PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Emergence of Pakistan

[Chapter 1]

Historical Perspective of Pakistan’s ‘nation-state’

Arabs penetrated South Asia via Indus delta in the 8th century.

After pirates along the Sindh coast pillaged ships carrying Muslim pilgrims, the Governor
of Basra sent a force under Mohammad Bin Qasim in 711 to Debul.

Two years later, Multan became the first Muslim province in South Asia.

In the late 12th century, Muhammad Ghauri, a Turkic ruler of Ghazni, extended his realm
eastwards to Delhi.

His successors, Iltumish and Balban, ruled the northern plains during the 13th century.

The Delhi Sultanate was taken over by Khilji and Tughlak dynasties until the end of the
14th century.

Amir Taimur marched his army through Afghanistan into Punjab and plundered and
sacked Delhi before returning to Samarkand in 1399.

The Sayyids and Lodhi Afghans subsequently re-established the Delhi Sultanate. In 1526,
Baber led his army from Kabul to supplant the last Lodhi Sultan. From his new capital at
Agra, he extended his realm, laying the foundation of the great Mughal Empire that rose
to its zenith under Shah Jehan in the 17th century.

After Aurangzeb, the dynasty went into decline in the 18th century. Its fall was hastened
by European empire-builders who scrambled to pick up the pieces.

Defeating France and Portugal, Britain put the pieces together to rule the expanding
realm through the East India Company, before assuming direct imperial rule after a
coalition of the aggrieved local elite tried to wrest power back from the company in the
name of the Mughal titular emperor in 1857. The Mughal emperor [Bahadur Shah Zafar]
was exiled to Burma and Britain then assumed the reins of government directly until
1947.

1
After the British took control, Muslims became suspect and were not only supplanted by
loyal non-Muslims but also subjected to suppression, exclusion and expropriation.

[Sir] Syed Ahmad Khan, a social reformer and political visionary, discerned the dangers
confronting his community and embarked on a campaign to awaken and inspire the
Muslim people to abandon the boycott of the foreign rulers and to acquire contemporary
education. He also founded a school that grew into the Aligarh Muslim University where
learned ac academics, some of them from England, were employed to teach modern
subjects and prepare the youth for gainful opportunities in the professions and
participation in the expanding political and economic life and institutions of the land.

As contemporary ideas of self-government and ‘nationalism’ began to stimulate political

though in the later part of 19th century, different ethnic and religious communities
projected their futures in terms of their interest. The Muslim community, comprising a
quarter of the population in British India awoke to its predicament, characterized by
economic disparities and social exclusion. The future looked bleak as they faced the
prospect of a powerless ‘permanent minority.

The idea of ‘nationhood’ captured the imagination of the Muslim community as its
leaders discerned the loosing danger of political domination across the religious and
social fault line. At first, they sought legal and constitutional safeguards to secure and
ensure an equitable share in social and political institutions.

The rift began to widen after the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1886 with
Allan Octavian Hume, a British ex-official, as its first President. Dominated by Hindu
elite, the Congress attracted few Muslims as their leaders advised them to keep aloof
from this nominally secular party that sought to supplant the British in positions of power
and influence.

To protect and promote the rights of the Muslim community, the leaders with modern
education and political vision established the Muslim League in 1906.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a brilliant barrister with impeccable anti-colonial credentials,

successfully promoted a compromise package for the future constitution. The constitution
known as Lucknow Pact, after its approval by both the Congress and the League in 1916,
included:

 separate electorate
 provincial autonomy
 a one-third share for Muslims in the central assembly and
 safeguards in respect of legislation affecting any of the religious
communities.

The Indian National Congress, however, went back on its commitment in 1928 when it
adopted the Motilal Nehru Report, recommending replacement of ‘separate electorates’

2
with a ‘joint electorate’ and the curtailment of provincial autonomy, thus striking a fatal
blow to any prospect of harmonious politics.

The Muslim League’s struggled evolved through four stages:

1. it sought an equitable share in political and social life.

2. The League’s emphasis was on constitutional safeguards for Muslims
in provinces where they are a minority.
3. it sought autonomy for Muslim-majority provinces and
4. it finally sought an independent state.1

The influential poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, in his address to the annual session
of the Muslim League at Allahabad, 1930 said:

“I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and
Balochistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the
British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a
consolidated North-West Muslim State appears to me to be the final
destiny of Muslims, at least of North-West India”.2

Allama Dr. Muhammad Iqbal ugeed, in a letter to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was then
living in London, to return, as he was the ‘only Muslim in India today to whom the
community has a right to ask for safe guidance”. Eminent Muslims and the Muslim
media began to call him Quaid-i-Azam, the Great Leader and the Muslim League first
used the titled in 1937.3

The Muslim League, in a resolution adopted in 1938, authorized Mohammad Ali Jinnah
to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative political structure which would
completely safeguard the interests of Muslims and other minorities in India. The Sindh
Muslim League recommended the devising of a scheme for Muslims to attain full
independence.

The Second World War accelerated the political evolution. ‘The British wanted to win
the war first and transfer power afterwards; the Congress demanded power at once, and a
Hindu-Muslim settlement afterwards; the Muslims insisted on a Hindu-Muslim
settlement first’.4

On 23 March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore session, adopted the historic
resolution demanding, ‘that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as
it in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute
Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
[The ambiguity was clarified by the Quaid-i-Azam. When asked whether the resolution
asked for one or two States, he said ‘one’]. The next day newspapers referred to it as the
‘Pakistan Resolution’.5

3
The Muslim students in London had first suggested the name of ‘Pakistan’ in 1932. [The
signatories of the pamphlet “Now or Never” were Mohammad Aslam Khattak, President,
Khyber Union, Choudhury Rahmat Ali, Inayatullah Khan (of Charsadda) and Sheikh
nMohammad Sadiq of Mongrol, Kathiawar. They conceived the name ‘Pakistan’ by
combining ‘P’ for Punjab, ‘A’ for Afghania (a synonym then for land of Pathan), ‘K’ for
Kashmir, ‘S’ for Sindh and ‘TAN’ for Baluchistan].6

In a last attempt to realize their dream of preserving the unity of their Indian empire, the
British Cabinet Mission, in 1946, proposed a constitutional plan based on the division of
British India into three autonomous zones with the powers of the centre to be limited to
foreign affairs, defence and communications. The League first accepted the plan but later
rejected it, because the Congress leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, asserted his party ‘regarded
itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission plan as it thought best.7 With the plan
thus undermined by the Congress refusal to guarantee the autonomy of the zones, the
League reverted to the demand for the partition of British India into sovereign states.

The British government then proposed the Partition Plan which was
accepted by both Muslim League as well as Indian National Congress and was
announced on 3 June, 1947. Pursuant to the agreement, Pakistan was established through
the exercise of self-determination by the people of the Muslim-majority provinces and
parts of provinces of the British Indian Empire, either in popular referenda or by the votes
of the elected representatives of the people on 14th August, 1947 and India became an
independent state on 15th August, 1947.

Notes

1. Abdul Sattar, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005”, Oxford

University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 2007, pp. 1-4.
2. Shamloo, “Speeches and Statements of Iqbal”, Lahore, 1948,
pp.11-12.
3. Sharif Al-Mujahid, “Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah”, Quaid-i-Azam Academy,
Karachi, 1981, p.41.
4. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, “The Emergence of Pakistan”, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1967.
5. Stanley Wolpert, “Jinnah of Pakistan”, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1989, p. 185.
6. Mohammad Aslam Khattak, “A Pathan Odyssey”, Oxford University
Press, Karachi, 2004, pp.15 & 264.
7. Ibid., p. 67

4
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Foreign Policy - Beginnings

[Chapter 2]

The Foreign Policy of Pakistan was to be moulded in the crucible of interaction with its
neighbour India, but it was imbued from the start with the idealistic vision of the state’s
founding father. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first head of new state, was a
man of ideals and integrity, committed to the principles of peace with faith and
confidence in human capacity to resolve differences through the application logic and
law.

Another exemplar was Liaquat Ali Khan. A barrister who became Secretary General of
the Muslim League in the 1930s and first Prime Minister of Pakistan. Like Jinnah, he
believed that Pakistan should be a progressive, democratic polity founded on Islamic
principles of social welfare, religious tolerance and the equal rights of all citizens.

The first Foreign Minister, Choudhry Sir Zafarullah Khan, was a jurist of repute and
throughout his tenure sought to promote the resolution of international disputes in
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Manifest in the views Quaid-i-Azam articulated was a modern intellect with a firm
commitment to fundamental principles indispensable for the maintenance and promotion
of international peace, progress and prosperity of mankind. This is illustrated in the
following excerpts from his speeches:

“There lies in front of us a new chapter and it will be our endeavour to create and
maintain goodwill and friendship with Britain and our neighbourly dominion, Hindustan,
along with other sisterly nations so that we all together may make our greatest
contribution for the peace and prosperity of the world”.1

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the
world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in
the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are
prepared to make the utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity
among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its
material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in
upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter”.2

5
“There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in
peace, and develop our country according to our known lights without outside
interference, and improve the lot of the common man”.3

In a speech in Karachi, on 21st February, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Said:

“You have to stand guard over the development and maintenance of democracy,
social justice and the equality of manhood in your own native soil with faith,
discipline and selfless devotion to duty. There is nothing worthwhile that you
cannot achieve”

Quaid-i-Azam gave the following three golden principles:

Faith
Unity
Discipline

In a statement on 11 March, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam said:

“Out object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and
maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world
at large….We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our full
contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.

In another statement, Quaid-i-Azam said:

“It is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent, sovereign states to

collaborate in a friendly way to jointly defend their frontiers, both on land and sea against
any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether India and Pakistan can resolve their
own differences. If we can put own house in order internally, then we may be able to play
a very great part externally in all international affairs. The Indian Government should
shed their superiority complex and deal with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully
appreciate the realities”.4

In a speech to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August, 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam

Mohammad Ali Jinnah said:

“You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business
of the State. We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and
equal citizens of one State”.5

Addressing the last session of Muslim League, he said:

“It is obvious that the Musalmans of Pakistan and India can no longer have one and the
same political organization. The Muslims of India would no longer be guided from

6
source outside and they would aspire to equal rights and obligations as loyal citizens of
India.

Pakistan is going to be a Muslim State based on Islamic ideals. It is not going to be an

ecclesiastical State. In Islam, there is no discrimination as far as citizenship is
concerned”.6

In affirming the principle of equality of citizenship, Jinnah emulated the precedent set by
the first Islamic state in the Misaq-i-Madinah that provided for equal rights for all people,
Muslims as well as Jews, Madinites as well as those who migrated from Mecca.7

‘Quaid’s vision’ of ‘human rights’ anticipated the universal Declaration of Human Rights
who proclaimed the principle:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration a year
later, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam

said:

“I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play without any prejudice
or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding participle will be justice
and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and cooperation, I can
look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world”.

From the very beginning, Pakistan’s foreign policy upheld the fundamental principles of
international law, especially respect for independence, non-aggression and non-
interference in internal affairs as an indispensable condition for peace and progress. It
extended goodwill towards all states and support for the legitimate causes of peoples, the
cherishing of fraternal bonds with other Muslim nations and the desire for cooperation
with all other states, especially its neighbours.

Quaid-i-Azam concept of Pakistan as a Muslim, liberal, democratic and modern nation-

state naturally predisposed him in favour of close relations with democratic countries like
United States and France for its ideals of ‘liberty, fraternity and equality’.

Notes
1. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Speeches as Governor General, 1947-48,
Ferozsons, Karachi, p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 65
3. Ibid., p. 62
4. Ibid., p. 45
5. Jinnah Papers, Vol. VI, pp. 446-450.
6. Sharif al-Mujahid, “DAWN”, Islamabad, 26 December, 2004.
7. Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., 207

7
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Kashmir Question, 1947-57

[Chapter 3]

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of some 500 quasi-autonomous princely states
which exercised varying degrees of internal autonomy on the basis of treaties and
agreements made during the period of colonial penetration and recognized Britain as their
suzerain.

The British Indian Act of 1947 affirmed the lapse of British suzerainty over the states and
theoretically, the states regained the ‘sovereignty’. However, the British Secretary of
State for India announced, “We do not, of course, propose to recognize any states as
separate, international entities.

Earlier, on 25th July, 1947, Governor General, Mountbatten had advised the Princes to
accede to Pakistan or India and in doing so, he told them: “You cannot run away from the
Dominion government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from
the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible. This advice was consistent with the
principle underlying the Partition Plan of 3rd June. On the basis of this principle, the
Indian National Congress had insisted on the partition of the provinces of Assam, Bengal
and Punjab.

The partition of British Indian Empire was based on the principle of ‘self-determination’
by Muslim majority areas forming ‘Pakistan’ and Hindu majority areas setting up
‘Indian’ state in accordance with the ‘Partition Plan’ of 3rd June, 1947.

Pakistan emerged on the map of the world through the exercise of ‘self-determination’ on
14th August, 1947 and India became an independent state on 15th August, 1947. All the
provinces or parts of provinces that joined Pakistan did so by the express decision of the
people either through elected representatives or directly in popular referendums.
Tension between the two new emergent states of Pakistan and India is ascribable to:

 a difficult and divisive legacy;

 the clash of political aims and ideologies between All India Muslim
League and Indian National Congress;
 differences of religions and cultures between the two nations and
 adversarial perceptions of history.

Being agreed to the partition of British India, the two newly independent states could
have lived in peace and harmony, had India accepted the existence of Pakistan with

8
sincerity. The disputes between the two countries, particularly that of Kashmir had not
arisen, had India not denied the right of ‘self-determination’ to the Muslim majority area
Kashmiris, violating the very principle of partition and in utter disregard of the United
Nations’ Security Council resolutions on the subject.

All the princely states except Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir and Junagadh followed
the principle of partition and acceded to India or Pakistan.

The Nizam of Hyderabad aspired to independence but his state was invaded and occupied
by India in 1948.

When the Muslim ruler of the Hindu-majority state of Junagadh announced ‘accession to
Pakistan’ on 15th August, 1947, the Indian Government protested, arguing that the
decision by the ruler was ‘in utter violation of the principles on which partition of India
was agreed upon and affected’. Pakistan offered to hold a ‘plebiscite’ but India refused,
invaded and occupied the state.

Two months later, however, the Indian Government itself committed an ‘utter violation
of the principles on which partition was based’ when it accepted the offer of accession by
the Dogra-Hindu Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, even though 77 per cent
of its four million people were Muslims.

9
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Search for Security

[Chapter 4]

The ‘security’ of a state depends largely on a vigilant policy towards its neighbours
which postulates a sound frontier policy.

According to Lord Curzon:

“Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which, hang suspended modern issues of war or
peace, of life or death to nations”.1

Pakistan has the unique distinction of being surrounded by three of the world’s largest
nations, i.e. Russia, China and India.

The ‘geographical pivot of history’ and strategically the most critical zone in Euroasia is
formed by those states which lie along with periphery of the great continental powers of
Asia, Russia Federation and the Peoples Republic of China.

As a Southwest Asian peripheral state, Pakistan’s security is linked with the Indian
Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Gulf region. It must find an equation with big neighbours
and with the United States which has global interests.

Traditionally, Pakistan has shared a common destiny with its two Muslim neighbours,
Afghanistan and Iran.

Afghanistan with its high mountain ranges and legendary Khyber and Bolan passes
guards the strategic gateway of the Indo-Gangetic plains of the subcontinent and no one
has reached them without getting the control of Kabul.

Despite the air age, the triangle of land, wedged strategically between Iran, Afghanistan
and Pakistan remains the gateway to the subcontinent. The Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan
region provides a land-corridor to any power to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and
the Indian Ocean.

The Strait of Hormuz, characterized as the ‘international oil highway’ which connects the
world’s largest site of oil reserves and production with world markets and the hub of
international oil tanker traffic is 250 miles off the naval complex of Iran at Chah Bahar
which is about 25 miles West of the Pakistan border, thus linked with the crucial
geopolitical problems of the ‘life line’ sea-lanes.

10
Foreign Policy is often considered as the first line of defence of any country. This is more
pronounced in case of Pakistan. It has inherited a difficult ‘security’ situation because of
India’s antagonistic and hostile relationship from the very beginning.

The ‘quest for security’ has been at the heart of Pakistan’s foreign policy ever since its
independence as its security environment derives its origins from the circumstances in
which Pakistan was created. The accompanying violence leading to the emergence of the
two independent states of Pakistan and India and the mass migrations of the Muslim and
Hindu communities at a scale having no parallel in human history had generated
‘hostility’ which continues to afflict relations between the two countries.

India’s efforts immediately after independence to undo Pakistan, particularly its attempt
to seize Kashmir were the main causes for the bitterness, tension, conflict and a sense of
insecurity which gripped the Pakistani policy-makers from the very outset.

This perception had a profound influence on the formulation of the defence and foreign
policies of Pakistan.

In the years that followed, the Pakistani policy-makers remained convinced that India
which is several times bigger than Pakistan in size, population and resources was
conspiring against Pakistan’s very existence and territorial integrity.

India’s hostile designs not only consisted of the conventional methods of warfare but also
included diverse political and other pressures including a psychological war of relentless
propaganda questioning the very raison d’etre of Pakistan’s creation.

India sought to isolate and to encircle Pakistan with the help of other countries.

Pakistan’s odd and almost indefensible frontiers consisting initially of two separated
wings, across a thousand miles of hostile territory added to intricacies of its security
problem.

On almost every issue that arose in relations with India, Pakistan found itself faced with
New Delhi’s refusal to resolve the differences on the basis of principles of law and
justice, whether it was:

 the transfer of Pakistan’s share of the assets inherited from British India,
 accession of princely states, or
 continued flow of river waters,

India sought to impose its own will, in disregard of the principles of the partition
agreement between the two countries.

Exploiting power disparity, India dismissed in negotiations:

11
  ‘reason’ and ‘equity’
 spurned resort to impartial peaceful means of resolving differences and
 did not hesitate to use force or threat of force to impose its own preferences.

India’s military intervention in Jammu and Kashmir, and its refusal to hold a plebiscite as
agreed in the Security Council resolutions, injected a sense of urgency to the fledgling
state’s search for ways and means to bolster its capacity to resist dictation.

‘India factor’ has always dominated the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy as New
Delhi, much bigger in size, having much more resources in men and material and
exhibiting a ‘hostile’ attitude towards first, the ‘establishment’ and then ‘existence of
Pakistan’ right from the beginning, has always overshadowed Pakistan’s foreign policy.

Furthermore, as the saying is that “one can choose one’s friends but not one’s
neighbours”, Pakistan has no choice than to live with its neighbours, India, Afghanistan
and Iran.

The attitude of Afghanistan, a Muslim neighbour on the West which shares historical,
religious, cultural and ethnic links with Pakistan had not been encouraging at all as it was
the only country which voted against the membership of Pakistan into United Nations.
Besides, Kabul put up irredentist claims against Pakistan, questioning the validity of
‘Durrand Line’ which was settled long before at the time of the British empire.

Afghanistan also backed the secessionist ‘Pakhtoonistan’ movement and was willing to
collude against Pakistan’s security with India and later with USSR which adopted a
hostile posture and extended vital military and economic aid to India.

The crisis over Afghanistan is having immediate geo-political effects with shifting of the
area of Major Powers’ struggle eastward from West Asia towards South Asia.

The ethnic ties between Pakistan and Iran as well as with Afghanistan makes this country
an ideal place for subversion against them. Thus Pakistan has shown signs of strain under
pressures emanating from Afghanistan, India and Russia and at times from Iran as well.

There is no defence depth, all its major cities are border outposts.

Any army crossing the Khyber Pass or the Punjab border could seek to cut right across
Pakistan disrupting the whole communication system and thus bringing about a political
and economic chaos in which survival of the state would hand in a precarious balance.
[An attempt of such nature was made from the Punjab border in 1965].

The role of Iran had always fluctuated over the years. Sometimes, it was good,
sometimes bad, depending upon the ‘national interests’ of the two countries which had
been at ‘variance’ at different intervals of time.

12
Pakistan’s response to the ‘objective problem’ posed by:

 the tyranny of power imbalance,

 the agony and
 humiliation of dictation by a major power of the region

was in ‘classical style’ which other states had done throughout history when faced with
such a situation of more powerful neighbour, intent on exploiting ‘disparity’ and trying to
achieve its inimical aims.

Pakistan, therefore, embarked upon cultivation of ‘sympathy’ and ‘support’ from

wherever it could find.

It sought ‘friends’ and ‘allies’ and ‘assistance’ over the globe to strengthen the ‘sinews of
statehood’ and to preserve its ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’ which it cherished most.

The contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy were thus shaped by the ‘dictates of time’ and
the ‘desperate need’:

 for ‘arms’ to ensure the security of the new state and

 for ‘funds’ to finance its economic development.

 Hence, the over-riding motivation in determining Pakistan’s foreign policy has

been the desire to safeguard the ‘country’s independence’ and ‘territorial
integrity’ at all costs. This exactly explains why Pakistan adopted the policy of
‘alignment’ and signed a number of military pacts with one of the two super
powers of the time i.e. United States.

 Pakistan first approached Great Britain, the only Western country, Pakistani
leaders knew at first hand.

o Britain was, however, too exhausted and debilitated following the World
War-II.

o The British Labour Government was anti-pathetic to Pakistani Leaders

whom it
simplicistically blamed for wrecking the British hope of maintaining the unity of
their Indian empire – ‘the Jewel in the Crown’.

 As Pakistan looked for economic and military cooperation, the Soviet Union was
not an ‘option’.

o It had borne the brunt of Nazi Germany’s powerful war machine in Europe
in
which 25-30 million people were killed

13
 o Its economy was exhaustively devastated and it was hardly in a position to
provide any assistance.

o Politically, the Soviet system was unattractive to Pakistani leaders who

were
committed to ‘democracy’.

o The ‘Communist ideology’ was considered antithetical to ‘Islam’.

o The Soviet leadership looked with little favour at Pakistan as compared to

India.

o The relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union got off to an

inauspicious start
as USSR did not even send a customary message of felicitations on Pakistan’s
independence.

o Besides, Moscow posed a real threat of expansionist nature of Soviet Communism

to Pakistan’s security and its long cherished desire to reach to the warm waters of
Arabian Sea and India Ocean.

Hence, Pakistan was in desperate need to find somehow an ‘equalizer’ against a

belligerent India.

The United States was the only promising source of assistance as:

 it had emerged from the 2nd World War with its economy intact and
was the wealthiest nation in the world, accounting for over 40 % of
global production.
 its Capitalist economy was closer to Pakistan as compared to the
Soviet’s Communist economy,
 US democratic system was congenial and also close to Pakistan’s
democratic credentials,
 United States was preoccupied with Soviet expansion in Eastern
Europe.

From United States’ point of view, Pakistan was well placed geo-politically and
geo-strategically, next to the oil-rich Middle East which was the life-line for United
States and the West.

This also explains why Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan accepted and
preferred an invitation to visit United States over that of Soviet Union which also could
not settle the dates. It was under these circumstances that Pakistan decided to join the US-
sponsored military pacts:

14
 o In May 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah received the US
Charge
d’affaires in New Delhi and explained to him that Pakistan’s foreign policy would
be oriented towards the Muslim countries of the Middle East and they would
stand together against possible Russian aggression and look to the US for
assistance.

o After Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state, President Truman of

United
States sent a warm message on its independence on 14th August, 1947, saying, “I
wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm
friendship and goodwill of the United States of America”.

o As North Korea’s forces moved across the 38th parallel on 25th June, 1950,
Pakistan promptly denounced the attack as ‘a clear case of aggression’.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who was in United States
endorsed the US decision to invoke UN Charter provisions for collective
security.

Pakistan voted for the UN General Assembly’s resolution, authorizing the

UN operation for the defence of South Korea. But when the United Nations called
upon Members to contribute to the UN action, Pakistan decided against sending a
military contingent and limited its contribution to supply of 5,000 tons of wheat
for South Korea. [Pakistan was willing to send an army brigade but only if its own
security was assured in the event of Indian aggression. Pakistan’s position,
combining ‘principle’ with manifest constraints of security, was generally well
understood at home and abroad and was appreciated by the Western countries as
compared to India’s stance.

o Pakistan supported the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan and

attended the
San Francisco conference convened in 1951 to sign the treaty.

o On the question of China’s representation, Pakistan supported the

participation by
the Peoples Republic of China. When majority voted against, Foreign minister
Zafarullah Khan voiced regret over the absence of Peoples Republic of China
whose people had suffered the most at the hands of Japan’s erstwhile oppressor
regime.

o Pakistan’s policy on issues in East Asia, was appreciated by Peoples

Republic of China, Japan and South Korea and laid the foundation for
Friendly relations with these important states.

15
 o The New York Times was so impressed as to praise Pakistan editorially as
America’s ‘one sure friend in South Asia’.

o Mindful of Peoples Republic of China’s importance, Pakistan was among

the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Government
soon after it was proclaimed on 1st October, 1949 and a year later opened a
diplomatic mission in Beijing.

o Differences of ‘ideology’ did not obstruct the development of friendly

relations
between the two neighbours as both conducted bilateral relations strictly in
conformity with the principles of non-interference in internal affairs.

o With bitter experience of foreign domination, Peoples Republic of China

evinced
understanding and sympathy for the struggle of other countries of Asia and Africa
to maintain their independence and develop their economies. Particularly
engaging was Peoples Republic of China’s treatment of small and medium
countries on the basis of sovereign equality eschewing big power chauvinism and
condescension.

Thus Pakistan’s foreign policy has very largely revolved around the problem of defining
and defending its territorial personality and it may continue to be so 2.

The specter of Russia and India looms large, a threatening perception for the small states.

In the words of Olaf Caroe, ‘Russia is so tender in Central Asia that it cannot afford the
“polarization” of alliances which could bring China in support of Pakistan’s right into
Kashmir’.3

Notes

1. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, “Frontiers, The Romanes Lecture”, 1907,

London Clarenden Press, 1908, p.4.
2. Mehrunnosa Ali, “Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy: 19711998”
2001, pp. 183-184.
3. Olaf Caroe, “Soviet Empire”, Macmillan, London, 1967, p. 49.

16
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

ALLIANCES
[Chapter 5]

Pakistan’s policy-planners were confronted with a unique ‘security syndrome’ and a

‘dilemma’ as:

 tensions with India showed no signs of abatement,

 Islamabad’s efforts to mobilize the UN as well as the Commonwealth

against India’s intransigence in Kashmir were making no real headway,

 the Islamic countries were quite weak and in any event, were not
responding to Pakistan’s suggestions for an Islamic block and

 Soviet Union was not forthcoming and was not really in a position to
extend large-scale assistance to any one.

 Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in a public

meeting at Liaquat Gardens, Rawalpindi in October 1951, introduced a new
element of ‘uncertainty’ into Pakistan’s internal stability.

 Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings shrank from Rs.2880 Million in 1951 to

Rs.1920 Million in 1952 and to approximately Rs.1500 Million in 1953. Gold and
Sterling reserves which had stood at 1487 Million on 1st January, 1952 were
reduced to Rs.606 Million only by the beginning of 1953.

 The prospect of a severe wheat famine in 1953 further aggravated an already

serious situation.

At that time, the Indian and American views on ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’ were
poles apart.

 Indian Prime Minister Nehru believed that the modern imperialism was an
outgrowth of ‘capitalism’ and in his views ‘communism’ was not ‘imperialistic’.

 On the crucial question of ‘peace’, Nehru believed in enlarging the area of peace
by cooperation without war.
 The Americans believed that the ‘Communists’ respect only the superior force

17
 and that it was necessary for the non-Communist countries to build up ‘collective
defence’.

Hence, India and United States did not see eye to eye on three major areas:

 the menace of expansionist Communism,

 the colonialism of European nations and
 China.

In such a situation of utter disappointment and frustration after courting India zealously
and unsuccessfully, most Americans turned to the second largest non-Communist country
of mainland Asia, Pakistan.

As early as March 1949, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the strategic importance of
the Karachi-Lahore area ‘as a base for air operations’ against the Soviet Union and ‘as a
staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil areas’.

By November 1952, the US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, Admiral Arthur W.

Radford paid a visit to Pakistan, stayed in Karachi as the ‘Guest of the Governor General’
visited Khyber Pass and was honoured at a reception hosted by the Prime Minister.

Before leaving Karachi, he declared that Pakistan enjoyed a strategic position and had an
important role to play in the world fight against ‘Communism’.

Pakistan’s position as the world’s largest Muslim state with the best army in the Middle
East, its proximity to the Soviet Union and the oilfields of the Persian Gulf was
highlighted and even warned that it would be prejudicial to US interests to develop an
India policy without taking into account Pakistan’s legitimate interests.

Pakistani leaders lost no opportunity to project the country’s strategic importance.

Speaking to a visiting Assistant Secretary of State in October 1949, Finance Minister
Ghulam Mohammad stressed the ‘importance to the United States …of the establishment
of a block of (Islamic) nations ….as a check to any ambitions of USSR. Ambassador
George McGhee was impressed by the directness of Pakistani leaders and their
willingness to support any US-backed efforts to prevent communist encroachments in
South Asia.

Interest in defence cooperation with Pakistan mounted after the Korean War.

Analysts in Washington concluded that the North Korean attack which took place less
than a year after the triumph of the Chinese liberation struggle, evinced an expansionist
design. They were particularly concerned about the security of the Middle East, specially
the vital Persian Gulf region with the world’s richest petroleum reserves.

The rise of the nationalist Mohammaed Mossadegh in Iran and nationalization of the
Anglo-American Oil Company heightened concerns over upheavals in the Middle East

18
and lent urgency to the need for insulating the region against Soviet political penetration
and ‘stemming any military advance towards the Persian Gulf and in the Near East in
general’.

A meeting of US Ambassadors to South Asian countries held in Colombo in February

1951 ‘favoured the idea of Pakistani participation in the defence of the Middle East’.

IN April 1951, American and British officials agreed that Pakistan’s contribution would
probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defence of the area.

By the end of 1952, the Truman administration in US endorsed the idea of a ‘Middle East
Defence Organization [MEDO] that was conceived by London to shore up its sagging
position.

Changes of regimes in 1953 in Russia, America and Pakistan added new impulses to the
moves already underway:

 Eisenhower’s inauguration as President of United States with John Foster Dulles

as Secretary of State, brought a new look to politics in Washington.

 Muhammad Ali Bogra’s shift from ambassadorship in USA to Prime Ministership

in Karahci brought an avowed admirer of America to the helm of affairs in
Pakistan and

 the death of Joseph Stalin removed a hardliner from Kremlin and brought the
lively Khurschev to the fore in Russia.

At the end of 2nd World War, United States and Russia emerged as the strongest powers
in the world, each standing for a way of life which the other thought incompatible with
her own; rivalry for world supremacy between them was inevitable and by 1947, the
‘Cold War’ had descended upon Europe with the possibility of a hot war and Communist-
supported revolutions always in the offing.

With the installation of Eisenhower as the President of the United States in January 1953,
the process of Pakistan-US rapprochement was expected to be speeded up.

In his inauguration address, he said that the strength of all free peoples lies in unity and
that destiny had laid upon America the responsibility of the free world’s leadership. His
administration would help ‘proven friends of freedom’ to achieve their own security and
well-being.

His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles saw the struggle against Communism as a
moral crusade: if it was only power politics and did not involve a threat ‘to the basic
moral principles of our Judeo-Christian civilization and indeed the civilization which is
based upon other great religions’, it would not be treated as a worldwide struggle. Unless
the free world met it everywhere, they would be defeated.

19
In May, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles undertook a tour of the Middle East and
South Asia and was extended a warmer welcome in Pakistan. Governor General Ghulam
Muhammad, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra and Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah
Khan, ‘all stressed their allegiance to the anti-Communist cause and emphasized
Pakistan’s desire to join the free world’s defence team.

Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan expressed his conviction that the
threat to Pakistan’s security could be contained only with the support of a powerful ally
and argued that the United States needed to fill the vacuum created by the British
withdrawal. His strategic assessment of the threat of a Soviet drive to the warm waters of
the Arabian Sea and Pakistan’s potential for opposing it, made the most favourable
impact on the visiting dignitary.

John Foster Dulles was struck by the ‘spirit and appearance’ of the Pakistani armed
forces and their leaders and had a ‘feeling that Pakistan is one country that has the moral
courage to do its part in resisting Communism’.

Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on his return to Washington, he
praised the courage and determination of Pakistanis.

He publicly spoke of the idea of a defence arrangement of ‘northern tier’ countries –

Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran and in July, the proposal was adopted by the US National
Security Council and Washington decided in principle to go ahead with the alliance idea.

In October 1953, General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan’s Army paid
a visit to Washington, followed by in November by Governor General, Ghulam
Muhammad and the Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan. Their activities in the US
Capital gave rise to strengthening of military ties between the two countries and
Newsweek wrote that informal talks had involved the possibility of a sizeable military
assistance programme for Pakistan, similar to the aid given to Turkey.

Americans had long been agreed that their global strategy against Communism demanded
a militarily stronger Pakistan.

In December, Vice President Nixon, during his three-day stay in Karachi stated that he
was convinced the people of Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart Communist
ambitions and that the US would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial and defence
development.

On his return, he urged that the ring around the Soviet empire be closed by creating a
military crescent comprising Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Indo-China, Formosa and Japan.

He recommended military aid to Pakistan and thought the United States decision on the
subject must be guided by what was best for America and should not be deflected by any
fear of Indian reaction.

20
After President Nixon’s effective presentation at the National Security Council, it was
finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan.

Rising security concerns due to India exploitation of its military and economic
dominance and recurrent threats were the determining factor that impelled Pakistan to
search for foreign defence cooperation.

Britain was, however, unsympathetic because of the priority it attached to relations with
the larger India.

Hence, four alliances were concluded between Pakistan and the United States:

1. Mutual Defence Assistant Agreement of 1954.

2. South Wast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] in 1954-55.
3. Baghdad Pact in 1955 and Central Treaty Organization in 1959.
4. Pakistan-US Agreement on Cooperation in 1959.

1. Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement - 1954

Under this agreement signed on 19th May, 1954, United States undertook to provide
defence equipment ‘exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-
defence, or to permit it to participate in defence of the ara’. [The assistance was to be
made available under US legislation – the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and
Mutual Security Act of 1951 relating to the defence of the free world].

On its part, Pakistan undertook to cooperate with the United States in measures to restrict
trade with nations ‘which threaten the maintenance of world peace’.

Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra lauded Pakistan-US agreement saying the two
countries ‘have a great deal in common’ and share convictions regarding freedom and
democracy and spiritual strength to fight the totalitarian concept.

2. South East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] - 1954

Establishment:

The idea of SEATO was conceived by the United States in 1954 after the French defeat at
Dien Bien Phu in order to create ‘deterrence’ to ‘communism’ in general and Vietnam in
particular.

US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was in favour of inclusion of Thailand and the
Philippines only but Anthony Eden wanted to include India, Pakistan and Ceylon [Sri
Lanka] to give it a colour of local military backing and invited these countries on 18 th
May to join talks on the defence of the region

21
Pakistan was invited to attend the Manila Conference in September 1954 to discuss the
plan for the defence of South East Asia – an area of which Pakistan was a part on account
of East Pakistan.

Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra was, however, careful to inform Eden that
participation in the conference did not ‘imply acceptance of any scheme that might
emerge from the discussions in the meeting’. Pakistan’s reservations were due to its
disappointment with the small amount of assistance, the United States allocated for
Pakistan.

The US Secretary of State Dulles asked US Ambassador in Karachi to clarify to the

Pakistan government that the US capabilities were limited and that while it would
provide equipment to enable Pakistan to play an effective role in the Middle East,
Pakistan itself would have to bear the cost of maintaining its forces. Dulles was of the
view that it was in Pakistan’s interest to join SEATO and that it should not do so to
oblige the United States. He also considered it imperative to clarify to Pakistan that the
treaty aimed at defence against ‘communist aggression’ and excluded involvement in
Pakistan-India disputes.

Pakistan was not satisfied with the first draft of the treaty which:

 covered only East Pakistan,

 provided for ‘consultation’ only and not ‘joint action’ as in NATO in the event of
aggression against one of its members,
 did not have a provision of defence and economic assistance and
 Pakistan did not want the treaty to refer to ‘communism’ or even to permit its
Possible extension to Formosa with a view not to offend China.

During discussions in Manila, the conference agreed to a redraft so as to cover the entire
territories of the Asian parties.

In Article IV, each party recognized that ‘aggression’ against any of the parties would
endanger its own security. However, the United States remained adamant in appending to
the treaty the reservation that its obligations would apply only in the event of ‘communist
aggression’. Hence, the treaty did not cover Pakistan against Indian aggression so far as
the United States was concerned.

In the circumstances, the brief required the Pakistani delegation to first consult the
government before accepting the document. However, upon urging by Dulles, Foreign
Minister Zafarullah Khan decided to sign the treaty nevertheless. The Pakistan cabinet
was surprised and displeased and some of its members were critical of the Foreign
Minister who offered to resign. On reflection, the cabinet quietly acquiesced in his
judgment. Pakistan ratified the treaty in January 1955 after receiving an assurance from
Dulles that in the event of non-communist aggression against Pakistan, the US ‘would be
by no means disinterested or inactive’.

22
United States believed South East Asia to be a crucial frontier in the fight against
Communist expansion and viewed SEATO as ‘essential’ to its global Cold War policy of
containment.

SEATO or the Manila Pact was, therefore, created as an International Organization for
collective defence on 8th September, 1954. with headquarters at Bangkok, Thailand.

Membership:

The Members of SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. The membership reflected a mid-1950s
combination of ‘out of area’ powers and ‘in area’ pro-Western nations.

Although called SEATO, only two South East Asian nations viz. The Philippines and
Thailand became its members.

Burma and Indonesia preferred to maintain their ‘neutrality’.

Observers:

The terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, signed after the fall of French Indochina
prevented Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from joining any international military alliance,
though these countries were ultimately included in the area protected under SEATO and
were granted ‘Observer Status’.

Principles:

SEATO claimed the adherence of the Member States to the:

 principles of peaceful settlement of disputes,

 declared their intention for collective defence against external aggression and
 provided strengthening of free institutions by economic and technical cooperation.

Structure:

 Mutual consultations were stipulated in the event of the forms of aggression.

 A protocol was added to the treaty making Cambodia. Eligible for economic
measures under the treaty.

The structure of SEATO was as under:

i. Council of Foreign Ministers:

A Council of Foreign Ministers was set up to decide the policies which usually
had a meeting once in a year.

23
 ii. Secretariat

A Secretariat of SEATO headed by Secretary General was set up to take day-to-

day decisions.

iii. Military Advisers:

The Military Advisers were named by the respective Governments and were
responsible to the Council.

iv. Military Planning Office:

Military Planning Office and a Permanent Working Group, comprising senior

staff Members from the armed forces of the Member states was set up who were
tasked to prepare plans of military in the light of changing conditions.

Aims and Objectives:

SEATO was created as a part of Truman Doctrine of creating the anti-communist

bilateral and collective defence treaties. These treaties and agreements were intended to
create ‘alliances’ that would contain Communist power. This policy was considered to
have been largely developed by American diplomat and Soviet expert George F. Kennan.
John Foster Dulless, US Secretary of State in President Eisenhower’s administration
[1953-1959] was the primary force behind the creation of SEATO which expanded the
concept of anti-Communist collective defence to South East Asia.

SEATO was designed to be a South East Asian version of NATO in which the military
force of each Member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defence of the
Members. A protocol later extended the treaty’s protection to South Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos.

SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its Members in annual joint training
maneuvers.

SEATO funded mainly to provide collective defence in case of an attack by external

aggression against any one of the eight signatories of treaty. The purpose of SEATO was
also economic cooperation.

SEATO Charter was vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War.

24
Functions:

i. Joint Military Exercises:

It maintained no military forces of its own but the organization hosted joint
military exercises for Member states each year as the Communist threat appeared
to change from one of outright attack to one of internal subversion.

ii. Economic Development:

SEATO worked to strengthen the economic foundations and living standards of

the South East Asian nations. It sponsored a variety of meetings and exhibitions
on cultural, religious and historical topics.

iii. Exchange of Scholars:

Non-Asian Member states sponsored fellowships for South East Asian scholars.
Exchange of scholars and other technical assistance and cooperation between the
Member nations continued and perhaps was the only tangible result of SEATO.

iv. The Pacific Charter:

Appended to the Treaty was a document called ‘The Pacific Charter’ which
stressed the need to develop the area and raise the standard of living. It affirmed
the rights of Asian and Pacific peoples to equality and self-determination and
setting forth goals of economic, social and cultural cooperation between the
Member countries.

Like other organizations, this was again a typical measure of the American
strategy to create influence in the different regions of the world.

Failure:

Despite being intended to provide a collective, anti-communist shield to South East Asia,
SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam because
an intervention required a decision of unanimity which was never reached as France and
the Philippines objected. Intervention in the Vietnam conflict was sought once again
later, but France and Pakistan withheld support.

Given the declining interest of France after 1954 and that of United Kingdom in South
East Asia, after the end of Indonesian and Malaysian conflict in 1966. SEATO failed as a
collective defence and security organization.

 Unlike NATO alliance, SEATO had no joint command with standing force.
 Unlike NATO, an attack on any Member was not automatically considered an
attack on all the Members.

25
  Unlike NATO, SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining intelligence
or deploying military forces, so the potential for collective defence was
necessarily limited and flawed.
 It failed to address the problems attached to the guerilla movements and local
Insurrections that plagued the region in the post-colonial years as it called for
Consultations only, leaving each individual nation to react individually to internal
threats.
 Each Member could effectively block any collective SEATO action.
 Because of 1954 accords, settling the First Indochina War, South Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos were not SEATO Members. The United States sought but
failed to make the Vietnam War into a SEATO collective defence problem.

Consequently, the question of dissolving the organization arose as early as 1973.

On dismemberment of Pakistan and separation of its Eastern wing by naked Indian

aggression in 1971, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO on 7th November, 1973 followed by
France in June 1974.

When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the most prominent reason for SEATO’s
existence disappeared. As a result, SEATO was formally disbanded on 30th June, 1977.

3. Baghdad Pact -1955/Cemntral Treaty Organization [CENTO] - 1959

Establishment:

Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, signing a Pact of Mutual
Cooperation for ‘security and defence’ in February 1955 in the Iraqi capital.

On receiving an invitation from Turkey and Iraq to join the pact, Pakistan was not
enthusiastic Turkey was unpopular in the Arab world for having recognized Israel and
Egypt, being considered as the key to a defence arrangement in the Middle East had
denounced the pact.

Ayub Khan, the then Defence Minister as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
was skeptical about the world of the pact unless the United States also joins.

Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra did not make a commitment when the
Ambassadors of Turkey and Iraq met him.

Pressure mounted from United States and Britain which wanted a regional arrangement.

Ayub Khan whose opinion was decisive in security matters was invited to Turkey in June
where Turkish and Iraqi Premiers Nuri Said and Adnan Menderes succeeded in
convincing Ayub Khan, the advantage of joining the pact. Within days the Pakistan
cabinet approved accession to Baghdad Pact and on 23rd September, 1955, Pakistan
signed the Pact of Mutual Cooperation in Baghdad.

26
Membership:

Besides Pakistan, the other members were Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Britain. The United
States did not become a full member but decided to become an ‘Observer’ and associate
itself with its defence and political committees in 1958.

On 14th July, 1958, the unpopular Iraqi regime was overthrown in a bloody coup by
Abdul Karim Qasim and the country pulled out of the pact, named after its capital.
Consequently, it was renamed as the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959 and its
headquarters was shifted form Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. The name CENTO referred to
a central area between the regions that included in NATO and SEATO.

United States withdrew from CENTO on 24th March, 1959 after the revolution in Iraq.

Principles:

 The treaty was concluded for a period of 5 years.

 It was renewable for another 5 years.
 Any Member state could withdraw either at the end of a period or at six months’
notice.

Goals:

i. Mutual Aid and Peace

Modeled after NATO, CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and
protection as well as non-interference in each other’s affairs.

Its purpose was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states alaong the
USSR’s south-western frontier.

ii. Defence arrangement:

Like SEATO, the development of Baghdad Pact or CENTO had arisen essentially from
the need of the United States to have system of defence arrangements with various
regions of the world to confront ‘communism’.

DRAWBACKS

i. No Military Base

Unlike NATO, CENTO did not have a unified military command structure, nor were
many American and British military bases established in Member countries although the
United States had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran and
operated U-2 intelligence flights over the USSR from a base in Peshawar, Pakistan.

27
Likewise, United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times
while the treaty was in effect.

Besides, Turkey had agreed to permit American access to Turkish bases but this was
done under the auspices of NATO.

ii. Non Cooperation among its Members:

Middle East and South Asia became extremely volatile areas in 1960s with the on-going
Arab-Israeli conflict and Indo-Pakistan hostilities. CENTO was unwilling to get involved
in either of the two conflict areas.

Likewise, CENTO did little to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence to non-Member
states in the area. Whatever containment value, the pact might have had was lost when
the Soviets ‘leap-flogged’ the Member states, establishing close military and political
relationships with the Governments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Peoples Democratic Republic
of Yemen, Somalia and Libya. Indeed, by 1970, USSR had developed over 20 thousand
troops to Egypt and had established naval bases in Syria, Somalia and PDR Yemen.

Badaber Base:

The most concrete and strategic benefit of CENTO, drawn by the United States was the
establishment of a secret intelligence base at Badaber near Peshawar, consented by Prime
Minister Suharwardy to President Eisenhower, during his visit to the United States in July
1957.

It allowed permission for US aircraft to use the base which United States described as a
‘Communication Centre’ and used for high level U-2 ‘spy in the sky’ surveillance aircraft
for illegal flights over the Soviet Union for photographic intelligence. It enabled
Washington to complete a ring of similar bases around the Soviet Union.

The United States was granted ‘extra-territorial rights’ on this base. It operated the base
with 1,200 military and technical personnel, all from the United States and no Pakistani
official was ever admitted to the base.

Pakistan, later learnt that the facility was also used for the same purpose against China

The operations from this base prompted Soviet Union to circle it with ‘Red’ and
threatened to bomb the base if its activities are not put to an end.

The base, however, served for a decade as an anchor of US military and economic aid to
Pakistan.

28
Reaction:

The treaty was seen by the world at large as an attempt by Britain to retain influence in
the Middle East as a substitute for the loss of their empire in India.

It was generally viewed as one of the least successful Cold War alliances.

Dissolution:

 The treaty was as good as finished after 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus,
leading Britain to withdraw forces that had been earmarked to the alliance.

 With the fall of the Iranian monarchy and revolution in 1979, whatever remaining
rationale for the organization was lost.

 The United States and Britain then conducted defence agreements with regional
countries like Pakistan, Egypt and the Gulf States bilaterally.

Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the new Iranian regime announced its
withdrawal from CENTO. Shortly afterwards, Pakistan withdrew from the organization
in 1979. This rendered CENTO ineffective and the same year, it was formally dissolved.

4. Pakistan-US Agreement on Cooperation - 1959

More important than SEAT and CENTO, the 1959 agreement was negotiated to
specifically assure Pakistan of US support in the event of aggression.

In the years to come, Pakistan spoke of the alliances with the West as ‘the sheet anchor of
Pakistan’s foreign policy’.

United States was also appreciative of Pakistan as ‘wholehearted ally’ which undertook
‘real responsibilities and risks’ by providing facilities ‘highly important to US national
security’.

Pakistan invoked this agreement in 1971 when naked aggression was launched by India
but United States did not honour its obligations to come to Pakistan’s assistance.

The alliance with United States was not an unnatural one.

•
In ideological terms, Pakistan felt closer to the
‘Capitalism’ of the
West/USA than to Communism of Soviet Union.

• The Russians had been on an expansionist course

southwards since
the previous two centuries and had annexed the vast Muslim

29
 territories in Central Asia with which Pakistan had age-old links.

•
Russians’ involvement in an abortive coup d’etat
bid in 1951 known as
‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case’ had infused a new element of suspicion
and concern.

• Pakistan’s close friends in Islamic World i.e. Iran

and Turkey were keen to join
these military pacts as both of them felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union
and their stance clearly influenced Pakistan which was eager to join them that
could give it a sense of ‘security’ against India and this policy was also in line
with its Pan-Islamic approach.

Thus, the reality was that the decisive factor for Pakistan in joining these military pacts
was its fear of hostile India and Soviet Union and the need to find an ‘equalizer’ to
bolster its security.

United States with which Pakistan had military pacts and close alliance all along the
history has never been a trust-worthy friend as it left Pakistan alone in its wars with India
in 1965 and 1971.

Rather, it suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan by an announcement of the
complete stoppage of military assistance to Pakistan on 12th April, 1967.

In 1971 which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan, United States failed to come to
Islamabad’s rescue despite its military pacts with it while the then super-power, Soviet
Union signed a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ with India - Pakistan’s arch rival
in the same year to signal its support to New Delhi.

In 1989, United States left Pakistan in the wilderness, following the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan to face along the menace of Kalashinkov, drugs and the
Mujahideen which in the eyes of Washington turned into ‘terrorists’ after the events of
9/11.

In a broader sense, both the Democratic and Republican administrations of United States
appear to agree on pre-eminent position of India in the subcontinent as was reflected by
the statement of the then US Under-Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in New Delhi
in July 1977 that the US had decided to look towards India as the leader of South Asia.

Then signing a civilian nuclear energy deal with India in 2006 and refusing to sign a
similar agreement with Pakistan was a clear signal that it accords much more priority to
India than Pakistan which had played a leading role in its ‘War on Terror’.

30
The fateful decision of United States and the West to send military and other aid to India
in complete disregard of the security concerns of Pakistan, brought an end to the special
relationship between Pakistan and United States and the termination of military pacts.

Pakistan’s Reaction:

 Pakistan embarked upon a major effort to improve its relations with its two joint
neighbours viz. Soviet Union and China.

 Pak-Soviet ties began to mend with the signing of an agreement in 1961 for
cooperation in the exploration of gas and oil reserves in Pakistan and trade and
air services agreements in 1963.

 With People Republic of China, Islamabad was able to cultivate excellent

relations which had remained ‘warm’ even when Pakistan signed military pacts
with United States as Islamabad made it known to Beijing that its joining the
pacts is not aimed at China.

In 1960s, Pakistan’s foreign policy entered the phase of ‘bilateralism’ as it

successfully cultivated good relations with leading powers in the world viz. USA,
USSR and China even though they were antagonistic to each other. This
balancing act on the part of Pakistan was a high point in its ‘diplomacy’.

Pakistan-China friendship has become all-weathered over the years and is

described as the deepest than the Ocean and highest than the mountains.

Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Deep Sea Port are of utmost importance to
China which provide it a safe route to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

In any future crisis in which Pakistan is involved, it is the geo-political interest of China,
apart from a firm friendship with Pakistan that may induce China not to remain a silent
spectator.

Therefore, Pakistanis look at China as a neighbour, favourably inclined to assist them

than a distant country of United States.

31
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Alliances – Costs and Benefits

[Chapter 6]

The imperative of ‘national security’ is primordial. Lacking adequate means to ensure

defence against the ever-looming Indian threat, it was perfectly ‘rational’ for Pakistan to
look for ‘alliances’ to compensate for the glaring ‘power disparity’.

However, on joining Pakistan’s military alliances of Mutual Defence Assistant

Agreement of 1954, Baghdad Pact/CENTO & SEATO of 1955 and Pak-US Cooperation
Agreement of 1959, there was a harsh criticism on the part of:

 the influential Arab countries, particularly of the Baghdad Pact.

 Pakistan was suddenly isolated in the African and Asian nations who were
suspicious of the West and looked upon the Soviet Union as supporter of the
struggle for emancipation from colonial domination and exploitation.
 The ‘cost’ was more serious in respect of furious Soviet reaction.
 Assured of the ‘Soviet veto’ in the UN Security Council, India exploited
Pakistan’s decision to join the ‘alliances’ and renounced its obligation for a
plebiscite in Kashmir.

Arab World:

 Concerned about the implications of the ‘alliances’ for the Arab unity and
aspiring the leadership of the Arab world, Arab Republic of Egypt denounced the
‘alliances’. Radio Cairo said a Turko-Pakistan alliance would be a catastrophe for
Islam … the first stab in our back. The next one will probably occur when Iraq
joins the plot.1

President Nasser of Egypt described Iraq’s decision to join the ‘Baghdad Pact’ as
a treacherous blow to Arab solidarity and branded non-Arab Pakistan, Iran and
Turkey as agents of imperialism. Particularly offensive to Pakistan was Nasser’s
partiality to the Indian stand on Kashmir, failing to take the cognizance of the
right of self-determination of the Muslim people of the state.

Coming from Arab Republic of Egypt - a country that is the cradle of Islam, this
made Pakistanis embarrassed.

32
  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invited Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru
for a visit who was welcomed on arrival by the slogan: ‘Welcome messenger of
peace’. This was a great disappointment to the sentiments of Pakistanis from the
Guardian of the Holy shrines of Haram Sharif and Madina-e-Munawarra.

Soviet Union and India:

Discarding its neutral stance in Pak-India disputes, Soviet Union threw its powerful
weight behind India as a response to Pakistan’s alliance policy. Promising ‘all help’ to
make India industrially strong, the USSR announced aid for a big steel plant. On a visit to
India in December 1955, Nicolai Bulganin and Nikta Khrushchev declared they were
‘grieved that imperialist forces succeeded in dividing India into two parts’. The Soviets
referred to ‘Kashmir’ as ‘one of the states of India’.

The Soviet leaders visited Afghanistan and demonstrated their hostility towards Pakistan
by announcing support for ‘Pakhtoonistan’.

United States:

The ‘great disappointment’ was particularly due to the American failure to throw its
weight behind Pakistan for a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Opinion in the United States too began to swing within a few years, illustrated by the
radical change in evaluation of neutralism.

By 1957, neutralism acquired a mantle of respectability, indeed a position of privilege.

The US President, Eisenhower endorsed India’s neutrality and in internal discussions,

became critical of his own administration’s ‘tendency to rush out and seek allies’. He
called the ‘alliance’ with Pakistan, ‘a terrible error’.

Senator John F. Kennedy defended Indian ‘neutrality’ calling that during its formative
period in the 19th century, America too, followed non-alignment.

Opinion in Pakistan was deeply agitated by the change in US policy. While Pakistan was
‘taken for granted’ by its allies and penalized by the Soviet Union, neutral India was
courted by both the US and the USSR,

The West was becoming lukewarm in its support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and
Pakistan government was placed on the ‘defensive’.

While Pakistan suffered loss of esteem due to its ‘alliance’ with the West, neutralism
enhanced India’s prestige, with the Soviet Union and United States competing for India’s
goodwill and giving it aid and assistance.

33
Under pressure of criticism in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon
exploded in frustration on 8th March, 1958 by saying:

“Our people, if they find their freedom threatened by Bharat will break all the pacts and
shake hands’ with people with whom we have made enemies because of others’.

Reaction at Home:

Opposition to the policy of ‘alliances’ increased over the years because it cut across other
aims and aspirations of the people. Foremost among them was the deep-rooted desire of
the people for solidarity with other Muslim peoples because they felt they were part of
Umm.

Pakistan was, therefore, torn by a fundamental contraction i. e. its national commitment

to solidarity with the causes of Muslim nations while loyalty to ‘allies’ called for
concession to their concerns. Hence, no other issue in Pakistan’s short history had posed
such a sharper dilemma than this ‘contradiction’, particularly on the ‘Suez crisis’.

 Prime Minister, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, however, decided on an objective and

balanced approach, upholding Egypt’s sovereign right to nationalize the canal,
opposing the Anglo-French threat of use of force to restore the dispute and also
recognizing the interests of Pakistan and many other nations ‘vitally concerned
with the maintenance of the freedom of navigation’.

 Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suharwardy replace Chaudhry Mohammd Ali as the Prime
Minister on his resignation and retrieved Pakistan’s self-respect. However, the
Suez episode confirmed the view of those who regarded ‘alliances’ as a liability
as Pakistan was seen to have obliged ally Britain and supported its imperialist aim
at the cost of a Muslim country with a just cause and thus allowed itself to be
stood in a corner of isolation.

Although the ‘costs’ of the ‘alliances’ were high but Pakistan could not afford to abandon
the policy in view of its precarious security situation which was the demand of its ‘
national interest’
BENEFITS

Guarantees against the ever-present ‘security threat’ constrained reappraisal and Pakistan
went on to strengthen the ‘alliances’ with the United States by signing another agreement
in April 1959.

In the new agreement, the United States went further than before in declaring, in Article
1, that it ‘regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of
the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan’.

It further stated that ‘in case of aggression against Pakistan …the United States of
America … will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may

34
be ally agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and
Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist Pakistan at its request’.

In Article II, the United States pledged ‘to assist the Government of Pakistan in the
preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of
economic development’.

Benefits were initially meager as the military aid announced by the United States for
1954 was only US $ 29.5 million on which President Ayub’s remark was that ‘it would
be better for Pakistan not to be involved in defence arrangements with the United States’.

Pakistan’s concerns were not dismissed in Washington and economic and military aid
was increased subsequently:

 In 1954, the US economic assistance amount to US $ 106 million.

 In 1955, the US military aid was boosted to US $ 50 million. [United States
Committed to equip four infantry divisions, one armoured division and another
armoured brigade to provide modern aircraft for six squadrons for Pakistan Air
Force and supply twelve vessels for Pakistan Navy over the coming years].
 In 1959, the annual allocations of US economic and military aid were doubled.
 Over the 1954-1962 period, US economic assistance amount to US $ 3.5 billion.
 United States also provided US $ 1,372 million for defence support and purchase
of equipment.

From a poorly equipped force in 1954, Pakistan’s armed forces became a powerful
defence machine, with heavy armour and artillery, the latest aircraft and ships, confident
of its self-defence capability.

Speaking in the National Assembly in February 1957, Suharwardy expressed satisfaction

over the ‘dividends’ of the country’s foreign policy. He said in the ‘United States’
Pakistan had a ‘friend and an ally’.

Having first sought the ‘alliance’, Pakistan soon felt, it was doing the United States a
favour, exaggerating its costs and under-valuing the benefits. Still mismatch was
accepted.

Later, Pakistan was not alone in having second thoughts about the policy of ‘alliances’.

Because of Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962, India was proclaimed a ‘key country’ in
the West’s struggle against communism.

The Eisenhower administration which had started cutting aid to India, now swung to the
other extreme, increasing the amount from US $ 93 million in 1956 to US $ 365 million
in 1957 and a record US $ 822 million in 1980 and in the John F. Kenney’s
administration, it increased to US $ 1 billion.

35
Reacting to the new trends, Pakistan also sought to normalize relations with the USSR. In
December 1960, Pakistan signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for exploration of
petroleum resources that marked the beginning of an improvement in bilateral relations.

During a visit to United States in July 1961, President John F. Kennedy, in his welcome
speech expressed concern over the ‘misunderstandings’ that had arisen. He was evidently
aware of Pakistan’s perception of declaring US support.

During talks, President Ayub Khan gave an account of India’s stonewalling on Kashmir.

Kennedy recognized the urgency of settling the Kashmir dispute and said that it was a
‘vital interest of the United States’.

He affirmed the desire of the United States to see a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir
issue and expressed the hope that progress towards settlement would be possible at an
early date.

In the meantime, Pakistan decided to move the UN Security Council to take up

consideration of the Kashmir dispute.

Contrary to Kennedy’s commitment to Ayub Khan, the US administration was hesitant to

extend support.

The Security Council took up the discussion on Kashmir on 28 th April, 1962 while India
repudiated its commitment to a plebiscite.

In June, Republic of Ireland sponsored a resolution that reminded India and Pakistan of
past resolutions of the Security Council, calling for a plebiscite in Kahsmir.

Seven out of the Council’s nine members supported the resolution but it was vetoed by
the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 22 February, 1954.

36
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Relations with China and other Developments

[Chapter 7]

Features of Pak-China Relations

 Pakistan extended ‘recognition’ to China soon after the

‘Communist
Revolution’ in 1950.

 The unique feature of Pak-China relations is that the bilateral

ties
between the two countries remained on an even keel despite:

 Pakistan’s criticism of ‘Communism’

 Islamabad’s increasing cooperation with the United
States and
tension in Sino-US relations.

 On Pakistan’s joining SEATO, China criticized the ‘alliance’

and not
Pakistan.

 More impressive for Pakistan was China’s scrupulous

avoidance of
any ‘partisan’ pronouncement on Pak-India disputes.

 China did not strengthen its relations with India at the cost of
Pakistan.

 Pakistan was less careful in its anti-communist rhetoric when

37
 Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra spoke of ‘international
communism’ as the ‘biggest potential danger to democracy in
the region’.

 Premier Chou En Lai told Pakistani Ambassador that he was

‘hurt’ by
Pakistan’ statement as he considered Pakistan, a friend but
still said ‘he fully understood Pakistan’s circumstances’.1 He
expressed the hope that Pakistan would follow ‘principles of
peaceful coexistence’.2

 Pakistan did notice Chinese forbearance and henceforth,

followed a
more ‘balanced policy’.

At the Afro-Asian summit conference in Bandung in April

1955, Prime Minister Bogra requested for a meeting with
Premier Chou En Lai who insisted on coming over himself.
The meeting was remarkably friendly and Chou En Lai
readily accepted Premier Bogra’s explanation that ‘Pakistan’s
membership of SEATO was not directed against China’.
At the summit conference, Premier Bogra state that ‘China is,
by no means an ‘imperialist nation’ and has not brought any
other country under her heel’. He especially praised Chou En
Lai who ‘ has shown a great deal of conciliation’.

Bandung conference provided an opportunity to both, Prime

Minister Bogra and Premier Chou En Lai to discuss bilateral
relations. Chou En Lai, publicly acknowledged Premier
Bogra’s statement in conversation with him that:

 Pakistan was not against China,

 it had no fear of Chinese aggression and that

38
  if the United States should take aggressive action under
SEATO,
Pakistan would not be involved

 Prime Minister Chou En Lai’s visit to Pakistan in December

1956 led to further
development of bilateral understanding. The joint
communiqué recorded the shared view of the Prime Ministers
that ‘divergence of views on many problems should not
prevent the strengthening of friendship between the two
countries……They are happy to place on record that there is
no real conflict of interests between the two countries’.

Notes

1. Hindu, Madras [India], 27th November, 1954.

2. People’s China, 16th October, 1954.

39
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Pakistan-India War, 1965

[Chapter 8]

 Indo-Pak War of 1965, Role of China, USA & Soviet

Union and Tashkent Accord

The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 was, in fact:

 the culmination of a process of rise and fall of

expectations of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir
dispute,
 popular agitation and
 state repression in the India-held state,
 jingoism triggered by border clashes in the Rann of
Kutch,
 a limited operation born out of frustration and
desperation, conceived by the Government of Pakistan to
draw international attention and unintended escalation.

In the perspective of history, leaders on both sides, leaders on both

sides seemed to have lost control over actions decided under
pressure, provoking reactions and allowing the build-up of
momentum that pushed them into an unwanted war neither side
had planned.

40
The fundamental cause of tensions lay in the failure to settle the
festering Kashmir dispute. The ceasefire in the state was defined in
the 1949 Security Council resolution as the first step towards the
holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices to determine the
question of the accession of the state. Accepted by Pakistan as well
as India, the resolution constituted an international agreement
requiring implementation by the parties. But India concocted one
pretext after another to evade its obligation.

 Even before Pakistan signed a defence assistance agreement

with the
United States, Prime Minister Nehru began using the
assistance Pakistan might receive as representing a change in
the situation, though how that could affect the rights of the
people of the state defied logic.

 Then India invented the argument that if the Muslims of

Kashmir opted to accede
to Pakistan that could trigger a Hindu backlash and massacre
of Indian Muslims.

 Another pretext for refusal to implement the resolution was

that continued hold
over Kashmir was a necessity for maintaining the integrity of
India, otherwise, its unity would be destroyed.

In the process, the pledge to the people of the state and to the
United Nations was relegated as India sought to freeze the status
quo and perpetuate its occupation of two-thirds of the state. This
was unjustified in law and unacceptable to Pakistan.

Expectations rose in 1962, as a result of American and British

intercession with India during the Sino-Indian border clashes in
which Pakistan had honoured a suggestion from them, not to

41
exploit the situation. It was assured to Islamabad that purposeful
negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the festering Kashmir
dispute would be held. However, India stalled earliest negotiations
after the Sino-Indian war which had registered a panicky
perception of Chinese invasion aimed at conquering and occupying
India, proved incorrect.

Soon, Americans and Britishers also lost their interest to help solve
the Kashmir problem and their strategy changed from focusing on
the settlement of Kashmir to drawing neutral India, away from its
bias in favour of the USSR and towards their own orbit.

After the Sino-Indian border war ended and New Delhi received a
large quantity of weapons, it reverted back to its rigid position on
Kashmir, refusing to consider a solution in conformity with the
plebiscite principle.

Pakistani disappointment over the failed talks was soon followed

by ‘anger’ when in October 1963, India initiated legal maneuvers
to erode the disputed status of Kashmir. The puppet Prime Minister
of the Indian held Kashmir, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, who
was installed by New Delhi and sustained in power through rigged
elections, announced changes in the Constitution of the state,
designed to bring Kashmir at part with the other states in India.
The designation of Sadr-i-Riyasat [President of State] was replaced
with the title of ‘Governor’ and the Head of the Government of the
state from Prime Minister to the Chief Minister.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru announced in November that a

‘gradual erosion’ of the special status of Kashmir was in progress.
Pakistan protested, denouncing the proposed changes as ‘clearly
illegal’ and a ‘flagrant violation of Indian’s commitments’.

Deeply disrupted by New Delhi moves, evidencing once again the

Indian design to annex the state against their will, the Kashmiri

42
people launched an agitation which assumed massive proportions,
following the theft of Moo-e-Muqaddis [holy hair of the Prophet
(PBUH)] from the shrine of Hazartbal. Attributing the crime to
Indian authorities, the Kashmiri people poured out in a
spontaneous eruption. Demonstrations of unprecedented
proportions were held in cities and towns across the occupied
valley. Even after the Indian authorities announced the recovery of
the relic, the agitation did not stop. Instead, it took a political
direction with the Kashmiri people demanding the exercise of their
right of self-determination. In the months, following December
1963, Kashmir was in the grip of a crisis, with the administration
in collapse and India resorting once again to repression against the
unarmed Kashmiri people.

Pakistan appealed to the UN Security Council which held lengthy

debates in February and May, 1964 but was prevented by the threat
of a ‘Soviet veto’, not only taking any effective action but even
from reaffirming its previous resolutions on the Kashmir question.
This failure on the part of the apex organ of the United Nations
was yet another blow to prospects of peace between Pakistan and
India.

In December 1964, the Indian Government resumed moves aimed

at the merger of Kashmir with India through the application of the
Indian Constitution, enabling it to impose presidential rule and
extend Indian laws to Kashmir.

The boundary in the Rann of Kutch, a low-lying marsh wedged

between the province of Sindh and the Indian state of Gujrat that
floods during the monsoon season, was the subject of dispute,
dating before 1947 between the princely state of Kutch and the
British Government. Although the boundary was not demarcated,
an area of about 3,500 square miles, north of the 24th parallel was
contested. After independence, India claimed the entire territory

43
and in 1956, sent its forces to seize the Chhad Bet high ground.
Pakistan protested but India did not begin negotiations until 1960.

In violation of an agreement reached with the Pakistan

Government, Indian forces advanced to the north in January 1965
and tried to establish new posts and obstruct Pakistani patrols in
the disputed area. Pakistan sent in forces to stop India from solving
the dispute unilaterally by force.

As both sides strengthened their forces in the Rann of Kutch,

fighting flared up in the month of April. The Pakistani forces
surrounded the Indian contingent and could have captured it but
President Ayub Khan ordered restraint.

The danger of further escalation was averted partly due to the

approaching monsoon. British Government persuaded the two
sides to agree to a ceasefire on 1st May. Indirect but intense
negotiations were held through British High Commissioners in
Islamabad and in New Delhi. Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed
ensured that the agreement signed on 30th June, 1965 provided for
a time-bound, self-executing mechanism for settlement of the
dispute peacefully.

The agreement gave two months to the two sides to try to resolve
the issue through bilateral negotiations. If that failed, they would
submit the dispute to arbitration by a tribunal to be constituted
within four months with the UN Secretary General, designating its
Chairman. Both sides further agreed that the tribunal’s award ‘shall
not be questioned on any grounds whatsoever, that it would be
implemented as soon as possible and until then the tribunal would
remain in being. Relying on evidence as to where the traditional
boundary was, the tribunal awarded 350 square miles to Pakistan, a
mere 10 % of the territory under dispute while 90 % of the
disputed territory was awarded to India. Interestingly, Pakistan was
satisfied that the dispute was honourably resolved but India was

44
still indignant, always wanting to settle disputes on its own terms
and vowed never again to accept third-party mediation or impartial
adjudication.

Except for Jayaprakash Narayan commended the Kutch agreement

‘as an object lesion in peace-keeping which should be applied to
all disputes including that of Kashmir, most Indian politicians and
commentators considered the arbitration agreement ‘humiliating’
and denounced it in Lok Sabha.

In fact, the Kutch clash, by making India want to settle a score and
Pakistan over-confident, proved to be one further stumble towards
war towards war which came within five months, as the Kashmir
cauldron came once again to the boil.

In a statement on 29th April, Prime Minister Shastri threatened that

India would fight Pakistan at a time and place of its own choosing.

United States diplomacy allowed itself to be placed on the

defensive during the Kutch crisis. Washington announced an
embargo on the further supply of arms or spare parts. Apparently
even-handed, the decision was weighted against Pakistan because
almost all of its equipment was of US origin while the restriction
had little impact on India which had its weaponry, Soviet-based.
President Johnson ordered discontinuation of any additional US aid
or loans which worked to Pakistan’s detriment. This contributed to
the build up of a mood of desperation in Pakistan. President Ayub
described Americans ‘power drunk’. On another occasion, Ayub
Khan said Pakistan was seeking ‘new friends, not new masters’

Tension built up when India took additional steps to integrate

occupied Kashmir. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the former Prime
Minister of Indian-held Kashmir and his colleague Mirza Afzal
Beg, leader of the Plebiscite Front were arrested in May 1965, on
their return from abroad, having had meetings with leaders of

45
Muslim countries during Haj and with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai
in Cairo. The Indian moves triggered another popular uprising in
Kahsmir with Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, leader of the Awami
Action Committee, joining the Gandhi-style non-violent
disobedience movement. India unleashed its forces to crush the
struggle in the state.

In Pakistan, recurrent popular uprisings in occupied Kashmir and

their brutal repression by India and the ‘rise and fall’ of hopes for a
settlement through peaceful means, fostered mounting frustration
in Pakistan.

In the later part of 1964, there was ‘thaw’ in the situation and
Pakistan jolted the world community into recognizing the urgency
of fulfilling the pledge given by India, Pakistan and the United
Nations to let the Kashmiri people themselves determine their
future.

President Ayub Khan was disturbed by India’s refusal to agree to a

peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. He was moved by the
heroic struggle of the people of Algeria and Vietnam and his own
confidence grew after the encounter in the Rann of Kutch, though
he was still averse to war, agreed for preparation of a plan by
GHQ. The plan named ‘Gibraltar’ was approved.

Calling for incursions by Kashmiri volunteers into Indian-held

Kashmir, it was based on three assumptions:

 People in Kashmir would rise to support the guerillas,

 a large-scale Indian offensive against Azad Kahsmir
was unlikely and
 the possibility of attack across the international border
was ruled out.

46
 Escalation to War

Volunteers entered Indian-held Kashmir in August, poorly

equipped and in desolate conditions of the cold and high mountains
and were not joined by Kashmiris who were not prepared for an
uprising. Nevertheless, the guerillas inflicted heavy damage on the
Indian forces.

To cope with the situation, the Indian authorities decided to mount

a major offensive across the ceasefire line and occupied a large
territory in the Kargil ara in the north and the Haji Pir Pass
between Uri and Poonch, posing a threat to Muzaffarabad, the
capital of Azad Kashmir.

Now the Pakistan had no choice than to respond and it decided to

launch an attack in the Chamb area from its territory. As the
Pakistan army advanced towards Akhnur, a nodal point on the
transport and supply link between Jammu and the Kashmir valley,
India decided to launch an offensive across the international
border. Hence, actions and reactions led the two sides to the war
which probably they did not plan and did not want.

The Indian forces crossed the international border before dawn on

6th September and their offensive was to capture Lahore, the capital
of the province of Punjab, 20 miles from the Indian border and the
‘capture’ was also announced by BBC.

Although the Pakistan army was caught by surprise but the

legendary acts of heroism and sacrifice halted the Indian thrust.
The small but highly professional Pakistan Air Force went on the
offensive and attacked a number of Indian bass on the evening of
6th September, inflicting heavy losses.

The attack by Indian Air Force came two days later on 8th
September but was check-mated and particularly the bold initiative

47
of the out-numbered contingent of East Pakistan which not only
rose in defence but took the battle into the enemy airspace,
bombing targets in India in retaliation for the Indian bombing of
Dhakka and Chittagong. In a matter of few days, Pakistan Air
Force shot down 75 Indian aircraft for the lost of 19 of its own,
clearing the Pakistani airspace, forcing the Indian Air Force to a
passive role.

The tiny Pakistan Navy made an audacious foray into Indian

territorial waters to attack Dwarka, a naval base, 200 miles from
Karachi and captured almost a hundred coastal ships as the Indian
Navy did not join the battle.

On 9th September, Pakistan Army launched a major offensive in

the Khem Karan area towards Amritsar. The armoured division
made good progress but then became bogged down as the Indian
forces flooded the countryside by breaching an irrigation canal.
The Indian armour then counter-attacked in the Sialkot area where
the biggest tank battle of the war was fought in the Chavinda area,
containing the Indian advance aimed at cutting off Wazirabad, a
communications nodal point.

Considering the disparity of size and resources between the two

countries and their force levels, the Pakistani armed forces can be
legitimately proud of their performance in the war. Pakistan made
marginally larger territorial gains but the war ended in a stalemate
as neither side achieved any major breakthrough.

The role of China

The Peoples Republic of China, a real friend of Pakistan took the

lead in relieving pressure on Pakistan by issuing a strong protest
against Indian acts of aggression and provocation along China’s
border and on 8th September, Beijing demanded an end to India’s
frenzied provocation activities. On 16th September, China delivered

48
an ultimatum that unless India dismantled its military structures on
the Chinese side of the border, stopped incursions into China and
returned livestock and kidnapped civilians within three days, it
would have to bear ‘rull responsibility’ for all consequences. On
19th September, China extended the ‘ultimatum’ for three days.
The threat of expansion of the war served to inject a sense of urgency into the
deliberations of the UN Security Council which had adopted resolutions on 4th and 6th
September which were unacceptable to Pakistan. It passed a resolution on 20th September
which went beyond earlier resolutions and demanded a ceasefire, withdrawals and
promised to take steps to assist towards a settlement of the political problems underlying
the present conflict. This resolution was accepted by both Pakistan and India on 22 nd
September.

In 1965 crisis, China extended full support to Pakistan, both directly and implicitly. The
Chinese foreign ministry used vivid language to manifest their friendship.

In transit through Karachi on 4th September, Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi expressed
support for the just action taken by Pakistan to repel Indian armed provocations.

On 7th September, a day after India launched its offensive towards Lahore, China
condemned India’s ‘criminal aggression’ against Pakistan and charged India with trying
to ‘bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes’. It further declared
on 12th September that its non-involvement in the Kashmir dispute ‘absolutely’ does not
mean that China can approve of depriving the Kashmiri people of their right of self-
determination or that she can approve of Indian aggression against Pakistan.

China responded generously to Pakistan’s request for assistance, Apart from providing
munitions and spare parts, China was prepared to fly in the material by fighter aircraft
which it did by sea on Pakistan’s request.

The role of ALLIES

Pakistan’s allies made belated and half-hearted attempt to invoke the alliances, realizing
that not all the allies agreed that India was the ‘aggressor’.

The SEATO Council did not meet for consultations and CENTO could not be activated.

The UK backtracked after India raised a storm over Prime Minister Wilson’s criticism of
Indian aggression.

The role of United States

The US response to the outbreak of war between Pakistan and India was one of
frustration. Finding its policy in South Asia in shambles, with Pakistan and India, using

49
US-supplied arms to fight each other rather than against its enemies, the US adopted a
neutral, hands-off stance, leaving it to the Security Council to promote an end to the war.

On 8th September, the United States decided to stop the supply of arms to Pakistan and
India. When Pakistan protested that the US decision to cut off defence supplies amounted
to punitive action against an ally, the US Ambassador said he considered Pakistan to have
provoked the war.

The US view that it was not bound to come to Pakistan’s assistance provoked a
predictable reaction of betrayal as the 1959 bilateral defence agreement had stated:

“the US regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the
independence and integrity of Pakistan”.

The Ayub-Kennedy communiqué of 13th July, 1961, had reaffirmed ‘commitment to the
preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan’ and the US embassy aide
memoir of 5th November, 1962 assured assistance to Pakistan ‘in the event of aggression
from India’.

But as the US Ambassador had expressed the view of ‘Pakistan to have provoked the
war’, Washington did not interpret the ‘Indian attack’ as ‘aggression’.

Assistance from friends

President Soekarno of Indonesia extended memorable assistance, readily agreeing to

provide some MIG aircraft and sent two submarines and four missile boats. BY the time,
they reached Karachi, Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire.

Iran and Turkey provided planeloads of arms and ammunitions, though the two CENTO
allies could not send equipment imported from the United States because of American
restrictions on transfer to another country.

President Nasser of Egypt, though often favaouring non-aligned India, echoed sympathy
for Pakistan and endorsed the Arab summit’s communiqué which called upon India and
Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the principles and resolutions
of the United Nations.

Tashkent Declaration

The Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin offered his good offices to work for a settlement
between Pakistan and India.

50
Pakistan accepted the offer on a variety of reasons including the hope that Soviet Union
would work for progress in pressing for settlement of Kashmir dispute and its both allied
viz. US and UK had left the field open for Soviet diplomacy to promote a post-war
settlement.

The Tashkent declaration provided:

 for the withdrawal of forces to positions held on 5th

August, 1965,
 repatriation of prisoners of war,
 return of High Commissioners to their posts and
 for further meetings between the two sides on ‘matters
of direct concern to both countries. [However, it did not make any direct reference
to the crucial Kashmir question].

51
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Policy Ups and Downs: 1965-71

[Chapter 9]

Peoples Republic of China:

Pakistan’s acceptance of the UN Security Council’s demand for a

ceasefire surprised Chinese leaders but after President Ayub Khan
explained Pakistan’s constraints, they, as usual, showed
understanding of Pakistan’s decision even though their own view
was different. An engaging characteristic which has distinguished
Chinese leaders, has been their respect for the right of Pakistan, as
also other countries, to determine what is in their ‘national
interest’.

China’s support of Pakistan in the 1965 crisis had made a deep

impression on the Pakistani people. President Liu Shao-Chi’s visit
to Pakistan in March 1966 was a memorable occasion. In Lahore,
Karachi and Dhaka, the welcome of the Chinese leader was
enthusiastic multitudes was on a scale rarely seen since
independence. His description of Sino-Pakistan relations as
mujahidana dosti [friendship in righteous struggle] aptly translated
the sentiments of the Pakistani people and boosted their morale.
This friendship, forged in the hat of the war, developed in
succeeding years.

To help Pakistan’s defence capability after the United States

embargoed military sales, China agreed, in 1966, to provide
equipment for two divisions of the army as well as MIG aircraft for
Pakistan Air Force.

52
China provided US $ 60 million for development assistance in
1965, a further US $ 40 million in 1969 and US $ 200 million for
the next five-year plan.

Besides, China placed emphasis on the transfer of technology to

help Pakistan achieve self-reliance:

 Heavy Mechanical Complex,

 Heavy Re-build Factory,
 Kamra Aeronautical Complex and
 Several other industrial plants.

To provide a land link, China played a major part in the

construction of the spectacular Karakorum Highways [KKH],
linking Gilgit in the northern areas with Kashgar in Xinjiang
province, over the second highest mountain range in the world and
through the 15,800-foot high Khunjarab Pass.

USSR:

Pakistan’s policy of normalization of relations with the Soviet

Union gathered momentum after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. As a
result, Soviet Union provided credit for development projects in
Pakistan.

Pakistan sent a military delegation to Moscow in 1966 to probe the

purchase of military supplies from the Soviet Union. Besides, high
level visits by leaders of the two countries were held.

Pakistan’s decision, not to renew the lease with the United States
for the Badaber electronic base, upon its expiry in July 1968 was
appreciated by Moscow. At the same time, Soviet Union
announced to built a Steel Mill in Karachi. Later that year, Soviet

53
Union agreed to sell a small quantity of military equipment to
Pakistan. Soviet Union committed over a billion dollars in soft
loans for 31 development projects. However, acquiescing in Indian
pressure, Moscow discontinued the further supply of military
equipment in 1970, illustrating to Pakistan, the limits of
bilateralism. In East Pakistan crisis, Soviet priority reverted to one-
sided support for India, leading to a breakdown of the developing
links between the two countries.

USA:

The relations between Pakistan and United States were already

under strain. The United States was antagonized by Pakistan’s
allegation of betrayal in 1965, as United States was committed
under the 1959 agreement of cooperation to come to Pakistan’s
assistance in the vent of aggression but it did not accept such an
interpretation of the Indian attack across the border. It was,
however, confirmed in December that the alliance between the two
countries was over, military aid was discontinued and any further
economic aid was made conditional on Pakistan, curtailing its
close ties with China which was unacceptable to Pakistan. On 12
April, 1967, the United States announced termination of military
assistance to Pakistan (and India), exempting only cash sales of
spare parts for the previously supplied equipment on a case-by-
case basis. However, neither United States nor Pakistan renounced
the 1959 Cooperation Agreement. The alliance was torn apart
because of the divergent pulls of ‘national interest’ of both the
countries in a fast changing world scenario.

President Ayub Khan realized the necessity of mending fences

with the United States. In Washington, tempers were cooled down
as some people in high places recognized Pakistan’s potential for
contributing positively to better understanding between the United
States and China.

54
In April, 1966, US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk even asked
Foreign Minister Bhutto for Pakistan’s help to arrange a meeting
with the Chinese Foreign Minister for discussion on Vietnam.

The US-Pakistan relations improved after President Richard Nixon

took office in 1969. An advocate of close relations with Pakistan
since the 1950s and appreciative of its role as an ally, he did not
view Pakistan-China relations in a frozen inimical perspective.
Cognizant of the sea change in China’s position following the
Sino-Soviet split and border tensions between them, he was among
the first leaders in America to detect a ‘dimly perceived
community of interest between the United States and China.
Pakistan’s close relations with China, no longer needed to be
viewed from the jaundiced eyes of the previous administration. On
the contrary, Nixon administration considered Pakistan an asset for
opening communications with China.

The upbeat tone of Pakistan-US relations was manifest in the strong support the United
States gave for ‘aid-to-Pakistan’ at the World Bank’s consortium meeting in May 1969.

In August, President Nixon paid a visit to Pakistan and in early 1970, Pakistan agreed to
President Nixon’s request for the opening of a secret channel of communication between
Washington and Beijing via Islamabad. In October 1970, the United States relaxed the
ban on military supplies, allowing the sale of a limited number of B-57 and F-104
aircraft.

Before, the White House activated the secret channel in October 1970 for negotiations
with Beijing, the Nixon administration had already been engaged for a year in cautious
diplomacy aimed at making ‘a new beginning’ in relations with China.

Following China’s split with the Soviet Union, President Nixon and his National Security
Council Advisor, Henry Kissinger appraised China to be confronted with the ‘nightmare
of hostile encirclement’ in which it might welcome ‘strategic reassurance’ from improved
relations with the United States.

In January 1970, the United States offered to send a representative to Beijing to consider
ideas to reduced tension. The Chinese response was affirmative. To signal serious intent,
President Nixon started to dismantle obstacles to better relations by relaxing restrictions
on travel and trade. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, well known for his
preference for ‘secret diplomacy’, used personal friends for confidential contacts with the

55
Chinese embassy in Paris, in order to prepare the ground for a positive outcome of the
proposed direct dialogue.

In October 1970, President Nixon asked President Yahya Khan in a meeting in New York
to inform the Chinese leaders, during his visit to China in November that President Nixon
considered rapprochement with China ‘essential’. Upon his return, President Yahya Khan
conveyed the Chinese response in an elaborately confidential manner. Henry Kissinger
was fascinated by Ambassador Agha Hilaly’s insistence on dictating the message at slow
speed which he had to take in long hand. For four months thereafter, messages were
passed on this Kissinger-Hilaly-Yahya Khan channel to Beijing in utter secrecy. Pakistan
was equally helpful in arranging Henry Kissinger’s secret trip for talks in Beijing on 9-11
July, 1971. The world was stunned when President Nixon announce the ‘breakthrough’
simultaneously with a similar announcement form Beijing about an invitation to
President Nixon to visit China.

Moscow’s reaction to the development was both angry and quick. Taking advantage of
the spiraling crisis between Pakistan and India, it concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship
and Cooperation with India.

56
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY
Islamabad Campus

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

1971 Disaster
[Chapter 10]

Shared interest in the protection of cultural, economic and political rights brought he
Muslim people of British India to a common platform, with leaders of Bengal playing an
important role in the formation of the All India Muslim League and the formulation of
the demand for Pakistan.

After Pakistan into being, the unity of its two wings, separated by a thousand-mile hostile
territory, came under strain as a result of several factors, some of which were inherent in
demography and differential colonial legacy and resource endowment, while others arose
from narrow and shortsighted politics.

 Differences with the distant centre began to surface in East Pakistan soon after
independence. A group of students protested when Quaid-i-Azam said, in a
speech in Dhaka in 1948, that ‘Urdu’ would be the national language.
 Expectations of the people for visible self-rule were disappointed.
 Few of the senior administrative personnel inherited by Pakistan were from East
Pakistan and some of those who were appointed to East Pakistan did not win the
confidence of the people.*
 East Pakistan did not have sense of participation in the government in distant
Karachi.

In 1950, East Pakistan Muslim League asked for ‘maximum autonomy’.

But in 1954 elections, Muslim League eclipsed and the United Front which won 223 out
of 237 seats, demanded for ‘complete autonomy’ according to Pakistan Resolution of 23rd
March, 1940 ** which called for ‘independent states in the north-western and eastern
zones’ ignoring the fact that in 1946, the most representative body of elected Muslim
League [which won 446 of 495 seats] had adopted a unanimous resolution declaring that
Pakistan would be ‘a sovereign independent state’, thus clarifying the ambiguity of the
1940 Resolution.

* Of 101 top civil and police officers who opted for Pakistan, only 18 were Bengalis.
** The resolution adopted in Lahore demanded that contiguous Muslim-majority units in
the north-western and eastern zones should be grouped to constitute ‘independent
states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’. The popular

57
 intent was later clarified that left no doubt that Pakistan was to be ‘a sovereign
independent state’.

 Delay in constitution-making and holding of national elections exacerbated East

Pakistan’s sense of exclusion.
 East Pakistan’s isolation during 1965 war and its lack of self-defence capability
gave a fillip to the existing demand for autonomy.

In March 1966, the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman put forward ‘six
points’ calling for a new constitution under which the federal government would be
responsible ‘only for defence and foreign affairs’ for which purpose, it would be provided
with requisite revenue resources’ by the federating units. President Ayub Khan’s highly
centralized government equated the demand for ‘autonomy’ with ‘secessionism’. This set
in a process of polarization between the people of East and West Pakistan, dubbing
Bengalis as dupes of Indian propaganda and Bengali elites, ascribing motives of
domination and exploitation to West Pakistanis. Ayub Khan said: ‘They are not going to
remain with us’.1

Alert to the brewing trouble and growing alienation in East Pakistan, India encouraged
the separatist sentiment. Operatives of its secret service agency, Research and Analysis
Wing [RAW] intensified subversion. In 1966, they met with a group of extremists in
Agartala to plan sabotage.2

In January 1969, a raid on an armoury led to the arrest of 28 low level civilian and armed
forces personnel. The government implicated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, though he was in
custody during the Agartala Conspiracy period. Trial by special tribunal robbed the
proceedings of credibility. Opinion in East Pakistan concluded that the case was
concocted for political persecution.

In November 1970, a cyclone of ferocious intensity left death and devastation in its trail
in East Pakistan. A quarter of a million people were drowned and the federal government
was charged with indifference to the plight of the people of East Pakistan.

In December 1970, Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman swept the polls in
East Pakistan, winning 167 of the 169 seats from the province, sufficient for an absolute
majority in the 313-member National Assembly. The Pakistan Peoples Party led by Mr.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the second largest party but all seats won from West
Pakistan and sought a share in power.

The focus was on constitutional reforms. Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had earlier
told President Yahya Khan that his six-point demand was negotiable but after the
electoral triumph, he became a prisoner of his own extremist rhetoric and lost control
over hawks in the party who wanted independence. He declined President Yahya Khan’s
invitation to visit Islamabad for talks. When President went to Dhaka, he found that
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was in no mood for a compromise. President Yahya Khan, then
convened the National Assembly on 3rd March in Dhaka hoping the political leaders

58
would settle the issues among themselves. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, now announced that
his party would boycott the Assembly unless constitutional issues and power sharing
formula is first agreed. He went to the extent that those Members of National Assembly
who opted to go to Dhaka for the session would do so on one-way ticket and that their
legs would be broken. President Yahya Khan gave in to the pressure and postponed the
session but went to Dhaka in mid-March for talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The
talks failed on 23rd March when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman proposed confederation.
President Yahya Khan imposed martial law on 26th March and used military force against
the people of East Pakistan. It was a wrong decision as 42,320 West Pakistani troops 3
could not suppress 75 million people of East Pakistan with India determined to obstruct
and prevent the effort through instigation, abetment and military intervention.

India was bent upon exploiting the internal situation in Pakistan. On 30th January, 1971,
an Indian Airliner name ‘Ganga’, on a Srinagar-Delhi flight, was hijacked to Lahore by
two Kashmiri youth. They were lionized as freedom fighters on arrival at Lahore airport.
Other than popular opinion, the usually alert Mr. Z. A. Bhutto applauded the ‘brave
freedom fighters’.3 Their leader set the plane on fire. New Delhi made furious protests,
demanding compensation and immediate surrender of the criminals and suspended over
flight rights to Pakistan’s planes. Later, Pakistani inquiry tribunal discovered that the
leader of the hijackers was a recruit of Indian intelligence, trained and coached for the
mission; the weapons given to him and his innocent accomplice were toy pistols and
wooden grenades; and the ‘Ganga’ was the oldest plane in the airliner’s fleet. Pakistan
had walked into a clever trap.

Following President Yahya Khan’s crackdown in East Pakistan, the Indian government
had moved into higher gear. India saw in the crisis, an ‘opportunity of the century’ to cut
Pakistan into two. The Director of the official Indian Institute of Defence Studies and
Analysis said on 31 March, 1971, ‘What India must realize is the fact that the break-up of
Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again’4

RAW operatives smuggled out Mr. Tajuddin Ahmad, an Awami League leader, escorted
him to a border village to proclaim the independence of Bangladesh and installed him as
head of the provisional Bangladesh government in Mujibnagar, a house in Calcutta,
rented by RAW 5

On 31st March, the Indian Parliament adopted a resolution assuring the East Pakistani
insurgents that ‘their struggle and sacrifices will receive wholehearted support of the
people of India’.* Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reassured Parliament that she
would make timely decisions about the developing situation.

 Within days, the Indian border police started operating inside East Pakistan.
 India embarked on an emergency training programme for Bengali army officers
and provided military equipment for armed resistance.6
 First secretly and later openly, India began building up a rebel force called the
_______________________________________________________________________
_* Bangladesh Documents, Government of India, Vol. 1, P. 672, quoted in Siddiq Salik,

59
 Op. cit. P. 97.
 Mukti Bahini. An estimated 100,000 men were trained in guerrilla skills.7

 Public opinion and the media in the United States and Western Europe were
outraged by the Pakistani military crackdown.
 The excesses committed by Pakistani forces were reported at great length and the
number of refugees who entered India was wildly exaggerated. Few bothered to
take notice of Indian interference or its rejection of proposals for impartial
international inspection.
 To ease India’s burden on account of the refugees, the United States provided $
350 million in aid but that did not dissuade Indira Gandhi from her preconceived
purpose. ‘The opportunity to settle scores with a rival that had isolated itself by its
own shortsightedness was simply too tempting’.
 All efforts by the international community to promote a political solution were
resisted as India ;insisted on terms that escalated by the week’. The US President
Nixon read the Indian design clearly, but the State Department was swept off its
feet by popular reaction. He acquiesced in the State Department’s decision to
embargo delivery of arms to Pakistan.
 Mrs. Gandhi had ordered plans for a lightening ‘Israeli-type’ attack to take over
 East Pakistan.8 Its implementation had to be deferred in the light of Chief of Staff
General Manekshaw’s view that the army needed six to seven months to prepare
for war’ 9 The Indian commanders insisted, at a minimum, on waiting until
November when weather in the Himalayas would make Chinese intervention
more difficult. 10
 On 9th August, the USSR concluded a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ with India,
providing for consultations ‘on major international problems’ of concern to the
two sides and requiring each to refrain from giving assistance to any third country
taking part in an armed conflict with the other. The treaty was bound to eliminate
fears of Chinese intervention.11
 With the Soviet shield in place and the veto in the UN Security Council in its
Pocket, India issued orders to the armed forces to prepare for operations.12
 A policy planning committee was established to ensure political and military
coordination at home and the buildup of international opinion through propaganda
and high level visits.

In contrast, the conditions in Islamabad were confused and chaotic:

o The army was said to be operating largely on its own;

o President Yahya Khan was oblivious to his perils;
o Pakistan’s military leaders were ‘caught up in a process beyond their
comprehension’ 13
o President Yahya Khan did not inform others in the government of his role
in
providing a secret channel between Washington and Beijing and did not anticipate
the strong reaction it was bound to provoke in Moscow.

60
  Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi rejected Washington’s suggestion for UN
monitoring of the border in order to curb guerrilla activities from its territory.

 By October, Yahya Khan informed Washington that he was willing to grant full
autonomy to East Pakistan.
 A month later, he was even agreeable to a unilateral withdrawal of forces.

Before moving in for the ‘kill’, Indira Gandhi undertook an international tour. She visited
Washington on November 4 & 5, mainly for the purpose of influencing the public
opinion. President Nixon was not unsympathetic to India as his administration had given
$ 1.5 billion in aid to India during the two years of his administration. 14 President Nixon
was, however, opposed to her designs against Pakistan and his conversation with Indira
Gandhi was a ‘classic dialogue of the deaf’ and he ‘disturbed by the fact that although
Mrs. Gandhi professed her devotion to peace, she would not make any concrete offers for
deescalating the tensions’. 15 She denied that she was opposed to [Pakistan’s] existence
but her analysis did little to sustain her disclaimer. 16 In fact, she argued that Pakistan
should not have come into being. President Nixon, later recorded in his diary that Indira
Gandhi ‘purposely deceived me in our meeting’, 17 having ‘made up her mind to attack
Pakistan at the time she saw me in Washington and assured me she would not’. 18 In
retrospect, Nixon further lamented: ‘how hypocritical the present Indian leaders are’ and
how ‘duplicitous’ Indira Gandhi.

Beginning of 1965 Indo-Pakistan War

 On 21st November, Pakistan protested that India ‘without a declaration of war, has
launched an all-out offensive’.
 By 22nd November, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger ‘had no doubt that
we were now witnessing the beginning of an India-Pakistan war and that India
had started it’. While ‘Pakistani repression in East Bengal had been brutal and
shortsighted’, in his view, and Nixon’s, ‘it was India’s determination to use the
crisis to establish its prominence on the sub-continent’. 19
 ‘From 21 to 25 November, several Indian Army divisions, divided into smaller
tactical units, launched simultaneous military actions’. 20. Troops, tanks and
aircraft were used to assist the Mukti Bahini occupy ‘liberated’ territory.
 The US President Nixon sent another letter to Indira Gandhi informing her of
Pakistan President Yahya Khan’s offer of unilateral withdrawal and he wrote to
Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to intercede with her. She was implacable. On 29th
November, she told the US Ambassador, ‘we can’t afford to listen to advice
which weaken us’.
 On 2nd December, President Yahya Khan invoked the 1959 agreement with the
United States for assistance, under which Washington was under obligation to
assist Pakistan in case of aggression from any side including India. The US State
Department argued that the agreement w did not oblige the US Government to
give a positive response which was contrary to the provisions of the agreement.
 Meanwhile, the military situation in East Pakistan grew desperate by the day.

61
 President Yahya chose what he considered the path of honour and ordered a
retaliatory attack across the border from West Pakistan on 3 rd December. This
decision, like the others Yahya Khan made, proved ineffectual and merely helped
India advance its military plan which was to commence operations on 4th
December. 21
 On 4th December, the UN Security Council voted 11 to 4 in support of a
resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces but it was killed by
USSR veto.
 On 7th December, the UN General Assembly, acting under the ‘Uniting for Peace
procedure’ adopted a resolution with 104 members in favour, 10 against and 11
abstentions, recommending a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to their own
territories and the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of refugees.
 The overwhelming vote of the world community had no effect on India as it
persisted on its ruthless course of aggression in violation of the principles of the
UN Charter.
 The Chinese Prime Minister Zhou recognized that India was guilty of ‘gross
interference’ in Pakistan’s internal affairs and China continued to supply military
equipment under existing agreements and extended political support to the
Pakistani position in the United Nations.
 The United States, although did not fulfill its alliance commitments to help
maintain Pakistan’s unity and territorial integrity, reviewed its posture on learning
that Indira Gandhi was determined to continue fighting ‘until the Pakistani army
and air force were wiped out’. 22 On 9th December, the US Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger called in the Indian ambassador to warn against such a course.
 On 9th December, President Nixon authorized the dispatch of a task force of eight
ships including the aircraft carrier Enterprise from the Pacific to the Bay of
Bengal. The ‘objective was to scare off an attack on West Pakistan …[and] to
have forces in place in case the Soviet Union pressured China’. 23 He stressed
upon the Soviets, who had ‘proceeded to equip India with great amounts of
sophisticated armaments’, to restrain India.
 On 10th December, Mr. Henry Kissinger sent a message to Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev, saying if Indian military operations continued, ‘we must inevitably
look toward a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The
Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan’. 24
 The crisis now involved high stakes and the threat of great power confrontation
loomed on the horizon as the USSR encouraged New Delhi in its design,
promising that it would initiate military moves if China threatened India.
Washington decided it could not allow Moscow to intimidate Beijing if it wanted
its China policy to retain credibility.
 On 10th December, Mr. Henry Kissinger met China’s representative to the UN,
Huang Hua and briefed him on the steps the US had taken to help Pakistan.
 On 12th December, President Nixon sent a ‘hotline’ message to Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev saying, ‘I cannot emphasized too much that time is of the
essence to avoid consequences neither of us wants’. 25 To make the point more
concretely, the Soviet authorities were also informed of fleet movements.

62
  On 13th December, Moscow finally responded to say that they were conducting ‘a
clarification of all the circumstances in India’. Mr. Kuznetsov was sent to New
Delhi to work for a ceasefire.
 On 14th December at 3.00 AM, the Soviet ambassador in Washington delivered a
message reporting ‘firm assurances by New Delhi that India has no intention of
seizing West Pakistani territory’.
 At this stage, Poland proposed a resolution in the Un Security Council which
called for the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives in East
Pakistan from further humiliation. But, as often happens in a crisis, the rush of
events overtakes human capacity to make timely decisions. To India’s relief, the
resolution was not pressed to a vote.
 On 16th December, speaking in the Parliament, Indira Gandhi offered an
unconditional ceasefire, under mounting US and Soviet pressure. She was
reported to have said that she had defeated Pakistan and avenged several centuries
of Hindu humiliation at the hands of Muslim Sultans and Emperors.
 The US President Nixon could credibly claim that his diplomatic signals and the
dispatch of the US naval fleet persuaded the Soviet Union to join in pressurizing
India, thus saving West Pakistan from India’s evil design. President Nixon not
only demonstrated his long-standing goodwill towards Pakistan but also
manifested a profound understanding of the implications of India and the Soviet
Union succeeding in destroying Pakistan. That would have encouraged the Soviet
Union ‘to use similar tactics elsewhere … (and) change the balance of power in
Asia …. A victory of India over Pakistan would be the same as a victory of the
Soviet Union over China. 26 President Nixon’s decision to improve relations with
China was a part of the same global vision.

The East Pakistan crisis was the result of the following:

 The blunders and follies of Pakistani leaders over the years manifest in the
neglect
of East Pakistan and its exclusion from due share in power. Political autonomy for
East Pakistan would have been consistent with the vision of the founders of
Pakistan.
 United States failed to fulfill its legal obligations under the 1959 Agreement of
Mutual Cooperation to assist Pakistan in case of aggression. The United States
Congress and media was equally responsible as it opposed President Nixon’s
policy and thus became accomplices in Indian crime against peace and
international law.

Hence, Pakistan suffered ‘disaster’:

 the country was divided into two parts, wrecking the dream of the founding
fathers;
 the nation was demoralized;
 the people were bewildered and distraught and their pride in the armed forces
destroyed;

63
  the leadership was exposed to self-centered and incompetence;
 over 93,000 soldiers and civilians were taken as ‘prisoners of war’;
 the Indian forces seized 5,139 square miles of territory in West Pakistan;
 a million people were dislocated;
 the country was isolated in the international community;
 the vast majority of Muslim Umma did not come to its help in the hour of trial and
 a dark shadow hovered over the prospects of the state.

Bhutto’s Dynamic Role, 1972-73

In the tortured and turbulent situation, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed the Office of the
first civilian Martial Law Administrator and then President of residual Pakistan. His task
was tremendous:

• to pick up the pieces and bring the nation to grips

with the new reality;
• to rebuild the morale and confidence of the nation;
• to rehabilitate Pakistan in the world community and
• to re-orient failed policies both at home and abroad.

To rescue Pakistan, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto decided first to turn friends for sympathy and
support.

 Even before returning to Pakistan from New York, Mr. Bhutto visited
Washington and met President Nixon on 18th December, 1971, saying that now he
wanted good relations with the United States. 27 President Nixon promised that
the United States would do ‘all within its power’ 28 to help Pakistan and that ‘The
cohesion and stability of Pakistan are of critical importance to the structure of
peace in South Asia’. 29
 In January 1972, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Peoples Republic of China after
becoming President of Pakistan. China extended diplomatic support and economic
and military assistance.
 Mr. Bhutto undertook a whirlwind tour of Islamic countries in the Middle East
and Africa which upheld the principles of law for the unconditional release of
Pakistani prisoners and the withdrawal of Indian forces from occupies territories.
 Mr. Bhutto decided to quit British Commonwealth when Britain recognized
Bangladesh and persuaded New Zealand and Australia to follow the suit.
 Mr. Bhutto also visited Soviet Union in March 1972 in the hope of moderating
its
hostility. However, Moscow did not indicate any interest in playing a role.

Pakistan was, however, left to herself to solve its problems with India, primarily of the
repatriation of prisoners of war and the recovery of territory.

64
 NOTES

1. Gauhar, Altaf, “Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler”, Sang-e-Meel

Publications, Lahore, 1994, P. 411
2. Raina, Ashoka, “Inside RAW”, Vikas Publishing Co., Delhi, 1981, P. 49.
Salik, Siddiq, “Witness to surrender”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1977,
3. Lamb, Alastair, “Kashmir – a disputed legacy”, Oxford Books, UK, 1991,
P.288.
4. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1947-2005 – A Concise
History”,
Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, P. 122.
5. Ashoka Raina, Op. cit. P. 54.
6. Ibid. P. 57
7. Siddiq Salik, Op. cit. P. 100
8. Kissinger, Henry, “The White House Years”, Little Brown, 1979, P. 856.
9. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, “War nd Secession – Pakistan, India and
the
Creation of Bangladesh”, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990,
P. 209.
10. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 857.
11. Ibid. P. 867
12. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. P. 209
13. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 861.
14. Ibid. P. 848.
15. The ‘Memoirs of Richard Nixon’, Vol. I, Warner Books, New York, 1978, P.
651.
16. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 880.
17. Nixon Op. cit. P. 652
18. Ibid. P. 658
19. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 885.
20. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. P. 213
21. Kux Dennis, “India and the United States: Estranged Democracies”,
National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1993 and “United States
and Pakistan, 1947-2000 – Disenchanted Allies”, Woodrow Wilson Centre
Press, Wshington, DC., 2001, P. 199.
22. Henry Kissinger, Op. Cit. P. 901.
23. Ibid. 905.

65
 24. White House Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and
Soviet
Minister of Agriculture, Vladimir Matskevich, quoted in Dennis Kux,
Op. cit. P. 201.
25. Henry Kissinger, Op. cit. P. 910.
26. Memorandum of conversation with President Pompidou, 13 December, 1972,
quoted in Denis Kux, Op. cit. P. 203.
27. Denis Kux, Op. cit. P. 204, quoting Memorandum of Conversation of Nixon-
Bhutto meeting, 18 December, 1971, President’s Office Files, NPNP, NA.
28. Memorandum of Nixon-Bhutto meeting, quoted in Denis Kux, Op. cit. P.
204.
29. Statement of Policy for the 1970s, issued on 3 May, 1973, Documents,
Op. cit. P. 207.

PRESTON UNIVERSITY
Islamabad Campus
Prof. Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Shimla Agreement: Negotiating under duress

[Chapter 11]

For over four months after the ceasefire of 17 December, no foreign power offered to
mediate a peace settlement nor did Pakistan or India take the initiative to call for a
bilateral meeting. Then India sent Union Minister D.P. Dhar to Islamabad for preliminary
talks preparatory to a peace conference.

The talks were held in Murree from 26-29 April, 1972 and Pakistan had a glimpse of the
demands India had in mind at the meeting. Mr. Dhar proposed that the peace conference
should aim at eliminating once and for all the sources of antagonism between the two
countries and focus on the determination of ‘elements of durable peace’. He did not
mention Kashmir and made eloquent disclaimers of any intention to impose a solution on
Pakistan. But the assurance rang hollow: India was not prepared to release the prisoner of
war and withdraw from occupied territory without conditions. The message was loud and
clear that India wanted to dictate a settlement of the Kashmir question. Pakistan, on its
part, wanted the peace conference to address issues generated by the war. The Murree
meeting did not resolve the question as to whether immediate postwar issues or the
establishment of durable peace (i.e. settlement of the Kashmir question) should receive
priority at the summit conference. Mr. Dhar and Pakistan’s Secretary General, Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed agreed to place both the items on the agenda for simultaneous
consideration.

66
At Shima conference seems in retrospect a veritable drama in which superb diplomats
played skillful roles using words and gestures that masked, but did not conceal, the real
aims and intentions of each side from the other. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, the twin directors of the drama without a script were also the
principal actors. The chief executives dominated the centre of the stage, even when they
were not on it and kept strategic control of the direction in their own hands.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a leader of exceptional intellect excelled in rhetoric and
eloquence. His legal education and superb knowledge of the English language stood
Pakistan in good stead at the Shimla conference. He proposed the ‘no-prejudice’ clause in
the Shimla agreement which Indira Gandhi accepted, protecting Pakistan’s position on
the Kashmir question from compromise.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, seemingly frailin body but robust in mind, was deceptive in her
inarticulate speech. The words at her command did not do justice to the clarity and depth
of her thought but no one could miss the thrust of her remarks. She seemed engagingly
shy but was entirely self-confident and unwavering in resolve. A rare leader with a
capacity to view her role in history from a vantage point in the future, she spoke and
acted with a sense of accountability to her country. The ‘iron lady’ was also intensely
nationalistic and probably never felt happier and more self-fulfilled than on the day when
India humiliated Pakistan. Ye she was capable of discerning the limits beyond which the
adversary could not be pushed or squeezed as she demonstrated by reducing the demands
in the final draft in order to prevent collapse of the peace conference.

On 28th June in the opening round at Shimla, the wide gulf between Pakistani and Indian
positions was manifest despite formal politeness and courtesies, characteristic of
conversations between diplomats. It was reflected more vividly in the initial drafts tabled
by India on 29th June and by Pakistan on June 30. Leaving aside the preambular parts,
pledging mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the
Pakistani and Indian drafts diverged fundamentally in concepts about the outcome of the
Shimla conference. India proposed an elaborate treaty that already comprised eleven
articles, with more to be added later to incorporate a Kashmir settlement. It was a
comprehensive in every aspect of interest to India but, rather surprisingly for the
Pakistani side, did not include a word about either withdrawals from the occupied
territories or release of prisoners, which were, unsurprisingly, the main focus of the
unpretentious but pragmatic draft presented by Pakistan. The two drafts presented an
interesting contrast in their selection of principles for the conduct and regulation of
relations between the two countries. Whilst the Indian selection betrayed intent to
construct a rather peculiar and particularistic framework of principles, with not even a
mention of the United Nations Charter, Pakistan emphasised the universally recognized
principles of relations between sovereign states. Of course, the most substantive
difference between the two drafts centred on Jammu and Kashmir. While India proposed
discussion on the Kashmir question and inclusion of the envisaged agreement in the
suggested treaty, Pakistan omitted any reference to it because, it its view, the purpose of
the Shimla conference was limited to resolving the problems resulting from the
December war. In the negotiations that followed, both sides tried to give the impression

67
of accommodation, each toning down its own formulations and incorporating portions of
the other’s draft, but there was little progress on core issues.

By 1st July, a sense of gloom set in which was reflected in the second Indian draft.
Premised on the failure to bridge differences on substantive issues, it envisaged an
interim agreement, leaving the substantive issues for settlement at a subsequent summit.
Pakistan declined to join such a charade that would create an illusion of success. Faced
with the collapse of the Shimla conference, India changed text again. On 2nd July, it
presented Pakistan with a final draft. That too, was unacceptable to Pakistan. The
omission of any reference to the United Nations Charter from the selection of principles
included in the Indian draft was rather peculiar. More than surprising the Pakistani side, it
served to bare a design in India’s mind to circumscribe and restrict the applicability of
some of the Charter and universally recognized principles of relations between sovereign
states, including in particular the fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the Charter a pointed reminder that India had failed to
implement the obligations arising from the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir.
When the Pakistan side pointed to the flaw in the Indian draft, the Indian Secretary
General in the Prime Minister’s Office, Mr. P. N. Haksar explained the omission by
arguing that the two countries did not need to invoke ‘foreign ideas’. However, realizing
gap in their logic, the Indian side gave up their stand and reference to UN Charter was
incorporated but resisted Pakistan’s suggestion based on Article 33 of the Charter that
any dispute between the two countries ‘will be settled by peaceful means such as
negotiation, conciliation, enquiry, mediation or should these methods prove unavailing,
by arbitration or judicial settlement’. Instead, Indian side suggested that the two
countries agree to ‘undertake to settle all issues between them bilaterally and exclusively
by peaceful means’. Considering the dire situation, Pakistan suggested amendment of the
Indian text so that differences would be settled ‘by peaceful means through negotiation or
any other peaceful means’. India added the qualification of ‘mutually agreed upon
between them’.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Nuclear Programme and Relations with USA

[Chapter 12]

HISTORY

Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme started in mid-1950s and was aimed at scientific

knowledge and technology for peaceful uses in agriculture and health. It also envisaged
the construction of power plants in due course to meet the energy needs of its developing
economy.

In 1962, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC] obtained a small 5 Megawatt

research reactor from the United States for Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and
Technology [PINSTECH] near Islamabad under an agreement that provided for
inspection and controls by International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

In 1972, another 120 Megawatt nuclear power plant was completed with the cooperation
of Canada and it was also placed under the safeguards of IAEA.

In early 1960s, it became evident that Pakistan’s arch rival - India was acquiring nuclear
technology not only for peaceful purposes as was emphasized in public statements but
also to develop nuclear weapons because its entire nuclear-fuel cycle facilities including
production of bomb-grade plutonium were directed in that direction to win the prestige,
status and economic benefits associated with a Nuclear Power.

Taking cognizance of the emergent threat to Pakistan’s security and the potential for
blackmail in an asymmetrical nuclear situation, the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto made a statement in 1965 that ‘if India makes an atomic bomb, then we will
also do so, even if we have to eat grass … an atom bomb can only be answered by an
atom bomb’.

1966, PAEC proposed purchase of a plutonium separation plant that France was willing
to sell but the President Ayub Khan did not favour the idea as the military leadership
believed that a strong conventional defence will suffice for the ‘deterrence’.

Pakistan vested hopes in Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT} and actively participated in

efforts at the United Nations to promote its early conclusion. It joined multi-pronged
efforts for a fair bargain between nuclear-weapon states and noon-nuclear states that
would provide for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons
held by nuclear-weapon powers in exchange for the renunciation of the nuclear weapons

69
by other states. At its initiative, a Conference of non-nuclear states recommended that
nuclear-weapon states should provide ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ guarantees pledging:

 non use of nuclear-weapons against non-nuclear states and

 assistance to a non-nuclear state threatened with nuclear weapons.

Both proposals were conceded in principle but the pledge on reduction of nuclear
weapons in the NPT remained non-binding and the resolution on security guarantees
adopted by the Security Council of which the five nuclear powers were permanent
members was far from reassuring.

Pakistan expressed its readiness to sign the NPT provided India did the same which
refused to do so and was a reflection of its aims in the nuclear field in future.

Pakistan’s reasonableness was contrasted with intransigence on the part of India which
championed nuclear disarmament but at the same time persisted in a programme aimed at
the acquisition of the weapons option.

In 1971, when Pakistan was cut into two pieces with the active aid abetment of India,
Islamabad was compelled to undertake ‘reappraisal’ of its nuclear policy as Pakistan’s
conventional defence capability had proved inadequate to safeguard its territorial
integrity in the face of India’s military might which exploited the gap and intervened
militarily crossing the international border to convert ‘East Pakistan’ into ‘Bangladesh’.
India’s exploitation of Pakistan’s internal political troubles, encouragement and
assistance to separatism in East Pakistan, violation of the principle of non-interference in
internal affairs of another country, aggression and military intervention illustrated India
animus, the irremediable imbalance of power, the reluctance of allies to come to
Pakistan’s rescue and the powerlessness of the United Nations, Pakistan had to devise its
own means to ensure its security and survival.

In January, 1972, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, soon after assuming the office of the President
of Pakistan reviewed its nuclear programme with nuclear scientists Prof. Abdus Salam
and Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan, a nuclear Engineer serving with IAEA. Convinced of the
necessity to acquire weapons’ option, President Bhutto appointed Mr. Munir Ahmed
Khan as Chairman, PAEC and allocated requisite funds.

The decision to pursue the nuclear option was more easily made than implemented:

 Pakistan did not possess fissile material

 It did not had explosion technology.
 Nuclear suppliers were already strengthening controls on nuclear technology
transfer.

India conducted nuclear test codenamed “Buddha smiles” on 18th May, 1974 and
branded it for peaceful purpose. Following the explosion:

70
  Canada unilaterally cancelled cooperation agreement with Pakistan
although it did not commit any violation of the agreement.
 United States led other industrial states in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to tighten controls on the export of nuclear technology.
 United States focused its non-proliferation agenda on Pakistan alone.
 France, under US pressure cancelled supply of a nuclear reprocessing
plant to Pakistan which it had signed in 1973 with IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan embarked upon imaginative diplomacy to counter pressures from United States
and other industrialized countries.

In 1974, on Pakistan’s proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in

South Asia, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution

With Pakistan’s policy, India was cornered into virtual isolation and despite its
intransigence, Pakistan gained high moral grounds on international level which exposed
the United States’ discriminatory pressures.

Pak-US Relations [1972-79]

Following emergence of East Pakistan as an independent state of ‘Bangladesh’, Pakistan

withdrew from a military pact SEATO but remained another military pack CENTO
which was still valued by Washington in the context of its policy on the Middle East.

The Nixon administration expressed some understanding of Pakistan’s dire needs:

 In March 1973, it authorized a ‘one time exception’ for delivery of

300 armoured personnel carriers Pakistan had purchased three years
earlier.
 Following visit to the United States by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
 Bhutto, United States resumed economic assistance to Pakistan,
 providing US $ 24 million for wheat and US $ 18 million as AID
loan.
 It further agreed to seek congressional approval for US $ 40-50
million as rehabilitation loan.
 Ford administration lifted the embargo on arms sales to Pakistan and
allowed purchase of arms and spare parts worth US $ 160 million.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme

Prime Minister Bhutto made no secret of its views on nuclear technology rather than
allow itself to be deceived by an international treaty limiting this ‘deterrent’ to the present
Nuclear Powers.

Pakistan embarked on an alternative e route for production of fissile material. A Pakistani

metallurgist, Dr. A. Q. Khan was appointed by the Government in 1976 to build a

71
uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Dr. A. Q. Khan and his team of scientists and
engineers faced enormous technological difficulties as United States and other members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group refused even export of non-nuclear components. But this
goes to the credit of Dr. A. Q. Khan’s team that they succeeded in building the key
centrifuges indigenously within a few years and by 1982, they achieved the capability to
enrich uranium to the level required for building an explosive device.

PAEC was also tasked with the responsibility for pre and post enrichment phases of
research. Pakistan manufactured the first atomic device in 1983 and a tunnel was dug in
Chagai Mountain of Balochistan province but the Government deferred the test to avert
political offence from United States. However, PAEC conducted on different designs of
the bomb and performed a number of successful ‘cold tests’ to judge its performance.

Worsening of Pak-US Relations

 In 1977 and 1978, United States, under the legislations of Symington and Glenn
imposed restrictions for provision of economic aid and other penalties to a
country not party to NPT that imported equipment or technology for production of
plutonium and enriched uranium but the American law singled out Pakistan for
its practical application excluding India and Israel.

 Ford administration tried in vain to persuade Pakistan to abandon its

nuclear programme by offering to sell 110 A-7 aircraft.

 Pak-US relations suffered another set back when Prime Minister

Bhutto termed United States as an adversary in a speech in National Assembly of
Pakistan by interpreting an intelligence intercept of a remark by an official of US
mission in Pakistan in April 1977 saying ‘My source tells me the party is over’.

 The policy of Carter administration in South Asia became India-

centric and Pakistan was excluded from a tour of Asian countries.

 The slide in Pak-US relations accelerated after General Ziaul Haq

took over in July 1977 and the US offer of sale of A-7 aircraft was
withdrawn.

 In 1978, President Giscard d’Estaing of France decided to cancel a

nuclear processing plant contract with Pakistan under US pressure, inflicting
colossal damage to Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
 In April 1979, President Carter decided to apply ‘sanctions’ against
Pakistan and US aid of around US $ 50 million was cut off.

 In August 1979, there were reports that United States considered the
option of destroying Pakistan’s nuclear capability by an attack on Kahuta.

 On 21st November, 1979, a mob of students from Quaid-i-Azam

72
 University, Islamabad infuriated by a false report broadcast by an unidentified
radio alleging US occupation of the holy Kaa’ba, attacked and burnt American
embassy in Islamabad and an American and two Pakistani staff members had
perished in the fire. [However, Pakistan Government accepted the responsibility
for failure to fulfil its obligations under international law to protect the diplomatic
mission and immediately agreed to pay the compensation of US $ 23 million].

Steadfast pursuit of Nuclear Programme

Pakistan did not lag behind in the technological progress towards acquisition of the
nuclear option.

Overcoming obstacles and resisting discriminatory pressures, it succeeded not only in

completing the Kahuta plant but also achieving explosion technology. Scientists at PAEC
were able to master the design of the nuclear device.

By mid-1980s, Pakistan publicly acknowledged possession of the nuclear capability,

disclaiming that it has produced nuclear weapons.

In December 1979, Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan, Reagan

administration, after coming to office in January 1981, decided to join Pakistan in
supporting and assisting the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation and relegated
nuclear sanctions.

Indian Plan of attack on Kahuta

In 1981, Indian Air Force concluded a study that an attack on Kahuta enrichment plant
was feasible. This was reported by Washington Post on 20th December, 1982 that Indian
military advisers had 9 months earlier prepared a plan for strikes on Kahuta and
PINSTECH.

Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman, PAEC mentioned in a conversation with his Indian
counterpart Homi Sethna in 1983 that Indian attack would result in Pakistani retaliation
against Indian nuclear power stations in Rajasthan and Trombay. Therefore, New Delhi
realized the dangerous consequences of such an adventure.

India did not abandon the idea altogether and then considered such a strike in
collaboration with Israel but finally New Delhi reached to the conclusion that such an
exercise was also not feasible in the wake of Pakistan’s warning that Islamabad would
presume Indian complicity in such an eventuality. India had to abandon the idea also
because United States was then allied with Pakistan as the frontline state assisting the
Afghan Mujahideen against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

In September 1984, there were reports in US press regarding Indian planning for an
attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

73
In early 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was reported
To have considered a pre-emptive strike on Pakistani’s nuclear facilities before
‘Brasstacks exercises’ but was dissuaded by Indian defence analysts.

By 1990, Pakistan was estimated to have accumulated enough enriched uranium for 10 or
more explosive devices while India had built up a stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium
for an estimated 100 plus Hiroshima-size bombs.

Indian Nuclear Programme

As early as 1946, an ambitious and brilliant Indian Cambridge-educated Physics

Professor Homi Bhaba at Bangalore obtained approval for establishment of the Atomic
Energy Research Committee [AERC] at Mumbai.

In 1948, speaking in Indian Parliament, Jawaharlal Nehru said, “I think we must develop
[atomic energy] for peaceful purposes ….Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to
use if for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiment of any of us will stop the nation
from using it that way”.

Under the Atoms for Peace Plan, United States provided training facilities to 1104 Indian
scientists and engineers between 1955 and 1974. During training at Argonne Laboratory
School of Nuclear Science and Engineering the Indians ‘mined’ the declassified literature
for design and operation of nuclear facilities.

In 1955, India built the first research reactor ‘ASPARA’ with assistance from UK which
provided heavy water.

CIRUS, a 40-Megawatt research reactor suitable for generation of bomb-grade plutonium

was built with the assistance of Canada which accepted Indian statement that it would use
the resultant fissile material for peaceful purposes only.

On similar terms, United States provided ‘heavy watger’ for the plant.

In 1961, India began construction of the Phoenix plant for reprocessing plutonium. A US
firm, Vitro International, was the contractor for preparing the construction blueprints
while technological assistance was provided by the British Atomic Energy Commission.

In 1963, United States decided to provide two reactors for the Tarapur power plant.

In 1963, Bhaba’s successor, Vicram Sarabhai was opposed to nuclear weapons on moral
and economic grounds but a group of scientists led by Raja Ramanna, R. Chidambaran
and P. K. Iyenger continued work on the project for a nuclear explosion.

Meanwhile, Indian foreign policy establishment led by Trivedi protected India’s nuclear
option in negotiations on NPT who opposed any prohibition on the transfer of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, calling it ‘nuclear apartheid’.

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In 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Government decided not to sign the NPT.

In 1972, she authorized preparations for a nuclear test which was conducted codenamed
‘Buddha Smiles’ on 18th May, 1974 termed as ‘peaceful explosion’ but years later, the
Indian scientist who played a leadership role acknowledged that it was actually a bomb
test.

British newspaper ‘Sunday Standard’ captioned ‘India goes Nuclear at last’ saying the
monopoly of Big Five broken.

International sanctions and tightened export controls slowed down the programme but
India now had proven technology and all the requisite facilities for building a nuclear
arsenal.

On 11th May, 1998, under the directives of Prime Minister Ata Bihari Vajpai, India tested
three nuclear weapons and two days later another two.

In response, Pakistan detonated 7 nuclear devices five on 28th May, 1998 and another two
a couple of days later.

United States condemned the tests publicly but accepted the reality and President Clinton
paid an unprecedented 6-day visit to India in early 2000.

In 2005, President George W. Bush agreed to extend technological cooperation to India

for nuclear power plants, proposing an India-specific exception to US non-proliferation
laws as well as to the agreed restrictions of Nuclear Suppliers Group. An equal criteria-
based treatment was denied to Pakistan.

In 2006, United States signed an agreement with India for provision of nuclear
technology for civilian use.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Afghan Crisis

[Chapter 13]

Through history, Afghanistan has seldom known peace. Its ethnic heterogeneity and, to
an extent, its topography, geographical location and the extremity of its climate with
bitterly cold winters and scalding summers, have shaped and influenced its violence-
ridden past. Peaceful coexistence among the ethnic groups led by the Pushtuns, who
account for about 50 percent of a population of 16.48 million, and the Tajiks (22.9
percent), Hazaras (12 percent), Uzbeks (6.25 percent) and other small groups such as the
Turkmen and Aimaks has been alien to the Afghan experience. The ethnic map of the
country, with the groups separated and confined to clearly defined areas, has also
militated against national unity. The Hindu Kush range, which translates as the “slayer of
Hidus” has served as the rough divide.

In the historical perspective, the term “Afghan” was probably first used in the fifteenth
century during the reign of Mahmud of Ghazni, a ruler of Turkish descent, while the
name of the country, “Afghanistan” was coined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
by the Moguls. History contains no record of an Afghan state before 1947. Eastern
Afghanistan formed part of the Mogul Empire while its west was controlled by the
Safavids of Iran. Kabul became the capital of Mogul territory west of the Indus.

The second major Afghan town, Kandhar was contested between the Mogul and Persian
empires up to the time when it was taken by the latter during the reign of the Mogul
emperor, Shah Jahan. The Shahs of Iran continued to treat Afghanistan a province of their
empire until the nineteenth century.1

In 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali founded the Kingdom of Afghanistan and extended it up to
Kashmir as well as the Punjab, Sindgh and Baluchistan of present day Pakistan. He was
conferred the title Durr-i-Durran (Pearl of Pearls) and from this his tribe, which was to
play so a prominent role in Afghan history, became known as the Durrani.

After Abdali’s death in 1773, the empire fragmented into independent city states and
spurred rivalry between the British and the Russians for dominance of the country.

76
The emergence of Afghanistan as a state in the last two centuries owed itself more to
Britain’s imperial ambitions than any desire among its peoples to forge national identity.
British writers claimed that their country had contributed significantly to give “a national
unity to that nebulous community which we call Afghanistan (which the Afghans never
called by that name) by drawing a boundary all around it and elevating it into a position
of buffer state between ourselves and Russian”.2

External compression was, therefore, applied by the advancing empires of Britain and
Russia to foster effective cohesion among the Afghan groups.3

The conflicting interests of the two imperial powers did not permit either to establish
itself in Afghanistan. The alternative to an armed clash over the territory was to transform
it into a buffer state. It was also in their interest, if Afghanistan was to play this role, to
ensure that chaos and anarchy did not prevail in it. A strong ruler was, therefore, needed
in the country. Britain and, to an extent, Russia feared chaos in a leaderless Afghanistan
more than the unfriendliness of an Afghan ruler.4 British were also conscious that there
was nothing to guarantee Afghanistan’s continued existence as a buffer between England
and Russia as no other country cared about its arrival.5 This generated a disproportionate
British interest in Afghanistan which played itself out as the “Great Game” in the
nineteenth century.

The attempt to incorporate Afghanistan in the British sphere of influence led to two
Anglo-Afghan wars from 1839 to 1842 and 1878 to 1880. The first resulted in defeat for
the British while the second enabled them to control Afghanistan’s foreign policy and
annex sizeable territory. These lands, stretched from the Indus to the Durand Line, which
demarcates the present-day border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The result was the
delimitation of frontiers of Afghanistan in the west, south and east by the British, and in
the north by the Russian and British governments.

After bringing Afghanistan into existence, the need for a strong ruler or Amir to hold the
country together thus became of paramount concern to the British who, on occasions,
played a decisive role in the selection of the Amir. So deep was their involvement that
British support became essential to ensure any particular Amir’s continued occupation of
the Afghan throne. They provided him the subsidies and weapons to build an army and
consolidate power. Furthermore, the subjugation of the ethnic minorities by the Pushtun
Amirs was carried out with the encouragement and support of the British. In the words of
a Russian historian “after 1849 Dost Muhammad turned to the conquest of non-Afghan
peoples living north of the Hindu Kush [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen] with the support
of the British India Company”.6

With British subsidies, Amir Abdur Rahman, who ruled from 1880 to 1901, sought to
establish an absolute monarchy. He was succeeded by his son, Habibullah, who was
assassinated in 1919. Habibullah son, Amanullah Khan, then became the Amir but later
changed this title to ‘king’ and during his ten-year rule, tried to modernize the country.
He won Afghanistan’s independence in the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 but lost the

77
subsidy as a consequence of which he failed to establish a resource base or build a
reliable army. An insurrection supported by extremist clergy ensued and Kabul was taken
by the rebels in January 1929. An ethnic Tajik rebel ruled for the next nine months when
the capital fell, yet again, in October 1929 to the Pushtun tribes led by Nadir Khan, a
member of the royal family.

The power base in Afghanistan has constantly remained extremely narrow. Its exercise
has been the privilege of the Pushtuns (or Pathans), within the Pushtuns that of the
Durranis and within the Durranis of the Barakzais.

For almost half a century during which power rested witht eh Mohammadzai branch of
the Barakzai clan, Afghanistan was controlled by an inner cabinet consisting of key
members of the royal family and a few of their trusted associates. Command positions in
the army were invariably held by members of the royal family and, in some instances, by
staunch supporters of the monarchy.

On 17th July, 1973, Sardar Mohammad Daoud assumed power in Afghanistan,

supplanting King Mohammad Zahir Shah, his cousin and brother-in-law who was a
known Pakistan-baiter. It merely ended the monarchy but did not result in any diffusion
of power. In effect, power was transferred from the former oligarchy to a single
individual. In order to consolidate his power, Sardar Daoud entered into close
relationship with the Soviet Union.

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had vitiated right at the beginning when
Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan into United Nations and became the
first and the only country to do so.

On the eve of establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghan Government denounced the
‘Durand Line’ treaty, establishing boundary with British India which was signed by Amir
Abdur Rehman in 1889. Afghanistan also laid a territorial claim in the guise of support
for ‘Pakhtunistan’.

During the period of 1947 to 1958, Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based on the following
two main objectives:

 settlement of the Durand Line issue and

 reconciliation over the Pakhtoonistan issue.

There was no improvement in Pakistan’s Afghan policy till 1973. By now, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto had assumed the reigns of power in Pakistan after its dismemberment in 1971.

By 1976, Sardar Daoud realized that the Soviets had their own agenda as they penetrated
in the internal politics of Afghanistan, providing support and assistance to the
revolutionary People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA].

78
To counter-balance Soviets, Sardar Daoud embarked on improvement of relations with
Pakistan, Iran and other Muslim countries.

Daoud’s new policy did not please PDPA and Soviet Union. Consequently, a clique of
Communists launched a coup on 27th April, 1978 in which Sardar Daoud and his family
members were murdered. PDPA called it ‘Saur Revolution,Constitution was abrogated
and Nur Muhammad Taraki assumed the Office of the President in the name of PDPA.

From the beginning, the regime, lacking popular support was faced with opposition in the
traditional conservative Afghan society.

The party was torn into predominantly rural and Pashto-speaking ‘Khalq’ and urban-
based Persian-speaking ‘Parcham’ factions. Infighting between the two factions led to
Taraki’s murder in September 1979. He was succeeded by Hafizullah Amin whose
radical reforms evoked even stronger opposition from the people and he was also defiant
to the Soviets.

On 26th December, 1979, Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan, eliminating Hafizullah
Amin and installing Banrak Karmal, leader of Parcham faction as President of
Afghanistan.

Indian initial response was strong condemnation by Prime Minister Charan Singh but
later Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Government which came into power in January
1980 adopted pro-Soviet stance.

Pakistan’s reaction was carefully calculated, sober and cautious:

 It described it as a ‘serious violation’ of the norms of peaceful coexistence.

 expressed Pakistan’s ‘gravest concern’ in the context of its links of Islam,
geography and non-aligned policy with Afghanistan.
 hoped that the ‘foreign troops’ would be removed from the Afghan soil forthwith.
 At Pakistan’s request, six non-permanent, non-aligned Members of the UN
Security Council sponsored a resolution which strongly deplored ‘the recent
armed intervention in Afghanistan’ and called for immediate, unconditional and
total withdrawal of foreign troops. 13 of the 15-Member Council voted in favour
but was vetoed by USSR.
 At Pakistan’s request, UN General Assembly took up the same resolution and
adopted with a majority vote of 104 with 18 abstentions under the ‘Uniting for
Peace’ procedure on 14th January, 1980.
 On 29th January, 1980, an extraordinary session of OIC Foreign Ministers was
held in Islamabad which adopted a resolution, strongly indicting Soviet
intervention, suspending Afghanistan’s membership of OIC and affirming
solidarity with the struggle of the Afghan people to safeguard their ‘faith, national
independence and territorial integrity’. The resolution had the following main
provisions:

79
  immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan;
 to restore independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan;
 respect for the rights of Afghan people to determine their own destiny
without external interference and
 creation of conditions to permit Afghan refugees to return to their homes
with dignity and honour.

With the arrival of foreign troops to protect and perpetuate a regime with an alien
ideology, Afghan resistance took the shape of a ‘people’s war’.

Pakistan confronted with lack of resources but not lack of ‘will’ decided to provide
discreet help as it knew that Afghans fighting for their national survival would also be
fighting for Pakistan’s security and independence.

The initial thrust of Pakistan’s policy was diplomatic in orientation. It sought to build up
greater political pressure on the Soviet Union in the regular sessions of UN General
Assembly. The resolution sponsored by non-aligned countries from Africa, Asia and
Latin America coupled with Muslim countries was adopted with majority votes year after
year with the key elements of:

 immediate withdrawal of foreign troops

 preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence
and non-aligned status
 respect for the right of its people to determine their own form of
Government and economic system, free from outside intervention,
subversion, coercion or constrain and
 creation of conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees
to their homes in safety and honour.

At this time Pakistan had strained relations with the United States because of
discriminatory sanctions imposed by Carter administration in 1979.

In a strange move, Washington announced an offer of US $ 400 million in economic and

military assistance to Pakistan over 18 months but President Ziaul Haq rejected the offer
describing it as ‘peanuts’.

However, Pakistan continued its steadfast policy of opposition to Soviet intervention and
supported Afghan resistance with the provision of modest assistance out of its own
meager resources for more than a year.

After President Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981, Washington revived the offer
of cooperation with a new package of loans and grants amounting to 3.2 billion dollars
over five years. It included US $ 600 million a year for development and defence. In 10
years, Pakistan received aid worth 10 billion US dollars and became the 3rd largest
recipient of US aid.

80
The US administration was still reluctant to support a formal security guarantee to
Pakistan for its vulnerabilities as a front-line state against Soviet Union. However, it
agreed to consider sale of 40 F-16 aircraft to express its ‘concern’ for Pakistan’s security.

On nuclear issue, both countries maintained their formal positions with Pakistan
reiterating its intention to continue research and US proclaiming its non-proliferation
concern. But Washington accepted President Zia’s assurance that Pakistan would not
develop nuclear weapons or transfer sensitive technology.

Geneva Accords

Soviet Union was confident that its mighty forces equipped with the latest weapons
would rout the Afghan Mujahideen armed with antiquated rifles. But it misjudged the
situation as it could not pin down Mujahideen guerillas who were supported by the
Afghan populace and received sophisticated weapons including stringer missiles from the
United States for guerilla warfare.

In 1981, Mr. Diego Cordovez, a diplomat from Ecuador was appointed as Personal
Representative of the UN Secretary General on Afghanistan.

In June 1982, negotiations began in Geneva, Switzerland to explore the structure of a

settlement that would integrate the components of the UN General Assembly resolution.

In November, 1982, hard-liner Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev died and the new Soviet
leader, Yuri Andropov gave a ‘hint of flexibility’ during a meeting with President Ziaul
Haq who visited Moscow for Brezhnev’s funeral.

In March 1983, UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar and Mr. Diego Cordovez during
a meeting with Soviet leader Andropov received ‘new encouragement’ for pursuing UN
mediation and counted ‘reasons’ for a solution:

 cost in lives and money

 regional tensions
 setbacks to détente and
 lost of Soviet prestige in the Third World.

This paved way for successful conclusion of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva between the
two sides in April and June 1983 with the agreement on essential components of a
comprehensive settlement which included:

 non-interference and non-intervention,

 guarantees by third states and
 arrangements for voluntary return of refugees.

81
Discussions made good progress. Mr. Diego Cordovez was optimistic and envisaged
‘gradual withdrawal’ of Soviet forces within a reasonable timeframe.

But Soviet-Kabul side dragged their feet indicating that the hardliners were marking time
as Soviet leader Andropov was ailing. On his death, the policy was reversed to a military
solution which continued under the leadership of Konstantin Cherneko and Mikhail
Gorbachev till the end of summer 1987.

The struggle in Afghanistan was unequal but Mujahideen demonstrated courage and
resourcefulness in resistance in the face of ferocious Soviet military might including
lethal artillery, helicopter gun-ships and bombers for savage and indiscriminate
destruction of villages.

The United States increased its covert allocations for supply of arms to Mujahideen from
US $ 250 Million in 1985 to US $ 470 million in 1986 and US $ 630 million in 1987
which was matched by Saudi Arabia. China, Iran and other countries also provided
significant assistance.

Pakistan calibrated the flow of assistance to Mujahideen cautiously so as to minimize the

risk of spillover of the conflict.

Pakistan realized that military might of a super power cannot be defeated but bleeding
inside and blows to its prestige outside would bring Moscow down. Negotiations in
Geneva [12 sessions in 6 years] and resolutions in OIC, NAM and United Nations were
moves in that direction.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko refused to recognize the reality of internal resistance
and dismissed the idea of a broad-based Government in Kabul.

By late 1986, the texts of the agreements were finalized and Mr. Cordovez remarked: ‘It
is now true for the first time that the only issue remaining is the question of timeframe for
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan’.

By mid-1987, the Soviets wanted 18 months for the withdrawal while Pakistan was
inclined up to seven months.

In summer 1987, Soviet military offensive failed and Mikhail Gorbachev finally decided
to abandon the misadventure as the imperatives of democratic and economic reforms at
home necessitated and end to confrontation with the West.

Meanwhile, Soviet leaders Gorbachev and Shevardnadze succeeded in getting the

endorsement of Communist Party Politburo for terminating military involvement in
Afghanistan. The reasons were clear:

 Soviet system was faltering

 Economy was in decline and

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  People were alienated.

 The cost of military confrontation

 arms race with the West
 occupation of Eastern Europe
 tension with China and
 finally intervention in Afghanistan had ‘ruined’ the Soviet Union.

On 10th December, 1987, Soviet leader Gorbachev announced at a press conference in

Washington that Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan within 12 months of the
conclusion of Geneva Accords and that during that period, the forces would not engage in
‘combat’.

On 15 February, 1989, the last units of the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, abandoning it
to the rebels and the Kabul Government under the Pashtu leader, Muhammad Najibullah
who had seized power in May 1986 and was elected President at a General, Assembly on
30 November, 1986.

In July 1987, President Najibullah proposed a coalition, offering 12 Ministries and the
Office of Vice President to Mujahideen Alliance. Soviet leader Gorbachev also endorsed
the idea of ‘national reconciliation’ but Mujahideen Alliance unanimously rejected a
coalition with PDPA and the war continued.

Until 16 April, 1992, government troops and various rebel units engaged in fierce battles.
As a result, Kabul’s government lost control over almost all the country’s other cities.

When at last, the new government of the Russian Federation and USA agreed to stop
arms deliveries, Najibullah’s power virtually collapsed and on 16 April 1992, as a result
of pressure from the army and he rebels, he was forced to resign.

The Jam’iyat-i-Islami under the Tajik commander from the rebellious Panjsher region,
Ahmad Shah Mas’ud was now able to make its influence felt.

The 50 men appointed in Peshawar to form an interim government on 25 April – five

representatives each from the ten major rebel groups – agreed to elect the political leader
of the Jubha-yi Njat-i-Islami, Sibgatullah Mujaddidi, as the new President. Only the
Hizb-i-Islamiof Gulbadin Hikmatyar resisted and engaged in violent conflicts with
Mas’ud’s units prior to the arrival of the new government in Kabaul.

On 28 June, 1992, Mujaddidi handed over his power, as stipulated in the Peshawar
agreement, to the provisional President, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Hikmatyar’s statist Hizb-
i-Islami was by no means willing to abandon control to ‘the Tajiks’ or ‘the Ubzeks’
Abdul Tashid Dostum [the Lord of the North] and stepped up its attacks on Kabul. In the
provinces, the Khans were meanwhile organizing autonomous sovereignties and thus
challenging the new Kabul government, which wanted to extend its sovereignty over the
entire country.

83
Rabbani was in a way continuing the military policy of Najibullah, as was Hikmatyar,
who now tried to identify himself as the champion of ‘true Islam’ against the ‘renegades’
of Kabul.

The nationalism of the three major parties to the war (Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Tajiks)
referred to a united Afghanistan, although with the exception of Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i-
Islami, in the 1980s all had presented themselves as secessionist ethnic parties. The war,
which had led to the transformation of the qaum movement into ethnic nationalist parties,
continued because no side was prepared to give up Afghanistan as an infidel of the
nation-state and allow for actual secession through a complete political reorganization of
the country. Islam, which had lent a powerful expression to the resistance against
Najibullah’s regime, receded into the background as a political factor.

It is true that under Najibullah, Afghanistan was organized as an ‘Islamic republic’ in

May 1990, and that two years later, the Shari’a was introduced; but this in practice led to
no results, since the institutions of the state and of the autonomous regions exercised their
own authority and were no longer influenced by Islamic symbolism.

The war between the resistance groups now completely centred on the capital Kabul. But
no side succeeded in making a military breakthrough.

Two peace treaties (signed in Mecca on 7 March, 1993 and in Jalalabad on 19 May,
1993) mainly served to stabilize the division of regional power by forming a government
which embraced all parties to the conflict. However, the regions for the time being
remained largely autonomous. 7

NOTES

1. Murshed, S. Iftikhar, “Afghanistan – The Taliban Years”, Bennett & Bloom,

London, England, 2006, P-10.
2. Tate,G. P. “The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch” Asian
Educational Services, New Delhi, 2001, P. 111.
3. Holdich, Sir Thomas, “The Indian Borderland”, Methuen & Co, London, 1901,
Quoted in J. C. Griffiths’ Afghanistan: Key to a Continent, P. 20.
4. Adamec, Ludwing W. “Afghanistan 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History”
University of California, 1967, P.P 4 & 10.
5. Griffiths, John C. “Afghanistan: Key to a Continent” Waterview Press, 1981,
P. 16.
6. Newell, Richard S. “The Politics of Afghanistan” Cornell University Press,
1972. P. 48.
7. Schulze, Reinhard, “A Modern History of the Islamic World”, I. B. Tauris
Publishers, London – New York, 2000, PP. 255-257.

84
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Kashmir: The Struggle for Azadi

[Chapter 14]

Basis of ‘Kashmir Dispute’

The partition of British Indian Empire was based on the principle of ‘self-
determination’ by Muslim majority areas forming ‘Pakistan’ and Hindu majority areas
setting up ‘Indian’ state in accordance with the ‘Partition Plan of 3rd June, 1947’.

Pakistan emerged on the map of the world through the exercise of ‘self-
determination’ on 14th August 1947 and India became an independent state on 15th
August, 1947. All the provinces or parts of provinces that joined Pakistan did so by the
express decision of the people either through elected representatives or directly in popular
referendums.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General/Head of

State set the goals of Pakistan’s Foreign policy when he declared:

“There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let
others live in peace and develop our country according to our own shade.
Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral
support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in
upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter. It would be
Pakistan’s endeavour to promote goodwill and friendship with our
neighbourly dominion, Hindustan”.1

Tension between the two new emergent states of Pakistan and India is
ascribable to:

 a difficult and divisive legacy,

 the clash of political aims and ideologies between All India Muslim
League and Indian National Congress
 differences of religions and cultures between the two nations and
 adversarial perceptions of history.

Being agreed to the partition of British India, the two new independent
states could have lived in peace and harmony, had India accepted the existence of
Pakistan with sincerity and disputes, in particular of Kashmir not arisen due to the denial

85
of right of ‘self-determination’ to the Muslim majority area of Kashmiris and utter
disregard by India of the United Nations’ Security Council resolutions on the subject.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the 562 princely states of
British India which exercised varying degrees of internal autonomy under treaties with
British suzerainty over the states that lapsed in 1947, Princes were advised to accede to
Pakistan or India remembering: ‘You cannot run away from the Dominion government
which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose
welfare you are responsible’.2

The rulers of princely states all knew that by August 15 (1947) they had to
accede to one or the other dominion, since British paramountcy and its protective
umbrella would disappear from their lands on that day; yet many a maharaja, nawab and
nazim found it almost impossible to decide which way to jump. Bhopal in central India,
chafed at the bit of integration into a domination toward which its nawab felt the
strongest personal antipathy. Kashmir and Hyderabad were to prove the most difficult
problems. The Himdu maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh refused to join either dominion,
fearing he would be dethroned by Jinnah for religious reasons, yet ‘hating Nehru with a
bitter hatred’ because of his socialist proclivities and democratic demands. The nazim of
Hyderabad preferred to join Pakistan, if he was not allowed to remain independent, but
surrounded as he was by 85 percent of his state’s population Hindu, he was forced the
following September by ‘Operation Polo’ to integrate his domain within the Indian
union’3.

The Muslim Nawab of Junagadh, a small princely state on the coast of

Kathiawar, acceded to Pakistan that September, though his domain was surrounded by
India and the vast majority of his state’s population was Hindu. The apolitical nawab’s
shrewd diwan was Sindi landowner, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (the enterprising father of
Pakistan’s late prime minister, Zulfi Bhutto), who drafted the documents of accession and
personally delivered them to Jinnah. Nehru and Patel were outraged when they learned of
Junagadh’s ‘treachery’ and delayed martial invasion only till November, driving Muslim
courtiers like the Bhuttos to sail from Veraval port to Karachi with their treasure and
talents placed at Pakistan’s service.4

On Junagadh’s announcement of accession to Pakistan, the Indian

government said that the decision was ‘in utter violation of principles on which partition
was agreed upon and effected’.5 India peremptorily invaded and occupied the state.

Two months later, Indian government itself committed an ‘utter violation’

of the principle on which ‘partition’ was based when it manipulated accession by Hindu
Maharaja of Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The procrastinating maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, (had) signed a

‘standstill agreement’ with Pakistan that permitted petrol supplies and other vital needs of
that northernmost state of South Asia to continue flowing over the Pakistan roads that
served as its major highways to the world. Hari Singh knew that time was running out.

86
Muslim peasants in Kashmir’s southern province of Poonch were the first to revolt. That
September and early October, neighboring Pakistani Muslims crossed the Poonch border
to help their co-religionists fight against the maharaja’s forces sent to put down the
revolt. By mid-October Pakistan stopped all shipments of vital supplies to Kashmir. New
Delhi then ‘decided to step into the breach and try to send such things as salt, kerosene
and sugar’ to ‘blockaded’ Srinagar.6

A Knight of the British Empire, Sir Cyril Radcliff betrayed the trust
reposed in him as the supposedly impartial head of Boundary Commission. Departing
from the principle of the partition, he unjustly awarded two Muslim-majority tehsils of
Gurdaspur district to India, providing a land link to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu
and Kashmir.

The Maharaja’s collusion with the Indian government sparked popular

agitation and revolt. In Gilgit Agency, the local authority decided with the enthusiastic
backing of the people to declare allegiance to Pakistan. The people of Poonch and Mirpur
districts, home to sixty thousand demobilized soldiers of the Second World War rose in
revolt and declared the formation of Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir government. The
Maharaja’s forces embarked on ‘systematic savageries’ against unarmed Kashmiris. They
were assisted by the forces of the state of Patiala which were under Indian control after
the state acceded to India.7

On October 23, British trucks and jeeps of the Pakistan army loaded with
some 5,000 armed Pathan Afridi, Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen of the North-West
Frontier crossed the Kashmir border and headed east along the Muzaffarabad-Baramula
road that led to Srinagar itself. Reports of the raiders burning and seizing Muzaffaarabad
reached New Delhi unofficially on the night of October 24 and the next morning Pakistan
army officially informed New Delhi’s sister-dominion command that ‘tribal volunteers’
had ‘entered’ Kashmir, ‘their advance guard…only 35 to 40 miles from Srinagar.
Mountbatten summoned an emergency meeting of the Indian Defence Committee that
Saturday morning and they agreed to assemble all the arms and aircraft they could find
for possible immediate dispatch to Srinagar. V. P. Menon was sent flying over Himalayan
heights to see if he could convince Hari Singh to sign an agreement at this point. Menon
returned early Sunday morning, October 26, to report to Mountbatten, Nehru and Patel
that the maharaja ‘had gone to pieces completely’ and could ‘come to no decision’. His
state prime minister, M. C. Mahajan (later chief justice of India), however, proved
‘receptive’ to Menon’s mission and returned with him to New Delhi where he met with
Nehru and Patel.

“I requested immediate military aid on any terms”, Mahajan recalled,

urging Nehru to “Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give
whatever power you desire to the popular party. The army must fly to save Srinagar this
evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr. Jinnah”. Mahajan
reported that Nehru ‘became upset’ and ‘angry’ at the mention of Jinnah’s name and
ordered him ‘away’, but Patel detained him, whispering “Of course, Mahajan, you are not
going to Pakistan”. The Sheikh Abdullah, who appears to have been ‘listening’ from an

87
adjoining bedroom in Nehru’s Delhi house, sent in a ‘message’ to second Mahajan’s
advice, which instantly changed Nehru’s ‘attitude’.

The next morning, the defence council met and decided to airlift the First
Sikh Battalion from New Delhi to Srinagar. “In the early hours of the morning of the
27th”, Mahajan wrote, “I could hear the noise of the planes flying over Sardar Baldev
Singh’s house [where Mahajan spent the night] and carrying the military personnel to
Srinagar. At about 9 a.m. I got a message from …Srinagar that troops had landed there
and had gone into action. On receipt of this message, I flew to Jammu with Mr. V. P.
Menon … Mr. Menon and myself mete His Highness [Hari Singh had driven down from
Srinagar the previous night to his Winter capital] at the palace …after some discussion,
formal documents were signed which Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi …I stayed at
Jammu. This was a narrow shave”.

Mahajan’s autobiographical account of this most important sequence of

events is at critical variance with previous reports published by V. P. Menon and others
close to Nehru and Patel and associated with the Government of India at the time. Menon
insists that Kashmir’s ‘instrument of accession’ was signed and delivered to New Delhi
before any Indian troops were flow into action at ; Mahajan reports the reverse. The
Kashmir was, in legal terms, based on having secured a legitimate instrument of
accession prior to airlifting any troops into the Vale. Mountbatten, of course, understood
that ‘the risk of Pakistan also sending troops would be considerable’ and if that occurred
then two Commonwealth armies, each trained and led by British commanding officers,
would have had for the first time in history to face one another on the field of battle. It
would have been so ignominious, so utterly intolerable a conclusion to his ‘last Chukka
in India’ that Mountbatten had to move heaven and earth to avoid so tragic a denouement.
He had, in fact, assembled over a hundred transport planes, civil as well as military, at
Delhi’s airport with less than a day’s notice, and packed India’s best Sikh regiment inside
those planes, fueled up and kept ready to take off before dawn on October 27. All that he
lacked was the signed accession, which would, he rightly reported to his royal cousin,
‘fully regularize the position and reduce the risk of an armed clash with Pakistan forces to
the minimum. I shall relate a little further on how lucky it was that this accession was
accepted”. The crisis situation Mountbatten faced during that last terrible week in
October obviously did not permit the luxury of holding a plebiscite or referendum. The
tribals were burning, looting, raping, shooting and within a day’s march of Srinagar –
where hundred of thousands of people were virtually unprotected or, as Mountbatten
quite accurately put it, “time did not, of course, permit the will of the people being
ascertained first”, prior to lifting those guardian troops over the Himalayan wall that
separated Delhi from Srinagar. By the same token, then, should time permit the
indecision of an autocratic maharaja who had ‘gone to pieces’, fled Srinagar and
abandoned his own subjects to a fate worse than death, to stand in the way of their
salvation ?

“Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the
three British Chiefs of Staff of Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks
involved in the operation”, V. P. Menon reported. “But Nehru asserted that the only

88
alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinaga, which would be
followed by a major communal honocaust in India. Moreover, the British residents in
Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the raiders, since neither the Pakistan
Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their
lives”. What else Lord Mountbatten possibly have done in the face of such dire warnings,
threats and advice ? To hesitate for even an hour might have proved fatal to so precarious
an operation.

On October 27, as soon as Governor-General Jinnah learned of India’s

airlift to Srinagar, he ordered his ‘acting’ British commander-in-chief (General Messervy
was on leave), Sir General Douglas Gracey, to ‘move two brigades of the Pak army into
Kashmir …one from Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to
march to Jammu, take the city and make the Maharaja a prisoner. The Rawalpindi
column was to advance to Srinagar and capture the city”. Such strategic action could
have secured Kashmir for Pakistan while saving Srinagar from ‘tribal anarchy’. General
Gracey refused, however, to accept those orders from his governor-general, informing
Jinnah that ‘he was not prepared to issue instructions which would inevitably lead to
armed conflict between the two Dominions and the withdrawal of British Officers,
without the approval of the Supreme Commander” [Field Marshal Auchinleck]. Mr.
Jinnah insisted on the orders being issued at once. General Gracy informed Field Marshal
Auchinleck from Rawalpindi by phone at 1.00 A.M. on October 27-28 that he had
‘received orders from Jinnah which if obeyed would entail issue ‘Stand Down’ order,
Auchinleck wired his chiefs of staff in London on October 28, a ‘stand down’ order
meant the automatic withdrawal of all British officers from a dominion army.

The “Auk” flew into Lahore from Delhi that fateful morning of October
28 and was met at the airport by Gracey, who stated that the orders Gracey had not
obeyed were nonetheless issued to Pakistani troops ‘to seize Baramula and Srinagar also
Banihal Passa and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu’. The supreme
commander and General Gracey went to confront Jinnah immediately to explain the
‘situation vis-à-vis British officers very clearly’, Auchinleck reported to London. “Gracey
also emphasized military weakness of Pakistan while I pointed out incalculable
consequences of Kashmir’s sudden accession”. “His approach to Jinnah”, Mountbatten
reported of Auchinleck’s crucial confrontation in Lahore, ‘was based on the fact that
India’s acceptance of the accession of Kashmir’ was just as legally proper and correct as
Pakistan’s acceptance of Junagadh’s accession; that India had a perfect right to send
troops to the State in response to Maharaja’s request; and on the extreme weakness of the
Pakistan Army, and its virtual usefulness without British Officers’. Jinnah “withdrew
orders”, Auchinleck was able to report at the end of his longest day in India’s service. 8

Nevertheless, the fight between the tribals and Indian forces continued
unabated. Meeting stiff resistance by the people of Kashmir, India lodged a complaint
with the UN Security Council. Pakistan filed a counter-complaint. After listening to both
sides, the Security Council established in January 1948, the UN Commission for India
and Pakistan [UNCIP]. At UNCIP’s initiative, the 15-member Council adopted a
resolution on 21st April, 1948 recommending measures “appropriate to bring about

89
cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free impartial plebiscite to
decide whether the state of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan”.

On 13th August, 1948, UNCIP adopted a more elaborate three-part

resolution providing for:

 a ceasefire,
 a truce agreement and
 plebiscite.

Both India and Pakistan reaffirmed “their wish that the future status of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the
people”.

On 5th January, 1949, UNCIP adopted another resolution incorporating:

 supplementary principles about truce

 the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator and
 arrangement for a free and impartial plebiscite.

India leveled baseless accusations of non-compliance by Pakistan.

A joint appeal by President Truman [USA] and Prime Minister Attlee

st
[UK] on 31 August, 1949 for ‘arbitration’ on differences of interpretation of the UNCIP
plan did not elicit any positive response from India. The message was sent by US
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson to Indian Prime Minister Nehru recommending
acceptance of McNaughton’s realistic approach to the demilitarization issue.

Mr. Owen Dixon of Australia, the next UN representative e, tried to secure

India’s agreement to alternative proposals but came to the conclusion that India’s
agreement ‘would never be obtained to demiliterization’.

Proposals made by the UN Security Council President in December 1949,

General A.G.L. Mc Naughton of Canada for reduction of forces on both sides of the
ceasefire line prior to the plebiscite were rejected by India.

Pakistan’s decision to enter into alliance with the United States in 1953
was used by India as a pretext to renounce the pledge of plebiscite, refusing to explain
how Pakistan’s relations with another country could prejudice the Kashmiri right of self-
determination or absolve India of its international obligations.

Groaning under occupation and suppression, the people of Indian-held

Kashmir grasped every opportunity to protest against the denial of their fundamental right
to self-determination.

90
 In 1973, the valley exploded in protest following the discovery of a book
in a library in Anantnag with a drawing of the Prophet.

Notes

1. M. A. Jinnah, ‘Speeches as Governor General’, Ferozsons,

Karachi, 1981, pp. 11, 62 & 65.
2. Alan Campbell-Johnson, ‘Mission with Mountbatten’, Robert Hall,
London, 1972, pp. 51-56
3. Stanley Wolpert, ‘Jinnah of Pakistan’, Oxford University Press,
Karachi, 1989, pp. 335-336.
4. Ibid. p. 347.
5. UN Security Council’s Official Records: 250th Meeting,
th
18 February, 1948.
6. Ibid. pp. 347-348
7. Suroosh Irfani, ‘Fifty Years of the KASHMIR dispute’, University of
Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad, 1997, p.13.
8. Ibid. pp. 348-351

91
 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The Afghanistan Civil War, 1990-1998

[Chapter 15]

Although Soviet forces had withdrawn from Afghanistan following the signing of
Geneva Accords between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union and United States on 14th
April, 1988 but the crucial question of ‘formation of Government in Kabul’ with the
participation of all the Mujahideen leaders was not addressed. In fact, this was the bone
of contention between President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo
which cost Mr. Junejo his Government on return from an official visit to Peoples
Republic of China.

During the military intervention in Afghanistan, Afghan people had suffered grievously
in the struggle to recover freedom:

 A million people had died in the conflict.

 Some six million people had to take refuse, largely in Pakistan and
Iran. Around three million Afghan refugees were still in Pakistan in
2007.
 The economic and human infrastructure had devastated on a scale
with no parallel.
 Damage to agriculture, irrigation systems, roads, transport and
educational institutions in a traditional tribal society and least
developed country was unimaginable.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan did not bring peace in the country as
Soviets’ installed Najibullah regime fought on for nearly three more years before it
collapsed in April 1992.

This followed a protracted ‘war of succession’ among the Mujahideen political leaders,
progressively exposing its ethnic basis.

After Najibullah’s fall, Mujahideen leaders began on a hopeful note of unity at a meeting
in Peshawar on 24th April, 1992, setting up an Islamic Council headed by Mr.
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi for two months to be followed by Professor Burhanuddin
Rabbani as President for another four months as a transitional Government was to be
formed in two years’ time.

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Prof. Rabbani refused to hold election for his successor and did not relinquish power
when his term expired. This broke fighting among the Mujahideen leaders.

Pakistan which had worked for ‘unity’ among Afghan parties in concert with Saudi
Arabia and Iran in brokering ‘Peshawar Accord’ again joined hands and at a meeting in
Islamabad on 7th March, 1993, Afghan leaders agreed on the formation of a Government
for a period of 18 months with Prof. Rabbani continuing as President and Mr. Gulbadin
Hekmatyar as Prime Minister.

Although Afghan leaders re-confirmed ‘Islamabad Accord’ in Saudi Arabia and Iran but
did not implement it as the Cabinet to be formed by Mr. Hekmatyar in consultation with
the President could not be agreed upon and Hekmatyar felt too insecure even to enter
Kabul.

As the accord broke down, Hekmatyar attacked Kabul and intra-Mujahideen fighting
began.

In 1995, the situation was that:

 Tajik-dominated Rabbani Government ruled over 5 central provinces

with its seat in the Capital,
 Mr. Abdur Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek militia controlled northern
provinces with his centre in Mazar-e-Sharif,
 A Pashtun Shura or Council governed eastern provinces from
Jalalabad and
 Taliban controlled southern provinces with their base in Kandahar.

The Mujahideen Alliance, in fact failed to establish an effective central administration.

The Northern Alliance led by Tajik Panjsher valley leader Ahmed Shah Masood received
assistance from foreign countries to sustain itself in power but did little to either
‘establish security’ or ‘economic reconstruction’ of the ruined country.

The absence of a national army, financial resources and administrative reach led to
anarchical conditions in the country with warlords and local commanders trying to
impose their personal control through intimidation and extortion.

On 6th September, 1995, Pakistan’s expectations of a friendly Government in Afghanistan

received a severe setback when its embassy in Kabul was ransacked by a Government-
sponsored mob. One employee was killed, Ambassador and 40 officials were badly
injured and the building and official record was burnt.

Pakistan exercised ‘restraint’ in this difficult situation which paid positively as an Afghan
Government delegation in a visit in May 1996 acknowledged ‘liability’ for the
reconstruction of the embassy.

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 The Rise of Taliban

Graduates and students of religious seminaries, ‘The Taliban’ had played a significant
part in the struggle against Soviet occupation but did not have any organization and
therefore, could not play a role in the new power structure under Mujahideen leaders.

The beginning of their rise to prominence was incidental due to a local happening in a
southern village in 1994.

Outraged by the offensive social behavior of a local commander, the villagers approached
the local Mullah Omar to intercede with the authorities. Mullah Omar led a procession
to the office of the local commander. Unable to province satisfaction or intimidate the
angry crown, the commander fled. The people proclaimed Mullah Omar as their leader.
Other people in the neighborhood who were fed up with the brutalities of the local
commanders, violating the Islamic teachings rallied around Mullah Omar who found
himself at the head of a popular revolt. His Taliban supporters were warmly welcomed in
other villages. Consequently, they took over the provincial capital of Kandahar without a
fight. Warlord Commanders did not put up any resistance as the Taliban were invited by
the people of other provinces. Helmand, Imroz, Uruzgan and Zabul fell one after the
other.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Pakistan-India Disputes and Crises

[Chapter 16]

Sir Creek:

The demarcation of the line in Sir Creek at the western terminus of the Pakistan-India
boundary in the Rann of Kutch, has remained unresolved since 1969 when the main
dispute was settled by an arbitration tribunal.

For most of its length, the boundary was demarcated by the tribunal, which did not
consider it necessary to take up the question with regard to the 100-km stretch of Sir
Creek because here the boundary between the state of Kutch and the province of Sindh
was already delimited by a resolution of the British Indian Government 1914 with the
annexed map showing Sir Creek on the Sindh side and neither side had contested that fact
before the tribunal.

Later, with an eye on the maritime resources, India claimed first that Sir Creek was on the
Indian side and then that the boundary should run in the middle of the Creek because it
was a navigable channel. The changed Indian stance aimed to substantially reduce the are
of Pakistan’s economic zone.

Pakistan sought negotiations to resolve the difference but India said it first wanted to
complete an air survey of the area. The Surveyors General of the two countries met in
May 1989 but could not reach agreement as India no longer accepted the 1914 resolution
map, considered authentic during the proceedings of the tribunal.

The stalemate has persisted to the detriment of poor fishermen on both sides, hundreds of
whom are arrested by the coastguard forces of the two sides, hundreds of whom are
arrested by the coastguard forces of the two sides, charging them with trespass.

In 2003, India shot down an unarmed Pakistani aircraft in the area, kipping all its crew
and passengers.
Siachen Glacier

Descending from the lofty Karakorum Range at elevations of 5,000 meters or more, the
Siachen Glacier traverses part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas whose inhabitants threw
off the yoke of Maharaja of Kashmir in 1947.

The area was so difficult to access and so inhospitable that no fighting took place here in
any of the three wars between two countries.

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After the two sides agreed to half hostilities, an agreement was reached on 27th July, 1949
at a meeting of the military representatives of the two countries under the auspices of the
UN Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] on the ceasefire line.

Pakistan exercised control in the glaciated area up to the Karakorum Pass. Following the
Sino-Pakistan agreement of 1962, the provincial boundary between the Xinjiang region
of China and the Northern Areas of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir under
Pakistan’s control started from the tri-junction with Afghanistan in the West to the
Karakorum Pass in the East.

India’s protest against the agreement, claiming that Kashmir was part of its territory,
stated that the portion west of the Karakorum Pass was under ‘Pakistan’s unlawful
occupation’, implicitly conceding that the pass was under Pakistan’s control.1

Other evidence of Pakistan’s control over the region was available in the ‘permits’
granted by the Pakistan Government to mountain climbing expeditions.

After 1965, the two countries agreed to revert to ‘status quo’ ante.

During the 1971 war, there was no change of control over the territory in the region. The
terminus of the ‘Line of Control’ resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971
remained the same as that of the 1949 ceasefire agreement.

Salal, Wuller, Baglihar and Kishenganga Projects:

The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 allows construction of run-of-river power plants but
forbids the construction of dams on the western rivers in excess of prescribed limits.
However, if India plans projects that interfere with the flow of rivers, New Delhi is under
obligations of the treaty to provide relevant data to Pakistan. And if Pakistan feels that the
magnitude of the dam is in violation of the treaty provisions, it is entitled to raise the
issue in the permanent Indus Commission. Even if they fail to reach agreement, either
side can refer the dispute to the World Bank for the appointment of a neutral expert
whose verdict is binding on both parties.

Four such issues had arisen since 1960:

 In 1970s, India decided to build a dam on the Chenab River at Salal,

the two governments took up the issue after the Indus Commission failed to settle
it. Consequently, India agreed to reduce the height of the dam so as to address
Pakistan’s concerns regarding interference in the flow of the river.
 In early 1980s, Indian government embarked on the construction of a
barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of the Wuller Lake, envisaging the
creation of storage. Finding it 33 times in excess of the prescribed limit, Pakistan

1. R. K. Jain, ed. ‘China-South Asian Relations’ Vol. 1, p. 197.

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 raised the issue in the Commission in 1985 where no progress was made. In 1987,
Pakistan asked India to discontinue construction, pending resolution of the
question. After some delay, India suspended the work. India then argued that the
barrage could be of mutual benefit. Without entering into a controversy over this
argument, Pakistan declined to take part in any discussion that would tinker with
the provisions of the treaty, it sanctity being too vital for Pakistan. It asked India
to first acknowledge that the project was inconsistent with the treaty. India was
unwilling to do so but offered, in 1989, to change the design and operating
procedures to eliminate any harmful effects on Pakistan. The two sides then
exchanged drafts of a possible compromise. No agreement was reached despite
numerous meetings at the level of the commission as well as government. After
India suspended implementation of the project because of uprising in Kashmir,
the problem lost urgency.
 Another dispute arose when India decided to build a hydroelectric
power project on the Chenab River with a dam at Baglihar upstream from the
Salal Dam. The reservoir was far in excess of the prescribed limit and would
enable India to manipulate the flow of the river in a way that would lead to either
complete stoppage for up to 28 days during the critical wheat growing period of
December to February or open the flood gate to inundate the land in Pakistan.

At first, India did not provide the requisite data about the project in
advance and they delayed a visit by the Pakistani experts to the site as required
under the treaty. Negotiations at the level of Commissioners from 2001 to 2004
proved in fructuous as India maintained that the design of the dam did not violate
the treaty. The matter was taken up at the level of Government Secretaries in
January 2005 but the stalemate remained unbroken. Pakistan offered to continue
bilateral negotiations, provided India suspended construction work but India
rejected the proposal. As work proceeded to complete the first phase of the project
by the end of 2005, Pakistan decided to refer the issue to the World Bank
invoking the treaty provision that entitles either party to request the appointment
of a neutral expert. The World Bank nominated the expert in July 2005.
 After learning that India planned to build a power project on the
Kishenganga tributary of the Jhelum River, Pakistan objected on the ground that
diversion of the stream would violate the Indus Waters Treaty. The Indus
Commission commenced discussion of the issue in 2005.

Consular Missions:

When Pakistan and India resumed diplomatic relations in 1976, following the Indo-
Pakistan War of 1971, New Delhi proposed the reopening of Consular Offices of the two
countries and offered to lease Jinnah House in Mumbai as Pakistan’s Consulate. Since
Jinnah House, owned by the Founder of Pakistan until it was taken over by the Indian
government as ‘evacuee property’ was on lease to the British Deputy High Commission
and its vacation had entailed some delay, India sought permission to open its Consulate in
advance. Pakistan agreed to the proposal and the promise by reiterated by Indian External

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Affairs Minister in Parliament on two different occasions, affirming: ‘The property is at
present leased out to the British High Commission and on expiry of the lease in
December 1981, it is propos4ed to lease out this property to the Pakistan Embassy for use
by the Consulate’.2 However, when Jinnah House was vacated by the British Deputy
High Commission, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to refuse its lease to
Pakistan.

Meanwhile in August 1980, the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi sought the permission of
the Indian government for the purchase of a plot of land for the construction of the
Consular Office in Mumbai. New Delhi refused the request on the ground that the
location was not suitable. Nor was India prepared to help Pakistan acquire an alternative
site.

In August 1992, Pakistan Government sent Consular Staff to open an Office in Mumbai.
They had to stay in a hotel and were hounded by the Indian intelligence personnel.

Pakistan was obliged to close down the Office in March 1994 but the Indian Consulate in
Karachi continued to function even though it was known to the Pakistani authorities that
the bulk of its personnel did not belong to the commerce and external affairs ministries of
India. After the evidence of subversive and terrorist activities by the Indian Personnel
was discovered, Pakistan Government was obliged to order the closure of the Indian
Consulate in December, 1994.

In 1992, the diplomats of the two countries agreed on a bilateral ‘code of conduct’ for the
treatment of the personnel of the missions. But this was a superfluous exercise in view of
the fact that their privileges and immunities are spelt out in international conventions on
diplomatic and consular relations. The problem was not that of ‘lack of norms’ but of
‘political will’ to observe International Law as both the Governments had accused each
other of using their diplomatic staff for activities incompatible with their legitimate
functions. Apart from vigilance which is the right of the host government, the authorities
have been accused of violating immunities and

2. Statement of Mr. V. P. Narasimha Rao in Parliament on

2 September, 1980 and then on 25th March, 1982.
nd

even resorting to violence against the staff. Whatever the merits of these allegations, it
was obvious that instead of contributing to the furtherance of normal relations between
the two countries, the Consular Missions added to the ‘bitterness’.

In April 2005, two countries agreed to reopen the Consular Missions, hoping to open a
new chapter in their bilateral relations.

Indian Plan for Attack on Kahuta, 1984:

Pakistan received a number of intelligence reports during 1983-85 that India was
preparing an air attack on its uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. In 1984, Islamabad
received information from a friendly country, alerting it to the imminence of an Indian

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attack. Reports indicated that India might act in collusion with an Israeli agency or the
Soviet-installed Afghan regime. Washington, however, informed Islamabad after
checking from Tel Aviv that it was false. As for India, Islamabad took the precaution of
informing New Delhi through friendly intermediaries that any such attack would be
treated as an act of aggression. Concerns on this account subsided after Pakistan and
India agreed informally in December 1985 to refrain from attack on each other’s nuclear
installations. A formal agreement was later signed which entered into force in 1988.

The Brasstacks Crisis, 1986-87:

Another crisis erupted when India decided to hold the largest combined military exercise
in South Asian history, code-named “Brasstacks” in the winter of 1986-87. Planned by
the hawkish Indian Army Chief, General Krishnaswami Sundarji, the exercise was
comparable in scale to the biggest exercises by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It envisaged
the concentration of a quarter of a million troops, nine army divisions, five independence
armoured brigades and 1300 tanks in western Rajasthan, at places hardly 50 kilometers
from the Pakistan border, giving the assembled forces the capability to launch a piercing
strike into Pakistan to cut off northern Pakistan from the southern part. Contrary to the
existing understanding, the Indian Army Chief did not inform his Pakistani counterpart of
the location, schedule and scale of exercise. Specific requests to this effect by the GHQ
on the ‘hot line’ and by diplomats in New Delhi were rebuffed.

Concerned about the situation, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo took up the
matter with Rajiv Gandhi in their meeting during the SAARC summit in Banglore in
November 1986. He was given to understand that the exercise would be scaled down
which was, however, not done.

As a precaution, the Pakistan Army decided to extend its own winter exercises and later,
in December 1986, as the crisis escalated, moved some of the formations to forward
areas, north of the Sutlej river opposite the Indian town of Fazilka and west of the Ravi in
Sialkot district. The Indian officials termed the Pakistani action as ‘provocative’. They
perceived the Pakistani force dispositions as a pincer posture menacing the security of the
troubled Indian state of Punjab where the Sikh people had been up in arms since the
Indian Army’s assault on the Golden Temple, their most sacred shrine in 1984.

In January 1987, the crisis reached to the peak when the Indian Government demanded a
pullback of Pakistani forces ‘within 24 hours’. Pakistan pointed out that India should first
remove the cause of the Pakistan reaction. Both countries placed their forces on ‘alert’.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi publicly expressed ‘tremendous concern’. N 20 th January,
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet met in emergency session under the chairmanship
of the Prime Minister and decided to try to defuse the dangerous situation. Prime Minister
Junejo telephoned his Indian counterpart, Rajiv Gandhi and suggested immediate talks at
the level of the Foreign Secretaries to discuss the mutual withdrawal of forces to
peacetime locations. An agreement was signed in New Delhi on 4th February, providing
for deactivation of forward air bases and sector-by-sector disengagement and return of

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forces to their peacetime locations, to commence in the Ravi-Chenab sector in the north.
The storm which had been brewing over several months, passed over within days.

In 1991, the two countries concluded an agreement which specified force thresholds and
distances from the border that would require prior notification in the event of exercises or
troop movements to preclude recurrence of unintentional crises. Under another such
agreement concluded in the same year required advance communication about aircraft
flying in proximity to the other side’s airspace.

Re-entry to the Commonwealth:

British partisan role in the 1971 crisis was disappointing for Pakistan as British failure to
censure Indian military intervention was reflective of an expedient and unprincipled
policy. London did not even allow a decent interval to lapse before it decided to extend
recognition to Bangladesh, persuading several countries of Western Europe, Australia
and New Zealand to do so simultaneously. In anger, Z. A. Bhutto decided to pull out of
the Commonwealth. A Quick analysis revealed that the pullout would not entail any great
loss except inconvenience to Pakistani settlers in Britain. National pride would be served
by giving a counter-punch to Britain which looked at the Commonwealth as a source of
comfort in its time of decline from a ranking world power status. If the precipitate
decision to quit the Commonwealth was largely Bhutto’s the decision by President Ziaul
Haq to rejoin was no less personal. It was made at the suggestion of the visiting British
leaders, subject to the condition that re-entry was arranged in an honourable way. For
several years, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi frustrated the proposal. She vetoes Pakistan’s
return at the Melbourne summit in 1980, despite pleadings by the Australian Prime
Minister. Her decision was also quite personal and surprised even the Indian Foreign
Secretary who had earlier told the Pakistani Ambassador that India would not stand in the
way. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi followed his mother’s line, justifying the opposition to
Pakistan’s return to the Commonwealth on the ground that Pakistan was ruled by a
dictator. Actually democratic rule was not a precondition for membership at that time. In
any case, India did not abandon its opposition even after elections in 1985, the
installation of a civilian government and an end to martial law. Not until after the 1988
election in Pakistan did New Delhi relent. If Pakistan’s manner of leaving the
Commonwealth in a huff was childish, that of suing for re-entry also did not reflect
maturity of decision-making in foreign policy.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Professor Dr. Z. A. QURESHI

Nuclear Tests
[Chapter 17]

India conducted multiple nuclear explosions on 11th and 13th May in 1998 and became a
declared ‘Nuclear Power’. There were two motives behind this move:

 To demonstrate that New Delhi is the ‘major power’ of the region.

 To challenge Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

Pakistan was confronted with a dilemma:

 not to test the nuclear device tantamount to jeopardizing the national

security &
 conducting the nuclear tests, meant threat of economic sanctions at a
time when country’s international debt of US $ 18 billion in 1988 had doubled to
US $ 36 in 1998.

For Pakistan, the security argument was irrefutable as the tone and tenor of India had
changed after the nuclear tests:

 threatening Pakistan to reconcile the ground realities and forget about

Kashmir. In case, it persists in its current policy, India would invade and occupy
Azad Kashmir.

 Indian Home Minister, L. K. Advani (next in power and influence in

the ruling BJP to the Prime Minister) warned that Pakistan should realize that the
Indian nuclear tests had changed the strategic balance. He demanded that Pakistan
roll back what he described as its anti-India policy.

 The Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Madan Lal Khurana

Challenged Pakistan to a ‘fourth war’.

 Besides, there was tremendous pressure from the United States.

President Bill Clinton had telephoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif several times
in the week with ‘carrot and stick’ attitude. President Bill Clinton expressed
understanding of Pakistan’s concerns and promised to review US sanctions and
resume economic assistance but conspicuously missing from the dialogue was the
one component, most important to Pakistan, namely assurance on the key issue of
‘security’.

• Pakistan could not ignore the threats.

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 • Almost all political parties, political leaders and
security analysts,
Newspaper editors and columnists, the security establishment and public opinion
became vociferous in demanding a response to the Indian tests and a
demonstration to adventurists in India that Pakistan too possessed the bomb.
• Another factor in Pakistan’s decision was the
realization that if it did
not response immediately, international pressure would make it even more
difficult to test later.
• Pakistan had a bad experience as after the 1974
Indian test, the West
Had acquiesced in the fait accompli but targeted Pakistan by a policy of denial
and discrimination in an attempt to prevent it from acquiring nuclear capability.
• Again in May 1998, Western states focused efforts
on preventing
Pakistan from following suit.

Hence, on the afternoon of 28th May, 1998, scientists of Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission [PAEC] and Khan Research Laboratories [KRL] conducted nuclear
explosion tests in a sealed tunnel in the Chaghi Mountains in Balochistan. More were
carried out two days later on 30th May, 1998, marking the success of a ‘truly gigantic
endeavours spanning three decades and involving thousands of scientists, engineers,
technicians and administrative personnel.1

1. Sattar, Abdul, “PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: 1947-2005”

Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 201-2,
2.

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 Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Terrorism
[Chapter 20]

After 9/11, Pakistan became a frontline state in the ‘war on terrorism’ and intensified its
pursuit of foreign militants many of whom were brought by CIA to assist the Afghan
Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

In 2003, Pakistan deployed over 70 thousand armed forces personnel in the border areas
adjoining Afghanistan to flush out foreign extremists and their local supports, incurring
heavy costs in lives during the protracted campaign [over 300 killed by mid-2005 –
number much higher than the casualties suffered by International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan]

General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan urged world leaders to promote a just
resolution of international issues including Palestine and Kashmir, many of which had
brought protracted suffering to Muslim people and generated resentment. Pakistan was,
however, disappointed at the lack of salutary response.

Negotiations at the UN General Assembly on a comprehensive international convention

against terrorism were stalled because of disagreements on the definition of terrorism,
with a group of states resisting the distinction between terrorism and freedom struggle
like in Kashmir and Palestine.

The events of 9/11 marked what the then Secretary General Kofi Annan called a ‘seismic
shift in international relations’.

Some states began to use the label of terrorism ‘to demonize political opponents, to
throttle the freedom of speech and the press and to de-legitimize political grievances.
States living in tension with their neighbours make opportunistic use of the fight against
terrorism to threaten or justify new military action on long-running disputes’.

Ironically, some nations that justified resort to violence against the ruling powers during
their own freedom struggle, condemned the same means when others under their yoke
took to militant struggle. Such a striking contradiction characterized the Indian stance.
When Bhagat Singh was hanged for assassinating a British police officer and throwing a
bomb in the colonial legislature in New Delhi in 1930, the Indian National Congress
described him as a ‘great martyr’ and 70 years later, the Indian Government issued a
postage stamp to honour him as a national hero. But by contrast, the Indian Government
described the Kashmiris who attacked the Indian Parliament building as ‘terrorists’.

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A French President Jacques Chirac has rightly called terrorism ‘a feverish expression of
suffering, frustration and injustice’.

Oppressive policies of states against people have historically been a main generator of
terrorism.1

No state has contributed more than Israel to the generation of suffering and outrage
among Muslims in recent history. As Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London has said:
‘Israel’s expansion has included ethnic cleansing. Palestinians who had lived in that land
for centuries were driven out by systematic violence and terror. The methods of groups
like Irgun and the Stern gang were the same as those of the Bosnian Serb leader
Karadzic.2
Mr. Livingstone more forthrightly castigated Ariel Sharon for continuing seizures of
Palestinian land, military incursions and denial of the rights of Palestinians. Recalling
that Israel’s own Kahan Commission found that Sharon shared responsibility for the
Sabra and Shatila massacres, Livingstone noted that more than 7,000 Palestinians were in
Israel’s jails.

Since its birth, Israel has enjoyed the strong support of the Western countries with
influential domestic Zionist lobbies. The United States has provided large budgetary
support, allowed tax exemption for private donations, facilitated market access, supplied
the latest military weapons and abused its veto power in the Security Council to shield
Israel from resolutions condemning its actions, thus emboldening the Jewish state to
persist in its iniquitous policies in flagrant violation of international law and the human
rights of the Palestinian people. US policy has provoked deep resentment in the Arab
world, Pakistan and Palestinians. It has also fuelled rage and the rise of extremism
responsible for terrorist attacks on US targets. The US political elite, however,
conspicuously ignored this root cause as Zionist lobbies exploited the popular outrage
against terrorism and Ariel Sharon’s government resorted to demonisation. ‘Initial targets
were and have now become Muslims.

Islam targeted

As the Soviet Union collapsed, Zionists, born-again Christian priests and political
lobbyists in the United States supplanted Islam in place of communism as the new threat
to the West, insidiously stoking prejudices rooted in medieval crusades 4 to plant seeds of
Islamophobia.

For a Western world long accustomed to a global vision and a foreign policy predicated
upon super power rivalry for global influence if not dominance - a US-Soviet conflict
often portrayed as a struggle between good and evil, capitalism and communism - it is all
too tempting to identify another global ideological menace to the ‘threat vacuum’ created
by the demise of communism. As Western leaders attempt to forge the New World Order,
transnational Islam may increasingly come to be regarded as the new global monolithic
enemy of the West.5 Today, the world is still divided into East and West, but with a new

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East: ‘Islam’ has replaced ‘communism’. Whereas before one spoke of a clash of
ideologies, today this has been elevated to a clash of civilizations. “Clash” because the
suspicion, hostility, even conflict that marked East-West relations in the old world order
have survived in the new.

Bernard Lewis, a Jewish authority on Islam coined the phrase ‘clash of civilisations’6
which was further developed by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington in an article in the
prestigious Foreign Affairs in 1993. The slogan attracted worldwide publicity and
influenced powerful circles in US, spreading fear that the Judeo-Christian civilization
forever faced a ‘hostile Islamic world hell-bent on the conquest and conversion of the
West’7 Even though the perpetrators of the 9/11 outrage were not religious men and their
motivations were political, the anti-Islamic activities exploited the crime to stoke anti-
Islamic hysteria. Out-of-context quotations from the Quran and incorrect translations
were used to whip up hate campaigns against Muslims. Samuel Huntington’s theory of
‘Clash of Civilizations’ did not introduce the concept; the West had been searching for a
substitute “enemy” ever since it became obvious the Soviet bear was on its last legs. He
was the first to articulate and define the new enmity. In particular, he was the first to
unite diverse militancies in the Muslim world (Algeria, Bosnia, Palestine, Lebanon,
Kashmir) and present them as part of the same whole: Islam. The Islamic civilization that
Huntington portrayed was one with a long tradition of bloodshed and warfare, dating
back 1300 years. It was different from and fundamentally opposed to the West, and hence
–according to Huntington – posed a massive threat to it. But the “clash of civilizations”
was not dismissed. On the contrary, it found a receptive and appreciative audience.
Within the United States, the many vested interests associated with the defence industry
seized on the Islamic threat as justification for America to remain armed to the teeth.
Outside the US, innumerable governments facing militant Islamic opposition quickly
realized that by presenting their conflict as part of the wider “clash of civilizations”, they
could garner international sympathy (or at least mute criticism of their human rights
abuse). Russia, Israel, India and until recently Serbia, all claim to be engaged in the
struggle to hold back Islamic fundamentalist hordes.8 ‘To some Americans, searching for
a new enemy against whom to test the mettle and power, after the death of communism,
Islam is the preferred antagonist. But, to declare Islam, an enemy of the United States is
to declare a second Cold War that is unlikely to end in the same resounding victory as the
First.9 Daniel Pipes says: “In a world, it is a battle between secularist and fundamentalist
Muslims - to be more precise, a competition between two of the great countries of the
Middle East, Turkey and Iran. It’s likely to be a long, and difficult fight”.10 The terrorist
attacks on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon in Washington on September,
the 11th, 2001 provided a pretext to US President George W. Bush to launch strikes
against a Muslim Saudi billionaire – Osama Bin Laden, his Al-Qaida network and their
perpetrators Taliban regime in Afghanistan declaring his ‘war on terrorism’ as “crusade”.
Later President Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others apologetically stated
that this war is directed against terrorism and not against ‘Islam’. Likewise, when Islamic
Republic of Pakistan had to decide to side with international coalition against terrorism
led by United States or fanatic Muslim Taliban regime in Afghanistan who were
perpetrators of a Saudi Muslim – Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network, it took a

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decision to side with international coalition purely on ‘national interest’ and not on the
basis of ‘Islam’ or as a Muslim state.

The predominant political though in the Muslim world does not regard the West as an
adversary. On the contrary, it recognizes the desperate need for cooperation in order to
end centuries of stagnation, by benefiting from the undeniable progress the West has
made in all fields of knowledge including political, economic and social sciences. As a
perceptive US panel observed, ‘Muslims do not “hate our freedoms”, but rather they hate
our policies’. It blamed the government for characterizing the new threat of Muslim
militancy in a way that offended most Muslims.11

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decried ‘the distortion of Islam by a wicked few’ and
urged the vital need to expose ‘those who wrongly claim that Islam justifies the callous
murder of innocents to give this rich and ancient faith a bad name’.12

Islam

 The word ‘Islam’ means ‘peace’.

 Islam emphasizes coexistence.
 Murder is a crime under Islamic law.
 Islam upholds the sanctity of human life and abhors the killing of even
a single innocent person.
 The Holy Quran ordains: ‘Whosoever kills a human being for other
than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as it he killed all mankind
and whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he saved the life of all
mankind’.13

The Holy Prophet [PBUH] said: ‘A believer remains within the scope of his religion so
long as he does not kill another person illegally’. Islam teaches the noble precept of
human fraternity and abhorrence of discrimination on grounds of race or colour, language
or national origin, wealth or gender. ‘There is no compulsion in religon’.14

All OIC countries joined in condemning the 9/11 outrage and several of them have also
provided logistic support for the fight against terrorists in Afghanistan.

Enlightened leaders in the West were also anxious to avoid besmirching Islam and
alienating the large Muslim world. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair took the
trouble to quote from the Quran to emphasize that Islam was a religion of peace.15 They
were not oblivious to the value and importance of Pakistan’s support, not only because of
its location, but also because, as a large Muslim nation, its decisions would influence
other Muslim nations.

Osama bin Laden exploited the concept of jihad in pursuit of his self-proclaimed mission
against the government of his country – Saudi Arabia and later against the United States.

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But his influence owed much to his role, with the encouragement and even the instigation
of the United States in the Afghan liberation struggle against Soviet occupation.

Supporters of the struggle including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States were
not averse to the invocation of jihad by the Mujahideen alliance to fight Soviet
expansionism. The CIA reportedly recruited some twenty-five thousand Arabs to join the
war.16 After the war was won, some of these and other foreigners skilled in making
bombs joined bin Laden and al-Qaida. The United States was not their only target but
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were also their victims.

The Islamic doctrine of Jihad is too often mistranslated as ‘holy war’ by militants as at
the moment. In fact, the word Jihad means a struggle by thought, by pen or by an action,
by an individual or collectively against the anti-Islamic forces to promote the cause of
Islam in its letter and spirit with the ultimate goal of achieving the blessings of Almighty
Allah. The word Jihad has been explained as the ‘maximum effort put in the way of
Almighty Allah to protect the religion in the face of enemies’.17 Syed Maulana Abul
A’la Maudoodi explaining the term ‘Jihad’ used in Surah: al-Haj, Ayah: 78 of the Holy
Quran says: ‘Jihad’ does not mean ‘Qital’ or ‘war’ but this word has been used to mean
as ‘struggle, conflict and the supreme effort’ which is needed against the resisting forces
which put hurdle in the way of Almighty Allah and to achieve His blessings and that one
should defeat such forces for the supremacy of ‘Qalma’ and should fight for its
achievement. In Jihad, only the supremacy of Almighty Allah should be the final goal
and Jihad could be launched under the leadership of an Imam for which criterion has
been set’.18

States have also used this word in the same sense as the doctrine of ‘just war’ but that is
the ultimate shape after exploring all the other avenues and aspects of Jihad.

But there is no warrant in Islamic law for the use of the term Jihad by the individual or
state to proclaim ‘violence’ against another individual, community or the state.

Muslims victimized:

Politically motivated exploitation of acts of militancy and violence by an extremist fringe

among Muslims unleashed a wave of Islamophobia in countries with significant Muslim
immigrant populations, especially the United States, France, Germany and the
Netherlands. Muslim citizens, residents and visitors to be United States were exposed to
economic and social discrimination, exclusion and discriminatory surveillance. Doors
began to close for the admission of Muslim students to institutions of higher education. In
2009, Pakistani students were apprehended by authorities in London on suspicion of
terrorism and following their clearance of the charges after a thorough probe, they are not
being allowed to continue their education. Discrimination in employment deprived
immigrants of jobs in business and industry. In the United States, ‘profiling criteria came
to include ethnicity, national origin and religion, a heightened scrutiny and harassment at
airports and selective enforcement of visa regulations.19 Muslims became targets of FBI
interrogations while their mosques came under surveillance, creating state of fear.20

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Uncounted number of innocent Muslims including a large number of Pakistanis suffered
detention without charge, loss of jobs, deportation and discrimination, not to mention
those who were subjected humiliation. Some of the other Western countries known for
religious tolerance were beset with an eruption of hostility towards Islam. France
prohibited the use of jihab in public schools.

The Muslim World’s response:

Muslim countries realized the need to project a correct understanding of their faith.21
The 57-Member OIC, in its meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Doha on 10th October,
2001 reiterated condemnation of the 11 September outrage, cooperation in bringing
perpetrators to justice for deserved punishment and willingness to contribute to the
elimination of the scourge of terrorism. It also underlined Islamic teachings that uphold
the sanctity of human life, prohibit the killing of innocent people and emphasize
tolerance, understanding and coexistence among people of different faiths. Another
important conference of Foreign Ministers of OIC and EU held in Istanbul, Turkey in
February 2002, provided a unique opportunity for better mutual understanding.
Participants rejected the perverse thesis of ‘clash of civilizations’. They emphasized
instead the history of mutually beneficial interaction among civilizations.

The need was also recognized to combat the extremist fringe within Muslim societies.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adopted policies to denounce such elements. Both suffered
numerous attacks by terrorists.

Terrorism and Religion:

Religion has long been abused to justify wars and campaigns of terror. As far back as the
first century AD, a Jewish sect of Zealots targeted fellow Jews suspected of aiding the
Romans. Extremist interpretations of Christianity misled medieval Christendom to
unleash the crusades against Muslims. The ‘Assissins’, an extremist sub-sect of Muslims,
waged a campaign of terror against other Muslims during the 12th and 13th centuries. In
the 15th century, Muslims were liquidated in Spain and the Inquisition carried out brutal
burnings of alleged heretics at the stake. The Spanish clergy subjected the indigenous
people in Central and South America to a veritable genocide starting in the 16 th century.
Millions of people perished in the Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant
Christians in the 17th century.22

State Terrorism:

State terrorism has an equally long history. To deter resistance to his ambition of
conquering the world, Alexander burned and razed Persepolis in 325 BC. Reman
emperors Tiberius and Caligua executed people to terrorise the opposition. During the
French Revolution, the Jacobins officially proclaimed the ‘Reign of Terror’ in 1793 to
ensure their power in the face of opposition. Medieval invaders routinely ordered arson
and slaughter in cities that resisted their attacks. As recently as the 20 th century, Britain,
France and Portugal unleashed terror against freedom movements in their colonies. India

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has used even more savage, if modern, methods to suppress the Kashmiri struggle for
freedom and as a result of indiscriminate killings and arson of houses and shops, the
number of victims since 1989 is estimated at 60,000-100,000.

The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy:

The demonisation of Islam or Palestine and Kashmiris and Chechens represents

uncivilized responses to an objective problem that calls instead for a comprehensive
strategy combining preventive and deterrence measures with redress of root causes. The
High Level Panel of Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the UN Secretary
General in 2003 recommended such an approach. ‘Terrorism’ it said, ‘attacks the values
that lie at the heart of the United Nations: respect for human rights, the rule of law, rules
of war that protect civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful
resolution of conflict’. Noting that the war on terrorism, too, ‘has in some instances
corroded the very values that terrorists target: human rights and the rule of law’, it
recommended:

1. Discussion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism,

including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law
and democratic reform, working to end occupations and address major political
grievances, combating organized crime, reducing poverty and unemployment and
stopping state collapse.
2. Efforts to counter extremism, including through education and
fostering debate.
3. Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism,
cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil
liberties and human rights.
4. Building state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and
operations.
5. Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.23

The High Level Panel emphasized the need to resolve ‘long standing disputes which
continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the
issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula’. Otherwise, it warned, ‘no
amount of systemic changes to the way the United Nations handles both old and new
threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the
Charter’.24

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan had outlined a similar five-point global strategy
for fighting terrorism, comprising discussion of disaffected groups from choosing
terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals, denial of means for terrorists to attack,
deterring states from supporting terrorists, developing state capacity to prevent terrorism
and defending human rights and the rule of law. He criticized repressive tactics, saying
“terrorism is in itself a direct attack on human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice
them in response, we are handling victory to the terrorists’.25 Kofi Annan also endorsed
the panel’s recommendation for the United Nations to agree on a universal definition of

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terrorism that would stress the fact that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate,
could justify the targeting of civilians in order to intimidate a population or influence
government policy.26
Notes
1. Statement by Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga at
SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in 2002.
2. The Guardian News Service/Daily DAWN, Islamabad, 5 March 2005.
3. Ibid.
4. Manifest in a ‘slip of tongue’ by President George W. Bush.
5. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat – Myth or Reality,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 4-5.
6. Professor Bernard Lewis, author of the essay The Roots of Musli
Rage
7. Quoted by Anjum Niaz in her Sunday column in Dawn, 7 November,
2004
8. Dr. Iffat S Malik, “Civilisational clash or dialogue” The News, 07
February, 2001, p. 6
9. Patrick J. Buchanan, “ Islam - an Enemy of the United States ?
“ Sunday News, New Hampshire: November 25, 1990.
10. Daniel Pipes, The National Interest, Spring 1994, No. 35.
11. US Defense Science Board report, DAWN, Islamabad, 26 Nov. 2004.
12. Message to the anti-terrorism conference in Riyadh, DAWN, Islamabad, 10
February, 2005.
13. Al-Quran: 5:32
14. Al-Quran: 2:256
15. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise History”,
Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 259.
16. Ibid. p. 260
17. Luis Ma’loof, “Al-Munjido fil-luga”, Nashre Partau, Shiraz, Iran,
1953,
18. Maudoodi, Abul a’la, “Tafheem-ul-Quran”, Tarjuman-ul-Quran,
Lahore, April, 1987, pp. 253-4.
19. US Commission on Civil Rights, quoted in report, “DAWN”
Islamabad, 18 November, 2004.
20. Report on Convention of American Muslim Voice, San Francisco,
DAWN” Islamabad, 05 October, 2004.
21. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia called for establishment of an
international centre, DAWN” Islamabad, 07 February, 2005.
22. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise
History”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 262.
23. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
UN General Assembly document, 29 November, 2004, p. 41.
24. Ibid., pp. 1, 41 & 42.
25. Address to International Conference on Terrorism, Madrid, AFP
Report, DAWN” Islamabad, 11 March, 2005.
26. Report to Security Council, 21 March, 2005.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy [1947-2005]

Pakistan-India Relations: 2001-05

[Chapter 21]

Background

The roots of antagonism between Pakistan and India can be traced to the history of
Hindu-Muslim relations and contention between Indian National Congress and the
Muslim League.

The ‘evolution’ of relations between the two states of South Asia ever since
independence could be better understood in the ‘secular paradigm’ of a conflict of aims
between a more powerful state, seeking domination and less powerful neighbours,
aspiring to protect their rights.

Forgetting its own struggle for independence, India ignored the legitimate aspirations of
its smaller neighbours for relations based on the principle of sovereign equality.

Stepping into Britain’s imperial shoes, India imposed unequal treaties on the
Himalayan kingdoms of Hindu Nepal and Buddhist Bhutan while Sikkim was forcibly
occupied and annexed despite the treaty India had signed recognizing its separate and
autonomous status. Sri Lanka too did not escape Indian hegemonic pressure and became
the victim of interference and intervention during the 1980s and 1990s.

India’s imperial attitude is partly inherited from the predecessor British rulers but its
roots are traceable to great power ambitions cultivated in the minds of the Indian political
elite by leaders of the Indian National Congress since the late 19th century whose dream
envisaged domination over neighbours.

As far back as 1895, a committee Chairman of the annual session of the Indian National
Congress, Rao Bahadur V. M. Bhide declared:
‘[India] is destined under providence to take its rank among the foremost nations of the
world’.1

Justifying the claim, Gangadhar Tilak argued, in a letter to President Georges Clemencau:
‘With her vast area, enormous resources and prodigious population, she [India] may well
aspire to be a leading power in Asia.2

Jawaharlal Nehru, the mentor of the post-Independence generations of Indian strategic

thinkers, considered India as a world power, which ‘will have to play a very great role in
security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially in the Middle East and

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South Asia.’ He envisioned India as ‘the pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast
Asia’.3

In India could not impose its will on Pakistan immediately upon Independence, Nehru
look forward to a time when it would be able to do so. In a confidential letter (later
declassified) he wrote on 25th August, 1952:

“We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not
so great to produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest
demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and at the same time,
add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the armed forces but the
industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, as we are
likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less incli8ned to threaten or harass us, and a
time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept
a settlement that we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.”4

The derive to impose its own preferences on less powerful neighbours in utter disregard
of the principles of justice and international law has been manifest in India’s insistence in
the bilateral settlement of differences and disputes which allows it to exploit power
disparity for duress. To that end, India has refused to utilize the other peaceful means for
settlement of disputes evolved by the community of states through centuries of
experience. Article 33.1 of the UN Charter provides:

“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

Developments

Ever since the events of 9/11, Indian efforts are to paint Pakistan as a ‘terrorist state’ and
the Kashmiri Mujahideen as the ‘terrorists’ backed by Islamabad.

Exploiting worldwide outrage against terrorism, Indian leaders accused Pakistan of

sponsoring terrorism, bracketed it with the Taliban and adopted the pose that India, too,
was a victim of terrorism.

Pakistan’s point of view is that India is not a victim of terrorism but in fact, a perpetrator
of state terrorism.

Soon after 13th December 2001, when armed men entered the premises of the Indian
Parliament and clashed with security personnel, the shadows lengthened to darken the
Pak-India horizon.

Without any evidence, the Indian Government charged Pakistan with responsibility for
the attacks.

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Exploiting the international condemnation of the terrorist act, New Delhi escalated
pressure on Pakistan:

 it down-graded diplomatic relations,

 suspended train and air services and
 moved its forces including strike formations, forward to the border
with Pakistan and the Line of Control in Kashmir.
 it demanded that Pakistan hand over 20 Indian and Pakistani nations
who were alleged to have hijacked Indian airliners and committed other acts of
terrorism in India over the previous 20 years.

Faced with the threat of aggression, Pakistan moved its troops to forward defensive e
positions.

For a year the two armies stood ‘eyeball to eyeball’ and on more than one occasion, the
two countries came dangerously close to the brink of war.
Fortunately, the danger of a conflict was averted due to an unprecedented combination of
factors:

 Pakistan’s capacity for self-defence acted as restraint.

 The risk of escalation to the nuclear level was another powerful
deterrent.
 All major powers including United States, European Union, Russia,
China and Japan counseled restraint.

After nearly a year, having incurred colossal expenditure and exposing Pakistan to a
similar burden, India decided to begin withdrawal of its forces towards peacetime
positions.

In April 2003, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a reversal:

 High Commissioners were assigned to both the countries again.

 Over-flights were resumed.
 Cricket was allowed and
 Dialogue resumed.

Prime Minister Vajpayee met President Musharraf on 6th January, 2004 during his visit to
Islamabad for the SAARC summit and the two leaders announced an agreement to re-
commence the ‘composite dialogue’ between the two countries, expressing confidence
that it would lead to ‘peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues including Jammu and
Kashmir’.

At a press conference, Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized that ‘violence, hostility and
terrorism must be prevented’ and President Musharraf reassured him stating he ‘will not

113
permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in nay
manner’.

Progress was made at meetings held in 2004 at ministerial, foreign secretary and senior
official levels to discuss the components of the bilateral dialogue with greater success on
normalization issues than on resolution of disputes.

President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in New York on 24 th
September, 2004 and agreed on a number of normalization measures including the
resumption of bus and rail links on old and new routes:

 a bus service was inaugurated on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road in

early April 2005.
 the two sides decided to open Poonch-Rawalakot road and
reopen the Khokharpar-Munabao rail link.
 The two sides also opened talks on Siachen and Sir Creek issues with
a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions.
 The two sides addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed
to continue their discussions in a sincere, purposeful and forward-
looking manner for a final settlement ……and expressed their determination to
work together to carry forward the process and to bring the benefit of peace to
their region.

President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in New Delhi on 17th &
18th April, 2005 and reiterated their determination that the peace process was now
irreversible.

Peace in Kashmir:

The relations between Pakistan and India remained strained and prospects of
normalization as distant as ever because of the long lingering issue of Jammu and
Kashmir.

Hopes of success will remain elusive so long as India persists in its policy of denying or
circumventing the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination.

Mr. Joseph Korbel, a Czechoslovak member of the UNCIP gives his observations in his
book written in 1966:

“The people of Kashmir have made it unmistakably known that they insist on being
heard…The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India cannot be considered
as valid by canons of international law….The issue itself cannot be sidetracked. The
history of the case has made it clear that time has only aggravated, not healed the
conflict; that neither the Pakistanis nor the Kashmiris will accept the status quo as a

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solution…No high hopes should be entertained that bilateral negotiations will lead to a
settlement…The United Nations has a principal responsibility to seek a solution….5

Mr. Korbel’s assessment made in 1966 has stood the test of time. Over 60 years of Indian
occupation and repression has steeled the will of the Kashmiri people. Their heroic
struggle and sacrifices have demonstrated their resolve to win freedom. Nor has India’s
threat or use of force intimidated Pakistan to acquiesce in India’s usurpation of Kashmir.

The UN Security Council has not resumed consideration of the Kashmir question since
the early 1960s and although in its resolution after the nuclear tests in 1998, it implicitly
recognized the ‘root cause’ of the tension between Pakistan and India and the threat it
poses to the maintenance of international peace and security, the prospect of its
addressing the issue remain bleak in the foreseeable future.

There is no sign of flexibility from the Indian side as in a speech on 21st November, 2004,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ruled out any redrawing of borders or further division.

Although diplomacy remains stuck in a blind alley, the people of Kashmir have taken
their destiny into their own hands. Their heroic sacrifices in the protracted struggle for
‘independence’ are a guarantee that the cause will ensure.

By contrast, India’s savage repression has exposed the colonial nature of its stranglehold
over occupied Kashmir.

Civilised opinion in the world and in India itself, cannot fail to recognize the inevitability
of conceding to the Kashmiri people their right to determine their own destiny.

Debate on Opinions:

At an Iftar Dinner in Islamabad on 25th October, 2004, President Musharraf called for a
public debate on options/alternatives to a statewide plebiscite for the settlement of Jammu
and Kashmir. He said:

a. the state had seven geographical regions with different religions, sects
and languages,
b. some should remain with one side or the other, and
c. the others could become autonomous, be placed under UN trusteeship
or a condominium or divided between the two countries.6

There were other options in the past as well but none was acceptable to all the three
parties i.e. the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and India.

A statewide plebiscite remained the only formula bearing the imprimatur of Security
Council resolutions for determination of the future of Jammu and Kashmir by its people.

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The regional alternative was first conceived in 1950 by UN Mediator, Mr. Owen Dixon
whose plan envisaged a plebiscite only in the ‘valley of Kashmir’ assuming that some
areas were certain to vote for accession to Pakistan and some for accession to India.

Sheikh Abdullah floated the idea of independence after New Delhi’s interference in
Kashmir’s administration convinced him that his friend Nehru was intent on maintaining
Indian occupation and had no intention of allowing a fair and impartial plebiscite.
Realizing he had been deceived and Nehru had merely used him to give the appearance
of legitimacy to the Indian grab of the state against the principle of the partition, he
belatedly started protesting. Thereupon, he was dismissed and jailed in 1953 and
remained there for 12 years.

The only serious Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir took place after the Sino-Indian
border clash in 1962.

At the urging of Britain and the United States, the two countries held six rounds of talks
between delegations led by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mr. Swaran Singh.

At first, the Indian side appeared open to discussion of the idea of partitioning the state
on the basis of the presumed wishes of its people but it back-tracked as soon as the
Chinese forces withdrew to the pre-war lines and Swaran Singh then spoke of the
possibility of only minor adjustments in the ceasefire line.

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, India formally put forward the idea of not
only freezing the status quo but converting the ceasefire line into an international border
at Shimla Conference in 1972. Pakistan resolutely resisted the Indian proposal and
despite terrible pressures following the 1971 disaster, refused to barter away the right of
the Kashmiri people to self-determination.

Acceptability to the Kashmiri people has remained an explicit premise for any settlement
formula as the Pakistan government has reiterated again and again its stance that a
settlement must conform to the aspirations of the people of Kashmir which has virtually
been converted into an Indian military camp with deployment of 450,000 military and
para-military troops.

In a speech in November 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ruled out any redrawing
of borders or further division.

As a result, public debate on alternatives lost relevance or utility.

Prospects:

Pakistan is well aware that it has to ensure its own security and formulate an effective
strategy for peace and progress. More than ever before, it has to rely on its own
resources, political will and defence capacity. Fortunately, the nation has the scientific
talent and the political and economic resilience necessary to overcome technological

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barriers and cope with external pressures and penalties. Better fiscal management and
provident policies have rescued Pakistan from the deepening fiscal crisis of the 1990s and
improved the State’s capacity to sustain adequate allocations for defence as well as
enhance allocations for economic growth and social development, thus reconciling the
demands of the present with the imperatives better future. The combination of strategic
and conventional defence forces has enabled the nation to improve security without
excessive demands on fiscal resources. Budgetary allocations for defence have increased
at a rate lower than that of economic growth. As a proportion of GDP, defence
expenditure declined from 6.5 per cent in 1990 to 3.8 per cent in 2002-03.7

History abhors determinism. The future can and should be different from the past. But the
past is surely a guide to the future. It has lessons to offer for dealing with the challenges
that continue to hover over Pakistan’s security horizon.

Notes

1. A. Moin Zaidi & Shaheda Zaidi, The Encyclopaedia of the Indian

National Congress (New Delhi, S. Chand & Co.), Vol. II, P. 506.
2. R. Palme Dutt, India Toady (London, Victor Gollance, 1940), p.
3. J. Nehru, Selected Works (Delhi, Oxford University Press), Second
Series, Vol. I, p. 406.
4. J. Nehru, Op. cit., vol. 19, p. 322.
5. Joseph Korbel, “Danger in Kashmir”, p. 351-52
6. Sattar, Abdul, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy - 1947-2005: A Concise
History”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 271.
7. Ishrat Hussain, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, DAWN, Islamabad,
8 October, 2004.

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 PRESTON UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

The UN and International Cooperation

[Chapter 22]

Heads of State and Government adopted the ‘Millennium Declaration’ at their meeting
held at the United Nations in New York from 6th to 8th September, 2000. They reaffirmed:

 faith in the organization and its Charter as the indispensable

foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world and
 recognized collective responsibility to uphold:
 human dignity and equity at the global level,
 pledged efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law in
international as well as national affairs,
 free peoples from the scourge of war,
 strengthen security,
 promote disarmament and
 renewed support for the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

The declaration was notable for its emphasis on development and poverty eradication and
the setting of goals to be achieved by 2015 including:

 the halving of poverty,

 primary education for all children,
 reduction of maternal morality by two-thirds and
 halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

The summit also called for:

 efforts to spread the benefits of globalization,

 protection of the environment and
 promotion of human rights,
 democracy and good governance and
 for strengthening of the United Nations.

Progress towards the realization of the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ during the first
five years fell short of its targets.

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  Only the momentum of economic growth in China, India and a few
other countries of Asia and North Africa contributed to the reduction of the
proportion of people in extreme poverty from 30 to 21 per cent.
 In sub-Sahara Africa, poverty was intensified and HIV/AIDS took an
excessive rate, especially in low-income countries and was projected to increase
from 6.4 billion in 2004 to 9 billion by 2050.

 In Pakistan, the high population growth rate posed a serious obstacle

to the reduction of unemployment, despite the acceleration of
economic growth.

 Development assistance by affluent countries remained inadequate.

Only five of the 22 most affluent countries met the UN-endorsed target of 0.7 per
cent of GDP for official dev elopement assistance and
Only six of the rest promised to do so by 2015.

 Meanwhile, global military exp0enditure began to gallop in 2002,

rising nearly 40 per cent to approach the colossal total of one trillion dollars.

R E F O R M of the United Nations

There was a demand for reform of the United Nations on account of:

 failing states in the Third World e.g. Somalia and Ethiopia,

 genocide in Rwanda in 1994,
 ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1995,
 proliferation of poverty,
 environmental degradation,
 rise of terrorism and
 recurrent crises in international relations.

In early 1990s, a proposal for enlargement of the Security Council surfaced as

membership had increased greatly since 1965 when the Charter was amended to add four
non-permanent seats. Japan, Germany, India and other major states asserted claims to
permanent seats in the UN Security Council.

The Millennium Declaration called for efforts to make the United Nations a more
effective instrument for pursuing global priorities. Whilst reaffirming ‘the central
position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative policy-making and
representative organ’, the summit called for ‘a comprehensive reform of the Security
Council in all its aspects’.

The terrorists attacks on the United States on 11 September, 2001 and the US attack on
Iraq in 2003, ignoring the Security Council’s rejection of its proposal for authorization of
the use of force, further underlines the need for reform.

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The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annas appointed a 16-Memebr high level panel to
recommend ‘clear and effective measures for ensuring effective collective action’. The
Panel’s letter, transmitting the report to the Secretary general stated:

“The members of the Panel believe it would be remiss of them if they failed to point out
that no amount of systemic change in the way the United Nations handles both old and
new threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the
Charter if efforts are not redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which
continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the
issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula”.1

Based on the recommendations of the high-level panel and the plan of action prepared by
experts, Kofi Annan presented a plan for reform focusing on the three pillars of freedom
from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity.2 The summit meeting held
in September 2005 remained content with the minimum common denominator acceptable
to member states.

Enlargement of the Security Council:

Discussion on the enlargement of the Security Council began in the General Assembly in
1993.

Recalling that in view of the increased membership of the United Nations since 1945, the
Security Council was enlarged in 1956 to add 04 additional non-permanent seats and that
membership of the organization had since greatly increased again, a demand arose for
further enlargement of the Security Council. At the same time, Germany and Japan
staked claims to permanent seats on the ground of their rise in economic power and large
contributions to the UN budget. That led demands for regional balance in the permanent
category by addition of other states from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Meanwhile, a
group of like-minded states known as the ‘Coffee Club’ including Argentina, Mexico,
Italy, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea joined together in support of a democratic and
accountable Security Council in which they advocated the addition of non-permanent
seats only.

As consensus eluded the General Assembly and the Millennium Summit, the Secretary
General appointed a high level panel for advice on enlargement of the Security Council
and other UN reform issues. It too was divided and suggested two alternative models for
enlargement:

 Model A provided for the addition of 06 new permanent seats without

veto power and
 Model B for the creation of a new category of 08 four-year
renewable-term seats.

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In electing states to these seats, it would be for the General Assembly to take into account
Article 23 of the Charter that provides for ‘due regard being specially paid, in the first
instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of
international peace and security’. The criteria, as suggested by the panel should include:

a. increasing ‘the involvement in decision-making of those who

contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and
diplomatically’ and those developed countries that make substantial
progress towards 0.7% contribution in overseas development aid,
b. Bringing in countries that are ‘more representative of the broader
membership, especially the development world’,
c. Enlargement should not impair the effectiveness of the Security
Council.

After Germany, Japan, Brazil and India formed a group (G-4) to canvass for ‘Model A’,
the ‘Coffee Club’ also became more active in support of ‘Model B’. The latter’s
argument against permanent seats was founded on Article 24.1 of the Charter in which
UN members ‘agree that in carrying out its responsibilities the Security Council acts on
their behalf’. The only way of ensuring that the Security Council actually does so is to
make its members accountable to the General Assembly and to achieve that aim the
accepted method is periodic elections. To have a chance of election or re-election,
aspirants to seats on the Security Council should have to be accountable to the electorate.

In the hope of expediting a decision, the G-4 circulated a draft resolution in May 2005,
providing for expansion of the Security Council to 25 members with 06 additional
permanent seats without the right of veto and 04 non-permanent seats.

UN Summit [September 2005]

A Summit held in 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and
attended by 150 Heads of State or Government reaffirmed:

 a strong and unambiguous commitment to achieve the Millennium

Development Goals and pledged an additional $ 50 billion a year to fight poverty.
 the summit resolution voiced unqualified condemnation of terrorism
‘in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for
whatever purposes’ and affirmed the resolve to push for a comprehensive
convention against terrorism within a year.
 Deciding to enhance the relevance, effectiveness efficiency,
accountability and credibility of the United Nations, the leaders pledged collective
action, in a ‘timely and decisive manner’, through the Security Council and in
accordance with the Charter, to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, when peaceful means prove
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.
 The leaders agreed to replace the Commission on Human Rights with

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 the Human Rights Council and its 47 members are to be elected by the General
Assembly.

However, no agreement was reached:

 on the ‘enlargement of the Security Council,’ due to the opposing

approaches of ‘dividing for privilege’ and ‘uniting for consensus’ and
 on disarmament and nuclear proliferation due to the refusal of the big
powers with the largest nuclear arsenals to commit themselves to reduction of
stockpiles.

Human Rights:

Humanity has coveted, craved and struggled for equal rights since the dawn of
civilization. People have sought to curtail and eliminate distinctions and discriminations
based on race and colour and to supplant the arbitrary powers of rulers with a system of
laws to protect civil and political rights.

Islam promulgated values and laws to sanctify human rights to life, human dignity and
equality without distinction of race, language, gender or religion and promoted social
justice.

The Renaissance movement in Europe built up the philosophic rationale for civil and
political rights; these were then embedded in the Constitutions of democratic states.

But it was not until after the Second World War that the world community embarked on
concerted efforts to set international standards of human rights.

The United Nations Charter reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women. It also
envisioned higher standards of living and full employment and international cooperation
for the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the UN General

Assembly on 10th December, 1948, with only the apartheid regime of South Africa and
communist states abstaining, codified as well as extended general concepts. It
commenced with the inspiring proclamation ‘All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights, without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status’.

Pakistan’s record:

The Constitution of Pakistan requires the state to ensure observance of fundamental

rights, including the rights to life and liberty, dignity and inviolability of privacy,

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freedom of religion, speech, association and assembly and provides safeguards against
arrest and detention, forced labour and traffic in human beings, etc.

The state is also party to most of the human rights treaties and has been endeavoring to
raise standards of compliance by additional legislation.

International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

For the promotion of economic and social progress for all people, the world community
has established a number of international agencies to facilitate:

 international cooperation for economic development,

 expansion of trade,
 monetary stability and
 the provision of multilateral and bilateral assistance to developing
countries.

After the havoc wrought by World War-II, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [IBRD] was set up at Bretton Woods in 1944 for the purpose of providing
financial assistance for the reconstruction and development of war-shattered economies.
It was later known as the ‘World Bank’. In 2003, it was operating in over a hundred
countries and provided US $ 18.5 billion in assistance.

The International Monetary Fund [IMF] – the other Bretton Woods institution was
established:

 to promote international monetary cooperation,

 help establish a multilateral payments system,
 lend out of its resources, under adequate safeguards, to needy member
states to maintain adequate exchange reserves and
 facilitate expansion of international trade.

Unlike the World Bank, the IMF is not a provider of economic assistance but provides
loans under adequate safeguards.
Both expect the recipient states to follow agreed programmes and conditions.

Economies being a developing science, the strategies followed by IFIs have evolved over
time, conceding that some past policies were flawed. However, criticism of IFIs for
imposing preconceived agendas on borrowers misses two essential points:

 First, they provide funds only upon application;

 Secondly, like any provident lender, they try to ensure that the
borrower will utilize the loaned funds for the agreed purpose in a manner that will
enable it to repay the loan within the agreed period. Neither writes off defaulted
loans.

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Foreign Assistance:

Like other developing countries, Pakistan has over the decades received substantial
amounts in concessional loans from foreign countries and IFIs. Of the total foreign debt
of US $ 38 billion in the year 2000, bilateral debt was US $ 12 billion and the bulk of the
rest was owed to World Bank, Asian Development Bank [ADB] and IMF.

Development banks usually provide long-term loans for infrastructure projects at interest
rates that are lower than the market rate. A significant part of the loans are interest-free
and repayable over upto 40 years. In the decade of the 1990s, Pakistan resorted to
borrowing from commercial banks, supplier-credit and foreign currency bonds at
usurious rates. Most of such high-interest debt was retired by 2004.

Pakistan’s dependence on foreign loans has declined as a result of increased earnings

through exports (US $ 14 billion) and remittances by Pakistanis abroad (US $ 4 billion)
in 2005 and increased flow of foreign private investment and higher domestic revenues.
Meanwhile, the end of multiple sanctions and resumption of bilateral assistance have
facilitated inflows while debt rescheduling has reduced the annual debt-servicing burden
from over US $ 5 billion to less than US $ 3 billion.

Globalization:

Globalization result from the gathering momentum of mass media, instant radio and
video communications, horizontal spread of multinational corporations, expansion in
international trade in goods and services and ease of movement of people across
international borders has knitted the world together and make humanity more
interdependent than ever before.

As the Millennium Declaration of the UN General Assembly noted in September 2000,

‘While globalization offers great opportunities at present, its benefits are very unevenly
shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed’. Developing countries particularly faced
special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. The Declaration, therefore,
called for:

 broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future for humanity

through international cooperation for development and poverty
eradication,
 protection of the environment,
 promotion of human rights and strengthening the United Nations.

Included among measures to be taken in order to realize the objectives were commitment
to good governance within each country and at the international level, transparency in
financial, monetary and trading systems, enhanced programmes of debt relief and more
generous development assistance.

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International trade, aid and capital for investment and negotiations for an orderly legal
framework for enhancing their smooth flows have become an increasingly important part
of international diplomacy since the mid-twentieth century. So also servicing the
expatriater communities in foreign countries. Of course, public diplomacy to inform and
influence opinion abroad has been an expanding field.

Corruption:

IFIs and the United Nations have recognized ‘corruption’ as a major obstacle to
economic development. In 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted an international
convention on cooperation to eliminate corruption. When it comes into force, after the
requisite number of states have ratified it, the parties will be required to assist one another
in the prosecution of persons charged with crimes of corruption, seizing their assets and
returning illicit funds to their countries. Countries that have historically attracted deposits
into secret accounts are expected to reform banking laws. Meanwhile, the process of
recovering illicit funds remains subject to numerous obstacles including denial of access
to information, expensive litigation and interminable delays in court proceedings.

World Trade Organization [WTO]:

International trade, increasing 12-fold between 1948 and 1995, has contributed
significantly to faster economic growth across the globe. The WTO plays an increasingly
important role in the promotion of fair and free trade based on binding rules, ensuring
transparency and predictability, liberalization and reduction in tariffs on industrial
products and the smooth implementation of existing agreements on trade in agricultural
products, textiles and clothing, services and intellectual property and settlements of
disputes.

Expiry of the Multi-Fabric Agreement and reversion of international trade in textiles and
garments to normal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] rules from 1st
January, 2005 was of special importance to Pakistan as this category accounts for some
60 per cent of its exports. Open international competition was expected to present
Pakistan and other major exporters of textile products with an opportunity as well as a
challenge.

Two principles that govern all trade-related agreements are:

 most-favoured-nation [MFN] and

 ‘national treatment’.

Both proscribe discrimination the former in the rate of customs duty and the latter
between national and foreign persons. Members of a group may, however, agree to
special rates and rules governing intra-group trade.

The latest round of trade negotiations that began in 2001 covers the Doha Development
Agenda, focusing on concerns regarding the implementation of existing agreements,

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especially relating to agriculture and textiles, technical barriers and improvement of
dispute settlement mechanisms etc. With the industrialized countries continuing to
provide massive support for domestic agriculture, estimated at US $ 400 billion a year
and to build new barriers, developing countries desire the phasing out of market-
distorting price support and export subsidies and improvement in market access for their
goods. Central to the strategy for promoting a level playing field is a fair regime for trade
in agricultural products and elimination of non-tariff subsidies on the export of
agricultural products.

Regional Cooperation:

Pakistan has been engaged in efforts to develop regional cooperation with countries to its
west and in the South Asian region.

Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO] and South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation [SAARC] are expected to become significant new components in the
acceleration of development, although cooperation among developing countries is
inherently problematic because their product range is limited and their exports are often
more competitive e than complementary.

Even in the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] region, intra-trade
remained about a quarter of their global exports until economic development led to a
broadening and sophistication of products that opened up possibilities for profitable
exchange.

South East Asian Nations [ASEAN]:

The idea of cooperation among the South Asian countries was late to be conceived and
has been slow and faltering in evolution. Impulses toward cooperation in South Asia have
been historically weak, primarily because of political discord and the existence of bitter
disputes among the states of the region in general and the two major states of the region -
Pakistan and India in particular.

Neither a common threat perception, such as that which actuated states of Western
Europe to abandon old patterns of conflicts, nor the shared vision of security through
cooperation that motivated countries of South-East Asia, has existed in South Asia. Fears
founded in the political experiences of the peoples of the region are compounded by
asymmetries of resources.

India, the largest and the most industrialized country in the region, accounts for nearly
three-quarters of its economic production and trade. Conscious efforts have, therefore, to
be made to ensure mutual and balanced exchange of costs and benefits.
In 1990, Bangladesh formally proposed that South Asian states begin negotiations for
forming a regional forum of cooperation. Actively supported by Nepal and Sri Lanka, the
idea was greeted with reservation by Pakistan .

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Islamabad was apprehensive lest the forum be used by India to realize its dream of
hegemony over the region.

Surprisingly, India, too, appeared unenthusiastic. Its spokesmen apprehended the danger
that the neighbours might ‘gang up’ against India. Actually, New Delhi was quite pleased
about opportunities for expansion of its exports of industrial products to the markets of
the neighbouring countries, but decided to assume a calculated posture of reluctance. In
order to undercut the argument that India would be the principal beneficiary of the
proposal.

In the end, Pakistan decided to defer to the preference of friendly countries in order both
to avoid offence to proponents and to mould the proposal so as to preclude damage.

The first meeting of the foreign secretaries of the South Asian countries, held in Colombo
in April 1981 endorsed the view that regional cooperation in South Asia was ‘beneficial,
desirable and necessary’. They also ‘noted the need to proceed step by step, on the basis
of careful and adequate preparations’. It was agreed that the decisions should be taken on
the basis of unanimity. At India’s suggestion, it was further agreed that bilateral and
contentious issues should be excluded from the scope of the regional forum.3

Lengthy preparatory work went into the identification of areas for fruitful cooperation.
The list was progressively expanded to encompass agriculture, rural development,
telecommunications, meteorology, health and population activities, science and
technology, education and tourism etc. Significantly, cooperation in trade and industry
was relegated in early years. Some of the countries of the region wanted to gain
experience and in particular, to study the implications of cooperation in trade so that their
economies would not be swamped.

After four years of intensive preparation, the SAARC was formally launched at a summit
meeting in Dhaka in December, 1985.
The SAARC Charter defined its aims of accelerating economic growth, social progress
and cultural development in the member states and strengthening collaboration in
international for a on matters of common interest. It also elaborated on the principles and
the organisational structure of the association and the mandates of its various committees.

Notes

1. UN General Assembly document dated 29 September, 2004, p. 2.

2. Report to the Security Council, 21 March, 2005.
3. From SAARC to SAARC, Vol. 1, SAARC Senatorial, Kakhmandu,
p. 9.
4.

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 Prof. Dr. Z. A. QUREHSI

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

[1947-2005]

Policy in a Changing World

[Chapter 23]

As a means to an end, a state’s foreign policy adapts to the flux in world affairs in order
to safeguard:

 independence and integrity,

 protect the right of the nation to live in peace and security,
 promote the legitimate aspirations of its people to economic and
social progress and
 attain a position of dignity and honour in the comity of nations.

Past evolutions in Pakistan’s foreign policy reflected adjustments to the imperative of the
changing global and regional environment.

The process can be expected to continue as the world power structure changes and
nations rethink their priorities.

Pakistan’s emergence on the world map as an independent-sovereign state in 1947, only

two years after the founding of the United Nations was an era of full hope of durable
international peace and security based on:

 the principles of justice and international law,

 respect for human rights and
 international cooperation for economic development and
social progress.

With the end of the colonialism, 53 new states emerged by 1960 and another 56 by 1990
which sought to build a new international order. However, post-war optimism fell victim
to the realities of Cold War and the contest for power and conflict of ideologies between
the two most powerful states of the time.
 The Soviet Union, successor to Czarist Russia, historically a victim of
invasions from the West, sought security by perpetuating its hold over
East European countries.

 The United States led the policy of containment of ‘communism’

because of the challenge it posed to the existing international order by its
aggressive promotion of revolution and overthrow of non-communist
governments.

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The Cold War triggered the formation of opposing alliances, each trying to contain the
order.

The world was polarized and focus shifted away from their agenda of consolidation of
independence, acceleration of economic and social progress and support for struggles
against colonialism and imperialism.

The high hopes of the emergent nations were disappointed by the realities of a divided
world as freedom struggles were distorted.

The UN Security Council, entrusted with the primary objective of bringing peace and
security in the world was paralyzed by the abuse of veto by the USA and the USSR:

 The United Nations was rendered ineffective in settling disputes and

promoting peace as issues like Palestine, and Kashmir festered;
 Algeria and Vietnam suffered protracted agony, and
 Proxy wars were fought in South Africa and Afghanistan which was
destroyed by Soviet intervention.

‘End of History’

The sudden and spectacular collapse of the Soviet system brought the ideological contest
that dominated the 20th century to an abrupt end in 1991, triggering a strategic
transformation in world affairs.

The Communist-totalitarian system was discredited, liberal democracy emerged as ‘the

end point of mankind’s ideological evolution… and the final form of human
government’.1

 Fifteen independent nations emerged out of the former Soviet Union.

 Germany was reunited.
 Proxy wars ended in Afghanistan, South Africa and Central America.
[In South Africa, the protagonists of ‘apartheid’ regime reversed policy and it
emerged as a new leader on the continent].
 With the lapse of confrontation, United States and the resultant
Russian Federation agreed on further reduction of their strategic arsenals.
 The UN General Assembly approved the CTBT.
 Expecting sharp reductions in military budgets, the developing world
hoped that affluent countries would set aside a part of the ‘peace divided’ for
alleviation of poverty.

It seemed that the UN Security Council could now fulfil its envisioned role of
safeguarding international peace and security.

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Prospects brightened for harmony and cooperation among major powers, with each
playing a role in international affairs in proportion to its economic and military power.

The Power structure:

 The United States, with a GDP of 11 trillion dollars – one-quarter of the world
total – and unrivalled capacity to project power globally, became the ‘sole
superpower’ with an unprecedented opportunity to influence the world
community’s response to the old and new challenges to international peace and
progress.
 The European Union, comparable to the United States in global trade and with
Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain among the top ten states with the largest
economies as its members, is potentially another economic colossus. Sharing
strong ties of history and civilization across the Atlantic, the EU is a strategic
partner of the United States, with convergent international policies. The 15-
member block decided in 2004 to admit ten new states from Eastern Europe. It
also agreed to strengthen coordinaiton for a common foreign policy and enhance
the role of the European parliament.2
 Japan, with a GDP of 4.5 trillion dollars, remains at second place among stated by
size of economy. A part of the West by virtue of its economic and political
system, it maintains close security links with the United States, and remembering
the disastrous consequences of competing for dominance in the Pacific in the
1930s, consciously avoids a high profile foreign policy.
 China, ranking six at present, is on the way to taking third place in the world
hierarchy by GDP, thanks to political stability, development of human resources
and sagacious demographic and economic policies. Committed to priority for
economic development, it pursues a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. While
eschewing rivalry with other powers, it has opposed hegemony in international
affairs. A sought-after partner in trade and investment, it has broken out of the
ring of containment that its erstwhile adversaries sought to erect in the past. In
2000, Colin Powell said China was ‘not a strategic partner’ but ‘a competitor and
potential regional rival’.3 Still, the containment lobby in the United States has
advocated policies aimed at the build up of rivals to check China’s rising power.
 The Russian Federation, largest state by territory and a superpower with the
second largest arsenal of strategic weapons, and producer and exporter of modern
military equipment, is at sixteenth place in the world by economic size, below
Canada, Mexico, South Korea, India, Brazil, Netherlands and Australia. Several
developing countries have succeeded in raising per capita annual income to above
$ 2,000; they include Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand.
 India’s rise in economic, technological and military power has added to its
international importance and influence. By 2005, it was twelfth in the world
hierarchy by GDP, with the potential of rising higher. With a per capita income of
$ 500, it has achieved considerable reduction in the proportion of population
living below the poverty line. Retaining the traditional cooperative relations with
Russia, India has also pursued a policy of normalization of relations with China.
India’s relations with the United States have continued to improve since the

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 1980s. In the strategic dialogue in the 1990s, the two sides discussed cooperation
for security of the sea-lanes for oil tankers from the Gulf. After 9/11, India
underlined a commonality of interests with the West in opposing ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’. IN March 2005, senior American officials said the US would
‘help India become a major world power in the twenty-first century’. An analyst
saw the rationale of his this policy of strong states on China’s periphery’. In July
2005, President Bush reversed sanctions on the export of civilian nuclear
technology and sophisticated weapons to India.

Setbacks to an Emergent Era of Peace:

The prospects of an emergent era of peace and harmony suffered several setbacks in
quick succession. Dissolution of the Soviet Union lifted the lid on unresolved ethnic
tensions:

 Amenia occupied the enclave of Ngoro-Karabach in Azerbaijan;

 Georgia was convulsed with separatism;
 Particularly sanguine was the suppression of Chechnya’s demand for
autonomy.
 The eruption of ethnic tension and strife in former Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s culminated in a savage ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the Serbs. Finally, the
United States intervened to bring an end to the travails of the Muslim people of
Bosnia and Kosovo. The UN Security Council proved powerless to enforce its
resolutions. It suffered further loss of prestige because of its failure to take timely
action to prevent the genocide of a million ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda.
 For a time, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict seemed to be moving
towards a solution. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized
Israel’s right to exist in 1988.

In 1993, President Bill Clinton mediated a successful meeting between President

Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Washington, laying the
foundation for the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords and the Oslo Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Rabin, Arafat and Foreign
Minister Shimon Perez were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and Arafat returned
to Palestine in 1994. Clinton convened another summit in December 2000 at
Camp David to promote agreement on the final status of Jerusalem but Ehud
Barak obstructed a compromise. The Israeli army’s re-entry into Palestinian
towns, suicide attacks by desperate Palestinians and massive Israeli retaliation,
confining Arafat to his small compound in Ramallah in 2001, halted the political
process. In 2003, the EU, UN, Russia and USA worked out a ‘roadmap’ aiming to
restore the peace process but, despite agreeing to the outline, Israel violated its
basic provisions and started to build a ‘security fence’ on Palestinian land.
Following Arafat’s death in November 2004, President Bush agreed to
recommence efforts for a settlement hoping to see an independent Palestinian
state before the end of his second term. Israel also signaled readiness to resume
peace negotiations. In February 2005, Ariel Sharon and Muhammad Abbas agreed

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 on a ceasefire, and Sharon announced a decision to dismantle Jewish settlements
in Gaza and release 500 of some 8,000 Palestinians from Israeli jails.

War on Iraq:

Iraq launched on 20th March, 2003 marked a black day in the history of the United
Nations.

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, a superpower, founder of the United
Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council resorted to use of force not
only without authorisation by the Security Council, but in defiance of its manifest
opposition. The main question before the Security Council was whether Iraq was in
breach of Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which warned of serious consequences if
it did not cooperate with the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission
charged with the task of ascertaining elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

Notes

1. Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History And the Lst Man,

pp. xi-xiii.
2. Sattar, A. “Pakistan’s Goreign Policy: 1947-2005 – A Concise
History, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 296
3. Statement of Secretary of State-designate, Colin L. Powell, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 17 January 2001.

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 New Great Game

The collapse of the Soviet Union facilitated the emergence of eight republics of Central
Asia and the Caucasian region viz. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Gerogia and Armenia as independent ‘nation-states’ in 1991.
This opened their borders to the southern neighbours of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan
[connected by land through a small strip of Afghanistan] and to the Peoples Republic of
China to the East.

Central Asia and Caucasian region is a new geopolitical creation which

has an important strategic role to play in the years to come. It is in the
middle of three super civilizations - the Islamic, the Christian and the
Buddhist and is seen by many experts as one of the most vulnerable
areas of instability between them. It can, therefore, become a natural,
historically formed 'buffer zone' and can also form the 'hub' of Islamic
extremism. Being placed in the middle of the Eurasian continent, it is
one of the most convenient routes of 'transit'. It is rich in mineral
resources, especially hydrocarbons. As a consumer market, it still
remains to be exploited. All these factors lead to increasing interest in
the region by various countries, its neighbours, regional states and the
major powers.

Before the events of September 11, 2001, there was a growing realization that the
accumulation of challenges in Central Asia - especially given the escalating crisis in
Afghanistan - demanded attention. But despite these concerns, Central Asia was low
down in the priorities of the United States and other Governments. Even for Japan, as the
leading bilateral donor in Central Asia, its pre-eminence was largely the result of the
disinterest of others rather than a major priority on the part of the Government in Tokyo.

In the 1990s, there was no real vision for the region in the world capitals, and no sense of
their interaction with issues of global consequence. This changed with the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the United States and the realization that civil war and acute state failure in
Afghanistan had facilitated them.

Within the Central Asian region, the fate of Uzbekistan was of

particular concern as it is in the centre of Central Asian Republics and
the most strategically located in the region, with the largest population
and the most significant military capabilities and resources. At the
same time, it has been a source of regional tension and a logjam for
regional developments.

The internal political dynamics in Central Asia are conditioned by the pressures exerted
from the Middle East and South Asia. China, India and Russia are all out to grab the
tremendous economic potential of the region while Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, each projecting a different model of ideology and development has been
directly involved in the religious, cultural, economic and political affairs of the CARs.

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On September 11, 2001, the terrorists' attacks on the Pentagon and the twin towers in
New York, followed by the United States "War on Terror" against Al-Qaida and Taliban
in Afghanistan pushed Central Asia, a region that had been as obscure as the Balkans
several years ago, to the forefront of the world attention,.

The United States’ Afghan campaign against al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan set the
stage for the "New Great Game" in Central Asia and the Caucasian region.

Coined in early 1990s, the term describes an odd re-run of the first "Great Game" when
Tsarist Russia conquered the Central Asian and Caucasian region and subjugated the
nomadic tribes of Turkestan that rung alarm bells in London which considered it as a
threat to the British Crown Colony of India.

In turn, the Russian Government in St. Petersburg feared that the British might incite the
Muslim tribes of Central Asia to rebel against the Russian empire.

The two empires wrestled with each other for the control of Afghanistan, whose central
location offered the most strategically viable base for an invasion of India or Turkestan.

The 'Great Game' between colonialist Tsarist Russia and imperialist Britain finally ended
when Russian Foreign Minister, Count Alexander Izvolsky and the British Ambassador,
Sir Arthur Nicholson signed a secret treaty in St. Petersburg on 31st August, 1907 in
which both the colonial powers defined their respective spheres of influence. The Tsarist
Russia acceded that 'Afghanistan' lay in the British sphere of influence while in turn,
Britain accepted that the rest of Central Asia fell within the sphere of influence of Tsarist
Russia.

Now, more than a hundred years later, the same Great Powers indulge themselves in
another competition over the control of the heart of the Eurasian landmass which has
emerged as the most promising region blessed with rich hydrocarbon reserves. However,
the actors in this 'New Great Game' are more than two and the rules of the new neo-
colonial game are far more complex than those a century ago.

 The United States has taken over the leading role from Britain.

 Along with the ever-present Russians, new regional powers such as China,
Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and India have entered the arena.

 Another important actor are the 'multinationals' with huge budgets, more than the
Central Asians themselves. They are out to grab the opportunity, pursue their own
interests, agenda and strategies and have signed lucrative contracts with the initial
investment of more than 30 billion dollars in new production facilities and
earmarking another a hundred billion dollars for further investments.

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The main difference between the old and the new 'Great Games' is that while in the past,
London and St. Petersburg competed over access to the riches of India, today, the 'New
Great Game' is focused on the Oil and Gas resources of Central Asian and the Caspian
energy reserves where at its shores and at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, lie the world's
biggest untapped fossil fuel resources. Estimates range from 50 to 110 billion barrels of
oil and 170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The US Department of Energy,
comfortably assumes a 50 percent probability of a total of 243 billion barrels of oil
reserves. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are said to have more than 130 billion barrels of oil,
more than three times the United States' own reserves. Only Saudi Arabia, with 262
billion barrels, can claim greater resources. As recently as the summer of 2000, the giant
Kashagan oil field was discovered off the Kazakh coast, believed to rank among the five
largest fields on earth.39

These newly discovered huge reserves should be viewed in the background of a hard
reality that one out of every seven barrels of oil produced in the world is consumed by the
United States. Besides, half of the American oil needs are met by imports from the
Middle East [where two-thirds of the planet's fossil reserves lie] and where Washington is
on the retreat in its 'War on Oil' in Iraq.

The then Vice President of the United States, Mr. Dick Cheney and CEO of the oil supply
corporation, Halliburton, in a speech to oil industrialists in Washington, DC in 1998 said:
"I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as
strategically significant as the Caspian".40

The Middle East is also the largest oil supplier to Canada, Venezuela and Mexico.

The US-led Afghan campaign has fundamentally altered the geo-strategic power
equations in Central Asian and Caucasian region which has become the main focus of
new American Foreign Policy. It would be naïve to understand that the American military
presence in Afghanistan is exclusively for its 'War on Terror' and has nothing to do with
its strategic aims in energy-rich Central Asia and the Caucasian region.

In Azerbaijan,* the "New Great Game" has its origins in the discovery of oil in the early
19th Century.

With the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Azerbaijan became independent republic along
with other 14 republics of the Union and slipped immediately into chaos with several
governments ousted each other in a succession of coup d'etats and a totally demoralized
Azeri army lost the bloody war with Armenia over the predominantly Armenian-
populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, bereft of 15 percent of its territory,
was on the verge of falling back under Moscow's control when Heydar Aliyev, a
distinguished KGB general and a member of the Politburo, was elected President of the
republic in October 1993. He quickly realized that the only chance for the independence
of the country and for keeping his own power, lay in the oil business for which the
_______________________________________________________________________
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*Azerbaijan was originally known as the 'Land of Fire' because of natural fires, fed by
gas from the soil, that burnt on the Apsheron peninsula. From the early Middle Ages,
Zoroastrian pilgrims who worshiped 'fire' as a 'sign of God', came here from Persia,
erecting temples around the mysterious holy fires. One such 'atashgah' (Temple of Fire)
still exists north of Baku.
country needed money and the technology to exploit its resources, off the Caspian coast.
He made his son Ilhan [now President of Azerbaijan], the 2nd Vice President of Socar, the
State Oil Company and nominated a team of experts led by him to negotiate a good deal
with foreign investors as early as the spring of 1994. It sent tremors in Russia and rumors
of an impending Moscow-backed putsch spread throughout Baku. The team had first
meeting in Istanbul during the summer of 1994 and finally reached an agreement after
47-day exhausting talks in Houston, Texas, [the unofficial capital of American oil
industry] on 24th September, 1994. Several billion dollars flowed into new production
facilities, with a majority shared secured by the American company, Amoco, British
Petroleum, initially a secondary shareholder and later acquired Amoco and became the
most important corporation doing business in Baku.

Russia and Iran protested strongly against the contract, accusing Aliyev of handing out
concessions for oil fields that Azerbaijan possibly did not own. This may be kept in mind
that no agreement exists among the five Caspian littoral states – Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran – on a territorial separation of the Caspian Sea.

Besides, Iran and Turkmenistan laid claim to oil fields that had been given to the Western
consortium for exploitation that further complicated the matter.

Several months earlier, on July 21, 1994, Russian President Yeltsin had signed a secretive
directive number 396, for the "protection of the interests of the Russian Federation on the
Caspian Sea" which clearly stated that Russia should uphold its sphere of influence in the
Caucasian and Central Asian republics.41

Right away, Western investors in Baku were faced with the problem of how to get the oil
and gas from the landlocked Caspian Sea to the markets of the industrialized world.

Determined to keep precious raw materials out of Russia's reach, the United States
equally rejected a southern route through Iran 42 although even American Oil Executives
privately conceded that Persian route is shorter, cheaper and safer than any of the other
routes through Russia, south Caucasus or Afghanistan.

The United States participation in the 'New Greatt Game' is fully reflected in the
statement of US Ambassador in Baku, Ross Wilson made to Mr. Lutz Kleveman, the
writer of the book titled: "The New Great Game - Blood and Oil in Central Asia" in
which he said: "As you can imagine, this region has become even more important to
Washington. We do not see ourselves as part of a Great Game with Russia, least of all in
a zero-sum game. We have our interests, the Russians have theirs – but they don't
necessarily need to collide. Of course, the Azeris try and play off America and Russia
against each other. But they understand that the United States alone is the guarantor of

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their independence". The US Ambassador expressed Washington's firm determination
when he said: "The oil will never go through Russia". As far Iran, Azerbaijan's southern
neighbouor, Ambassador Wilson's comments were less tempered. "Iran is a competitor
for Azerbaijan and is trying to control the Caspian Sea. On a regular basis, Iranian ships
penetrate Azerbaijan's territorial waters, and Iranian fighter jets enter Azeri space". The
United States has responded by giving two new patrol boats to the Azeri border police. It
remains out of question for the State Department that Caspian oil be pumped through a
pipeline running across a country ruled by Sh’ite mullahs. "Iran supports terrorism and is
determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we must curtail at its
means of generating revenue which would help the government fund those activities",
the US Ambassador remarked.43

The heads of United States, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey met in Istanbul on 18th
November, 1999 and signed a treaty authorizing the construction of a westbound four
billion dollar 42-inch-wide pipeline, covering a total distance of 1,768 kilometers, of
which 443 kilometers lies in Azerbaijan, 249 kilometers in the neighbouring Georgia and
1076 kilometers in Turkey, linking to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan which is
a deep-water port that can accommodate tankers upto 300,000 tons capacity. The planned
annual capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was 50 billion tons of oil with
pipeline’s capacity of one million barrels a day.

More than for any other country on the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean pipeline is a
matter of national security for Georgia. The then Georgian President, Eduard
Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister under Mikhail Gorbachev signed the
agreement on behalf of Georgian Government and concentrated all his efforts into
making the pipeline a reality. He says: "His aim is nothing less than Georgia's re-
establishment as the center of a new Great Silk Road, linking Europe with Asia".44

Mr. Shevardnadze's ascendancy to the Office of the President of Georgia in December,

1991 could not hold the country from drifting to chaos, political anarchy and economic
melt down. His first few months in power saw the virtual disintegration of the country, as
Abkhazia and the pro-Russian South Ossetia province, whose border runs only a few
kilometers, north of Tbilisi, practically seceded from the rest of the country. To make
matters worse, the President of the Ajaria province along Turkey's border [comprising the
entire south-western quarter of Georgia, where the pipeline is to run straight through on
its way to Turkey] has for years ignored any instructions from the central government in
Tbilisi. Abkhazia is essentially controlled by 1700 Russian troops stationed since late
1993, allegedly to keep the peace between two opposing armies. In return for a ceasefire
in Abkhazia in 1994, Russia forced Georgia to join CIS and accept 16 thousand troops on
its territory as so-called peace-keepers. In 2002, Moscow conferred Russian citizenship
on the residents of Abkhazia. Russia crushed a Georgian assault on the rebel pro-Russian
region of South Ossetia in August 2008, sending tanks into Georgia proper and then
recognising South Ossetia and the Black Sea territory of Abkhazia as independent
states.45 Hence, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become Moscow's main trump cards
in the game over oil pipelines in the South Caucasus and is playing its part of the 'New
Great Game' in the region.

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In May 2002, United States stationed 500 elite US Special forces in Georgia to train the
country's raging army in anti-terrorist warfare. The Pentagon's $ 64 milliion program also
included supplying the Georgian military with new small weapons and ammunition,
uniforms and communication equipment. The 17-thousand strong Georgian armed forces
also received military aid from the United States, including new combat helicopters. Mr.
Shevardnadze hailed the US military presence as "a very important factor for
strengthening and developing Georgian statehood".

After the collapse of Soviet Union, Chechen leaders negotiated a withdrawal of all
Russian troops from the republic and by the summer of 1992, not a single Russian soldier
was left on Chechen soil. No other part of the former Soviet empire, not even East
Germany had seen the Russian troops to leave so quickly. By now, Mr. Boris Yeltsin had
become the President of Russian Federation in a fierce power struggle in Moscow with
President Mikhail Gorbachev. Powerful people around him argued that tolerating
Chechen independence would have set a dangerous precedent as the other predominantly
Muslim mountain republics in the North Caucasus – Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria,
Inguishtia and Dagestan could follow the suit.

But this partially explains Russia's motives in the region. The most important motive of
Russia attacking Chechnya in November 1994 was its strategic location in the 'New Great
Game'. Only a few weeks before the invasion, Caspian Sea oil-rich Azerbaijan had signed
the 'Contract of the Century' and in case, the plans for a West-bound pipeline failed to
materialize, the oil of Azerbaijan would have to be continued to be pumped through the
only existing pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. This pipeline runs
straight across Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus. If Russia wanted to profit
from the oil boom in Baku through transit fee, while trying to hold on the only export
route as a powerful lever vis-a-vis Azerbaijan, then it had to regain control over the
secessionist republic.

Along with its geographic significance, Chechnya sits on considerable oil reserves,
discovered and developed in the late 19th century. The capital Grozny was second only to
Baku as the biggest oil town in the Russian empire. Oil accounted for two-thirds of all
revenues in Chechnya, an estimated $ 800 million to $ 900 million in 1993 alone.
Besides, Grozny was the centre of a major network of pipelines linking Siberia,
Kazakhstan and Novorossiisk, with the flow of the Caspian pipeline traveling in reverse,
from Grozny to Baku. The Soviet leadership decreased production at Azerbazijan's oil
fields to such an extent that Baku was receiving oil via Grozny from West Siberian
reserves.

Mr. Vahid Mustafayev, CEO of Azerbaijan News Service [ANS], the only independent
TV and Radio network in the country says: "All the Caucasian Wars [Azeri-Armenian,
Abkhazian, South Ossetian, Chechan etc.] are, at least partly, about oil.

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In the 1990s, Russia tried to destabilize the southern Caucasus by ensuring that crises and
conflicts would percolate indefinitely. Russia still views Azerbaijan as part of its empire.
Once it loses this country, the entire Caucasus is lost.

To keep the Americans out, Russia had even aligned itself in the south with its old rival,
Iran. Together, the two countries were trying to pinch Azerbaijan from both sides to
restrict its dealings with the West. In Baku, there are more agents and spies than
businessmen – most of them are Russians and Iranians.46

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the

Caspian Sea connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia; and
Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is the second
longest oil pipeline in the world after the Druzhba pipeline. The pipeline was officially
inaugurated on 13th July, 2006 in the Turkish port city of Ceyhan.

In Kazakhstan, there was an oil discovery in Kashagan field, of the Caspian Sea in July
2000 which the geologists estimate an astronomical 30 billion barrels of crude while the
Kazakh Government put it at 50 billion barrels which would make the Kashagan, the
second largest oilfield on earth. [Ghawar filed in Saudi Arabia with 80 billion barrels is
the largest while the combined oil fields in the North Sea still hold about 17 billion
barrels. According to the estimates, by 2020, Kazakhstan could sell up to 10 million
barrels of crude per day to the world as much as the Saudi Arabia. This potential is a
nightmare for the international oil cartel Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
[OPEC], as it is unlikely that as non-member, Kazakhstan will respect OPEC production
limits and price agreements. Kazakhstan could, therefore, break the Saudi monopoly and
be a strategic major force in the 21st Century. This discovery of the Kashagan field
promises massive profits which in turn, has shaken up the geo-political balance in the
Caspian region, ushering in a new and dangerous round of 'New Great Game' for raw
materials and pipelines. The Kazakh Government has already rejected an idea of a
pipeline, routed through Russia which has triggered a talk of a second pipeline along the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the southern Caucasus which is both expensive and
complicated as the oil will have to be shipped from Kashagan through tankers to the
Caspian. However, on 16th June, 2006, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and
Presdient Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan met in the Kazakh capital Astana and
signed an agreement to encourage and create conditions for the Kazakh oil to be
delivered from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then onward
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline to the world market.

Pipeline politics had already become a 'pawn' in the chessboard of 'New Great Game' in
early 2001 when oil corporations, exploiting Kashagan oil faced the task of choosing an
operator from their midst. ExxonMobil, an American company, subject to US economic
sanctions against Iran, was unable to embrace the lucrative Iran option and TotalFinaElf,
was unacceptable to the Americans as the French pay little heed to the call of US
sanctions against Iran in their dealings with Tehran. A compromise was, therefore, struck
among the Kashagan partners of Sharagan in London in February 2001, to elect the
politically neutral, Italian Oil Corporation, Agip for the job. United States wants the oil to

139
be shipped by tankers across the Caspian Sea to Baku, to be fed into the Mediterranean
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

The Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, during his visit to India in early 2001,
hinted the possibility of a south-eastern route through post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Kashagan is not the only oil field in Kazakhstan, some 30 miles east of the town of
Atyrau is the Tengiz, the sixth largest oil field in the world containing upto 25 billion
barrels of oil which was discovered in 1979 for which US Corporaiton, Shevron bought a
drilling concession from Kazakhstan in 1993, being the first Western oil company to
massively investing on post-Soviet territory. In a joint venture with the state-owned oil
company, Tengizchevroil, Chevron expected a daily output of 700,000 barrels a day by
2010 with an investment of US $ 4 billion, its largest international project, to be pumped
across the northern Caucasus to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorissiisk. The
Kashagan consortium fears Russia's exorbitant fees, shutdown and acts of bureaucratic
sabotage which the operators of the Tengiz pipeline have struggled with, in the past. In
November 2002, ChevronTexaco unilaterally decided to indefinitely postpone a long-
planned $ 3 billion expansion of production at the Tengiz oil field after an intense dispute
with the Kazakh Government over how to finance the project which would have
increased output up to 430,000 barrels of crude a day by 2005.

With one new 1,065-mile pipeline already transporting Tengiz oil across Russian
territory, Kazakhstan is cautious, not to make its entire oil exports, dependent on
Moscow.

Kazakah oil has attracted yet another regional power in the ongoing 'New Great Game'
when Chinese National Petroleum Company [CNPC] purchased 60 % of all shares in
Kazakhstan's 3rd largest oil field of Aktubinsk. It later bought two additional oil fields. In
March 2003, China's state-owned offshore oil company, CNOOC announced the
purchase of a $ 615 million stake in the Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan, giving the
company control over nearly one-tenth of Kashagan. The Chinese Government has also
reached an agreement with the Kazakh Government to build a 1,250-mile pipeline from
the Caspian Sea through the Kazakh steppe to Urumchi, capital of Xinjiang province of
China with an estimated cost of US $ 9.6 billion.

CNPC Director General in Kazakhstan, Zheng Chenghu said there was a much larger
problem. "Our situation has much deteriorated recently. The Americans are driving us out
of the region. Since September 11, the United States has become very aggressive in
Central Asia. The fact that they have stationed their troops here is not good news, neither
for the local people nor for us. The US troops are here in order to control the oil reserves
in Central Asia".47

Once Kazakh Ambassador to Japan, Sabr Yessimbekov and Chief Planner for all oil
pipelines in Kazakhstan said: "In general, we do not want to pump our oil to the West but
to the East, where the hungry markets are". He further said: "Historically, China, together
with Russia, has always acted at the expense of the Kazakhs. And now the Chinese have

140
once again become very aggressive. They are trying at all costs to get into Kazakhstan.
And that is why it is good that the United States have stationed their troops in Central
Asia – they keep the Chinese out. The soldiers give us security and make it clear to the
Chinese and the Russians that the world has changed. America has now encircled China
militarily. Who believes anyway that for the Americans this so-called war on terror is
about Osama bin Laden ? This war is about us – it is our oil they want".48

United States encounters a much more hostile rival – Islamic Republic of Iran, in the
'New Great Game' being played in Central Asia, among its various neighbours, regional
and major powers of the world today.

Iran has suggested a route along the eastern shore of the Caspian in Turkmenistan, and
onward through Iran to the Persian Gulf, offering a financial contribution towards the
pipeline's $ 1.6 billion price tag.

In October 2002, Mr. Mahmood Khagani, Director for Persian Gulf in the Iranian Energy
Ministry asked Caspian oil producers to ignore US sanctions and to pie their oil through
Iran. He said: "The Golden gate from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is now open.
Companies working in the Caspian Sea can be sure their resources will be delivered in
the international markets".49

In its efforts to keep the United States out of the Caspian region, Iran has found an
unexpected ally in Russia. American activities in this region have led both countries to
temporarily set aside their centuries-old enmity. Now that they no longer share a common
border after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and its disintegration,
the bilateral relations between the two countries have become cordial. Despite criticism
from the United States, Russia encourages its companies in their dealings with Iran and
helped build $ 800 million first civilian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, of course,
subject to IAEA controls.

One of the principal architects of this new alliance between Moscow and Tehran was
Alexander Maryasov, the long standing Russian Ambassador in Iran who said:

"We are in agreement with Tehran that no other great power should gain influence at the
Caspian Sea. We are against this project [Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline] because behind it
lie political and strategic motives. A pipeline routed through Iran will be supported by
Russia" Now the Americans have moved troops into Central Asia. There can be no
partnership between us and the United States if the Americans always act unilaterally
without even consulting us. The US military has used terrorists in Afghanistan as a
pretext to penetrate Central Asia. For the Americans, this is about economic interests,
especially the Caspian oil" As soon as our economy regains its strength, we will re-
establish our old relations with Central Asia and southern Caucasus, and reassert our
sphere of influence in that region.50

On 23rd July, 2001, Azerbaijan and Iran came to the verge of an armed conflict over oil as
part of their 'New Great Game'. An Azeri exploratory vessal with geologists and

141
engineers from Baku, operated by BP Amoco had ventured into the southern part of the
Caspian Sea to test drill a suspected oil field. Around mid-day, two Iranian fighter jets
suddenly roared over their heads and circled above the ship for two hours. A naval officer
radioed the BP vessel's captain to immediately cease all drilling operations and leave
Iranian territorial waters. When the Azeri ship did not change its coarse immediately, the
Iranian gunboat repeated its demand, adding that there would not be a third warning. The
BP vessel turned around and sailed back to Baku. The confrontation raised a much larger
question that has never been adequately resolved. The five littoral states – Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan – have not come to an agreement on the
territorial division of the Caspian Sea. This leads to the contentious question as to
whether the Caspian Sea is a 'sea' and governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea under which the entire sea-bed and surface would have to be divided among the
countries like a pie or a 'lake' in which case, each littoral state would merely control a
strip of several nautical miles, stretching out from its respective coastline and the larger
central part of the lake would be 'international waters' whose shipping routes, fish stocks
and natural resources would have to be used communally in a condominium.

Iran maintains that the 750-mile-long Caspian Sea is a 'lake' whose natural resources
should be exploited together. It claims a 20 % share of the Caspian Sea, from the sea
bottom to the surface and the ensuing nautical border is patrolled by the vessels of the
Iranian Navy.

Iranian gunboat diplomacy with Azerbaijan, border disputes and the qeustion of
undefined 'territorial waters' and 'exclusive economic zones' of the littoral states of the
Caspian region in this 'New Great Game' raises the prospects that could lead to a 'scenario
for a third world war".51

Turkmenistan with proven gas reserves of 100 trillion cubic feet and an estimated
reserves of upto 260 trillion cubic feet and among top ten in the world, is another pawn
on the chessboard of the 'New Great Game' of Central Asia.

In mid-1990s, Turkmenistan which exports all its gas through old pipelines to Russia,
came up with a plan to lay a pipeline underneath the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan where it
was to link with a pipeline to Turkey. The project was enthusiastically embraced by the
American Government, seeking to free Turkmenistan from Russia's grip and achieving its
own aim of East-West pipeline avoiding Russia and reducing its dependence of the
Middle East. The Shell Corporation joined the project and conducted the feasibility study
which showed that it was technically and commercially viable. The Shell Managers and
President Saparmurat Nyazov signed preliminary contracts in 1991. Then the project was
caught up in a fierce struggle of 'New Great Game' between United States and Russia as
under sever pressure from Moscow, President Nyazov did not sign the final contract and
the opportunity to lay a second pipeline was lost because Ankara had since signed
contracts with Iran and for Russia's 'Blue Stream' pipeline to be laid under the Black Sea
to the Turkish coast.

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As early as 1990s, the Argentine energy company, Bridas and the American oil
corporation, UNOCOL competed to build two pipelines from Turkmenistan via
Afghanistan to Pakistan worth US $ 8 billion. Pakistan and Taliban Governments were
inclined towards Bridas as it did not need any loans from international financial
institutions [IFI] whereas UNOCOL was handicapped as the IFI's first condition was to
have international recognition of Taliban regime. Under pressure from United States,
Pakistan turned its back on Bridas and declared its support for UNOCOL. Turkmenistan
had earmarked the Daulatabad field with about 45 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves for
these projects which was situated about a hundred miles from the Afghanistan's border.
President Nyazov signed an agreement with UNOCOL Managers in New York City on
October 21, 1995. Later, a trilateral MOU between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and
Pakistan was signed on 15 May, 1996. In February and November 1997, two Afghan
Taliban delegations accepted an invitation by UNOCOL and visited Washington and
Houston for talks with US Government representatives and UNOCOL Executives. Mr.
Gozchmurad Nazdianov, Turkmen Oil Minister from 1994 to 1998 and UNOCOL Vice
Presdient, Mr. Marty Miller flew to Kabul at the head of their respective delegations for
talks on the oil and gas projects. Both the ruling Taliban and Northern Alliance [led by
Mr. Ahmed Shah Masood and General Abdul Rashid Dostam] were very much interested
in the pipeline projects and sent high level officials to join in the talks. Yet all efforts
turned out to be fruitless as Northern Alliance, under the influence of Russia, India and
Iran refused to make peace with Taliban which was a condition for the success of the
pipeline projects. The reason was simple:

 Moscow did not want that Turkmens get an export alternative to the Russian
pipelines,
 India did not want that its arch rival, Paksitan should extend its influence in the
Region and
 Iran wanted to export its own gas to Pakistan and then onward to India for which
an agreement was concluded later.

Finally, Turkmenistan has been able to break the shackles of Russian imperialism and
successfully construct a 7000-kilometer Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline through
Uzbekistan [530 kilometers], Kazakhstan [1300 kilometers] and China [4500 kilometers].
On completion, the pipeline is to be inaugurated at a ceremony, attended by the
Presidents of China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on 15th December, 2009.
Turkmenistan will supply upto 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China within 30
years through this pipeline. At the initial stage, the transit of 13 billion cubic meters of
gas will be ensured through the construction of facilities for natural gas cleaning and
processing at Samandepe and Altyn Asyr gasfields with the remaining volumes coming
from new gasfields.

Mr. Mahfooz Nedai, Deputy Minister of Industries in Karazai Government said:

"Washington has sent their men into our government for good reason. The Americans
have not come to Central Asia just for the terrorists".52

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Afghanistan's neighbouring countries ruthlessly waged their struggle of interest on the
backs of the Afghans so that in later 1998, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan warned of
a "deeper regionalization of the conflict" in which Afghanistan would be degraded to a
mere "stage for a new version of the Great Game".53

The stationing of United States' troops and those of NATO in Central Asia has given an
impetus to the region's new Great Game.

The former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular and Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan in general, have grabbed the ideal opportunity of 9/11 events to free
themselves from the shackles of Russian Federation under the protective shield of the
United States. After Chanabad air base in Uzbekistan and a smaller camp in Tajikistan,
Manas was the third and largest US base in Kyrgyzstan, the smallest of the five CARs
where upto three thousand troops from United States and its French, Spanish and Dutch
allies were stationed.

The reaction of Russian Federation to the deployment of American troops in Central Asia
is clearly reflective from the statement of Mr. Victor Kalyuzny, Foreign Minister during
President Putin's era who was involved in the ‘New Great Game’ when he said: "We have
a saying in Russia. If you have guests in the house, there are two times when you are
happy. One is when they arrive, and one is when they leave again. Americans will have
to pullout of Central Asia as soon as they have caught bin Laden". As Oil Minister under
President Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Victor Kalyuzny was the fierest opponents of the
Mediterranean pipeline through the southern Caucasus. For the majority of the Russian
establishment, it is unthinkable to permanently cede the political, economic, cultural and
territorial hegemonic claims on the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In December, 2002, Presdient Putin made an unexpected visit to Kyrgyzstan, signing a

new security pact with his Kyrgyz counterpart and deployed a squadron of SU-25 and
SU-27 fighter jets, bombers and other aircraft to an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, a vanguard of
a force of 20 aircraft and upto one thousand troops, making it one of the most significant
deployments of Russian military in the region since 1991. This was to be joined by troops
from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to form a new joint rapid-reaction force. The airfield in
Kant where the Russians have set up their latest foothold in Central Asia, lies only thirty-
five miles away from the Manas airbase, where the American troops are stationed.

Another Central Asian republic of Tajikistan has more than 20 thousand Russian regular
army troops and border guards which is Moscow's largest military force outside the
Russian borders. Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov had routinely stated that 201st
Motorized Division which is currently building new headquarters in Dushanbe, would
stay for at least another fifteen years and the Russian border guards stationed along the
mountainous 850-mile Tajik border with Afghanistan are unlikely to pull out any sooner.

China also reacted to the American presence on its borders by holding joint military
exercises with Kyrgyzstan which was the first time servicemen of the Chinese People's
Army ever took part in a maneuver abroad. The two sides subsequently signed an anti-

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terrorism pact and discussed the possibility that Beijing may station troops in
Kyrgyzstan.54

The Central Asian and Caucasian region's impoverished populace, disgusted by United
States' alliances with the corrupt, despotic and undemocratic rulers, rampant poverty,
massive unemployment, worst human rights’ violations and injustice pushes them
towards militancy and Islamic radicalism and can become a basis which can determine
the fate of 'New Great Game' in Central Asia and Caucasus.

In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq which sits on an astromical 112 billion
barrels of crude oil, the world's second largest oil reserves, in utter violation of UN
Charter and the will of the international community; therby extending the theatre of 'New
Great Game' from Central Asian and Caucasian region to the Middle East. Washington
has, therefore, further alienated its rivals in the 'New Great Game' viz. Russia, China and
Iran.

The prevailing scenario does not seem favourable to United States. With the wars loosing
in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that Washington may win the 'New Great Game'
either in the Central Asian and Caucasian region or the Middle East.

NOTES

1. Barnet A. Rubin, “Reverberations in Central Asia” Crosslines, Vol.3, Nos. 12-

13,
(March 1995), pp. 6-7.
2. International Life, No. 1. (1993), p. 26
3. Asia, No. 4, (February 1994), p.2.
4. Rai Shakil Akhtar, TURKEY – in new world perspective,
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996), p. 211.
4. Ali Banbuazizi and Myron Weiner, The New Geopolitics of Central
Asia, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), (Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia – By
Sabri Sayari), p. 183.
5. “Turkey Pushing Eastward – By Satellite” Washington Post, (22 March,
1992).
6. DAWN, (Karachi), 25 April, 1996.
7. The Economist, 26 December, 1992, p. 46.
8. Richard Frye, Bukhara, (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma University Press, (1965).
9. Economic interests of Iran in the region” Iran Business Monitor, (Sept.
1992).
10. Stephen Black, “Russia and Iran in a new Middle East” Mediterranean
Quarterly, 111/4 (Fall 1992), pp. 108-128.
11. Daily “The News” (Islamabad, Pakistan), 14 May, 1996.
12. Daily “DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan), 14 May, 1996.
13. Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s catapult to independence”,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Summer 1992), P. 121.
14. Mehrdad Haghayeghi, “Islamic Revival in Central Asian Republics”

145
 Central Asian Survey (1994), 13 (2), p. 260.
15. G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Sov iet Central Asia,
(New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 13.)
16. AFP News Agency, 10 August, 1996.
17. Bruce Vaughn, “Shifting geopolitical realities between South, Southwest and
Central Asia” Central Asian Survey (1994), 13 (2), pp. 310-311.
18. LINK, 21 June, 1992.
19. The Nation, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 25 January, 2009.
20. MAINSTREAM, (04 April, 1992).
21. The Statesman, (New Delhi), April, 1992.
22. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 06 January, 2003.
23. Yaqub Zaki, “Israeli Penetration in Central Asia” The Muslim,
(Islamabad, Pakistan), 03 July, 1992.
24. Ghani Erabi, “The Promise of ECO hold” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan),
19 December, 1992, “The Perils ECO faces” DAWN (Karachi, Pakistan),
20 December, 1992), “New Calculus of Muslim Power” DAWN,
(Karachi, Pakistan), 21 December, 1992.
25. Remin Ribao, 05 July, 1995.
26. Remin Ribao, 25 June, 1995(speech by President Akayev to Chinese
journalists).
27. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 27 April, 1996 (AFP).
28. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet
Empire,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.36.
29. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 10 January, 1997.
30. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 03 December, 1996 (AFP).
31. The NEWS, (Islamabad, Pakistan), 18 December, 1996 (AFP)
32. The NEWS, (Islamabad), 20 December, 1996.
33. Ghani Erabi, “The Promise of ECO hold” DAWN, (Karachi, Pakistan),
19 December, 1992, “The Perils ECO faces” DAWN (Karachi, Pakistan),
20 December, 1992), “New Calculus of Muslim Power” DAWN,
(Karachi, Pakistan), 21 December, 1992.
34. See excerpts from the Pentagon’s report (New York Times, 08 March, 1992).
35. Andrei Zagorski, Post-Soviet nuclear proliferation risks, Security Dialogue,
September 1992, pp. 28, 31-32.
36. Robert Norris, “The Soviet nuclear archipelago” Arms Control Today,
(January/February 1992), p. 25.
37. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
38. REUTERS TV (ASPAC), Story: 314, December 23, 1996.
39. US Department of Energy [www.eia.doe.gov] and International Energy
Agency, Paris, France [www.iea.org].
40. Quoted in "The Guardian", October 23, 2001, P. 19.
41. Amina Parvizi Mehdi, "Towards the Control of Oil Resources in the
Caspian Region", New York, 1999, P. 127.
42. Lutz Kleveman, "The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia"
Atalantic Books, London, 2003, Pp. 15, 21-24.

146
43. Ibid. P. 26.
44. Ibid. P. 32.
45. “The Gulf Today”, UAE, 24th July, 2009.
46. Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 27-28.
47. Ibid. P. 115.
48. Ibid. P. 90-91.
49. BBC Business News, October 04, 2002.
50. Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 140-141.
51. "The Economist", 02August, 2001
52. Kleveman, Op. Cit. P. 225.
53. Ibid. P. 190-163.
54. Ibid. P. 190-193.

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