The MILITARY BALANCE 2011

PressArundel
Statement
House, London
8 March 2011
remarks by
Dr John Chipman
Director-General and Chief Executive
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

INTRODUCTION expanding number of states. Thus, using The Military

Welcome to the launch of the 2011 edition of The Military Balance, it is possible to make time-series comparisons over
Balance. many years of states’ defence spending, military personnel
Joining me to respond to your questions today are: numbers, and equipment holdings. But it is entirely valid to
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia; ask how much this tells us about real military capabilities:
Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace; the ability of states to deter potential adversaries and, if
Brigadier Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Forces; James necessary, to deploy and use military force effectively.
Hackett, Editor, The Military Balance; Tim Huxley, Director The IISS already includes substantial qualitative
for Military and Defence Analysis; Nigel Inkster, Director analysis in The Military Balance, in order to strengthen its
for Transnational Threats; Christian Le Mière, Research utility to those assessing military capability. For example,
Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security; Rahul for many air forces we indicate the number of flying
Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia; and Adam hours per operational pilot. We include a table showing
Ward, Director of Studies. selected major military exercises and training activities.
Since the launch of the previous edition of The Military We provide extensive narrative surveys for each region,
Balance last year, the IISS has substantially boosted its which among other things highlight national efforts to
capacity to collect, collate and analyse military data, and develop military capability.
to organise research projects on important developments We recognise, though, that The Military Balance could
in defence policy and armed forces globally, through more systematically take account of a fuller range of
establishing its new Defence and Military Analysis factors contributing to contemporary national military
Programme, known as DMAP. This programme already capabilities. Specifically, we plan in future editions to
constitutes a substantial and key element of the Institute’s assess key states’ capacities in areas such as logistics and
overall research activity. combat support, C4ISR, training, joint-service operations,
While DMAP is now engaged on important research and interoperability with allies. In that light, we expect to
projects that will find their published outlets in articles
for our journal Survival, books in the Adelphi series, and
in some cases Strategic Dossiers, producing the annual
Military Balance is a key responsibility for the programme’s
research staff.
In the Military Balance that we are launching today,
you will find improvements compared with previous
editions. Chapters on the war in Afghanistan, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and the military dimension of cyberspace
provide additional specialist analysis. The whole of Asia is
now included in a single chapter, reflecting the increasing
integration of the continent’s security relationships,
cooperative and adversarial alike. We have thoroughly
re-examined and revised the systems we use to classify
naval vessels and some types of military aircraft. We are
planning more profound changes to the structure, content
and appearance of The Military Balance to take effect next
year.
Since its beginnings fifty years ago, The Military
Balance has provided an increasingly detailed record of
the numerical indicators of the military strength of an

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 Press Launch
THe MILITARY BALANCE 2011 Arundel House, London
8 March 2011
Page 2 of 4
Information as of mid-December 2010. Units below baalion level are not shown. The military symbols of ISAF nevertheless forcing the Pentagon and US armed services
units show their normal role, but in the majority of cases these units are operating in a specific task organisation
for their mission and have been allocated theatre-specific equipment such as heavy APCs and protected patrol
vehicles, and counter-IED equipment.
to search hard for efficiency savings that can be reinvested
Estimated troop contributions of NATO–ISAF nations in front-line operations in Afghanistan. The surge there
has now peaked. With the US, UK and other coalition
Albania 258 Canada (CAN) 2,913 Georgia 924 Latvia 190 Norway (NOR) 352 Sweden (SWE) 491
Armenia 40 Croatia 311 Germany (GER) 4,877 Lithuania (LTU) 179 Poland (POL) 2,488 Turkey (TUR) 1,815
Australia (AUS) 1,550 Czech Republic (CZE) 472 Greece 134 Luxembourg 9 Portugal 95 Ukraine 17
Austria
Azerbaijan
3
94
Denmark (DNK)
Estonia (EST)
750
139
Hungary (HUN)
Iceland
522
4 (civilians)
Malaysia
Mongolia
30
49
Romania
Singapore
1,664
38
United Arab Emirates 35
UK 9,500 members’ armed forces applying relevant lessons learned
in Iraq, the surge is achieving military effect in terms of
Belgium 519 Finland 165 Ireland 7 Montenegro 31 Slovakia 293 US 90,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina 45 France (FRA) 3,850 Italy (ITA) 3,770 Netherlands (NLD) 190 Slovenia 80 US (OEF-A) ε7,000
Bulgaria 589 FYR Macedonia 163 Rep. of Korea (ROK) 246 New Zealand (NZL) 234 Spain (ESP) 1,505 Total (rounded) 138,730

US ISAF Provincial
Reconstruction Team 3
×
209 (AFG) 1
×
10 (US)
||
231 (GER) 2
×
209 (AFG)
clearing populated areas of insurgents and then holding
these areas. The increased tempo of the offensive by special
and troop nationality ×
(see above for key) || BADAKSHAN
232 (GER) 1 209 (AFG)

Regional Command North

∼11,000 JOWZJAN BALKH
KUNDUZ
GER
GER
Faizabad ×
9 LT (FRA)
operations forces against Taliban command and logistic
|||
3 (ESP)
TUR
Shibirghan
SWE
Mazar-e Sharif
Kunduz TAKHAR
Regional Command networks is also making headway. The Afghan army and
Capital – Kabul
×
JULIA (ITA)
HUN
Pul-e Kumri
BAGHLAN
PANJSHER US
Nuristan
∼9,000 police are growing in size, confidence and capability, and
are starting to take the lead in some tactical operations.
× NOR SAMANGAN Panjsher US || ||
Maimanah SAR-E PUL NURISTAN
1 207 (AFG) KAPISA (TUR) (TUR)
ROK US
FARYAB × ××

ISAF is likely to transfer the leading security role to Afghan

BADGHIS Bagram US US Asadabad
2 34 (US) PARWAN Nijrab Mehtar Lam KUNAR 111 CAPITAL (AFG)
×
KABUL LAGHMAN US
2 201 (AFG)
forces in Kabul and some other districts during 2011.
ESP NZL
Qal’eh-Now Bamiyan Wardak TUR Jalalabad
HERAT BAMIYAN WARDAK CZE LOGAR NANGARHAR ×
LTU

Nevertheless, serious obstacles remain to a satisfactory

Pol-e Alam 1 101 (US)
Chaghcharan PAKTIA
ITA ×
Herat GHOR US Khost 3 201 (AFG)
DAIKONDI

resolution of the conflict. Pakistan’s forces are still

US Gardez US

Regional Command West Ghazni KHOST ×

GHAZNI 4 10 (US)
∼6,500
not pressing Taliban sanctuaries in North Waziristan
Sharan ×
URUZGAN US 1 201 (AFG)
×
2 207 (AFG) Regional
sufficiently hard. The biggest challenge to NATO’s and the
FARAH ×
Tarin Kowt
AUS/US PAKTIKA
Command East 3 101 (US)
US
US
Qalat ZABUL
∼36,500 ×
Farah
Lashkar Gah CAN
1
×
203 (AFG)
Afghan government’s strategic objective of an Afghan lead
in security across the country by the end of 2014 remains
UK
Kandahar 4 101 (US)
NIMRUZ ×
KANDAHAR 2 203 (AFG)

Regional Command Regional

×
10 (POL)
the Kabul government’s weakness. It remains possible that
Southwest
the Taliban may conserve their strength, wait for Western
HELMAND
Command South ×
∼32,000 ∼35,000 3 203 (AFG)

governments to withdraw most of their forces, and then

|| × ×
||| ||| 5 RAR (AUS) 2 CR (US) 2 205 (AFG)
1 RCT (US) 2 RCT (US) × || ||

mount offensives with renewed strength against a regime

× || 4 205 (AFG) 812 (ROM) 811 (ROM)
16 (UK) (DNK) × ×
|| × 1 4 (US) 2 101 (US)

in Kabul that has relatively little military capability or will,

32 (GEO) 1 215 (AFG) || × Regional Command Air Assets
× ×
× × 1 RCR (CAN) 1 205 (AFG)
2 215 (AFG) 3 215 (AFG) × × North 4 East 101

and sparse political legitimacy.

3 205 (AFG) ×
|| || 525 (US)
3 LAR (US) 1 (US) South 10 Southwest USMC AIR WG*
Source: ISAF/IISS research *incl UK own assets

The defence budgets of the United States, Britain and

increase country-specific narrative capability assessment other Western states deploying forces in Afghanistan have
significantly from next year onwards. At the same time, we needed to accommodate not only the costs of continuing
are reconsidering the categories of equipment that we list military operations there, but also a requirement for
in the context of their contribution to military capability. equipment procured especially for that conflict such as
protected patrol vehicles, UAVs and helicopters. As the
DEFENCE CUTS IN THE WEST Afghan war winds down, there will be a need to make
Turning to this year’s edition of The Military Balance, difficult choices about which of these equipment types
which is as ever comprehensively global in its scope, one have enduring value and should be retained.
key theme stands out. Western states’ defence budgets In the meantime, major procurement programmes such
are under pressure and their military procurement is as the US Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
constrained. But in other regions – notably Asia and the are likely to suffer cuts or cancellation. Even the F-35 Joint
Middle East – military spending and arms acquisitions Strike Fighter programme, and notably the vertical and
are booming. There is persuasive evidence that a global short take-off version of the aircraft, may be under threat.
redistribution of military power is under way. And in the longer term, the US defence budget is likely to
In an atmosphere of economic stagnation, Western remain under considerable pressure.
states’ defence budgets are declining. The outcome of the As the Foreword highlights, recent defence and
United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence and Security Review security statements by Western governments indicate
in October 2010 indicated the hard times facing most the complexity of perceived contemporary security
Western defence ministries and armed forces. While the challenges. However, the scope of these challenges
UK will remain one of the world’s leading military powers, and current fiscal constraints arguably call for more
the SDSR is resulting in significant cuts to Britain’s defence fundamental reassessments of defence priorities than we
capability including its ability to contribute to future have seen so far.
expeditionary operations beyond Europe.
One result of the pressure on Britain’s defence spending, NON-WESTERN MILITARY AMBITIONS ARE
and similar constraints in France, was the two countries’ GROWING
announcement in November that they were ‘opening a There is now a stark contrast between the contracting
new chapter’ in their bilateral defence cooperation that defence budgets of many Western states and the growing
will include creating a joint expeditionary task force, and military spending and arms procurement that characterises
collaboration on aircraft carriers. the Gulf, the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This fact has
The United States’ defence budget is still huge, significant implications for Western arms manufacturers.
of course, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is Faced with contracting domestic order-books, military

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THe MILITARY BALANCE 2011
exports to other regions are more important than ever for
US and European defence companies. However, where
more basic military equipment is concerned Western
arms exporters face strong and in some cases growing
competition from non-Western defence industries, notably
those of Brazil, China, Russia, Singapore, South Africa and
South Korea.
The different types and quantities of military
equipment that developed and developing countries
are seeking reflects the disparity in defence-budget
trajectories between them. With straitened finances as well
as a relatively new focus on combating asymmetric threats,
developed countries have diminishing appetite for grand
defence projects. In the naval arena, for example, this
means fewer large ships and larger numbers of smaller,
multirole vessels. In the US, the navy has cut its Zumwalt-
class destroyer programme from 32 to three ships, but
still plans to procure 20 smaller, modular Littoral Combat
Ships. In the UK, an aircraft carrier will be mothballed and
the number of frigates in service reduced to 13, while the
Type-26 replacement frigate will probably be smaller and
more versatile. Meanwhile, in India, China and Brazil,
there is still a desire to expand or establish fleets based
around aircraft carriers and other large ships.
In the Gulf, the threat perceived from Iran with its
growing missile capabilities and nuclear potential is
stimulating the Gulf Cooperation Council countries
including Saudi Arabia to spend heavily on defence, and
they are emphasising combat aircraft and ground-based
air defences in their procurement programmes. In the
maritime arena, Iran’s extensive fleet of small, fast attack
craft, increasingly armed with capable anti-ship missiles,
is encouraging GCC states, concerned to protect their
offshore oil and gas infrastructure, to build up their own
small attack craft capabilities. At the same time, the role of
the United States remains key to security in the Gulf. There
is no effective multilateral defence cooperation under
GCC auspices, and it is the US that provides the ‘common
operating picture’ for missile defence in the region.
In Asia, increasing defence budgets and expanding
military procurement programmes have provoked
much speculation about an ‘Asian arms race’, and
about whether China’s major efforts to enhance its
military capabilities combined with its greater strategic
assertiveness – particularly in its maritime littoral – are
fuelling such military competition. In reality, while plans
to expand submarine fleets across the region do suggest
efforts to counter China’s growing capabilities, the
factors influencing Asian defence spending and military
modernisation are diverse, ranging from the region’s
relative economic vibrancy to suspicion and distrust
among small and medium powers.
The modernisation of all branches of China’s People’s
Liberation Army continues to overshadow other Asian
states’ military efforts and to create uneasiness on the
part of the United States and other Asian powers, notably
Japan and India. While media attention has focused on
China’s aircraft-carrier plans, the PLA Navy’s submarine
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Page 3 of 4
programme, its new landing platform docks and its
deployment of more effective anti-ship missiles hold
greater strategic significance.
The recent unveiling of the J-20 – a new combat aircraft
with some ‘stealth’ characteristics – was an interesting
indication that China is gradually closing the military
technology gap between itself and the West. However,
the build-up of the PLA Air Force’s inventory of multirole
Sukhoi 30s, together with in-flight refuelling tanker and
AWACS aircraft, is already significantly strengthening
China’s air capability. One consequence of China’s
apparently relentless military upgrading, which also
includes the development of anti-satellite and cyber-war
capabilities, is that the balance of power across the Taiwan
Strait is gradually changing in favour of the PLA.
In several Latin American countries – Ecuador, Brazil,
Colombia and Paraguay – defence budgets have been
rising in step with economic growth. Brazil has taken
delivery of new main battle tanks and attack helicopters,
amongst other equipment. The first KC-135 in-flight
refuelling aircraft arrived for Chile’s air force, while navies
throughout the continent have been commissioning new
patrol vessels.
FLASHPOINTS AND CONFLICTS
While war across the Taiwan Strait remains unlikely, the
last year has seen international tensions rise in several
other places with a concomitant increase in the likelihood
of inter-state conflict. Iran’s nuclear programme continues
to provoke the implicit threat of Israeli or US military
action. In the context of an imminent and possibly
unclear leadership succession in Pyongyang, North
Korea’s apparent aggression towards the South – seen in
its alleged sinking of the Cheonan in March last year and
its shelling last November of the island of Yeonpyeong –
mean that the Korean peninsula is now as dangerous a
place as it has been at any time since the end of the Korean
War in 1953. These developments have reinforced South
Korea’s determination to strengthen its military capacity.
Seoul has focused on procuring anti-submarine warfare
capabilities and has accelerated the FX-III multirole fighter
aircraft programme. South Korea’s new defence build-
up and intensive programme of military exercises have
backed up Seoul’s more assertive rhetoric stressing that
a ‘disproportionate response’ will meet any future attack
from the North.
Meanwhile, greater assertiveness on the part of China
(in relation to its maritime claims) and the United States
(in relation to its right to gather intelligence within China’s
EEZ) has increased tensions in the South China Sea, while
China has also acted with less restraint in the East China
Sea where its claims conflict with Japan’s. At the same time
that some Southeast Asian states are watching China’s
behaviour in the South China Sea nervously, the long-
established but always tenuous expectation that members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would not
go to war with each other has been dashed with a renewed
and more clear-cut outbreak of border fighting between
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Multinational UK Netherlands Germany Poland

Latvia

Lithuania
Canada Norway
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Belgium Slovakia
France
Lux. Slovenia Hungary

United States Croatia Romania

Bulgaria

Portugal Spain Italy Greece Turkey

Heavy transport aircraft (Tpt ac) Medium Tpt ac Military passenger aircraft (PAX ac)

Heavy transport helicopter (Tpt Hel) Medium Tpt Hel Multi-role helicopter (MRH Hel)

Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft (Tkr + Tkr/Tpt ac) = 10 units

TOTALS Heavy Medium PAX ac Tkr + Heavy Medium MRH Hel

Tpt ac Tpt ac Tkr/Tpt ac Tpt Hel Tpt Hel
US 285 516 78 538 632 2090 467
NATO Europe 16 323 123 72 205 633 1117
NATO Total 305 863 210 617 843 2737 1662

Cambodia and Thailand. Thailand and other Southeast
Asian states, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Vietnam, continue to increase their defence spending and
all have major military procurement programmes.
Long-running mistrust between China and India
focuses on their border disputes, with New Delhi
pointing to alleged Chinese transgressions of the Line
of Actual Control. In response, India has significantly
reinforced its air-force deployments to northern bases.
China’s encroachment into the Indian Ocean through its
anti-piracy patrols, and its funding of port construction
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, has concerned India’s naval
establishment, and has provided a justification for India’s
own naval expansion plans.
In Latin America, important tensions, not least
concerning the continuing FARC presence on Venezuelan
territory, persist between Colombia and Venezuela. In
October, a military incursion by Nicaragua into Costa
Rica at a disputed section of the border led to a diplomatic
confrontation. And Argentina responded to early
indications of oil deposits in waters around the Falklands
by escalating its diplomatic protests and more stringently
regulating shipping to the islands.
CONCLUSION
The latest Military Balance is rich in detail and nuance,
and provides cogent analyses by IISS experts of global
defence developments and trends. But while The Military
Balance examines trends, it is avoids trendiness. For
example, we acknowledge the importance of cyber threats
and cyber defence, but we remain unconvinced that this
is the most important aspect of the contemporary defence
debate. Over time, ‘cyber’ will find its place in the wide
array of factors comprising military capability that policy-
makers must properly consider but this place may not be
as prominent as the recent high profile given to the issue
has sometimes suggested.
Among the other important areas that the latest Military
Balance investigates, the assessments of Russian military
reforms and Indian defence policy are particularly worthy
of attention. These further emphasise the key theme that
while the military sector in the West is, overall, contracting
as a result of financial constraints, elsewhere the picture is
often quite different. Many states are seeking to translate
their economic strength into military power which they
may then use in support of national goals ranging from
protecting their energy supplies to asserting territorial
claims.
How quickly the global redistribution of military
spending and procurement will translate into useful
military capability will vary according to national
circumstances. However, it is already clear that as a
result of shifts in the global distribution of economic
power and consequently the resources available for
military spending, the United States and other Western
powers are losing their monopoly in key areas of defence
technology, including stealth aircraft, unmanned systems
– and cyber warfare. As the IISS Defence and Military
Analysis Programme develops its research and analysis,
the questions of how quickly and in which directions
non-Western military capabilities are evolving will be a
top priority.

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