude
itself. Of course, just what this amounts to will vary with different
theories, and it is no part of the aim of this paper to settle the issue.
It should be plain, however, that, among other possibilities, the
recognizably-deontological picture derived above by reversing
Singer’s order of reasons cannot be ruled out. I conclude, then, that,
despite Singer’s argument for a utilitarian Ôdefault setting’, tradi-
tional deontology remains one of the live options for contemporary
moral philosophy. More generally, I conclude that the internal
tensions in Singer’s and comparably-grounded views give us good
reason to reconsider the nature and place of rationality in human
nature – including good reason to examine afresh those moral
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 191

theories which do seek to accord reason a central and, not least, a

governing role.
It may therefore be enlightening to close with a backward glance
at one such theory. In the ÔDoctrine of the Methods of Ethics’ at the
end of his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant provides a sample fragment
of a moral catechism. The argument of this catechism is, given the
purposes of this paper, singular indeed. It begins from a starting-
point very much like Singer’s, with the student’s desire for personal
happiness. Moreover, it proceeds from there to the student’s
expressing a comparable concern for the happiness of all, although –
as might be expected, given Kant’s one-time enthusiasm for
Hutcheson’s moral theory – this widening horizon is the effect of
natural feeling, not of a requirement of formal universalization. From
this point, however, things take quite a different turn. They do so not
merely because rational reflection enters the frame, but because it
enters authoritatively, with the power to review the conclusion already
reached. The teacher asks the student if this concern for the happiness
of others extends to cushions for the idle, drink for the drunkard, and
other similar aids to indulgence of one’s desires, no matter what those
desires might be. The student resists – and so, as the teacher points
out, thereby shifts the focus from the desire to maximize some natural
good to the question of what kinds of life are worthy of happiness.
The student accepts that this question applies even to himself. So the
question arises of how one should live: how one should govern one’s
natural desires, given that we care about not happiness alone, but
also worthiness to be happy. The question arises because the student
naturally comes to accept the necessity of subjecting actual desires to
reflective scrutiny. Once this much is established, distinctively Kan-
tian conclusions quickly arrive: worthiness to be happy requires that
reason must rule over inclination; the power to do so is free will;
reason establishes laws; and the law that reason lays directly on a
human being is duty. So worthiness to be happy depends on the free
observance of duty.32
The point of this example is not to argue for Kant’s ethics. It is
simply to illustrate that the starting-point of Singer’s argument for
utilitarianism leads to his conclusions only if reason is denied the
authority to review where that starting-point leads. It therefore
reinforces the conclusions already reached. Singer’s starting-point is
not merely a neutral place from which to begin, but a first principle,
to which all else is subject – as shown by the order of his reasons.
Further, that first principle of natural self-interest reflects the influ-
192 STEPHEN BUCKLE

ence of the Humean conception of reason, an influence acknowledged

but not seriously defended. But it is not only alternative conceptions
of reason that are passed over; Hume’s sympathetic psychology –
another means by which the self-interest of the natural attitude could
be transcended – is also ignored. The fundamental role of the argu-
ment’s natural attitude is therefore not adequately justified; and the
same applies to the utilitarian conclusions to which it gives rise.
Utilitarian moral thinking is therefore no more than one possibility
amongst others; and Kant’s catechism shows that those others
include precisely the kinds of theories Singer’s argument is meant to
defeat. It must therefore be concluded that the argument is a failure.
Singer has, however, reason to welcome the fact, since the argument
cannot justify his own lofty conception of the ethical point of view.

NOTES
1
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), Ch. 1; the bulk of the chapter is reprinted in Singer, ed., Writings on an Ethical
Life (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), pp. 7–17.
2
That is, as distinct from discussions of some aspects of it. Dale Jamieson, ed.,
Singer and His Critics (Blackwell, 1999).
3
R.M. Hare, ÔEthical Theory and Utilitarianism’, in Utilitarianism and Beyond,
eds. Amartya Sen and Bernard William (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), pp. 23–38; and more fully in Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and
Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), esp. Ch. 6.
4
Singer identifies it as such in his notes at the end of Practical Ethics, p. 361. He
also acknowledges a general indebtedness to Hare in other places, e.g. in Singer and
His Critics, pp. 269, 322.
5
Singer observes that his own argument Ôdoes not go as far as the argument to be
found in Moral Thinking’ (Practical Ethics, p. 361).
6
Practical Ethics, p. 7; Writings, p. 12.
7
G. J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1967).
8
Practical Ethics, p. 10; Writings, p. 13.
9
One way of summing up Singer’s point here is that he is interested in the sense of
morality that is opposed to amorality, rather than in the sense opposed to immorality.
10
Practical Ethics, p. 10; Writings, p. 14.
11
Practical Ethics, p. 11; Writings, p. 15.
12
Practical Ethics, pp. 12–13; Writings, p. 16.
13
Practical Ethics, p. 13; Writings, p. 16.
14
Practical Ethics, p. 13; Writings, p. 16.
15
Practical Ethics, p. 14; Writings, p. 17.
16
Practical Ethics, p. 14; Writings, p. 17.
17
Plato, Republic, trans. D. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 338c.
18
Practical Ethics, pp. 320–321.
 ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM 193
19
David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 9.22–25.
20
Singer’s tendency to talk of extending the natural attitude has already been noted.
The same thought explains both the content and title of another of his works, The
Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
21
Hume, Enquiry, 9.4-9.
22
Cf. Karl Popper’s remark that foundation-piles do not have to reach bedrock to
be effective. A multitude of piles driven into swampy undersurface can do the job
well enough: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p. 111.
23
This means that Hume sidesteps the contemporary version of the Ôis-ought
problem’. Moral obligations are on his account merely hypothetical, so for him it
matters not whether any categorical Ôought’ can be derived from Ôis’ premises. What
matters is that, from the standpoint of (broadly-speaking) moral sense theory, a
pragmatically-equivalent Ôought’ can be derived. See David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.1.1.27.
24
Practical Ethics, p. 335.
25
Hume, Enquiry, 9.3.
26
See, for example, the cases of Henry Spira and Christine Townend in Singer, How
Are We To Live? Ethics In An Age of Self-Interest (Melbourne: Text Publishing,
1993), pp. 219–225; and, again on Spira, in Writings, pp. 283–289.
27
Practical Ethics, p. 332.
28
Practical Ethics, p. 332.
29
Practical Ethics, p. 334.
30
Hume’s own view is not simply that human beings do in fact value according to
the principles of usefulness and agreeableness to oneself and others, but that they
properly do so – that to identify underlying principles is simultaneously to identify
norms, even if only norms for us. If these connections are not granted, his attack on
the Ôgloomy hair-brained enthusiast’ must be regarded as both philosophically and
morally unjustified.
31
Practical Ethics, p. 321.
32
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and
ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6: 480–482.

REFERENCES

Hare, R.M. ÔEthical Theory and Utilitarianism’. In Utilitarianism and Beyond. Edited
by A. Sen, & B. Williams. 23–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Hare, R.M. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981.
Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1998.
Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Jamieson, D., ed. Singer and His Critics. Blackwell, 1999.
Kant, I. (1996) The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy. Edited and
translated by M.J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
194 STEPHEN BUCKLE

Plato, Republic. Translated by D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987.

Popper, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1972.
Singer, P. The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981.
Singer, P. How Are We To Live? Ethics In An Age of Self-Interest. Melbourne: Text
Publishing, 1993.
Singer, P. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Singer, P. Writings on an Ethical Life. London: Fourth Estate, 2000.
Warnock, G.J. Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Macmillan, 1967.

Plunkett Centre for Ethics

School of Philosophy
Australian Catholic University
Locked Bag, 2002
Strathfield, NSW, 2135
Australia
E-mail: s.buckle@plunkett.acu.edu.au